304 lines
51 KiB
Markdown
304 lines
51 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Boland Amendment
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aliases:
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- Boland Amendment
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- Boland Amendments
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- Boland amendments
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- Boland
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created: 2026-05-17
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updated: 2026-10-14
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category: "Intelligence Scandal"
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tags:
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- Concept
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- UnitedStates
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- ContraWar
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- 1980s
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- DarkAllianceInvestigation
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- IranContraAffair
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- CongressionalOversight
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- NationalSecurityCouncil
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summary: "Series of congressional appropriations riders from 1982 to 1986 restricting U.S. military support for the Contras, whose coverage of the National Security Council staff split the Iran-Contra committees."
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start: 1982-12-21
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end: 1986-10-18
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location: "United States"
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relations:
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Edward P. Boland]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "sponsor of the first substitute (December 1982) and of the October 1984 conference provision"
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start: 1982-12-08
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fn: 4
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Tom Harkin]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Representative who offered the amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill that Boland's substitute replaced"
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start: 1982-12-08
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fn: 4
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Ronald Reagan]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "President who signed P.L. 98-473 containing the October 1984 prohibition"
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start: 1984-10-12
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fn: 27
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[George P. Shultz]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Secretary of State who reported at the National Security Planning Group on June 25, 1984 that James Baker had called third-country solicitation an impeachable offense"
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start: 1984-06-25
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fn: 16
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[James A. Baker III]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "White House chief of staff whose view on third-country solicitation was reported to the National Security Planning Group"
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start: 1984-06-25
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fn: 16
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[William French Smith]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Attorney General who advised Casey on June 26, 1984 that third-country funding was permissible"
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start: 1984-06-26
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fn: 21
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Oliver North]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "NSC staff official who ran the resupply network during the cutoff"
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start: 1984-10-12
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end: 1986-10-18
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fn: 55
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Robert McFarlane]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "National Security Adviser who wrote the 1985 letters to Barnes and Hamilton"
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start: 1985-09
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end: 1985-10
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fn: 50
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[John Poindexter]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "National Security Adviser who testified that the NSC staff complied with Boland and withheld the Sciaroni opinion from Congress"
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start: 1987-07-15
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fn: 41
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Bretton G. Sciaroni]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Intelligence Oversight Board counsel who wrote the opinion that the NSC was not covered"
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start: 1985-08
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fn: 42
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[William J. Casey]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Director of Central Intelligence whose position on the Contras Walsh linked to the resupply network"
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start: 1984-10-12
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end: 1986-10-18
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fn: 55
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Alan Fiers]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "CIA Central American Task Force chief whom Walsh said dovetailed CIA activities with North's network"
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start: 1984-10-12
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end: 1986-10-18
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fn: 55
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Dewey Clarridge]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "CIA Latin American Division chief who in November 1984 told Fiers to cooperate with North, according to Fiers"
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start: 1984-11
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fn: 54
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[A. Langhorne Motley]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Assistant Secretary of State who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1985 that the Boland prohibition barred third-country solicitation"
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start: 1985-03
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fn: 34
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- type: participant_in
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with: "[[Elliott Abrams]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Assistant Secretary of State who solicited $10 million from Brunei"
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start: 1986-08
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fn: 72
