disinfozone/The_Info_Web
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull requests Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions
The_Info_Web/20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Unit 8200.md

30 KiB
Raw Blame History

aliases category tags summary start location updated relations
Unit 8200
IDF Unit 8200
Israeli Defense Forces Unit 8200
Detachment 8200
Unit S.M. 2
Intelligence & Government
Organization
Unit8200
Israel
SignalsIntelligence
NSA
Snowden
Stuxnet
Spyware
NSOGroup
Carbyne
EhudBarak
JeffreyEpstein
Lavender
Refuseniks
AIMilitary
Unit 8200 is the Israeli Defense Forces' signals-intelligence and cyber unit whose alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms and whose commander was exposed as the author of an AI-warfare book in 2024. 1952 Glilot Camps, Ramat HaSharon, Israel 2026-10-12
type with reverse role fn
head_of Yoel Ben-Porat true unit commander, per Ben-Menashe's account 2
type with reverse role fn
employed_by Sasson Yishaek true number-two in the code-breaking department, later commander 2
type with reverse role fn
employed_by Reuben Yirador true department commander 2
type with reverse role fn
employed_by Shulamit Ingerman true cryptographer, head of the Iranian desk 2
type with reverse role start end fn
employed_by Ari Ben-Menashe true Iranian desk, code-breaking department, per his own account 1975 1977 2
type with reverse role fn
employed_by Yosef Zeira true department commander, per Ben-Menashe's account 2
type with reverse role end fn
head_of Yossi Sariel true commander 2024-09-12 23
type with reverse role fn
head_of Pinhas Buchris true commander; later director general of the Ministry of Defense 31
type with reverse role end fn
head_of Reuven Yerdor true in charge of the unit by early 1982, per Hersh's account 1982 34
type with reverse role fn
head_of Nadav Zafrir true commander, who established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command 16
type with fn
member_of Aman 1
type with start role fn
partner_of NSA 2009-03 intelligence-sharing memorandum of understanding, reached in principle March 2009 9
type with role fn
participant_in Operation Olympic Games payload development, per Sanger's account 5
type with start role fn
partner_of Minerva Project 2020-09 admissions page headed Partner: IDF 8200 24

Unit 8200 is the signals-intelligence and cyber unit of the Israel Defense Forces, attached to Aman, the military intelligence directorate. Its central base is the Glilot Camps in Ramat HaSharon, north of Tel Aviv, close to the Mossad headquarters.1 Its alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms. A 2009 intelligence-sharing memorandum with the NSA, disclosed in 2013, names the unit's counterpart only by its acronym. A 2014 refusal letter was signed by 43 of its veterans and reservists, and 2024 reporting tied the unit to AI-assisted targeting in the Gaza war.

Glilot base and origins

Ynet reported in August 2024 that the unit, designated Unit S.M. 2 when it moved to the Glilot base in 1952, was later renamed 8200. Sixteen years before that report, the army decided to evacuate most of the Glilot compound as part of a move to the Negev. The transition had been delayed repeatedly and was expected to take place in several phases over the following years.1

In Profits of War (1992), Ari Ben-Menashe placed the base near a country club north of Tel Aviv, with a nearby building known as "the villa" that belonged to Mossad and housed top-secret security meetings. He wrote that the unit operated on a need-to-know basis and that its departments required special permission to enter one another's areas.2

Personnel in the record

Ben-Menashe named the unit's commander as Yoel Ben-Porat, known as Buffy. He named Sasson Yishaek as the number-two officer in the code-breaking department and later its commander, Reuben Yirador as a department commander, and Shulamit Ingerman as a cryptographer who headed the Iran desk.2 He also wrote that Yosef Zeira, a department commander in the mid-1970s, briefed a small team on the 1976 rescue at Operation Entebbe and ordered its members into communications isolation for the duration of the operation.2

Seymour Hersh wrote in The Samson Option (1991) that by early 1982 Brigadier General Reuven Yerdor, known as Rudi, was in charge of the unit. Hersh wrote that Yerdor had been an officer of the Israeli signals-intelligence detachment (then Detachment 515, later 8200), had cracked a Soviet code, and traveled to Washington, D.C. every three months for liaison meetings with the NSA. According to Hersh, Yehoshua Saguy, the head of Aman, gave Yerdor two packets of documents over the 1981-82 New Year holiday, one of them daily and weekly summaries of worldwide NSA intercepts, and Yerdor received American technical data on Syrian air defenses in May 1982. The spelling Yerdor differs from the Yirador of Ben-Menashe's account, and the two names may refer to the same officer.3

