The_Info_Web/20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Central Intelligence Agency.md

title	aliases	created	updated	tags	category	summary	start	location	relations
Central Intelligence Agency	Central Intelligence Agency CIA	2025-07-22	2026-10-14	Organization Intelligence Government USA CIA DarkAlliance	U.S. Government	The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the principal U.S. civilian foreign intelligence service, established by the National Security Act of 1947 and headquartered at Langley, Virginia.	1947-09-18	Langley, Virginia	type with role start end fn partner_of LEAA Office of Security release of police techniques through LEAA 1970 1973 5 type with reverse role start end fn employed_by Bobby Ray Inman true deputy director 1981-02 1982-04 32 type with role start fn participant_in Psychological Strategy Board Member agency; the Director of Central Intelligence chaired meeting M-8 1952-01-10 56 type with reverse role start end fn employed_by Max Millikan true Assistant Director, Research and Reports (1951); Special Consultant (1952) 1951-01 1952-03 57 type with role start fn funded Center for International Studies agency money reported to have set up the center in 1951; $300,000 reported in 1967 1951 64

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a primary intelligence-gathering organization of the United States government. In the context of psychic research, the CIA played a significant, albeit often covert, role in funding and overseeing programs aimed at exploring and utilizing psychic phenomena for intelligence purposes.¹

The CIA, particularly through its Photographic Intelligence Division, was instrumental in aerial reconnaissance efforts, especially with the U-2 spy plane, to monitor Soviet nuclear programs and later, the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona.²

Early Involvement in Psi Research

The CIA's interest in psi research dates back to the early 1970s, partly in response to rumors of extensive Soviet psi research. Following a number of scandals in the mid-1970s, including revelations of domestic spying, the CIA came under unprecedented scrutiny from Congress. This led to a preference for "clean" spying methods, making psychic intelligence an appealing, low-profile alternative to traditional human intelligence (HUMINT).¹

In 1972, the CIA, through officials like Kenneth A. Kress from the Technical Services Division (TSD) (later the Office of Technical Service, OTS), provided the initial funding for Hal Puthoff's psi research program at Stanford Research Institute (SRI). This funding, initially $50,000 for eight months, was contingent on the researchers demonstrating a repeatable psi phenomenon. The Office of Research and Development (ORD) also jointly managed the funding and contract.¹ In the late 1960s, the CIA had approached Hal Puthoff and Russell Targ at Stanford University to develop a program to counter a similar effort in the Soviet Union, which led to the creation of the Stargate Project, a program that trained individuals in Remote Viewing to spy on foreign targets. The program was reportedly highly successful, and Puthoff reported directly to the Director of the CIA and the White House.³

The Search for Behavioral Control

Since World War II the CIA searched secretly for ways to control human behavior, an effort that extended the wartime Office of Strategic Services quest for a truth drug and echoed both the Nazi experiments at Dachau and Albert Hofmann's discovery of LSD. The programs were triggered by the 1949 show trial of Josef Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary, whose glazed confession convinced Agency officials the Communists had developed a technique to render defendants zombielike; what began as defensive research quickly turned offensive, with documents stressing the goal of "controlling an individual to the point where he will do our bidding against his will and even against such fundamental laws of nature as self-preservation." The effort passed through Project Bluebird and Project Artichoke (1950), ARTICHOKE (1952), and finally Project MKUltra under the Office of Technical Service, with Richard Helms its most important sponsor and his protégé Sidney Gottlieb running it day to day. The research systematically violated the will of subjects drawn from groups officials considered expendable, mental patients, prostitutes, foreigners, drug addicts, and prisoners; as one Agency psychologist put it, operators lacked "a universal concept of mankind" and were willing to do things to foreigners they would not try on Americans. "It was strictly a patriotic vision," he said.⁴

Police Technique Program Through LEAA

From 1970 the Office of Security used the LEAA as its channel for releasing agency techniques to police. A June 10, 1970 memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence recommended LEAA as "the best vehicle to expand dissemination of this technique to all public law enforcement officials in the United States" for the Trace Metal Detection Technique, which the Director had declassified.⁵ The memorandum carried the concurrence of the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines. It stated that the only stipulation placed on recipients was that there be "no public connection between the technique and this Agency."⁵

Between June 1970 and December 1971 Office of Security representatives demonstrated the technique to approximately 35 police departments, three professional police associations and representatives of 83 other state and local departments. Outside the Washington area they appeared as "consultants" to LEAA, and "no mention was made of the Agency."⁶ The office provided six men to LEAA in 1970 for the same briefings.⁷

The Explosive Residue Detection Technique was declassified in March 1971, and the Security Office recommended dissemination through LEAA or the LEAA-funded National Bomb Data Center.⁶ On November 10, 1971 agency officers demonstrated it to LEAA staff and then met Lester Shubin and Marc Nerenstone, whom the memorandum describes as "both witting of the Agency's role in the development of the technique."⁸