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- type: investigated
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with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
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reverse: true
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role: "Independent Counsel whose final report concluded the conspirators violated the Boland Amendment"
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start: 1986-12-19
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fn: 47
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---
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The Boland Amendments were a series of appropriations provisions, passed between December 1982 and October 1986, that restricted the use of U.S. funds for overthrowing the government of [[Nicaragua]] or for military support to the [[Contras]]. They were named after Massachusetts Democrat [[Edward P. Boland]], chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1] The first text applied only to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Department of Defense]].[^2] Later texts applied to "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities."[^3] The statutes did not name the [[National Security Council]], and the Iran-Contra committees divided over whether they reached its staff. [[Gary Webb]] wrote that the amendments were circumvented by the CIA, the [[White House]], and [[Oliver North]]'s illegal resupply network.[^1]
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### Boland I, December 1982
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On December 8, 1982, Representative [[Tom Harkin]] offered an amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill. Boland offered a substitute that referred to overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. He said it was substantively identical to the restriction in the classified annex to the intelligence authorization bill effective September 27, 1982, and that the Administration had accepted it: "They do not like it," he said, "but it is agreeable to them." Harkin countered with a substitute that would have barred aid to any group "already known by that agency to have the intent of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or of provoking a military conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras." Harkin's substitute was defeated, and the Boland substitute prevailed 411 to 0.[^4] Webb quoted Harkin calling the Contras "vicious, cutthroat murderers" and urging Congress to "end our involvement with this group."[^1][^5] Webb wrote that Harkin had proposed a complete funding cutoff, and that the amendment followed a [[Newsweek]] cover story, "America's Secret War: Target Nicaragua."[^1] The Iran-Contra report cites Newsweek of November 8, 1982, pages 42 to 53, under the headline "A Secret War for Nicaragua."[^6]
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Webb wrote that Boland, who knew of the CIA's Nicaragua project, persuaded Harkin to accept a weaker amendment, and that the amendment was largely a fraud. In Webb's account, internal memoranda showed that the CIA, the White House, the Defense Department and the Contras' congressional supporters knew the Contras could not defeat the [[Sandinistas]]. Supporters reasoned that CIA funds could still be spent, and Webb quoted the phrase "that wasn't the CIA's fault" for the position that if Contra money went to a different purpose, the agency was not at fault.[^1]
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The enacted text read, in part: "None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and [[Honduras]]."[^2] The provision took effect on December 21, 1982. The Senate had tabled a proposal by [[Christopher Dodd]] 58 to 38 on December 18. The provision remained law at least until October 1, 1983.[^4][^7]
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The Administration and Congress disagreed over whether the prohibition turned on the intent of the Contras or the purpose of the agency. Boland and others in Congress contended that the intent of the recipients governed, so that no group intending to overthrow the Nicaraguan government could receive U.S. assistance. The Administration took the position that if the United States itself was not seeking the overthrow, the Contras' objectives were irrelevant, and it pointed to the defeat of the second Harkin amendment. The report cites an [[Intelligence Oversight Board]] opinion of April 6, 1983 for the position that the agency's purpose, not the Contras' purpose, was controlling.[^8] Webb wrote that in May 1983 the House Intelligence Committee issued a special report suggesting the Contra operation was illegal.[^1] On May 13, 1983 the House Intelligence Committee reported H.R. 2760, a bill to amend the fiscal 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act, which would have barred funds "for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua"; the Senate never voted on it.[^4] The committee also reported the Boland-Zablocki bill, which provided $80 million in assistance to Central American governments to stop arms flows and no funds for "support of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua." The House passed the Boland-Zablocki bill on July 28, 1983, by 228 to 195. The Senate never considered it, and it did not become law.[^9] Webb described the House vote of July 28, 1983, 228 to 195, as a resolution to stop all aid to the Contras.[^1]
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### Fiscal 1984 cap
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The House voted 243 to 171 to cut off covert aid in H.R. 2968, and on November 3, 1983 the Senate approved an intelligence authorization bill that did not restrict assistance. In December 1983 the conference capped covert funding.[^4] Section 775 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (P.L. 98-212) set a limit for fiscal 1984.[^10] Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 1984 (P.L. 98-215), headed "Limitation on covert assistance for military operations in Nicaragua," provided that "not more than $24,000,000" of funds available to the CIA, the Defense Department, or "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" could be obligated or expended for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.[^3] Boland described the compromise as "a $24 million cap on funding from whatever source." The cap counted funds from October 1, 1983, and the conference language took effect on December 8 and 9, 1983.[^11]
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On June 11, 1984, a memorandum by CIA counsel [[Stanley Sporkin]] advised [[William J. Casey]] that the fiscal 1984 appropriation for CIA assistance to the Contras had virtually run out, and that under the Anti-Deficiency Act sanctions could be imposed directly on CIA officers if spending went beyond the $24 million cap.[^12] Webb wrote that by 1984 Congress had cut off CIA funding for the Contras entirely, and that this led North to build private funding networks, the enterprise at the center of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
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### Third-country funding, June 1984
