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Intelligence & Government |
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McGeorge Bundy, Harvard dean, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Kennedy and Johnson (1961 to 1966) and chairman of the Special Group that reviewed CIA covert action, later headed the Ford Foundation. | 1919-03-30 | 1996-09-16 | Boston, Massachusetts |
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2026-10-07 | 2026-10-09 |
McGeorge Bundy served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs under John F. Kennedy and remained in that post under Lyndon B. Johnson, chaired the interagency committee that reviewed CIA covert operations, and in 1966 became president of the Ford Foundation.12
Yale, Skull and Bones, and the Council on Foreign Relations
Bundy majored in mathematics at Yale University and returned to Harvard University and its Society of Fellows after the war.3 Ron Rosenbaum's 1977 Esquire article on Skull and Bones names Bundy among the society's members, together with Averell Harriman, Henry L. Stimson, Henry Luce and Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, and places Bundy's brother William P. Bundy and William F. Buckley in the CIA after their years in the society.4 The Council on Foreign Relations lists Bundy among the members who joined in 1946.5
Harvard
Bundy began teaching government and world affairs at Harvard in 1949 and was named Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences in August 1953, at age 34.36 Kai Bird, Bundy's biographer, wrote that Harvard negotiated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation a policy under which the university would terminate the contracts of untenured scholars who refused to name names, would share information, sometimes from its confidential personnel files, with the FBI, and would use confidential FBI information to screen its employees.6
Sigmund Diamond stated in 1977 that in 1954, about three weeks after Bundy considered him for the post of Counsellor for Foreign Students and Dean of Special Students, the FBI asked him about his prior Communist Party membership and his associates, and that days later Bundy told him the appointment would be withdrawn if he refused to name names. Bundy responded that he was justified in withdrawing the recommendation because the post was administrative, and that only academic appointments "carried all the immunities of academic freedom."7 Robert Bellah wrote that in 1954 Bundy told him an "officer of the university" had informed Bundy of his political past, that he owed "complete candor," and that his fellowship would be cancelled if he failed to cooperate; the FBI then questioned Bellah, and he later declined a Harvard instructorship conditioned on his answering committees such as the House Un-American Activities Committee.7 Leon Kamin, subpoenaed by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee under William Jenner and by Joseph McCarthy's subcommittee, said Bundy urged him to name names and let him know that Bundy was in close contact with the FBI.7
Special Group and 303 Committee
The Cuba Study Group's June 13, 1961 narrative for President Kennedy described the Special Group (also called the 5412 Committee) as consisting of a Deputy Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.8 The Church Committee recorded that with the inauguration of Kennedy in January 1961 Special Group meetings were transferred to the White House under the chairmanship of Bundy; that Maxwell Taylor chaired for a brief period, until Taylor became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, after which Bundy resumed the chair; and that in January 1963 NSAM 124 created the Special Group (Counterinsurgency), chaired by Taylor, on which Bundy and Robert Kennedy served.9 A CIA paper prepared in February 1967 for the Katzenbach Committee lists the chairmen as "first McGeorge Bundy, then General Maxwell Taylor, then back to Bundy, and finally to Walt Rostow."10 The Church Committee's account of the 1963 Cuba operations states that review and approval of covert operations against Cuba were the responsibility of the Special Group "chaired by McGeorge Bundy."11
On May 19, 1964, Peter Jessup of the National Security Council staff sent Bundy a memorandum proposing a drab new name for the Special Group, warning that if it were surfaced its members would be exposed to speculative publicity such as "Bundy’s Secret Task Force"; a handwritten marginal note, probably by Bundy, reads "McC[one] v. any change."12 National Security Action Memorandum 303 of June 2, 1964 provided that "Henceforth, the Special Group 5412 will be known as the 303 Committee"; an undated list in the file names its members as Bundy, John McCone, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thompson, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance.13
Bundy testified before the House Select Committee on Intelligence on December 10, 1975 that senior officials outside the CIA understood that no covert operation would be undertaken without the explicit approval of "higher authority," and that there was "a general expectation within the Agency that it was its proper business to generate attractive proposals and to stretch them, in operation, to the furthest limit of any authorization actually received."9
On March 24, 1966, Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, drafted a memorandum for President Johnson describing the 303 Committee, whose members were Vance, U. Alexis Johnson, Admiral William Raborn and formerly Bundy, as "the small four-man group" that had been "meeting weekly since 1963," and asking for a White House representative.14 When Johnson named Walt Rostow Special Assistant on March 31, 1966, he designated Rostow and Bill Moyers within four days as Bundy's replacement on the 303 Committee; The New York Times reported on April 1 that the President seemed "reluctant to put in the hands of one man the kind of power within Government that Mr. Bundy had."15
