The_Info_Web/30 - PROGRAMS & PROJECTS/INTELLIGENCE_OPERATIONS/Operation Mongoose.md

---
created: 2026-05-15
updated: 2026-10-15
title: Operation Mongoose
aliases:
  - Operation Mongoose
  - Operation MONGOOSE
  - Project Mongoose
  - MONGOOSE
  - The Cuba Project
tags:
  - Program
  - CIA
  - Cuba
  - AntiCastro
  - ColdWar
  - Kennedy
  - 1960s
  - TaskForceW
  - ZRRifle
  - SpecialGroupAugmented
category: "Intelligence Operation"
summary: "Covert action program against Cuba from November 1961, directed by Edward Lansdale, run by the CIA's Task Force W under William Harvey, and suspended after the October 1962 missile crisis."
start: 1961-11-01
end: 1962-10-31
location: "Miami, Florida / Washington, D.C."
relations:
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[Joint Chiefs of Staff]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "pretext list and JCS answer of April 10, 1962 that invasion was needed"
    start: 1962-03-05
    end: 1962-04-10
    fn: 17
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[Edward Lansdale]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose"
    start: 1961-11-30
    end: 1962-10-31
    fn: 1
  - type: head_of
    with: "[[William Harvey]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "chief of Task Force W and CIA project officer for Operation Mongoose"
    start: 1962-01-01
    end: 1963-01-31
    fn: 2
  - type: reported_to
    with: "[[NSC Special Group]]"
    role: "policy oversight body, the Special Group (Augmented), which approved important operations and received Lansdale's reports"
    start: 1961-11-30
    end: 1962-10-31
    fn: 3
  - type: subject_of
    with: "[[Fidel Castro]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "target of the program"
    start: 1961-11-30
    end: 1962-10-31
    fn: 3
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[JM-WAVE]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "CIA Miami station whose chief helped rent the truck that delivered equipment for the ZR/RIFLE assassination track"
    start: 1962-04-01
    end: 1963-02-15
    fn: 24
  - type: participant_in
    with: "[[ZR RIFLE]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "assassination track run in parallel by William Harvey, using poison pills given to Johnny Roselli"
    start: 1962-04-01
    end: 1963-02-15
    fn: 24
  - type: investigated
    with: "[[Church Committee]]"
    reverse: true
    role: "Senate inquiry into the Mongoose program and the assassination plots"
    start: 1975-01-14
    end: 1975-11-20
    fn: 2
---

Operation Mongoose was the Kennedy administration's covert action program against [[Fidel Castro]]'s [[Cuba]]. It was authorized in November 1961 after the failed [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion and suspended in late October 1962 during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. The planning papers called it "The Cuba Project," and the [[Church Committee]] used the name MONGOOSE for the whole operation.[^1] It was the largest CIA covert action program since the [[Korean War]], with [[Task Force W]], the CIA component, employing approximately 400 people at [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] headquarters and its [[JM-WAVE|JM/WAVE]] station in [[Miami]], several thousand Cuban exile agents, and a budget approaching $50 million annually.[^2]

### Origins

The April 17 to 19, 1961 invasion failed within three days. The CIA-trained exile brigade was captured, the expected popular uprising against Castro did not occur, and the operation had been run without adequate air support. [[John F. Kennedy|President Kennedy]] publicly accepted responsibility but was furious at CIA misjudgments. [[Robert Kennedy]], the attorney general, became the administration's main driver of continued pressure on Cuba.

At a White House meeting on November 3, 1961, President Kennedy authorized the development of a new program designed to undermine the Castro government.[^3] Robert Kennedy's handwritten notes of the meeting read: "My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists. Do not know if we will be successful in overthrowing Castro but we have nothing to lose in my estimate."[^3] [[Edward Lansdale]], whose counterinsurgency work in the [[Philippines]] had made him the administration's preferred irregular warfare figure, was assigned to survey the situation.

