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Academic work and RAND

Schlesinger was born in New York City. He took his bachelor's, master's and doctoral degrees at Harvard University (1950, 1952 and 1956), taught economics at the University of Virginia from 1956 to 1963, and was a consultant to the Federal Reserve Board and to the RAND Corporation during part of that period. He was academic consultant in economics to the Naval War College in 1957, and his lectures there were published in 1960 as The Political Economy of National Security.¹

From 1963 to 1969 he was a senior staff member at RAND in Santa Monica, California, and later its director of strategic studies, where he worked on strategic analysis "with particular reference to nuclear weaponry."¹⁴

Budget Bureau and Atomic Energy Commission

In 1969 Richard Nixon appointed him assistant director of the Bureau of the Budget. He later became assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget and served as acting director during the transition between the two agencies. His responsibilities included national security and international programs, the Budget Bureau's place on the Environmental Quality Council and the National Space Council, and its representation on several National Security Council committees.¹⁴

He chaired the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971 to 1973 and headed the United States delegation to the sixteenth General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.¹

Director of Central Intelligence

Richard Helms resigned as Director of Central Intelligence on February 2, 1973, the day Schlesinger was sworn in. The President had appointed Schlesinger on December 21, 1972, and the Senate confirmed him on January 23, 1973.⁵ Schlesinger served until July 2, 1973, when he became Secretary of Defense. Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, the deputy director, was acting director from July 2 to September 4, 1973, when William Colby (deputy director for operations from March 2 to August 24, 1973) became director.³ Colby later estimated, in his memoirs, that under Schlesinger's purge about 7 percent of the agency's staff were "fired or were forced to resign or retired."⁶

The historian David S. Robarge, writing in Studies in Intelligence, listed Schlesinger among six directors he classed as "manager-reformer outsiders," and recorded that at 43 he was the youngest of the directors he surveyed.⁷ Robarge wrote that when directors tried to "clean house" (Schlesinger and Stansfield Turner), the result was "administrative disarray and low morale," and that Schlesinger and Turner "facilitated the departure of hundreds of clandestine services veterans."⁷ Robarge also recorded that Schlesinger told veteran John McMahon and his superior, Carl Duckett, that he had just appointed McMahon to head the Office of Technical Service. When Duckett suggested that McMahon start on the first of the month, Schlesinger answered, "How about at 10:00?"⁷

The House Committee on Armed Services special subcommittee on intelligence opened its inquiry into the agency's role in the Watergate scandal and the Daniel Ellsberg matter on May 11, 1973, and issued its report on October 23, 1973.⁸ The report states that in February 1973 "Mr. Dean" called Schlesinger to ask whether the CIA could recover from the Federal Bureau of Investigation the file material the agency had given the Justice Department about its contact with Howard Hunt, and that "This was not done."⁸ The report described a view of the agency's assistance to Hunt as "the better view, although charitable," which it said was "probably expressed by" Schlesinger, and gave the words: "The Agency was insufficiently cautious in the initiation of assistance to Hunt."⁹ The report also recorded the account given by James McCord of a meeting with his lawyer, Gerald Alch, at which Alch proposed a CIA defense in which McCord's records would be doctored to show a recall to duty, and that "the new Director, Dr. Schlesinger, 'would go along with it.'" The report records that Alch disputed McCord's version "in the strongest of terms."¹⁰

On May 9, 1973, Schlesinger signed a memorandum, drafted by deputy director for operations William Colby, calling on senior officers to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency."¹¹ Schlesinger issued the directive after learning that Hunt and James McCord, both veteran CIA officers, had received cooperation from the agency as they carried out "dirty tricks" for President Nixon.¹¹ The replies were compiled into a 693-page file, the CIA Family Jewels, which passed to Colby when he succeeded Schlesinger. The file was declassified in June 2007.¹²

On January 3, 1975, Colby briefed Gerald R. Ford on the file, describing the compilation as the agency's "skeletons," including surveillance of student radicals, illegal wiretaps, assassination plots, and the confinement of a Soviet defector for three years.¹³ On February 20, 1975, Cabinet and sub-cabinet officials led by Henry A. Kissinger, with Schlesinger and Colby present, discussed ways to protect information sought by the Church Committee and the House Pike Committee investigations.¹⁴

