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Raw Blame History

Founding and membership

In Ben-Menashe's account, Menachem Begin ordered in the fall of 1980 that Yehoshua Sagi (also spelled Saguy), director of the Military Intelligence Directorate, and Nachum Admoni, whom Ben-Menashe calls acting director of Mossad, appoint the committee, and that it coordinated the efforts of both services.² He writes that William J. Casey telephoned Begin, Sagi and Admoni before the committee was formed, and that a meeting in Amsterdam in September 1980 was attended by David Kimche, Uri Simchoni and Shmuel Morieh.³⁴ He names Kimche, Morieh, Simchoni, Moshe Hebroni and Rafael Eitan as its first members.¹ He writes that he was appointed on November 28, 1980, as the youngest member, responsible for carrying out its initiatives because of his fluency in Farsi and his contacts in Iran.⁵ He writes that Yitzhak Shamir, prime minister from 1983, let the group expand its operations,⁶ and that after Shamir became prime minister, members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.¹

The House October Surprise Task Force recorded that Eitan, whom Ben-Menashe says confirmed to him reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between William J. Casey and Mehdi Karrubi, told the Government of Israel that he did not know Ben-Menashe and had never met him, and that Saguy, in whose presence Eitan allegedly confirmed the reports, told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe and had no knowledge of such meetings.⁷ According to the same report, Israeli authorities interviewed Kimche, Saguy, Eitan, a Samuel Moriah, Meir Meir and General Yitzhak Segev (chief Israeli military attache in Iran until 1980), and each said that he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until Ben-Menashe began making allegations in the American media in 1991. Yitzhak Hofi, whom the report identifies as head of Mossad during 1980 to 1982, told Israeli authorities that he did not know Ben-Menashe, had never met him, and that Ben-Menashe was never assigned to any mission by Mossad.⁸

Ben-Menashe's account of the arms sales

Ben-Menashe writes that Begin secretly reached an agreement of cooperation in principle with Casey in August 1980.⁹ He writes that by March 1981 the committee had set up procedures for secret sales to Iran, as promised at the October Paris Summit Meeting, and that Robert Gates, dealing directly with Kimche, approved the sale of unsophisticated weapons to Iran in early 1981.¹ He writes that the case for helping the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini government was that if the Iranians fought the Iraqis, their soldiers would be killed instead of Israeli soldiers,² that the war diverted Arab attention from Israel and drained Arab countries of money, and that from the perspective of the Likud Party, Khomeini, as a radical, anti-American and anti-Arab leader, served Israel's national security interest.¹ In his account, Hebroni expedited the export license for tires sold to Iran in April 1980.¹ He writes that the sale was of 300 tires at $900 each, under a SIBAT export license.¹⁰

The 1992 report of the special counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee summarized his claim that in the early 1980s he helped organize an international network of private arms dealers on behalf of the Israeli government in order to supply several billion dollars in American-made arms to Iran.¹¹ He writes that between March 1981 and the end of 1987 Iran spent over $82 billion on equipment from the United States, Israel, Europe, South America and South Africa, and that the government of Sweden under Olof Palme sold military equipment to Iran through Israel until Palme refused to continue the sales.¹

Israeli proposals and shipments, 1980 to 1982

The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force states that during a visit to Washington on April 13, 1980, a high level Israeli official told President Jimmy Carter that Israel had contacts in Iran that could be useful in the hostage negotiations and could be developed further if Israel were permitted to sell the Iranians certain military equipment. Carter rejected the offer and asked for assurance that Israel would observe the arms embargo, and Israel agreed.¹² On September 28, 1980, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister Mordechai Zipori said in an interview that Israel was "in a position to supply Iran with artillery shells, sea-to-sea missiles and other arms."¹²

