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Raw Blame History

The 1959 attempt on Qassim

At a National Security Council meeting on October 1, 1959, Allen Dulles said that Gamal Abdel Nasser "had urged the assassination plotters not to move too fast" and that, although rumors were generally wrong, "it was possible an attempt would be made on Kassem's life in the next two months."² On October 7, 1959 Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qassem was wounded in the shoulder in an assassination attempt, and the Director of Intelligence and Research, Hugh Cumming, suggested to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter that it might be the beginning of the coup about which the United States had been picking up rumors.² A Central Intelligence Agency memorandum on the attempt dated October 13, 1959 is printed in the same volume with its text not declassified.²

On April 10, 2003 the journalist Richard Sale reported in United Press International, citing almost a dozen former U.S. diplomats, British scholars and former U.S. intelligence officials, that Saddam Hussein was part of a "CIA-authorized six-man squad" tasked with assassinating Qasim. Sale wrote that a former senior State Department official said Saddam, in his early twenties, was installed in an apartment opposite Qasim's office to observe him, and that the writer Adel Darwish said the CIA handler was an Iraqi dentist working for the CIA and Egyptian intelligence. According to the report the attempt was "completely botched," Saddam escaped to Tikrit and then crossed into Syria, and was transferred by Egyptian intelligence to Beirut, where "the CIA paid for Saddam's apartment and put him through a brief training course," after which the agency "helped him get to" Cairo, where he was "watched over by CIA and Egyptian intelligence operatives." The report quotes Roger Morris, a former NSC staff member, as saying the CIA chose the Ba'ath Party "as its instrument," and says the CIA veteran Miles Copeland told UPI in the mid-1980s that the agency had "close ties" with Qasim's ruling Ba'ath Party. The report states that the CIA declined to comment.³

The 1963 coup

A Department of Defense memorandum of February 8, 1963 from Stephen O. Fuqua reported that the "consensus of members of State and CIA is that if the coup is successful, relations between the U.S. and Iraq will be considerably improved." A footnote to the memorandum quotes Robert W. Komer's note to President John F. Kennedy of the same date that the Iraqi revolution "is almost certainly a net gain for our side" and that the United States "ought to recognize as soon as we're sure these guys are firmly in the saddle."⁴ On February 9 Secretary of State Dean Rusk asked Kennedy for contingency authority to recognize the new regime, writing that "it would appear to be in our interest to grant early recognition."⁴

Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt wrote that Eric Jacobsen's article in Diplomatic History shows that American officials "were indeed in close contact with Iraqi Baathists before, during, and after their 1963 putsch," and that the CIA assisted the Ba'ath in "a systematic purge of Iraqi communists" in the days after February 8; the review quotes Peter L. Hahn as having written that declassified documents "offer no evidence" of Ba'ath contacts with American officials before the coup.⁵ The historian Bryan Gibson told Rudaw in 2015 that "there is enough evidence available today to question whether the US was behind the coup," while stating that U.S. policy from 1958 to 1975 led to "covert operations to support groups inside Iraq that were opposed to Moscow's imperial designs, like the Baath Party in the early 1960s."⁶

King Hussein of Jordan told Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, editor of Al-Ahram, in a conversation published on September 27, 1963 that "what happened in Iraq on 8 February had the support of American Intelligence" and that "on 8 February a secret radio beamed to Iraq was supplying the men who pulled the coup with the names and addresses of the Communists there."⁷ The historian Hanna Batatu wrote that arrests after the coup "were made in accordance with lists prepared beforehand" and that "it cannot be unerringly established where these lists came from or who compiled them"; he gave a Communist reckoning of no fewer than 5,000 killed from February 8 to 10, a figure of 340 Communists from a source in Iraq's Directorate of Security, and about 1,500 from a foreign diplomatic observer.⁷ Sale reported in 2003 that, according to former U.S. intelligence officials, the CIA gave Iraqi National Guardsmen lists of suspected communists who were then "jailed, interrogated, and summarily gunned down." The same report quotes a former very senior CIA official who denied the CIA was behind the coup ("We were absolutely stunned"), and quotes the writer Con Coughlin as saying that James H. Critchfield, then a senior CIA Middle East official, regarded the killing of Qasim and the communists "as a great victory."³