Lansdale's own proposal, as the Senate interim report recorded it, was to work with Cuban exiles who had opposed Batista and then turned against Castro. The objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba."[^4] He wanted to "develop means to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and activities inside Cuba." Lansdale testified that the plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people there and abort any eventual success."[^4] The program was built around a different theory from the Bay of Pigs: rather than a direct invasion, Mongoose would use covert operations to create conditions for internal Cuban resistance that could eventually produce an uprising without requiring direct American military intervention.[^2]

On November 30, 1961 the president recorded his decision to begin the project to "use our available assets * * * to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime."[^5]

### Command structure

The [[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Augmented)]] oversaw the program. Its regular members were [[McGeorge Bundy]], [[U. Alexis Johnson]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[John McCone]] and [[Lyman Lemnitzer]], augmented by Robert Kennedy and [[Maxwell Taylor]], who chaired it. [[Dean Rusk|Secretary of State Rusk]] and [[Robert McNamara|Secretary of Defense McNamara]] attended some meetings without being formal members.[^3] The Foreign Relations volume describes Robert Kennedy as "the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President."[^3] The Church Committee wrote that Robert Kennedy "played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation, a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General."[^2]

President Kennedy gave the Chief of Operations post to Lansdale rather than to his brother, because he distrusted the CIA after the Bay of Pigs.[^2] Lansdale coordinated the CIA's operations with those of the State and Defense departments. The CIA's operational implementation was headquartered at JM/WAVE, a large covert station at the [[University of Miami]]'s South Campus.[^2] Inside the CIA, [[William Harvey|Harvey]] was put in charge of Task Force W in late 1961 or early 1962, and he operated under guidance from the Special Group (Augmented).[^2] [[Richard Helms]] attended only seven of the forty Mongoose meetings, though he testified that he was "as interested" in the program as Harvey and McCone.[^2]

### Operations

Mongoose operations were grouped into intelligence collection, psychological operations, resistance development and sabotage. Intelligence collection was the central objective until August 1962. By the end of Phase I the CIA had infiltrated no more than eleven teams into Cuba, and Harvey's July memorandum counted nineteen maritime operations since April 1 that had aborted or failed.[^6] Psychological operations included radio broadcasts and leaflet drops aimed at the Cuban population and at Castro's military and political leadership.[^2] The effort to recruit and organize internal resistance networks was largely unsuccessful, and Castro's state security apparatus (G2) detected and penetrated the networks that were infiltrated.[^2] The station's cover included a legitimate South Florida business presence and several front companies.[^2] Sabotage: CIA and Cuban exile teams conducted multiple sabotage operations against Cuban economic targets, including sugar mills, oil facilities, and transportation infrastructure. The sabotage program was intended to create economic disruption that would increase popular dissatisfaction with Castro's government. The Church Committee wrote that "sabotage and paramilitary actions were also conducted," including "a major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban copper mine," and Lansdale testified that the sabotage acts involved "blowing up bridges to stop communications and blowing up certain production plants."[^7] The targets proposed to the Special Group in 1962, the operations approved and the sabotage program of 1963 are set out in the sections below.

### Planning and the thirty-three tasks

On December 21, 1961 Lansdale told the Special Group that the proposed operation was "primarily a political one, and that economic and paramilitary aspects are secondary to the political."[^8]

Lansdale's program review of January 18, 1962 set the goal as helping "the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace."[^1] The review assigned thirty-two tasks to the departments and agencies. Task 5 called on the CIA for a plan for the defection of top Cuban government officials, and the review said that a "name" defector would be "worth at least a million U.S. dollars." Task 29 asked the Defense Department for a contingency plan for "use of U.S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement." Task 30 asked the CIA for an operational schedule for sabotage inside Cuba.[^1]

Lansdale sent the attorney general a separate note on January 18 saying that his review "does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you."[^9] In a January 27 memorandum he wrote that "we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional program we are spurring." Lansdale testified that the touchdown play was "a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime," not an assassination. The memorandum proposed a defection project aimed at the top echelon of the Communist leadership in Cuba, and labor and youth actions.[^9]

On January 19, 1962 Lansdale added Task 33, a plan to "incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by chemical warfare means. Lansdale testified that the plan involved nonlethal chemicals meant to keep workers away from the fields for a 24 to 48 hour period. The task was approved for planning with the notation that it would require a policy determination. A study later found the plan unfeasible, and it was cancelled without being submitted to the Special Group (Augmented).[^9] The Foreign Relations volume notes that the January 19 memorandum "has not been found."[^10] Lansdale's January 26 memorandum assigned the Defense Department a separate presentation on the use of U.S. military force under Task 33b.[^10]

On January 30, 1962 the Special Group approved the thirty-three tasks for planning.[^9] The same day, Brig. Gen. [[William Craig]] forwarded to Lansdale a concept called Operation Bounty, described as a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists." Rewards ranged from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for "government officials," and a reward of "2 cents" was listed for Castro. Lansdale testified that the figure was meant "to denigrate * * * Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." He tabled the concept and never brought it before the Special Group.[^9]

