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created updated title aliases tags category summary start end location relations
2026-05-15 2026-10-09 Warren Commission
President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy
Warren Report
Warren Commission Report
Event
JFKAssassination
Government
Investigation
1960s
SingleBulletTheory
CIAAssassinationPlots
Intelligence Scandal Seven-member commission created by Executive Order 11130 that reported on September 24, 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, a finding the House committee later said was presented in a fashion that was 'too definitive.' 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 Washington, D.C.
type with reverse role start end fn
member_of Earl Warren true chairman 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of Richard B. Russell true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of John Sherman Cooper true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of Hale Boggs true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of Gerald R. Ford true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of Allen Dulles true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse start end fn
member_of John J. McCloy true 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with reverse role start end fn
employed_by J. Lee Rankin true general counsel 1963-12-16 1964-09-24 14
type with start end fn
reported_to Lyndon B. Johnson 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 3
type with start end fn
investigated Lee Harvey Oswald 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 1
type with start end fn
investigated Jack Ruby 1963-11-29 1964-09-24 1

The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, known as the Warren Commission after its chairman, Chief Justice Earl Warren, was created by Lyndon B. Johnson in Executive Order 11130 on November 29, 1963, one week after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in Dallas, Texas. The Commission presented its Report to the President on September 24, 1964. The Report concluded that the shots which killed Kennedy and wounded John Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window of the Texas School Book Depository and that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone. It stated that it had found no evidence that Oswald or Jack Ruby, who shot Oswald on November 24, 1963, was part of any conspiracy.1

Membership and the executive order

Executive Order 11130 named seven members: Warren; Senators Richard B. Russell of Georgia and John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky; Representatives Hale Boggs of Louisiana and Gerald R. Ford of Michigan; and Allen Dulles, the former Director of Central Intelligence, and John J. McCloy, a former president of the World Bank and former High Commissioner for Germany.2 The order directed the Commission to examine the evidence developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and any additional evidence, to make such further investigation as it found desirable, and to report its findings and conclusions to the President.3 The Commission's first meeting was held on December 5, 1963.4 In recorded telephone conversations of November 29, 1963, in which he told Russell that he was to serve, Johnson said that the matter had to be taken "out of the arena where they're testifying it's [Nikita S.] Khrushchev and [Fidel A.] Castro did this and did that," and described the alternative as "kicking us into a war that can kill 40 million Americans in an hour."5

Dulles was Director of Central Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency from 1953 until November 1961. Kennedy removed him from the directorship after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, and John McCone was sworn in as his successor in November 1961.6789 Senate Joint Resolution 137, passed on December 13, 1963, authorized the Commission to issue subpoenas and to compel testimony by granting immunity. The Commission granted immunity to no witness.4

On December 12, 1963 Cartha DeLoach of the FBI recorded in a memorandum to John P. Mohr that Ford, in his office that morning, had offered to keep the Bureau informed of the Commission's activities on a confidential basis. A second DeLoach memorandum, dated December 17, 1963, summarized what Ford reported of the Commission's meeting of the day before, including that two members were not convinced that the President had been shot from the sixth-floor window of the Depository.101112 The Associated Press reported in 2008 that DeLoach, with J. Edgar Hoover's personal approval, lent Ford a locked Bureau briefcase to carry the FBI report on the assassination on a ski trip.12 In 1997 Ford told T. Jeremy Gunn of the Assassination Records Review Board that DeLoach's claim that valuable information about the Commission's discussions had been obtained was not true, and that DeLoach may have exaggerated to curry favor with Hoover.13

Staff and counsel

J. Lee Rankin, formerly Solicitor General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel on December 16, 1963. Fourteen assistant counsel worked under him.14 The Church Committee recorded that Burt Griffin, Howard Willens and David Belin of the Commission staff had not known of the CIA plots against Castro, and that former Senator Cooper said the subject never came up in the Commission's deliberations.715

Rankin's records, about 40,000 pages, were made public by the Assassination Records Review Board in July 1997, and included Ford's handwritten notes on a staff draft of the Report.16

Liaison with the FBI and the CIA

The division of the FBI responsible for investigating the criminal aspects of the assassination, and not the division responsible for subversive activities, served as the Bureau's liaison to the Commission. The Church Committee found that Hoover perceived the Commission as an adversary, and that the subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaisons with the Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts.17

On December 10, 1963 Hoover told Assistant Director Alan Belmont that he would be "personally responsible for reviewing every piece of paper that went to the Warren Commission" and designated the FBI headquarters inspector who had supervised the Dallas field investigation as liaison. Hoover's memorandum of that meeting records his instruction to the inspector "to establish the closest and most amiable working relationship with Mr. Rankin," whom Hoover said he had known since Rankin served as Solicitor General.1819 Throughout the Commission's existence Belmont kept Hoover informed daily on the Commission's internal meetings and decisions, the areas in which it requested information or further FBI investigation, and the materials the Bureau intended to provide.1920 Each time Hoover learned that a person was being considered for the Commission staff, he asked what the Bureau had on the individual.18

