The_Info_Web/10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yitzhak Shamir.md at 706d8820a2df7ee175df7395cfabc7c1916e51ae - disinfozone/The_Info_Web

disinfozone/The_Info_Web

Fork 0

disinfo.zone 9173c41b79

vault backup: 2026-10-16 01:25:00

2026-10-16 01:25:00 -04:00

34 KiB

Raw Blame History

aliases

Stern Group and LEHI

Shamir joined the Irgun Zvai Leumi in 1937 and in 1940 became a founder of its splinter group, LEHI, known to the British as the Stern Gang; he was arrested twice by the British in 1940 and escaped both times, the second time from a detention facility in Eritrea.¹ After the death of Avraham Stern at the hands of British police in 1942, the group was led by a triumvirate. The Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem names the three as Israel Eldad (also Scheib), Nathan Yellin-Mor (also Friedman) and Shamir (also Yzernitzsky).⁴ The same reference describes Shamir as a member of the Irgun before he joined the Stern Gang, where he became one of its leaders.⁴

Lord Moyne in Cairo

On November 6, 1944 two members of LEHI shot the British minister resident in the Middle East, Lord Moyne, outside his house in Cairo; his driver was also killed. The two men, Eliahu Bet-Tsuri and Eliahu Hakim, were captured at the scene, admitted the killing in court, and were tried, condemned and executed in early 1945.⁵ Anthony Eden told the House of Commons on November 9, 1944 that the two prisoners had confessed: "We are members of the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel organisation and what we have done was done on the instructions of this organisation. The organisation is that known as the Stern Group."⁶ The National Archives (United Kingdom) at Kew holds Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office files titled "Assassination of Lord Moyne" (CAB 104/254 and PREM 4/51/11) and Foreign Office files on the trial and execution of the assassins (FO 141/1001, FO 954/5D and FO 371/41514 to 41517).⁷ The Encyclopedia states that Shamir "was one of the terrorists who planned the assassination."⁴

Folke Bernadotte

On September 17, 1948 Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, was assassinated together with a French United Nations observer in a part of Jerusalem under Jewish control. The Yearbook of the United Nations prints the mediator's progress report, dated 18 September 1948, as document A/648.⁸ Eden told the Commons on September 20 that the House deplored "the callous and the seemingly purposeless assassination of Count Bernadotte."⁹ A Central Intelligence Agency weekly summary from October 1948 reported that the Provisional Government of Israel had not apprehended the assassins and that many members of the Stern Gang were still at large.¹⁰ Foreign Office files on the killing from 1948 and 1949 include the Sweden government's dissatisfaction with the Israeli report to the Security Council.¹¹

Two former LEHI members described the killing on Israeli television and radio on September 9, 1988, in what The New York Times called the first public acknowledgement by members of the group. Yehoshua Zettler (also spelled Zeitler) said he directed the assassination, and Meshulam Markover said he led the four-man squad that blocked the mediator's car with a jeep on a Jerusalem street. According to their account Yehoshua Cohen, who had died two years earlier, fired the shots that killed the mediator and his French aide. Zeitler said he spoke out because he feared the United Nations would again try to force Israel into concessions. A spokesman for Shamir, then prime minister, said that Shamir had played no role in the assassination because the group had officially disbanded six months earlier.¹² The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Zeitler said four people carried out the assassination and that Shamir was not directly implicated in the act, while Israel Eldad (Scheib) said Shamir was one of four men responsible for planning assassinations and could not confirm that Shamir attended the meeting at which Bernadotte's killing was ordered. Sweden insisted on a second apology; Israel refused.¹³

The Encyclopedia reports that the decision to kill the mediator was taken at two clandestine meetings of the Stern Gang triumvirate, in June and September 1948. Shamir "was at the first meeting, which agreed in principle that the mediator had to be killed. The second meeting gave the order to go ahead."⁴ For the account of September 10, 1948, when Zettler drove Eldad from Jerusalem to a meeting in Tel Aviv with Nathan Yellin-Mor and Shamir, the Encyclopedia draws on Dan Kurzman's Genesis 1948.¹⁴ The Encyclopedia quotes the London Sunday Observer of September 18, 1988, under the headline "Death Warrant Returns to Haunt Shamir," as saying that Shamir "has not denied his part in the murder." A spokesman, Josef Ahimeir, is quoted: "The Prime Minister is concentrating on the present and future problems of the State of Israel. We don't want to deal with this affair. All that can be said has been said."¹⁵ The Encyclopedia adds that the revelations prompted Sweden to demand that the case be reopened.⁴

