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2026-06-13 2026-10-12 Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS
Joint Chiefs
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Organization
USGovernment
Military
ColdWar
JointChiefs
OperationNorthwoods
OperationMongoose
BrotherSam
GulfOfTonkin
MoorerRadford
IranContra
CovertAction
Counterinsurgency
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U.S. Government Senior uniformed advisers to the president and defense secretary, whose 1961-62 Northwoods papers proposed staged incidents to justify war with Cuba and whose members appear in the Moorer-Radford and Iran-Contra records. 1942 Arlington, Virginia
type with reverse role start end fn
head_of Lyman Lemnitzer true chairman 1960-10-01 1962-10-01 5
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head_of Maxwell Taylor true chairman 1962-10-01 1964-07-01 5
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head_of Earle G. Wheeler true chairman 1964-07-03 1970-07-02 5
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head_of Thomas H. Moorer true chairman 1970-07-02 1974-06-30 5
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head_of Arthur W. Radford true chairman 1953-08-15 1957-08-15 5
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head_of John W. Vessey, Jr. true chairman 1982 1985-09-30 5
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head_of William J. Crowe, Jr. true chairman 1985-10-01 5
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member_of Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, named member under NSAM 124 1962-01-18 10
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participant_in Operation NORTHWOODS submitted JCS 1969/321 pretext memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara 1962-03-13 16
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participant_in Operation Mongoose Joint Staff pretext list, and JCS answer of April 10, 1962 that a Cuba invasion was needed 1961-11 1962-04-10 15
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participant_in Operation Brother Sam JCS assigned the code name and issued the implementing instructions 1964-03-31 22
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participant_in Gulf of Tonkin Incident JCS orders for the DeSoto patrol and attendance at the August 4, 1964 Pentagon meeting 1964-08-02 1964-08-04 24
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participant_in Moorer-Radford Affair JCS liaison office at the National Security Council received documents taken from briefcases 1970-09 1971-12 26
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participant_in Iran-Contra Affair chairmen and senior officers in 1985 Iran and hostage-rescue discussions 1985-03 1985-11 37
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participant_in Project Azorian Chairman Moorer's August 28, 1972 memorandum to the 40 Committee stated he could not support the mission 1972-08-28 36
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participant_in Operation Paperclip Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, a subcommittee agency of its Joint Intelligence Committee, operated the program; the 1946 policy statement was based on JCS recommendations 1945 1962-10-15 6
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participant_in Grill Flame Joint Staff Special Operations Division evaluated the unit's Iran hostage reports 1979-11-23 1981-01-13 51

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the senior uniformed leaders of the United States armed forces who advise the president, the National Security Council, and the secretary of defense. The JCS took shape during World War II and were given a statutory basis by the National Security Act of 1947, which named the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force as its members. A chairman was added in 1949 and a vice chairman in 1986.1234

Statutory basis

Section 211 of the 1947 act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the National Military Establishment, composed of the Army chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, the Air Force chief of staff, and the chief of staff to the commander in chief if there was one. Its duties included preparing strategic plans, providing strategic direction of the armed forces, and establishing unified commands, and the Joint Chiefs "shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense."1 The chairmanship was created by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, and Omar N. Bradley was sworn in as the first chairman on August 16, 1949.2 The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created the vice chairman position, and Robert T. Herres took office as the first vice chairman on February 6, 1987.3

Chairmen

The Joint History Office of the chairman's office records that Arthur W. Radford succeeded Bradley in August 1953, that Nathan F. Twining succeeded Radford in August 1957, and that Lyman Lemnitzer became chairman on October 1, 1960. Dwight D. Eisenhower chose Lemnitzer, in the president's judgment less parochial than his two predecessors.5 After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Lemnitzer's standing at the White House "dropped sharply," and John F. Kennedy recalled Maxwell Taylor to serve as military representative of the president. Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman on October 1, 1962.5 Earle G. Wheeler became chairman on July 3, 1964, and Thomas H. Moorer on July 2, 1970. The history says Moorer sometimes acted on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, informing the service chiefs only afterward, if at all.5 John W. Vessey, Jr. followed in 1982 and retired on September 30, 1985. William J. Crowe, Jr. became chairman on October 1, 1985.5

Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency and Operation Paperclip

The Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency (JIOA) was established in 1945 as a subcommittee of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee composed of the Army's director of intelligence, the chief of naval intelligence, the assistant chief of Air Staff-2 and a representative of the Department of State. The JIOA was given direct responsibility for operating the foreign scientist program, code-named Overcast and then Operation Paperclip. Its duties included administering the program's policies and procedures, compiling dossiers, and liaison with British intelligence officers operating a similar project, and it took over many of the activities of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee when that body ended.6

On August 30, 1946 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent Harry S. Truman a memorandum, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States," presenting a statement of policy to expand Paperclip to between 800 and 1,000 specialists, with the War Department responsible "for excluding from the program persons with Nazi or militaristic records." The memorandum stated: "This statement is based on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has been approved by the State, War and Navy Departments." Truman's notation reads "approved 9/3/46."7 Appendix B of the policy paper, SWNCC 257/22, provided that the specialists selected by the War and Navy Departments and those nominated by the Commerce Department would be consolidated, coordinated with the British, and "certified by a designated agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (identified in the text as the JIOA) as the list of German and Austrian specialists in science and technology, and that the War Department would supply biographical and professional data on specialists arriving in the United States to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the JIOA and the technical services.8

The JIOA's foreign scientist case files, 1945 to 1958, comprise personnel dossiers on more than 1,500 German and other foreign scientists, technicians and engineers brought to the United States under Paperclip and similar programs, among them the dossiers of Georg Rickhey, Walter Schreiber and Arthur Rudolph; the dossier of Wernher von Braun was never transferred to the National Archives. The JIOA was disbanded in 1962, and its records passed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on October 15, 1962.69

Special Activities and the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)

On January 18, 1962, National Security Action Memorandum 124 established the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) under the military representative of the president as chairman. Its members included the attorney general, the deputy under secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of central intelligence, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, and the administrator of the Agency for International Development.10 The Joint Staff's counterinsurgency office, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, is described in the JCS history as recently created in 1962. Victor H. Krulak, a Marine major general, held that post and attended the September 1962 conference in the Panama Canal Zone with Robert S. McNamara and Lemnitzer.11

Operation Northwoods

The Operation NORTHWOODS papers had an earlier origin. On April 26, 1961, a Joint Chiefs memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, JCSM-278-61, reviewed the Bay of Pigs invasion and recommended a military plan to overthrow the Fidel Castro government in Cuba. The memorandum cited Operation Plan 312-61 as one "which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and said: "One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States."12 The memorandum was signed for the Joint Chiefs by Earle G. Wheeler, who signed above the typed signature of Arleigh Burke, the chief of naval operations.12

On March 6, 1962, Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, wrote to the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Richard Goodwin, that he was asking the Defense representative, William H. Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."13 Brigadier General William H. Craig, U.S. Army, was the Defense Department's project officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962 and the Joint Chiefs' representative on Lansdale's interagency group; a member of the Joint Staff's Plans and Policy Division (J-5), he transmitted that group's requests to the Joint Staff and, when more help was needed, passed tasks to staff elements not cleared for Mongoose without stating their origin or purpose. In July 1962 he was succeeded by Brigadier General Benjamin Harris, who worked in the recently created office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities.14 The JCS history records that the Joint Staff then drew up a list of manufactured incidents: attacks, riots and sabotage at Guantanamo, a blown-up unmanned ship near Havana or Santiago de Cuba, faked assassination attempts and terrorist bombings in Florida and Washington, the sinking of a boatload of Cuban refugees, a staged filibuster against a Caribbean state, the downing of a civilian airliner that was in fact a drone, and the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Air Force fighter. According to the history, none of these incidents was supposed to involve actual killing.15