Bay of Pigs
On the evening of April 16, 1961, Bundy telephoned the CIA deputy director Charles P. Cabell. The Cuba Study Group's June 13, 1961 narrative for President Kennedy states that at about 9:30 p.m. Bundy "telephoned General C.P. Cabell of CIA to inform him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead," and that further consultation "should be with the Secretary of State."8 Cabell's own memorandum of May 9, 1961 records that "I was called in the CIA headquarters for the Cuban operation by the Special Assistant to the President, Mr. McGeorge Bundy," who "notified me that we would not be permitted to launch air strikes the next morning until they could be conducted from a strip within the beachhead." Richard Bissell joined Cabell at the office of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, where both arrived at about 10:15 p.m.16 In a memorandum to Kennedy of September 1, 1961, Bundy wrote: "I made it very clear to Cabell and Bissell on Sunday evening that if they disagreed, you would be willing to hear arguments from them."16
Operation Mongoose
The Church Committee recorded that Bundy "participated in the planning that led to the creation of Operation Mongoose." He was also a member of the NSC Special Group, the body that oversaw the program.1 The March 1962 guidelines for the program were "revised slightly in response to suggestions made by McGeorge Bundy and McCone," and they stated that "The Special Group (5412 augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress."17
Bundy's handwritten notes of a Special Group (Augmented) meeting on February 26 read, at one point, "Edward Lansdale Project: Consensus is that we are in no position to say when U.S. commitment."18 On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued NSAM 100, "Contingency Planning for Cuba," addressed to the Secretary of State.19
On March 29, 1962, Bundy met members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, José Miró Cardona and Antonio de Varona, who urged that the council be given the means to invade Cuba. Bundy replied that if the United States supported any military action against Fidel Castro, "such action must be decisive and complete."20
Bundy testified before the Church Committee that it was his "conviction" that "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the cabinet, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." The committee's account records that Bissell and Bundy were personal friends, and that Bissell testified he never told Bundy about the plot, a fact Bundy confirmed.21 Earlier in the administration Bissell had discussed with Bundy a "capability" for "executive action," a term Bissell said included various means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders, including assassination.22 In later testimony Bissell said he "merely informed Bundy of the capability," and Bundy "said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections."23
Middle East
Seymour M. Hersh wrote that Bundy tried to cut Myer Feldman out of the flow of Middle East paperwork because of Feldman's strong pro-Israel bias, which Hersh said often produced bureaucratic chaos within the White House staff. Hersh also wrote that Bundy was suspicious of Feldman and anxious about other Jewish National Security Council staff members who handled Israeli issues.24 Hersh reported that Robert W. Komer recalled that Bundy had a standing rule not to send anything to Feldman, because Feldman was involved in issues where he had no business, and that it was hard to tell the difference between what Feldman said and what the Israeli ambassador said.24
In a December 22, 1969 oral history for the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Komer said: "Bundy, I have reason to believe, always played it square with Mike in clueing him when he was going to send up a recommendation from State." He said Feldman "didn't have any of the intelligence clearances" and that "Kennedy and Bundy didn't give them to him," and, asked whether Feldman was used to communicate with the American Jewish community, answered that "That was a constant maneuver on Bundy's part as well as mine."25
On June 7, 1967, after the Six-Day War began, Johnson named Bundy, who took a leave of absence from the Ford Foundation, Executive Secretary of a Special Committee of the National Security Council to coordinate United States policy in the Middle East; the committee ended its formal work in mid-August.26
NSAM 273
On November 20, 1963, officials met in Honolulu on Vietnam. Bundy wrote the first draft of National Security Action Memorandum 273 and sent copies to Roger Hilsman and William P. Bundy; the editors of the Foreign Relations series state that his draft was almost identical to the final paper, the major exception being paragraph 7, which in Bundy's draft read: "With respect to action against North Vietnam, there should be a detailed plan for the development of additional Government of Vietnam resources, especially for sea-going activity, and such planning should indicate the time and investment necessary to achieve a wholly new level of effectiveness in this field of action. (Action: DOD and CIA)." Hilsman answered on November 23 that the draft was "fine."27
At 3 p.m. on November 24, 1963, Johnson met Rusk, Robert S. McNamara, George Ball, Bundy, McCone and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on South Vietnam.28 The memorandum issued on November 26, 1963 over Bundy's signature to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development and the Director of the United States Information Agency stated that the President had reviewed the Honolulu discussions and "has discussed the matter further with Ambassador Lodge." Its paragraph 7 read: "Planning should include different levels of possible increased activity, and in each instance there should be estimates of such factors as: A. Resulting damage to North Vietnam; B. The plausibility of denial; C. Possible North Vietnamese retaliation; D. Other international reaction."27