On October 22, 1980, Israeli officials told the American embassy that Israel had established contact with Iranians interested in buying arms and that a deal for F-4 Phantom aircraft tires had been negotiated. The Government of Israel's report to the task force states that, with the encouragement of the Israeli government, an Israeli businessman who had lived in Iran for many years renewed relations with Iranian military officials and negotiated with an Iranian procurement representative in Europe.¹³ On October 27, 1980, Samuel W. Lewis cabled that Israeli officials said the Iranians wanted artillery pieces and ammunition, "and we [Israel] have exactly what they want."¹³ The Government of Israel's report states that the overall scope of the proposed deals was approximately $200 million, that Begin raised the subject with Carter and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie in November 1980, and that on November 21, 1980 Begin ordered that arms and equipment not be supplied directly or indirectly to Iran until the hostages were released.¹⁴ On December 12, 1980, Lewis was told that Israel was receiving a "steadily mounting pile" of requests for sales of ammunition and spare parts to Iran.¹⁴

After the hostages were released, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. cabled on February 4, 1981 that the United States did not support arms sales to Iran. The Israeli government's account of Begin's meeting with Lewis that day says that Begin replied that future arms deliveries to Iran would not include American arms or arms with American components, and that only Israeli equipment would be supplied.¹⁵ Lewis cabled that Israel "had been aware as early as last autumn that weapons were reaching Iran from both French and British sources via various arms dealers."¹⁵ When Shamir, then foreign minister, met Haig in Washington later that month, Haig said, according to his own account, that the United States could not prohibit Israeli sales to Iran of items without American components but opposed any arms deals with Iran and prohibited sales of American-origin arms. Shamir reported to Begin that the United States objected to the sale of American-origin equipment but did not object to Israel shipping its own parts.¹⁶

The Government of Israel's report states that on March 20, 1981 a shipment of 60 106 mm recoilless rifles was sent by aircraft from Israel to Portugal and then to Iran, with Ahmed Heidari among the mediators, and that another delivery followed on April 13, 1981. Zipori had told a United States embassy official on February 25, 1981 that the sale of 106 mm recoilless rifles and Israeli-manufactured shells was about to be concluded.¹⁶ During Haig's April visit to Israel, Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon raised the subject of selling arms to Iran at a meeting at the King David Hotel.¹⁶

A State Department memorandum of November 21, 1986, quoted in the 1987 congressional report, records that in 1981 and 1982 the Government of Israel asked the United States to approve shipments of items under U.S. control to Iran, and that no such shipment was approved. The same report states that in May 1982 Israeli officials acknowledged publicly that Israel had sold substantial quantities of American-origin military supplies to Iran.¹⁷

On July 18, 1981, a Canadair CL-44 cargo aircraft of the Argentine company Transporte Aereo Rioplatense crashed about 50 kilometers from Yerevan in the Soviet Union after colliding with a Soviet Su-15 fighter sent to intercept it. The aircraft had flown two round trips from Tel Aviv to Tehran by way of Larnaca and was returning from delivering a third load; the three crew and one passenger died. The Soviet pilot said that the collision was a deliberate attempt to bring the aircraft down; Western aviation experts who examined his account believed that he misjudged a turn.¹⁸ The Christian Science Monitor, citing the Sunday Times of London, reported on July 27, 1981 that the aircraft was returning from the third of twelve scheduled trips to Iran in a $15 million arms deal under which Israel was to supply Iran with 360 tons of American-made tank parts and ammunition, and that the Miami-based Scot hired to arrange the deal, who had chartered the aircraft, was killed in the crash, according to his Swiss partner.¹⁹

The 1985 and 1986 transfers

The documented Israeli role in the Iran-Contra Affair of 1985 and 1986 begins in July 1985, when David Kimche, director general of the Israel Foreign Ministry, met Robert McFarlane at the White House on July 3. On August 2 Kimche asked whether it would make a difference if Israel delivered TOW missiles itself rather than the United States.²⁰ The independent counsel reports that, according to Michael Ledeen, Shimon Peres expressed displeasure with Israel's intelligence on Iran during Ledeen's May 1985 visit to Israel.²¹