In 1975 Parrott, an assistant to the president's military representative, testified about a plan that he attributed to Lansdale: spreading word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent, with an American submarine surfacing off Cuba to send up starshells as the sign. Parrott said that somebody dubbed the plan "Elimination by Illumination."[^11]

### The six-phase plan

On February 20, 1962 Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule designed to culminate in October 1962 with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime."[^9] For the "Resistance" phase he listed "attacks on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." The plan stated: "This should be a 'Special Target' operation." It continued: "Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police G-2 officials. Bloc technicians should be added to the list of targets. CW (Chemical Warfare) agents should be fully considered."[^12] Lansdale testified that the "actions" and "attack" referred to in this component meant killing.[^12] The Church Committee recorded that he conceded that his proposal to recruit gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targeted killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in the course of the revolt itself.[^9] He testified that early in the program he had suggested that working level representatives of the participating agencies get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelligence and for "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba.[^9] A CIA memorandum to the Special Group of January 24, 1962 had listed "crime syndicates" among possible intermediaries for the defection task.[^9]

The Special Group tabled the six-phase plan in February. On February 26 it asked Lansdale for an initial intelligence collection program only, and on March 1 it agreed that "the immediate objective of the U.S. during March, April, and May will be the acquisition of intelligence, and that other U.S. actions must be inconspicuous" and consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro.[^13] The Church Committee found that Lansdale was ordered to cut his plan back to intelligence collection for March through May 1962, rather than the five-stage plan culminating in an October popular revolution he had first conceived.[^14]

Lansdale's March 2 program review recorded that "the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress."[^13] The Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, dated March 14, 1962, made intelligence collection "the immediate priority objective" and provided that other actions would be taken "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt within the target area." The same guidelines stated that "final success will require decisive U.S. military intervention."[^15]

The Church Committee quoted a March 22 note that the Special Group added to the minutes of a March 16 session. It stated that "no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority."[^14] The earlier record of the March 16 session said that Lansdale and the group had been given "tacit authorization" to proceed under the guidelines. A covering note by U. Alexis Johnson recorded that the president expressed "skepticism" that circumstances would arise to justify overt military action by American forces, and that "It was clearly understood no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^15]

### Pretexts and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

At a March 5 meeting chaired by Rusk, the secretary spoke of "other tracks" that might be opened for the United States to achieve its objective. Lansdale's March 6 memorandum to [[Richard Goodwin|Goodwin]], in which he said he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, for the description, reported that Rusk mentioned proof of "their" plots in Latin America, and that there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, "as a notional clandestine action for which 'they' could be blamed." The same memorandum asked for "a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^16]

The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] answered with a list of what the Joint Staff called manufactured incidents. It included "a menu of attacks, riots, and acts of sabotage at [[Guantanamo Bay|Guantanamo]]," the blowing up of an unmanned ship, faked assassination attempts against Cuban exiles, terrorist bombings in Florida and Washington, the sinking of a boatload of Cuban refugees, a staged filibuster, the downing of a civilian airliner (actually a drone with no one on board), and the apparent shooting down of a U.S. Air Force fighter. The history of the Joint Chiefs states that "None of these incidents was supposed to involve actual killing." It also records the staff's warning that justification for intervention would "probably be more convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise."[^17]

On March 13, 1962 Chairman Lemnitzer forwarded the list to McNamara in a memorandum titled "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba."[^17] The memorandum, filed as JCS 1969/321 and now part of the [[Operation NORTHWOODS|Northwoods]] record, stated that "it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan" and recommended that "this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^18] The Joint Chiefs' history states that the provocation proposals "never moved beyond the discussion stage."[^17]

On April 5, 1962 the Special Group met, and the minutes recorded by [[Thomas A. Parrott|Parrott]] are cited in the Joint Chiefs' history as its conclusion that "the time had come to re-examine Mongoose's 'basic philosophy with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention.'"[^19] Taylor put two questions to the Service Chiefs, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so. Five days later, on April 10, the Joint Chiefs answered "yes" to both.[^17] The same day, Harvey sent McCone an appraisal of the plan. It stated that "Even if the current operational plan attains maximum success, it is our firm conclusion that it will not lead to the overthrow of the Castro regime and that if that overthrow is a serious objective of the U.S. Government, it will be necessary at the conclusion of the present plan to face the decision of military intervention, then prepare for it and intensify the preparation for any necessary revolt or provocation upon which it is based."[^20]