Mossad and Operation Damocles

Roger Howard's Operation Damocles describes Shamir as "Mossad's European operations chief," who handpicked the agents for the operation.¹⁶ Howard also places him as head of the Paris office of Mossad, under the cover name Samuel Singer.¹⁷ The campaign Howard describes was directed by Isser Harel, then head of Mossad, against German engineers and scientists working on Egypt's rocket and missile program. Howard writes that Mossad's complicity in the disappearance of a Munich procurement company director on September 11, 1962 "has never been conclusively proven, but almost certainly this was just the beginning of Operation Damocles."¹⁶

Howard records an attack on a German engineer in Lörrach on February 12, 1963. The attackers forced his car to stop on a narrow lane near his house, one agent fired at him, the weapon jammed, and the engineer returned fire before the attackers ran back to their car. Howard concludes that he "had narrowly survived."¹⁶ On November 27, 1962 a letter bomb sent from Germany injured a secretary in the office of a German scientist at the Heliopolis factory where the Egyptian rocket program was based.¹⁷ Howard places Shamir's Paris posting in 1962 and 1963; the Jewish Telegraphic Agency dates his service as a senior Mossad official to 1955 through 1965.¹

Prime minister, 1983 to 1984

Shamir became prime minister on October 10, 1983.² A December 1983 Central Intelligence Agency assessment titled "Israel: Economic Problems Facing the Shamir Government" reported that his government inherited severe economic problems. The Tel Aviv Stock Exchange had been closed, and Israelis were buying dollars in such numbers that some banks ran out of foreign exchange.¹⁸ A Washington, D.C. Post column of November 29, 1983 reported that Reagan and his top advisers were meeting Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens behind closed doors. Its most important topic was how to implement the administration's decision to cooperate more closely with Israel in Lebanon. The column noted that on October 29 the president had signed a secret National Security Decision Directive calling for "closer strategic coordination with Israel in the Middle East." Its second topic was the Israeli-Lebanese agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon.¹⁹

Foreign minister, 1980 to 1983

Shamir was foreign minister from March 10, 1980.² On October 4, 1982 George P. Shultz, then secretary of state, told the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko in New York City that he had put the question of Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon to Shamir. Shamir had said that once the Syrians were out, Israel would leave all of Lebanon and "not occupy any part of it."²⁰

In February 1981 Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent Shamir to Washington to see Alexander Haig, the secretary of state, because Begin was unhappy with the American position set out in a February 4 cable. According to Haig, Shamir was told that the United States could not prohibit Israeli sales of non-American items to Iran but opposed any arms deal with Iran and prohibited sales of American-origin arms. The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force (1993) records that "Foreign Minister Shamir apparently heard Haig's message differently," and that he told Begin the United States objected to the sale of American-origin equipment.²¹ An affidavit by William Northrop asserted that Haig had authorized Israel to ship American weapons to Iran. The Task Force's review of the cable traffic and the participants' notes found that "no green light was ever given for the shipment of American-made weapons between Israel and Iran."²¹

Rotation with Shimon Peres, 1984 to 1986

From September 1984 to October 1986 Shamir served as foreign minister under Shimon Peres, who was prime minister, and the two then exchanged posts on October 20, 1986.² On September 27, 1984 Shultz telegraphed from New York that Shamir had told him Gromyko's manner "seemed slightly more moderate in their bilateral."²² The Foreign Relations of the United States volume for the period records that Gromyko had confirmed to Shamir that the Soviet Union supports the existence of an independent Israel.²³

The Bus 300 affair surfaced in June 1986. A Labor Party minister named in the report as Gur, the minister of health and a former army chief of staff, called for Shamir's resignation over his reported part in covering up the killing of two captured Palestinian bus hijackers by Israeli agents. The New York Times reported that Shamir had been prime minister when the 1984 hijacking took place, and that the head of Shin Bet, Avraham Shalom, had resigned.²⁴ Shamir was quoted by Cabinet sources as saying "My conscience is clear."²⁴

