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Raw Blame History

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Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1977 to 1981

Bobby Ray Inman became director on July 5, 1977. In February 1981 he told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that he had served as director "since 5 July 1977."³ He told the committee that during his four years at the agency "this committee constantly pressed on the administration the question of the adequacy of the intelligence assets."³

The BBC's Tim Harford wrote in 2017 that the agency's head "was genuinely puzzled about the academics' motives" in the public-key cryptography episode, and that he "soon accepted that the professor had a point and no prosecutions followed."⁴

A Senate executive summary of January 1993 records that Inman testified that the NSA's signals intelligence collection in Southeast Asia was dismantled after the war and was not resumed until at least 1978.⁵

SHAMROCK and the watch list activity

The Church Committee's statement of November 6, 1975 described SHAMROCK as a message collection program in which the government persuaded three international telegraph companies, RCA Global, ITT World Communications and Western Union International, to make their international telegraph traffic available, so that "for almost 30 years, copies of most international telegrams originating in or forwarded through the United States were turned over to the National Security Agency and its predecessor agencies." The committee found that the Army Security Agency, later folded into INSCOM, was the first agency with operational responsibility for SHAMROCK; the Armed Forces Security Agency inherited it in 1949 and NSA assumed operational control when it was created in 1952. The committee added that no documents at NSA or the Department of Defense reflected the operational arrangements between the government and the companies.² In his own testimony Allen separately described a "watch list activity" conducted by NSA between 1967 and 1973 in response to requirements levied by other government agencies, and the committee chairman's opening statement noted that NSA, like the Central Intelligence Agency and the Internal Revenue Service, had maintained a watch list containing the names of United States citizens.²

Hal Puthoff at the NSA

Hal Puthoff, later the principal investigator of the Stanford Research Institute remote viewing work, reported to active duty as a U.S. Navy officer in 1960 after taking a master's degree at the University of Florida and was assigned to a research billet at the NSA at Fort Meade. According to the biography SRI filed with its 1979 Grill Flame protocol, he pursued research and monitored contracts on the development of ultra-high-speed computers under Project LIGHTNING, started a program on the potential of lasers, fiber optics and related devices for optical computers, received a Department of Defense Certificate of Commendation, and won second prize for outstanding paper of the year in the NSA Technical Journal in 1963. He left active duty in February 1963 and remained a civilian (GS-13) until September 1963, when he entered Stanford University.⁶

The 1973 West Virginia target

SRI's final report for the period January 1974 through February 1975 describes experiments "under the control of the sponsor," in which an SRI experimenter requested geographical coordinates of a site unknown to the experimenters and subjects from "the sponsor's group responsible for threat analysis." The coordinates received were 38 degrees 23 minutes 45 seconds to 48 seconds north, 79 degrees 25 minutes west, described only as being in West Virginia. On May 29, 1973 Puthoff relayed them by telephone to a first subject, designated S3 in the final report and named as Ingo Swann in SRI's October 1, 1973 proposal, whose sessions of May 29 and 30 described rolling hills, lawns like those around a military base, and "either some old bunkers around, or maybe this is a covered reservoir." On June 1, 1973 Puthoff gave the coordinates to a second subject, designated S1 and named as Pat Price in the proposal, whose written response of June 2 reported a peak in a mountain chain, a concealed road, a "former missile site" where underground rooms held records, microfilm and file cabinets under "Army 5th Corps Engineers," and, beyond them, bays "with computers, communication equipment, large maps" staffed by the Army Signal Corps. The report states that both West Virginia reports and the report on a Urals site that Price volunteered were "verified by personnel in the sponsor organization as being substantially correct."⁷

On a later date, the report says, S1 was asked to return to the site "with the goal of obtaining information on code words," and supplied the following: top of desk with papers labeled "Flytrap" and "Minerva"; a file cabinet labeled "Operation Pool"; folders labeled "Cueball," "14 Ball," "4 Ball," "8 Ball" and "Rackup"; a site name that "vaguely seems like Hayfork or Haystack"; and the personnel "Col. R. J. Hamilton, Maj. Gen. George R. Nash, Major John C. Calhoun (??)."⁷ The name Sugar Grove does not appear in the SRI report. An article by the former Time science correspondent John L. Wilhelm in The Washington Post (c. 1977) wrote that the coordinates were encoded and passed through an NSA monitor in the Washington area to a CIA scientist at Menlo Park, that the site was a satellite interrogation station which "eavesdrops on Soviet space vehicles," that an officer exclaimed "Hell, there's no security left," and that a security investigation was launched to determine whether the information had leaked to Price. Wilhelm, who also names Sugar Grove in listing the explanations later offered, quoted a source as saying the security men "wouldn't buy the idea of remote viewing."⁸ An Army briefing script on the Grill Flame program, describing the same episode without naming the site, states that the viewer "actually entered the place, calling out names of people who were working there," that he "read" classified codewords on folders, some locked inside security containers, and that "the CIA later confirmed with NSA the validity of much of the subject's information."⁹