Lemnitzer signed the response, dated March 13, 1962, a memorandum entitled "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)." The Joint Chiefs recommended that the proposed memorandum "be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes," and that responsibility "for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff."16 The Joint Secretariat's cover note of March 12, 1962, numbered JCS 1969/321, records that the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations that month.17 The March 5 request from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for pretexts was followed on March 8 by a memorandum from the chief of naval operations, "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)," which the Joint Chiefs' submission cites in its discussion of a course of action the Navy had proposed for generated instances in the Guantanamo area.18

The enclosure states that its courses of action are "arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order." They include a series of incidents in and around Guantanamo meant to give "genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces": rumors on clandestine radio, Cuban exiles in uniform staging an attack over the fence, mortar shells lobbed into the base, and mock funerals for victims of a staged attack.19 A "Remember the Maine" incident was proposed in several forms, among them the destruction of a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay or of an unmanned vessel near Havana or Santiago, and a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The annex also proposed that a duplicate, prepared at Eglin Air Force Base, of an aircraft registered to a Central Intelligence Agency proprietary company in Miami would carry passengers under aliases on a chartered flight whose route would cross Cuba, while the real aircraft flew on as a drone that broadcast a "MAY DAY" report of attack by Cuban MiGs before it was destroyed.19

James Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer soon after the document reached him, left no doubt about his reaction. The paper remained classified until its release in 1997 under the Assassination Records Review Board.20 In July 1962 Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer, who was assigned to command NATO forces in Europe.5

On April 5, 1962, the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its "basic philosophy with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention." Maxwell Taylor put two questions to the service chiefs, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so. The JCS history records that the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both five days later.15 On April 12, John McCone recorded in his notes of the April 11 Special Group (Augmented) meeting that a JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions had been discussed and added: "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."21

Operation Brother Sam and the Gulf of Tonkin

On March 31, 1964, the Joint Chiefs assigned the code name "Operation Brother Sam" to the planned support of anti-Goulart forces in Brazil, under instructions implementing decisions in a State Department telegram to the embassy at Rio de Janeiro. The code name appears in telegram 5591 from the JCS to the Atlantic Command the same day.22

On July 27, 1964, the Joint Chiefs sent McNamara a memorandum on actions relevant to South Vietnam. Only three options met its criteria, one of which was "selected air missions using non-US unmarked aircraft against prime military targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."23 On August 2, 1964, Chairman Wheeler sent Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, commander in chief of the Pacific, telegram JCS 7680 authorizing the continuation of the DeSoto patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, with the closest approach to the North Vietnamese coast set at 11 miles. A follow-up message, JCS 7681, that evening stated that if the destroyers were attacked in international waters the commander should destroy the attacking forces, and that "pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized."24 On August 4, at 11:40 a.m., McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green met with the Joint Chiefs at the Pentagon, while the destroyer USS Maddox reported that an attack from unidentified vessels appeared imminent.25 At 12:04 p.m. the civilians moved to McNamara's office, where the options were refined to three, while the Joint Chiefs stayed in the dining room until 1:49 p.m. At their direction, General Burchinal telephoned McNamara at the White House to recommend the sharp limited response option.25