McCone's memorandum for the record of April 5 had recommended "that we review our policy and perhaps decide upon more aggressive action including direct military intervention."[^21] At the April 11 meeting, McCone's notes record that a "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that it was "a very thoughtful and useful document."[^22] The Joint Chiefs' history records that Rusk and McNamara held that "at this time" there was no way to justify an invasion, and that the group could only "play for the breaks" while taking "necessary steps to get into a position which would afford ... a maximum number of choices of action."[^17]

### The assassination track

The Church Committee documented a parallel track with [[Johnny Roselli]] that ran under the [[ZR RIFLE]] designation. The track was technically separate from the broader program but operationally intertwined with it, since Roselli's contacts ran through Sam Giancana and [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.|Santo Trafficante Jr.]] in the record. Helms succeeded [[Richard Bissell|Bissell]] as deputy director for plans in February 1962, and Harvey became the officer responsible for the project. In early April 1962, acting on what he described as "explicit orders" from Helms, Harvey asked the support chief to introduce him to Roselli. He met Roselli in Miami and told him to maintain his Cuban contacts but not to deal with [[Robert Maheu]] or [[Sam Giancana]], whom Harvey considered "untrustworthy" and "surplus."[^23]

On April 18, 1962 four poison pills were given to the support chief, who passed them to Harvey. Harvey arrived in Miami on April 21 and gave the pills to Roselli, explaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything." Roselli testified that he told Harvey the Cubans intended to use the pills against Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul Castro, and that Harvey approved the targets, saying "everything is all right, what they want to do."[^24]

Through the JM/WAVE station, Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of JM/WAVE rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli.[^24] Roselli reported in May that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba. On June 21 he told Harvey that the Cuban had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's report described the mission as "vague."[^24] Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962, when he was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would take place. A second team never left for Cuba. In early January 1963 Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses, and he terminated the operation in mid-February 1963.[^24]

Helms testified that he doubted he had been told when Harvey gave the pills to Roselli, and that he did not recall authorizing the assassination by that means. He said that the plots, "if not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms." He added: "I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within what was expected."[^25] McCone and other Kennedy administration officials testified that assassination was impermissible without a direct order.[^25]

Harvey testified that during the October 1962 crisis he ordered agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation. Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^26]

[[Evan Thomas]] wrote that Robert Kennedy demanded Harvey's removal.[^27] Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^28]

### Sabotage and the 1962 record

The Special Group's control procedures remained tight. Harvey complained to McCone that the requirement for advance approval of "major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence" was too restrictive, and asked that it be relaxed.[^14] On May 3, 1962 Harvey gave "a long oral report, summarizing all actions taken," and "No additional actions were authorized at this time."[^29]

Harvey's July 24, 1962 memorandum, written for Lansdale's end-of-phase report, stated that "As of 23 July, 477 CIA staff personnel are devoting full time to this effort." It said the plan had called for at least twenty-three teams to be infiltrated by July 31, but that the CIA "will have actually infiltrated no more than eleven such teams." Harvey attributed the shortfall primarily to "lack of policy approval by higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support," and to operational failures and aborts.[^6] Lansdale's July 25 review reported that the program had made Mongoose "numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state."[^30] The Church Committee put the staff of Task Force W at approximately 400 people at headquarters and in Miami.[^2]

On August 17, 1962 Taylor's memorandum to the president reported that the Special Group had reviewed Phase I and that the program had generated "the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country." It stated that "we perceive no likelihood of an overthrow of the government by internal means and without the direct use of U.S. military force," and that "We have ruled out those which would commit us to deliberate military intervention although we recognize that an unanticipated revolt might at any time force a decision for or against the support of such a revolt by U.S. forces." The president approved the papers on August 20. The attached Phase II guidelines stated that "Sabotage will be employed for this purpose on a selective basis," and that "While a revolt is not sought at this time, we must be prepared to exploit it should one unexpectedly occur."[^31]