Assassination of Kennedy
The Church Committee recorded that on the morning of November 23, 1963, McCone met with Johnson and Bundy to brief them on information that CIA Headquarters had received from its Mexico Station about Lee Harvey Oswald's September 1963 visit to Mexico City, and that McCone met the President and Bundy again on December 1 and December 2, 1963; the memorandum of the December 1 meeting indicates they again discussed the story of "D."11
Brazil
At a meeting on March 28, 1964, which discussed Ambassador Lincoln Gordon's message of March 27 on Brazil, the group discussed the situation involving Joao Goulart and the Brazilian military, and Bundy said "we should be worrying that the military will not react." The participants included Richard Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.29
Vietnam
On February 7, 1965, writing en route from Saigon to Washington, D.C., Bundy sent President Johnson a memorandum on the situation in Vietnam; he met the President from 10:48 to 11:25 p.m. that day. Its annex, "A Policy of Sustained Reprisal," opened: "We believe that the best available way of increasing our chance of success in Vietnam is the development and execution of a policy of sustained reprisal against North Vietnam." The annex added that "we may wish at the outset to relate our reprisals to those acts of relatively high visibility."230
FBI and CIA domestic programs
In 1961 J. Edgar Hoover sent Bundy a report of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference on the status of internal security programs.31 In April 1965 Bundy asked the FBI for information concerning the Communist role in criticism of American policy in Vietnam; the following day Hoover met the President, and Hoover's account of the meeting refers to "the request he had made through Honorable McGeorge Bundy at the White House" for an over-all memorandum on the Vietnam demonstrations and communist influence in the same.32
In 1965, after the Long Subcommittee hearings on mail covers raised concern at the CIA about discovery of its New York mail-opening project, Thomas Karamessines, then Acting Deputy Director for Plans, "gave instructions that steps should be taken to arrange to pass through McGeorge Bundy to the President after the subcommittee has completed its investigation." The Church Committee found that Bundy "does not recall ever having been informed of the project," that neither Karamessines nor Helms knew of any attempt to inform him, and that there is no documentary record of one.33
Ford Foundation
John J. McCloy offered Bundy the Ford Foundation presidency on November 7, 1965, and Bundy reported the offer to Johnson the next day. A report by Garnett D. Horner in the Washington Star of December 8, 1965 gave the presidency's salary as 75,000 dollars a year, against his White House salary of 28,500 dollars.34 In a memorandum of December 4, 1965, Bundy told Johnson that he had asked the Ford trustees to let him accept "on the understanding that I shall always be free to accept any special assignments from you," that Julius A. Stratton, McCloy's successor, had agreed in the name of the trustees,35 and that he would stay in the White House through February 1966; McCloy, for the foundation, had accepted the delay on November 29.36 On November 13, 1965, Johnson asked Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann about "Bill Bundy to succeed his brother."37 The Harvard Crimson reported on November 15, 1965 that McCloy, the foundation's chairman, approached Bundy in Washington about succeeding Henry T. Heald as president beginning January 1, and that Stratton, MIT's president, would succeed McCloy as chairman; as a trustee Stratton had been consulted on the selection of presidential candidates and had supported Bundy as the best man for the job.38
In October 1966 the FBI learned that Martin Luther King Jr. had met with Bundy, "then Director of the Ford Foundation," and had received a tentative offer of a grant for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division decided that if the foundation's officials were briefed on King's advisers "this might preclude any assistance being granted," and Hoover approved a plan to have a former FBI agent, then a vice-president of the Ford Motor Company, approach Bundy. In a memorandum of October 26, 1966, Cartha DeLoach reported that Bundy had refused to talk with the former agent about King, saying he would only talk with a person having first-hand knowledge; Hoover wrote on the memorandum, "Yes. We would get no where with Bundy."39
On September 23, 1966 Bundy wrote to Julius A. Stratton, then chairman of the board of trustees, that the foundation would make a grant of 7,000,000 dollars to the Congress for Cultural Freedom over six years. "It may raise a few eyebrows among those who know or think they know the previous financial history of the Congress," he wrote, "but it is the right thing to do at the right time."40 The foundation's annual report for 1966 records a grant of 1.5 million dollars in further support of the Congress, with a new board of trustees headed by Raymond Aron.41
William P. Bundy
William P. Bundy, McGeorge Bundy's brother, was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs in November 1965.42 He joined the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of National Estimates in 1951 as chief of staff and liaison to the National Security Council staff, and served on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations from 1964 to 1972.43
Footnotes
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Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 156 (Bundy testimony of July 11, 1975), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf ↩︎
