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Raw Blame History

Palmach and the 1948 war

Rabin served in the Palmach, the strike force of the Haganah. In the early months of the 1948 war he was the Palmach's operations officer and liaison to the general staff, in April 1948 he took command of the Harel Brigade, and in July he served as operations officer and deputy to Yigal Allon in Operation Danny, the offensive that captured Lydda and Ramle.²

David K. Shipler wrote in 2015 that in 1979 an Israeli censorship committee chaired by the justice minister deleted five paragraphs from Rabin's memoir, his first-person account of the expulsion of Arab residents from Lydda and Ramle. Shipler quoted the suppressed section: "Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action," Rabin wrote. "There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action." Shipler added that when he learned of the deletion at the time, Rabin told him that he had intentionally given the censors something else to do by writing about Israel's nuclear weapons.³ Alix Wall wrote in 2001 that the memoir's translator, Peretz Kidron, gave the excised passage to the New York Times.⁴

Seymour Hersh wrote that Rabin, Allon and Ariel Sharon were among the old-fashioned military men who held, as Rabin did as army chief of operations, that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. Hersh wrote that these men regarded nuclear weapons as nothing more than a great equalizer, and argued that an Egypt equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to Israel than an Egypt limited to conventional arms.⁵

Chief of staff and the 1967 war

Rabin was chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 1964. At the end of a three-year term in late 1966 the Prime Minister extended his tenure by a year, and he left the army at the beginning of 1968 after 27 years of service.⁶ A telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House dated June 18, 1967 records that on the evening of June 17 Lieutenant Colonel Efrat, "Aide to General Rabin, IDF COS," told the naval attaché: "Gen Rabin extends his personal regrets to the CNO USN for the sad mistake of the USS Liberty Incident incident." The telegram records that Rabin had decided to provide a synopsis of the findings of the IDF court of inquiry into the attack, although the findings had not yet received final review.⁷

Washington, 1968 to 1973

Rabin became Israel's ambassador to the United States at the beginning of 1968 and held the post until March 1973.⁸ At the fifth session of the F-4 negotiations, on November 22, 1968, held in the office of Paul C. Warnke, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding, allowing the United States to recover aircraft if Israel acted contrary to its undertakings, looked "quite awkward," had no precedent, and implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with Clark Clifford and Clifford with Dean Rusk, and that the government did not put that construction on it. Rabin said that Israel had agreed only to reaffirm its earlier understandings, that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry them on United States aircraft. Warnke asked: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?" The embassy's minister, Shlomo Argov, said: "We feel we are on parole." Warnke's deputy Harry H. Schwartz, the NESA deputy director Robert J. Murray, and the Israeli air force commander Mordecai Hod attended.⁹

On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft. The letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons" and its agreement not to use the aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier, and stated the United States position that "the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons." A note to the letter records that Rabin objected by telephone that the proposed last paragraph implied Israeli agreement with that interpretation, and that Warnke substituted a bland concluding paragraph.¹⁰

On June 20, 1969, Rabin spoke with Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council staff. Saunders recorded that Rabin had labeled the conversation strictly personal, and that because of the "extremely personal nature of Rabin's talk" the memorandum would not be distributed through the system.¹¹

On July 29, 1969, Rabin met the acting secretary of state, Elliot L. Richardson, and the deputy secretary of defense, David Packard, on Israel's nuclear weapon and missile policy. Rabin cited the exchange of letters with Warnke the previous November and observed that there were two problems, nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. He asked which of the two was the subject of the talk.¹²

The record of a September 25, 1969 meeting in Washington between William P. Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and the Israeli party, with Rabin present, describes the channel the two governments had agreed on with Richard Nixon and Golda Meir. Rabin's memoir, as quoted in that record, says that Kissinger would reach Rabin and Rabin would transmit the messages directly to Simcha Dinitz in Jerusalem.¹³