A February 16, 1972 Office of Security memorandum records that LEAA never reimbursed the agency's travel costs "because of their desire to avoid unclassified (i.e. public) reimbursement of the money to CIA" and that "LEAA indicated it did not wish to be publicly affiliated with CIA."⁹ A May 9, 1973 survey of the Office of Research and Development recorded that an adhesive restraint, a non-lethal incapacitation system, had been made available to LEAA in August 1972. It said that "if they developed the system, it would be used for civilian crowd and riot control."¹⁰ On June 18, 1973 the House adopted by voice vote the Holtzman amendment to H.R. 8152, which the Office of Legislative Counsel summarized as prohibiting LEAA from using the agency's services, equipment, personnel and facilities.¹¹

Section 508 of the Crime Control Act of 1973 authorized LEAA to use federal agency services "(not including the Central Intelligence Agency)," a restriction absent from the 1968 statute.¹² An Office of General Counsel memorandum of October 15, 1973 concluded that the agency was not required to reject all LEAA requests and would decide each one case by case.¹³ In July 1978 the Office of Legislative Counsel reviewed reauthorization language that would bar any use of CIA services by LEAA, and reported that the agency did not endorse the provision but had no formal objection to it.¹⁴ On November 14, 1975 an agency officer briefed two staff members of a House select committee on the LEAA liaison. The memorandum records that the agency discontinued liaison with LEAA in 1973 as a result of the Kennedy-Holtzman amendment, and that one staff member asked where the agency fit into the operation of the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit, described as "a communications network between police intelligence agencies"; the officer answered that he knew of no such nationwide network in which the agency had taken part.¹⁵

The 1977 Notifications to Institutions

In the summer of 1977 the agency located MKULTRA documents it had believed destroyed in 1973, and notified the institutions named in them. Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner wrote to Senator Daniel K. Inouye on August 2, 1977 that the agency now held "the names of 185 non-government researchers and assistants" and the names of 80 institutions where the work was done or with which the researchers were affiliated. He listed them as 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or chemical or pharmaceutical companies and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, and 3 penal institutions. The names went to the Senate committee on a classified basis, and the Director wrote that he had "a legal obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names of the individual researchers without their consent."¹⁶

General Counsel Anthony A. Lapham wrote to each institution in August 1977. The letter stated that the institution "is included among the institutions at which some portion of this CIA-sponsored research appears to have been performed or with which one or more individuals performing some aspect of this research were affiliated," and that the agency "does not intend to reveal to the public the identities of any institutions that knowingly or unknowingly were involved in MKULTRA activities, or the names of individual researchers."¹⁷ On September 7, 1977 A. R. Cinquegrana of the Office of General Counsel sent the president of the New School for Social Research, John R. Everett, copies of the two MKULTRA subproject files relating to the school, with a letter stating that "the name of the School has been reinserted wherever it appears in the original documents."¹⁸ Lapham's letter of November 7, 1977 asked whether each institution had itself made its correspondence public, and wrote that "Where an institution has itself made public these relationships, there would seem to be little point in our continued refusal to confirm these facts."¹⁹ On March 17, 1978 Assistant General Counsel Cinquegrana wrote that the agency would presume an institution wished its identity protected if it did not respond by April 15, 1978.²⁰

The Senate Health Subcommittee invited the presidents of 20 institutions to testify on September 20 and 21, 1977. Only one accepted, and that president was not scheduled to testify because the others declined.²¹

Notable Operations and Impact

• Semipalatinsk: CIA officials tasked Pat Price with remote viewing a mysterious Soviet military research facility at Semipalatinsk. Price's detailed descriptions of a gantry crane and large metal spheres were later confirmed by satellite photography, significantly impressing the Agency and securing further funding for SRI's psi research.¹
• Soviet Diplomat and Fishing Pole: Norm Everheart utilized remote viewers to investigate a Soviet diplomat suspected of using a fishing pole for dead-drop operations, leading to the successful identification of a dead-drop site.¹
• KGB Agent Interrogation: Remote viewers, particularly Ken Bell, were used by the CIA to telepathically interrogate a captured KGB agent in South Africa, extracting information about a hidden pocket calculator used for coding messages. This operation, facilitated by Norm Everheart and Jim Morris, was considered a success despite its unconventional nature.¹
• Tehran Hostage Crisis: During the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979-1980, the CIA and Department of Defense tasked remote viewers hundreds of times to gather information on the hostages' whereabouts and conditions. While the remote viewers experienced burnout due to the relentless tasking, the data was considered "no worse" than that collected by more conventional methods.¹
• Moscow Embassy: The CIA tasked remote viewers to assess the new U.S. Embassy building in Moscow for Soviet bugs, even before its construction was complete. Remote viewers like Joe McMoneagle accurately described the building being riddled with thousands of bugs and metallic decoys, including girders welded into antennas, which was later confirmed by a CIA/NSA investigation. This prescient remote viewing highlighted a major security fiasco for the U.S. diplomatic efforts.¹