Hoover's handwritten note on an April 4, 1964 memorandum reads: "I place no credence in any complimentary remarks made by Warren nor the Commission. They were looking for FBI 'gaps' and having found none yet they try to get sympathy." When he learned that the Commission intended to send two staff members to Mexico City, the Director "expressed concern as to how lawyers on the Commission could spot gaps in our investigation."20 On May 13, 1964 James Jesus Angleton of the CIA contacted William Sullivan of the FBI to say that it would be well for McCone and Hoover to be aware that the Commission might ask the same questions of both, and gave Sullivan the replies he expected McCone to give, among them that Oswald had never been an agent of the CIA and that the CIA had no evidence of a conspiracy.20 On October 1, 1964, a week after the Report was delivered, a senior Bureau official instructed the FBI inspector who had handled the liaison to telephone Rankin and tell him that "he did the Bureau a great disservice and had out-McCarthyed McCarthy."21

On the CIA side, the desk officer responsible for intelligence activity related to Mexico was instructed by Richard Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, immediately after the assassination to coordinate the agency's information.22 In late December 1963 Angleton suggested that his Counterintelligence Division take over the investigation, and Helms agreed. One of Angleton's subordinates stated that he was designated the "point of record" for all matters relating to the assassination and the Commission on January 23, 1964, when the Commission began requesting information from the CIA.23 Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis in the counterintelligence staff, was the CIA's working-level contact point with the Commission and had no knowledge of the agency's efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro.22 The House committee found that the Commission's staff assumed the CIA would provide it with all relevant information, while Helms testified that the CIA's general position was that it should forward information only in response to specific requests.22

Executive sessions

The National Archives inventory lists transcripts for the executive sessions of December 5, 6 and 16, 1963, January 21, 27, February 24, March 16, April 30, May 19, June 4 and June 23, 1964.24 The transcript of the January 22, 1964 session was prepared in August 1974 by a Department of Defense stenographer from reporter's notes among the Commission's records, at the request of the General Services Administration.2526 The Assassination Archives and Research Center holds the transcripts of all the sessions.27

For the September 18, 1964 session the National Archives holds minutes, and the first page of those minutes appears to be the beginning of a verbatim transcript. In 1996 the Assassination Records Review Board staff examined, at the request of James Lesar of the Assassination Archives and Research Center, whether a stenotape or transcript had been made. Lesar's letter of May 7, 1996 postulated that Rankin or Warren destroyed any stenotape or transcript, or replaced it with minutes, to preserve the appearance of unanimity. The staff memorandum recorded that Rankin is the only staff member listed as present, that two stenographers of the Commission's reporting firm who examined the minutes supported the view that the first page begins as a verbatim transcript, that Warren's papers at the Library of Congress contain the same cover sheet and minutes, and that former Commission staff and reporting-firm personnel interviewed had no recollection of the session.26 A separate review board memorandum of August 28, 1996 records the view of some researchers that the session was contentious, with Russell expressing strong concerns about the Report and the degree of certainty it ascribed to some of its conclusions.28

The informant allegation, January 22, 1964

The Commission met in executive session on the evening of January 22, 1964, from 5:30 to 7:00 p.m., after Rankin reported a call he had received that day. Rankin said that Waggoner Carr, the Attorney General of Texas, had telephoned him at 11:10 that morning to say that the word had come out that Oswald had been an undercover FBI agent, with a badge number, and had been paid two hundred dollars a month from September 1962 through the assassination. Carr said that Henry Wade, the Dallas County district attorney, had cited the story in court to explain why the FBI was so willing to give records to Ruby's defense counsel. Carr said the source was a member of the press, and that Wade did not know the informant's name. Rankin said that Leon Jaworski, who was working with the Attorney General on the matter, did not think Wade would make the claim without substantial information.25

Members questioned the story. Boggs noted a denial of it in one of the FBI records. Cooper asked how the claim could be tested, and Rankin answered that the FBI would never admit it. Ford said that postal authorities might have watched activity at a particular box, and said that Oswald had been "playing ball" with the Communist parties and with the Trotskyites. Dulles asked what the ostensible mission would have been, suggested that it may have been to penetrate the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and said that the FBI did not need such a person on the outside. Dulles said that practically any American could obtain a passport good for anywhere, and that the Passport Bureau had no record of Oswald's defection.25

Dulles argued that if the employers were sure the story would close the case, the approach would work for them, but that if it did not close the case they were worse off than ever. Boggs said: "This closes the case, you see." Dulles then said: "I think this record ought to be destroyed." Boggs said he hoped none of the records would be circulated to anybody. Rankin said that the copies would go only to the Commissioners.25