The Ba'ath return and the presidency

The Ba'athist government of 1963 was overthrown the same year, and a Ba'athist coup in 1968 put Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr in power. Saddam Hussein replaced al-Bakr as president on July 16, 1979. A few days later he purged party and armed forces members he considered a threat, and "hundreds were shot by firing squads."¹

Osirak

On June 7, 1981 aircraft of Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak bombing near Baghdad, which was under the government of Saddam Hussein.⁸ The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 487 on June 19, 1981. Its first operative paragraph "strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct." Paragraph 5 "calls upon Israel urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards," and paragraph 6 "considers that Iraq is entitled to appropriate redress for the destruction it has suffered, responsibility for which has been acknowledged by Israel."⁸

The Iran-Iraq War and the American tilt

On September 22, 1980 Iraq launched an offensive against Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988 in a stalemate.¹ A State Department information memorandum of October 7, 1983, from Nicholas Veliotes and Jonathan Howe to Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, analyzed a "possible U.S. shift from position of strict neutrality" in the war and set out financial, diplomatic and military options for a "tilt toward Iraq." The memorandum found that financial relief from international institutions was "so meager as not to provide significant relief," and it described Iraq as "the bulwark against Khomeinism," four years after the Iranian Revolution. It stated that the policy of strict neutrality "has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran's forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982."⁹

On December 7, 1983 the State Department instructed the United States Interests Section in Baghdad that Donald Rumsfeld wished to visit, and that he "probably will be carrying a presidential message for Saddam."¹⁰ On December 20, 1983 Rumsfeld met Saddam Hussein for 90 minutes and presented a letter from Ronald Reagan. Tariq Aziz attended on the Iraqi side. The embassy in London reported that Saddam said the United States was "urging other states to curtail arms sales to Iran," and that Rumsfeld told him the two countries had "shared interests in preventing Iranian and Syrian expansion."¹¹

On March 24, 1984 the State Department circulated briefing notes for a second Rumsfeld visit to Baghdad. The notes said relations had been "sharply set back" by "our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW use."¹²

On November 26, 1984 George Shultz met Aziz in Washington. In the memorandum of conversation Aziz says that Iraq's "superiority in weaponry now assures its defense," and Shultz remarks that "superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense," which Aziz acknowledges "may be true." Shultz told Aziz that the United States would maintain its opposition to "both the use and production of chemical weapons," a position he said "is not directed specifically at Iraq."¹³

Sale reported in 2003, citing a former Defense Intelligence Agency official, that during the war the CIA regularly sent a team to Saddam to deliver battlefield intelligence obtained from Saudi AWACS aircraft, and that the same official said he had signed a document sharing U.S. satellite intelligence with both Iraq and Iran "in an attempt to produce a military stalemate." The report also quotes Darwish as saying the CIA and DIA helped the February 1988 assault on the al-Faw peninsula by blinding Iranian radars for three days.³

The Teicher declaration

Howard Teicher, a former National Security Council staff member, signed a declaration on January 31, 1995 in United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al., Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida. The caption lists as defendants Carlos Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada, Teledyne Industries doing business as Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, Edward A. Johnson, Ronald W. Griffin and others.¹⁴ Teicher states that he served in the United States government from 1977 to 1987 and on its staff from early 1982 to 1987, with responsibility for the Middle East and political-military affairs, and that he had regular contact with Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey and Deputy Director Robert Gates.¹⁴