A Central Intelligence Agency talking-points paper of September 29, 1986 said that Shamir, unlike Peres, was adamantly opposed to any kind of international conference for Middle East peace.²⁵

Israeli arms channel and Iran-Contra

The congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra Affair recorded that Adnan Khashoggi introduced Manucher Ghorbanifar to Al Schwimmer, described as an adviser to then Prime Minister Peres, and to Yaacov Nimrodi. In late June 1985 David Kimche, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, became involved. On August 2 and 3, 1985 he was in Washington, where Robert McFarlane told the Israelis that TOW missiles had been authorized.²⁶

The Tower Commission report gives Shultz's account of a conversation in which McFarlane said that "Foreign Minister Shamir had told Mr. Kimche that he wanted to know explicitly whether I was informed."²⁷ A note by Hill dated August 6, 1985, cited in the Walsh Report, records the same remark.²⁸ Ari Ben-Menashe's account places Shamir among those who decided on Israeli arms supplies to Iran in its war with Saddam Hussein Iraq, a decision he says was made in the belief that it served Israel's national security interest.²⁹

In September 1986 a memorandum from Oliver North recorded that "Incoming PM Shamir and outgoing PM Peres have agreed that Nir will remain in his current capacity after the change of government in October." The memorandum refers to Amiram Nir, who was then the Israeli official in the arms dealings.³⁰ Ben-Menashe says that Rafael Eitan served as Shamir's counterterrorism adviser and later ran the Iran-Israel Joint Committee.²⁹

Pollard affair

The Los Angeles Times reported on November 29, 1985 that Peres, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shamir had been meeting daily to review the internal investigation into Jonathan Pollard's activities. The paper reported that the essential elements of the case were believed to be clear to the three, who were hesitating about any public disclosure.³¹ In late February 1987 the Israeli embassy spokesman Yossi Gal said that Shamir had reiterated on a recent visit to Washington "that this was a rogue operation that was not authorized and against the will of the government."³²

Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment in the first week of March 1987. In a report from Jerusalem published March 11, 1987, Thomas L. Friedman quoted Shamir: "The State of Israel has no connection with Pollard or his family." Shamir rejected a formal inquiry: "There is no need for a commission of inquiry," he said. "The problem is not to investigate what happened. Those who need not know should continue not knowing." A committee headed by Abba Eban was to question the officials involved, through its intelligence subcommittee.³³ Friedman wrote that Shamir's remarks "reflect a certain anti-American sentiment that has been brewing here in the last few days," directed at both American Jews and the American government.³³ The Washington Times reported on March 11 that Shamir had said "the Pollard affair is closed," while the Knesset would conduct a full-scale investigation.³⁴

The Eban subcommittee and a two-member cabinet panel reported on May 26, 1987. The Washington Post reported that the subcommittee said Shimon Peres, Shamir and Rabin shared responsibility for the government's failure to live up to commitments made to the United States after Pollard's arrest, and that, contrary to the government's earlier statements, the subcommittee's report described the affair as "not a rogue operation." Shamir told reporters that the government had no intention of resigning and that "the mountain was really a molehill and the earth did not move."³⁵ The Christian Science Monitor reported that the cabinet adopted the findings of its panel, which held the entire government collectively responsible.³⁶

Ben-Menashe wrote that Shamir authorized some of the Pollard material to be sanitized, retyped and turned over to Soviet intelligence officials as a gesture of Israeli goodwill during 1984 to 1986. Shamir was foreign minister for most of the 1984 to 1986 period, while Peres was prime minister.² He writes that Shamir regarded the United States as "soft, bourgeois, materialistic and effete," and that Shamir believed the relay would show Israel to be a more dependable collaborator than the "fickle" Arabs.²⁹ Seymour Hersh's The Samson Option also describes Israeli passage of Pollard material to the Soviet Union.³⁷ Ben-Menashe adds that Shamir was furious when the North group leaked the Pollard story and sought to end it.²⁹

Second term and the Soviet channel, 1986 to 1988

Shamir again became prime minister on October 20, 1986.² A 1988 briefing paper in the Foreign Relations of the United States records that Shamir's visit to Washington had been scheduled for March 14 to 17, 1988.³⁸ In Moscow in April 1988 Shultz told Eduard Shevardnadze that Shamir "rejected some elements" of the American initiative, "accepted interrelationships, and accepted international auspices," and "was leery of a conference because he feared it would be authoritative." Shevardnadze told Shultz that "Shamir was more negative than Arafat," and said there was a question of who was in charge in Israel, the prime minister or the foreign minister.³⁹