NSA and the Army remote viewing program

An INSCOM staff paper of 1982, written when Congress was ending National Foreign Intelligence Program funding for the Army's Grill Flame project, listed among the options for its future a determination "if the Director, NSA would integrate the current INSCOM GRILL FLAME project into any NSA program."¹⁰ A September 22, 1982 memorandum from the 902d Military Intelligence Group set out the mechanics of NSA sponsorship: the psi personnel could be carried on the rolls of the CONUS MI Group, the housekeeping organization for Army personnel working at NSA, under a "Strategic Systems Planning Detachment" with funding provided by the NSA sponsor and tasking exercised by the INSCOM commander through an INSCOM liaison officer at the NSA.¹¹ INSCOM's chronology records that Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, director of the NSA, was briefed on the program on August 2, 1982.¹⁰

On August 27, 1982 the Grill Flame project manager, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Jachim, recorded a conversation with NSA personnel. The NSA people said the agency had "no active remote viewers," asked INSCOM how remote viewers were selected, what psychological battery was used, whether a screening questionnaire could be provided and what training SRI had offered, and were given copies of articles from Signal, Omni and an IEEE article by Robert Jahn of Princeton. Jachim wrote that Puthoff had telephoned an NSA contact to say that some of SRI's funding had not materialized and to invite NSA into the program, and that the NSA contact "was noncommittal." The memorandum gives an internal NSA designation for the agency's own parapsychology activity, which is redacted in the released copy.¹² A 1984 INSCOM commanding general's memorandum lists the NSA among the agencies that had tasked remote viewing and says an evaluation from the NSA, with one from the CIA, was attached to it.¹³

PROMIS

An NSA database named PROMIS appears in the Department of Justice inquiry into the INSLAW matter. The 1993 report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua records that Ari Ben-Menashe told Bua's team that the "PROMIS" software Earl Brian distributed to the Israelis was an NSA program and not INSLAW's, that the NSA had developed it to translate Vietnamese into English, and that Bill Hamilton had worked on it while employed at the NSA before INSLAW existed. Ben-Menashe had earlier sworn affidavits for INSLAW stating that Brian told a 1987 Israeli meeting that the CIA, the NSA, the Department of Justice and Israeli intelligence had been allowed to use PROMIS since 1982; he told Bua that he had let the Hamiltons "assume" he meant INSLAW's product. The Bua report states that the NSA told the investigators Hamilton had worked for the NSA in the 1960s but that, because his personnel records had been purged, it could not say whether he had worked on such a program. The NSA also told them it used a commercial software package from Computer Corporation of America and that in 1974 and 1975, six years before INSLAW was incorporated, it had developed a database in the M204 language called PROMIS, an acronym for Product Related On-line Management Information System ("product" being the agency's term for its intelligence reports), which it said had no relationship to INSLAW's product and shared the name coincidentally. The NSA general counsel's office told the investigators that many NSA personnel knew of its PROMIS and that many had since moved to other agencies and private employers. The Bua report declined to credit the rest of Ben-Menashe's account.¹⁴

The House Judiciary Committee's 1992 report on the INSLAW affair had recorded a different claim: Juval Aviv, a former Israeli intelligence officer and head of the investigative firm Interfor, told committee investigators in January 1991 that Brian had sold INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS to United States agencies outside the Department of Justice, including the CIA, the NSA, NASA and the National Security Council, and to Interpol, the Mossad, the Israeli Air Force and the Egyptian government.¹⁵

UFO records and Citizens Against UFO Secrecy v. NSA

In Ground Saucer Watch v. CIA (D.D.C., Civil Action 78-859) the Central Intelligence Agency located documents that originated with the NSA and referred them to that agency in four separate referrals, the last on July 27, 1979. The attorney for the plaintiff, Peter A. Gersten, then requested the documents from the NSA; by letters of January 9, 1979 and December 19, 1979 the NSA's policy staff chief, Roy R. Banner, told him the records were classified in their entirety and exempt under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) and (b)(3), the latter on the strength of 18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3) and Public Law 86-36. The NSA appeals authority affirmed on March 24, 1980, and in Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency (D.D.C., Civil Action 80-1562) the agency's Chief of the Office of Policy, Eugene F. Yeates, swore an affidavit that the withheld material consisted of communications intelligence reports that were "all based on intercepted foreign communications," whose disclosure would identify communications "successfully intercepted and processed," together with four non-COMINT records, and that he would supply a second affidavit classified Top Secret for the court's in camera consideration. A portion of one responsive document was declassified and released to plaintiff's counsel on September 15, 1980.¹⁶