Intelligence Liaison with Israel

The CIA's relationship with Israeli intelligence, particularly Mossad, was extensive, involving 28 formal cooperative ventures in strategic intelligence since the 1950s. These arrangements were often financed off-the-books through a special contingency fund maintained by the Director of Central Intelligence. One such operation, code-named KK MOUNTAIN, involved millions in annual cash payments to Mossad in exchange for their agents acting as American surrogates in North Africa and other regions. Other agreements financed Israeli operations in Syria and the Soviet Union, where the CIA found it difficult to operate.²

In 1977, Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence, abruptly cut back intelligence liaison with Israel as part of a CIA restructuring. This led to a sharp reduction in the flow of intelligence from Israel to Washington, D.C.. However, the CIA's "embarrassingly inept reporting on Iran", particularly their failure to anticipate the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, forced the American leadership to turn back to Israeli help in anticipating world events. This contributed to the March 1979 KH-11 agreement, which granted Israel access to high-tech satellite imagery.²

Initially, the KH-11 satellite's images were tightly restricted, even to close allies like Great Britain. However, Jimmy Carter's decision to provide Israel with direct access to the KH-11 in March 1979 disrupted the satellite's careful scheduling and meant less access for some American intelligence agencies. This decision was suspected by some American intelligence officials as a reward for the Camp David Accords.²

Following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak bombing in June 1981, William J. Casey, Ronald Reagan's Director of Central Intelligence, ordered a review of Israel's use of the KH-11 intelligence-sharing agreement. The review found that Israel had expanded the agreement to extract virtually any photograph desired, including extensive coverage of western Russia and Moscow. This led to anger within the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency over the "very lax" management of the liaison agreement. Despite this, it was agreed that photographs would continue to flow to Israel, but with the initial 1979 restrictions re-enforced.²

Involvement with BCCI

The CIA used the Bank of Credit and Commerce International extensively, particularly in connection with covert U.S. operations in Central America.²² Even before Oliver North established his network for illegal payments to the Contras, the National Security Council used BCCI to channel money to them through Saudi Arabia.²² The CIA maintained accounts in BCCI for covert operations.²³

In 1986, the CIA issued a report stating that BCCI had owned First American Bank since 1982.²⁴ In 1991, Acting CIA Director Richard J. Kerr confirmed that the agency had used BCCI to move money around the world.²⁵ The CIA also maintained slush funds at BCCI branches, which were used for payoffs of Pakistani military officers and Afghan rebel leaders.²⁶

William J. Casey, former CIA Director, met secretly with Agha Hasan Abedi over a three-year period, discussing U.S. arms deals with Iran and the arming of Afghan resistance forces.²⁷ The CIA began using BCCI in the bank's earliest days, as it was establishing itself in countries where American intelligence had few assets.²⁷

The BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report recorded that the agency produced several hundred reports on BCCI between 1979 and 1991, including special analyses in 1985, 1986 and 1989. The 1985 report, delivered in January 1985 to the Treasury's intelligence liaison, Douglas Mulholland, who called it "dynamite," stated that BCCI secretly owned First American Bank; the 1986 report went to the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Security Council, Commerce and the Treasury, except for "the two agencies which would have had a statutory responsibility to begin investigations in response," the Federal Reserve Board and the Department of Justice. Acting Director Richard J. Kerr testified on October 25, 1991, that the agency's own use of BCCI had been "limited and routine," and acknowledged "extensive use of First American" for ordinary accounts. The agency denied any relationship between William J. Casey and Agha Hasan Abedi; the report recorded a contrary account from a BCCI official of meetings at the Madison Hotel in Washington, and the view of the agency's legal department that any such activity by Casey would have been undertaken "in his position as an advisor to the President, rather than in his position as Director of Central Intelligence," outside the agency's records.²⁸

Operations and Activities

The CIA sent the Inter-Services Intelligence agency enormous quantities of cash to keep things moving through Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War.²⁹ The CIA was responsible for obtaining arms and ammunition for the Mujahideen, but once delivered to Karachi, the ISI was responsible for moving the equipment.²⁹

In 1980, Jimmy Carter signed a presidential "finding" authorizing the CIA to aid the Afghan rebels in "harassment" of the Soviet occupying forces through secret supplies of light weapons and limited funds.³⁰ This became the largest covert-action program since World War Two.³⁰

Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman, 1981 to 1982

President Ronald Reagan nominated Bobby Ray Inman, then director of the NSA, as deputy director of Central Intelligence in 1981.³¹ The White House announced his resignation on April 21, 1982.³² The White House biography gives March 1982 as the date he resigned.³¹