On January 28, 1964, Rankin met with Hoover at the Commission's direction to discuss the allegation that Oswald had been an FBI informant. According to Hoover's memorandum of January 31, Rankin said that the Commission did not want to initiate an investigation on the outside, because it might appear the Commission was investigating the FBI. Hoover replied that Oswald "was never at any time a confidential informant, undercover agent, or even a source of information for the FBI."19

Investigation

The Report states that the Commission heard testimony from 552 witnesses.14 The Report's foreword states that from November 22, 1963 the FBI conducted approximately 25,000 interviews and reinterviews of persons with information of possible relevance, and that by September 11, 1964 it had submitted 2,300 reports totaling about 25,400 pages.4 The investigation ran from November 29, 1963 to September 24, 1964. The hearings were published in 26 volumes.1429

Book V states that the CIA's Counterintelligence Division, under Angleton, conducted the agency's research for the Commission. Angleton testified that he was not aware of the AMLASH operation.30

The Commission was apparently not given the administrative cover pages of the report that John W. Fain, a Special Agent, wrote on Oswald, which discussed Oswald's refusal to take a polygraph test. When Fain testified on May 6, 1964, he did not mention the refusal, although Ford and Dulles questioned him in detail about discrepancies in Oswald's statements and about his reaction to them.31

At the executive session of December 16, 1963, which took up the FBI's report, Russell said that practically everything in it had already appeared in the press. Cooper raised whether any bullets had been found in the President. McCloy said, "This bullet business leaves me confused," and the Chairman said, "It's totally inconclusive." Russell said that the investigators could not find where the bullet that struck the President came out, and yet had found a bullet on the stretcher.32

Oswald's contacts in Mexico City

The Report states that eight weeks before the assassination Oswald traveled to Mexico City, where he visited both the Cuban and Soviet embassies, and that he was in Mexico from September 26 to October 3, 1963.33 The Report states that no credible witness had been located who saw Oswald with any unidentified person in Mexico City.34 It describes the testimony of Silvia Duran, a Mexican employee of the Cuban consulate who dealt with Oswald, and states that "[b]y far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico."34 It states, on information produced for the Commission by the CIA, that the "comrade Kostin" of Oswald's last letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington was probably Valeriy Kostikov, a member of the consular staff of the Soviet Union in Mexico City and one of the KGB officers stationed at the embassy.35

The House Select Committee on Assassinations found that within two days of the assassination CIA headquarters had received detailed reports of Oswald's contacts at the Soviet embassy and Cuban consulate. Accurate summaries were given to the Commission on January 31, 1964, and direct access to the original material was not provided until April 1964, when Commission investigators traveling abroad met a CIA representative. A staff member who reviewed it wrote in a memorandum of April 22, 1964 that it "disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies." The committee also found that the CIA did not give the Commission all of its information on Luisa Calderon, a Cuban consulate employee in Mexico City, who in a conversation about five hours after the assassination indicated possible foreknowledge of it.36

The Report states that on November 22 the CIA provided the FBI with a photograph of a man who it was thought might have been associated with Oswald, taken by the CIA outside the United States between July 1 and November 22, 1963. FBI Special Agent Odum trimmed the background from it, and the copy supplied to the Commission was cropped along the contours of the figure. It was shown to Oswald's mother on November 23 and again in her testimony.37

The Odio visit

The Report states that Sylvia Odio, a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Junta (JURE) whose parents were political prisoners in Cuba, testified that late in September 1963 three men came to her apartment in Dallas, that one of them, an American introduced as "Leon Oswald," was in her belief Lee Harvey Oswald, and that her sister, who saw them briefly, also believed so. Odio testified that one of the Cubans telephoned the next day and reported that the American had said that "President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs." The Commission concluded that Oswald could not have been in Dallas on the evening of September 26 or 27 and requested further FBI investigation. On September 16, 1964 the FBI located Loran Eugene Hall in California, who said he had visited Odio in September 1963 with two companions. The Report states that the FBI had not completed its investigation at the time the Report went to press, and that the Commission had concluded that Oswald was not at Odio's apartment.38

The House committee reported that on September 14, 1964 the Commission's assistant counsel J. Wesley Liebeler wrote to Willens that there was "no evidence at all" that Oswald left Houston on the bus the Report placed him on, and "There are problems. Odio may well be right. The Commission will look bad if it turns out that she is." Rankin wrote to Hoover on August 23, 1964 that "It is a matter of some importance to the Commission that Mrs. Odio's allegation either be proved or disproved." The committee reported that portions of the FBI's investigation were not sent to Rankin until November 9, 1964, after the Report was complete, that Hall said Oswald was not one of the men, that his two companions denied having met Odio, and that Hall later retracted his statement about meeting her. It stated that it was inclined to believe Odio, that one of the three men at least looked like Oswald and was introduced as Leon Oswald, and that it did not agree with the Commission's conclusion that Oswald could not have been in Dallas at the requisite time.3940