On August 20, 1985, Israel, working through Yaacov Nimrodi, Al Schwimmer and Manucher Ghorbanifar, transferred 96 American-made TOW missiles to Iran by chartered aircraft.²² A second shipment of 408 TOWs reached Iran on September 14, and the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir followed it.²³ A note of September 4, 1985 by Nicholas Platt records that Oliver North, Ledeen and McFarlane were involved in obtaining the release of hostages, with Israel providing "equipment" to Iran.²⁴ The Iran-Contra report quotes George P. Shultz's cable that "Israel's interests and ours are not necessarily the same," and a briefing paper Shultz brought to a private meeting with the President in November 1986 stating that Israel "obviously sees it in its national interest to cultivate ties with Iran, including arms shipments."²⁵

A shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel reached Iran on November 24, 1985. The missiles were rejected as the wrong type, and one planeload of 18 HAWKs was delivered without any hostage release.²⁶ The independent counsel wrote that the failed HAWK shipment resulted in the illegal involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency.²⁷

The congressional committees concluded that the arms transfers before January 17, 1986, the August, September and November 1985 shipments, were made from Israel's own stocks, and that "Israel was promised and later was given substantially identical replacements." In a December 17, 1986 memorandum, Assistant Attorney General Charles J. Cooper wrote that "the real nature of the 1985 transactions was a bilateral sale by the United States to Iran, with Israel serving solely as a conduit or facilitator in the execution of that sale."²⁸ The report describes Schwimmer as an adviser to Prime Minister Peres from September 1984, Amiram Nir as Peres's adviser on counterterrorism, and Nimrodi as an Israeli defense attache and then a consultant in Tehran for a total of 24 years.²⁹

A note of January 4, 1986 by Charles Hill, a Shultz aide, records John Poindexter saying that Nir had come to see him to revive the hostage idea, and states that Newsweek had the McFarlane-Kimche meetings but did not run them, and that "Kimche seems to have leaked it deliberately."³⁰ By May 1986 Nir had replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the arms dealings. When McFarlane, North and others flew toward Tehran on May 23, 1986, by way of Frankfurt and Israel, Richard Secord and Nir joined the party in Israel.³¹

Ben-Menashe writes that political chaos in Israel in 1984 led to a coalition government of the Labor Party and Likud, and that Peres, as prime minister, opened a competing arms channel to Iran through Nir. He writes that the committee worked against that channel, including by leaking information about Jonathan Pollard and the North-Nir operation, and that North's April 1986 sting operation, the Hashemi sting, was aimed at discrediting the committee's channel and its members.¹ He writes that the sting was planned from the World Trade Center in New York.³² He writes that the committee leaked the $10 million contribution from the Sultan of Brunei wired through Bruce Rappaport to North's group,³³ and that Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin did not try to impede the committee's operations.¹ He also says that he was the first person to leak the Iran-contra scandal to the press.¹¹

Money and smokescreens, as Ben-Menashe described them

Ben-Menashe writes that the committee became self-sufficient, with an operating budget drawn from the profits of arms sales and overseen by the Mossad comptroller, and that the profits grew into a slush fund outside the Mossad budget. He writes that disbursements were requested from the comptroller through the heads of the intelligence community or directly from the Prime Minister's Office, that the committee used trading companies and a flagship holding company, Ora Group, to manage the fund.¹ He names the holding company as Ora Group.³⁴ He writes that it used the private arms broker John Hortrich, also known as John de Laroque, as a smokescreen,³⁵ and Nicholas Davies, whom he identifies as the foreign editor of the London Daily Mirror.³⁶ Its sales, in his account, included TOW missiles, T-80 tanks and other equipment.¹³⁷

He writes that the committee's profits financed the faction of Shamir within the Likud, "black" operations including those involving Mohammed Radi Abdullah and the Achille Lauro attack, and housing projects for Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹³⁸³⁹ He writes that in 1987 the committee withdrew its funds from Drexel Burnham and from the control of Menachem Schneerson, whose institutions had been used to route funds for settlement housing, and redirected them to the yeshivahs of the Shas Party.¹⁴⁰ He describes aircraft loaded with arms landing in Western Australia, en route to Tehran, with the permission of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization,⁴¹ and writes that C-130 aircraft flew from Vietnam to Western Australia from early 1986.⁴² He writes that Mohammed Jalali worked with the committee and, in July 1987, met Gates at the Americana Hotel in Kansas City to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue despite the Iran-Contra scandal.¹⁴³

Ben-Menashe's service record and the Israeli government's position

Ben-Menashe says that he joined the External Relations Department of Israeli military intelligence in 1977 as an Iran specialist and worked alongside Kimche and Eitan there. He has also said that he was an adviser to Shamir.¹¹ His book reprints letters of reference dated September 1987 on External Relations Department letterhead, which he presents as evidence of his service.⁴⁴

The special counsel to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Reid H. Weingarten, wrote in 1992 that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," and that his insistence on placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and his decision to pit himself against the sworn testimony of numerous credible witnesses and unimpeachable documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness."⁴⁵

The October Surprise Task Force reported that the personnel file maintained by Israeli Military Intelligence, and interviews with his superiors, confirmed that he worked in the External Relations Department from 1977 to 1987, and stated that he worked the entire time as a translator of materials of relative insignificance and low levels of classification. Seven of his ten annual efficiency reports listed him as a translator. The other three listed him as a staff officer in an armaments unit, which the task force attributed to available slots and pay in an underfunded department.⁴⁶ It also reported that he failed the preparatory training portion of the officer's course, a fact he omitted from his testimony to the task force, and that his job did not involve travel abroad or responsibility concerning Iran.⁴⁶

Steven Emerson and Jesse Furman, writing in the New Republic in November 1991, reported that Ben-Menashe's military personnel records showed that he served as a low-level translator, and found that his allegations were fabricated, often drawing on things he read in the newspaper.⁴⁷ At his 1990 trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss said that Ben-Menashe was merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987.⁴⁸

Prosecution and acquittal, 1989 to 1990

Federal prosecutors in New York accused Ben-Menashe, described in the press as a man who claims to be a former Israeli intelligence agent, and the businessman Richard St. Francis of arranging, in April 1989, a $36 million deal to sell three Israeli-owned C-130E transport planes to Iran. They were charged with planning to circumvent the State Department approval required for resale of American-made military goods, and the indictment said that the scheme was revealed by an undercover Customs Service agent posing as an Iranian buyer.⁴⁹ The first count of the indictment charged conspiracy to sell American-made C-130 military cargo planes located in Israel to Iran, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.⁵⁰ In an opinion of August 1, 1990, Judge Louis L. Stanton of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied St. Francis's motion to dismiss on due process grounds. He granted motions to sever the second count, which concerned anti-aircraft missiles located in Israel, and to sever Joseph O'Toole from the first count. Ben-Menashe joined St. Francis's motions.⁵⁰

On November 28, 1990, a federal jury in New York acquitted Ben-Menashe and St. Francis after a six-week trial before Stanton.⁵¹ At trial, Ben-Menashe's attorney, Thomas F.X. Dunn, contended that his client had been a former intelligence operative who represented Shamir in an attempted arms-for-hostages deal in 1988, which was to include the release of four U.S. hostages and fell through when Shamir insisted that three Israeli soldiers also be freed. After the verdict, Dunn said that his client claimed Israel had brokered arms deals with Iran between 1980 and 1988 that the U.S. government had covertly approved, among them the transaction that became the Iran-Contra scandal.⁵¹ The Senate special counsel's 1992 report states that "In 1990, Ben-Menashe was tried and acquitted in New York on federal charges of conspiring to sell U.S.-made arms to Iran."¹¹

The October Surprise Task Force

The House October Surprise Task Force, chaired by Lee Hamilton, issued its joint report on January 3, 1993. Its finding on Ben-Menashe's allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980 between Casey and Karrubi reads: "Credible testimonial and documentary evidence show Ben-Menashe to be totally lacking in credibility regarding his allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980 between William Casey and Mehdi Karrubi." The report adds: "Aside from early biographical details, virtually everything Ben-Menashe told the Task Force has been found to be false."⁵²

