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---
title: Henry A. Kissinger
aliases:
- Henry A. Kissinger
- Henry Kissinger
- Henry Alfred Kissinger
- Heinz Alfred Kissinger
- Kissinger
created: 2026-05-14
updated: 2026-10-14
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- KeyFigure
- Person
- CIA
- Politician
- Israel
- Nuclear
- ColdWar
- Chile
- Cambodia
- Wiretaps
- OperationCondor
- EastTimor
- BancaNazionaleDelLavoro
- Iran
- Kurds
- BCCI
- Pakistan
- 1960s
- 1970s
- 1980s
summary: "National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Nixon and Ford, documented in the NSC wiretaps, Track II against Allende, the Condor demarche, Kurdish covert aid and the BNL advisory board."
born: 1923-05-27
died: 2023-11-29
location: "Fürth, Germany"
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Rockefeller Brothers Fund]]"
role: "director, Special Studies Project"
start: 1956
end: 1958-06-30
fn: 5
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]]"
role: "attended some sessions, Quantico I"
start: 1955-06-05
end: 1955-06-10
fn: 4
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]]"
role: "panel member, Quantico II"
start: 1955-08
end: 1955-11
fn: 4
- type: head_of
with: "[[National Security Council]]"
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
start: 1969-01-20
end: 1975-11-03
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: "[[State Department]]"
role: "Secretary of State"
start: 1973-09-22
end: 1977-01-20
fn: 7
- type: head_of
with: "[[40 Committee]]"
role: "chairman"
start: 1969-01-20
end: 1975-11-03
fn: 22
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Project FUBELT]]"
role: "principal, Track II"
start: 1970-09-15
end: 1970-11-30
fn: 20
- type: founded
with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
role: "co-founder with Brent Scowcroft"
start: 1982
fn: 63
- type: member_of
with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
role: "international advisory board member"
start: 1985
end: 1991-06
fn: 63
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Richard Nixon]]"
role: "Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
start: 1969-01-20
end: 1974-08-09
fn: 28
- type: reported_to
with: "[[Gerald R. Ford]]"
role: "National Security Advisor, then Secretary of State"
start: 1974-08-09
end: 1977-01-20
fn: 60
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Harvard University]]"
role: "faculty member, Department of Government and Center for International Affairs"
start: 1954
end: 1971
fn: 3
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
role: "study director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy"
start: 1955
end: 1956
fn: 3
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Halperin v. Kissinger]]"
role: "defendant"
start: 1973-06
end: 1992
fn: 11
- type: member_of
with: "[[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]"
role: "consulting contract for Kissinger Associates, July 1986 to June 1988"
start: 1986-07-01
end: 1988-06-30
fn: 65
---
Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923 to 2023) was a German-born American political scientist and diplomat who served as [[United States Secretary of State]] and as National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that in the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College, and that at the end of that course he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the [[White House]] warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
Hersh wrote that Kissinger approached inauguration day on January 20, 1969, convinced that Israel's nuclear ambitions were justified and understandable; that once in office he and Nixon endorsed those ambitions and shared a contempt for the 1968 [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|Nonproliferation Treaty]]; and that Kissinger told his staff in the first months of 1969 that [[Japan]], as well as Israel, would be better off with the bomb than without it, believing that nuclear weapons were essential to the national security of both nations. Hersh described Kissinger's view as pragmatic: most major powers would eventually obtain nuclear weapons, and the [[United States]] could benefit most by helping them do so rather than engaging in futile exercises in morality.[^2]
Hersh wrote that Kissinger's support for Israel's nuclear weapons program was widely known to the Israeli leadership, and that it was signaled by the decision in 1969 to end the [[Floyd L. Culler, Jr.|Floyd Culler]] inspections of Dimona, a move that became American policy for the next two decades, signifying that Israel had gone nuclear and the United States would not intervene.[^2]
### Biography
Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923, in [[Fürth]], Bavaria, to a German-Jewish family. The family emigrated to the United States in 1938. He was naturalized as a United States citizen on June 19, 1943, while serving in the [[U.S. Army]].[^3] He earned a B.A. summa cum laude from [[Harvard College]] in 1950, an M.A. in 1952, and a Ph.D. in 1954, with a dissertation later published as *A World Restored* (1957).[^3]
He died on November 29, 2023, at his home in [[Kent, Connecticut]], at the age of 100.
### Harvard Career
Kissinger's Harvard career began in 1951. He was a member of the faculty from 1954 until 1971, with a leave of absence beginning January 1969 when he entered government service.[^3] He directed the [[Harvard International Seminar]] from 1951 to 1971,[^3] a program that brought rising foreign policy figures from Europe and Asia to Cambridge each summer. From 1957 to 1960 he served as Associate Director of Harvard's [[Center for International Affairs]].[^3] He directed the [[Harvard Defense Studies Program]] from 1958 to 1971. His last seminar at the Center for International Affairs was held on December 16, 1968, before he departed for [[Washington, D.C.]] to serve as Nixon's National Security Advisor.
The Harvard International Seminar received funding from at least three [[CIA]] cutouts, including [[The Asia Foundation]], [[The Fairfield Foundation]], and [[American Friends of the Middle East]], the last of which channeled approximately $243,000 to the program. After CIA funding was publicly exposed in 1967, the [[Ford Foundation]] assumed financial support for the program.