The KH-11 and the Israeli access dispute

Seymour Hersh wrote in The Samson Option that a former NSA official told him the KH-11 satellite, launched in December 1976, was considered the most important advance of its time in reconnaissance photography, that every military and civilian intelligence agency had an urgent requirement for its imagery, and that the NSA, responsible for all communications intelligence, had a role in scheduling the satellite to maximize collection. Hersh wrote that Jimmy Carter's decision in March 1979 to give Israel direct access to KH-11 photographs disrupted that scheduling and was unpopular within the NSA and other agencies, and that during the Ronald Reagan administration it was learned that Israeli military officers were permitted to attend Pentagon meetings where future KH-11 missions and orbital paths were discussed, which dismayed some NSA officials.¹⁷

Memorandum of understanding with the Israeli signals unit

On September 11, 2013, The Guardian published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document provided to the Guardian by Edward Snowden. The Guardian reported that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009." The memorandum says that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection," so that the material is not filtered in advance to remove communications of US citizens. The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content," and permits Israel to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year.¹⁸ The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities." The text does not name Unit 8200; the unit is the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military.¹⁹

The Guardian reported that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing. A top-secret report dated September 2007, also quoted by the Guardian, described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."¹⁸

USS Liberty intercepts, 2003 to 2007

The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the USS Liberty Incident in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by A. Jay Cristol filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.²⁰ In January 2004 the agency's historian, David Hatch, said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.²¹ On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."²² Oliver Kirby, the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.²³ The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.²⁴

United Nations headquarters, Security Council delegations and Ndola

According to a commission of jurists reporting to the United Nations General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight in September 1961, at the naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, on the night of the crash that killed Dag Hammarskjöld. The Eminent Person wrote in 2022: "It has not been disputed that he held a specialization as a "processing and reporting" officer who was assigned at a naval communications facility near Nicosia in 1961."²⁵ The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."²⁶ The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.²⁷

The 2015 Independent Panel recorded that the United States, in its response of June 9, 2015, confirmed that Charles Southall was an active member of the United States Navy at the time, without saying where he was stationed or in what capacity he served.²⁸ The 2019 report recorded that the United States confirmed that he joined the Navy in 1955, was released from active duty in 1969, and retired as a commander from the Naval Reserve in 1978, and that the United States gave no information on whether he worked in support of NSA activities.²⁹

The 2022 and 2024 reports described Southall and Paul Abram as two United States personnel who had provided information tending to confirm that they were working for or in support of NSA activities on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when they overheard or read a transmission concerning an attack on flight SE-BDY.³⁰ Both reports recorded that the two men had passed away as of 2018.³⁰ The 2024 report wrote that the failure of the United States to take up the opportunity to contradict their claims "tends to have the effect of supporting those claims."³¹

The Panel recorded that Abram, a former United States Air Force security services officer, had said he was attached to an NSA listening post at Iraklion, Greece. It assessed that his claim to have performed special duties at the time appeared to be valid, on the basis of a discharge record describing him as a "voice intercept procedure specialist," but could not confirm that he was posted to Iraklion at the time.³² The 2017 report recorded that the United States confirmed his service record only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time he reported hearing the intercept.³³

The National Security Archive at George Washington University filed Freedom of Information Act requests on behalf of the 2013 Commission of Jurists for any NSA recording or transcript of radio traffic on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961 appearing to relate to one aircraft firing upon another, and for any message intercepted concerning the approach of an aircraft to Ndola.³⁴ The NSA's initial response indicated that two of three responsive documents appeared exempt by reason of "top secret" classification, and that the third was not held by the NSA; an appeal was lodged.³⁴ The agency told the commission that releasing the two files "could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."³⁵ The Swedish newspaper SvD Nyheter reported on November 21, 2014 that the United States had given the Swedish foreign minister, Carl Bildt, access to the two files, quoting him as saying that the information was "trivial and unimportant." In 2015 one member of the Independent Panel, of Australian nationality, was given full access to the two files and assessed that they contained no information on the interception of communications about an attack on SE-BDY.³⁵ On June 9, 2015 the United States told the Panel that its search of NSA and CIA records had not found documents matching the materials requested.³⁵

The 2024 report described Dakota aircraft at Ndola equipped to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances, and wrote that there was "a reasonable evidentiary basis" to consider that these aircraft "may have overheard or relayed communications from or about flight SE-BDY."³¹

A January 31, 2003 email from Frank Koza, chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to GCHQ asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." The Observer published the memo on March 2, 2003.³⁶ Katharine Gun, who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.³⁷