The Iranian desk and Ben-Menashe's account

Ben-Menashe wrote that he served on the Iranian desk of the code-breaking department from 1975 to 1977 and that he broke the Iranian diplomatic code. The break, he wrote, made it unnecessary to "acquire" the weekly black book sent by diplomatic pouch to the Iranian embassy in Ramat Gan.2 He described satellite stations at Bet Ella and listening stations in northern Israel, the Sinai, and overseas in Japan, Italy and Ethiopia. According to his account, these intercepted traffic from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the Royal Court, SAVAK and Iranian military intelligence.2

Ben-Menashe wrote that in 1972 Yirador decoded a Soviet Union intercept showing that the Soviets were bugging the office of Golda Meir, then prime minister. The account names the intercept VENONA, the name of a United States program that ran from 1943 until the NSA closed it in 1980 and that decrypted Soviet cables, mostly from 1943 to 1945.4 Ben-Menashe linked the discovery, together with Meir's meeting with Leonid Brezhnev and her rejection of a peace settlement, to Anwar Sadat's understanding of Israel's position. He wrote that it may have prompted the 1973 war.2

In 1976, Ben-Menashe wrote, he intercepted while on duty a telegram detailing Lockheed Aircraft Company bribes paid to Defense Minister Shimon Peres. The sum was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in Europe. Superiors, including Buffy and Lt. Col. Yishaek, covered the information up, he wrote.2

Stuxnet and Olympic Games

In June 2012 David Sanger reported in The New York Times that President Barack Obama had accelerated cyberattacks against Iran's uranium enrichment program. The program had begun under the Bush administration and was code-named Olympic Games. A worm had escaped Iran's Natanz plant in the summer of 2010 and spread across the Internet. The last attack in the later series, the paper reported, "temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium." The account drew on interviews with current and former American, European and Israeli officials, none of whom would allow their names to be used.5

Sanger's book Confront and Conceal (2012) says that development of the payload enlisted Unit 8200, which had "deep intelligence about operations at Natanz", together with the NSA. The excerpt reported that bringing the Israelis on board was meant as a means to discourage a pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.6

The Kaspersky intrusion

The New York Times reported on October 10, 2017 that Israeli intelligence officers had hacked into the network of the Russian antivirus company Kaspersky Lab and watched "in real time as Russian government hackers searched computers around the world for the code names of American intelligence programs." The paper wrote that the Israelis alerted the United States, that they gave their NSA counterparts screenshots and other documentation, and that the Department of Homeland Security's September 13, 2017 order removing Kaspersky products from federal agencies rested in large part on intelligence from Israel's 2014 intrusion. The article drew on people briefed on the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Israeli Embassy declined to comment and Kaspersky denied any involvement in the Russian operation.7

Kaspersky had published a report in June 2015 on an intrusion into its own network that it named Duqu 2.0, after the Duqu malware that researchers had linked to the nation states behind Stuxnet. The Times wrote that the company did not name Israel in that report, that the attackers were interested in Kaspersky's work on the "Equation Group," the industry term for the NSA, and that other victims included hotels and venues used for the negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement, from which Israel was excluded.7

The 2014 refusal letter

On September 11, 2014, a letter from 43 veterans and reservists of the unit was distributed to the media. Al Jazeera reported that it was addressed to the prime minister, the armed forces chief and the head of military intelligence. The letter declared: "We veterans of Unit 8200, reservists past and present, declare that we refuse to take part in activity against Palestinians and refuse to be tools to deepen the military control in the occupied territories." It was published less than three weeks after the Gaza offensive that killed more than 2,200 people.8

Hanan Gefen, a former commander of the unit, accused the signatories of a grave breach of trust. He said that if he were the serving commander he would put them on trial and remove them from the unit.8 Public radio coverage later that month carried the headline "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue."9

In January 2015 the army dismissed some of the signatories. Ynet reported that the decision ended the reserve service of the refuseniks, who received letters stating they would not be called up for reserve duty in the future. The Military Intelligence Directorate noted that only a small part of the 43 had been called up in recent years, and then for a handful of days. Ynet reported that the dismissals followed the media storm the letter had created.10

The NSA memorandum of understanding

On September 11, 2013, The Guardian published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document "provided to the Guardian by whistleblower Edward Snowden." The reporters, Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, wrote that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009" and that the memorandum described itself as an agreement "pertaining to the protection of US persons." The full text was published with the article.1112

The memorandum states that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection." The counterpart is named ISNU, and the text does not name Unit 8200. The unit's role as the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military is the basis for the identification.1 Under the memorandum, Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year and was to consult the NSA's special liaison adviser when such data appeared. Communications to or from an official of the US government were to be destroyed "upon recognition." The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities."11