The Moorer-Radford affair

The Moorer-Radford Affair began with an inquiry into leaks of material to the columnist Jack Anderson in December 1971. The inquiry identified a Navy yeoman, Charles Radford, assigned since September 1970 to the Joint Chiefs liaison office at the National Security Council, as the source of papers taken from the briefcases of Henry A. Kissinger and Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and passed to the Joint Chiefs through the liaison office heads, Rear Admiral Rembrandt Robinson and his successor, Rear Admiral Robert O. Welander.26 The Foreign Relations volume records that H. R. Haldeman wrote in his diary that the yeoman was "the almost certain source" of the leaks, and that the president was shocked and agreed that strong action had to be taken, "but very carefully, since we don't want to blow up the whole relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff."26 At the December 21, 1971 meeting, John N. Mitchell warned that prosecution or a public confrontation would mean "You would have the Joint Chiefs allied on that side directly against you," and urged that the liaison office be moved out of the NSC and back to the Pentagon.26 A December 22 editorial note records the subsequent discussion of the Radford-Joint Chiefs pipeline.27 On December 24, 1971, Richard Nixon told Mitchell that "Our best interests are served by not, you know, raising holy hell," and Radford was transferred to the Northwest.28

On February 20, 1974, Radford testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that he had taken secret White House documents on the Vietnam peace talks and other matters at the request of two Pentagon admirals, beginning in 1970. The United Press International report says Radford named Robinson, who had been killed in a helicopter crash in Vietnam, as the officer who first taught him to take information the Joint Chiefs wanted, and said that Welander continued passing information to the office of Moorer. It quotes one of Moorer's aides telling him in the Pentagon: "Radford, you do good work." The same report says Moorer and Kissinger had both dismissed the pilfering as the independent work of an overzealous enlisted man. Harold Hughes said the testimony should trigger a deeper investigation and that "We must track down the other parties who were involved in this and question them to verify Radford's testimony." The committee chairman was John C. Stennis.29 The Chairmanship history records that during the 1971 and 1972 operations the commanders were in direct telephone contact with the Chairman several times a day, and that the directions relayed were carried out without informing the Chiefs in advance.30

On March 7, 1974, J. Fred Buzhardt, formerly general counsel of the Defense Department and then counsel to the president, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the report he had delivered to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on January 10, 1972. He testified that on December 14, 1971, the day Anderson's column appeared, Welander reported that its information came from four documents to which, he believed, only persons in his office had access, and that within the office access to all of them belonged to Welander, Radford and Chief Yeoman William R. Sessoms; that six persons were polygraphed, Welander and Sessoms with negative reactions and Radford with what he called "a positive reaction" on questions about disclosures to Anderson; that Radford's access to classified material was terminated on December 16, 1971; and that Radford was transferred to the Naval Reserve Training Center in Salem, Oregon.31 Buzhardt testified that Radford told investigators that he had routinely obtained information for Welander by surreptitious means from the National Security Council staff, including documents taken on Kissinger's first trip to China and on several of Haig's trips to Southeast Asia, that Welander said he had informed the chairman generally of the way the trip documents were obtained, and that Moorer told him he had assumed he had authorized access to all that came through the liaison staff.32 Questioned by Senator Sam Nunn, Buzhardt said of Moorer: "He did not specifically recall having ever been told how they were obtained."33 Asked by Senator Stuart Symington whether he knew where the decision against prosecuting Radford was made, Buzhardt answered: "It was communicated to me by Mr. Laird. Mr. Ehrlichman was involved in the investigation, the Attorney General was involved, as I know now, the matter was discussed with the President. But where the decision was actually made I don't know."34 Questioned by Senator Harold Hughes about an attempt to have Welander sign a statement of fact, Buzhardt said: "I guess I am not surprised that, not particularly surprised that Mr. Ehrlichman would ask Admiral Welander to sign a statement. I am no more surprised that Admiral Welander refused."35