In August 2013 Der Spiegel reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the International Atomic Energy Agency and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.³⁸

Footnotes

Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, "Communications Intelligence Activities," October 24, 1952, and NSCID No. 9, December 29, 1952, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 23, Documents 2a and 2b. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/ ; National Security Agency, "Origins of NSA" (Major General Ralph J. Canine first Director, November 4, 1952). https://irp.fas.org/nsa/oldind.html ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities, Senate Resolution 21, Hearings, vol. 5, "The National Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights," 94th Cong., 1st sess., October 29 and November 6, 1975 (testimony of Lt. Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.; committee statement on SHAMROCK read November 6), https://archive.org/details/Church-Committee-Hearings-Volume5-National-Security-Agency (text at https://archive.org/download/Church-Committee-Hearings-Volume5-National-Security-Agency/Vol5-NSA_djvu.txt). ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Admiral B. R. Inman to Be Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, hearing of February 3, 1981 (Washington: GPO, 1981). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/97inman.pdf ↩︎
Tim Harford, "Geeks v government: The battle over public key cryptography," BBC News, April 24, 2017. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39341663 ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Report of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, S. Rept. 103-1, Executive Summary, January 13, 1993. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1993_rpt/pow-exec.html ↩︎
"Proposed Grill Flame Protocol: Proposed SRI International Applied Remote Viewing Protocol," SRI 9-4107, March 23, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R001300070001-1, biography of Harold E. Puthoff, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300070001-1. ↩︎
Harold E. Puthoff and Russell Targ, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part Two: Research Report," final report covering January 1974 through February 1975, SRI International, December 1, 1975, section on "West Virginia Site (S3)," "West Virginia Site (S1)" and "Urals Site," CIA-RDP96-00788R001300030001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001300030001-5; and SRI Proposal for Research ISH 73-146, "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques, Part One," October 1, 1973, CIA-RDP96-00787R000700100001-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000700100001-5, which names Price in the same passage. ↩︎
John L. Wilhelm, "The CIA, the Pentagon and the Russians: The Military Potential of Parapsychology," The Washington Post (c. 1977), as reproduced in CIA-RDP96-00788R001700360003-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700360003-3. ↩︎
"Army's Role in a Sensitive, Close-Hold DoD Project," Army briefing script on psychoenergetics (undated), CIA-RDP96-00787R000200020023-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000200020023-5. ↩︎
Staff paper on termination of the Army Grill Flame program, 1982, and "Center Lane Historical Overview," CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001500180001-7 and CIA-RDP96-00788R000400060001-2. ↩︎
Memorandum, "Detachment G Reorganization," 902d Military Intelligence Group Security Support Detachment, September 22, 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700350013-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700350013-3. ↩︎
Memorandum for the record, "NSA Involvement in GRILL FLAME," Lt. Col. Robert J. Jachim, August 1982, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700230009-1, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r001700230009-1. ↩︎
INSCOM commanding general's memorandum and talking paper, May 4, 1984, CIA-RDP96-00788R001500180001-7. ↩︎
Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc. (1993), pp. 73 to 80, released by the Department of Justice Office of Information Policy on September 30, 2013 (AG/13-00675 (F)), https://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/nsa/DOJ-OIP-INSLAW_1993.pdf. ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, The INSLAW Affair, H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992, pp. 67 to 68, https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport. The report records these statements as Aviv's account to committee investigators. ↩︎
Affidavit of Eugene F. Yeates, Chief, Office of Policy, National Security Agency, Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency, Civil Action No. 80-1562 (D.D.C. 1980), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf). ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991). Hersh attributes the account of the KH-11 scheduling to an unnamed former NSA official. ↩︎
Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," The Guardian, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel ; memorandum full-text page, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document ↩︎
Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic ↩︎
National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html ↩︎
Guy Dinmore, Financial Times, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027 ↩︎
National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty ↩︎
David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree ↩︎
"New revelations in attack on American spy ship," Chicago Tribune, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/ ↩︎
A/76/892, paragraph 370. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/70/132, report of the Independent Panel of Experts, paragraph 84 (the United States response of June 9, 2015). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, September 12, 2019, paragraph 102. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/76/892, report of the Eminent Person, August 25, 2022, paragraph 32; A/78/1006, report of the Eminent Person, September 9, 2024, paragraph 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F76%2F892&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/78/1006, paragraphs 47 to 50. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F78%2F1006&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/70/132, paragraphs 76, 77 and 85. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, September 5, 2017, paragraph 7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/68/800, paragraphs 15.11 and 15.12. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
A/70/132, paragraphs 81 to 83. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf ↩︎
Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," The Observer, March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," Consortium News, January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/ ↩︎
House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun ↩︎
Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194 ↩︎

33 KiB Raw Blame History