The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content." It permits Israel to disseminate foreign intelligence concerning US persons derived from raw Sigint provided it does so "in a manner that does not identify the US person," and to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. The Guardian reported that Israeli personnel agreed not to deliberately target Americans identified in the data, that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing, and that the NSA spokesperson did not deny that personal data about Americans was included in the material sent.11

The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. An NSA spokesperson said that "Any US person information that is acquired as a result of NSA's surveillance activities is handled under procedures that are designed to protect privacy rights." The Guardian also quoted a top-secret report dated September 2007 that described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."11

Alumni and the surveillance industry

The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project wrote that veterans of Unit 8200 "are known to have helped develop" the technology of NSO Group, the spyware company co-founded in 2010 by two high-school friends.13 The two, Shalev Hulio and Omri Lavie, are described by some accounts as unit alumni. In a January 2019 profile by Ronen Bergman, Ynet wrote that Hulio "didn't serve in the IDF's elite Unit 8200," that his final posting was as commander of a Home Front Command search and rescue team, and that one of two friends from Hugim High School in Haifa who developed the technology of an earlier company, CommuniTech, had served in Unit 8200. Bergman quoted a senior intelligence official who said NSO was "another example of Israel's strategic capabilities, which were developed to protect its citizens and its national security, that have been proliferated by former members of the intelligence community." Hulio denied the claim and said that an early employee, the engineer who began building the first offensive tool in August 2010, "may have served in Unit 8200" but that the technology did not come from there.14 The profile also names Niv Carmi, who worked at the Prime Minister's Office as a student, as the technical expert the investor Eddy Shalev required the founders to bring in.14 The OCCRP quoted Gadi Aviran, who founded the intelligence firm Terrogence, telling The New Yorker in 2019: "There was this huge pipeline of talent coming out of the military every year."13

NSO Group litigation

WhatsApp sued NSO in October 2019 in the Northern District of California. A March 2020 order described the defendants, which the plaintiffs had attempted to serve through the Hague Convention, as Israeli entities.15 A July 2020 order described NSO as an Israeli limited liability company, described Q Cyber Technologies as an Israeli corporation and NSO's only active director and majority shareholder, and recorded the complaint's allegation that defendants sent malware through WhatsApp's system to about 1,400 mobile devices.16

On December 20, 2024, Judge Phyllis Hamilton granted WhatsApp's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and California's Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. She denied NSO's motion for summary judgment and granted the sanctions motion in part. The order considered terminating sanctions, preferred evidentiary sanctions, and called defendants' limitation of Pegasus source-code production "simply impracticable for a lawsuit that is to be litigated in this district." It stated that a trial would proceed only on damages.17

On May 6, 2025 a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $444,719 in compensatory damages, the full amount WhatsApp sought, and $167,254,000 in punitive damages (Dkt. 736), a total of $167,698,719. The jury found that the defendants acted with malice, oppression or fraud.1819 On October 17, 2025 Judge Hamilton granted WhatsApp's motion for a permanent injunction and granted the defendants' motion for remittitur, reducing the punitive award to $4,002,471, the maximum she found permissible at a ratio of nine to one to compensatory damages under the Ninth Circuit's Riley framework. The order stated that the defendants had reverse-engineered WhatsApp's code to create a modified client and had repeatedly redesigned their software to avoid detection.19 WhatsApp accepted the remittitur on October 31, 2025. On November 12, 2025 the court entered a permanent injunction, which excluded the defendants' foreign sovereign customers and outside counsel from the parties it binds, and a final judgment of $4,447,190, consisting of $444,719 in compensatory and $4,002,471 in punitive damages.1820 On December 19, 2025 the court denied the defendants' motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.21

Alumni in SEC filings

Executive biographies in SEC filings also name the unit. The annual report on Form 20-F filed by Check Point Software Technologies on March 17, 2025 describes its chief executive, Nadav Zafrir, as having "served as Commander of Unit 8200, Israel's elite military technology unit, where he established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command." The report also lists him as a director of SolarEdge Technologies.22

The annual report on Form 20-F for 2022 of HUB Cyber Security states that the company "was founded in 2017 by veterans of the elite Unit 8200 and Unit 81 of the Israeli Defense Forces."23 The 2024 proxy statement of Playtika Holding describes a vice president for customer relationship management and analytics as having served, before joining the company, "in the elite Israeli military unit 8200."24