Project Azorian

The CIA's own account of Project Azorian, the Hughes Glomar Explorer program, records that on August 15, 1972 Deputy Secretary of Defense Kenneth Rush forwarded to Richard Helms copies of three memoranda on the project from the chief of naval operations, Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, Dr. Hall, and the Defense Intelligence Agency director, Vice Admiral de Poix. All three, to varying degrees, judged the expected intelligence gain lower than the ad hoc committee's estimate, pointed to escalating costs and political risks, and generally felt that the program should be terminated; Zumwalt, while not recommending immediate termination, stated strong reservations. On August 28, 1972, Moorer, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, wrote to the 40 Committee that he could not support the proposed mission. He cited the reduced intelligence value of the target after the sinking of the submarine in March 1968, the escalating costs, and the possibility of a strong Soviet reaction if the nature of the activity became known. Helms answered on September 14 with a memorandum urging that the program continue. On September 18, 1972, Rush wrote that, because of continuing relationships and negotiations with the Soviet Union, he believed it undesirable to execute the mission as then planned, estimated the chances of technical success at 20 to 30 percent, and believed that the program should be terminated. On December 11, 1972, the President decided to continue the project, with the 40 Committee exercising policy supervision, in a memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to the committee's principals.36

Iran-Contra

The Iran-Contra Affair record in Lawrence Walsh's report on Defense Department officers places Vessey, then chairman, in several conversations. Vessey recalled that Caspar Weinberger told him "incredulously," after a White House meeting in the summer of 1985, that someone had proposed contacts with Iran.37 Vessey also recalled that Prince Bandar bin Sultan told him on two occasions that the Saudis were funding the contras, that on each occasion he reported the statement to Weinberger, and that Weinberger responded that he did not want the issue to become public; Vessey recalled as well that he or Weinberger, in a White House conversation with Robert McFarlane, urged McFarlane to support a proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia because the Saudis were funding the contras. In his April 17, 1987 deposition to the Select Committees Vessey described one occasion on which Bandar told him of a contribution to the contras.38 Weinberger's daily notes for March 13, 1985, made after a meeting with Vessey ("Jack Vessey in office alone"), record that he "passed on to him Jack Vessey's report that Bandar is giving $25 million to Contras" in a call to McFarlane the same day, and that he suggested "covert non-lethal aid of $14 mil."39 The memorandum for the record of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon on the breakfast of March 15, 1985 among Weinberger, William J. Casey and McMahon records Weinberger's statement that he had heard that Bandar had earmarked $25 million for the contras in $5 million increments.40 Walsh dates a meeting in Weinberger's office, attended by McFarlane, Colin Powell and Charles Gabriel, the acting chairman, to August 22, 1985, on the basis of Weinberger's diary, which records an Israeli message that two Iranians had offered to return some hostages.41 Weinberger's diary for November 21, 1985 records William J. Crowe, Jr. in office, regarding the president's decisions at Geneva and hostage rescue attempts.42

Unidentified anomalous phenomena

The Joint Chiefs of Staff published JANAP 146, the joint communication instructions for reporting vital intelligence sightings. An Air Force memorandum of October 20, 1948 to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee, stamped received October 26, 1948, and titled "Communication Instructions for Reporting Military Intelligence Sightings (CIRMIS) - JANAP 146," states that the Director of Communications had requested that the document be tabled for review and that "subject document was published without prior coordination with any intelligence agency."43 A chronology of the publication compiled for the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena lists JANAP 146(A) of September 25, 1950 as the start of CIRVIS reporting for commercial and military pilots and the first edition to add unidentified flying objects to the sighting categories.44

JANAP 146(C), promulgated by the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee on March 10, 1954 as an unclassified publication superseding 146(B), directs under article 201 that sightings of "Unidentified flying objects" be reported by aircraft while airborne, and under article 301 that the same category be reported "Immediately" by waterborne sources. Article 308 provides that all persons aware of the contents or existence of a MERINT report are governed by the Communications Act of 1934 and the Espionage Laws, that such reports "contain information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, 18 U.S. Code, 793 and 794," and that the unauthorized transmission or revelation of their contents "in any manner is prohibited."45 JANAP 146(E), issued in March 1966 as a Canadian-United States publication, lists "Unidentified flying objects" among the CIRVIS sightings and states in article 208 that reports "contain information affecting the national defense of the United States and Canada" and that "Any person who makes an unauthorized transmission or disclosure of such a report may be liable to prosecution under Title 18 of the US Code 793, Chapter 37, or the Canadian Official Secrets Act of 1939, as amended," adding that "This should not be construed as requiring classification of CIRVIS messages." Change No. 2 of May 17, 1977 directs CIRVIS-related photography to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.46