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McGeorge Bundy, memorandum to President Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Situation in Vietnam," with Annex A, "A Policy of Sustained Reprisal," February 7, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. II, doc. 84 (source note: Bundy met the President from 10:48 to 11:25 p.m. on February 7), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d84 ↩︎
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"Mac Bundy," The Harvard Crimson, November 10, 1956, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1956/11/10/mac-bundy-pwhen-mcgeorge-bundy-became/ ↩︎
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Ron Rosenbaum, "The Last Secrets of Skull and Bones," Esquire, September 1977. ↩︎
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Council on Foreign Relations, "Celebrating a Century: Changing Membership," entry for McGeorge Bundy ("Joined in 1946"), https://www.cfr.org/celebrating-a-century/changing-membership ↩︎
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Kai Bird, excerpt from The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms (Simon & Schuster, 1998), "Open Book: Dean Bundy Deals with McCarthyism," Harvard Magazine, https://www.harvardmagazine.com/so98/browse.open2.html ↩︎
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Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, "Harvard's Troubled History with Free Association, Part 2" (summarizing Sigmund Diamond's 1977 and Robert Bellah's accounts in The New York Review of Books, including the Bellah quotations, and Leon Kamin's account), https://www.fire.org/harvards-troubled-history-with-free-association-part-2/ ↩︎
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Memorandum No. 1 from the Cuba Study Group to President Kennedy, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," June 13, 1961, paragraph 43 and footnote on the Special Group, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, doc. 231, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d231 ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), Part II, sections on the National Security Council and the Special Group (chairmanship 1961 to 1966; NSAM 124; Special Group (Augmented)), and the section on maintaining a covert capability quoting Bundy's House Select Committee on Intelligence testimony of December 10, 1975, Hearings, vol. 5, pp. 1794-1795, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_I.pdf ↩︎
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Paper prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, "Coordination and Policy Approval of Covert Operations," February 23, 1967 (Appendix C to the report of the Katzenbach Committee), paragraph A.7, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 263, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d263 ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book V, The Investigation of the Assassination of President Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), sections on the CIA's Cuba operations in 1963, the November 23 McCone briefing, and the chronology for December 1 and 2, 1963, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_V.pdf ↩︎
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Memorandum from Peter Jessup of the National Security Council staff to Bundy, "Proposed Name Change for Special Group (5412)," May 19, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 203, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d203 ↩︎
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National Security Action Memorandum No. 303, June 2, 1964, with editorial footnote on the undated membership list, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 204, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d204 ↩︎
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Draft memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson, "Need for White House Representation on 303 Committee," March 24, 1966, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 249, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d249 ↩︎
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Editorial note on the appointment of Walt W. Rostow, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 164, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d164 ↩︎
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Memorandum from the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Cabell) to General Maxwell D. Taylor, "Cuban Operation," May 9, 1961, paragraphs 1 to 3, with editorial footnote quoting Bundy's memorandum to Kennedy of September 1, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, doc. 108, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d108 ↩︎
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"Guidelines for Operation Mongoose," with editorial note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, doc. 314, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314 ↩︎
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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, doc. 307, footnote citing Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented), Operation Mongoose, 2/62 to 4/62, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d307 ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 136 (NSAM 100, October 5, 1961), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf ↩︎
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Memorandum of conversation, March 29, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, doc. 317, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d317 ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 119 (Bundy testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 41, 54, 63; Bissell testimony), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 121 (Bissell testimony of July 22, 1975, p. 32), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 182 to 183, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf ↩︎