The Special Group (Augmented) met on August 10, 1962 in a session chaired by Rusk, and the record of it is fragmentary. McCone's memorandum of April 14, 1967, written from retirement to Helms, recalled that "I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro. I took immediate exception to this suggestion." He said McNamara "heartily agreed." Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to Helms recorded that the issue had been raised by McNamara, and that it was "the obvious consensus at that meeting" that the subject was not to become a matter of official record.[^32] On August 13 Lansdale had directed Harvey to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in a proposed Phase II plan.[^33] The Inspector General's 1967 report on the Castro plots stated that the subject was raised at the meeting at State on August 10, 1962 "but it is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination," and that it "did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders."[^33][^34] The report lists as present Rusk, Johnson, [[Edwin Martin]], Goodwin and [[Robert Hurwitch]] for State, Taylor and Bundy (with Robert Kennedy's proxy) for the White House, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer and Lansdale for Defense, McCone and Harvey for the CIA, [[Edward R. Murrow]] and [[Donald Wilson]] for the [[United States Information Agency]], and Parrott as secretary. It states that Parrott's minutes make no mention of the subject of assassination, that McCone and Harvey both recalled that McNamara raised it, and that Harvey's notes show that Murrow also mentioned it. The Inspector General wrote: "Mr. McCone's recollection is probably faulty. It is quite clear that assassination came up for discussion at the 10 August meeting at State." McCone had recalled the suggestion as made at a Joint Chiefs meeting.[^34]

The report states that Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to Helms gave the excised portion of Lansdale's August 13 memorandum as the phrase "including elimination of leaders," that Harvey telephoned Lansdale's office and spoke with [[Frank Hand]], protested the use of the phrase and proposed that it be excised from all copies, that this was agreed to, and that Harvey deleted the phrase from his own copy. It records Harvey's statement to the Inspector General that Lansdale repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassinating Castro with him over the following weeks and that he always avoided such discussions, and his estimate that five persons in Lansdale's office were generally aware of the sensitive details of Mongoose and of Lansdale's interest in assassination as an aspect of it.[^34] Lansdale testified to the Church Committee that he never took up assassination with the attorney general or the president.[^9]

On September 12, 1962 Lansdale's memorandum to Taylor, Rusk and McNamara stated that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel." It followed a Special Group decision to replace a proposed task of provoking incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel with one of causing actions by Cubans against them.[^35] The Church Committee wrote that, despite the administration's urgings, the Special Group (Augmented) "shied away from sabotage and other violent action throughout 1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis."[^7] On August 30 the Special Group instructed the CIA to submit a list of possible sabotage targets, noting that "The Group, by reacting to this list, could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative."[^36] The Church Committee recorded that the attempt to blow up the Matahambre copper mine in Pinar del Rio province was approved on August 30, 1962.[^37]

Lansdale's Phase II projection of August 31, 1962, distributed in 21 copies, listed under action 27, "Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban industries and public utilities, with priority attention being given to transportation, communication, power plants, and utilities," a task assigned to the CIA. It named as the targets then selected the Matahambre mine at Santa Lucia, the Texaco refinery at Santiago, the Shell and Esso refinery at Havana, the Regla and Matanzas steam electric plants, the Moa Bay nickel plant, a paper mill at Cardenas and microwave towers. The projection stated that the sabotage would be conducted by commando teams infiltrated for the operation or by internal assets, and that "Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups." Action 32 proposed covert reduction of export crops through work slow-downs, destruction of bags and cartons and "sabotage of sugar mill machinery." Action 28 proposed sabotage of Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity.[^38] The Church Committee quoted the same memorandum as suggesting "encouraging destruction of crops by fire, chemicals, and weeds, hampering of harvest by work slowdown, destruction of bags, cartons, and other shipping containers."[^37]

At the October 4, 1962 meeting, chaired by Robert Kennedy, McCone recorded that Lansdale had pointed out "that no sabotage had been attempted," and that McCone himself stated that phase one was "principally intelligence gathering, organizing and training," that "no sabotage was authorized," and that "one operation against a powerhouse had been contemplated but was discouraged by group." Robert Kennedy took "sharp exception," stating that the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified action to his knowledge. Lansdale was instructed that "specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived," that "a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented," and that "the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied."[^39] The Church Committee recorded that the Special Group decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken.[^36] Harvey's October 8 memorandum asked the Special Group to approve the sabotage of Cuban-owned vessels "wherever and whenever secure access to them can be attained," normally in non-Bloc ports.[^40]

The October 1962 crisis changed the operational environment. Kennedy's agreement with Soviet Premier [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] to resolve the crisis included a private U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba. This commitment effectively foreclosed the political precondition on which Mongoose was premised, that internal Cuban resistance could ultimately trigger an American-supported uprising. Robert Kennedy began holding daily meetings with the operational representatives. On October 16, 1962 Helms recorded that the attorney general expressed the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with the program, and "pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice."[^41] On October 26 the Special Group (Augmented) agreed that three agent teams already on the way should be recalled and all dispatch plans suspended, and that "No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time," a decision to be reviewed in about a week.[^42] On October 30, 1962 the Special Group (Augmented) ordered a halt to all sabotage operations.[^43] [[Theodore Sorensen|Sorensen]] testified that Cuba was the "No. 1 priority" during the crisis and that assassination was never raised in the National Security Council or the Executive Committee.[^44]