The record of an Oval Office meeting on September 18, 1987, with Shultz, Senator Baker, Ken Duberstein and Frank Carlucci, includes the line "Thatcher cable urges we go w/o Shamir," in a discussion of a Middle East international conference.⁴⁰

Gulf War

The New York Times headlined on January 18, 1991 that Iraq had fired missiles at Israeli cities. On January 20, President George H. W. Bush telephoned Shamir twice from Camp David, at 3 a.m. and 11:30 a.m. Washington time, to thank Israel for its "restraint" in not retaliating for the Iraqi Scud attacks and to express his hope that Israel would let the United States retaliate on its behalf. The White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater quoted the president as telling Shamir: "I understand the anguish of your people and your Government." Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz were sent to Israel to coordinate policy, and American crews arrived that day to operate Patriot missile batteries, which Israel had resisted accepting until the first Scud fell on Tel Aviv.⁴¹ On January 21 the paper reported that Israeli tension eased a bit as new American help arrived.⁴¹ The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's obituary states that Shamir overruled members of his government who wanted to strike Iraq.¹

Madrid Conference

The Madrid Conference began on October 30, 1991. The New York Times headlined that day "Bush and Gorbachev in Spain: let the talks begin," and the next day "Israel, Arabs face to face, begin quest for mideast peace."⁴² Shamir delivered Israel's opening address on October 31. He told the delegations that "the issue is not territory, but our existence," that "it will be regrettable if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory," and that the goal of the bilateral negotiations was peace treaties with Israel's neighbors and interim self-government arrangements with the Palestinian Arabs. He appealed to Palestinian delegates to "renounce violence and terrorism" and said Israel could not "be expected to talk with people involved in such repulsive activities."⁴³ The Tehiya, Tzomet and Moledet parties left his coalition over the talks, which led to early elections in which Labor defeated Likud.¹

Loan guarantees, 1991 to 1992

In September 1991 Israel applied for $10 billion in American loan guarantees, and President Bush publicly asked that consideration be delayed. Israeli officials reacted, in the Christian Science Monitor's words, with a mixture of scorn and bitterness; one anonymous official called Bush's argument "nonsense" and hinted that Israel might reconsider attending the peace conference. Shamir, on Israeli television, answered a question about the effect on Israeli participation by recalling Secretary of State James Baker: "As Secretary Baker said, 'Everything has an effect.' This might have an effect as well." In a radio interview he predicted that if the Arabs were "handed such a gift, without even asking for it, they will dance on the roofs, make new and even bigger demands, and the peace process will become impossible."⁴⁴ The Monitor reported in October that Shamir had rebuffed a request by Baker, during Baker's trip to Jerusalem, to delay the application, that a senior administration official had said the guarantees would hinge on a freeze on new settlement activity, and that pro-Israel senators had concluded they could not pass the guarantees over the president's opposition.⁴⁵

Robert Maxwell

The publisher Robert Maxwell died in November 1991. The New York Times reported on November 9 that his body had been flown to Israel.⁴⁶ The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Maxwell was buried on Sunday on the Mount of Olives "with all the pomp of a state funeral," and that President Chaim Herzog and Prime Minister Shamir "headed a galaxy of dignitaries and politicians."⁴⁷

Daniel Pipes, reviewing Gordon Thomas's Gideon's Spies (1999) in Commentary, wrote that the book presents Shamir as a "virulent" anti-American who would "do anything" to reduce Washington's influence in the world.⁴⁸

Ben-Menashe's claims

Ben-Menashe wrote that Shamir authorized him to undertake a secret mission to Peru to acquire nuclear substances for Israel's tactical atomic bomb program. He also writes that he confronted Shamir about the chemical weapons trade to Iraq and the need to secure the release of Israeli soldiers held in Lebanon.²⁹ Ben-Menashe says that Shamir initially refused to release C-130 aircraft to Iran until the soldiers were freed, and then changed his mind, and that Shamir intervened to put on hold an execution list of people deemed enemies of the state of Israel.²⁹