### Quantico Panels, 1955
Kissinger attended some sessions of the first [[Quantico Vulnerabilities Panel]] at the Marine Corps Schools in June 1955, as did members of the State and Defense departments and the CIA.[^4] On August 16, 1955, [[Nelson Rockefeller]] invited him, then a Harvard academic, to a second panel on the psychological aspects of future United States strategy, which is called Quantico II in the record.[^4] The panel's twelve members met in Washington in late August and at Quantico in September, with [[Frederick L. Anderson]] designated chairman. Kissinger took the place of [[Hans Speier]], who had planned a trip to Germany for the [[Rand Corporation]]. [[Daniel Bessner]] describes the meeting as crucial to Kissinger's career and states that Rockefeller became his political patron after it. The [[Rockefeller Archive Center]] describes its folder of Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview in the Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers as stating that Kissinger "met Nelson Rockefeller while serving on the staff of the Quantico II conference in the mid-1950s"; Bessner, citing Isaacson, places the two men's first meeting at the first panel.[^4] Kissinger's paper "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR" appears in the November 1955 source book, which the panel submitted on November 29, 1955.
### Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project
Kissinger served as director of the [[Rockefeller Brothers Fund]] Special Studies Project, a policy planning initiative convened by Nelson Rockefeller that ran from 1956 to 1960, with the final publication appearing in 1961. The project produced a volume entitled *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961).[^5] The volume sold over 400,000 copies.
The project was organized into seven panels examining sweeping strategic and domestic issues. [[Dean Rusk]] chaired Panel I (International Objectives and Strategies). Kissinger, director of the whole project until his resignation on June 30, 1958, directed the report of Panel II (International Security: The Military Aspect), whose members included [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[Townsend Hoopes]], [[Edward Teller]], [[Henry Luce]], and [[Laurance Rockefeller]]. Panel III (International Economic and Social Objectives) was chaired by [[Milton Katz]]. Panel IV (U.S. Economic and Social Policy) was chaired by [[Thomas B. McCabe]]. Panel V (U.S. Utilization of Human Resources) was chaired by [[John W. Gardner]]. Panel VI (U.S. Democratic Process) was chaired by [[James A. Perkins]]. Panel VII (The Moral Framework of National Purpose), chaired by [[Richard McKeon]], produced a report by [[Robert Heilbroner]] that was not published.
The project was Kissinger's primary institutional bridge to the [[Rockefeller family]] network prior to his entry into government. Roswell Gilpatric subsequently served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy administration. Nelson Rockefeller retained Kissinger as his personal foreign policy consultant after the project concluded. In a telephone conversation of March 13, 1972, [[David Rockefeller]], chairman of the [[Chase Manhattan Bank]], offered Kissinger a plane ride to the next [[Bilderberg Group|Bilderberg]] meeting.[^6]
### Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (1957)
Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957) grew out of eighteen months of work with a study group organized by the [[Council on Foreign Relations]] and led by [[Gordon Dean]], former chairman of the [[Atomic Energy Commission]]. The book argued for a doctrine of limited nuclear war as an alternative to massive retaliation, and established Kissinger as a leading voice on strategic doctrine. Panel II of the Rockefeller Special Studies Project built on the same framework.
### Brazil and 1964 Coup
A week before the April 1964 Brazilian military coup that overthrew [[Joao Goulart]], Nelson Rockefeller's longtime Latin American representative [[Berent Friele]] briefed both Nelson Rockefeller and Kissinger on [[Brazil]]'s political crisis. Friele, a Norwegian-born coffee dealer who had served as Rockefeller's country director in Brazil during the [[Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs]] (OCIAA) programs in [[World War II]], had maintained a dense network of contacts in Brazilian business and military circles. His briefing dismissed Goulart's constitutional reform proposals as demagoguery and characterized the opposition's plans favorably.
After the coup, Friele functioned as a back-channel between the Nixon administration and the Brazilian military government. A secret communications channel was established between Nixon and Brazilian President [[Emilio Garrastazu Medici]] through Kissinger, with Brazilian contacts including figures close to Friele.
### Bay of Pigs
When news of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]] reached Harvard in April 1961, Kissinger told students who asked his view: "Well, as long as we're there, I don't think it would do us any good to lose."
### Government Service
Kissinger was appointed Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on January 20, 1969, the date of Nixon's inauguration. He was appointed Secretary of State on September 21, 1973, and took office the following day, September 22, 1973. He held both positions concurrently until November 3, 1975, when President Ford removed him as National Security Advisor. He continued as Secretary of State until January 20, 1977.[^7]
### Cambodia Secret Bombing
On March 15, 1969, the President issued the directives for the Breakfast Plan, the first phase of the secret bombing of [[Cambodia]] (Operation Menu, first phase: Operation Breakfast), after a rocket attack on [[Saigon]]. The directives provided that the Department of State and the ambassadors in Saigon would be notified only after the point of no return.[^8] Kissinger's memorandum to Nixon of March 16 set out the political reasons for the action and its possible consequences, including a Cambodian protest.[^9] Kissinger transmitted Nixon's order to commence the secret bombing to Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]], briefed Nixon on preparations on March 17, 1969, and received a report on the first raid's results on the evening of March 18, 1969.