A Church Committee staff index of Mongoose documents, released under the JFK Records Act, summarizes Lansdale's special memorandum of November 11, 1962 for the Special Group (Augmented). It records that when the CIA was asked on October 30 and 31 for the status of all operations, for an eyes only background memorandum requested by Roswell Gilpatric, it reported all militant operations ordered held at a stop and did not mention the Matahambre operation, although Lansdale had asked for specifics on militant teams inside Cuba. Lansdale's memorandum of November 13 states that the CIA did mention two action teams inside Cuba, one small team in central Cuba and one with about 200 men in western Cuba, under orders to collect intelligence and not to take actions. The index also summarizes Harvey's memorandum of November 14, 1962, which states that on November 3, 1962 a fragmentary report was received reflecting arrests by the Cuban authorities in Pinar del Rio of infiltrees, and that it was impossible to determine definitely whether the report referred to the two members of the Matahambre sabotage team. A memorandum dated November 21, 1962, summarized in the same index, records the recollection that in the October 30 conversation with Lansdale there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA team and one other team, and that Lansdale did not ask specific questions that would logically have led to discussion of the Matahambre operation.[^45]

The program was formally suspended in late 1962. Subsequent anti-Castro covert operations continued under different organizational structures and with reduced resources, but the large-scale coordinated program of 1961 and 1962 was not reconstituted. The suspension terms, including the no-invasion pledge, provided the diplomatic framework within which Cuba's revolutionary government survived for decades.[^46]

### Successor arrangements, 1963

Harvey was replaced as chief of Task Force W in January 1963 by [[Desmond FitzGerald]]. In a January 28, 1963 memorandum to McCone, Lansdale acknowledged that the program was being phased out.[^47]

On April 3, 1963 Gordon Chase of the National Security Council staff reported to Bundy on a meeting of the Cottrell Committee, identified in the memorandum's subject line as the Cuban Coordinating Committee. The committee discussed covert operations and agreed to recommend to the Special Group a program titled "Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops." The general consensus was that it was "O.K." for individual Cubans to attack Soviet troops or installations "(e.g. throw a grenade over the camp fence)," but undesirable for groups of Cubans to organize attacks.[^48]

On April 16, 1963 Parrott recorded that the "revived" Standing Group of the NSC would consider Cuba at its first meeting. Bundy chaired the group, whose task was "to deal with matters of national security which did not require Presidential determination, a role different from the earlier Standing Group which had been established to organize and monitor the work of the NSC." The members of the Special Group were also members of the Standing Group, with the exception of Harriman, who replaced Johnson for the State Department.[^49]

### Sabotage program of 1963

Bundy stated at an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba that no sabotage operations were then under way because the Special Group had decided that such activity was not worth the effort expended on it.[^50] On April 11, 1963 the Special Group considered papers dated April 9 from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, [[Sterling Cottrell]], one outlining three specific sabotage operations proposed for April 15 to May 15 and the other entitled "A General Sabotage and Harassment Program Against Cuba," and its members agreed that a searching examination should determine whether to change the present policy.[^51] The program paper of April 18, 1963, "A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba," stated that it included "those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals" and that it would "in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro."[^52] In a June 1963 note the Cuban government stated that a plane that took off from United States territory had attacked a Havana refinery at the end of April, and that a small plane loaded with explosives, apparently for an attack on Havana refineries, had been seized by United States customs.[^53]

On June 19, 1963 President Kennedy approved a sabotage program, following a meeting that morning attended by McNamara, General McKee, [[W. Averell Harriman]], McCone, FitzGerald and Bundy. The Special Group minutes record that FitzGerald outlined a program directed at four segments of the Cuban economy: electric power, petroleum refineries and storage facilities, railroad and highway transportation, and production and manufacturing. They record that the first operation was planned for mid-July and that raids would be conducted from outside Cuba using Cuban agents under CIA control, staged from a United States key. The Church Committee quoted the program's objective as "to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest."[^37][^50] On October 3, 1963 the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, several of which involved sabotage. On October 24, 1963 thirteen major sabotage operations, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery and a sugar mill, were approved for the period from November 1963 through January 1964.[^50]