On March 12, 1970, Kissinger showed Rabin the points he had covered with Anatoly Dobrynin about a Soviet message on the Middle East, and let Rabin read the portion of the message Dobrynin had read to him.¹⁴ On August 17, 1970, Nixon met Rabin in the Map Room with General Alexander Haig present. Rabin later described the meeting in his memoir.¹⁵ On September 21, 1970, during the crisis over Syrian intervention in Jordan, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco met Rabin and read him the King's answer to Allon.¹⁶

On December 29, 1971, Sisco met Rabin at the ambassador's residence. Sisco said that Nixon had directed that discussions begin with Rabin as a follow-up to the December 2 conversation between Nixon and Meir, with the aim of working out an agreement.¹⁷ In a November 14, 1972 meeting held during the visit of the defense minister, Moshe Dayan, Rabin said of King Hussein that he was "moderate to the Western world, but this was not necessarily the case in his relations with Israel."¹⁸

First premiership, 1974 to 1977

Rabin took office as Prime Minister on June 3, 1974, and negotiated the interim agreement with Egypt through Kissinger, signed on September 1, 1975.¹⁹ On February 11, 1975, Kissinger's report on his talks in Jerusalem, relayed to Gerald Ford by Brent Scowcroft, said that he had met Rabin alone at breakfast and then with the Prime Minister and his negotiating team, which included Allon and Peres.²⁰ On March 22, 1975, Kissinger met Rabin and Israeli ministers in Jerusalem, where the discussion focused on the suspension of the negotiations with Egypt.²¹

In the 1976 hijacking of an airliner to Entebbe Airport, the cabinet protocols released by the Israel State Archives record Rabin telling ministers that the Israeli intention was to hold the French government responsible for the fate of the passengers, and telling the cabinet on the fourth day: "We have no way of acting without the agreement of the countries concerned. What are we supposed to do, attack Uganda?" At a Saturday cabinet meeting, after the chief of staff, Mordechai Gur, presented the plan, Rabin said: "Additional time, intelligence and study make a military option possible." The ministers unanimously approved the operation, and Rabin told them that if journalists called, "you deny it. In a case like this, it is justified not to tell the truth."²²

In March 1977 Dan Margalit of Haaretz reported that Leah Rabin held a dollar account at a bank in Washington. Maariv reported that the account had been opened while Rabin was ambassador and should have been closed when the family left Washington in March 1973, and that at one point the balance was $20,000. Foreign currency accounts of that kind were illegal under Israeli law. On April 8, 1977, a Finance Ministry administrative penalty committee fined Rabin and his wife IL150,000. In a radio announcement Rabin said he accepted full responsibility for the joint offense. The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the step meant he would not lead the party in the next elections, and that Defense Minister Peres was expected to take the party's reins.²³

Defense minister, 1984 to 1990

Rabin was defense minister from the 1984 national unity government until the Labor Party left the government in 1990.²⁴ Ari Ben-Menashe, who says he sat on the Iran-Israel Joint Committee, wrote that Rabin did not try to impede the committee's arms operations, as he had no interest in helping Peres, and that Rabin threw Oliver North out of his office when the Contras were mentioned, thwarting North's attempts to set up his second channel.¹

The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in the summer of 1985 Rabin would not proceed with the TOW sale to Iran unless he received assurances that the Secretary of State knew of the plan and that the President unequivocally approved it, and that Peres and Rabin approved the second shipment, of 400 TOW missiles, on September 9, 1985.²⁵ Michael Ledeen told North and Robert McFarlane that Rabin was "complaining about" the failure of the United States to replace the TOWs sent to Iran.²⁶ The report of the Independent Counsel, Lawrence Walsh, records that on November 14, 1985, McFarlane told William Casey and the deputy director of central intelligence that Israel planned to ship weapons to Iranian military elements. The following day Rabin had breakfast with Casey and then met McFarlane at the White House. Rabin asked whether the United States still approved of Israeli arms sales to Iran. McFarlane replied that Ronald Reagan continued to approve. McFarlane later said that the purpose of Rabin's visit "was simply to reconfirm that the President's authority for the original concept was still valid."²⁷²⁸ The congressional report adds that Rabin also sought reassurance that the matter was a joint project of the two governments, and raised the unresolved replacement of 504 TOW missiles.²⁹