The agency's contract for parapsychology research at SRI International reached Schlesinger in the spring of 1973. A new contract continuing and expanding the work went from the Office of Technical Service and the Office of Research and Development to Colby in April 1973 and was referred to the Executive Management Committee. Kenneth A. Kress, the project officer, wrote in his 1977 study for Studies in Intelligence that an approval memorandum was written "for the signature of the DCI, then Dr. James Schlesinger," that Colby "took the memorandum to the DCI a few days later," and that he was "soon told not to increase the scope of the project and not to anticipate any follow-on in this area. The project was too sensitive and potentially embarrassing. It should be tabled."¹⁵ Kress added that the Office of Technical Service was then being investigated for involvement in Watergate and that in May 1973 the DCI had issued his memorandum asking employees to report improper activities.¹⁵ An Office of Technical Service memorandum for the record of November 17, 1977, prepared for a briefing of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, gives the same chronology: in March 1973 a third subject, Pat Price, "is discovered with an apparent ability for 'remote viewing,'" and in May 1973 "The contract is finally sent to the DCI (Schlesinger) who decides to allow the existing contract to be completed without a follow-on." The memorandum continues that an informal SRI experiment with a scientist of the Office of Scientific Intelligence uncovered classified information about a military site and convinced "the new DCI (Colby) to renew work on ESP."¹⁶

Secretary of Defense

Schlesinger moved from the agency to the Pentagon as Secretary of Defense on July 2, 1973, after about five months as director.³⁴

During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Seymour Hersh wrote in The Samson Option (1991) that Kissinger made no secret of his strategy, telling Schlesinger that his goal was to "let Israel come out ahead, but bleed."¹⁷ In the same book Hersh quoted Schlesinger, whom he interviewed on April 25, 1989: "Israel's [ammunition] consumption rate was gauged for a seven-day war," but "Kissinger just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical" in urging an immediate and massive resupply, and "Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear exchange" in the Middle East. Schlesinger added: "From where we sat, there was an assumption that Israel had a few nukes and that if there was a collapse, there was a possibility that Israel would use them." Hersh wrote that Colby, then director of the CIA, shared the assumption: "We were afraid Israel might go for broke."¹⁸

The claim that Schlesinger told the military not to act on White House orders, particularly on nuclear matters, in the last days of the Nixon presidency rests on an account that Stanley I. Kutler traced to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." As Kutler summarized it, Schlesinger asked General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to monitor all orders from any source to military units, because Nixon or his aides might reach units outside Pentagon channels, and the account says Schlesinger supposedly prepared plans to deploy troops in Washington if there were anything but a peaceful succession.¹⁹ In an essay in The American Interest of January 12, 2018, Larry Diamond wrote that Schlesinger "reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff not to follow any presidential orders to the military without checking with Schlesinger first," and quoted the historian Gil Troy calling the act "the most patriotic act of treason in American history."²⁰ Kutler wrote in the History News Network in 2014 that, "as far as can be determined, such information emanated from Schlesinger himself," and that there are "no corroborating documents." He described a message from Brown on August 8, 1974, advising increased vigilance to commanders, and two messages on August 9, 1974, sent over Schlesinger's name, one of which conveyed the remarks of the new president, Ford. Kutler called both August 9 messages "boilerplate," and quoted Thomas H. Moorer, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, calling Schlesinger's communiqué "ridiculous."¹⁹ Haig, Nixon's chief of staff, later told senators, in Kutler's quotation, "There were no tanks. No troops were drawn up."¹⁹

The National Security Council met four times on the seizure of the SS Mayaguez by Cambodian forces, and the minutes list Schlesinger as a principal at each meeting. On May 12, 1975 (12:05 to 12:50 p.m.), he told Gerald R. Ford the options: "We can have a passive stance or we can be active. We can do such things as seizing Cambodian assets. We can assemble forces. We could seize a small island as a hostage. We might also consider a blockade," and when Donald Rumsfeld asked "Isn't this piracy?" he answered "Yes."²¹ On May 13 he described the force options (Marines and helicopters at Utapao, and the carrier USS Coral Sea) and the minutes record an exchange with Vice President Nelson Rockefeller over where the ship was.²² On May 14, after General David C. Jones recommended landing on the island and on the ship, Schlesinger asked "How about a local ultimatum?" and Kissinger answered that the action should not depend on one.²³ At the meeting of May 15, 1975 (4:02 to 4:20 p.m.), held after the recovery, Schlesinger corrected the number of aircraft used ("Not the 81 that had been on the carrier") and Ford asked him for "a full factual report giving a summary and chronology of what happened."²⁴