At a meeting on November 12, 1963 FitzGerald reported four successful sabotage operations, against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill and a floating crane in a Cuban harbor. Asked what was planned for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges and harbor facilities, and the consensus was that the CIA should proceed with its planning looking toward January.[^54] On December 19, 1963 FitzGerald told President [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] that the CIA had directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations. A proposed attack on the Matanzas power plant was not approved at that time, and it was agreed in principle that low-risk sabotage efforts could go forward.[^55]

### Investigations

The Church Committee investigations of 1975 and 1976 disclosed the assassination planning component of Mongoose. The interim report, [[Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders]], was issued as Senate Report 94-465 in November 1975. Its Mongoose chapter drew on testimony from Lansdale, Harvey, Helms, Bissell and Parrott, and on the CIA Inspector General's report of May 23, 1967, a 143 page document prepared by John S. Earman.[^2][^34] The report's cover memorandum of May 23, 1967 states that it was prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, that the task was assigned to the Inspector General on March 23, 1967, and that it was delivered to the Director in installments beginning April 24, 1967. It states that the Director returned it on May 22 with instructions that the Inspector General retain it in personal, eyes only safekeeping, destroy the one burn copy and destroy all notes and source materials originated by those who wrote it, and that the stayback burn copy, the notes and the derived source materials were destroyed on May 23, 1967. The memorandum states that the ribbon copy was "the only text of the report now in existence." It lists as having read the text Helms, Earman, K. E. Greer and S. D. Breckinridge, and as filed with the report an Office of Security file, memoranda concerning William Harvey, certain Mongoose papers and Drew Pearson columns.[^34] The report disclosed that the CIA had maintained assassination plots against Castro through multiple administrations, and that it had not informed the [[Warren Commission]] investigating the Kennedy assassination. The report records that Helms failed to inform the Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked, and that McCone, who knew of the pre-Bay of Pigs plot during the Commission's inquiry, did not disclose it.[^56]

The program institutionalized the CIA-organized crime connection to the anti-Castro effort, which became entangled with Kennedy assassination conspiracy theories.[^46]