Carbyne and the Epstein investments

Minutes of a meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd. (later Carbyne) on December 23, 2015 list as directors present Amir Elichai, Alex Dizengof, Ehud Barak and "Pinchas Bouchris," with the company's lawyer. The minutes record a resolution to seek $10 million from venture funds and a further investment of $500,000 by Barak expected by February 1, 2016. The minutes were among the records released in the Department of Justice's Epstein Library.25 Pinhas Buchris, identified in Calcalist's July 2019 reporting as "the former director of Israel's Unit 8200," sat on Carbyne's board in 2017 with Barak, Elichai and Nicole Junkermann.26 In a December 2022 interview with Calcalist, Buchris described himself as a former officer of Sayeret Matkal, commander of Unit 81 and of Unit 8200, and director general of the Ministry of Defense (Israel), said he had introduced the unit to cyber operations in 1997, and spoke of his part in the 1976 Operation Entebbe rescue.27

Forbes reported in February 2026 that Barak served on the company's board until 2019 and that Jeffrey Epstein invested through Barak.28 Epstein's stake was held through SUM (E.B.) Limited Partnership. In a February 28, 2019 email, the partnership's lawyer wrote that at the time of the initial investment it had received warrants for 61,251 Preferred A shares of Carbyne, and that exercising them would raise its holding from about 13 percent to about 26.33 percent. A later message in the chain told Epstein's lawyer Darren Indyke that Southern Trust Company had signed the additional investment agreement.29 On March 11, 2019, Barak wrote to Epstein in a thread that carried the subject line "Re: Carbyne warrants" and included a message forwarded by Indyke.30

Gaza targeting reporting, 2024

On April 3, 2024, +972 Magazine and Local Call published a report by Yuval Abraham describing an AI-based system called Lavender (targeting system). The report says six Israeli intelligence officers who served in the Gaza war described its use in generating human targets, and that four of them said it had marked some 37,000 Palestinians as suspected Hamas militants.31 The same report describes tracking software, called "Where's Daddy?" in the reporting, that alerted targeting officers when marked individuals entered their homes.31

The report says that the commander of Unit 8200 wrote the 2021 book The Human-Machine Team under the pen name "Brigadier General Y.S.", and that five sources in the unit confirmed him as its author. It also cites a 2023 lecture at Tel Aviv University by a colonel the report calls "Col. Yoav," commander of the unit's Data Science and AI center, whose slides +972 obtained.31

The IDF told +972 and Local Call that it did not use artificial intelligence to incriminate targets, describing its tools as "auxiliary tools that assist officers in the process of incrimination." The army said each target is examined individually.31

The commander's identity

On April 5, 2024, The Guardian reported that the commander of Unit 8200, Yossi Sariel, was the secret author of The Human Machine Team. The Guardian wrote that an electronic version of the book published on Amazon included an anonymous email address that traced to Sariel's name and to a private Google account, which exposed his unique ID and linked maps and calendar profiles. The Guardian reported that Sariel wrote the book with the army's permission after a year as a visiting researcher at the National Defense University in Washington.32

An IDF spokesperson told the Guardian that the email address was not Sariel's personal one, but "dedicated specifically for issues to do with the book itself." The army later described the exposure of Sariel's personal details as "a mistake."32

On September 12, 2024, Sariel announced his resignation as commander. In his letter he wrote: "I did not fulfill the mission as I expected of myself, nor as my subordinates, superiors and the citizens of Israel expected of me." The army said he would be replaced "in the coming period."33

Minerva University admissions

A page on the admissions site of Minerva Project was headed "Partner: IDF 8200" in a capture of September 21, 2020. The page states that "IDF unit 8200 alumni have the mature perspective and technological experience to both benefit from and contribute to Minerva's diverse undergraduate experience." It is published under the company's name and carries no statement attributed to Ben Nelson.34

Project 8200

A 2024 book by Frederick Atwater titled Project 8200 presents remote-viewing transcripts concerning UAP bases. Records found do not establish whether Project 8200 has any connection to this unit.35

Footnotes

  1. Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic ↩︎

  2. Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015). ↩︎

  3. Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), ch. 21. ↩︎

  4. Wilson Center, "The Venona Project." The program began in 1943, decoded its first cable in 1946, and ran until the NSA shut it down in 1980; most of the cables date from 1943 to 1945. https://wilsoncenter.org/article/venona-project ↩︎

  5. David E. Sanger, "Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," The New York Times, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html ↩︎

  6. David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (2012), excerpt as reported by The Register, June 1, 2012. https://www.theregister.com/2012/06/01/stuxnet_joint_us_israeli_op/ ↩︎