Ben-Menashe writes that Shamir's anti-American sentiment stemmed from a belief that the United States was partially responsible for the Holocaust. He says Shamir sought to open lines of communication with the East Bloc after becoming prime minister in 1983, and passed sanitized American intelligence reports on nuclear issues and assessments of Soviet nuclear technology to the Soviet Union.²⁹ He also says Shamir opposed American peace initiatives that would involve giving up territory in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, held that Jordan should be the Palestinian state, and in secret discussed with the Palestine Liberation Organization a plan to unseat King Hussein of Jordan.²⁹

The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force found that Ben-Menashe made "several allegations that proved to be factually incorrect," and that documentary evidence showed he was not in Paris at the time he alleged. The Task Force also found the testimony of Ben-Menashe and of a second witness on the Madrid meetings "wholly lacking of any credibility."⁴⁹

Footnotes

"Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's 7th prime minister, dies at 96," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 2012 (born 1915 in Ruzhany; Irgun 1937; Lehi 1940; one of three leaders after Stern's death; senior Mossad official 1955 to 1965; Likud leader on Begin's resignation in 1983; Gulf War; Madrid and the coalition departures). https://www.jta.org/?p=1789432 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. I, biographical register, entry "Shamir, Yitzhak." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01 ↩︎
"Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," The Christian Science Monitor, 14 July 1992 (refers to "outgoing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Cabinet"). https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html ↩︎
Issa Nakhleh, Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, vol. 1 (1991), entries on the Stern Gang, Lord Moyne and Count Bernadotte. https://archive.org/details/encyclopedia-of-the-palestine-problem-volume-i ↩︎
"The Assassination of Lord Moyne," Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England (article text); The National Archives (Kew), FO 141/1001. https://www.jhse.org/pre-2015articles/the-assassination-of-lord-moyne ↩︎
"Assassination of Lord Moyne," HC Deb 9 November 1944, vol. 404, cols. 1538-41. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1944/nov/09/assassination-of-lord-moyne ↩︎
The National Archives (Kew), Discovery catalogue: CAB 104/254, "Assassination of Lord Moyne" (1944); PREM 4/51/11 (November 1944 to March 1945); FO 141/1001, "Lord Moyne: trial of his assassins" (1944); FO 954/5D/666 (5 December 1944); FO 371/41514 to 41517 (Code 66, file 33). https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ ↩︎
Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48, "Tributes to Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot," and the document index entry for A/648, Progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, dated 18 September 1948. https://archive.org/details/yearbook-of-the-united-nations_1947-1948 ↩︎
"Count Bernadotte (Assassination)," HC Deb 20 September 1948, vol. 456, col. 521. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/sep/20/count-bernadotte-assassination ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, weekly summary, October 1948 (CIA-RDP78-01617A002100020001-5). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-01617a002100020001-5 ↩︎
The National Archives (Kew), Discovery catalogue: FO 371/68696 (1948), "Assassination of UN Mediator Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot by Jews"; FO 371/75266 (1949), "Assassination of Count Bernadotte"; FO 371/75192 (1949). https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ ↩︎
John Kifner, "2 Recount '48 Killing in Israel," The New York Times, 12 September 1988, p. A3. https://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/12/world/2-recount-48-killing-in-israel.html ↩︎
"Israel refuses to apologize for 1948 assassination," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 1988. https://jta.org/archive/israel-refuses-to-apologize-for-1948-assassination ↩︎
Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948 (1970), pp. 555-556, as quoted in Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem (see note 3). https://archive.org/details/genesis1948first00kurz ↩︎
Eric Silver, "Death Warrant Returns to Haunt Shamir," The Sunday Observer (London), 18 September 1988, as quoted in Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem (see note 3). ↩︎
Roger Howard, Operation Damocles: Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists in Egypt, 1954-1967 (2013), chapter 1. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa ↩︎
Roger Howard, Operation Damocles, chapter 16. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, NESA 83-10332, "Israel: Economic Problems Facing the Shamir Government" (December 1983). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84s00927r000200070002-4 ↩︎
"Talks Focusing on Cooperation," The Washington Post column, 29 November 1983 (reading-room copy). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000100140007-2 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. III, document 221 (Shultz and Gromyko meeting, New York, 4 October 1982). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03/d221 ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force (1993), section 9, "Israel Renews Request to Sell Arms, January 1981," and the section on the Northrop allegation. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce ↩︎