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On June 25, 1984, the [[National Security Planning Group]] met on Central America. The participants listed in the minutes included the President, the Vice President, [[George P. Shultz]], [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[John Poindexter]], Casey and CIA officer [[Dewey Clarridge]]. The White House chief of staff, [[James A. Baker III]], was not present.[^13][^14] Casey told the group: "The legal position is that CIA is authorized to cooperate and seek support from third countries. In fact, the finding encourages third country participation and support in this entire effort," and said that if the CIA notified the oversight committees, "we can provide direct assistance to help the FDN get the money they need from third countries," that the [[FDN]], Misura and ARDE were acting on their own to obtain financial support from third-party sources, and: "We need a decision to authorize our permitting the FDN to obtain third country support."[^15]
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Shultz listed several points, the third of which read: "I would like to get money for the Contras also, but another lawyer, Jim Baker, said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense." Casey answered: "I am entitled to complete the record. Jim Baker said that if we tried to get money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem and he was informed that the finding does provide for the participation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the funding does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an 'impeachable offense', and you heard him say that, George." Shultz replied: "Jim Baker's argument is that the US Government may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation of the Congress." Weinberger said: "I am another lawyer who isn't practicing law, but Jim Baker should realize that the United States would not be spending the money for the anti-Sandinista program; it is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources." Shultz then said: "I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources. It would be the prudent thing to do."[^16]
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Later in the meeting Casey said: "We need the legal opinion which makes clear that the US has the authority to facilitate third country funding for the anti-Sandinistas."[^17] Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] asked: "How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas under the finding? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of an exchange." Casey said: "Jim Baker changed his mind as soon as he saw the finding and saw the language." McFarlane proposed: "that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." President Reagan said: "If such a story gets out, we'll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House until we find out who did it."[^18] The Iran-Contra committees wrote that Shultz conveyed Baker's concern that solicitation and control of third-country funding was an "impeachable offense," and that others at the meeting asserted that third-country solicitation was permissible if the United States did not serve as a conduit.[^14]
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McFarlane testified to the committees that it was "likely" he told Baker in the spring of 1984 of the contribution from the country the report calls Country 2, and "possible" that he told Meese. Baker denied in his deposition of June 22, 1987 any knowledge of the contribution, and said of the June 25 remark that he did not recall "using that language or having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very close look at the question of legality and feeling that we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly." Shultz testified that he was told of the contribution for the first time in June 1986, and Weinberger had no recollection of being told.[^19]
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McFarlane testified at North's trial that he told the President of the first Saudi contribution in June 1984 by putting the information on a card in the President's daily briefing book, saying either in writing or orally that "no one else knows about this," and that the President responded "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^20]
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On June 26, 1984, Casey and Sporkin met with Attorney General [[William French Smith]], who expressed the opinion that third-country funding was permissible if no U.S. funds were used and the donor did not expect repayment.[^21] [[Saudi Arabia]] donated $32 million between July 1984 and March 1985, and [[Taiwan]] contributed $2 million in September 1985 and February 1986.[^22] The majority wrote that between June 1984 and the beginning of 1986 the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC staff secretly raised $34 million for the Contras from other countries.[^23]
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### Boland II, October 1984
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The majority identified the revelation of the CIA's role in mining Nicaraguan harbors as a major factor in the formulation of Boland II. [[The Wall Street Journal]] reported the involvement on April 6, 1984; Senator [[Barry Goldwater]], chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, protested to Casey; Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]] resigned as vice chairman and was persuaded to stay; and both houses voted to condemn the CIA's involvement.[^24] The majority also wrote that the CIA had allegedly exceeded the $24 million limit in the mining operation, and that according to reports it had attempted to obscure the overrun by charging the $1.2 million cost of a vessel to its overall operating budget.[^25]
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The House passed a fiscal 1985 prohibition on August 2, 1984, by 294 to 118. The Senate rejected a parallel provision on October 3, 1984, by 42 to 57.[^26] The conferees adopted the House prohibition and coupled it with a promise to revisit the issue in four months.[^26] Section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985, enacted October 12, 1984 as section 101 of P.L. 98-473, provided in subsection (a): "During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." Subsection (b) allowed the prohibition to cease after February 28, 1985, if the President reported to Congress and a joint resolution was enacted. Subsection (d) specified $14,000,000.[^27] The 98th Congress had a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives (269 to 166) and a Republican majority in the Senate (55 to 45).[^28] Webb wrote that the Democrat-controlled Congress passed the October 1984 amendment.[^29]
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Boland told the House that the provision "clearly ends United States support for the war in Nicaragua," and that "there are no exceptions to the prohibition."[^30] [[Lawrence Walsh|Walsh]] quoted him describing the amendment as clearly prohibiting "any expenditure, including those from accounts for salaries and all support costs."[^31] North did not count fixed operating costs, such as his appropriated salary, as covered by Boland II; asked whether he was aware that salaries were included in the Boland Amendment, he answered "No" and, as to his own salary, "not mine."[^25] Senator [[Ted Stevens]] said the compromise did not cut the Contras' lifeline, but rather "[put] off the decision until next year," and that "The Contras [already] are supporting themselves with assistance they are getting from elsewhere in the world. Having that assistance out there to be made available on March 31 will encourage that assistance from other sources to the Contras during this period."[^32]