Teicher states that in the spring of 1982 Iraq "teetered on the brink of losing its war with Iran," that Iran found a gap in the Iraqi defenses between Baghdad and Basra, and that "United States intelligence, including satellite imagery," detected both the gap and the Iranian massing of troops opposite it. He states that Reagan decided in June 1982 that the United States "could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran," and that Reagan formalized the policy in a National Security Decision Directive that Teicher co-authored with another NSC staff member, Geoff Kemp, which Teicher says is classified "even its identifying number."¹⁴

Teicher states that Casey "personally spearheaded the effort to ensure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war," and that the United States supplied Iraq with "billions of dollars of credits," provided "U.S. military intelligence and advice," and acted "by closely monitoring third country arms sales to Iraq." He states that in 1986 Reagan sent a secret message to Saddam Hussein that Iraq should step up its air war and bombing of Iran, delivered by Vice President George H.W. Bush to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who passed it to Saddam, and that Teicher wrote Bush's talking points for the meeting with Mubarak.¹⁴ He states that he attended meetings in which Casey or Gates "noted the need for Iraq to have certain weapons such as cluster bombs and anti-armor penetrators," that Casey was "adamant that cluster bombs were a perfect 'force multiplier,'" and that "the CIA knew of, approved of, and assisted in the sale of non-U.S. origin military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to Iraq."¹⁴

Teicher also states that one of the reasons the United States refused to license or sell U.S.-origin weapons to Iraq was that non-U.S. supply "was sufficient to meet Iraq's needs," and that under Casey and Gates the CIA "made sure that non-U.S. manufacturers manufactured and sold to Iraq the weapons needed by Iraq." He states that "the highest levels of the United States government" decided in certain instances to make a key weapon component available to Iraq directly or indirectly, and that the provision of anti-armor penetrators was "a case in point."¹⁴ He describes a CIA program known as "Bear Spares," under which the United States made sure that spare parts and ammunition for Soviet-style weaponry were available to countries seeking to reduce their dependence on the Soviets, with Israel transferring captured stocks "to third countries or insurgent movements (such as the Afghan rebels and the Contras)" and Egypt manufacturing Soviet-design weapons and spare parts for Iraq and other countries, which Teicher states the United States "approved, assisted and encouraged."¹⁴

In the same declaration Teicher describes a 1984 Israeli approach, made in a meeting in Jerusalem that he attended with Rumsfeld, in which Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked Rumsfeld whether the United States would deliver a secret offer of Israeli assistance to Iraq. Teicher states that the United States agreed, that he traveled with Rumsfeld to Baghdad and was present when Rumsfeld told Aziz of the offer, and that Aziz "refused even to accept the Israelis' letter to Hussein," because Aziz told them "he would be executed on the spot by Hussein if he did so."¹⁴

Teicher states that his National Security Council files are held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Archives in Simi Valley, California, and that they contain his notes and memoranda from meetings with Casey or Gates.¹⁴ In the case, Teledyne Wah Chang Albany was charged with illegally providing zirconium to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq.¹⁴

Cardoen and the cluster bombs

According to Teicher, the Chilean manufacturer Carlos Cardoen supplied cluster bombs to Iraq. Teicher states that "the mere request to a third party to carry out an action did not constitute a 'covert action,' and, accordingly, required no Presidential Finding or reporting to Congress," and that the supply of Cardoen cluster bombs, "which were fitted for use on Soviet, French and NATO aircraft," was "a mere extension of the United States policy of assisting Iraq through all legal means in order to avoid an Iranian victory." He states that under Casey and Gates "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs and other munitions to Iraq."¹⁴

Teicher states that the highest levels of the United States government, including the NSC staff and the CIA, "were well aware of Cardoen's arrest in 1983 in Miami in a sting operation relating to the smuggling of night vision goggles to Cuba and Libya," and of the arrest and conviction of two Cardoen employees and Industrias Cardoen. He also states that Casey "directed the Secretaries of State and Commerce Departments that the necessary licenses required by Cardoen were not to be denied."¹⁴

