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28
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/LAKAM.md
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@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
---
updated: 2026-10-12
tags:
- Organization
- Government
@ -8,32 +9,47 @@ summary: "LAKAM (Hebrew acronym for Science Liaison Bureau) was an Israeli Minis
start: 1957
end: 1985
location: "Tel Aviv, Israel"
relations:
- type: informant_for
with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
reverse: true
start: 1984-06
end: 1985-11
role: "Handled Pollard as an Israeli agent"
fn: 9
---
[[LAKAM]] (Hebrew acronym for Science Liaison Bureau) was an Israeli Ministry of Defense intelligence agency, previously known as the Office of Special Tasks. It was set up to gather and exchange technology and intelligence with foreign military industries. Under its founding director [[Binyamin Blumberg]], LAKAM agents operated worldwide, collecting technical information and setting up front companies in [[Europe]] and [[Latin America]] to purchase high-tech equipment from the [[United States]] that U.S. export controls would otherwise deny to [[Israel]].[^1][^2]
### Leadership and Operations
In the early 1980s, LAKAM was widely known by its Hebrew acronym. [[Rafael Eitan]], a crony of [[Ariel Sharon]], was appointed its new head, succeeding [[Binyamin Blumberg]]. LAKAM operations in the [[United States]] produced a steady stream of routinely transferred scientific and technical documents, including [[KH-11]] imagery and reporting and assessments from U.S. embassies and intelligence operatives inside [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Jordan]], and [[Egypt]]. Some of this material was marked JUMBO, indicating it was not to be discussed with American counterparts.[^2]
In the early 1980s, LAKAM was widely known by its Hebrew acronym. [[Rafael Eitan]], a crony of [[Ariel Sharon]], was appointed its new head, succeeding Binyamin Blumberg. LAKAM operations in the United States produced a steady stream of routinely transferred scientific and technical documents, including [[KH-11]] imagery and reporting and assessments from U.S. embassies and intelligence operatives inside [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Jordan]], and [[Egypt]]. Some of this material was marked JUMBO, indicating it was not to be discussed with American counterparts.[^2]
### U.S. Spy Network Operations
[[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]]'s operation to build a spy network in the [[United States|United States]] to obtain information about Palestinian terrorists was funded from [[LAKAM|LAKAM's]] budget. [[Iris]], a [[LAKAM]] representative in [[Washington, D.C.]], served as a conduit for intelligence reports between [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Jonathan Pollard]], and [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]].[^1]
Rafi's operation to build a spy network in the United States to obtain information about Palestinian terrorists was funded from LAKAM's budget. [[Iris]], a LAKAM representative in [[Washington, D.C.]], served as a conduit for intelligence reports between [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Jonathan Pollard]], and Rafi.[^1]
### Political Control and Funding
[[LAKAM]] was later controlled by [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]] after [[Shimon Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, and its huge slush fund, which had once financed [[Labor Party|Labor]] projects, was then controlled by [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan]].[^1]
LAKAM was later controlled by Rafi after [[Shimon Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, and its huge slush fund, which had once financed [[Labor Party|Labor]] projects, was then controlled by Eitan.[^1]
### PROMIS Software Operation
According to Gordon Thomas's account in *Gideon's Spies* (1999), drawing on Israeli intelligence sources, LAKAM's director [[Rafael Eitan]] personally arranged to obtain a copy of the [[PROMIS]] software from the [[Department of Justice|U.S. Department of Justice]] through back-channel contacts in the early 1980s. Eitan reportedly met with [[INSLAW]] founder [[Bill Hamilton]] while posing as a representative of the Israeli Ministry of Justice interested in PROMIS as a case management tool. After obtaining the software, Eitan assembled a team of former LAKAM programmers who reconstructed PROMIS and embedded a surveillance trapdoor - described as a $5,000 microchip - that allowed covert remote monitoring of database queries made by any user of the modified software. Eitan's reported statement on receiving PROMIS was: "We can use that program...it could be the most important intelligence tool that Israel has ever had."[^3]
According to Gordon Thomas's account in *Gideon's Spies* (1999), drawing on Israeli intelligence sources, LAKAM's director Rafael Eitan personally arranged to obtain a copy of the [[PROMIS]] software from the [[Department of Justice|U.S. Department of Justice]] through back-channel contacts in the early 1980s. Eitan reportedly met with [[INSLAW]] founder [[Bill Hamilton]] while posing as a representative of the Israeli Ministry of Justice interested in PROMIS as a case management tool. After obtaining the software, Eitan assembled a team of former LAKAM programmers who reconstructed PROMIS and embedded a surveillance trapdoor - described as a $5,000 microchip - that allowed covert remote monitoring of database queries made by any user of the modified software. Eitan's reported statement on receiving PROMIS was: "We can use that program...it could be the most important intelligence tool that Israel has ever had."[^3]