  7. Nicole Perlroth and Scott Shane, "How Israel Caught Russian Hackers Scouring the World for U.S. Secrets," The New York Times, October 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/kaspersky-lab-israel-russia-hacking.html ↩︎

  8. "Israeli reservists refuse to serve," Al Jazeera, September 13, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/9/13/israeli-reservists-refuse-to-serve ↩︎

  9. "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue," WGBH, September 22, 2014. https://www.wgbh.org/news/2014-09-22/snowden-reveal-makes-israeli-spies-protest-an-american-issue ↩︎

  10. Yoav Zitun, "IDF dismisses several intel reservists over refusenik letter," Ynetnews, January 26, 2015. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/4619538 ↩︎

  11. Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," The Guardian, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel ↩︎

  12. "NSA and Israeli intelligence: memorandum of understanding, full document," The Guardian, September 11, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document ↩︎

  13. "Where NSO Group Came From and Why It's Just the Tip of the Iceberg," OCCRP, The Pegasus Project (article in the OCCRP series). https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-pegasus-project/where-nso-group-came-from-and-why-its-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg ↩︎

  14. Ronen Bergman, "Weaving a cyber web," Ynetnews, January 11, 2019. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5444998,00.html ↩︎

  15. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting in part and denying in part motion to set aside default judgment (Dkt. 41, March 25, 2020), at 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-0.pdf ↩︎

  16. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order on motions to dismiss (Dkt. 111, July 16, 2020), pp. 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-5.pdf ↩︎

  17. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motions for summary judgment and sanctions (Dkt. 494, December 20, 2024), at 16. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-24.pdf ↩︎

  18. WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Final Judgment (Dkt. 810, November 12, 2025), p. 2, reciting the May 6, 2025 verdict (Dkt. 736) and the October 17, 2025 remittitur. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-44.pdf ↩︎

  19. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motion for permanent injunction, motion for remittitur or new trial, and motion to seal (Dkt. 802, October 17, 2025), pp. 1-2 and conclusion. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-40.pdf ↩︎

  20. WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction (Dkt. 809, November 12, 2025), p. 2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-43.pdf ↩︎

  21. WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order denying motion to stay permanent injunction (Dkt. 824, December 19, 2025). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-46.pdf ↩︎

  22. Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F, filed March 17, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015922/000117891325000867/zk2532836.htm ↩︎

  23. HUB Cyber Security Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F for 2022, filed August 15, 2023. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1905660/000121390023067760/f20f2022_hubcyber.htm ↩︎

  24. Playtika Holding Corp., definitive proxy statement, filed April 26, 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1828016/000182801624000011/playtika-20240425.htm ↩︎

  25. U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01074544, DataSet 9, minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd., December 23, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01074544.pdf ↩︎

  26. "The Ties That Bind: Ehud Barak's Business Network," CTech (Calcalist), July 18, 2019. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3766639,00.html ↩︎

  27. "A Buchris story: The rise, fall, and comeback of an Israeli hero," CTech (Calcalist), December 16, 2022. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/lwigv8m1o ↩︎

  28. Thomas Brewster, "Epstein Could Have Made $100 Million On A Secret Police Tech Investment With Ehud Barak," Forbes, February 10, 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/02/10/epstein-police-surveillance-investments-with-ehud-barak/ ↩︎

  29. U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02634615, DataSet 11, email chain "Carbyne warrants," February 28 to March 14, 2019. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02634615.pdf ↩︎

  30. U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02632339, DataSet 11, email from Ehud Barak to Jeffrey Epstein, "Re: Carbyne warrants," March 11, 2019, with a forwarded message from Darren Indyke. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02632339.pdf ↩︎

  31. Yuval Abraham, "'Lavender': The AI machine directing Israel's bombing spree in Gaza," +972 Magazine and Local Call, April 3, 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/ ↩︎

  32. "Exclusive: Yossi Sariel unmasked as head of Unit 8200 and architect of AI strategy after book written under pen name reveals his Google account," The Guardian, April 5, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes-his-true-identity-in-online-security-lapse ↩︎

  33. "Head of critical IDF intel unit resigns over Oct. 7 failure," JNS, September 12, 2024. https://www.jns.org/israel-news/head-of-critical-idf-intel-unit-resigns-over-oct-7-failure ↩︎

  34. Minerva Schools at KGI, "Partner: IDF 8200," page captured September 21, 2020. https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/ (Internet Archive capture, https://web.archive.org/web/20200921120000id_/https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/) ↩︎

  35. Frederick Atwater, Project 8200: UFO/UAP Bases and Activities: The Original Remote Viewing Transcripts (2024), ISBN-10 3911151047. ↩︎