Robert Parry reported that the government sealed the January declaration as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying; Consortium News reported that a federal grand jury heard testimony on a complaint over the defense's filing of an affidavit in the case.¹⁵¹⁶

The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne Wah Chang Albany had prepared the January 31, 1995 declaration and faxed it to him; that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987; that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18, the paragraphs on his files and on the CIA and Cardoen, were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact"; and that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." As to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration.¹⁷

The former Israeli intelligence officer Ari Ben-Menashe wrote in Profits of War that Cardoen was introduced in 1982 through a person at the South African arms company ARMSCOR to the Iraqi deputy chief of the General Staff for Procurement, that by early 1985 Cardoen was selling arms to Iraq "with the support of certain people connected with the U.S. government," among them Alan Sanders, "who had links to the CIA," and that Cardoen was producing cluster bombs "with a covert U.S. license." Ben-Menashe wrote that in August 1988 Prime Minister Shamir convened a task force headed by Avi Pazner to halt the flow of chemical weapons, missiles and nuclear technology to Iraq from the West, with Cardoen Industries the focus of the group's attention.¹⁸

Commerce Department licenses and the 1994 Riegle hearing

On May 25, 1994 the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing printed as S. Hrg. 103-900, United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans, on "United States Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War."¹⁹ The committee chairman, Donald Riegle, told the witnesses of a hearing in late fall 1992 at which the committee "found that some licenses had been granted by our own Commerce Department to ship certain dual-use items over there," and that "some of them had been shipped directly to Iraqi military installations."¹⁹

Gordon C. Oehler, Director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, testified for the Intelligence Community that before 1991 "there were four instances in which the Department of Commerce sought information on Iraqi export license applications, all dated in 1986." He said that Commerce asked for review "primarily when the licenses had significance to intelligence collection equities," and that the concern "was not so much Iraq, but whether there was a possibility the equipment would be diverted to the Soviet Union or other communist countries." His prepared statement says Iraqi procurement officers, "knowing full well the licensing thresholds, requested items that fell just under the denial thresholds."¹⁹ A committee report printed in the same volume lists biological materials provided by the American Type Culture Collection that were exported to agencies of the government of Iraq under export licenses issued by the Department of Commerce.¹⁹

Banca Nazionale del Lavoro

On August 10, 1992 the chairman of the House Banking Committee, Henry B. Gonzalez, delivered a special order on the House floor, printed in the Congressional Record under the heading "Details on Iraq's Procurement Network." He said that the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro branch in Atlanta "loan[ed] over $4 billion to Iraq between 1986 and 1990 without reporting the loans to bank regulators or the bank's headquarters in Rome," and that "over $2 billion of the BNL loans went to Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization otherwise known as MIMI."²⁰

Gonzalez stated that "our Government knew about the network, and as I have shown before, decided to tolerate its activity," and that "the policy was designed to see if Saddam Hussein could be turned into a reliable ally, according to the President, Secretary of State, and other officialdom of this Government." He said that "the Bush administration approved dozens of export licenses that allowed United States and foreign firms to ship sophisticated U.S. dual-use equipment to MIMI-controlled weapons factories." He also said that Saddam had entrusted MIMI to his son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, in 1988, and that the CIA believed Kamil was "probably the second most powerful man in Iraq."²⁰

In the BNL Scandal prosecution, the Atlanta branch's manager, Christopher Drogoul, was charged in the Northern District of Georgia with wire fraud, conspiracy and making false statements to government agencies, on the government's allegation that he concealed unauthorized loans and credit extensions totaling several billion dollars to agencies and instrumentalities of Iraq. He pleaded guilty in June 1992 to sixty counts of a 347-count indictment, and the district court allowed him to withdraw the plea on October 1, 1992. On September 2, 1993 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the government's motion to take depositions of Italian nationals in Rome.²¹