When the first raid was reported, Kissinger suggested that if the North Vietnamese "retaliate without any diplomatic screaming, we are in the driver's seat. Psychologically the impact must have been something."[^10]
### FBI Wiretap Program
On April 25, 1969, Nixon met in his office with Kissinger, Attorney General [[John N. Mitchell]] and FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] to discuss methods of controlling leaks of classified information. Mitchell, Hoover and Nixon continued the discussion over dinner at [[Camp David]] that evening and developed a program that included wiretaps on private telephones.[^11] A [[New York Times]] report of May 9, 1969 by William Beecher disclosed American bombing of targets in Cambodia. The Court of Appeals recorded that Nixon told Kissinger to ask the FBI to investigate the source, that Hoover told Kissinger that [[Morton H. Halperin]], an NSC staff member and former Harvard colleague, was the "prime suspect" although Halperin had no access to the information in the article, that Hoover and Kissinger spoke by telephone four times that day, and that the wiretap on the Halperin home telephone was in place by evening, after Kissinger had told Halperin earlier that day that he was considered a potential leaker.[^11]
The court wrote that three other private telephones were wiretapped in the attempt to find the source. On the following day, Colonel [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]], then Kissinger's assistant, went to FBI headquarters on Kissinger's behalf to submit a formal surveillance request covering Halperin and three others, including NSC staffer [[Helmut Sonnenfeldt]] and [[State Department]] official [[William Sullivan]]. FBI officials and Haig worked out procedures to conduct the surveillance "with no record maintained" in normal FBI files, and the Bureau then formally requested wiretap authorization from the Attorney General, who approved the Halperin tap. A May 12, 1969, FBI memorandum bears the heading "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request." A May 11, 1970, FBI report from Hoover to Nixon summarized the results of the surveillance program.[^11]
According to the court, the FBI observed in May and June 1969 that the Halperin tap was not producing evidence of a leak, and Kissinger requested that the taps be continued. On September 15, 1969, Kissinger requested termination of all wiretaps except Halperin's and one other. Halperin resigned from the NSC staff four days later, continued as a consultant until May 1970, and had no access to classified information during that period. After he resigned as consultant in protest over the invasion of Cambodia, the FBI reports on the wiretap went to [[H. R. Haldeman]] rather than to the National Security Advisor, and the tap continued until February 10, 1971. The plaintiffs cited FBI logs showing that agents overheard more than 600 calls on the Halperin telephone, of which 28 percent were between Halperin and people outside the family. The court wrote that "at first the FBI logs were kept at the Bureau in special files, where Kissinger and Haig reviewed them," and referred to "the 21 months of the Halperin wiretap."[^11]
The [[Church Committee]] reported that seventeen individuals (thirteen government officials and four journalists) were wiretapped between May 1969 and February 1971 and that most of the taps had been requested by Kissinger or Haig rather than by other White House officials.[^12] Nixon described the product as "just gobs of material: gossip and bull." The committee found that the program did not reveal the source of any leak of classified data, which was its ostensible purpose, and that it generated information about the personal lives of the targets.[^12] The litigation arising from the program, *Halperin v. Kissinger*, was settled in 1992 after twenty years.
### Operation CHAOS
On February 18, 1969, [[Richard Helms]] sent Kissinger the CIA's study of student dissidence worldwide, "Restless Youth," which included a section on American students. The covering memorandum states: "This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper."[^13] The Church Committee described the CIA's collection on student dissent in the United States as "clearly outside the Agency's statutory charter," and recorded that Helms urged Kissinger to treat the matter with extreme sensitivity.[^14] The [[Rockefeller Commission]] heard 51 witnesses in 1975, among them Secretary of State Kissinger.[^13]
### Chile
Kissinger's documented role in U.S. intervention in [[Chile]] against President [[Salvador Allende]] spans the period from Allende's electoral victory in September 1970 through the Pinochet era.