Telegram from Secretary of State Shultz, New York, 27 September 1984, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. IV, document 285. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v04/d285 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. IV, document 287 (Gromyko meeting, 1984). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v04/d287 ↩︎
"Charges of Cover-Up Bring Call for Shamir to Resign," The New York Times, 30 June 1986 (Jerusalem, 29 June; reading-room copy). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120015-1 ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, talking points, 29 September 1986 (CIA-RDP91B00874R000100280006-6). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp91b00874r000100280006-6 ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (S. Rept. 100-216, H. Rept. 100-433, 1987), chapter 10. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongress87unit ↩︎
Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission), 26 February 1987, account of Secretary Shultz's statements. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, chapter 24, note 59 (note by Hill, 6 August 1985). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm ↩︎
Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm ↩︎
Memorandum from Oliver North, September 1986, reproduced in the Tower Commission report. https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit ↩︎
"Pollard" report, Los Angeles Times, 29 November 1985 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000504890020-7). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000504890020-7 ↩︎
The Washington Post, 28 February 1987 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000403620005-5). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000403620005-5 ↩︎
Thomas L. Friedman, "Shamir Says Pollard's Fate Is No Concern of Israel," The New York Times, 11 March 1987 (Jerusalem, 10 March). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302120009-8 ↩︎
The Washington Times, 11 March 1987 (reading-room copy, CIA-RDP90-00965R000302310041-1). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302310041-1 ↩︎
Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," The Washington Post, 27 May 1987 (CIA reading-room copy CIA-RDP90-00965R000302080002-0). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0 ↩︎
"Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," The Christian Science Monitor, 28 May 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), chapter 21. https://archive.org/details/the-samson-option-seymour-hersh ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. I, briefing paper of early 1988 (Shamir's visit scheduled for March 14 to 17). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v01 ↩︎
Memorandum of conversation, Shultz and Shevardnadze, Moscow, April 1988, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. VI, document 145. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d145 ↩︎
Record of the President's meeting with Secretary Shultz, Senator Baker, Ken Duberstein and Frank Carlucci in the Oval Office, 18 September 1987, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, vol. VI, document 77. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v06/d77 ↩︎
Maureen Dowd, "War in the Gulf: The President; Bush Urges Israeli Restraint in Phone Appeals to Shamir," The New York Times, 20 January 1991, p. 16; headlines of 18 and 21 January 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/20/world/war-gulf-president-bush-urges-israeli-restraint-phone-appeals-shamir.html ↩︎
The New York Times, 30 and 31 October 1991, headlines "Bush and Gorbachev in Spain: let the talks begin" and "Middle East talks: Israel, Arabs face to face, begin quest for mideast peace." https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/30/world/the-middle-east-talks-bush-and-gorbachev-in-spain-let-the-talks-begin.html and https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/31/world/middle-east-talks-israel-arabs-face-face-begin-quest-for-mideast-peace.html ↩︎
"Address by Prime Minister Shamir at the Madrid Peace Conference," 31 October 1991. https://jcpa-lecape.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Address-by-Prime-Minister-Shamir-at-the-Madrid-Peace-Conference.pdf ↩︎
"Israeli Leaders Move to Head Off Rift With Bush," The Christian Science Monitor, 9 September 1991. https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/0909/09031.html ↩︎
"Stance on Loan Guarantees Marks Significant Shift in US Israel Policy," The Christian Science Monitor, 8 October 1991. https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1008/08062.html ↩︎
"Maxwell's body flown to Israel," The New York Times, 9 November 1991. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/09/business/the-media-business-maxwell-s-body-flown-to-israel.html ↩︎
"Maxwell, Colossus Even in Death, Laid to Rest on Mount of Olives," Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 11 November 1991. https://www.jta.org/archive/maxwell-colossus-even-in-death-laid-to-rest-on-mount-of-olives ↩︎
Daniel Pipes, review of Gordon Thomas, Gideon's Spies, Commentary (1999). https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/ ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force (1993), summary of allegations by Ari Ben-Menashe (p. 8) and the section on the Madrid meetings. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce ↩︎

34 KiB Raw Blame History