The modified software was then distributed internationally for use by foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, channeled through [[Robert Maxwell]] and his Israeli computer company [[Degem]]. Total sales through this network, according to the allegations reviewed by Special Counsel Nicholas Bua, exceeded $500 million. The [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] (1993) found no credible evidence to support any of these allegations, concluding that only public-domain versions of PROMIS had ever been distributed to foreign entities.[^4]
LAKAM was formally dissolved following the 1985 exposure of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] espionage case, after which its functions were redistributed to other Israeli intelligence services. Eitan, who had also run Pollard as an asset, left Israeli government service.[^2]
In the weeks after Pollard's arrest, Israeli officials described the bureau as the Liaison Bureau for Scientific Affairs, which was being dismantled while its activities were reorganized.[^5] A press report dated December 6, 1985 gave the Hebrew acronym as LEKEM.[^6] In May 1987 the *Washington Post* reported that the spy agency involved had been disbanded, and the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that its head had been forced to resign and the unit disbanded.[^7][^8] In 1998 the Israeli government stated that Pollard had served as an Israeli agent handled by senior members of the Scientific Liaison Bureau, which it gave in Hebrew as Lekam.[^9]
According to Hersh, LAKAM was formally dissolved following the 1985 exposure of the Jonathan Pollard espionage case, after which its functions were redistributed to other Israeli intelligence services. Eitan, who had also run Pollard as an asset, left Israeli government service.[^2]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991.
[^3]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad.* St. Martin's Press, 1999.
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^4]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
[^5]: Thomas L. Friedman, *New York Times*, December 22, 1985. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302120025-0
[^6]: Press item dated December 6, 1985, CIA CREST collection, CIA-RDP90-00965R000201380005-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201380005-6
[^7]: Glenn Frankel, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
[^8]: "Israel hopes that book is now closed on Pollard spy case," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 28, 1987. https://www.csmonitor.com/1987/0528/omary.html
[^9]: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government statement on Jonathan Pollard," May 12, 1998. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/docs/EBB-PollardDoc13.PDF

65
20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Mossad.md
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@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ aliases:
- Israeli Secret Intelligence Service
- Israeli intelligence
created: 2025-07-22
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Mossad
tags:
- Organization
@ -86,17 +86,17 @@ relations:
start: 1982
end: 1982
role: "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangist leadership"
fn: 14
fn: 17
- type: subject_of
with: "[[Kahan Commission]]"
start: 1982-09
end: 1983-02-08
fn: 15
fn: 18
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]"
start: 1980
role: "joint committee with military intelligence for arms supply to Iran, according to Ari Ben-Menashe"
fn: 17
fn: 20
---
The Mossad (the Institute for Intelligence and Special Assignments, in the words of the 1983 [[Kahan Commission]]) is the foreign intelligence service of [[Israel]]. Its own website carries a directive of [[David Ben-Gurion]] on its creation and lists twelve directors from [[Reuven Shiloah]] in 1949 to [[Yossi Cohen]], who left in 2021: Shiloah (1949 to 1952), [[Isser Harel]] (1952 to 1963), [[Meir Amit]] (1963 to 1968), [[Zvi Zamir]] (1968 to 1974), [[Yitzhak Hofi]] (1974 to 1982), [[Nachum Admoni]] (1982 to 1989), [[Shabtai Shavit]] (1989 to 1996), [[Danny Yatom]] (1996 to 1998), [[Efraim Halevy]] (1998 to 2002), [[Meir Dagan]] (2002 to 2011), [[Tamir Pardo]] (2011 to 2016) and Cohen (2016 to 2021).[^1] The record below follows the service where it touches the American intelligence services, the nuclear program at [[Dimona]], and the Lebanon, Iran and computer-software episodes that run through this vault.[^2]
@ -116,39 +116,43 @@ The CIA's Directorate of Operations name file on [[Adolf Eichmann]], released in
A National Security Archive posting records that in the spring of 1963 "some top officials in Israel, primarily Mossad chief Isser Harel with the support of Foreign Minister [[Golda Meir]]," began through leaks to the Israeli press a public campaign about German scientists in Egypt developing ballistic missiles and radiological weapons, "possibly even nuclear weapons"; that the State Department intelligence chief Thomas Hughes asked the Director of Central Intelligence [[John McCone]] for a special estimate on advanced weapons programs in the United Arab Republic and Israel; and that the estimate of May 8, 1963 concluded that Israel "will attempt to produce a weapon sometime in the next several years" unless deterred, while the United Arab Republic did not have "the capability of producing a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future."[^7] The same posting dates the correspondence between [[John F. Kennedy]] and Ben-Gurion over Dimona inspections to those months; Mossad's own list ends Harel's term in 1963.[^1][^7]