The Philadelphia Inquirer reported that Inman had submitted his resignation during a "heated internal debate" over a secret counterintelligence study, and that he and other intelligence officials had since narrowed the study's scope. Its sources said two topics that Inman, Casey and FBI Director William Webster had feared might be included, the organization of U.S. counterintelligence agencies and deceptive Soviet missile telemetry, were not on the agenda approved by an interagency working group chaired by John Kohler of the intelligence community staff.³³ A CBS radio commentary of April 22, 1982 described William J. Casey, the director, as "a professional politician."³⁴

Senior Review Panel

The Senior Review Panel was an advisory body within the Director's area that reviewed draft national intelligence estimates and commented on them to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and the relevant National Intelligence Officer. In a 1991 letter printed in the Senate report on the nomination of Robert Gates, Gates wrote that "The SRP's sole function was to review draft national estimates and offer comments as a group to the DCI, the Chairman/NIC and the relevant NIO."³⁵ The Senate report records that James D. Theberge served on the panel from January 1986 until his death in January 1988, and that he had been hired on a three-days-per-week basis.³⁵ Panel memoranda in the CIA reading room carry his name among the signers of comments dated September 1, September 8, September 24, October 22 and December 1, 1987, alongside William Leonhart, B. McPherson and, on some, Richard L. Walker or Courtland D. Perkins.³⁶

UAP Research and Secrecy

The CIA has a long and complex history with the Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) issue. The agency has been a key player in the government's long-standing policy of secrecy and denial on the UAP topic. The Robertson Panel, a CIA-sponsored committee in 1953, recommended a policy of debunking UAP reports and using the mass media to ridicule the topic. This policy was highly effective in creating the stigma that has surrounded the UAP issue for decades.³

The CIA is also said to have operated a little-known "weird desk," which was responsible for investigating unusual medical issues, implants, and abductions related to UAP encounters. Dr. William Livingston, who served as a medical advisor to the Advanced Aerospace Threat Identification Program (AATIP), is described as having presided over this desk.³

In recent years, the CIA has been more involved in the official UAP investigation. The agency was a participant in the UAP Task Force and is a member of the current All-domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO). However, the agency's long history of secrecy and obfuscation on the UAP topic has led to a great deal of skepticism about its willingness to be fully transparent.³

Dark Alliance Investigation

The CIA's covert action division, the Directorate of Operations, created and managed the Contra project during the 1980s, with its Latin American Division headed by Dewey Clarridge from 1981 to 1984. The agency recruited Contra leaders including Enrique Bermudez in 1980 and Eden Pastora in 1981. The CIA maintained station chiefs in Costa Rica, notably Joseph Fernandez from 1984 to 1986, who were integral to Oliver North's illegal Contra resupply operation.³⁷

Contra Drug Trafficking and the Frogman Case

Federal law enforcement records and congressional testimony established that the CIA had reports of Cocaine being transshipped through Contra-linked facilities, including Ilopango Airbase in El Salvador. When defense attorneys in the Frogman Case obtained letters from CIA assets claiming seized drug money belonged to the Contras, the CIA's Costa Rican station cabled Langley that both men were assets of an organization that had "unwittingly received CIA support." CIA lawyer Lee Strickland flew to San Francisco and asked the prosecutor to ensure depositions did not go forward. The government returned $36,020 in seized drug money and a CIA cable declared: "CIA equities are fully protected."³⁸

Webb wrote that the pseudonymous agent Ivan Gomez, assigned to Costa Rica in 1982 as the CIA's liaison to the Contra armies, admitted during polygraph tests that he had laundered drug money, and that he was fired in 1989 for repeated polygraph failures concerning drug dealing.³⁸ The CIA Inspector General's 1998 report stated that CIA records show a CIA independent contractor used the alias "Ivan Gomez" in Costa Rica in the 1980s, that CIA records place the contractor in the United States during April and May 1982, and that he denied meeting Carlos Cabezas.³⁹

The Secret 1982 Agreement with the Justice Department

In early 1982, CIA director William J. Casey and Attorney General William French Smith signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted the CIA from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees - a category including agents, assets, and non-staff employees. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. The agreement remained in effect from 1982 to 1995.⁴⁰

Ilopango Obstruction

When DEA agent Celerino Castillo began investigating Contra drug trafficking at Ilopango, the CIA intervened directly.⁴¹ On April 25, 1986 the El Salvador station replied to a Costa Rica station cable of April 23 about Carlos Amador. The reply asked: "Based on that information, [El Salvador] Station would appreciate [Costa Rica] Station advising [DEA] not to make any inquiries to anyone re: hangar no. 4 at Ilopango since only legitimate [CIA] supported operations were conducted from this facility." The same cable stated that station air operations had moved from Hangar 4 into Hangar 5, which the station still occupied.⁴²