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Webb described the October 1984 amendment as one with teeth. In his account it closed the loopholes that the earlier versions had left open. The CIA and Defense Department withdrew their trainers, advisers, administrators, tacticians and logisticians from [[Central America]], and by the end of 1984 the Contras were alone and in disarray, with thousands of rebel fighters retreating from Nicaragua to Honduras.[^29]
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President [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] made the certification in April 1985. The Senate approved the joint resolution on April 23, 1985, by 53 to 46, and the House rejected it 180 to 248. The majority found that no funds were available for the Contras from the exhaustion of the $24 million in about June 1984 until the humanitarian legislation took effect on August 8, 1985.[^33]
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In March 1985 A. Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, told the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]: "even if today we wanted to go to third countries to encourage or solicit, we could not because there is a prohibition." Asked by Dodd for an assurance that there would be no indirect efforts to finance the Contras through third-party nations, he said: "I think that was one thing that was loud and clear with us when I started. I told you that we understood what it means, direct and indirect, including third party." The committees wrote that the contributions were concealed from him.[^34] The majority wrote that the CIA also took the position that Boland II prohibited it from third-country solicitation, and that McFarlane told Congress that the NSC staff was not soliciting funds. North denied receiving any such instruction from McFarlane, but prefaced every meeting with potential contributors with a disclaimer that he was not soliciting.[^34] The majority described a memorandum from North to McFarlane that noted Boland II was silent on third-country funding but that Congress would regard it as an evasion, and concluded that solicitation could be safely undertaken only upon consultation with Congress and with the risk that Congress might refuse. The majority wrote that when North wrote it he was secretly involved in trying to raise money from Far Eastern countries, and that a Middle Eastern country had already contributed $32 million.[^35]
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### The NSC staff and the Intelligence Oversight Board
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Boland II applied to "any other agency or entity . . . involved in intelligence activities." The majority wrote that the assertion that the statute did not reach the NSC staff "never was made publicly prior to this investigation," and that "post hoc arguments are not persuasive." It concluded that Boland II "did not put just the CIA out of the Contra support business; it prevented other government agencies from covertly taking the CIA's place."[^36] It wrote that North and Poindexter both testified that there was discussion among the NSC staff after Boland II was adopted that it did not apply to the staff, and that "No documentary evidence exists, however, to suggest that this interpretation was ever put forward before August 1985." The majority wrote that the [[Department of Justice]], the Counsel to the President and the Attorney General were never asked for legal opinions on whether Boland II applied to the NSC staff. North testified that Professor [[John Norton Moore]] of the [[University of Virginia]] gave him an opinion that Boland II did not apply to the NSC; the majority recorded that Moore denied having been asked for or having given one.[^36]
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Robert McFarlane said that he interpreted the amendment "that the NSC was not to itself get involved in military or paramilitary activities or replicating the CIA function in those domains."[^37] At the public hearings he said: "If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing?"[^38] An undated memorandum by the [[Congressional Research Service]], prepared in response to an inquiry dated August 13, 1985, found "strong, if not conclusive evidence that the [language] was intended to apply to the National Security Council." A staff memorandum prepared for Representative [[Henry J. Hyde]], which the FBI later found in North's files, stated that the "NSC is clearly a U.S. entity involved in intelligence activities, subject to the Section 8066(a) prohibition."[^37]
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[[Bretton G. Sciaroni]], counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board, wrote an opinion that the NSC was not covered. Sciaroni wrote that "on the face of it the NSC would appear to be an agency or entity of the United States covered by the amendment," and reasoned from the premise that "it is a coordinating body with no operational role."[^39] The majority wrote that he had never practiced law before becoming Board counsel, that the opinion was his first on legislation, and that he "based his opinion on certain key factual premises that turned out to be incorrect." Asked at the hearings whether the incorrect facts were part of the basis for his opinion, he answered: "That is absolutely correct."[^39] The minority views defended the opinion, stating that Sciaroni testified that the additional facts then before the committees would not have changed his key legal conclusions, and that the opinion was approved and issued after review by a Board that included [[Charles Meyers]], former dean of the [[Stanford Law School]].[^40] The majority wrote that the opinion was not unveiled until long after North's activities began to unravel, and recorded John Poindexter's reason for keeping its conclusion under wraps as fear that if Congress learned the NSC staff considered itself exempt from Boland II, "Congress would act to eliminate any such misconception."[^41] The majority also wrote that Sciaroni noted in the opinion that if North's salary was borne by the Defense Department, an entity named in Boland II, North could be subject to its restrictions, and that this was the case.[^39]
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In late August 1985 the Board inquired into the activities of the NSC staff. It concluded that North "had not provided military or fundraising assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance." The committees found that [[Paul Thompson]] had withheld six "troubling" memorandums from Sciaroni, and that North gave Sciaroni a "blanket denial" of involvement.[^42] McFarlane told the House Intelligence Committee on December 10, 1986, in response to questions from Representative [[Dick Cheney]], that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" North had violated the Boland Amendment.[^43]
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The minority wrote that Congress chose language borrowed from the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, that "In the course of settling on that language in 1980, Congress deliberately decided to exclude the National Security Council (NSC) from its coverage," and that an appropriations rider "is nothing more than a limitation on the way Federal funds may be used."[^44] The minority wrote: "We have seen that the NSC was not covered by the law's language."[^45] It also quoted Thompson's recollection of telling Sciaroni that "McFarlane had already made the determination that we had not violated the Boland Amendment."[^46] Walsh wrote that the NSC fell within the statute as an "entity involved in intelligence activities," under the [[National Security Act of 1947|National Security Act]] and [[Executive Order 12333]], and that North was covered because his salary was paid by the Department of Defense.[^47] Attorney General Edwin Meese testified that "certainly the NSC is not an intelligence agency."[^48]