On September 12, 1970, Kissinger spoke with Helms by telephone. Kissinger announced that he was calling a [[40 Committee]] meeting for the following Monday and said: "We will not let Chile go down the drain."[^15] On September 14, Secretary of State [[William Rogers]] discussed with Kissinger a CIA paper on Chile and the risk that the paper record would look bad. Kissinger told Rogers: "The President's view is to do the maximum possible to prevent an Allende takeover, but through Chilean sources and with a low posture."[^16] On September 15, 1970, Kissinger, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, and Helms met with Nixon at the White House. Helms's notes of the meeting record "1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!", "$10,000,000 available, more if necessary," "game plan make the economy scream" and "48 hours for plan of action."[^17][^18] In his August 12, 1975 testimony to the Church Committee, Kissinger said that at that meeting "President Nixon did almost all of the talking" and that Nixon "used the figure of $10 million."[^17]
A CIA memorandum for the record of September 16, 1970, "Genesis of Project FUBELT," states that Helms told CIA officials that "President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was not acceptable to the United States," that the President authorized ten million dollars, that the CIA was to carry out the mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense, and that Helms had been asked by Kissinger to meet him on September 18 to give the Agency's views on how the mission could be accomplished.[^19] The Church Committee wrote that the September 15 meeting "initiated Track II," that "Track II was initiated by President Nixon on September 15 when he instructed the CIA to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile," and that "there is no doubt that the U.S. government sought a military coup in Chile," while noting that it had received conflicting testimony about White House officials' awareness of specific coup plans.[^20][^21]
The Church Committee wrote that, by Presidential instruction, Track II "was to be operated without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, the State Department, or any 40 Committee member save Henry Kissinger."[^22] The committee's chronology records that President Nixon instructed Helms to prevent Allende's accession to office and that the CIA was to play a direct role in organizing a military coup.[^23]
On October 15, 1970, [[Thomas Karamessines]], the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, met Kissinger and Brigadier General Haig at the White House and gave Kissinger a run-down on [[Roberto Viaux]], the army general at the center of the coup planning. The CIA record of the meeting states that Viaux "did not have more than one chance in twenty" of launching a successful coup. It records that those present decided the CIA must get a message to Viaux that included the words "Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support," that Kissinger instructed Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile and "maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future," and that Kissinger closed by saying the Agency should "continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight."[^24] In a telephone conversation with Nixon the same day, Kissinger said: "I saw Karamessines today. That looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive coup."[^25]
On October 22, 1970, gunmen shot and seriously wounded Chilean Army Commander General [[Rene Schneider]]. CIA briefing notes of October 23, titled "Track II," begin with the shooting.[^26] A CIA briefing of October 28 states that the military principals in contact with the agency had depended on the abduction of Schneider, probably by Viaux, "as the pretext needed to launch a coup."[^27]
On November 5, 1970, Kissinger sent Nixon a memorandum for the November 6 [[National Security Council]] meeting arguing that the election of Allende "poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere."[^28]
On September 16, 1973, five days after the coup that killed Allende, Kissinger spoke with Nixon by telephone about the U.S. role. Kissinger said that the newspapers were "bleeding because a pro-Communist government has been overthrown." Nixon remarked that "our hand doesn't show on this one," and Kissinger replied: "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them."[^29] These exchanges are documented in NSAEBB No. 437 and in *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI (Chile, 1969-1973).
On June 8, 1976, Kissinger met General [[Augusto Pinochet]] in Santiago at noon. Pinochet's Foreign Minister Patricio Carvajal and Ambassador Manuel Trucco were among the Chilean participants, and Assistant Secretary [[William D. Rogers]] and an interpreter accompanied Kissinger. Kissinger told Pinochet: "My evaluation is that you are a victim of all left-wing groups around the world, and that your greatest sin was that you overthrew a government which was going Communist." He said that his speech was not aimed at Chile and that he wanted Pinochet to succeed.[^30]
### Operation Condor
On August 3, 1976, [[Harry Shlaudeman]], the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, had reported to Kissinger that the [[Southern Cone]] military regimes saw themselves as embattled and were joining forces to eradicate "subversion."[^31] On August 23, 1976, the State Department cabled the embassies in Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Santiago, and La Paz that "government planned and directed assassinations within and outside the territory of Condor members has most serious implications," and set out how to raise the concern with the governments involved.[^32] On August 24, Ambassador David Popper replied from Santiago that he "seriously" doubted an approach to President Pinochet was the best way to achieve the objective and that, "given Pinochet's sensitivity regarding pressures by USG, he might well take as an insult any inference that he was connected with such assassination plots."[^33]
An unnumbered memorandum from Shlaudeman to Kissinger of August 30, 1976, titled "Operation Condor," stated: "What we are trying to head off is a series of international murders that could do serious damage to the international status and reputation of the countries involved." The memorandum, as the National Security Archive described it, reported that the U.S. ambassador in Montevideo, Ernest Siracusa, had resisted delivering the demarche to the Uruguayan generals for fear for his life and wanted further instructions, and it recommended that Kissinger authorize a message to Siracusa to talk to the Uruguayan Foreign Minister and the commander-in-chief of the army.[^34]
On September 16, 1976, a cable from Kissinger's party in Lusaka, Zambia (SECTO 27128, "Actions Taken"), addressed to the Department for the Secretary's and the Executive Secretary's offices, recorded: "Unnumbered ARA memo dated August 30, 'Operation Condor'. Secretary declined to approve message to Montevideo and has instructed that no further action be taken on this matter."[^34] [[Peter Kornbluh]] of the [[National Security Archive]], who posted the cable in April 2010, said: "The State Department initiated a timely effort to thwart a 'Murder Inc' in the Southern Cone, and Kissinger, without explanation, aborted it."[^34] On September 20, writing from San José, Costa Rica, to his deputy William Luers in Washington, Shlaudeman wrote: "You can simply instruct the ambassadors to take no further action, noting that there have been no reports in some weeks indicating an intention to activate the Condor scheme."[^35]
On September 21, 1976, [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]] were killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. The National Security Council staff's memorandum that morning described one of the dead as tentatively identified as Letelier and noted that no group had claimed the bombing.[^36] On October 8, 1976, Shlaudeman reported to Kissinger on the approach made, on Kissinger's instructions, to Colonel [[Manuel Contreras]], chief of the Chilean National Directorate of Intelligence (DINA), and wrote that the approach "seems to me sufficient action for the time being. The Chileans are the prime movers in Operation Condor."[^37]
### Argentina
On June 10, 1976, in Santiago, Kissinger told Argentine Foreign Minister [[César Augusto Guzzetti]]: "If there are things that have to be done, you should do them quickly. But you must get back quickly to normal procedures."[^38] On June 30, 1976, Kissinger rebuked a State Department aide for a demarche criticizing death squads in [[Argentina]]. On October 7, 1976, in a meeting in New York with Guzzetti, Kissinger stated: "The quicker you succeed the better," and "If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better."[^39] On October 19, 1976, U.S. Ambassador [[Robert Hill]] cabled Washington that Guzzetti had returned from the visit "in a state of jubilation, convinced that there is no real problem with the USG over this issue," and that "it will be unrealistic and ineffective for this Embassy to press representations to the GOA over human rights violations."[^40]
### East Pakistan / Bangladesh
On March 28, 1971, the American consulate in [[Dacca]] sent a telegram under the subject line "Selective Genocide," describing a reign of terror by the Pakistani military and reporting that the authorities appeared to hold lists of targets.[^41] On April 6, 1971, the consulate sent telegram 1138, "Dissent From U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan," signed by twenty officers of the Consulate General, USAID and USIS and known as the "Blood Telegram." It stated that the U.S. government "has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy" and that "the overworked term genocide is applicable." [[Archer Blood]], the U.S. Consul General in Dacca, did not sign it, wrote that he supported the right of the officers to voice their dissent, and added that he subscribed to their views.[^42] Blood was recalled from his post.