Nosenko

The House committee reported that the Commission "found itself in the middle of the Nosenko controversy," that it chose not to call Yuri Nosenko as a witness or to mention him in its Report, and that Helms told Chief Justice Warren about Nosenko.4142

The Report

The Report, delivered September 24, 1964, runs 888 pages in a single volume.3 At the Commission's last executive session, on September 18, 1964, the members approved 100 bound copies of the Report and hearings for distribution and 500 copies of the Report alone. The minutes record a discussion of Chapters III and IV, and an instruction to the General Counsel that their conclusions be checked so that they did not conflict with those in Chapter I. The minutes set delivery of the Report to the President for September 24 at 11:00 a.m. at the White House. A motion by Ford to print a letter from Representative John R. Pillion in the hearings failed for want of a second.43

The Report's introduction states that the Commission presented the Report to the President "in which each member concurred."14

Principal findings

The Report states that "[t]he weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots fired," and that the shots which killed the President and wounded Governor Connally were fired from the sixth-floor window at the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository.1 It concludes "[o]n the basis of the evidence before the Commission" that Oswald acted alone.1 It states: "The Commission has found no evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald or Jack Ruby was part of any conspiracy, domestic or foreign, to assassinate President Kennedy."1 On the killing of Oswald it states that the Commission found no evidence that Ruby acted with any other person.1

The single-bullet finding

The Report's narrative states: "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine."44 Its summary states that the President was first struck by a bullet which entered at the back of his neck and exited through the lower front portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not necessarily have been lethal, and that he was struck a second time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his head, causing a massive and fatal wound.1

The summary then addresses Connally: "Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the Commission to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally, there is very persuasive evidence from the experts to indicate that the same bullet which pierced the President's throat also caused Governor Connally's wounds. However, Governor Connally's testimony and certain other factors have given rise to some difference of opinion as to this probability."1 Connally himself thought it likely that all of his wounds were caused by a single bullet.45

Ford's edit to the wound location

The staff draft read: "A bullet had entered his back at a point slightly above the shoulder and to the right of the spine." Ford proposed: "A bullet had entered the back of his neck at a point slightly to the right of the spine." The published Report reads: "A bullet had entered the base of the back of his neck slightly to the right of the spine." Asked about the change, Ford said: "My changes had nothing to do with a conspiracy theory," and "My changes were only an attempt to be more precise."16 The Associated Press reported that the changes tended to support the single-bullet theory by placing the entry at the back of the neck rather than the uppermost back. Robert D. Morningstar, a computer systems specialist in New York who has written an Internet book on the assassination, called the edit "the most significant lie in the whole Warren Commission report."16

James Lesar of the Assassination Archives and Research Center said that both Ford's description and the staff's wording conflict with the Kennedy death certificate, which says the bullet entered "in the upper back region, well below the neck." Gerald Posner, author of Case Closed (1993), which accepts the Warren conclusions, said that the death certificate was based on erroneous drawings by the doctors who performed the autopsy.16 A transcript of the Commission's January 27, 1964 session records Rankin describing the back entry as below the shoulder blade and to the right of the backbone, and saying that the neck wound could be explained by a fragment that came out the front of the neck.46

Russell's objections

Russell's papers, as described in the 1996 review board memorandum, include two draft amendments or dissents dated September 16, 1964, prepared for the September 18 meeting, on the single-bullet theory and on the possibility of a conspiracy. A document in the same papers, dated September 18, 1964, records that Rankin's secretary telephoned Russell's office that day and dictated McCloy's compromise language on the single-bullet theory. When the Report was published the Atlanta Journal ran the headline "Russell at Odds on Bullet Report" and the Atlanta Constitution "Sen. Russell Wins a Change in Wording of Warren Report." In a letter of December 24, 1966, Russell described Cooper as very strong in opposition to the single-bullet theory and Boggs as having mild doubts.26

On September 18, 1964, Russell and Johnson spoke by telephone. The transcript of the call, from the Johnson Library tape, includes this exchange. Russell: "The commission believes that the same bullet that hit Kennedy hit Connally. Well, I don't believe it." Johnson: "I don't either." Russell: "And so I couldn't sign it. And I said that Governor Connally testified directly to the contrary, and I'm not going to approve of that. So I finally made them say there was a difference in the commission, in that part of them believed that that wasn't so."47 Johnson asked whether the Report was unanimous. Russell answered: "Yes, sir. I tried my best to get in a dissent, but they'd come round and trade me out of it by giving me a little old thread of it."47