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In August 1985 McFarlane replied to congressional inquiries that the NSC was complying with "the letter and spirit of the law."[^49] On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote [[Lee Hamilton]], chairman of the House Intelligence Committee; on September 12 he wrote Representative [[Michael D. Barnes]], chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; and on October 7 he answered questions forwarded by Hamilton. Walsh wrote that McFarlane "decided to lie about North's activities in a series of letters to Barnes and Hamilton in September-October 1985."[^50] McFarlane later pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor charges that he unlawfully withheld information from Congress.[^51] Poindexter testified: "I felt that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and I felt that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. Now, it doesn't say that we are not helping the Contras. We were."[^52]
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### The CIA and the NSC staff, September 1984 to 1985
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McFarlane testified that after Boland II was signed he believed the NSC staff's actions were restricted by it, and that he instructed his staff not to raise money for the Contras. On September 2, 1984 he had written on a North memorandum seeking to approach a private donor for a helicopter: "I don't think this is legal." McFarlane testified that Casey later expressed concern that North was conveying intelligence information to Contra leaders, and North replied with a memorandum of November 7, 1984, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom." McFarlane found Casey's inquiry into North's activities "very odd at the time" because "Bill Casey knew what Ollie was doing."[^53]
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Walsh wrote that Casey appointed Alan Fiers chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force in late August 1984, about a month before the Boland cutoff took effect, and that Fiers became chief on October 9, 1984. Fiers pleaded guilty on July 7, 1991 to two charges of withholding information from Congress and testified at the 1992 trial of [[Clair E. George]], the CIA's deputy director for operations. He testified that in mid-September 1984 Dewey Clarridge introduced him to North, saying that North was "someone you need to get to know" and "He's got responsibilities at the NSC for Central America and you'll be working with him," and that in early November 1984 Clarridge told him to cooperate with North. Fiers testified that at a later meeting Casey asked North whether he was operating in Central America, said "Now Ollie, I don't want you operating in Central America. You understand that?" and that North answered "Yes, sir. I understand it." According to Fiers, George told him afterward: "What we saw was for our consumption. Sometime in the dark of night Bill Casey has told the President: I'll take care of Central America, Mr. President; don't worry about it." Fiers said he replied: "Wow, if that's true and if it blows it will be worse than Watergate." Both Fiers and George were pardoned by President Bush on December 24, 1992.[^54] Walsh wrote that Casey "was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team when the Boland Amendment in October 1984 forced the CIA to refrain from direct or indirect aid," and that Casey's position on the Contras prompted Fiers to "dovetail" CIA activities with those of North's resupply network, "in violation of Boland restrictions."[^55]
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The majority wrote that after Boland II forced the CIA to withdraw, North, "with the express approval of Poindexter and at least the acquiescence of McFarlane, took over where the CIA left off." It quoted Poindexter: North "was the switching point that made the whole system work."[^56]
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### Humanitarian aid, 1985
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The day after the House rejected the joint resolution in April 1985, it voted 213 to 215 against an amendment that would have released the $14 million as humanitarian assistance.[^57] On June 6 the Senate passed its version, 52 to 42. It unfenced the $14 million, authorized an additional $24 million, and provided that the full $38 million would be spent on humanitarian aid.[^57] On June 12 the House voted 248 to 184 to include $27 million in humanitarian aid in a supplemental appropriations bill. Opponents suggested that humanitarian aid to a fighting force was a "Trojan horse" concealing military assistance.[^57]
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Section 722(g) of P.L. 99-83, enacted August 8, 1985, provided that "there are authorized to be appropriated $27,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^58] The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (P.L. 99-88, August 15, 1985) appropriated $27,000,000 for the program, available until March 31, 1986. Section 102(a) of that act applied the prohibition of section 8066(a) of P.L. 98-473, and section 801 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 1985 (P.L. 98-618), to those funds "without limitation as to fiscal year." Section 102(b) provided that nothing in the act or in those Boland prohibitions barred the government from exchanging information with the resistance, and that the funds could be obligated only for the purposes for which they were expressly made available.[^59] The conference report stated that "none of the prohibitions on the provision of military or paramilitary assistance to the democratic resistance prohibits the sharing of intelligence information with the democratic resistance."[^60] Representative Hyde suggested the exception could let the Contras "defend themselves against the helicopter gunships."[^60] Related provisions of the same legislation included the Pell Amendment, which barred the United States from "enter[ing] into any arrangement conditioning, expressly or implicitly" assistance or arms sales on a recipient's assistance to the Contras, and the Kerry Amendment, which barred funds for activities against the government of Nicaragua not authorized by or pursuant to law and which would place the United States in violation of international law.[^57]
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Walsh wrote that Congress "modified the Boland Amendment by appropriating $27 million for humanitarian assistance to the contras," and that President Reagan created the [[Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] on August 29, 1985 to administer the money. The conferees did not give the National Security Council a role in the program, and the office was placed in the [[State Department]].[^61] The aircraft used for the humanitarian deliveries also flew lethal resupply missions.[^62]
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### Boland III, December 1985 to October 1986