### The Paris office and Operation Damocles, 1962
From 1962 the Paris office of Mossad was run by [[Yitzhak Shamir]], under the cover name Samuel Singer, according to Roger Howard's account of [[Operation Damocles]], the campaign directed by Isser Harel against German engineers and scientists working on Egypt's rocket program.[^8] Howard writes that Mossad's complicity in the disappearance of a Munich procurement company director in September 1962 "has never been conclusively proven, but almost certainly this was just the beginning of Operation Damocles."[^9] The Jewish Telegraphic Agency's obituary of Shamir states that between 1955 and 1965 he served as a senior Mossad official.[^10]
### The May 1967 estimate and the June 1967 war
[[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, writes that on May 25, 1967 Tel Aviv submitted to Washington a Mossad estimate claiming the Israeli military was badly outgunned by a Soviet-backed Arab force. The CIA's [[Office of National Estimates]] appraised the paper within five hours: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[Walt Rostow]] sent both papers to Johnson with a note that the CIA appraisal "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^8][^9] On June 1, 1967, the Mossad chief Meir Amit met Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]] in Washington; the memorandum of the conversation was written by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, [[Rufus Taylor]].[^10]
[[David S. Robarge]], the CIA's chief historian, writes that on May 25, 1967 Tel Aviv submitted to Washington a Mossad estimate claiming the Israeli military was badly outgunned by a Soviet-backed Arab force. The CIA's [[Office of National Estimates]] appraised the paper within five hours: "We do not believe that the Israeli appreciation . . . was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials. We think it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US to do one or more of the following: (a) provide military supplies, (b) make more public commitments to Israel, (c) approve Israeli military initiatives, and (d) put more pressure on Nasser." [[Walt Rostow]] sent both papers to Johnson with a note that the CIA appraisal "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^11][^12] On June 1, 1967, the Mossad chief Meir Amit met Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]] in Washington; the memorandum of the conversation was written by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, [[Rufus Taylor]].[^13]
### Plumbat, 1968
Hersh wrote that Mossad wanted uranium ore of which "hundreds of tons" sat in a warehouse near Antwerp, controlled by Euratom, and that Dimona, "ostensibly a twenty-four-megawatt reactor capable of consuming no more than twenty-four tons of ore in a year," could not openly buy an eight-year supply. In March 1968, he wrote, Mossad approached one of its agents in West Germany to buy the ore for $4 million, allegedly for an Italian chemical company in Milan; Euratom approved the sale in October; the uranium left Antwerp aboard a vessel renamed the Scheersberg A, "purchased, with Mossad funds, by another Israeli agent-in-place in Turkey"; and at sea the ore was transferred to an Israeli freighter guarded by gunboats. The disappearance was known to Euratom within months, American and European agencies reported internally that Israel was involved, and it took nine years for the press to report it; Hersh cited published accounts "confirmed by Israeli officials" and a 1978 book, *The Plumbat Affair*.[^11]
Hersh wrote that Mossad wanted uranium ore of which "hundreds of tons" sat in a warehouse near Antwerp, controlled by Euratom, and that Dimona, "ostensibly a twenty-four-megawatt reactor capable of consuming no more than twenty-four tons of ore in a year," could not openly buy an eight-year supply. In March 1968, he wrote, Mossad approached one of its agents in West Germany to buy the ore for $4 million, allegedly for an Italian chemical company in Milan; Euratom approved the sale in October; the uranium left Antwerp aboard a vessel renamed the Scheersberg A, "purchased, with Mossad funds, by another Israeli agent-in-place in Turkey"; and at sea the ore was transferred to an Israeli freighter guarded by gunboats. The disappearance was known to Euratom within months, American and European agencies reported internally that Israel was involved, and it took nine years for the press to report it; Hersh cited published accounts "confirmed by Israeli officials" and a 1978 book, *The Plumbat Affair*.[^14]
On September 10, 1968, Raphael Eitan, whom the National Security Archive identifies as deputy chief of Mossad operations and the organizer of the Mossad and [[LAKAM]] team in the Plumbat operation, visited the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]] plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania, with three other Israelis, according to an Atomic Energy Commission security report of September 6, 1968.[^12]
On September 10, 1968, Raphael Eitan, whom the National Security Archive identifies as deputy chief of Mossad operations and the organizer of the Mossad and [[LAKAM]] team in the Plumbat operation, visited the [[Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation]] plant at Apollo, Pennsylvania, with three other Israelis, according to an Atomic Energy Commission security report of September 6, 1968.[^15]