Gerald Bull and Project Babylon

On April 10, 1990 HM Customs and Excise officers at Teesport detained eight large steel tubes destined for Iraq. In a statement to the House of Commons on April 18, 1990 Trade and Industry Secretary Nicholas Ridley said Ministry of Defence experts advised that the tubes were components of a large-calibre armament, that the goods were "consistent with what is known of Dr. Bull's design" (referring to "the late Dr. Gerald Bull"), and that in 1988 the Department of Trade and Industry had been asked by Walter Somers and Sheffield Forgemasters whether licences were needed and had decided they were not.²² The engineer Gerald Bull's large gun was the basis of the Project Babylon program for Iraq.

On April 27, 1990 Gordon Brown asked in written questions in the House of Commons when the trade department had first been made aware "that Iraq was acquiring export material for a major gun or launcher," and what information it held on "non-military research done by the Space Research Corporation." Ridley answered that, "in the light of charges laid against an individual on 25 April, and in the light of the continuing investigation by Customs and Excise, it would be inappropriate to give any further information."²³

Matrix Churchill and the Scott Inquiry

Gonzalez told the House on August 10, 1992 that Matrix Churchill Corporation of Cleveland, Ohio was the United States base of the Al-Arabi Trading Company network, which he described as the mechanism MIMI used to acquire other front companies, and that through the London holding companies Technology Development Group and Technology Engineering Group Iraq controlled more than a dozen United Kingdom firms including TMG Engineering and Matrix-Churchill Ltd.²⁰

On November 10, 1992 Attorney General Sir Nicholas Lyell told the House of Commons that prosecution counsel in the Matrix Churchill case had informed the court that, in light of the evidence given by Alan Clark in cross-examination, it would no longer be right to seek a conviction, and that Lord Justice Richard Scott had agreed to conduct an independent inquiry.²⁴ The Scott Inquiry into the Arms-to-Iraq reported in February 1996. In the House of Commons debate of February 26, 1996 Trade Secretary Ian Lang said the Government welcomed "the central conclusions of the report: that there was no plot secretly to arm Saddam Hussein, and no attempt to suppress documents that could have led to a miscarriage of justice." Menzies Campbell asked whether the Government accepted the report's central conclusion that policy was changed and that the change was deliberately kept from Parliament, and Lang answered: "No, I do not; there is a difference between the Government and Sir Richard on that matter."²⁵

Bank of Credit and Commerce International

The BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report, published as Senate Print 102-140 in December 1992, states that the Bank of Credit and Commerce International "also made loans to Iraq, although of a substantially smaller nature" than those of BNL. The report says BNL "was, according to federal indictments, a significant financial conduit for weapons to Iraq." Its appendix lists the relationship among matters for further investigation, which "could produce further understanding of Saddam Hussein's international network for acquiring weapons."²⁶

PROMIS

The former Israeli intelligence officer Ari Ben-Menashe wrote in Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (1992) that he believed he was arrested in 1989 on an arms charge because he had threatened, on behalf of the Israeli government, to expose "what the Americans were doing with Promis if they continued their support of chemical weapons being supplied to Saddam Hussein's Iraq."¹⁸ In an affidavit of February 17, 1991 in the Inslaw litigation, Ben-Menashe stated that in 1989 in Chile Carlos Cardoen told him that Cardoen had brokered a sale of PROMIS Software Scandal by Earl Brian to a representative of Iraqi Military Intelligence, as summarized in the report of the Department of Justice special counsel Nicholas J. Bua.²⁷ The same report, dated March 1993, rejected "conclusively" Inslaw's assertion that Ben-Menashe had personal knowledge of Brian's distribution of Inslaw's software, and stated that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration" and that the program he described was a different software said to have been developed by the National Security Agency.²⁷