On May 27, 1975, Ford met with Schlesinger, Colby, Donald Rumsfeld, Robert Ingersoll and Brent Scowcroft about a Seymour Hersh article on American submarines operating off Soviet waters. The memorandum of conversation records Ford saying, "Somehow someone must be made an example of." Schlesinger called the disclosure "a flagrant violation" of the law, said he had spoken to the Attorney General the month before, and stated that "There is some indication that Hersh has files of signals intelligence material." He then asked, "How about a search warrant to get them?"²⁵

On March 19, 1975, the day front-page stories revealed that Howard Hughes's Glomar Explorer had recovered part of a sunken Soviet submarine in an operation led by the CIA, Ford met in the Cabinet Room of the White House with Schlesinger, Colby, Philip Buchen, John O. Marsh Jr., Rumsfeld and Scowcroft (11:20 a.m. to 12:25 p.m.). Schlesinger called the operation "a major American accomplishment" and "a marvel, technically, and with maintaining secrecy," and advised: "If we don't confirm the mission details, acknowledge the bare facts. It has been confirmed privately by Colby. There is no plausible denial story, so 'no comment' will be taken as a confirmation. If we move now we can take the high ground, if not we will be pilloried." He offered to make the statement himself. Colby answered, "I go back to the U-2. I think we should not put the Soviet Union under such pressure to respond." The volume editors record that no statement by Schlesinger or Ford was found and that the press reported the administration refused to comment.²⁶ President Ford took Colby's advice instead.²⁷

On November 3, 1975, Ford announced that he intended to nominate Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, and thanked Schlesinger "for his able service" as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the CIA, and Secretary of Defense. Asked why Schlesinger and Colby did not fit on the new team, Ford answered, "I think any President has to have the opportunity to put together his own team." Asked about reports of conflict between Schlesinger and Kissinger over détente, he said, "There were no basic differences."²⁸

Secretary of Energy

Jimmy Carter appointed Schlesinger his special adviser on energy in January 1977.⁴ He was confirmed as the first Secretary of Energy on August 4, 1977, and served from August 6, 1977, to August 23, 1979.²

Later career

After leaving the Energy Department he became senior adviser to Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb in New York.⁴ He served on the President's Commission on Strategic Forces from 1982 to 1983, was vice chairman of the President's Blue Ribbon Task Group on Nuclear Weapons Program Management from 1984 to 1985, was a member of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century from 1998 to 2001, and sat on the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the U.S. Nuclear Stockpile from 1999 to 2003.⁴ He co-chaired a Defense Science Board task force on the future of the Global Positioning System.⁴

Independent Panel on DoD detention operations (2004)

The Secretary of Defense chartered the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations on May 12, 2004, to review Department of Defense investigations into detention operations and to advise on their causes and corrective measures.²⁹ Schlesinger chaired the panel, whose members were Harold Brown, Tillie Fowler and Charles Horner, with James A. Blackwell Jr. as executive director. The report is dated August 24, 2004, and is addressed to Rumsfeld.²⁹

The panel found that "the most egregious instances of detainee abuse were caused by the aberrant behavior of a limited number of soldiers and the predilections of the non-commissioned officers on the night shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib," and that commanding officers and staffs "at various levels failed in their duties," adding that "Military and civilian leaders at the Department of Defense share this burden of responsibility" (p. 43). It stated that "the weak and ineffectual leadership of the Commanding General of the 800th MP Brigade and the Commanding Officer of the 205th MI Brigade allowed the abuses at Abu Ghraib," and found no evidence that organizations above those two brigades "were directly involved in the incidents at Abu Ghraib" (p. 43).³⁰

On policy, the report recounts the Secretary of Defense decision of December 2, 2002, authorizing "as a matter of policy" Category I and II techniques and one Category III technique, rescinded after concern from the Navy General Counsel, and states that the legal resources of the Services' judge advocates and general counsels "were not utilized to their fullest potential" (pp. 35-36). It found that "pressure for additional intelligence and the more aggressive methods sanctioned by the Secretary of Defense memorandum resulted in stronger interrogation techniques" (p. 36), and that "Some individuals seized the opportunity provided by this environment to give vent to latent sadistic urges" while others "found themselves in uncharted ethical ground, with frequently changing guidance from above" (p. 29).³¹ Among the leaders who could have adjusted the detention plan after July 2003 it listed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and "the Office of the Secretary of Defense," and wrote, "In most cases these were errors of omission, but they were errors that should not go unnoted" (p. 47).³²