A December 1973 newspaper article in the CIA reading room, reviewing Donald Keyhoe's book on the subject, describes the directive as a Joint Chiefs of Staff secrecy directive covering armed forces airmen and airliner pilots, which directs immediate transmission of sighting data to the aerospace command and the nearest military command. Keyhoe is quoted on the directive: "Under the provisions of JANAP-146," Keyhoe explains, "hundreds of pilots reporting UFOs have been strictly muzzled and are still officially silenced."47

Luis Elizondo wrote that in 2016 the Joint Staff declined to give Jay Stratton's OPLAN Interloper an Alternative Compensatory Control Measures designation.48 The Department of Homeland Security special access program proposal for KONA BLUE, prepared in 2011 and released by DHS to the Department of Defense in February 2024, describes an Oral History Initiative to identify sources, and states: "Over past decades a number of high-level individuals in the military, intelligence, and even political sectors of our government have had various level of exposure/access to this subject area. This has included agency directors, members of the JCS and very senior individuals in the Executive Branch." The proposal adds that "Oral histories from individuals of the caliber referenced above are critical to this mission."49

Grill Flame evaluations

On November 21, 1979 Jackie Keith of the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, who represented the command on a Joint Chiefs of Staff task force established for the Iran hostage crisis, asked Lieutenant Colonel Murray Watt whether the Grill Flame remote viewing unit's assets could be used on the crisis.50 The final evaluation of the unit's hostage-situation reports, covering November 23, 1979 through January 13, 1981, was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Lenahan of the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff, Special Operations Division. In a memorandum of March 16, 1981 Watt wrote that the Joint Chiefs rated 37 percent of the reports as having some correlation or use and that his office, studying Lenahan's comments, raised the figure "to only 45%."51

Footnotes

  1. National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253, sections 211 and 212, 61 Stat. 495, 1947. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-61/pdf/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf ↩︎

  2. Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999 (Washington, 2000), chapter "The First Chairman" and Appendix 1 (extracts of Public Law 81-216, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, August 10, 1949). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit ↩︎

  3. Joint History Office, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999, chapter "The Vice Chairmen" and Appendix 2 (extracts of Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit ↩︎

  4. Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/218.html ↩︎

  5. Joint History Office, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999, chapter "The 1960s: Civilian Encroachment" (pp. 17-19, on Lemnitzer, Taylor and the second-term decision), chapter "The 1970s: Dealing with the Impact of Vietnam" (pp. 26-28, on Wheeler and Moorer), and the chairman sketches for Radford, Twining, Vessey and Crowe. https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit ↩︎

  6. National Archives and Records Administration, Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, "Records of the Secretary of Defense (RG 330): Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency," notice and description of "Foreign Scientist Case Files 1945-1958 (Entry A1-1B)." https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-330-defense-secretary ↩︎

  7. Acheson, memorandum for the President, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States," stamped August 30, 1946, with the notation "approved 9/3/46," Harry S. Truman Library document set on Operation Paperclip (FOIA release printed April 21, 2009), PDF page 13. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/trumanlibrary-paperclip.pdf ↩︎

  8. SWNCC 257/22, Appendix B, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists under Project Paperclip," paragraphs 2a and 3, Harry S. Truman Library document set on Operation Paperclip (PDF page 14). https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/trumanlibrary-paperclip.pdf ↩︎

  9. National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, entry 330.11.2, "Records of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency" (transferred to OSD from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 15, 1962; general correspondence 1946-52, foreign scientist case files 1945-58, Defense Scientist Immigration Program records 1958-70). https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/330.html ↩︎