Michael R. Beschloss transcribed the last word as "threat" in Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (1998). The 22 November 1963 website reproduces the call with "thread" and argues that Russell's contemporaneous notes and later remarks show that his public acceptance of the Report's conclusions came about because he was deceived, not because he was threatened.48

Dulles's role

Book V states that, with the exception of Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of the CIA's assassination efforts, and that Dulles knew of the plots with underworld figures that had taken place during his tenure as Director of Central Intelligence.715 Angleton testified that Dulles consulted him before agreeing to President Johnson's request that he serve on the Commission, that the two were in frequent contact, and that Dulles consulted him about what further investigation the CIA could do.30

Helms told the Church Committee that Dulles "was sitting right there" in the Commission's deliberations and "knew about this," and that he did not know what Dulles had said to the Commission about the plots.49 The 1975 interim report of the Church Committee states that Dulles "did not inform the other members about the plots that had occurred during his term as DCI."50 The interim report also states that it is "not entirely certain that Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation."51

In the January 22, 1964 session, Dulles raised the Fair Play for Cuba angle, passport practice, and whether a record of the discussion should exist.25 FBI Director Hoover's files held index cards on Dulles that cross-referenced a November 29, 1963 memorandum.52

The CIA and the plots against Castro

The Church Committee's final report states that neither the CIA nor the FBI told the Commission about the CIA attempts to assassinate Castro, and that none of the testimony or documents received by the Commission mentioned them.17 The interim report's section on ZR RIFLE identifies Johnny Roselli as the agency's principal contact in the underworld dealings connected with the Castro plots.50

Belin, the Commission's counsel, wrote in 1975 that "[a]t no time did the CIA disclose to the Warren Commission any facts which pertained to alleged assassination plans to kill Fidel Castro," and that the CIA withheld from the Commission information which might have been relevant in light of the allegations of conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban government. Griffin, also a former staff counsel, wrote to Belin that if the CIA suspected pro-Castro individuals in addition to Oswald, "they would have considered retaliation against Castro."53

On why the plots were not disclosed, the record contains several accounts. The Church Committee's 1975 interim report states that Helms "failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked," and that McCone failed to disclose the plot to the Commission during its inquiry.50 Helms testified to the committee that he had been asked: "you were charged with furnishing the Warren Commission information from the CIA, information that you thought was relevant?" and answered: "No sir. I was instructed to reply to inquiries from the Warren Commission for information from the Agency. I was not asked to initiate any particular thing." To Senator Morgan's statement "if you weren't asked for it, you didn't give it," Helms answered: "That's right, sir." He also said he did not recall being instructed, or deciding on his own, to cover with the Commission the precise details of the Agency's operations, and that his recollection at the time was that it was public knowledge that the United States was trying to get rid of Castro.4954 In his testimony to the Rockefeller Commission 1975, asked whether it entered his mind that Oswald's pro-Cuban activity might be connected to retaliation by Castro, he answered: "I don't recall its having done so."54

The Church Committee's final report of 1976 states that the officials whom the Commission relied on for expertise advised it that the CIA had no evidence of foreign conspiracy, that why senior FBI and CIA officials permitted the Commission to reach its conclusion without all relevant information "is still unclear," and that "the possibility exists that senior officials in both agencies made conscious decisions not to disclose potentially important information."55 The House Select Committee on Assassinations reported that Helms indicated he did not inform the Commission of the anti-Castro plots because he was never asked to testify before it about operations, and stated in a note that the committee considered this an unacceptable explanation, since the Commission was unaware of the plots and could not make a specific request about them.22 The same committee stated that only Helms would have been in a position to have both the knowledge and the power to cover up the plots in the course of the CIA's or the Commission's investigation, and that it was satisfied, on the basis of its investigation, that it was highly unlikely he did.56

The CIA Inspector General's report of May 23, 1967 on plots to assassinate Castro, which was prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence and whose text, according to the Inspector General's covering memorandum, had been read only by Helms, the Inspector General John Earman and two of the report's authors, describes the AMLASH operation in its own pages. It records that according to Desmond FitzGerald, then Chief of the Special Affairs Staff, he discussed the planned October 29, 1963 meeting in Paris with Helms, who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for FitzGerald to speak in his name.5758 It states that "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro," and that "The AMLASH project was probably about as widely known within the Clandestine Services as any other project of a similar nature."59 The report also states that Sam Giancana was "supposedly cut out of the second phase" of the underworld operation, and records, as one way the story of the Roselli plot may have reached the government, a chain running from Roselli to Robert Maheu, Maheu's Washington lawyer, the columnist Drew Pearson, and Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President, and from Warren to the chief of the United States Secret Service.60