On April 10, 1971, the Dacca consulate sent a second telegram stating its "specific areas of dissent with current U.S. policy toward East Pakistan" and preparing a series of policy recommendations.[^43]
Kissinger's April 28, 1971, memorandum to Nixon, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," set out three options: unqualified backing for West Pakistan, neutrality leaning toward the East, and an effort to help [[Yahya Khan]] achieve a negotiated settlement. Nixon approved the third and wrote: "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time," underlining "Don't" three times. A note from Haig to Nixon of the same day, attached to another copy of the memorandum, indicates that Kissinger suggested that Nixon include a note to the effect that he did not want any actions taken that would have the effect of squeezing West Pakistan.[^44] Casualty estimates for the 1971 conflict in East Pakistan range up to three million civilian deaths.
### Iran and the Kurds
On May 30, 1972, in [[Tehran]], Nixon and Kissinger met [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], the Shah of Iran, from 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he was afraid the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." Kissinger asked what could be done. The Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds." In the same conversation Kissinger noted that the United States would have to reestablish Pakistan's arms program to make [[Pakistan]] eligible for third-country transfers from Iran, and Nixon agreed.[^45]
A CIA memorandum of June 12, 1972, prepared for Helms ahead of a meeting with representatives of the Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, states that in March 1972 the policy of non-interference in Kurdish affairs was confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."[^46] On June 7, 1972, [[Harold Saunders]] of the NSC staff wrote to Kissinger that Helms was the channel for a message from the Shah, on the basis of the Tehran talk, that Kissinger should speak personally with two representatives of Barzani. Saunders wrote that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds" and advised against Kissinger seeing them, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."[^47] On July 28, 1972, Haig sent Kissinger a Helms proposal for covert assistance to Barzani of about $3 million in funds over one year and about $2 million in ordnance, and recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals, "but avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."[^48]
In a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973, Kissinger wrote: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah," and that the Shah had said he was impressed by the material aid supplied: "arms, ammunition, blankets, medical supplies, plus a monthly cash subsidy."[^49] On April 11, 1974, Kissinger wrote to Nixon that the program begun after the Tehran visit had provided a monthly subsidy and small arms "through the Iranians." He wrote: "The underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."[^50] On June 24, 1974, he recommended that Nixon approve $8.06 million from the Agency Reserve for support to the Kurds in fiscal year 1975.[^51] On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, [[Brent Scowcroft]] transmitted a message from Kissinger to Richard Helms, by then Ambassador to Iran, instructing him to answer a message from Barzani with the words "our prayers are with them," to raise with the Iranians "the problem both the Iranian and the U.S. Governments will face in the U.S. and elsewhere if there is a massacre and Barzani charges that he has been let down," and to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention.[^52]
### The Shah in New York, 1979
On November 5, 1979, the Special Coordination Committee recorded: "The Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah."[^53] The *Foreign Relations* editorial note on Iranian withdrawals from Chase Manhattan Bank states that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."[^54] On November 26, 1979, Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] reported to [[Jimmy Carter]] on congressional briefings, writing that an interview by [[George Ball]] "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice" and that several members pressed for details on the decision to let the Shah into the country.[^55]
In an undated summary of discussions with Panamanian emissaries about the Shah's presence in [[Panama]], White House Chief of Staff [[Hamilton Jordan]] recorded their account of meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister [[Sadegh Ghotbzadeh]] on January 7. According to that account, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others" who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."[^56]
### East Timor
On December 6, 1975, in [[Jakarta]], Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesian President [[Suharto]] the day before Indonesia's invasion of [[East Timor]]. Foreign Minister Adam Malik, Minister of State Sudharmono, Ambassador Newsom and an interpreter were also present. The memorandum of conversation was transmitted by the embassy in Jakarta as telegram 14945, classified Secret/Nodis, and is printed in the Foreign Relations volume for East and Southeast Asia, 1973 to 1976.[^57]
Suharto told Ford: "We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action." Ford replied: "We understand and will not press you on the issue." Kissinger added: "You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems." Ford said: "We could have technical and legal problems." Kissinger said: "It depends on how we construe it. Whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return."[^57]
The East Timor Truth Commission subsequently concluded that U.S. material support was "fundamental to the Indonesian invasion." Casualty estimates range from 100,000 to 180,000 Timorese deaths. The documents are also posted in the National Security Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 62.