Rabin called McFarlane in Geneva to report a problem with an arms shipment through a European country, and McFarlane directed North to help the Israelis with flight clearances.³⁰ On November 17, 1985, Rabin telephoned North to say that Israel was ready to ship 80 HAWK missiles once replenishment problems were resolved, and North flew to New York to meet him.²⁹³¹ The Walsh report states that 18 HAWK missiles were delivered from Israeli stocks on November 24, 1985, while Casey was on a trip to Asia.²⁸ Walsh also records that North told Attorney General Edwin Meese in an interview that Rabin had described the November shipment as containing "oil related equipment," and that North later learned from Richard V. Secord that it contained HAWK missiles. This is North's account, recorded in the report as his own statement.³²

The congressional report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at Haifa and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." John Poindexter sanctioned the offer ("It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless") and cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15, 1986, North told Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Peres recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance," and Poindexter penciled beside it: "Rabin. Very tightly held."³³

On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin called the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the Iran arms sales "highly inaccurate" and said that it "reached the wrong conclusions regarding Israel's role." He said he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.³⁴

The first intifada and the "break their bones" charge

In a February 1988 interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Rabin insisted that "there is no policy of beatings" by the government. He said beatings were permissible for soldiers during demonstrations or in "hot pursuit" of demonstrators, and acknowledged "exceptions" in reports of Palestinians beaten in their homes. Two weeks earlier, he had advocated replacing "live ammunition" with "punches and blows," and had labeled the policy "might, power, and beatings." He said of the change in policy: "I brought about a change in policy to use force on a large scale, including hitting to replace the use of firearms. I'm not denying this is what I've said. But to call it a policy of beating is not a correct statement."³⁵

The "break their bones" charge came from the case of Yehuda Meir, an Israel Defense Forces colonel who was a lieutenant colonel at the time of the events. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency report of November 7, 1989 says that the state prosecutor charged that Meir ordered soldiers to break the arms and legs of 20 residents of Beita and Huwara.³⁶ A report of March 30, 1990 says that the charge sheet alleged that in Huwara Meir ordered a platoon to arrest 12 Palestinians and break their bones, that they were bound, blindfolded and beaten with clubs although they had not resisted, and that Meir said he acted on orders from his superiors in "the military and political echelon."³⁷ In July 1990 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Rabin, by then out of office, told the Foreign Press Association that he had not given orders to break bones and that there was no evidence to back such charges before a court or commission of inquiry. It reported that several senior officers facing disciplinary action contended they had acted on explicit instructions from Defense Minister Rabin, and that Rabin said troops were ordered to storm rioters "beating them with fists and batons, not to punish them but to hurt them and force them to cease their assault," and also to handcuff and detain them.³⁸

Jonathan Pollard

The Knesset intelligence subcommittee chaired by Abba Eban reported on May 26, 1987 on the Jonathan Pollard affair. It faulted Rabin for failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the period of the operation, when he was defense minister.³⁹ A cabinet panel chaired by Yehoshua Rotenstreich held that Peres, Yitzhak Shamir and Rabin did not follow up after Pollard's arrest to ensure full Israeli cooperation with the United States. On the promotions of Aviem Sella and Rafael Eitan the panel wrote: "All three of them share responsibility for these decisions." Rabin and Peres both attacked the Eban panel as politically tainted.³⁹

Second premiership and Oslo, 1992 to 1995

Rabin defeated Peres in the Labor Party primaries, replacing him as leader of the Labor Party, and became prime minister in 1992 after the national elections, replacing Shamir. He presented his new government to the Knesset on July 13, 1992.⁴⁰ According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center, he approved the continuation of the secret negotiations in Oslo between Israeli and Palestine Liberation Organization representatives, and approved the PLO as a party to the agreement after a letter from Yasser Arafat affirming PLO recognition of Israel. The Declaration of Principles was signed on the lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, with President Bill Clinton present.⁴⁰⁴¹