  10. National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, "Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)," January 18, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. II, document 26. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d26 ↩︎

  11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964, chapter 11 and notes, including the September 1962 Panama Canal Zone conference with Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities; the note on the office "recently created" in 1962; and "SACSA-M 18-62 to DJS, 6 Mar 62, CJCS 334 Special Group (Counterinsurgency)." https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509 ↩︎

  12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-278-61, "Cuba," April 26, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, document 178. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d178 ↩︎

  13. Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310 ↩︎

  14. Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964, chapter 11 and note 2 (Craig as JCS representative on Lansdale's group; member of J-5; succeeded in July 1962 by Brigadier General Benjamin Harris); and Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, list of persons ("Craig, Brigadier General William H., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962"). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10 ↩︎

  15. Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964, chapter 11, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 158-160 (Operation Mongoose, the list of manufactured incidents, the April 5, 1962 Special Group conclusion, and the Joint Chiefs' answer five days later, April 10). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509 ↩︎

  16. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1969/321, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with Enclosure A (PDF pp. 1, 4 and 6). Declassified 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf ↩︎

  17. Joint Secretariat (F. J. Blouin and M. J. Ingelido), "Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Northwoods (S)," JCS 1969/321, March 12, 1962, page 2165, with the approval note (PDF pp. 2-3). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf ↩︎

  18. Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, memorandum for General Craig, "Operation MONGOOSE," March 5, 1962, and Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)," March 8, 1962, both cited in the footnotes to the Joint Chiefs' submission (PDF p. 5), and paragraph 3 of the submission (PDF p. 1). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf ↩︎

  19. JCS 1969/321, Enclosure A, appendix and annex "Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba" (PDF pp. 5-10), including the Guantanamo incidents, the "Remember the Maine" items, and paragraph 8 on the chartered airliner and the duplicate aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf ↩︎

  20. James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (New York: Doubleday, 2001), chapter 2, reproducing JCS memorandum 1969/321 of March 13, 1962. ↩︎

  21. John A. McCone, memorandum for the record on the April 11, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, April 12, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325 ↩︎

  22. Department of State to Embassy in Brazil, telegram 1301, March 31, 1964, with editorial note that the JCS assigned the code name "Brother Sam" (telegram 5591, JCS to CINCLANT, March 31, 1964), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 198. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d198 ↩︎

  23. Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Actions Relevant to South Vietnam," July 27, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. I, document 252. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d252 ↩︎

  24. Wheeler to Sharp, JCS 7680, August 2, 1964, 12:25 p.m., and JCS 7681, August 2, 1964, 6:49 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. I, documents 259 and 261. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d259 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d261 ↩︎

  25. Editorial note on the destroyer Maddox report of August 4, 1964, and the Pentagon meeting of McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. I, documents 272 and 276. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d276 ↩︎

  26. Editorial note on the Radford-Joint Chiefs of Staff case, citing The Haldeman Diaries and the White House tape of the conversation among Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman on December 21, 1971, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. II, document 164. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d164 ↩︎

  27. Editorial note on the December 22, 1971 Oval Office exchange between Nixon and Haldeman, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. II, document 165. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d165 ↩︎

  28. Transcript of the telephone conversation between Nixon and Haig, December 24, 1971, with the Nixon-Mitchell conversation of the same date cited in the editorial material, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. II, document 166. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d166 ↩︎

  29. "Pentagon spied on White House?," United Press International report from Washington, February 20, 1974, published in the Oregon Daily Emerald (Eugene, Oregon), February 21, 1974, p. 8. https://oregonnews.uoregon.edu/lccn/2004260239/1974-02-21/ed-1/seq-8/ ↩︎

  30. Joint History Office, The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999, chapter "The 1970s: Dealing with the Impact of Vietnam" (pp. 26-28, on the Moorer chairmanship and the operations of 1971 and 1972). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit ↩︎