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Section 105 of P.L. 99-169, enacted December 4, 1985, provided that funds available to the CIA, the Defense Department and other covered entities could be used during fiscal 1986 to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua "only as authorized in section 101," the classified schedule of authorizations, section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or section 106 of P.L. 99-88. Paragraph (b)(2) of the same section provided that "nothing in this section precludes . . . activities of the Department of State to solicit . . . humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^63] Section 8050 of the defense appropriations for fiscal 1986 (P.L. 99-190, December 19, 1985) provided that no funds could go to the resistance "unless in accordance with the terms and conditions specified by section 105" of P.L. 99-169.[^64]
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The majority wrote that Boland III permitted covered agencies to support the Contras "specifically by the provision of communications equipment, related training, and intelligence 'information and advice.'" The House conferees specified that Boland III prohibited any solicitation that the section did not authorize explicitly.[^65] The majority wrote that Boland II barred any significant transfer of intelligence information or resources to the Contras. The CIA proposed guidelines for "defensive" intelligence, meaning intelligence that could prevent needless loss of life, and those guidelines met resistance.[^66] Senator [[David Durenberger]] described advice on the "effective delivery and distribution of materiel" in a 1985 floor statement.[^67]
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### Renewed aid and the Brunei solicitation, 1986
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On March 20, 1986, the House rejected the administration's request for $100 million for the Contras.[^68] On June 25, 1986, the House approved an amendment offered by Representative [[Don Edwards]] by 221 to 209. The Senate adopted the House position on August 13, 1986. Congress ultimately provided $100 million for the opposition, of which $70 million could be used for non-humanitarian purposes.[^69] Section 206 of P.L. 99-500, enacted October 18, 1986, transferred $100,000,000 of unobligated fiscal 1986 defense funds and stated: "The Congress hereby approves the provision of assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in accordance with the provisions of this title."[^70] Section 106 of P.L. 99-569, enacted October 27, 1986, restricted support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua during fiscal 1987 to authorized channels.[^71]
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In the summer of 1986, Shultz and [[Elliott Abrams]] decided to solicit $10 million from the sultan of [[Brunei]]. Shultz had been expected to make the approach and did not, so Abrams made it to a Bruneian official in [[London]]. The committees dated the meeting August 8, 1986, and Walsh dated it August 9, 1986. Walsh wrote that Abrams used the name "Kenilworth" in arranging the meeting with the Bruneian defense minister, General Ibnu.[^72][^73] The committees wrote that Abrams traveled under an alias, requested $10 million in "bridge financing," and, asked what Brunei would receive, told the official: "Well, ... the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." Asked "What concrete do we get out of this?" he answered: "You don't get anything concrete out of it."[^72] North told Abrams that the account was controlled by the Contras, according to the committees; Walsh wrote that North told Abrams that the account North provided would permit more control by the U.S. Government.[^72][^73] When Brunei agreed to transfer the money, North gave Abrams the account number of [[Lake Resources]]. The number North provided was 368.430.22.1; the Lake Resources account was 386.430.22.1. North testified that he had intended to give Abrams the Lake Resources number and that the digits were transposed by him or by his secretary.[^72][^74] Walsh wrote that the deposit passed through accounts controlled by or on behalf of [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman; Swiss authorities declined to identify the recipient and reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^74] The majority described the arrangement as "a deliberate effort to divert funds solicited for humanitarian purposes to lethal ends, and was foiled only because of an error in the account number."[^75]
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### The Iran-Contra committees and Walsh
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The majority concluded: "Once the NSC staff became involved in intelligence operations and continuing covert, albeit quasi-private, assistance to the Contras, both the letter and spirit of Boland II were violated."[^56] On the diversion, it wrote: "Because Boland II and III both prohibited direct or indirect use of the United States funds, the diversion was a flagrant violation of those proscriptions."[^75] It wrote that Congress and the American people were routinely assured that the statutes were being observed "in letter and in spirit," and quoted President Reagan at a press conference on April 14, 1983: "But what I might wish or our government might wish still would not justify us violating the law of the land."[^76]
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The minority concluded: "In short, the appropriations limitation purposes of the Boland Amendment in fact were met."[^45] It wrote that "To whatever extent the Boland Amendments tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional," referring to efforts to persuade other countries to contribute their own funds, and that Congress could, by an appropriations rider, prohibit the entire U.S. Government from spending money to support the Contras, as the Clark Amendment had done for Angola in 1976, but that the specific language of the Boland Amendment was considerably more restricted.[^44]
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The majority found that the amendment was violated "in letter and spirit," and the minority found that it was not violated.[^47] Walsh wrote that the conspirators were not charged with conspiring to violate the Boland Amendment, and concluded: "Nonetheless, it is clear that the conspirators did violate that statute."[^47] Walsh, appointed Independent Counsel on December 19, 1986, listed among his findings that "the provision and coordination of support to the contras violated the Boland Amendment ban on aid to military activities in Nicaragua." He wrote that President Reagan "set the stage for the illegal activities of others by encouraging and, in general terms, ordering support of the contras during the October 1984 to October 1986 period when funds for the contras were cut off by the Boland Amendment," and that the directive to McFarlane to keep the Contras alive "body and soul" during the cutoff "was viewed by North, who was charged by McFarlane to carry out the directive, as an invitation to break the law." Walsh's account of [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)]] covers the same period.[^55][^77]
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Walsh wrote that "the Boland Amendment itself carried no criminal sanctions."[^78] He also wrote that the amendments were "always provisions in appropriation acts" and "did not provide for criminal sanctions."[^79]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), ch. 9 ("He would have had me by the tail").