The Nobel Committee awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Arafat, Peres and Rabin "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East."⁴²

Assassination, November 4, 1995

On the evening of November 4, 1995, Rabin addressed a rally under the slogan "Yes to Peace, No to Violence" in the square in Tel Aviv, and was shot on his way to his car. According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center he died at Ichilov Hospital at 11:14 p.m.⁴³ A summary of the Shamgar Commission report of March 28, 1996 states that Yigal Amir came to the event by bus from his home in Herzliya and situated himself in the parking area where Rabin's car was parked. At 9:45 p.m., as Rabin walked to the car with five bodyguards, Amir fired three shots. Rabin reached the hospital with no pulse and no blood pressure and died of his wounds.⁴⁴

The summary states that the commission concluded that the murder was made possible by a lack of cooperation between the security agencies responsible for protection at the event. It criticized the head of the Shin Bet, Carmi Gillon, who resigned before the commission completed its work, and the head of the agency's VIP protection division, who had failed to assess the intelligence data and the threat from a Jewish assailant. It recommended that the procedures for cooperation between the police and the General Security Service be reevaluated and that the VIP protection unit double its personnel. The summary lists among the commission's conclusions: "There was no basis for the conspiracy arguments that were raised regarding the event."⁴⁴

Amir was sentenced to life imprisonment plus six years for wounding Rabin's bodyguard. In a second trial he received eight more years, together with his brother Haguay Amir, who received 12 years for conspiracy to murder the prime minister and weapons possession, and his friend Dror Adani, who received seven years.⁴⁵

Avishai Raviv, identified as an agent of the General Security Service, was tried for not preventing the crime, on the basis that he knew Amir's intentions and did not report them to the service. He was found not guilty.⁴⁵ In November 2022 the Times of Israel reported that recordings of Amir's interrogation and testimony to the Shamgar Commission, aired by Channel 12, had Amir saying that the Shin Bet "didn't know anything" about his plans, and giving as his motives the election results and the 1994 massacre in Hebron by Baruch Goldstein. In the same recordings Amir said he knew Raviv, that Raviv had discussed killing Rabin, and that Raviv was not trusted in Kiryat Arba, where after Goldstein's massacre people told Amir that Raviv worked for the Shin Bet. Raviv has said that he heard Amir make the din rodef vow declaring Rabin worthy of killing but did not believe Amir was serious. A confidential section of the 1996 Shamgar report dealt with the Shin Bet and Raviv.⁴⁶

The Times of Israel reported that Bezalel Smotrich told the Knesset on November 6, 2022 that the security services had used "irresponsible manipulations, which haven't been fully exposed to this day, to encourage the murderer to carry out his plan." Raviv's lawyer, Eitan Peleg, called the allegations libel against his client and the state. The journalist Amichai Ataeli, who interviewed Amir in prison over several years, said that Amir and those around him suspected Raviv was being operated by the Shin Bet and that he did not see Raviv as having caused Amir to act. The former Shin Bet agent Lior Akerman, who first interviewed Amir after the assassination, acknowledged intelligence failures and rejected the claim of Shin Bet encouragement as false.⁴⁶