Book V states that the Cuban official code-named AMLASH met a CIA case officer on November 22, 1963, the day the President was shot.30 Helms, then Deputy Director for Plans, knew of the operation, although he would not characterize it as an assassination plot.30 The Chief of the Special Affairs Staff's counterintelligence section testified that it would have been logical for officials who knew of both the Kennedy investigation and the AMLASH operation to consider a connection and to explore it on their own.53 Angleton's subordinate who had been designated "point of record" for the Commission stated that he did not know of any assassination plots against Castro. In 1975, after being questioned by the Rockefeller Commission on the point, he noted that knowledge of an ongoing assassination plot might have changed his thinking about Oswald's Mexican trip.3049 Book V states that a memorandum by the same analyst stated that he was unaware of the plots until 1975 and expressed concern about the Commission's findings in light of the new information.61

Later findings and literature

The HSCA found in 1979 that the Warren Commission "conducted a thorough and professional investigation into the responsibility of Lee Harvey Oswald" but "failed to investigate adequately the possibility of a conspiracy to assassinate the President." It attributed that deficiency in part to the Commission's failure to receive all relevant information held by other agencies, and it said the Commission "presented the conclusions in its report in a fashion that was too definitive." The committee also stated that scientific acoustical evidence "establishes a high probability that two gunmen fired" at the President.62 In the same findings it stated that the Secret Service "was deficient in the performance of its duties," that the Department of Justice "failed to exercise initiative" in supervising the FBI investigation, that the FBI was "deficient in its sharing of information with other agencies and departments," and that the CIA "was deficient in its collection and sharing of information both prior to and subsequent to the assassination." Finding I.C.5 states that the Secret Service, the FBI and the CIA "were not involved in the assassination of President Kennedy," following findings I.C.3 and I.C.4, which state that "the available evidence does not preclude the possibility that individual members may have been involved."63 The committee reported that Ruby's shooting of Oswald "was not a spontaneous act, in that it involved at least some premeditation," and that Ruby probably did not come down the Main Street ramp, as the Commission had concluded.64

The Report is the government's published account of the assassination, and the Commission's records are held by the National Archives in Record Group 272.14 A Gallup poll conducted November 22-27, 1963 found that 29 percent of Americans believed one man was responsible for the shooting and 52 percent believed others were involved. Gallup reported that a majority had said others were involved each time it asked over the following fifty years except in December 1966, when exactly half did, that the figure was 81 percent in 1976, and that it was 61 percent in 2013.65 The debate has produced a large literature, including Posner's Case Closed and Vincent Bugliosi's Reclaiming History (2007).66

Footnotes

  1. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 1, summary and conclusions, pp. 19-22 (killing of Oswald by Ruby on November 24, 1963; three shots; no evidence of conspiracy; Oswald acted alone; the Connally paragraph). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-1.html ↩︎

  2. Bush, George H. W., "Statement on the Death of John J. McCloy," March 12, 1989 (President of the World Bank; Military Governor and High Commissioner in Germany), George Bush Presidential Library. https://www.bush41library.gov/digital-research-room/finding-aid/public-papers/statement-death-john-j-mccloy ↩︎

  3. Executive Order 11130, November 29, 1963, reproduced in the Report's appendix, which also gives the Report as one volume of 888 pages. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/appendix-01.html ↩︎

  4. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, foreword (first meeting December 5, 1963; Senate Joint Resolution 137 of December 13, 1963; immunity never granted; FBI interviews, reinterviews and reports). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/foreword.html ↩︎

  5. Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard B. Russell Jr., telephone conversations of November 29, 1963 (K6311-05-07 and K6311-06-14-15-16), Miller Center, Presidential Recordings Program, "You're Goddamn Sure Going to Serve." https://millercenter.org/sites/default/files/conversations/K6311-05-07_K6311-06-14-15-16%20-%20You%27re%20Goddamn%20Sure%20Going%20to%20Serve.pdf ↩︎

  6. Central Intelligence Agency, Museum, "Identification Card of Allen W. Dulles" (Dulles appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1953; retired in 1961). https://www.cia.gov/legacy/museum/artifact/identification-card-of-allen-w-dulles/ ↩︎

  7. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 68. Dulles "had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961," was a member of the Commission, and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures during his tenure. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  8. Robarge, David S., "Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005: A Long Look Back," Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005) (the Bay of Pigs under Dulles among the failures that led to the departures of the operator DCIs; McCone sworn in as DCI in November 1961). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/studies-in-intelligence/volume-49-no-3/directors-of-central-intelligence-1946-2005 ↩︎

  9. Warner, Michael, "The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair: Lessons Unlearned," Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1998-1999 (Kennedy accepted the resignations of Dulles and Bissell without waiting for the Taylor or Kirkpatrick reports). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/Internal-Probe-Bay-Pigs.pdf ↩︎

  10. Lardner, George, Jr. "Documents Show Ford Promised FBI Data, Secretly, About Warren Probe," Washington Post, January 20, 1978 (CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7), on the December 12, 1963 conversation recorded in the DeLoach memorandum. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91-00901R000500110025-7.pdf ↩︎