  31. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, hearing, 93d Cong., 2d sess., part 3, March 7, 1974 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), testimony of J. Fred Buzhardt, pp. 4-7. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf ↩︎

  32. Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 7-8 (Radford's statements in his first polygraph examination; Welander's and Moorer's accounts to Buzhardt). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf ↩︎

  33. Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, p. 34. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf ↩︎

  34. Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 15-16. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf ↩︎

  35. Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 24-25. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf ↩︎

  36. Central Intelligence Agency, "Project Azorian: The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer," section "Early Political Feasibility Evaluation by 40 Committee," CIA reading room item 0005301269. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0005301269 ↩︎

  37. Lawrence E. Walsh, Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, Part VIII, notes 10 and 165 (Vessey, Select Committees deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 30-31; Weinberger diary, March 13, 1985, ALZ 0039320B-C). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  38. Walsh, Part VIII, note 168 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, pp. 6-7, and Select Committees Deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 5-8), note 169 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, p. 7, and February 11, 1987, p. 1) and note 170 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, p. 7, and deposition pp. 8-9). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  39. Walsh, Part VIII, text and note 165 (Weinberger diary, March 13, 1985, ALZ 0039320B-C). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  40. Walsh, Part VIII, text and note 167 (McMahon, memorandum for the record, March 15, 1985, ER 26,187-88 and ER 92-00116-17). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  41. Walsh, Part VIII, citing the Weinberger diary of August 22, 1985 (ALZ 0039606-07) and the calendar corroboration, and Colin Powell's deposition of June 19, 1987 on the summer 1985 meeting. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  42. Walsh, Part VIII, citing the Weinberger diary of November 21, 1985 (ALZ 0039802-03). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm ↩︎

  43. Air Force memorandum (AFOIR-CO) for the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee, "Communication Instructions for Reporting Military Intelligence Sightings (CIRMIS) - JANAP 146," October 20, 1948, received October 26, 1948, declassified, National Archives (NN3 941612). http://www.nicap.org/directives/Tabling%20of%20JANAP%20146%20by%20Joint%20Intel%20Committee%201948-10-26%20NARA.pdf ↩︎

  44. "JANAP 146; History and Evolution," chronology (US Regulation, date issued, key differences) circulated by the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena, November 20, 2006, compiled from A. F. Rullan. http://www.nicap.org/directives/146hist.htm ↩︎

  45. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, JANAP 146(C), Communication Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings from Airborne and Waterborne Sources, March 10, 1954, letter of promulgation and articles 201, 301 and 308. http://www.nicap.org/directives/JANAP-146C%20March%201954.htm ↩︎

  46. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JANAP 146(E), Canadian-United States Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings (CIRVIS/MERINT), March 1966, with Change No. 2, May 17, 1977, articles 201 and 208 and the photography instructions. http://www.nicap.org/directives/JANAP-146E_March%201966.htm ↩︎

  47. CIA reading room item cia-rdp90-00552r000303250002-8, newspaper article "U.S. Officials Persist in Secrecy, But UFOs Real, Claims Authority," December 1, 1973, reviewing Donald E. Keyhoe's Aliens from Space (1973). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000303250002-8 ↩︎

  48. Luis Elizondo, Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs (New York: William Morrow, 2024), pp. 147 to 202 (Interloper at pp. 147 and 186). ↩︎

  49. Department of Homeland Security, KONA BLUE prospective special access program records, Special Access Program proposal, Oral History Initiative, pp. 8-9 of 17 (DHS-003-6-0006/11), released with the letter of Acting Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, February 5, 2024. https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2024/06/AARO_DHS_Kona_Blue.pdf ↩︎

  50. Murray B. Watt, "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Involvement in Iran," memorandum for the record, December 3, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240018-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240018-6 ↩︎

  51. Murray B. Watt, memorandum for Colonel Chad B. White, "GRILL FLAME Evaluation in Support of Iranian Hostage Situation," March 16, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001000340001-4 ↩︎