### Cyprus
The American response to the [[Cyprus]] crisis of July 1974 was handled through Washington Special Actions Group meetings and Nixon's telephone calls with Kissinger. In a conversation on July 17, 1974, Nixon and Kissinger discussed the European position that [[Makarios]] should be brought back to Cyprus and that the United States should press the Greeks to accept it.[^58] A Washington Special Actions Group meeting on July 20, 1974, discussed the evacuation of civilians from Cyprus and the positioning of the amphibious task force south of the island.[^59] In an April 29, 1975, memorandum to President Ford, Kissinger attributed the Greek request for military assistance in large part to the wish to recoup military losses "suffered during last summer's Cyprus crisis."[^60]
### Israel and the 1973 War
Kissinger's Israeli contacts during the October 1973 war ran principally through Ambassador [[Simcha Dinitz]]. On October 8, 1973, Kissinger and Dinitz discussed Israeli aircraft losses, including a reference to the SAM-6 missiles, which were "very effective against our planes."[^61] On October 13, 1973, Kissinger told Dinitz, "We are going to do three separate things."[^62]
### Kissinger Associates, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro and Iraq
Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft set up [[Kissinger Associates]] in 1982. Scowcroft served as vice chairman and head of the firm's Washington office until he became head of the National Security Council under President [[George H. W. Bush]] in January 1989.[^63] [[Lawrence Eagleburger]] was the firm's president.[^63]
The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs and its chairman, [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], pursued the relationship between the firm and the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] during the lending of its [[Atlanta]] branch to [[Iraq]]. Gonzalez told the House that Kissinger was a paid member of the bank's advisory board for international policy between 1985 and June 1991, and that he received at least $10,000 for attending each meeting of the board.[^63] Gonzalez said that Kissinger's contract expired in the summer of 1991, more than four months after the date Kissinger had previously reported for his departure from the board.[^63] Gonzalez inserted into the House hearing record the minutes of the advisory board's meeting in [[Madrid]] on May 4 and 5, 1987, which quote Kissinger giving "the victory of Iran over Iraq at 55 percent" and stating that he would change that estimate.[^64]
[[Christopher Drogoul]], the Atlanta branch manager, testified in 1993 that [[Wafai Dajani]] had told him in 1989 that Kissinger was "the architect of foreign policy in the United States." Drogoul also testified that "it became clear to us that the people at Kissinger and Associates were somehow assisting clients of Iraq in further developing business."[^64]
The report of the Italian Senate's parliamentary commission of inquiry on the Atlanta branch of BNL, approved on April 22, 1992, states that BNL's executive committee decided in June 1986 to begin a consulting relationship with Kissinger Associates, under a two-year contract at $150,000 a year plus expenses that ran from July 1, 1986 to June 30, 1988; that five meetings took place between officers of the bank and of the firm, with Iraq not among the countries examined; and that Scowcroft attended as a representative of the firm and received no personal compensation, only travel and lodging expenses. The commission gave June 30, 1991 as the end of Kissinger's membership of BNL's international advisory committee under his own consulting contract, which provided $50,000 for the address at the dinner preceding the committee's annual meeting, and noted Gonzalez's statement that the membership continued to August 1991. It reported that Alan Stoga of Kissinger Associates took part in a June 1989 meeting in Baghdad between the US-Iraq Business Forum and Iraqi government officials, and listed among the firm's clients [[American Express]], [[Coca-Cola]], [[Anheuser-Busch]], [[H. J. Heinz]], [[Volvo]], [[Arco]], [[Hunt Oil]], Chase Manhattan Bank, [[American International Group]] and [[Freeport-McMoRan]].[^65]
Gonzalez also reported that Eagleburger was at a meeting between the bank's managers and Kissinger Associates in New York in 1987 or 1988, and that Kissinger had stated that Eagleburger did not handle the BNL account at the firm.[^63]
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's December 1992 report on [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] by [[John Kerry]] and [[Hank Brown]] devotes its chapter 20 to Kissinger Associates. It states that from the fall of 1986 through early 1989 BCCI initiated contacts with the firm, which then had five partners (Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III); that Stoga and a retired Brazilian ambassador working as a Kissinger Associates consultant, Sergio Correa da Costa, explored ways to link BCCI's banks with the firm's services; and that the discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence," after which Kissinger Associates referred BCCI to its director William D. Rogers and the law firm [[Arnold & Porter]]. Letters of November 3, 1986 set da Costa's terms at $40,000 a year plus 10 to 20 percent of fees on transactions he arranged, and da Costa told Kissinger in them that he would also work for BCCI. In the summer of 1987 da Costa wrote to the firm about "that amusing luncheon with the BNL crowd." On September 20, 1987 da Costa invited Kissinger to a dinner at the plantation of the BCCI shareholder [[Ghaith Pharaon]], suggesting Pharaon as a client; the report states that Kissinger declined the invitation.[^66]
In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee wrote that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts," and that the firm refused to provide its client list to the subcommittee.[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
### Telephone Transcripts
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access. State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The National Security Archive began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^67] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.