Gulf War, Iraq War and execution

On August 2, 1990 the Security Council adopted Resolution 660 on the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.²⁸ In the Gulf War a U.S.-led military campaign forced Iraq to withdraw in February 1991, and a U.S.-led invasion in March 2003 toppled his government.¹ Saddam was captured on December 13, 2003 at ad-Dawr, south of Tikrit, and L. Paul Bremer announced the capture on December 14.²⁹ On November 5, 2006 an Iraqi court sentenced him to death after a trial over the killing of 148 Shias from the town of Dujail in the 1980s, and he was hanged in northern Baghdad on December 30, 2006.³⁰

Footnotes

"Hussein, Saddam," Gale reference entry reproduced at Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/middle-eastern-history-biographies/saddam-hussein (birth April 28, 1937; Ba'ath Party membership in 1957; July 16, 1979 replacement of Bakr; purge and firing squads; offensive on September 22, 1980); BBC News, "Timeline: Iraq," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/737483.stm (1963 and 1968 coups; 1979 takeover; 1980 to 1988 war; June 1981 Osirak raid; 1990 invasion of Kuwait and February 1991 withdrawal; March 2003 invasion). ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, vol. XII, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, document 204 (memorandum of discussion at the 420th NSC meeting, October 1, 1959), document 205 (editorial note on the October 7, 1959 attempt) and document 206 (CIA memorandum of October 13, 1959, text not declassified). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d204 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v12/d205 ↩︎
Richard Sale, "Exclusive: Saddam key in early CIA plot," United Press International, April 10, 2003, https://www.upi.com/Exclusive-Saddam-key-in-early-CIA-plot/65571050017416/ (read at https://web.archive.org/web/2003/https://www.upi.com/Exclusive-Saddam-key-in-early-CIA-plot/65571050017416/). ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963, document 153 (memorandum from Stephen O. Fuqua to Sloan, "Iraqi Coup," February 8, 1963, with footnote 2 quoting Komer's memorandum to Kennedy) and document 154 (Rusk to Kennedy, February 9, 1963, "Request for Contingency Authority to Recognize the New Iraqi Regime"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d153 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d154 ↩︎
Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt, review of Eric Jacobsen, "A Coincidence of Interests: Kennedy, U.S. Assistance, and the 1963 Iraqi Ba'th Regime," Diplomatic History 37, no. 5 (2013): 1029-59, H-Diplo Article Review (quoting Peter L. Hahn, Missions Accomplished? The United States and Iraq since World War I, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 48). https://issforum.org/reviews/PDF/AR455.pdf Wolfe-Hunnicutt's own article is "Embracing Regime Change in Iraq: American Foreign Policy and the 1963 Coup d'Etat in Baghdad," Diplomatic History 39, no. 1 (2015): 98-125, DOI 10.1093/dh/dht121. ↩︎
"Scholar: US more supportive of Kurds than was previously believed," Rudaw, April 29, 2015 (interview with Bryan Gibson on his book Sold Out? US Foreign Policy, Iraq, the Kurds, and the Cold War). https://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/290420151 Gibson's earlier book is Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 (Praeger, 2010). ↩︎
Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 985-987, quoting the conversation of King Hussein of Jordan with Muhammad Hasanein Haikal, Al-Ahram, September 27, 1963 (excerpt reproduced at https://users.wfu.edu/cottrell/ope/archive/0305/0019.html). ↩︎
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 487 (1981), adopted at the 2288th meeting, June 19, 1981, preamble and operative paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6. https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-177213 ↩︎
Department of State, information memorandum from Nicholas A. Veliotes and Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, "Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality," October 7, 1983, pp. 1-3, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 22 (the quotation on the modification of neutrality is from the briefing book's description of the document). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq22.pdf ↩︎
Department of State cable State 346516, "Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq," December 7, 1983, secret, paragraph 2, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 27. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq27.pdf ↩︎
U.S. Embassy London to Department of State, London 27572, "Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein," December 21, 1983, secret, paragraphs 2 and 3, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 31. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq31.pdf ↩︎