On the CIA, the panel wrote: "CIA personnel conducted interrogations in DoD detention facilities... at Abu Ghraib the CIA was allowed to conduct its interrogations separately. No memorandum of understanding existed on interrogations operations between the CIA and CJTF-7, and the CIA was allowed to operate under different rules." It added, "We are aware of the issue of unregistered detainees, but the Panel did not have sufficient access to CIA information to make any determinations in this regard" (p. 70), and recommended that "Clearer guidelines for the interaction of CIA with the Department of Defense in detention and interrogation operations must be defined" (p. 91).³³

On contractors, it stated: "Contractors were a particular problem at Abu Ghraib. The Army Inspector General found that 35 percent of the contractors employed did not receive formal training in military interrogation techniques, policy, or doctrine" (p. 69).³⁴ On ghost detainees: "Secretary Rumsfeld publicly declared he directed one detainee be held secretly at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence" (p. 87).³⁵

Nuclear weapons management task forces (2008)

In June 2008 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, a subcommittee of the Defense Policy Board, with Schlesinger as chairman and Michael P. C. Carns, J. D. Crouch II, Jacques S. Gansler, Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr., John J. Hamre, Franklin C. Miller and Christopher A. Williams as members and James Blackwell as executive director, after the 2006 misshipment of intercontinental ballistic missile components to Taiwan and the 2007 unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons from Minot Air Force Base to Barksdale Air Force Base. Its Phase I report, transmitted to Gates on September 12, 2008, found "an unambiguous, dramatic, and unacceptable decline in the Air Force's commitment to perform the nuclear mission" and that "Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift priorities and adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in the inattention that led to the Minot-Barksdale and Taiwan incidents" (Executive Summary, pp. 1-3). It listed five trends, including that "no one Command in the Air Force had 'ownership' of the nuclear mission," and made 33 recommendations.³⁶ The Phase II report of December 2008 found that "the lack of interest in and attention to the nuclear mission and nuclear deterrence... go well beyond the Air Force," "widespread fragmentation, dispersal of responsibility, and weakening of authorities" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and "a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence among many senior DoD military and civilian leaders" (Executive Summary, pp. iii-v). It recommended an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence.³⁷

Boards and advisory posts

Schlesinger was chairman of the board of MITRE Corporation, a member of the Defense Policy Board and of the International Security Advisory Board, and a counselor and trustee of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He chaired the National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Advisory Board from 2007 until his death on March 27, 2014, while serving his fourth term as chairman.³⁸