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[^2]: Public Law 97-377, sec. 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (Dec. 21, 1982). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE-96-Pg1830.pdf
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[^3]: Public Law 98-215, sec. 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (Dec. 9, 1983). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-97/pdf/STATUTE-97-Pg1473.pdf
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[^4]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), majority views, ch. 26, pp. 395-396 (Harkin and Boland substitutes of Dec. 8, 1982; Boland I prevailed 411 to 0; effective Dec. 21, 1982). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
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[^5]: 128 Cong. Rec. H9148-49 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1982) (Rep. Harkin), as cited in Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, n. 14.
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[^6]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, n. 6 ("A Secret War for Nicaragua," Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42-53).
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[^7]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 396 and n. 11 (Dodd proposal tabled 58 to 38 on Dec. 18, 1982; Boland I the law at least until Oct. 1, 1983, n. 13).
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[^8]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 396 and nn. 14-15; ch. 2, n. 20 (Intelligence Oversight Board opinion of Apr. 6, 1983).
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[^9]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, p. 34 and nn. 34-36 (H.R. 2760 reported May 13, 1983; Boland-Zablocki bill passed July 28, 1983, 228 to 195); ch. 26, p. 396.
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[^10]: Public Law 98-212, sec. 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (Dec. 8, 1983). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-97/pdf/STATUTE-97-Pg1421.pdf
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[^11]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 397 (Boland's statement on the compromise; funds counted from October 1, 1983; effective December 8 and 9, 1983).
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[^12]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 15, n. 6 (memorandum from Sporkin to Casey, June 11, 1984, ER 46099). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm
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[^13]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, "Central America," National Security Archive, The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), p. 1 (participants listed). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf
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[^14]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 403-404 ("The Permissibility of Solicitation").
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[^15]: Same minutes, p. 5 (Casey).
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[^16]: Same minutes, p. 9 (Shultz, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, Shultz).
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[^17]: Same minutes, p. 12 (Casey).
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[^18]: Same minutes, p. 14 (Bush, Casey, McFarlane, Reagan).
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[^19]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, pp. 38-39 and nn. 145-151 (McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, May 11, 1987, at 18, 53; Baker Dep., June 22, 1987, at 8-9, 12; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, July 23, 1987, at 4; Weinberger Dep., June 17, 1987, at 74).
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[^20]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 10 (McFarlane, North Trial Testimony, Mar. 13, 1989, pp. 4203-04). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
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[^21]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 14 (Sporkin memorandum for the record, June 26, 1984, ALV 035917) and ch. 15 (meeting of Casey and Sporkin with Attorney General Smith). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
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[^22]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 14 (Saudi Arabia and Taiwan contributions). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
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[^23]: Iran-Contra report, Executive Summary, p. 3 ($34 million from other countries, June 1984 to early 1986).
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[^24]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 397 and nn. 29-33.
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[^25]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 400-401 and nn. 73-75 (North's testimony on salaries; the CIA's mining overrun and the $1.2 million vessel).
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[^26]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 398 (House vote of August 2, 1984; Senate vote of October 3, 1984; conferees' four-month promise).
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[^27]: Public Law 98-473, sec. 101 (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985, sec. 8066(a)-(d)), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935-36 (Oct. 12, 1984). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg1837.pdf
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[^28]: Senate Historical Office, Party Division, 98th Congress, 1983-1985 (Republicans 55, Democrats 45). https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives, Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 98th Congress (Democrats 269, Republicans 166). https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
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[^29]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), ch. 10 ("Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it").
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[^30]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 398 (Boland statements, citing 130 Cong. Rec. H11974 and H11980, daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984).
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[^31]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, n. 47 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. H11980). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
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[^32]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 398-399 (Senator Stevens).
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[^33]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 399 (certification; Senate and House votes on the joint resolution; humanitarian effective date).
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[^34]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 403 (Motley testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 1985; CIA and NSC positions on solicitation) and Executive Summary, p. 3 (contributions concealed from Motley).
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[^35]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 404 and n. 103.
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[^36]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 399 and nn. 44-47.
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[^37]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 399-400 and nn. 48-53 (McFarlane; Congressional Research Service memorandum; staff memorandum for Representative Hyde).
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[^38]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 66 (McFarlane public testimony).
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[^39]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and nn. 54-60 (Sciaroni opinion, Ex. BGS-9; Sciaroni testimony, June 8, 1987, pp. 20, 33, 46).