### Commission Chairmanship, 2002
On November 27, 2002, President [[George W. Bush]] announced his choice of Kissinger to chair the independent commission on the September 11 attacks: "my choice for commission chairman, Dr. Henry Kissinger."[^68]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, chapter 12.
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, chapter 16.
[^3]: Nobel Prize Outreach, "Henry Kissinger: Biographical," Nobelprize.org, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/biographical/. Gives the birth at Fuerth on May 27, 1923, arrival in the United States in 1938, naturalization on June 19, 1943, the Harvard degrees of 1950, 1952 and 1954, membership of the Harvard faculty from 1954 until 1971, the Associate Directorship of the Center for International Affairs from 1957 to 1960, direction of the Harvard International Seminar from 1951 to 1971, study directorship for the Council on Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956, and the founding of Kissinger Associates.
[^4]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, description of the folder for Henry A. Kissinger's Spring 1980 interview, as quoted in the account of Daniel Bessner of the Quantico II panel.
[^5]: *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961. Report of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Special Studies Project, which Kissinger directed.
[^6]: National Security Archive, "The Kissinger Telcons," Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, edited by Thomas Blanton and William Burr, posted May 26, 2004, telephone conversation of Kissinger and David Rockefeller, March 13, 1972, 11:12 a.m. (Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 87). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/.
[^7]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Henry Alfred Kissinger," https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-alfred. Identifies him as the 56th Secretary of State, 1973 to 1977, while continuing as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
[^8]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume VI, Vietnam, January 1969 to July 1970, document 39, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, March 15, 1969, "March 16 Rocket Attack on Saigon." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d39.
[^9]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume VI, document 40, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 16, 1969, "Breakfast Plan." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d40.
[^10]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume VI, document 41, Editorial Note, quoting Kissinger's remarks after the first raid. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v06/d41.
[^11]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Text from the Caselaw Access Project (static.case.law, F.2d volume 606, case 1192). The opinion recounts the April 25, 1969 meeting, the events of May 9 and 10, 1969, the procedures worked out by FBI officials and Colonel Haig, the logs kept in special files where Kissinger and Haig reviewed them, the September 15, 1969 request, the continuation of the tap to February 10, 1971, and the 21 months of the wiretap.
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, Final Report, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), PDF pages 215-216 (the "seventeen" wiretaps, May 1969 to February 1971, Nixon's "gobs of material" remark, and the finding that no leak was identified), PDF pages 222-223 (the authorization and duration of the taps), and PDF page 244, note 2 (taps requested by Kissinger or Haig). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_II.pdf.
[^13]: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), June 1975, introduction (the commission "heard 51 witnesses," including Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger) and Chapter 11, "Operation CHAOS" (Helms's covering memorandum of February 18, 1969, delivering the first version of "Restless Youth" to Kissinger). https://archive.org/details/Rockefeller-commission-report-to-the-president-by-the-commission-on-cia-activiti.
[^14]: *Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book II, S. Rept. 94-755, PDF page 162, on the CIA's student-dissent survey and the letter from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, February 18, 1969.
[^15]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile: The Declassified Record on Regime Change," Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, document 1, Helms-Kissinger telephone conversation, September 12, 1970, 12:00 noon. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/.
[^16]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 88, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 14, 1970, 12:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d88.
[^17]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 93, Editorial Note, quoting Helms's notes of the September 15, 1970 meeting and Kissinger's August 12, 1975 testimony before the Church Committee. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d93.
[^18]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 3, handwritten notes of the September 15, 1970 meeting at the White House, with Mitchell and Kissinger listed as present.
[^19]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973, document 94, Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 16, 1970, "Genesis of Project FUBELT" (William V. Broe, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d94.
[^20]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, Staff Report, December 1975, PDF page 37 ("Richard Helms' notes from his September 15, 1970, meeting with President Nixon, the meeting which initiated Track II, contain the indication: 'Make the economy scream.'"). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94chile.pdf.
[^21]: Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973, PDF page 29 (Track II "was initiated by President Nixon on September 15"), and PDF page 14 (the "no doubt" finding and the conflicting testimony).
[^22]: *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, PDF page 57, on the operating restrictions placed on Track II.
[^23]: *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973*, PDF page 62, chronology entry for President Nixon's instruction to CIA Director Helms.
[^24]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 152, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 15, 1970 (Kissinger, Karamessines and Haig present; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-000012A, Chile Task Force Files). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d152.
[^25]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 153, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 15, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d153.
[^26]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 162, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 23, 1970, "Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d162.
[^27]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 168, Briefing Notes Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, October 28, 1970, "Recent Developments: Track II." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d168.
[^28]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, document 172, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 5, 1970, "NSC Meeting, November 6, Chile." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v21/d172.