Department of State cable State 086663, Shultz to Embassy Khartoum, "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," March 24, 1984, secret, paragraph 2, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 48. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq48.pdf ↩︎
Department of State cable State 352124, memorandum of conversation, "Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984," secret, paragraphs 3, 4 and 10 (transmitted November 29, 1984), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 60. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq60.pdf ↩︎
Declaration of Howard Teicher, United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al., U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, executed January 31, 1995, caption and paragraphs 1 to 18 (paragraph 1 service; 3 and 4 spring 1982; 6 June 1982 decision and NSDD; 7 Casey, credits, 1986 message; 8 cluster bombs; 9 non-U.S. weapons; 10 Israeli offer; 11 non-U.S. manufacturers; 13 Bear Spares; 14 Cardoen cluster bombs; 15 NSC files; 16 Cardoen and the CIA; 17 and 18 Cardoen arrest and licenses), National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 82, document 61 (the briefing book's description of the case appears in its document list). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/iraq61.pdf A sworn declaration of a witness, not an adjudicated finding. ↩︎
Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," Extra! (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm. ↩︎
Consortium News, "Iraqgate Cover-Up Goes After Defense Lawyers," undated, https://consortiumnews.com/archive/story1.html. ↩︎
Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al., No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679. ↩︎
Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; reprinted by TrineDay, 2015), chapter 9, "Promis," and chapter 17, "Agricultural Project." ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Impact on the Health of the Persian Gulf War Veterans, hearing of May 25, 1994, S. Hrg. 103-900 (subtitle: United States Chemical and Biological Warfare-Related Dual-Use Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War), including the testimony and prepared statement of Dr. Gordon C. Oehler, the chairman's remarks, and the May 25, 1994 committee report. https://archive.org/details/unitedstatesdual00unit ↩︎
Henry B. Gonzalez, "Details on Iraq's Procurement Network," Special Order, Congressional Record, House, August 10, 1992, pp. H7871-H7881 (loans and the "tolerate its activity" passage at H7871; export licenses and Hussein Kamil at H7872; Matrix-Churchill and the holding companies at H7873 and H7875). https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm (the host page is titled "US Armed Iraq Through BNL"). ↩︎
United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-8964, decided September 2, 1993). https://law.resource.org/pub/us/case/reporter/F3/001/1.F3d.1546.93-8964.html ↩︎
House of Commons, "Gun Components (Iraq)," statement by Nicholas Ridley, HC Deb, April 18, 1990, vol. 170, cc1425-32. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/apr/18/gun-components-iraq ↩︎
House of Commons, written answers, "Iraq (Arms Component Exports)," HC Deb, April 27, 1990, vol. 171, cc352-3W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1990/apr/27/iraq-arms-component-exports ↩︎
House of Commons, "Matrix Churchill," statement by Sir Nicholas Lyell, HC Deb, November 10, 1992, vol. 213, cc743-58. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/nov/10/matrix-churchill ↩︎
House of Commons, "Scott Report," HC Deb, February 26, 1996, vol. 272, cc589-694 (Lang's opening statement and the exchange with Menzies Campbell at c590). https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/26/scott-report The report is Sir Richard Scott, Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (HMSO, HC 115, 1995-96). ↩︎
John Kerry and Hank Brown, The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Senate Print 102-140, December 1992, ch. 24, "Appendix: Matters for Further Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/24appendic.htm ↩︎
U.S. Department of Justice, Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc., March 1993, section on Ari Ben-Menashe, including the summary of his affidavit of February 17, 1991 (p. 73). ↩︎
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990), adopted at the 2932nd meeting, August 2, 1990. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/94220 ↩︎
Kathleen Ridolfo, "Saddam Hussein Captured near Tikrit," RFE/RL Iraq Report 6, no. 52, December 15, 2003. https://www.rferl.org/a/1343152.html ↩︎
"Saddam Hussein executed in Iraq," BBC News, December 30, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6218485.stm ↩︎

36 KiB Raw Blame History