### Footnotes

[^1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 291, Program Review by the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), January 18, 1962, "The Cuba Project." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d291
[^2]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 139 to 149, including p. 140 (approximately 400 staff at CIA headquarters and Miami; Robert Kennedy's role; Harvey and Task Force W; Helms attendance, 7 of 40 meetings). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 270, Editorial Note on the November 3, 1961 meeting, including Robert Kennedy's handwritten notes of November 7, 1961, and the Special Group (Augmented) membership and Robert Kennedy's role. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d270
[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 140 to 141 (Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975, pp. 4 to 11). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^5]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 140, quoting the President's memorandum of November 30, 1961. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^6]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 359, Memorandum From the CIA Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), July 24, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d359
[^7]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 146 to 147 (Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975, p. 36; Helms memorandum of October 16, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^8]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 284, Memorandum for the Record, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, December 21, 1961, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d284
[^9]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 142 to 144 (Lansdale memorandum to the attorney general, January 18 and 27, 1962; Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975; Special Group minutes of January 30, 1962; Lansdale memorandum of February 20, 1962, p. 2; Craig memorandum of January 30, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^10]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 297, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), "Tasks 29 and 33, Cuba Project," January 26, 1962, including the editorial note that the January 19 memorandum has not been found. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d297
[^11]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 142 n. 2, quoting the testimony of Parrott, July 10, 1975, pp. 49-50. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^12]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., pp. 335 to 337 (Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975, pp. 106 and 107; Lansdale program review of February 20, 1962; CIA memorandum of January 24, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 309, Program Review, March 2, 1962, including the chronology for February 20, February 26 and March 1, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d309
[^14]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 145 to 146 (SGA minutes of March 5, 1962; Lansdale memorandum of March 2, 1962; SGA Memo for the Record of March 16, 1962 and note of March 22, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^15]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 314, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962, with the editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's covering memorandum of March 16, 1962 (Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson Files, Lot 90 D 410). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 310, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin), March 6, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
[^17]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, ch. 11, pp. 158 to 160, including the list of incidents, the March 13, 1962 memorandum "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba," the April 10 answer and the April 11 meeting. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^18]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, paragraphs 1 to 3, filed with the Joint Secretariat note JCS 1969/321 of March 12, 1962, National Security Archive Northwoods release, scanned pages 1 and 2. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^19]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, vol. VIII, ch. 11, p. 160, citing Thomas A. Parrott, "Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, Thursday, 5 April 1962," NARA JFK Records, RG 273, File 145-10001-10271. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 323, Memorandum From the Chief of Task Force W (Harvey) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone, "Operation Mongoose, Appraisal of Effectiveness and Results," April 10, 1962, paragraph 9. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 319, Memorandum for the Record by McCone on the Special Group-Mongoose Project, April 5, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d319
[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 325, Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, April 12, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
[^23]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 83 to 84 (Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, p. 65; Support Chief testimony of May 30, 1975, pp. 50 to 52; Rosselli testimony of June 24, 1975, pp. 27 to 30; Edwards memorandum of May 14, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^24]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 84 to 85 (Inspector General's Report, pp. 46 to 52, as quoted; Rosselli testimony of June 24, 1975, pp. 31 to 42; Harvey testimony of June 25, 1975, pp. 63 to 104). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^25]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 149 (Helms testimony of June 13, 1975, pp. 61 and 137; Helms testimony of July 17, 1975, pp. 16 to 17). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^26]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 149 n. 1 (Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80 to 81; Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34 to 35). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^27]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
[^28]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 334, Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, May 4, 1962, on the meeting of May 3, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d334
[^30]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 360, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Special Group (Augmented), July 25, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d360
[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 380, Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, August 17, 1962, with the attached Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, Phase II, and the approval note of August 20, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d380
[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 371, Editorial Note on the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), quoting McCone's memorandum of April 14, 1967 and Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d371
[^33]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), section on the August 10, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) meeting and the August 13, 1962 Lansdale directive to Harvey. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^34]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General John S. Earman, "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," memorandum for the record of May 23, 1967, and text pp. 112 to 115 and 118 (the Pearson story table), Secret, Eyes Only, 143 pages including cover memorandum; unsanitized copy, National Archives JFK Records 104-10213-10101. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf
[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 147 to 148 nn. 1 and 2 (Special Group minutes of September 9, 1962; Lansdale memorandum to Taylor, Rusk and McNamara, September 12, 1962, pp. 1 to 2). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^36]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 147 (SGA minutes of August 30, 1962 and October 4, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^37]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., p. 337 (approval of the Matahambre operation on August 30, 1962; Lansdale memorandum of August 31, 1962; Special Group minutes of June 19, 1963). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 399, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Special Group (Augmented), "Phase II, Operation Mongoose," August 31, 1962, actions 27, 28 and 32. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d399
[^39]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 8, Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone, October 4, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d8
[^40]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10, Memorandum From the CIA Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), "Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ship," October 8, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10
[^41]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 19, Memorandum for the Record by Deputy Director (Plans) Helms, "Mongoose Meeting with the Attorney General," October 16, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d19
[^42]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 82, Memorandum for the Record, Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, October 26, 1962, prepared by Thomas A. Parrott. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d82
[^43]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 147 to 148 (Lansdale memorandum for the record, October 30, 1962). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^44]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 148 (Sorensen testimony of July 21, 1975, p. 11). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^45]: Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, staff index cards on Operation Mongoose documents, June 1975 (cards headed "Matahambre Copper Mines," summarizing Harvey memorandum of November 14, 1962, Lansdale memoranda of November 11 and November 13, 1962, and a memorandum of November 21, 1962), National Archives JFK Records 157-10011-10002. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/jfk2023/157-10011-10002.pdf
[^46]: Rasenberger, Jim. *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs.* Scribner, 2011. Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994.
[^47]: National Security Archive, "Kennedy, Cuba and Operation Mongoose," briefing book, Documents 20 to 23, including Lansdale's memorandum to McCone of January 28, 1963. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba/2019-10-03/kennedy-cuba-operation-mongoose
[^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 307, Memorandum From Gordon Chase to the President's Special Assistant (Bundy), "Cuban Coordinating Committee, Covert Operations," April 3, 1963. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d307
[^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 316, Memorandum for the Record, Thomas A. Parrott, "Review of Cuban Operations for the Standing Group of the NSC," April 16, 1963. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d316
[^50]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 172 to 173 and nn. 1 and 2 (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, April 3, 1963; Memorandum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963; CIA Review Staff memorandum of July 11, 1975, "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba"). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
[^51]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 311, Memorandum for the Record, Special Group meeting, April 11, 1963. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d311
[^52]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 318, Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Special Group, April 18, 1963, attachment "A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d318
[^53]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 352, Telegram From Acting Secretary of State Ball and Kaysen to Bundy, June 1963, summarizing the Cuban protest note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d352
[^54]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 376, Memorandum for the Record, Cuban Operations, November 12, 1963. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d376
[^55]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 388, Memorandum of Meeting With President Johnson, December 19, 1963. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d388
[^56]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 269 to 270 and n. 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit