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Kerry Committee
Kerry subcommittee
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications
Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on terrorism, narcotics and international operations
Kerry-Brown Senate investigation
Intelligence & Government
Organization
Government
Congress
BCCI
Contras
DrugTrafficking
Noriega
KerryBrownReport
Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee under John Kerry that investigated Contra-linked drug trafficking and Manuel Noriega from 1986 to 1988 and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International from 1988 to 1992. Washington, D.C.
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head_of John Kerry true chairman 1987-04 1992-12 1
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employed_by Jack Blum true special counsel 1989 4
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employed_by Jonathan Winer true staff, Kerry's personal staff 1986 4
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member_of Hank Brown true ranking member for the BCCI inquiry 1991-05 1992-12 67
type with reverse role start end fn
member_of Mitch McConnell true ranking member 1987-04 1988-12 1
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reported_to Senate Foreign Relations Committee 1987-04 1992-12 1
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investigated Manuel Noriega 1986-04 1988-12 55
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investigated Contras 1986-04 1988-12 12
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investigated John Hull 1987-10 1988-12 31
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investigated Bank of Credit and Commerce International 1988-02 1992-12 65
type with start end fn
investigated Kissinger Associates 1991-07 1992-12 73
2026-09-23 2026-10-14

The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, produced two reports: S. Prt. 100-165, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy (December 1988), on narcotics trafficking, the Contras and Manuel Noriega, and S. Prt. 102-140, The BCCI Affair (December 1992), on the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), published as the BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report. The Foreign Relations Committee's drug inquiry began in April 1986; responsibility passed to the subcommittee in April 1987, with Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky as ranking member. Senator Hank Brown of Colorado was the ranking member for the BCCI investigation.1

Origins of the drugs inquiry

The report dates Kerry's own staff investigation to early 1986, when he began examining allegations that elements of the supply network for the Nicaraguan Contras were linked to drug traffickers. In April 1986 he took the information to the committee chairman, Senator Richard Lugar, who agreed to a staff inquiry. Lugar scheduled a closed session of the committee for June 25, 1986. In February 1987 Chairman Claiborne Pell continued the inquiry and widened it to the effect of Caribbean, Central American and South American drug trafficking on foreign policy; in April 1987 it was assigned to the subcommittee.1

The report's chapter on the Contras opens: "The initial Committee investigation into the international drug trade, which began in April, 1986, focused on allegations that Senator John F. Kerry had received of illegal gun-running and narcotics trafficking associated with the Contra war against Nicaragua." It states that the subcommittee uncovered "considerable evidence relating to the Contra network which substantiated many of the initial allegations laid out before the Committee in the Spring of 1986," and that in each case one or another agency of the U.S. government had information about the involvement, either while it was occurring or immediately afterward.2

The subcommittee held fourteen days of open hearings and nine executive sessions and received testimony from 27 witnesses. Its staff deposed 20 more, and thirty subpoenas were issued.3 The transmittal letter names Jack Blum, special counsel, with Kathleen Smith and Jonathan Litchman of the committee staff, and Richard McCall, Jonathan Winer and David McKean of Kerry's personal staff and Ron Rosenblith.4

The executive branch response, 1986 to 1988

After press accounts beginning in December 1985, the State Department, with the Department of Justice and the intelligence agencies, reviewed the allegations in the spring of 1986. It told Congress in April 1986 that it had "evidence of a limited number of incidents in which known drug traffickers tried to establish connections with Nicaraguan resistance groups," and that these attempts took place mostly when the resistance was receiving no U.S. funding. In a second statement of July 24, 1986 it said that "the available evidence points to involvement with drug traffickers by a limited number of persons having various kinds of affiliations with, or political sympathies for, the resistance groups."5

In August 1987 the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency's Central American Task Force, Alan Fiers, testified to the Iran-Contra committees that links between Contras on the Southern Front in Costa Rica and narcotics trafficking were far broader than the State Department had said in 1986. He testified that "it is not a couple of people. It is a lot of people," and that "We knew that everybody around Eden Pastora was involved in cocaine."6

The subcommittee reported that in the spring of 1986 the Justice Department was adamantly denying that the narcotics allegations had substance, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation had significant information on narcotics traffickers in Contra operations and on Neutrality Act violations. On May 6, 1986 a bipartisan group of committee staff met representatives of Justice, the FBI, the DEA, the CIA and the State Department. Justice Department officials there privately contradicted the department's public statements that the FBI had investigated the charges and found no substance, and confirmed that Neutrality Act investigations were under way. The CIA representatives categorically denied that the violations raised by the staff had taken place, citing classified documents; the report states that the FBI had by then assembled substantial information confirming them, including admissions by some of the persons involved.7

In August 1986 Senator Lugar and the ranking member, Senator Pell, wrote to the Justice Department asking for information on 27 individuals and organizations associated with the Contras. The department declined, on the grounds that the matters remained under active investigation and that the committee's "rambling through open investigations gravely risks compromising those efforts." The report records that less than three months earlier the department had told the press and the committee that the allegations had been thoroughly investigated and were without foundation, and that it did not disclose in reply that the FBI had developed extensive information from 1983 through 1986 suggesting many of the allegations were true.8

Allegations of interference with the inquiry

On October 5, 1988 the subcommittee received sworn testimony from Jeffery B. Feldman, the Miami assistant U.S. attorney who handled the Neutrality Act and gun-running cases, that he had been told Justice Department officials had met in 1986 "to undermine" Kerry's attempts to hold hearings. Feldman testified that on November 17, 1987 Thomas E. Marum of the Internal Security Division told him that representatives of Justice, the DEA and the FBI had met in 1986 to discuss how Kerry's efforts to hold hearings could be undermined; that a memorandum he wrote in late May 1986 recommending a grand jury had been rewritten without his knowledge to call the case a "fishing expedition"; and that files given to him by U.S. Attorney Leon Kellner included a transcript of a Foreign Relations Committee executive session and memoranda between Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Bergquist and committee staff on coordinating efforts "to basically show that what you were saying wasn't necessarily correct."9

The Justice Department witnesses denied any agreement to obstruct the inquiry. Marum, in a deposition of October 25, 1988, denied telling Feldman that there had been an agreement to undermine the committee's investigation, and said it was true that the department and the other participants at the meeting opposed hearings. Mark M. Richard, the Justice Department official, testified on November 7, 1988 that Feldman was wrong about any meeting he attended in which hearings were undermined; he recalled a meeting of October 15, 1986 attended by 20 to 25 people that went down the list of the committee's outstanding requests, and said the DEA did not want to provide the information requested. Kellner gave a deposition on November 8, 1988.10

What the subcommittee found about Contra-linked traffickers

The executive summary stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region."11 The summary also stated that U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua, and that the war "contributed to weakening an already inadequate law enforcement capability in the region" that mercenaries, pilots and others involved in drug smuggling exploited.11

The concluding chapter restates the finding and adds that "the largest Contra organization, the FDN, did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation." It records evidence that U.S. officials assisting the Contras knew that drug smugglers were exploiting the clandestine infrastructure established to support the war and that Contras were receiving assistance derived from drug trafficking, and states that "it appears that some officials may have turned a blind eye to these activities." On the question whether officials failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war, the subcommittee wrote that there were "serious questions" and urged the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Judiciary Committee to investigate.12

Paul Gorman, a retired general and former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testified on February 8, 1988 that the use of narcotics profits by armed resistance groups was commonplace and that "if you want to move arms or munitions in Latin America, the established networks are owned by the cartels." The DEA's assistant administrator, David Westrate, testified on July 12, 1988: "It is true that people on both sides of the equation (in the Nicaraguan war) were drug traffickers, and a couple of them were pretty significant."13

The Southern Front

The subcommittee traced drug trafficking in the region to the late 1970s, when Costa Rican airstrips near the Nicaraguan border were used by Manuel Noriega and others to ship weapons to the Sandinistas, and former Costa Rican law enforcement officials told it they were instructed to keep narcotics investigators away from the border during the revolution. After 1979, surplus weapons stored in Costa Rica were sold on the black market and some were shipped to Salvadoran rebels from the same airstrips by the same pilots.14

Werner Lotz, a Costa Rican pilot serving a sentence for drug smuggling, testified in closed session on April 8, 1988 that Contra operations on the Southern Front were in fact funded by drug operations: weapons came from Panama on small planes carrying mixed loads, and the pilots unloaded the weapons, refueled and flew north with drugs. He named the pilots as Americans, Panamanians and Colombians and occasionally uniformed members of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Karol Prado, an officer of Eden Pastora's ARDE organization, testified that traffickers "approaches political groups like ARDE trying to make deals that would somehow camouflage or cover up their activities."15

The report states that DEA officials testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime in July 1988 that Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North suggested to the DEA in June 1985 that $1.5 million in drug money, carried aboard a plane piloted by DEA informant Barry Seal and generated in a sting of the Medellin Cartel and Sandinista officials, be provided to the Contras; the DEA rejected the suggestion.16 The former CIA station chief in Costa Rica, Thomas Castillo, testified to the Iran-Contra committees that during June, July and August 1986 U.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs wanted to place guards on the secret Contra supply airstrip at Santa Elena to keep drug traffickers from using it.17

The State Department contractors

The State Department used the NHAO (NHAO) to channel humanitarian assistance to the Contras in 1985 and 1986. The subcommittee reported that the department selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers: SETCO, DIACSA, Frigorificos de Puntarenas and Vortex. In each case, before the department contracted with the company, federal law enforcement had received information that the individuals controlling it were involved in narcotics. NHAO officials told investigators of the General Accounting Office that all supply contractors were to have been screened by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the GAO and NHAO were uncertain whether that had been done. The payments made to the four between January and August 1986 totaled $806,401.20 in the report's table, which lists $185,924.25 for SETCO, $41,120.90 for DIACSA, $261,932.00 for Frigorificos de Puntarenas and $317,425.17 for Vortex.18

The report posed the questions it had been unable to answer: who selected the firms and on what criteria, whether any official at the CIA, the National Security Council or the State Department knew of the narcotics allegations, and why the contractors were not checked against federal law enforcement records, which would have shown them to be under investigation or, in the case of DIACSA, under indictment. The NHAO director, Ambassador Robert Duemling, could not recall how the companies were selected when Kerry questioned him in April 1988, and could not recall whether they had been checked. He had recalled before the Iran-Contra committees that Oliver North directed NHAO to continue "the existing arrangements of the resistance movement" in choosing contractors.19 The subcommittee concluded: "At best, these incidents represent negligence on the part of US government officials responsible for providing support to the Contras. At worst it was a matter of turning a blind eye to the activities of companies who use legitimate activities as a cover for their narcotics trafficking."20

SETCO had a long-standing relationship with the Honduras-based FDN, and from 1984 was the principal company the Contras used in Honduras to transport supplies and personnel for it, carrying at least a million rounds of ammunition, food, uniforms and other military supplies from 1983 through 1985. The report cites U.S. law enforcement records stating that SETCO was established by the Honduran cocaine trafficker Ramon Matta Ballesteros, whose April 1988 extradition from Honduras caused riots outside the U.S. embassy in Tegucigalpa, and quotes a 1983 Customs report: "SETCO aviation is a corporation formed by American businessmen who are dealing with Matta and are smuggling narcotics into the United States." One of the pilots who flew SETCO missions for the FDN was Frank Moss, under investigation as an alleged drug trafficker since 1979 and investigated, though never indicted, by ten law enforcement agencies. In 1985 Moss formed his own company, Hondu Carib, which flew supplies to the Contras under a commercial agreement with the FDN's chief supply officer, Mario Calero, who was to receive an ownership interest. One Moss DC-4 moved Contra goods from the United States to Honduras. A second DC-4 was chased off the west coast of Florida by U.S. Customs while, according to law enforcement personnel, it was dumping what appeared to be a load of drugs; when it landed at Port Charlotte no drugs were found, but an address book aboard contained the telephone numbers of some Contra officials and the Virginia number of Robert Owen, North's courier. The DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987.21

Frigorificos de Puntarenas, a Costa Rican seafood company, was created as a cover for laundering drug money, according to grand jury testimony by one of its partners and testimony by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the convicted money launderer who established it. It was owned and operated by Luis Rodriguez of Miami, whom Massachusetts law enforcement officials said directed the largest marijuana smuggling ring in the state's history, and two convicted drug traffickers. Luis Rodriguez was indicted on drug trafficking charges on September 30, 1987. He controlled the bank account that received $261,937 in humanitarian assistance funds from the State Department in 1986, according to the narrative section of the report. In September 1984 Miami police told the FBI that Ocean Hunter, the American seafood company of which he was president and which bought from Frigorificos, was funding Contra activities through "narcotics transactions." Kerry told the Justice Department, the DEA, the State Department, NHAO and the CIA of the allegations in May 1986; in August 1986 the Foreign Relations Committee asked Justice whether they were true, and Justice declined to answer.22

DIACSA was an aircraft dealership and parts supply company partly owned by the Guerra family of Costa Rica. Its president, Alfredo Caballero, was under DEA investigation for cocaine trafficking and money laundering when the State Department chose it, and was a business associate of Floyd Carlton, the pilot who flew cocaine for Noriega. DEA Special Agent Daniel Moritz, in an affidavit filed in federal court in January 1985, described working undercover as a money launderer and said the traffickers used DIACSA's offices "as a location for planning smuggling ventures, for assembling and distributing large cash proceeds of narcotics transactions, and for placing telephone calls in furtherance of the smuggling ventures." The report states that from March 1985 until January 1986 Moritz received approximately $3.8 million from members of the organization, most of it delivered at DIACSA's offices, and that during 1984 and 1985 the FDN chose DIACSA for "intra-account transfers" that concealed funds for the Contras deposited at North's direction. Carlton, Caballero and five other defendants were indicted, and the State Department made payments to DIACSA on May 14 and September 3, 1986 totaling $41,120.90 despite the indictments. Court papers of July 1986 show that the U.S. embassies in Panama and Costa Rica were clients of DIACSA, and that embassy personnel were meeting one of the defendants about purchasing Cessna aircraft while plea negotiations were under way.23

Vortex was an air service and supply company partly owned by Michael Palmer, whom the subcommittee described as an admitted drug trafficker. When the State Department signed its contract, Palmer, then the company's executive vice president, signed for Vortex while under active FBI investigation in three jurisdictions and facing a federal grand jury in Detroit. The contract required Vortex to receive, store, pack and inventory goods for the Contras; its principal assets were two airplanes Palmer had previously used for drug smuggling. The report states that Vortex was selected by NHAO assistant director Philip Buechler after calls among Buechler, Palmer and the president of Summit Aviation.24

George Morales and the Pastora organization

The subcommittee reported that George Morales, a Colombian drug trafficker living in Miami and under indictment for narcotics trafficking, approached the organization of Eden Pastora in 1984, with discrepancies among the parties about when the first meeting took place. Pastora was wounded by a bomb at La Penca, Nicaragua on May 30, 1984; the ARDE officer Karol Prado said that U.S. aid to ARDE was cut off that day. According to a State Department report to Congress of July 26, 1986, a senior member of Pastora's Sandino Revolutionary Front agreed in late 1984 that FRS pilots would aid in transporting narcotics in exchange for financial assistance, and Morales reportedly provided the front with a C-47 aircraft, two crated helicopters and $100,000. The State Department said it knew of one incident from the arrangement, the January 1986 arrest in Costa Rica of the Contra pilot Gerardo Duran.25

Robert Owen, North's courier, testified to the Iran-Contra committees that he told North he thought Prado and Pastora's pilot Marcos Aguado were involved in trafficking drugs out of Panama; the subcommittee could not validate Owen's claims, and Prado denied them, saying he believed the allegations against Pastora were a CIA effort to discredit him.26 Morales testified that his involvement began in 1984 at the urging of the widow of one of his drug pilots, who introduced him to Pastora's second in command, Adolfo "Popo" Adolfo Chamorro, Aguado and Octaviano Cesar at a meeting in Miami. He was under indictment for marijuana smuggling and thought assisting the Contras would end it. He wanted to make a deal, he said: he would help the Contras with their needs, and "they in exchange would help me with my objective, which was solving my indictment."27

The subcommittee videotaped depositions of Prado, Aguado and Cesar in San Jose, Costa Rica on October 31, 1987, and Chamorro testified in closed session in April 1988. Each said he had not known Morales was under indictment when they first met. All denied receiving more than $10,000 in cash from Morales; the subcommittee found that $10,000 went to Chamorro to cover the cost of flying a C-47 from Haiti to Ilopango, and that Customs records showed Morales entering the United States from the Bahamas on October 13, 1984 with Aguado, Cesar and Chamorro, carrying $400,000 in cash and checks that they said were returned to Morales after clearing Customs. Chamorro gave the subcommittee a notarized purchase order dated October 1, 1984 transferring a DC-3 (the civilian designation of a C-47) from Morales to Aguado for one dollar, and a list of 24 flights between October 1984 and February 1986 moving some 156,000 pounds of material from Ilopango to airfields in Costa Rica. The subcommittee stated that it substantiated key elements of Morales's account but did not find evidence that Cesar, Chamorro or Prado were personally involved in drug trafficking.28

Aguado told the subcommittee that the traffickers used "the same connections, the same air strips, the same people," and that "maybe they said that it was weapons for Eden Pastora, and it was actually drugs." Cesar testified that he told CIA personnel at the military attache's office at Ilopango Airbase about his dealings with Morales, and answered "Yes" when Kerry asked whether they had said it was all right as long as he did not deal in the powder.29

The report states that after the La Penca bombing the CIA cut off all assistance to ARDE, and that the United States said the cutoff related to the involvement of ARDE personnel in drug trafficking, while many of the same traffickers were assisting other Contra groups that continued to receive funding; Morales, for example, used the pilot Duran, who also worked for groups associated with Alfonso Robelo and Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro. Castillo testified that when the CIA learned of narcotics trafficking by Pastora's supporters and lieutenants it reported them to law enforcement. Morales continued to work with the Contras until January 1986, was indicted a second time in the Southern District of Florida for a January 1986 cocaine flight to the Bahamas, and was arrested June 12, 1986. He testified that his offers to cooperate were refused by the U.S. attorney, Leon Kellner; Kellner and the head of the criminal division, Richard Gregorie, told committee staff in November 1986 that Morales's story was not credible and that he was using the "I was working for the CIA" defense, and discouraged staff from meeting him before his sentencing. After his testimony the DEA accepted his offer to cooperate, and in November 1988 it gave him a polygraph examination on his subcommittee testimony; the report states that he was considered truthful.30

John Hull and the OPIC loan

John Hull, an Indiana farmer living in northern Costa Rica, was in the report's account a central figure in Contra operations on the Southern Front when they were managed by Oliver North, from 1984 through late 1986. According to Castillo's public testimony he had earlier helped the CIA with military supply operations, and he received $10,000 a month from Adolfo Calero of the FDN at North's direction. His properties included at least six airstrips, known to pilots as John Hull's ranch. On March 23, 1984 seven men aboard a U.S. government owned DC-3 were killed when the plane crashed near the ranch.31

Five witnesses testified that Hull was involved in cocaine trafficking: Floyd Carlton, Werner Lotz, Jose Blandon, Morales and Gary Betzner. Betzner was the only one who testified that he was present when cocaine was loaded onto planes in Hull's presence. Betzner, a pilot for Morales's network, testified that in July 1984 he flew weapons to Hull's ranch, was met by Hull, and flew 17 duffel bags and several boxes of cocaine to Lakeland, Florida, and that two weeks later he flew weapons to an airstrip about ten miles from Hull's properties and loaded approximately 500 kilos of cocaine. Lotz said drugs were flown into Hull's ranch but that he did not personally witness the flights, and that Hull was paid for the refueling stops.32

Feldman went to Costa Rica in late March 1985 with two FBI agents to investigate Neutrality Act violations. He testified that Ambassador Tambs and the CIA chief of station Castillo told him Hull had been working for U.S. interests before March 1984, that an embassy security officer told an agent the matter involved "agencies with other operational requirements and we shouldn't interfere with the work of these agencies," and that the embassy staff told Hull not to speak to him without an attorney. Feldman concluded that embassy officials were taking active measures to protect Hull, that the consul in San Jose was trying to get two jailed mercenaries to recant their statements about Hull's involvement with the CIA, and that because Hull was receiving protection from some U.S. officials he could not be interviewed. He took no further steps to do so.33

The report states that Hull then prepared falsified affidavits from jailed mercenaries in Costa Rica and sent them to Kellner; the mercenaries accused congressional staff of paying witnesses to invent stories about the Contra supply network. The Justice Department concluded the affidavits had been forged. Kellner testified that he "had concerns about them" and did not believe them, and the subcommittee recorded that the department had taken no action against Hull for filing false affidavits.34

On March 30, 1984 the Overseas Private Investment Corporation advanced $375,000 to a joint venture wood products factory for which Hull and two associates had applied in 1983; OPIC and the partners testified that no contributions were made to the venture. By the end of 1985 the loan was in default, OPIC found that the funds had been deposited in Hull's Indiana bank account and withdrawn in cash, and the report states that no equipment was purchased and no products shipped. In April 1987 the case was referred to the Justice Department for a criminal fraud investigation, and nothing had happened in almost two years. OPIC foreclosed and bought its own collateral at auction for $187,500. Hull was arrested by Costa Rican authorities in mid-January 1989 and charged with drug trafficking and violating Costa Rica's neutrality.35

The Frogman case and the Cuban-American connection

The San Francisco Frogman case, in which swimmers brought cocaine ashore from a Colombian vessel in 1982 and 1983, was in the State Department's words of July 26, 1986 one of the first in which allegations linked specific Contra organizations to drug smugglers. Two Nicaraguans convicted in it, including Carlos Cabezas, claimed they had delivered large sums to resistance groups in Costa Rica; Cabezas said part of $1.5 million in proceeds went to help Pastora's and Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro's operations on the Southern Front in 1982 and 1983. After the trial the government returned $36,020 seized as drug money to one of the defendants after he submitted letters from Contra leaders saying the funds were theirs. The subcommittee found that the defendants' second source of supply was Nicaraguans in Costa Rica associated with the Contras, among them Horacio Pereira, who was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to twelve years.36

The report describes Miami-based Cuban Americans who supported the Southern Front while the Boland Amendment barred official assistance, with help funded in part with drug money. The State Department said in July 1986 there was no information to substantiate allegations that the group around Rene Corbo was a source of drug money. The subcommittee reported that in August 1986 it asked Justice for information on Corbo, Frank Castro, Luis Rodriguez and others and was refused, that the CIA at the May 6, 1986 meeting categorically denied that weapons had been shipped to the Contras on flights involving Corbo and suggested the contrary allegations were disinformation, and that the FBI had learned from informants that Cuban American supporters had shipped weapons from south Florida to Ilopango and onward to John Hull's airstrips. Corbo told the FBI on June 4 and 16, 1986 that he had participated in shipping weapons to the Contras in violation of the Neutrality Act. He and Castro were indicted in a Neutrality Act case in August 1988, without narcotics allegations. Robert Owen warned North that the "Cubans (are) involved in drugs," and notes of Colonel Robert Earl record the CIA in August 1986 worrying about "disreputable characters in the Cuban-American community."37

In a closed session on June 25, 1987 Ramon Milian Rodriguez testified that in a meeting arranged by a Miami private detective he offered Felix Rodriguez drug money for the Contras, that Felix Rodriguez accepted, and that $10 million was subsequently provided through secret couriers; he said he also offered to help entrap the Sandinistas in a drug sting, in return for dropping the charges against him. Felix Rodriguez strenuously denied this version and said he reported the offer to U.S. government agencies including the FBI and CIA, which took no action. The detective declined to respond to a subpoena, and the subcommittee stated that it could not resolve the difference.38

Cuba and Nicaragua

The subcommittee's chapter on Cuba and Nicaragua rests on testimony. It reports testimony that Cuba was used throughout the 1980s as a transit point and haven for laundering money, that Cuban authorities provided smugglers with protection for their boats and aircraft, and that Fidel Castro mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellin cartel.39 George Morales testified that Cuban officials gave him overflight rights and sold him the radio frequencies of U.S. law enforcement agencies, and later offered him a house, a runway and banking facilities; he said he laundered over $500,000 through a bank at Cayo Largo.40

Jose Blandon testified that in the late 1970s Castro decided to use the power of drug traffickers to export revolution, and that he met Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 at Noriega's request after Noriega raided a cartel laboratory in the Darien province, arrested 23 employees and seized equipment and drugs after accepting $5 million from the cartel. Castro, Blandon said, recommended returning the money and the laboratory; Noriega and Castro met directly a week later for five to six hours, and Cuba sent a 25-soldier unit to fly back with Noriega. Blandon produced photographs of himself with Castro, which were made part of the hearing record. A witness at the Miami conspiracy trial of the Cuban Ravelo-Renedo quoted high-ranking Cuban officials as saying "We'll drown them in drugs."41

Castro denounced Blandon's testimony as a fabrication in an NBC interview of February 25, 1988 and offered to prove Cuba was not involved in drug trafficking. Kerry told the Cuban Interest Section on March 14, 1988 that he would not visit unless his staff could advance the trip, Cuba agreed to discuss drug trafficking, and staff could interview Robert Vesco; the Cubans never replied and the trip did not take place.42

On Nicaragua, Floyd Carlton testified that Pablo Escobar sent him there twice in 1984, once to deliver money with a business partner of Noriega and once to locate airstrips for cocaine transshipment. Milian Rodriguez said Escobar asked him to explore drug operations in Nicaragua and document them in order to bargain with the United States for amnesty. A Miami attorney who passed a polygraph told the DEA in October and November 1986 that Jorge Ochoa told him the cartel "finances both Sandinista and anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua by setting up drug operations there," and that cartel principals wished to supply intelligence on guerrillas in return for amnesty; the DEA and FBI broke off contact. The principal evidence for Sandinista involvement came from Barry Seal's photographs of Federico Vaughn, whom U.S. authorities identified as a Nicaraguan official, and Escobar loading Seal's plane; the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the telephone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal had been controlled by the U.S. embassy since 1985. The State Department's narcotics report stated there was "no evidence" of Nicaragua being used to ship drugs to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984" in the Seal case.43

Honduras and Bueso-Rosa

The Honduras chapter covers the narcotics history of the country, the case of General Jose Bueso Rosa and Ramon Matta Ballesteros, and the policy issues those cases raised.44 On October 28, 1984 the FBI seized 345 kilos of cocaine valued at $40 million on a South Florida airstrip; the proceeds were to finance a plot to assassinate Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova. Bueso-Rosa, then military attache in Santiago, Chile, and two others were charged with conspiracy to commit murder. The Justice Department called the conspiracy the "most significant case of narco-terrorism yet discovered."45

The report states, citing the government's admissions in the trial of Oliver North, that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral John Poindexter that Ambassador John Negroponte, General Gorman, the senior CIA official Duane Clarridge and North had worked out arrangements for support of the resistance with Bueso-Rosa, who had recently been convicted, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso-Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of these covert activities. One co-defendant received 30 years; Bueso-Rosa received five years at Eglin Air Force Base after senior U.S. officials intervened with a federal judge.46 Mark Richard testified to the Iran-Contra committees that he was adamantly opposed to the interventions and that the Pentagon had taken the initiative; he recalled a meeting at which North, Gorman, Elliott Abrams and Clarridge "all agreed that Bueso-Rosa should be accommodated."47

Law enforcement and national security

The chapter on confused priorities listed the Barry Seal episode, the law enforcement investigations of the Contras on the Southern Front, a narcotics sting directed at a high Bahamian official, the Bueso-Rosa case and the handling of Noriega as instances in which foreign policy considerations took precedence over the war on drugs.48 Seal, a former smuggler, was used by the DEA in an operation against the Colombian cartels and officials of the Sandinista government. The report states that the operation was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked evidence to the press in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid, and that one individual in the government, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, "decided to play politics with the issue." Associates of Seal who operated aircraft service businesses at the airport in Mena, Arkansas were targets of grand jury probes into narcotics trafficking; the report states that despite evidence sufficient for an indictment on money laundering charges and over the strong protests of state and federal law enforcement officials, the cases were dropped, and that the apparent reason was that prosecution might have revealed national security information.49

The subcommittee reported that it was unable to find a single case against a drug trafficker operating in the war zones of northern Costa Rica that was made on a tip or report from a U.S. intelligence official, and that traffickers' names in documents released in the Iran-Contra hearings were deleted in declassification although a memorandum on the trafficking written by Robert Owen to North had been widely circulated. Gregorie testified that the case against Noriega could be jeopardized if intelligence agencies did not share information, and that he was convinced the prosecutors had not seen "even a small percentage of what we should see." He resigned in January 1989.50

The chapter gives three case studies. Michael Palmer was an informant for the DEA and Customs while the State Department used Vortex's DC-6 for humanitarian cargoes. The Detroit indictment against him was dropped as "not being in the interest of the United States." Frank Camper, a Birmingham, Alabama informant for the FBI who ran a mercenary school, testified that he reported Panamanian Defense Forces dealings with the Medellin cartel to military intelligence, which did not follow up, that he trained members of the Civilian Military Assistance group who fought with the Contras and worked with Hull, and that the FBI advised him to continue training four Sikh nationalists; he said the Sikhs used plastic explosives obtained from his school in the June 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182. Richard Brenneke testified in a deposition of April 23, 1988 that he had worked for the CIA and Israeli intelligence and arranged purchases of Eastern European weapons for the Contras, and that Israeli agents in the Central American weapons project were running drugs into the United States; the subcommittee reported that its review of thousands of documents found he was never officially connected to U.S. intelligence and that no evidence showed any of his arms deals came to fruition.51

The Bahamas

The subcommittee's Bahamas chapter begins with Robert Vesco, who fled the United States in 1972 accused by law enforcement authorities of looting $240 million from the Overseas Investors Services mutual fund. He established operations in the Bahamas and developed a relationship with Everett Bannister, a political fixer close to Prime Minister Lynden Pindling. Vesco gave Bannister "carte blanche" at the Bahamas Commonwealth Bank, and Bannister and Pindling in return gave Vesco protection from extradition. Vesco returned to the islands in 1978 after establishing a relationship with Carlos Lehder, who bought most of Norman's Cay. Some forty Lehder employees drove other residents and visitors away from the island at gunpoint, and Lehder built a large hangar with cocaine storage facilities.52

Embassy cables led to a 1982 meeting between Vice President George H. W. Bush, Admiral Daniel Murphy and Pindling, at which Pindling was shown a computer printout of surveillance of Norman's Cay and told that the island resembled O'Hare Airport. The report states there was no follow-up; with a new ambassador, Lev Dobriansky, relations focused on base rights and the drug issue was relegated to a much lower priority. The State Department's 1988 narcotics report described "systematic corruption, which continues to make the Bahamas attractive to drug traffickers."53

Colombia

The Colombia chapter covers the origins of the cartels, their organization and wealth, and the cartels' war against the Colombian government. Its account of the origin of the cartels relies on the testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez on February 11, 1988 and of Leigh Ritch on February 8, 1988.54

Panama and Manuel Noriega

The Panama chapter describes the Noriega saga as "one of the most serious foreign policy failures for the United States." The executive summary held that each U.S. government agency with a relationship with Noriega "turned a blind eye to his corruption and drug dealing, even as he was emerging as a key player on behalf of the Medellin cartel."55

Witnesses testified that Noriega arranged for Hugo Spadafora, a Panamanian opposition figure who had criticized him for working with Colombian traffickers, to be tortured and murdered by members of the Panama Defense Forces in September 1985; the report states the PDF's involvement was confirmed by several sources including Noriega's personal pilot, Floyd Carlton, and Jose Blandon. Francis J. McNeil, a career State Department official and former ambassador to Costa Rica, referred to Noriega early on as "the rent-a-colonel," described the U.S. approach as a "see no evil approach," and called the failure a "true intelligence failure, the accountability for which rests with the intelligence folk who had become Noriega's clients." Noriega provided the Kalish drug smuggling organization with military protection and favorable treatment and, in return, Steven Kalish received three Panamanian passports, one of them diplomatic; Noriega worked with Kalish until his arrest in Tampa, Florida on July 26, 1984.56

The subcommittee reported that it could not determine what U.S. agencies knew because the National Security Council had decided to prohibit General Accounting Office investigators from receiving information on U.S. policymaking on Noriega and narcotics. Gorman testified that after taking command in Panama in 1983 he tried to establish whether the rumors about Noriega were true and could not, having been assured by the U.S. embassy that Noriega was cooperating. Norman Bailey, a senior NSC staff member from 1981 to 1983, testified to the House Select Committee on Narcotics that what was available to authorized officials was "not a 'smoking gun' but rather a twenty-one cannon barrage" of evidence, and that "clear and incontrovertible evidence was, at best, ignored, and at worst, hidden and denied by many different agencies." Noriega's name appeared in more than 80 DEA files between 1970 and 1987; the report states that DEA Administrator John Lawn told Admiral Murphy less than eight weeks before Noriega's indictment that no indictment would be issued, and that the Customs commissioner William von Raab testified that Customs had evidence linking Noriega to narcotics trafficking as early as 1983. Murphy, the former operations chief of the South Florida Drug Task Force, said information about Noriega was received by lower-level officials but not passed on to policy makers. Lawn had written to Noriega on May 8, 1986 to express the agency's "deep appreciation for the vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy that you have adopted."57

Conclusions of the 1988 report

The report's twelfth chapter lists conclusions on national security, federal priorities, covert activity, law enforcement, money laundering, personnel and the Neutrality Act. It states that international drug trafficking organizations are a threat to U.S. national security, that intelligence reporting on narcotics was "marginal and woefully inadequate," that law enforcement and national security agencies regarded each other with suspicion and should resolve the distrust, and that Customs preclearance be withheld from countries that do not cooperate. It recommends that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence examine why the government failed to acknowledge the cartels' threat, and that the Select Committee review the handling of Frank Camper's testimony and whether military intelligence was involved in improper domestic operations.58 The chapter closes with the statement that "in the end the Contras themselves became victims of the very network created to support them," and that officials who "turned a blind eye to General Noriega, who intervened on behalf of General Bueso-Rosa, and who adamantly opposed the investigations of foreign narcotics figures by honest, hard-working law enforcement officials, must also bear the responsibility for what is happening in the streets of the United States today." It quotes Gregorie: "If it was the communists that were taking over South and Central America, we would have done something about it. But it's the drug dealers and therefore they (the government) don't see that as a significant priority."59

The money chapter records that a proposal by the subcommittee to have the Treasury negotiate agreements permitting foreign banks to cooperate with narcotics investigations, sponsored by Kerry and McConnell as an amendment, was included in the Omnibus Drug Bill passed at the close of the 100th Congress.60

Hearings and witnesses

The hearing record was published in four parts under S. Hrg. 100-773. Part 1 covers hearings of May 27, July 15 and October 30, 1987, held jointly with the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment.61 Part 2 is the Panama volume, February 8 through 11, 1988, with the testimony of Leigh Ritch, Jose Blandon, Floyd Carlton and Ramon Milian Rodriguez.62 Part 3, April 4 through 7, 1988, includes the testimony of Gary Betzner and George Morales and the prepared statement of Francis McNeil.63 Part 4, titled "The Cartel, Haiti and Central America," covers July 11, 12 and 14, 1988 and includes the testimony of David Westrate, Admiral Daniel Murphy and Frank Camper.64

BCCI and the subcommittee's 1988 to 1992 investigation

The BCCI report states that the subcommittee's investigation of the bank began in February 1988, early in the second year of what it calls a two-year investigation of drug trafficking and its relation to foreign policy and law enforcement. At a hearing on Noriega's drug trafficking and money laundering, BCCI was identified as facilitating his criminal activity. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to those at the bank who handled Noriega's assets and the accounts of others in Panama and Colombia. Service was delayed at the request of the Justice Department and the Customs Service, which were concerned for the Operation C-Chase sting in Tampa; by the time the subpoenas were served in late July 1988 the subcommittee's public hearings were over. BCCI officials then told subcommittee counsel Jack Blum that the bank and its attorneys, among them Clark Clifford and Robert Altman, were obstructing the inquiry. The subcommittee deposed Amjad Awan shortly before his arrest in the sting and a second former BCCI officer afterward.65

In the spring of 1989, as Blum left the subcommittee, Kerry authorized him to give his information to the Justice Department. The report describes it as some 16 hours of interviews between Blum and two informants, taped by the Tampa prosecutors' office. When the department, in Blum's view, did not follow up, he took it to the New York District Attorney, Robert Morgenthau, who began his investigation based in substantial part on leads from Blum and the subcommittee. Kerry continued the investigation with two members of his personal staff through 1989 and 1990. In January 1990, when the Justice Department entered a plea agreement with BCCI, the subcommittee published a report on drug money laundering that raised further questions about BCCI and its alleged secret ownership of First American Bank; in July 1990 hearings were postponed after BCCI's attorneys and the Justice Department told staff that the requested witnesses, including Altman, would decline to testify.66

The Foreign Relations Committee authorized the investigation on May 23, 1991, without dissent, together with a subpoena to BCCI, and Brown and his staff then joined Kerry's. The printed report says that "staffing constraints in the offices of the Senators involved with the investigation hampered efforts to investigate matters pertaining to BCCI's activities outside the United States"; the committee's electronic text, which the Federation of American Scientists published, reads instead that staffing "remained limited, amounting to two attorneys, with no budget for travel," and adds that after efforts to obtain authorization through the Banking Committee failed Kerry decided in early 1991 to formalize the personal staff investigation. Subpoena and writ authorizations followed on November 27, 1991, February 29, 1992 and June 4, 1992.67

The subcommittee held thirteen days of public hearings, on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991, and staffed a Senate Banking subcommittee hearing on May 23, 1991. It obtained documents from BCCI and its attorneys, former officials and creditors, Price Waterhouse, Clifford and Altman, First American, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Resolution Trust Corporation, Abu Dhabi, the CIA, the Customs Service, the State Department and the Department of Agriculture.68 The introduction states that BCCI "cannot be taken as an isolated example of a rogue bank, but a case study of the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scope that is beyond the current ability of governments to control." Brown's separate statement credits Kerry with spearheading an investigation that "no other committee in the United States Senate" conducted, and says that because many important members of Kerry's own party were involved it was a distasteful subject for other chairmen.69

The report's chapter on BCCI's relations with foreign governments records that BCCI obtained the account of Noriega while he ran Panamanian military intelligence, and that BCCI official Alauddin Shaikh flew to Panama two to three times a year until 1985 to meet him, according to the BCCI officer Nazir Chinoy. Noriega opened an account in the name of the Panamanian Defense Forces in early 1982; at its height it held about $25 million, mostly from cash deposits, and he used it for political payoffs, intelligence operations and later personal expenses. After his indictment in Miami in February 1988 he told BCCI to move the funds, and in July 1988, when BCCI learned the subcommittee had subpoenaed the records, about $23 million was moved through trading accounts of BCCI's commodities affiliate Capcom.70

BCCI and the CIA

The chapter on the CIA states that the CIA's official record of its use of BCCI was "by and large, accurately represented" by Acting Director Richard J. Kerr in public testimony on October 25, 1991, supplemented by classified testimony on October 31, 1991. The report states that Kerr agreed to testify publicly after Kerry told the CIA that the nomination of Robert Gates as director would be delayed until the CIA provided such testimony.71 Kerr acknowledged what the subcommittee had learned the day before from the former First American president Altman, that the CIA had made extensive use of First American as a repository for "normal banking" and savings accounts, and that the CIA had also used BCCI for limited and routine intelligence-gathering. He testified that the CIA had not been involved with any BCCI "black network" of thugs and assassins, had no knowledge of any use of BCCI for arms sales to Iran or the diversion of funds for the Nicaraguan Contras, and had no relationship with BCCI's head, Agha Hasan Abedi. The report adds that the CIA's early 1985 report on BCCI was missing and had been reconstructed at the subcommittee's request, and that the record had substantial gaps on the activities of contacts including the BCCI customer and Iran-Contra arms merchant Adnan Khashoggi.72

Kissinger Associates and the two editions of the report

The report's chapter 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," records BCCI contacts with the New York consulting firm Kissinger Associates from the fall of 1986 through early 1989. The firm's partners were Henry A. Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Lawrence Eagleburger, Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III. Both editions state that discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence."73

In November 1991 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized a subpoena to Kissinger Associates for all documents on BCCI and its client lists. The firm promised to cooperate under an agreement that the subpoena not be served, provided documents, and declined to provide its client list. The printed report says the firm declined "contending the information was confidential"; the electronic text says the firm refused on the ground that the list was beyond the investigation and told the subcommittee it would litigate "through an extensive appellate process to the Supreme Court."74

The two texts of the chapter differ. The Federation of American Scientists' electronic text carries a note by Steven Aftergood describing it as the "penultimate draft" and stating that after the report's release Sen. Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger, pressed for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in Chapter 20 on 'BCCI and Kissinger Associates,'" so that the hardcopy printed by the Government Printing Office "differs slightly from the Committee's softcopy version." The electronic text names the firm's counsel, Lloyd Cutler, as the source of the January 30, 1992 representations that the firm had "never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder" and that the only substantive contact was Abol Helmy's meetings with Stoga in late 1988 and early 1989, and adds the committee's comment that this account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts." The printed chapter gives the same representations without naming Cutler, omits that comment, and says the contacts "extended over a period of 2 years." It adds a second paragraph stating that "while Henry Kissinger in December 1988, rejected the proposed relationship with BCCI," the record shows BCCI repeatedly reached out to the firm and to Kissinger as an individual and that "in each case reviewed by the Subcommittee, Kissinger declined the overtures."75

Footnotes

  1. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy, S. Prt. 100-165, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (December 1988; Washington: GPO, 1989), Introduction, "Origins and Methodology," pp. 5-6, on the early 1986 staff investigation, the April 1986 approach to Chairman Lugar, the closed session of June 25, 1986, the direction of Chairman Pell in February 1987, and the assignment in April 1987 to the subcommittee chaired by Kerry with Senator McConnell as ranking member. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  2. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "Narcotics Traffickers and the Contras," Introduction, p. 36. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  3. S. Prt. 100-165, "Origins and Methodology," pp. 5-6. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  4. S. Prt. 100-165, Letter of Transmittal (dated Washington, D.C., April 13, 1989), staff acknowledgment: "Special Counsel Jack A. Blum." https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  5. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 37, quoting State Department document 3079e (April 16, 1986) and document 5136c (July 26, 1986). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  6. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 37-38, quoting the testimony of the CIA Central American Task Force chief before the Iran-Contra committees, August 5, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  7. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 38-39, citing the memoranda of conversation of the May 6, 1986 meeting held in the subcommittee files. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  8. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, and ch. 5, "The Cuban-American Connection," p. 60 (which cites a letter of John Bolton to Senators Lugar and Pell, August 11, 1986). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  9. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, and Appendix B, "Allegations of Interference with the Committee Investigation," pp. 147-148, citing the subcommittee testimony of Jeffery B. Feldman, October 5, 1988, pp. 24 and 29, and his Iran-Contra testimony. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  10. S. Prt. 100-165, Appendix B, pp. 148-149, citing the deposition of Thomas E. Marum, October 25, 1988, p. 56, and the deposition of Mark Richard, November 7, 1988, pp. 37-40; p. 39 states that each Justice Department deponent denied participating in any agreement to obstruct a congressional investigation. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  11. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 1, "Executive Summary and Conclusions," "Past Failures," pp. 2-3. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  12. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 12, "Conclusions," items 5 and 6, "Covert Activity Issues," pp. 136-137. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  13. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, citing the testimony of Gen. Paul Gorman, Part 2, February 8, 1988, p. 44, and of David Westrate, Part 4, July 12, 1988, p. 144. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  14. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 39-40, citing Kerry's interviews with Costa Rican law enforcement officials, San Jose, October 31, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  15. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 40-41, citing the closed-session deposition of Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8, 1988, pp. 673-690, and the deposition of Karol Prado. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  16. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 41, citing DEA testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, July 28, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  17. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 42, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of "Thomas Castillo." https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  18. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections," pp. 42-43, with table and note 35 (GAO analysis of NHAO accounts; final figures provided by the State Department to the subcommittee, January 4, 1989). The table prints the four items and a total of $806,401.20. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  19. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 43-44, citing Duemling's statement to Kerry of April 6, 1988 and his Iran-Contra deposition, Appendix B, vol. 9, pp. 47-78. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  20. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 44. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  21. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "A. SETCO/Hondu Carib," pp. 44-45. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  22. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "B. Frigorificos de Puntarenas," pp. 45-47 (the $261,937 figure on p. 45; the table on p. 43 prints $261,932), citing the grand jury statements of Carlos Soto, the testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez, Part 2, February 11, 1988, pp. 260-261, and U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez, 88-0222 (S.D. Fla.). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  23. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "C. DIACSA," pp. 47-48, citing the affidavit of DEA Special Agent Daniel E. Moritz, U.S. v. Carlton et al., S.D. Fla. 85-70. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  24. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "D. Vortex," pp. 48-49, citing the subcommittee testimony of Michael B. Palmer, April 6, 1988, and the Detroit indictment of 1986. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  25. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The Case of George Morales and FRS/ARDE," p. 49, quoting State Department document 5136c (July 26, 1986), p. 5. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  26. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 50, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of Robert Owen, Appendix B, vol. 20, pp. 849-850, and the deposition of Karol Prado, Part 3, p. 285. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  27. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 50, citing the testimony of George Morales, Part 3, April 7, 1988, pp. 297, 300. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  28. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 50-51, citing the video depositions of Aguado, Prado and Cesar, Part 3, pp. 277-286, and the closed-session testimony of Adolfo Chamorro, April 6, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  29. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 51-52, citing Part 3, pp. 282-286. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  30. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 52-53, citing the Iran-Contra executive session testimony of Thomas Castillo, May 29, 1987, pp. 83-85, the testimony of Morales, Part 1, July 16, 1987, p. 98. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  31. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "John Hull," pp. 53-54, citing North notebook entries, the Iran-Contra deposition of Robert Owen, and the Castillo executive session. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  32. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 54-55, citing the testimony of Gary Betzner, Part 3, April 7, 1988, pp. 253-267, and the deposition of Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  33. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 55-56, citing the Iran-Contra deposition of Jeffrey Feldman, Appendix B, vol. 10, April 30, 1987, pp. 77-88. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  34. S. Prt. 100-165, p. 56, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of Leon Kellner. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  35. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 56-58, citing the Part 1 testimony of October 30, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  36. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The San Francisco Frogman Case, UDN-FARN and PCNE," pp. 58-59, quoting State Department document 5136c. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  37. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The Cuban-American Connection," pp. 59-61, including the account of the May 6, 1986 meeting on p. 60 and the Earl notes on p. 61 (Iran-Contra deposition of Robert L. Earl, Appendix B, vol. 9, p. 1109). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  38. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Felix Rodriguez," pp. 61-62. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  39. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Cuba and Nicaragua," Introduction, pp. 62-63. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  40. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, pp. 64-65, citing the testimony of George Morales, Part 3, pp. 294-296, and Part 1, pp. 48-66. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  41. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Ideological Use of Drugs" and "Cuba, Panama and the Cartel," pp. 65-66, citing the testimony of Jose Blandon, Part 2, February 9, 1988, pp. 101-108. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  42. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Castro Denies Involvement," pp. 66-67, citing NBC Nightly News, February 25, 1988, and a meeting of March 14, 1988 with the deputy chief of the Cuban Interest Section. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  43. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Allegations Concerning Nicaragua," pp. 67-69, citing the deposition of Floyd Carlton, December 4, 1987, the closed-session testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez, June 25, 1987, DEA debriefs of a Miami attorney (October 21 and November 13, 1986) and the testimony of Gen. Gorman, Part 2, pp. 104-107. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  44. S. Prt. 100-165, Honduras chapter, pp. 73-79. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  45. S. Prt. 100-165, Honduras chapter, p. 76. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  46. S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 76-77, citing the agreed statements in U.S. v. North, 1988, para. 102, and p. 121 ("Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"), citing the testimony of Francis McNeil, Part 3, April 4, 1988, p. 52, and John C. Lawn, Part 4, July 12, 1988, pp. 134-135. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  47. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, p. 122, citing the Iran-Contra deposition of Mark M. Richard, Appendix B, vol. 23, August 19, 1987, pp. 122-128. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  48. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Law Enforcement vs. National Security: Confused Priorities," Introduction, p. 121. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  49. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Barry Seal and the Cartel," p. 121. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  50. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Intelligence vs. Law Enforcement" and "Misguided Priorities," pp. 122-123, citing the testimony of Richard Gregorie, July 12, 1988, and the April 1, 1985 Owen memorandum to North (Iran-Contra exhibit RWO 7). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  51. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Case Studies," pp. 126-132, citing the testimony of Michael Palmer, Part 3, April 6, 1988, the testimony of Frank Camper, Part 4, and the deposition of Richard Brenneke, April 23, 1988. Camper's account of the Air India bombing is his testimony as summarized on p. 130. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  52. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 3, "The Bahamas," pp. 14-16. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  53. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 3, pp. 18-19, citing the State Department's 1988 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  54. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 4, "Colombia," pp. 25-35, "Origin of the Cartels," pp. 27-28. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  55. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 1, pp. 2-3, and ch. 9, "Panama," pp. 79-98. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  56. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 9, pp. 88-89, citing the testimony of Floyd Carlton, Part 2, February 10, 1988, p. 202, and the McNeil prepared statement, Part 3, p. 318. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  57. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 9, "U.S. Knowledge of Noriega's Activities," "Why Did the U.S. Fail To Respond to Noriega Allegations?" and "Mixed Messages," pp. 88-92, citing the testimony of Gorman, Part 2, pp. 38-39, of Admiral Murphy, Part 4, pp. 239-242, and of Norman Bailey before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, March 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  58. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 12, "Conclusions," pp. 133-145, items 1 through 11. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  59. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Conclusion," pp. 132-133, quoting an NBC Nightly News interview with Richard Gregorie of February 22, 1989. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  60. S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 10, "Money," "Summary and Conclusions," p. 120. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras ↩︎

  61. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy, hearings before the Subcommittees on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications and International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 1, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, July 15 and October 30, 1987. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0003 ↩︎

  62. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: Panama, hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 2, 100th Cong., 2d sess., February 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0004 ↩︎

  63. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: Hearings, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 3, April 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1988. Betzner's testimony is cited in the 1988 report as Part 3, April 7, 1988, and Morales's as Part 3, April 7, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0005 ↩︎

  64. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: The Cartel, Haiti and Central America, hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 4, July 11, 12 and 14, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0009 ↩︎

  65. Kerry, John, and Hank Brown, The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, S. Prt. 102-140, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (December 1992; Washington: GPO, 1993), ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation," p. 18. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 (GPO print); electronic text of the committee's version: https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm ↩︎

  66. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, pp. 18-19. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  67. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, p. 19 (printed text); electronic text of ch. 2, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm, for the "two attorneys, with no budget for travel" and Banking Committee sentences. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  68. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, pp. 19-20. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  69. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, p. 17 (introductory paragraph) and pp. 20-21 ("Senator Brown's View"). https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  70. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 5, "BCCI's Relationship with Foreign Governments, Central Banks, and International Organizations," pp. 108-109. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  71. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence," pp. 289 and 324. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  72. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, pp. 289, 292 (citing testimony of Kerr and of Altman, S. Hrg. 102-350, Pt. 3) and 293. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  73. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," Introduction, p. 549. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ; electronic text: https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm ↩︎

  74. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, p. 550, n. 507; electronic text, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ↩︎

  75. The BCCI Affair, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, pp. 549-551 (printed text); electronic text of ch. 20 and note by Steven Aftergood, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/index.html and https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm. ↩︎