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[^40]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 491, n.* (Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5, June 8, 1987, at 12).
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[^41]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 61 (Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, July 15, 1987, at 84-85).
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[^42]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 6, p. 132 (Intelligence Oversight Board inquiry, late August 1985; Thompson and the six memorandums; North's denial to Sciaroni).
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[^43]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 6, p. 132 and n. 194 (McFarlane before the House Intelligence Committee, Dec. 10, 1986).
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[^44]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 1, p. 451; ch. 6, p. 492.
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[^45]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 497.
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[^46]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 503 and n. 23 (Thompson).
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[^47]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, "The Boland Amendment was Violated," and nn. 43, 47-52 (majority views, pp. 395-410, "in letter and spirit"; minority views, pp. 489-500). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
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[^48]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 27, n. 61 (quoting Meese deposition, July 8, 1987, p. 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
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[^49]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 62.
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[^50]: Walsh, vol. I, part I, nn. 17-18 (letters to Barnes and Hamilton; Barnes letter of Aug. 16, 1985); ch. 1, nn. 60-62 (letters of Sept. 5, Sept. 12 and Oct. 7, 1985, AKW 001528-29, AKW 001512-14, AKW 001540-48); ch. 4, nn. 57-58. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
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[^51]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1 (McFarlane's guilty pleas of March 11, 1988). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
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[^52]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 7, p. 141 and n. 42 (Poindexter testimony).
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[^53]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1 and nn. 20-25 (McFarlane, North Trial Testimony, Mar. 10, 1989, pp. 3975-77; Mar. 15, 1989, p. 4645; North memorandum of Nov. 7, 1984, AKW 000329-30; McFarlane note of Sept. 2, 1984, ALW 019179). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
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[^54]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 15, nn. 21-26 (Fiers, George Trial Testimony, Oct. 28, 1992, pp. 1254-64) ch. 1, n. 24; ch. 19 (Fiers became chief of the Central American Task Force on October 9, 1984). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm
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[^55]: Walsh, vol. I, executive summary (Casey, North and Secord, Fiers; the President; the Boland cutoff period). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
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[^56]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 401 and 405 (Poindexter on North as "switching point").
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[^57]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 401-402 and nn. 76-86 (House votes of April and June 1985; Senate version of June 6, 1985; Pell and Kerry Amendments; opposition described as a "Trojan horse").
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[^58]: Public Law 99-83, sec. 722(g), 99 Stat. 190, 254 (Aug. 8, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg190.pdf
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[^59]: Public Law 99-88, sec. 102(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 293, 325; humanitarian appropriation of $27,000,000, 99 Stat. 325 (Aug. 15, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg293.pdf
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[^60]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 402-403 and nn. 87-94 (conference report on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985; Representative Hyde).
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[^61]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 402 and nn. 83-84 (conferees; NHAO in the State Department). Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25 (NHAO created August 29, 1985). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
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[^62]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25 (use of the same aircraft for humanitarian and lethal flights). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
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[^63]: Public Law 99-169, sec. 105(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 1002, 1003 (Dec. 4, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg1002.pdf
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[^64]: Public Law 99-190, sec. 8050, 99 Stat. 1185, 1211 (Dec. 19, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg1185.pdf
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[^65]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 404 (Boland III; House conferees on solicitation).
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[^66]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 402 and n. 89 (H.R. 2760 history; CIA guidelines for "defensive" intelligence).
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[^67]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, n. 32 (quoting Sen. Durenberger, 131 Cong. Rec. S16074 (1985)). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
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[^68]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 19 (House vote of March 20, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_19.htm
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[^69]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 405 (Edwards amendment, 221 to 209; Senate action of August 13, 1986; $70 million for non-humanitarian purposes).
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[^70]: Public Law 99-500, title II, sec. 206(a)(1)-(2), 100 Stat. 1783-300 (Oct. 18, 1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg1783.pdf
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[^71]: Public Law 99-569, sec. 106, 100 Stat. 3190, 3191 (Oct. 27, 1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg3190.pdf
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[^72]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 3, p. 71 and nn. 134-142 (Abrams's meeting in London, August 8, 1986; "bridge financing"; North's account card).
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[^73]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" and nn. 99-100 (London meeting of August 9, 1986; the name "Kenilworth"; General Ibnu). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
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[^74]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 14, nn. 37-42 (Shultz and Abrams decision; account numbers 386.430.22.1 and 368.430.22.1; Rappaport; money returned to Brunei). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
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[^75]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 405-406 (Lake Resources account number; "flagrant violation").
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[^76]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 406 and n. 116 (President Reagan, press conference, April 14, 1983).
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[^77]: Walsh, vol. I, Chronology of Key Public Events (Dec. 19, 1986: Walsh appointed Independent Counsel). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chron.htm
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[^78]: Walsh, vol. I, part II (the Boland Amendment "itself carried no criminal sanctions"). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
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[^79]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, text on the Boland versions as appropriation provisions. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
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