Footnotes

Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎
"1948 - A Commander during the War of Independence," Yitzhak Rabin Center, Tel Aviv. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1948/ ↩︎
Shipler, David K., review of S. Yizhar, Khirbet Khizeh, Moment magazine, May 5, 2015 (May-June 2015 issue). https://momentmag.com/book-review-khirbet-khizeh/ ↩︎
Wall, Alix, article on Rabin's memoir and the excised passage, J. The Jewish News of Northern California, January 26, 2001. https://jweekly.com/?p=27908 ↩︎
Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9. ↩︎
"1964 - Chief of Staff" and "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1964/ and https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/ ↩︎
Telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident," June 18, 1967, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967, Document 307. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307 ↩︎
"1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/ ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968, and editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972, Document 36, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 20, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d36 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 41, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 29, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d41 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 52, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1969, quoting Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (Little, Brown, 1979), p. 154. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d52 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 99, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d99 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 151, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970, citing Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs, pp. 184-185. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d151 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970, Document 306, Telegram, Washington, September 22, 1970 (Sisco's meeting with Rabin on September 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d306 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 271, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 29, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d271 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXIII, Document 319, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d319 ↩︎
"1974 - Prime Minister of Israel, first term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1974/ ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976, Document 131, Memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford reporting Kissinger's initial discussions, February 11, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d131 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXVI, Document 158, Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, March 22, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d158 ↩︎
Crissy, Ron, "'No concessions': Entebbe files reveal drama behind one of Israel's most daring rescue operations," Ynetnews, 2026, on the Israel State Archives release of the Cabinet, Security Cabinet and special ministerial team protocols. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sjzfgnszme ↩︎
"Rabin Resigns Following Probe into Illegal Bank Accounts Held by Him and His Wife in Washington," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 8, 1977. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-resigns-following-probe-into-illegal-bank-accounts-held-by-him-and-his-wife-in-washington ↩︎
"1984 - Minister of Defense," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1984/ ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 9, pp. 167 and 169, on Rabin's conditions for the 1985 TOW sale and the September 9, 1985 approval of the second shipment. ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, ch. 10, p. 174, on Ledeen's account of Rabin's complaint about replacement of the TOW missiles. ↩︎
Walsh, Lawrence E. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. 1, Investigations and Prosecutions (1993), p. 110 and n. 110, on the November 15, 1985 meeting of McFarlane and Rabin. https://archive.org/details/WalshReport ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. 1, ch. 15, on the Casey breakfast with Rabin, McFarlane's assurance of continuing approval, and the November 24, 1985 delivery of 18 HAWK missiles. ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, ch. 10, pp. 176-177, on the McFarlane-Rabin meeting of November 15, 1985 and Rabin's call to North on November 17. ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. 1, ch. 4, on Rabin's call to McFarlane in Geneva about the shipment through a European country and McFarlane's direction to North. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_04.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. 1, ch. 18, on Rabin's request for help with flight clearances and the planned shipment of 80 HAWK missiles. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. 1, ch. 31 and n. 163, on North's account of the November shipment in his interview with Attorney General Edwin Meese. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_31.htm ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986. ↩︎
"Rabin Rejects Senate Report," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report ↩︎
Moffett, George D., III, "Israeli foresees more unrest," Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 1988, interview with Defense Minister Rabin. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0209/orab.html ↩︎
"IDF Furloughs Officer for Beatings," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 7, 1989. https://jta.org/archive/idf-furloughs-officer-for-beatings ↩︎
"Israeli Colonel Pleads Not Guilty to Brutality Toward Palestinians," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, March 30, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/idf-colonel-pleads-not-guilty-to-brutality-toward-palestinians ↩︎
"Rabin Denies Giving Orders to Break Bones of Palestinians," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 6, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/rabin-denies-giving-orders-to-break-bones-of-palestinians ↩︎
Frankel, Glenn, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," Washington Post, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 ↩︎
"Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 1992. https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html ↩︎
"1992 - Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, Second Term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1992/ ↩︎
The Nobel Prize, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994," Nobel Foundation. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/summary/ ↩︎
"1995 - Assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1995/ ↩︎
Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), English summary of the Shamgar Commission, Report on the Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, March 28, 1996. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf ↩︎
Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), afterword to the summary of the Shamgar Commission report, on the sentences and on the trial of Avishai Raviv. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf ↩︎
"Rabin's killer said Shin Bet 'didn't know anything' about plot, refuting Smotrich," Times of Israel, November 8, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabins-killer-said-shin-bet-didnt-know-anything-about-plot-refuting-smotrich/ ↩︎

32 KiB Raw Blame History