Inspector General Investigation

CIA Inspector General Fred Hitz testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in March 1998 that the CIA "did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity," including trafficking within the United States. His 400-page report documented CIA relationships with more than 50 suspected drug traffickers during the Contra war.⁴⁰

Iran-Contra Indictments

Multiple CIA officials were indicted during the Iran-Contra investigation. Clarridge was indicted on seven counts of perjury. Fernández was indicted on four counts. Alan Fiers pleaded guilty to withholding information from Congress. All were pardoned by former CIA director George H.W. Bush.³⁷

Interrogation videotapes and the 2004 to 2006 directorship

Porter Goss, a former House intelligence chairman, was confirmed by the Senate 77 to 17 on September 22, 2004, was sworn in at the White House on September 24, 2004, and announced his resignation on May 5, 2006.⁴³ His executive director, Kyle Foggo, the agency's No. 3 official, resigned in May 2006 while the Federal Bureau of Investigation was examining whether he had improperly helped the defense contractor Brent Wilkes obtain large CIA contracts.⁴⁴ Foggo pleaded guilty in 2008 to one count of defrauding the government and was sentenced on February 26, 2009 to 37 months.⁴⁵

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 2014 study of the detention and interrogation program records that the CIA destroyed videotapes of the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri on November 9, 2005, the day after the Senate's November 8 vote against an amendment to establish an independent commission on detainee treatment.⁴⁶ In an October 31, 2005 email, the CIA attorney John Rizzo wrote that he needed "to be the skunk at the party again."⁴⁶

Emails released by the United States Department of Justice in April 2010, under a Freedom of Information Act request by the American Civil Liberties Union, state that in November 2005 Jose A. Rodriguez Jr. told Goss and others he "felt it was extremely important to destroy the tapes and that if there was any heat, he would take it," and that Goss "laughed and said he'd be the one to take the heat." The same email states: "PG, however, agreed with the decision." NBC News reported that the email is an after-the-fact summary that does not prove Goss approved the destruction, that current and former intelligence officials have said he did not and was angry to find out, and that Rodriguez's lawyer disputed that.⁴⁷ On November 9, 2010, the Justice Department said special prosecutor John Durham would not bring criminal charges over the destruction.⁴⁸

Foreign Broadcast Information Service

The Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service became a unit of the agency in 1947. The War Department had sponsored the service from January 2, 1946, and the Director of Central Intelligence assumed control of it on July 31, 1946, before the National Security Act of 1947 replaced the Central Intelligence Group with the agency.⁴⁹ The administrative history of the service's record group lists the successor as "Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Intelligence Agency, 1947-."⁵⁰ The service's 1969 history says it came to the agency "almost mature, trained and disciplined, and ready to plunge immediately into the tasks outlined for it."⁵¹

Within the agency the service sat under the Assistant Director for Operations. In January 1947 the Assistant Director presented a propaganda analysis program to the PRC, approving the proposed program but excluding "interpretative analysis" from its scope, and the requested staff was twelve at $61,000 a year. Lawrence K. White was announced as deputy chief of the service on January 9, 1947.⁵²

The service's functions were folded into the Open Source Center in November 2005. The release announcing the center said the Director of the CIA would administer it on behalf of the DNI.⁵³

Psychological warfare liaison, 1946 to 1952

In July 1946 the Central Intelligence Group's Central Planning Staff closed out its liaison with the Security Advisory Board of the Office of War Information. The memorandum designated a liaison officer to the Director, charged him with recommending when appropriate whether the board should be placed under the National Intelligence Authority, and recorded that no further action by the Security Branch was required. The board was being replaced by a new Security Advisory Board under the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.⁵⁴

In July 1947 the Assistant Director of the Office of Research and Evaluation complained to the chief of the Group's Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the arrangement for the Group's seat on the coordinating committee's subcommittee for psychological warfare was "not operable." The principal member came from the Office of Special Operations and the alternate from the Office of Research and Evaluation, and the memorandum was addressed to the Executive Director.⁵⁵

On January 10, 1952 the eighth meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board was chaired by Walter Bedell Smith, the Director of Central Intelligence. Its members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William C. Foster, and the Under Secretary of State, James E. Webb. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, attended as a participant from the Department of State.⁵⁶