  11. Holland, Max. "The Ford Files," Washington Decoded, August 11, 2008, citing "Memo, DeLoach to Mohr, 12 December 1963." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/53424 ↩︎

  12. Associated Press. "Ford was the FBI's spy on the Warren Commission," August 10, 2008 (Deseret News), on the FBI file release, the DeLoach memorandum of December 17, 1963 and the briefcase loan. https://www.deseret.com/2008/8/10/20268447/ford-was-the-fbi-s-spy-on-the-warren-commission ↩︎

  13. Gunn, T. Jeremy. Memorandum to file, "Gerald R. Ford 'Desk Diaries' and Interview," June 2, 1997, Assassination Records Review Board. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/JGUNN/WP-DOCS/INTERVIE/FORD.02.PDF ↩︎

  14. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, introduction (Rankin sworn December 16, 1963; fourteen assistant counsel; 552 witnesses; the Report presented September 24, 1964 "in which each member concurred"; 26 volumes of hearings; Record Group 272). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/intro.html ↩︎

  15. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 67. "With the exception of Allen Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts"; Cooper staff discussion of May 24, 1976. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  16. Feinsilber, Mike. Associated Press, "Ford defends his changes in JFK report," July 3, 1997 (Deseret News) (staff draft, Ford's proposed wording, Report wording, Ford's statement, Morningstar, Lesar, Posner; Rankin papers made public by the Assassination Records Review Board). https://www.deseret.com/1997/7/3/19321566/ford-defends-his-changes-in-jfk-report/ ↩︎

  17. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 5. Hoover and the Commission; FBI division serving as liaison; "Neither the CIA nor the FBI told the Warren Commission about the CIA attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro"; the liaison officers did not know of the plots. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  18. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 47. Hoover's request for information on prospective staff; December 10, 1963 memoranda on the liaison inspector. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  19. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 48-49. Hoover's memorandum on the liaison inspector; Rankin's meeting with Hoover on January 28, 1964 and Hoover memorandum of January 31, 1964; Belmont's daily reports to Hoover. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  20. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 49. Hoover's notes of April 3 and 4, 1964; the Commission's 52 questions; Hoover on the Mexico City trip; Angleton to Sullivan, May 13, 1964 (memorandum, W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, May 13, 1964). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  21. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 56. Bureau instruction to the liaison inspector of October 1, 1964 and Rosen to Belmont memorandum of October 2, 1964. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  22. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-D, pp. 252-253 (CIA liaison and Raymond Rocca; Commission staff assumption; Helms testimony; Senate committee note). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1d.html ↩︎

  23. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 31. Angleton, the Counterintelligence Division and the "point of record" designation of January 23, 1964. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  24. National Archives, catalog entry for Warren Commission records, Entry 1, "Proceedings and Minutes of Executive Sessions of the Commission," NAID 7455921. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/7455921 ↩︎

  25. Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 22, 1964, 5:30 to 7:00 p.m. (PDF; prepared in August 1974 from reporter's notes). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0122.pdf ↩︎

  26. Freeman, Joe. Memorandum to Jeremy Gunn, "Jim Lesar letter of 5/7/96, re: WC Executive Session of 9/18/64," August 15, 1996 (last revised September 19, 1996), Assassination Records Review Board. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/JFREEMAN/WP-DOCS/081596.WPD.pdf ↩︎

  27. Assassination Archives and Research Center, "Warren Commission Executive Session Transcripts." https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/contents.htm ↩︎

  28. Horne, Doug, and Joe Freeman to Jeremy Gunn and David Marwell, memorandum, "Possible questions for former President Gerald Ford," August 28, 1996, section on the September 18, 1964 executive session. https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB-Emails/ARRBmails03282.pdf ↩︎

  29. Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Hearings Before the President's Commission, Vol. IV (1964). https://archive.org/details/investigationofa04pres ↩︎

  30. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 69. Angleton's testimony on AMLASH and on Dulles's consultation (note 134); AMLASH meeting of November 22, 1963; Helms and the case officer on the characterization of the operation; the "point of record". https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  31. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 88 and note 8. Fain report cover pages and Fain testimony of May 6, 1964 (Warren Report, Vol. IV, p. 418). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  32. Warren Commission, executive session transcript, December 16, 1963 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx1216.pdf ↩︎

  33. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 299-300 (Oswald in Mexico, September 26 to October 3, 1963). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html ↩︎

  34. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 304-305 (Duran testimony and confirmation; no credible witness saw Oswald with an unidentified person). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html ↩︎

  35. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 309-310 (the letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington; Kostikov). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html ↩︎

  36. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-D, p. 254 (CIA summaries of January 31, 1964; April 1964 access; staff memorandum of April 22, 1964; Luisa Calderon). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1d.html ↩︎