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Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (Random House, 1991), ch. 8. ↩︎
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Robert W. Komer, recorded interview by Dennis J. O'Brien, December 22, 1969, JFK #5, pp. 38 to 39 (Feldman as minorities adviser; Bundy "played it square"), p. 81 (intelligence clearances), p. 82 (communicating with the Jewish community), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program, https://www.jfklibrary.org/asset-viewer/archives/jfkoh-rowk-05 ↩︎
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Editorial note on the Special Committee of the National Security Council, June 7, 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 178, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d178 ↩︎
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National Security Action Memorandum No. 273, November 26, 1963, with editorial note on the Bundy draft and Hilsman's reply of November 23, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. IV, doc. 331, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d331 ↩︎
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Memorandum for the Record of meeting, November 24, 1963, 3 p.m. (drafted by McCone), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. IV, doc. 330, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d330 ↩︎
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Memorandum of conversation, March 28, 1964, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 465, document 11, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/docs/Document%2011%20brazilnscdocument.pdf ↩︎
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Pentagon Papers, Part IV.C.3, reproduction of the February 7, 1965 Bundy memorandum with Annex A, https://archive.org/details/204285-pentagon-papers-part-iv-c-3 ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book III, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 465 (Hoover to Bundy, July 25, 1961, enclosing Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference report), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 483 (April 1965 request and Hoover's account), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), chapter on CIA mail opening, section "1965 Proposal to Inform President Johnson" (citing Karamessines testimony of October 8, 1975 and a staff summary of a Bundy interview of April 19, 1976), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf ↩︎
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Garnett D. Horner, Star staff writer, Washington Star, December 8, 1965, on Johnson's acceptance of Bundy's resignation effective February 28, 1966 and Bundy's move to the Ford Foundation presidency at $75,000 a year, against his $28,500 White House salary (CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000100560005-8). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000100560005-8 ↩︎
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Ford Foundation, "Annual Report 1965," opening review (McCloy retiring December 31, 1965; Julius A. Stratton, president of MIT and a trustee since 1955, elected chairman) https://www.fordfoundation.org/media/2435/1965-annual-report.pdf; Langenkamp, note 67 (Julius A. Stratton, chair of the Board of Trustees, September 23, 1966); FRUS 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, document 159 (December 4, 1965, "his successor, Jay Stratton"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d159 ↩︎
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Memorandum from Bundy to President Johnson, "Letter of resignation," December 4, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 159, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d159 ↩︎
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Memorandum of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Under Secretary of State Mann, November 13, 1965, 12:15 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 157, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d157 ↩︎
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"Bundy, Bell Up for Key Posts," The Harvard Crimson, November 15, 1965, https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1965/11/15/bundy-bell-up-for-key-posts/ ↩︎
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Senate Select Committee, Final Report, Book III, S. Rept. 94-755 (1976), p. 178 (October 1966 FBI plan concerning a Ford Foundation grant to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; DeLoach memorandum of October 26, 1966), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94755_III.pdf ↩︎
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Langenkamp, "A Most Interesting and Complex Involvement," Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports (2021), p. 16 and note 67, citing Bundy to Julius A. Stratton, chair of the Board of Trustees, September 23, 1966 (Rockefeller Archive Center, Francis X. Sutton Papers, FA1141, Box 50, Folder 465). https://rockarch.issuelab.org/resources/38323/38323.pdf ↩︎
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Ford Foundation, "Annual Report 1966" (fiscal year ended September 30, 1966), International Affairs section, p. 34. https://www.fordfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/1966-annual-report.pdf ↩︎
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Memorandum from Gordon Chase to Bundy, "World Disarmament Conference," November 20, 1965, footnote identifying "your brother William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXIII, doc. 373, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d373 ↩︎
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William P. Bundy Papers (MC189), Biography/History, Public Policy Papers, Princeton University Library, https://findingaids.library.upenn.edu/records/PRIN_MUDD_MC189 ↩︎