In a letter stamped January 30, 1951, Max Millikan wrote that he had "gone on leave from MIT to head up the Office of Research and Reports in this Agency."⁵⁷ On October 29, 1951 he wrote to a prospective recruit that for "the last nine or ten months" he had been "trying to put together for General Smith an organization to do economic research."⁵⁸ A memorandum of conversation dated January 22, 1951 lists "Dr. Max Millikan, Central Intelligence Agency" among the participants in a discussion with State Department officers of psychological intelligence, and records his concern that splitting that work among several organizations would produce the shortcomings of decentralization.⁵⁹ A memorandum of March 6, 1951, addressed to the intelligence chiefs of the State Department, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, was issued "For the Director of Central Intelligence" over Millikan's typed name as Assistant Director, Research and Reports.⁶⁰ A letter he signed as Assistant Director on November 26, 1951 says that "Walt Rostow at the Center for International Studies has sought my assistance in finding him someone to help out with some research."⁶¹ A letter of March 3, 1952 addresses him as Special Consultant, Central Intelligence Agency.⁶² In an interview note of March 5, 1952 titled "Origin of PSB," a CIA historian recorded that Millikan "participated in a 'contract study,' State and MIT," which the note identifies as the "Troy Project," and that its study "had considerable to do with the creation of the PSB."⁶³

The agency's financing of the Center for International Studies at MIT is recorded in several places. Patrick Oster reported in the Washington Post of September 11, 1977 that the agency "secretly financed a research project at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in order to gain data on how to turn Russian scientists into CIA agents," as part of "Project MK-ULTRA," with a foundation as a "front," and that the researcher was affiliated with MIT's Center for International Studies, "which was set up in 1951 with CIA money and had as its first director Max F. Millikan, a former assistant director of the agency."⁶⁴ Time reported on February 24, 1967 "directly and without masquerade" "$300,000 to finance M.I.T.'s topflight Center for International Studies," and that MIT then "terminated the contract 'for practical, not moral reasons.'"⁶⁵ Andreas Lowenfeld, of the State Department's Office of Legal Adviser, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee, said of the center in 1951 and 1952: "they had some kind of contract with the CIA," and, asked whether he knew it was a CIA operation, "I was never formally told, but it became apparent."⁶⁶

The third progress report on NSC 59/1 records that the CIA had been assigned a continuing study of balloons as propaganda carriers and "instructed to stockpile one thousand large-sized propaganda balloons of the best type presently available."⁶⁷ The Project Troy report had placed balloon work inside political warfare, stating that "The balloon problem is a part of political warfare. It cannot be handled by a separate balloon shop."⁶⁸

In February 1961 Allen Dulles wrote to Millikan, then director of the center, that he was "very deeply interested in the proposal in your letter of January 23," and expected to attend at least part of the meetings of May 18 to 21, 1961, at which the center would review its first ten years.⁶⁹

A CIA document titled "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" describes an annual contract under which research projects were "mutually agreed upon case by case" between the agency and the Center for International Studies, within an annual authorization of $500,000. The document is undated.⁷⁰ A CIA list of recipients of Office of Research and Reports unclassified studies names Max Millikan, Walt Rostow, Wilfred Malenbaum, Everett Hagen, Evsey Domar and Thomas Schelling, each listed under the Center for International Studies.⁷¹ A CIA memorandum dated February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, carries the item's text stating that Richard Bissell and Robert Amory "lean ideologically on CIA's outriding auxiliary at MIT, the Center for International Studies," and that they have been influenced by the theories of "W. W. Rostow, director of the Center."⁷² The MIT President's report for 1962 to 1963 refers to "Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies."⁷³ A CIA Office of Legislative Counsel journal entry of March 3, 1967 records that "the Agency has Senator Fulbright's letter concerning a Center for International Studies, MIT, and is preparing a response."⁷⁴

Footnotes

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1. Schnabel, Jim. Remote Viewers. Dell, 1997. ↩︎

2. Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991. ↩︎

3. Elizondo, Luis. Imminent. William Morrow, 2024. ↩︎

4. John D. Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate. Times Books, 1979, Chapters 1-2. ↩︎

5. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, "Release of Trace Metal Detection Technique to Law Enforcement Officials," June 10, 1970, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150029-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150029-5 ↩︎

6. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum on the relationship with LEAA, CIA CREST document C01435053. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435053 ↩︎

7. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, "Relationship with Police," CIA CREST document C01435041. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01435041 ↩︎

8. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security memorandum, "Technology Transfer of ERDT to LEAA," November 10, 1971, CIA-RDP83B00823R000600150007-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000600150007-9 ↩︎

9. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, memorandum for the Deputy Director of Security, "LEAA Request for Agency Support, Where's What," February 16, 1972, CIA-RDP83B00823R000200060130-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83b00823r000200060130-3 ↩︎

10. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Research and Development, "Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 9, 1973, CIA CREST document 01430445, entry on LEAA. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01430445 ↩︎

11. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, summary of the Holtzman Amendment, CIA-RDP76M00527R000700190003-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp76m00527r000700190003-1 ↩︎

12. Crime Control Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-83, sec. 508, 87 Stat. 211 (August 6, 1973). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-87/pdf/STATUTE-87-Pg197.pdf ↩︎

13. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of General Counsel, memorandum for the record, "CIA Action on LEAA Requests," OGC 73-1954, October 15, 1973, CIA-RDP75-00793R000300160026-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00793r000300160026-2 ↩︎

14. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel memorandum, "Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Reauthorization Legislation," July 12, 1978, CIA-RDP81M00980R001800050017-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp81m00980r001800050017-0 ↩︎

15. Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the Review Staff, "Briefing of House Select Committee Staff re LEAA Relationships," November 14, 1975, CIA-RDP89B00552R000100110024-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp89b00552r000100110024-1 ↩︎

16. Turner, Stansfield, Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, August 2, 1977, in New School digital object NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 96-103 (figures at p. 101; Privacy Act at p. 102). https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027 ↩︎

17. Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, August 1977 (stamped August 15, 1977), in NS010102_000027, PDF pp. 94-95. ↩︎

18. Cinquegrana, A. R., Office of General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, September 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 7. https://digital.archives.newschool.edu/index.php/Detail/objects/NS010102_000027 ↩︎

19. Lapham, Anthony A., General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, November 7, 1977, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 3. ↩︎

20. Cinquegrana, A. R., Assistant General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency, letter to John R. Everett, March 17, 1978, in NS010102_000027, PDF p. 1. ↩︎

21. Thomas, Jo, "Extent of University Work for C.I.A. Is Hard to Pin Down," New York Times, October 9, 1977, CIA reading room clipping CIA-RDP88-01315R000300390007-3. ↩︎

22. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 126. ↩︎

23. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 147. ↩︎

24. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 12. ↩︎

25. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 9. ↩︎

26. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149. ↩︎

27. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 347. ↩︎

28. Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm ↩︎

29. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 334. ↩︎

30. Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 341. ↩︎

31. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Biography of Bobby Ray Inman," December 16, 1993. https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1993/12/1993-12-16-biography-of-bobby-ray-inman.html ↩︎

32. George C. Wilson and George Gardner Jr., "Leaving for Private Industry: Inman Quitting," The Washington Post, April 22, 1982, CIA CREST copy CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230020-3 ↩︎

33. Michael J. Sniffen, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 1982, CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230017-7 ↩︎

34. CBS Radio network commentary, April 22, 1982, "Admiral Inman Resigns," CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5. https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP90-00552R000201230019-5 ↩︎

35. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf ↩︎

36. CREST Senior Review Panel memoranda CIA-RDP93T00837R000400110005-3 (NIC-03024-87, September 1, 1987), CIA-RDP93T01222R000100010013-9 (NIC-03595-87, September 8, 1987), CIA-RDP92T00306R000300090020-0 (September 24, 1987), CIA-RDP93T00451R000300080006-5 (NIC-04228-87, October 22, 1987) and CIA-RDP93T00451R000400110014-1 (December 1, 1987). https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00837r000400110005-3, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t01222r000100010013-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp92t00306r000300090020-0, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000300080006-5, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp93t00451r000400110014-1 ↩︎

37. Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue and Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom" ↩︎

38. Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom" ↩︎

39. CIA Office of Inspector General, Report of Investigation Concerning Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States, Volume I, January 29, 1998, findings on Carlos Cabezas and "Ivan Gomez." https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html ↩︎

40. Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done" ↩︎

41. Webb, Gary. Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends" ↩︎

42. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Chapter X, part 2, section C.2 (Carlos Amador: CIA cables of April 23 and April 25, 1986). https://oig.justice.gov/special/9712/ch10p2.htm ↩︎

43. Congressional Record, Senate, September 22, 2004, Rollcall Vote No. 187 (yeas 77, nays 17). https://irp.fas.org/congress/2004_cr/goss092204.html ; "Porter Goss Sworn in As New CIA Director," PBS NewsHour, September 24, 2004 (sworn in by Andrew Card in the Oval Office). https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/government_programs-july-dec04-cia_09-24 ; Norris, "Goss Is Latest to Leave Bush Administration," NPR transcript, May 5, 2006. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/5387220 ↩︎

44. JURIST, "FBI probes CIA defense contracts after top official resigns," May 2006 (FBI probe of Foggo's possible help to ADCS). https://www.jurist.org/news/2006/05/fbi-probes-cia-defense-contracts-after ; Paul Blumenthal, "MSNBC: Foggo Gone," Sunlight Foundation, May 8, 2006 (resignation reported Monday). https://sunlightfoundation.com/2006/05/08/msnbc-foggo-gone/ ↩︎

45. NBC News, "Ex-CIA executive gets 37 months in prison," February 26, 2009 (one count of fraud, 27 counts dropped, Judge James Cacheris, 37 months as requested). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna29413971 ; Associated Press, "CIA officer gets jail time for fraud," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 27, 2009. https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/nation_world/20090227_CIA_officer_gets_jail_time_for_fraud.html ↩︎

46. Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency's Detention and Interrogation Program, S. Rept. 113-288 (December 2014), executive summary and findings, sections on the 2005 videotapes ("The CIA destroyed the CIA interrogation videotapes the following day"; Rizzo's October 31, 2005 email). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf ↩︎