On his account of a meeting at the L'Enfant Plaza hotel in Washington, the task force found: "Ben-Menashe's account is demonstrably false from beginning to end."⁵³ On his account of the October 1980 meetings in Paris, which he places at a meeting attended by George H.W. Bush, the task force stated that the personnel records the Government of Israel supplied, with Ben-Menashe's contemporaneous handwritten answers to the questions he was required to answer for the External Relations Department when traveling abroad, showed that he did not travel outside Israel in October 1980, and that exit stamps on his civilian passport indicated the same. It wrote that his account of the October meetings, "like his other October Surprise allegations, is a total fabrication."⁵⁴

Ben-Menashe told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, during the 1991 confirmation hearings for Gates as director of Central Intelligence, that Gates had conspired with the Reagan-Bush campaign to delay the release of the hostages and was present at meetings, including those in Paris. Gates, under oath, denied the allegations. The committee later reported that FBI and CIA inspector general investigations, including analyses of Gates's calendars and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm Ben-Menashe's allegations, and the task force stated that it was aware of no evidence to the contrary.⁵⁵

Hersh and The Samson Option

Seymour Hersh's 1991 book The Samson Option states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.⁵⁶

The 1987 dismissal

Ben-Menashe writes that after the Iran-Contra story leaked, he and three other committee members were dismissed in September 1987 because of pressure on Shamir, and that before the dismissal some funds were set aside for their futures and CIA money controlled by Israel was transferred to the East Bloc.¹ The Israeli military file that the task force examined records a July 23, 1987 letter from Arieh Shur, his superior, warning Ben-Menashe that he had taken too much personal leave; a letter of the same day in which Ben-Menashe wrote to his superiors that he wished to leave the Army and asked for help in finding new work; a September 9, 1987 complaint by him before the union of civilian employees of the Israel Defense Forces that he had served ten years as a translator without a significant promotion; and his resignation from the Israel Defense Forces on September 15, 1987.⁵⁷

Footnotes

Ari Ben-Menashe, Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 78. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 70. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 71. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 79. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 143. ↩︎
U.S. House of Representatives, Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 97 (finding on Ben-Menashe; statements of Rafi Eitan and Yehoshua Saguy to the Government of Israel). https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 98 (statements to Israeli authorities of Kimche, Saguy, Eitan, Moriah, Meir, Segev and Hofi). ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 102. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 58. ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The October Surprise Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran, Report of the Special Counsel, S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, pp. 56-57. https://archive.org/details/ReportOfTheSpecialCounselOnTheOctoberSurpriseAllegationsAndTheCircumstancesSurrounding ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 201-02 (April 1980 approach to President Carter; interview of Deputy Defense Minister Zipori, September 28, 1980). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 202-04 (Israeli approaches of October 22 and 27, 1980; the Government of Israel's report; cable of Ambassador Lewis). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 204-05 (the Government of Israel's report on the November 1980 Begin-Carter-Muskie discussions and Begin's order of November 21, 1980; Lewis cable of December 12, 1980). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 205-06 (Haig cable of February 4, 1981; Israeli government's account of Begin's meeting with Ambassador Lewis; Lewis cable). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 207-08 (Shamir's meeting with Haig in February 1981; the Government of Israel's report on the meeting of February 25, 1981 and the shipments of March 20 and April 13, 1981; Haig's April 1981 visit). ↩︎
U.S. Congress, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), p. 526, note (U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Secretary of State Shultz, "U.S.-Israel Discussions on Arms Sales to Iran-1980-82," November 21, 1986, S3547). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport ↩︎
Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives, "Crash of a Canadair CL-44D4-6 near Yerevan: 4 killed," July 18, 1981 (operator Transporte Aereo Rioplatense, registration LV-JTN). https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/crash-canadair-cl-44d4-6-near-yerevan-4-killed ↩︎
"Plane that fell in USSR reported on Iran arms run," Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1981 (reporting the Sunday Times of London). https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0727/072721.html ↩︎
Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, vol. I, Part I (1993), on the July 3, 1985 meeting of David Kimche and Robert McFarlane, and vol. I, ch. 1 ("United States v. Robert C. McFarlane"), on the August 2, 1985 meeting. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm ; https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, Part I, on Michael Ledeen's May 1985 visit to Israel and his meeting with Shimon Peres. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, on the August 20, 1985 transfer of 96 TOW missiles by Israel working through Nimrodi, Schwimmer and Ghorbanifar, citing the Israeli Historical Chronology. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, on the 408 TOW missiles shipped on September 14, 1985 and the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 100 (Platt Note, September 4, 1985, ALW 0036259). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (1987), pp. 527-28, "The Israeli Connection" (Shultz briefing paper of November 1986 and Shultz cable of July 1985). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, on the HAWK missiles shipped from Israel on November 24, 1985 and the delivery of 18 missiles of the wrong type. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 119 (on the failed HAWK shipment and CIA involvement). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (1987), pp. 539-40, legal analysis of the 1985 Israeli transfers, including the December 17, 1986 memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Cooper. https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport ↩︎
Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (1987), p. 526, "The Israeli Connection" (Schwimmer, Nir and Nimrodi). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 24 ("The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt"), n. 206 (Hill Note, January 4, 1986, ANS 0001255-56). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm ↩︎
Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, ch. 1, on the party that left Washington on May 23, 1986 for Tehran by way of Frankfurt and Israel, where Secord and Amiram Nir, who had replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the arms deals, joined it. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, pp. 178-179. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 182. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 190. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 108. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 113. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 119. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 123 (the Achille Lauro operation as an Israeli "black" propaganda operation). ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 125 (the slush fund for West Bank and Gaza settler housing). ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 126. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 112. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 120. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, p. 193. ↩︎
Ben-Menashe, Profits of War, TrineDay reprint, 2015, appendix (letters of reference dated September 4, 6 and 14, 1987, on External Relations Department letterhead). ↩︎
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of the Special Counsel, S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 114 (evaluation of the evidence offered by Ari Ben-Menashe). https://archive.org/details/ReportOfTheSpecialCounselOnTheOctoberSurpriseAllegationsAndTheCircumstancesSurrounding ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, pp. 97-98 (Israeli Military Intelligence file and interviews with superiors on Ben-Menashe's service in the External Relations Department, 1977-1987). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 68 (summarizing Steven Emerson and Jesse Furman, "The Conspiracy That Wasn't," The New Republic, November 3, 1991, and their review of Ben-Menashe's military personnel records). ↩︎
"2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," The Washington Post, November 29, 1990 (dateline New York, November 28; statement of Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/ ↩︎
"2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," The Washington Post, November 29, 1990 (the charges: a $36 million deal for three Israeli-owned C-130E transport planes, April 1989; the January indictment; the undercover Customs Service agent). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/ ↩︎
United States v. Menashe, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), No. 90 Cr. 010 (LLS), memorandum and order of Judge Louis L. Stanton, August 1, 1990. https://static.case.law/f-supp/741/cases/1135-01.json ↩︎
"2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," The Washington Post, November 29, 1990 (verdict, length of trial and presiding judge; statements of defense counsel Thomas Dunn at trial and after the verdict). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/ ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 97 (finding on Ben-Menashe's allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980; passage beginning "Aside from early biographical details"). https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 110 (L'Enfant Plaza meeting account). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 148 (Ben-Menashe's account of the October 1980 meetings; personnel records and handwritten travel answers supplied by the Government of Israel; passport exit stamps). ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 172 (Ben-Menashe's allegations about Robert Gates; Gates's sworn denial; the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report of 1991). ↩︎
Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260. ↩︎
Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force, January 3, 1993, p. 98 (Israeli military file: letter of Arieh Shur dated July 23, 1987; Ben-Menashe's letter of the same day; document of September 9, 1987; resignation of September 15, 1987). ↩︎

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