  37. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 364-365 (the CIA photograph trimmed by the FBI). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html ↩︎

  38. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 6, pp. 321-325 (Odio testimony; the Commission's conclusions; Hall). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-6.html ↩︎

  39. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-C, p. 138 (Liebeler memorandum of September 14, 1964; Rankin letters of July 24 and August 23, 1964; FBI report of November 9, 1964; Hall). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html ↩︎

  40. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-C, p. 139 (committee's conclusion on Odio). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html ↩︎

  41. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-C, p. 101 (Nosenko and the Warren Commission). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html ↩︎

  42. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-C, p. 102 (the Commission's decision not to call Nosenko; Helms and Chief Justice Warren). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html ↩︎

  43. Warren Commission, executive session minutes, September 18, 1964 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0918.pdf ↩︎

  44. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 1, p. 3. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-1.html ↩︎

  45. Warren Commission. Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 1964, chapter 3, p. 96 (Connally's testimony). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/warren-commission-report/chapter-3.html ↩︎

  46. Warren Commission, executive session transcript, January 27, 1964 (PDF). https://aarclibrary.org/publib/jfk/wc/wcexec/pdf/WcEx0127.pdf ↩︎

  47. Telephone conversation between Richard B. Russell and Lyndon B. Johnson, September 18, 1964, from the Johnson Library tape as transcribed at 22 November 1963. https://22november1963.org.uk/jfk-assassination-documents/richard-russell-warren-report ↩︎

  48. Michael R. Beschloss, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963-1964 (Simon and Schuster, 1998), as quoted in the 22 November 1963 reproduction of the call, which reads "thread" where Beschloss printed "threat." https://22november1963.org.uk/jfk-assassination-documents/richard-russell-warren-report ↩︎

  49. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 70-71. Helms testimony to the Church Committee, July 17 and 18, 1975 (testimony of 7/18/75, pp. 36-37; 7/17/75, pp. 118-119); "Mr. Helms was the only CIA official who was both in contact with the Warren Commission and knowledgeable of the AMLASH operation"; Karamessines. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  50. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 269 and note 1. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

  51. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, p. 267. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit ↩︎

  52. U.S. Assassination Records Review Board, memorandum by Ronald G. Haron, "Assassination Records Among the Files of J. Edgar Hoover (FBI-36)," January 8, 1998 (index cards cross-referencing the November 29, 1963 memorandum in O&C File 92). https://documents3.theblackvault.com/documents/jfkfiles/NARA-Oct2017/ARRB/RHARON/HARON/FBIMEM.002.pdf ↩︎

  53. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 73. Belin memorandum to the Rockefeller Commission, May 20, 1975, p. 1; Griffin letter to Belin, April 7, 1975, p. 3; Chief, SAS/CI testimony, May 10, 1976, p. 21. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  54. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, pp. 71-72. Helms testimony, the Rockefeller Commission questioning of April 24, 1975 (testimony pp. 389-391) and his statement that the AMLASH operation was not relevant to the investigation. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  55. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 7. Summary of findings on the FBI and CIA investigations. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  56. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, Part I-C, p. 128 (the committee on a possible CIA cover-up and Helms). https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/part-1c.html ↩︎

  57. Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General (J. S. Earman). Memorandum for the Record, "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, covering the report prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (JFK record 104-10213-10101, 143 pp.). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ↩︎

  58. Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, pp. 88-89 (Project AMLASH, October 1963). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ; National Security Archive copy: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/33578-document-19-cia-inspector-general-john-s-earman-report-plots-assassinate-fidel ↩︎

  59. Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, p. 94 (November 22, 1963). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ↩︎

  60. Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General. "Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro," May 23, 1967, p. 56 (likely channels of the Roselli story; see also p. 131). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/104-10213-10101.pdf ↩︎

  61. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, Book V, Final Report, April 23, 1976, p. 74. CIA analyst, the "point of record," memorandum on the plots and the Commission's findings. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎

  62. U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations. Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, 1979, summary and findings on the Warren Commission and acoustical evidence. https://www.archives.gov/research/jfk/select-committee-report/summary.html ↩︎

  63. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Report, H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), summary Findings I.C.3 to I.C.5 (p. 3) and I.D.1 to I.D.4 (p. 4). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit ↩︎

  64. House Select Committee on Assassinations, Report, H. Rept. 95-1828, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1979), pp. 156-158 (Ruby's route into the police basement; premeditation). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit ↩︎

  65. Swift, Art. "Majority in U.S. Still Believe JFK Killed in a Conspiracy," Gallup, November 15, 2013 (poll of November 22-27, 1963 and later polls). https://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx ↩︎

  66. Gerald Posner, Case Closed (Random House, 1993); Vincent Bugliosi, Reclaiming History (W. W. Norton, 2007). ↩︎