[^29]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 7, Kissinger-Nixon telephone conversation, September 16, 1973.
[^30]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger and Chile," EBB No. 437, document 10, Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 8, 1976, noon (Gerald R. Ford Library copy), participants and Kissinger's statement.
[^31]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 238, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, August 3, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d238.
[^32]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, document 241, Telegram 209192 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia, Washington, August 23, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d241.
[^33]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 242, Telegram 8210 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State, Santiago, August 24, 1976, "Subject: Operation Condor" (signed Popper). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d242.
[^34]: National Security Archive, "Kissinger Blocked Demarche on International Assassinations to Condor States," Electronic Briefing Book No. 312, edited by Peter Kornbluh, posted April 10, 2010, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB312/index.htm, with document 1 (ARA memorandum of August 30, 1976, "Operation Condor," released in part under FOIA) and document 2 (SECTO 27128, Lusaka, September 16, 1976, Department of State, released 2004 on 25-year review; the cable text is in capitals and is quoted in lowercase). The Siracusa account is the Archive's description of the August 30 memorandum.
[^35]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, Documents on South America, 1973-1976, document 245, Telegram 4526 From the Embassy in Costa Rica to the Department of State, San José, September 20, 1976, "For ARA-Luers from Shlaudeman" (also National Security Archive EBB No. 312, document 3). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d245.
[^36]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 246, Memorandum From Mary Brownell and Dan Mozeleski of the National Security Council Staff to Les Janka, Washington, September 21, 1976. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d246.
[^37]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 249, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Shlaudeman) to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, October 8, 1976, "Operation Condor." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d249.
[^38]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 48, Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976, 8:10 to 9:15 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d48.
[^39]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 56, Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 7, 1976, "Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d56.
[^40]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-11, Part II, document 57, Telegram 6871 From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State, Buenos Aires, October 19, 1976, "Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric Over Visit to United States" (signed Hill). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d57.
[^41]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972, document 125, Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, March 28, 1971, "Selective Genocide." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d125.
[^42]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, document 19, Telegram 1138 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, April 6, 1971, 0730Z. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d19.
[^43]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-7, document 130, Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, Dacca, April 10, 1971, "Specific Areas of Dissent With Current U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve07/d130.
[^44]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XI, document 36, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 28, 1971, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," with the editorial note on Nixon's handwritten annotation (Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v11/d36.
[^45]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. (participants: the Shah, the President, Kissinger). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200.
[^46]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315.
[^47]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313.
[^48]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321.
[^49]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 233, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233.
[^50]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246.
[^51]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254.
[^52]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, 1336Z, WH50453. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281.
[^53]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2.
[^54]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," *New York Times*, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30.
[^55]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60.
[^56]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144.
[^57]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973-1976, document 141, Telegram 14946 From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Jakarta, December 6, 1975, 1000Z (the telegram header reads "JAKARTA 14945" and "PRIORITY 1579"), "Ford-Suharto Meeting." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d141. The telegram text is in capitals; quotations are rendered in lowercase.
[^58]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, 1973-1976, document 93, Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, July 17, 1974, 4:30 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d93.
[^59]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, document 105, Minutes of Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group, Washington, July 20, 1974, "Cyprus." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d105.
[^60]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXX, document 46, Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, Washington, April 29, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d46.
[^61]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, document 126, Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador (Dinitz), Washington, October 8, 1973, 1:14 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d126.
[^62]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXV, document 168, Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Israeli Ambassador (Dinitz), Washington, October 13, 1973, 1:03 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v25/d168.
[^63]: Gonzalez, Henry B. "Kissinger Associates, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Stoga, Iraq, and BNL," *Congressional Record*, House, April 28, 1992, pp. H2694-H2701. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920428g.htm.
[^64]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, Serial No. 103-95, hearing of November 9, 1993, testimony of Christopher P. Drogoul, with the Madrid advisory board minutes inserted into the record by Chairman Gonzalez. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit.
[^65]: Senato della Repubblica, X Legislatura, Doc. XXII-bis n. 4, Allegato, Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul caso della filiale di Atlanta della Banca Nazionale del Lavoro e sue connessioni, Relazione conclusiva approvata il 22 aprile 1992, schede di documentazione 30 ("La società Kissinger Associates. Rapporti con la Banca Nazionale del Lavoro") and 31 ("Scowcroft"), pp. 188-189, drawing on BNL document 158 (the consulting contract and renewals) and document 428 (transcript of a CBS interview with Kissinger, March 29, 1992). https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg18/file/DOC%20XXII%20bis%20n.%204%20Allegato.pdf.
[^66]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *The BCCI Affair*, report by Senator John Kerry and Senator Hank Brown, S. Prt. 102-140, December 1992, chapter 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," footnote 1 (Cutler letter) and text; the FAS note appears on the index page of the copy. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm and https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/index.html.
[^67]: National Security Archive, "The Kissinger Telcons," Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, edited by Thomas Blanton and William Burr, posted May 26, 2004, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/. Describes the release on May 26, 2004 of approximately 20,000 declassified pages (10 cubic feet) spanning 1969 to August 1974.
[^68]: White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Names Henry Kissinger Chairman of Commission," November 27, 2002. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/11/20021127-1.html.
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