Footnotes

Central Intelligence Agency, "Biography, James R. Schlesinger," reading room document CIA-RDP75B00380R000400150017-8, copy at https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75b00380r000400150017-8 ↩︎
U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Legacy Management, "Secretaries of Energy," entry for James Schlesinger (confirmed August 4, 1977; term of office August 6, 1977 to August 23, 1979). https://www.energy.gov/lm/secretaries-energy ↩︎
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, front matter, "Persons" (Schlesinger: "Director of Central Intelligence, February 2-July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1973-November 19, 1975"; Walters: "Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973-September 4, 1973"; Colby: "Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973-January 30, 1976"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/persons ↩︎
Miller Center, University of Virginia, "James R. Schlesinger (1973-1974)," https://millercenter.org/node/1002; and "James R. Schlesinger (1977-1979)," https://millercenter.org/node/1152 ↩︎
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. II, Document 284, editorial note (Schlesinger "sworn in on February 2, the same day that Helms resigned"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d284 ↩︎
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXVIII, part 2, Document 2, editorial note quoting William Colby's memoirs on the staff reduction under Schlesinger. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v38p2/d2 ↩︎
David S. Robarge, survey of the Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946 to 2005, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 49, no. 3, CIA reading room document C05460742, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-16290853 ↩︎
House Committee on Armed Services, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, "Inquiry into the Alleged Involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Watergate and Ellsberg Matters," report, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., October 23, 1973 (HASC No. 93-25), passage on the February 1973 call from Mr. Dean. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80b01495r000500030007-0 ↩︎
Same report, passage on the assistance to Hunt and Schlesinger's view of it. ↩︎
Same report, passage on McCord's account of the meeting with Gerald Alch and Alch's denial. ↩︎
National Security Archive, "The CIA's Family Jewels," Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, June 21, 2007, with the memorandum of May 9, 1973. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels," compilation of 693 pages, declassified June 2007, full text PDF as posted by the National Security Archive. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/family_jewels_full_ocr.pdf ↩︎
National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 2, "Colby Briefs President Ford on the Family Jewels," memorandum of conversation, January 3, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm ↩︎
National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, Document 4, "Investigations Continue," memorandum of conversation, "Investigations of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities," February 20, 1975, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm ↩︎
Kenneth A. Kress, "Parapsychology in Intelligence: A Personal Review and Conclusions," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 21, no. 4, winter 1977, CIA-RDP96-00791R000200030040-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00791r000200030040-0 ↩︎
Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Technical Service, Memorandum for the Record, OTS/BAB Memo #287-77, "Briefing for House Permanent Select Committee re OTS Involvement in ESP Research," November 17, 1977, CIA-RDP96-00787R000500170001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00787r000500170001-0 ↩︎
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 227. https://archive.org/details/Sampson_Option ↩︎
Hersh, The Samson Option, p. 230 (index entry "Schlesinger, James R., 227, 230"); the author's notes date the Schlesinger interview April 25, 1989, in Washington, and the Colby interview January 10, 1991. ↩︎
Stanley I. Kutler, "The Fast One James Schlesinger Pulled on the Media," History News Network, April 2, 2014, summarizing an account attributed to an unnamed "senior Pentagon official." https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/155168 ↩︎
Larry Diamond, "Our Year of Living Dangerously," The American Interest, January 12, 2018, quoting Gil Troy. https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/01/12/year-living-dangerously ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. X, Document 285, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 12, 1975, 12:05 to 12:50 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d285 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. X, Document 291, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 13, 1975, 10:22 to 11:17 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d291 ↩︎
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. X, Document 298, Minutes of National Security Council Meeting, May 14, 1975, 3:52 to 5:42 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d298 ↩︎
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. X, Document 301, "Minutes of National Security Council Meeting," May 15, 1975, 4:02 to 4:20 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v10/d301 ↩︎
Memorandum of conversation, May 27, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Colby, Rumsfeld, Ingersoll and Scowcroft, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553088.pdf (declassified in part) ↩︎
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. XXXV, Document 197, Memorandum of Conversation, "MATADOR Meeting," Washington, March 19, 1975, 11:20 a.m., with editorial notes citing Jack Nelson, "Administration Won't Talk About Sub Raised by CIA," Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1975, pp. A1, A14-A16. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v35/d197 ↩︎
Burr, William, ed. "Project Azorian: The CIA's Declassified History of the Glomar Explorer." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 305, February 12, 2010. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB305/index.htm ↩︎
Gerald R. Ford, "The President's News Conference," November 3, 1975, The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-60 ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; cover letter of August 24, 2004, and Introduction ("Charter and Methodology"), p. 21. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Command Responsibilities," pp. 43-47. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; chapter on the Secretary of Defense policy decisions of December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003, pp. 35-36, and "The Changing Threat," p. 29. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Failure of the Combatant Command to Adjust the Plan," p. 47. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Role of CIA," p. 70, and recommendation 8, p. 91. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "Use of Contractors as Interrogators," p. 69. ↩︎
Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Final Report, August 2004, DTIC ADA428743, copy at https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA428743; "The Role of the ICRC," p. 87. ↩︎
Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The Air Force's Nuclear Mission, transmittal letter of September 12, 2008, Executive Summary pp. 1-4 and recommendations, DTIC ADA486299; the figure of 33 recommendations is stated in the Phase II Executive Summary, p. iii. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA486299 ↩︎
Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear Mission, December 2008, Executive Summary pp. iii-v, DTIC ADA492647. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA492647 ↩︎
Global Positioning System, "James Schlesinger," advisory board member biography, archive.gps.gov (Advisory Board Chair, 2007 to 2014; death on March 27, 2014). https://archive.gps.gov/governance/advisory/members/schlesinger/ ↩︎

32 KiB Raw Blame History