47. NBC News, "Ex-CIA chief agreed with tape destruction," April 2010 (e-mails released by the Justice Department under an ACLU FOIA request; "PG, however, agreed with the decision"; the disputed account). https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna36589750 ↩︎

48. JURIST, "No charges to be filed in CIA videotape destruction case: DOJ," November 2010 (spokesman Matthew Miller on Durham's decision; Durham appointed 2008 by Attorney General Michael Mukasey). https://www.jurist.org/news/2010/11/no-charges-to-be-filed-in-cia-videotape-destruction-case/ ↩︎

49. Joseph E. Roop, "Foreign Broadcast Information Service. History. Part I: 1941-1947" (Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release April 1969), pp. 279, 299-300 and 303. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. ↩︎

50. National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 262, administrative history. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/262.html. ↩︎

51. Roop, Part I, p. 2. https://archive.org/details/ForeignBroadcastInformationServiceHistoryPart11941-1947. ↩︎

52. Roop, Part II (CIA Directorate of Intelligence, August 1970), pp. 2 and 151-152. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-06741690. ↩︎

53. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI Announces Establishment of Open Source Center," News Release No. 6-05, November 8, 2005. https://irp.fas.org/news/2005/11/odni110805.html. ↩︎

54. Central Intelligence Group, Central Planning Staff, memorandum "Liquidation of Security Advisory Board, OWI (C.I.G. Liaison with New Security Advisory Board under SWNCC)," July 22, 1946. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP78-04007A000300040024-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp78-04007a000300040024-9 ↩︎

55. Central Intelligence Group, Chief, ICAPS, to the Executive Director, memorandum "CIG Membership on SWNCC Subcommittee for Psychological Warfare," July 21, 1947. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP84-00022R000400100046-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp84-00022r000400100046-0 ↩︎

56. Central Intelligence Agency, Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB M-8), January 10, 1952, membership and other participants. CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP80-01065A000500100033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80-01065a000500100033-6 ↩︎

57. Max F. Millikan, letter stamped January 30, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003100150032-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003100150032-1 ↩︎

58. Max F. Millikan, letter of October 29, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79-01157A000200020002-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-01157a000200020002-2 ↩︎

59. CIA, memorandum of conversation, "Psychological Intelligence," January 22, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003500180026-1. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003500180026-1 ↩︎

60. CIA, "Report of Intelligence Project Initiations, February 1951," memorandum of March 6, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030008-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp60-00213a000200030008-3 ↩︎

61. Max F. Millikan, letter of November 26, 1951, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01731R003000200096-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01731r003000200096-6 ↩︎

62. Stuart A. Rice, Assistant Director for Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget, letter to Max F. Millikan, March 3, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00662R000300120004-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00662r000300120004-5 ↩︎

63. A. B. Darling, note of interview with Max Millikan, "Origin of PSB," March 5, 1952, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP83-00036R000400050039-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp83-00036r000400050039-0 ↩︎

64. Patrick Oster, "CIA Envisioned Soviet Scientists as U.S. Agents," Chicago Sun-Times, reprinted in the Washington Post, September 11, 1977, p. A-9, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP88-01315R000400460003-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp88-01315r000400460003-8 ↩︎

65. Time, February 24, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP84-00161R000400210135-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp84-00161r000400210135-8 ↩︎

66. U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Internal Security Subcommittee, extracts from hearings (Part 3) on State Department security and passport regulations, testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3 ↩︎

67. FRUS, The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955, Document 57 (third progress report on NSC 59/1), paragraph 12. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d57 ↩︎

68. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8, excerpt of the Project Troy report to the Secretary of State, February 1, 1951 (balloon chapter). https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP79S01011A000900030019-8 ↩︎

69. Allen W. Dulles, letter to Max F. Millikan, February 27, 1961, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80B01676R003500160028-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01676r003500160028-9 ↩︎

70. CIA, "Principles Governing Budgetary Relationships Between CENIS and CIA" (undated; released 2000), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP67-00059A000200090016-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp67-00059a000200090016-2 ↩︎

71. CIA, "Recipients for ORR Unclassified Studies" (undated list), CIA reading room document CIA-RDP63-00314R000100180007-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp63-00314r000100180007-7 ↩︎

72. CIA memorandum from the Assistant to the Director, February 16, 1959, forwarding a National Review Bulletin item, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000100260064-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000100260064-9 ↩︎

73. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, President's Report Issue for the year ending July 1, 1963, p. 165, MIT Libraries, DSpace. https://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/160055 ↩︎

74. CIA Office of Legislative Counsel, journal entry, "Friday, 3 March 1967," CIA reading room document CIA-RDP69B00369R000200020044-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp69b00369r000200020044-4 ↩︎