### Osirak and the Lebanon war
Hersh wrote that Hofi, "the director of Mossad," and the chief of military intelligence [[Yehoshua Saguy]] opposed the 1981 attack on [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] "primarily because there was no evidence that Iraq was as yet capable of building a bomb," and that two weeks after the raid Hofi gave an interview, identified only by title under censorship, complaining about politicians who compromised secret intelligence, which in Hersh's account left "no doubt in the Israeli intelligence community" that Begin was the politician meant; Hersh added that Hofi was also a critic of [[Ariel Sharon]].[^13]
Hersh wrote that Hofi, "the director of Mossad," and the chief of military intelligence [[Yehoshua Saguy]] opposed the 1981 attack on [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] "primarily because there was no evidence that Iraq was as yet capable of building a bomb," and that two weeks after the raid Hofi gave an interview, identified only by title under censorship, complaining about politicians who compromised secret intelligence, which in Hersh's account left "no doubt in the Israeli intelligence community" that Begin was the politician meant; Hersh added that Hofi was also a critic of [[Ariel Sharon]].[^16]
The Kahan Commission, reporting on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, wrote that Israel had extended aid to the Christian armed forces, that "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangists," and that its representatives "maintained a rather close connection with the Phalangist leadership"; that the Mossad "to a not inconsiderable extent under the influence of constant and close contact with the Phalangist elite" favored strengthening the relationship while military intelligence emphasized the Phalangists' unreliability; and that the Mossad's head, in testimony of December 27, 1982, accepted that "subjective, and not only objective, relations also emerged." In the view prevailing among the Mossad agents before the war, the commission wrote, the Phalangists' atrocities were a thing of the past, although in meetings with the heads of the Mossad [[Bashir Gemayel]] had said things that "left no room for doubt" of his intention to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon even by "aberrant methods."[^14] In cables of September 15 the Mossad representative in Beirut reported the meetings of the chief of staff and the defense minister with the Phalangist leadership and that the Phalangists would enter West Beirut after the Israeli Defense Forces; a cable of September 16 at noon reported a coordination meeting to prepare the Phalangists "for operations to clear the city of terrorists," and another that they would start work at the Burj el-Barajneh camp. The head of the Mossad, who had assumed the post on September 12, 1982 after serving as deputy, learned of the decision to send the Phalangists into the camps only at the cabinet meeting of Thursday evening, did not give an assessment of their entry or express reservations, and was found by the commission to have shown an inaction that "should not be considered serious," and the commission considered it sufficient to determine responsibility without further recommendation.[^15]
The Kahan Commission, reporting on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, wrote that Israel had extended aid to the Christian armed forces, that "the Mossad was made responsible for the link with the Phalangists," and that its representatives "maintained a rather close connection with the Phalangist leadership"; that the Mossad "to a not inconsiderable extent under the influence of constant and close contact with the Phalangist elite" favored strengthening the relationship while military intelligence emphasized the Phalangists' unreliability; and that the Mossad's head, in testimony of December 27, 1982, accepted that "subjective, and not only objective, relations also emerged." In the view prevailing among the Mossad agents before the war, the commission wrote, the Phalangists' atrocities were a thing of the past, although in meetings with the heads of the Mossad [[Bashir Gemayel]] had said things that "left no room for doubt" of his intention to eliminate the Palestinian problem in Lebanon even by "aberrant methods."[^17] In cables of September 15 the Mossad representative in Beirut reported the meetings of the chief of staff and the defense minister with the Phalangist leadership and that the Phalangists would enter West Beirut after the Israeli Defense Forces; a cable of September 16 at noon reported a coordination meeting to prepare the Phalangists "for operations to clear the city of terrorists," and another that they would start work at the Burj el-Barajneh camp. The head of the Mossad, who had assumed the post on September 12, 1982 after serving as deputy, learned of the decision to send the Phalangists into the camps only at the cabinet meeting of Thursday evening, did not give an assessment of their entry or express reservations, and was found by the commission to have shown an inaction that "should not be considered serious," and the commission considered it sufficient to determine responsibility without further recommendation.[^18]
### Iran, 1980 and 1981
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that in the fall of 1980 Begin ordered the military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Sagi]] and the Mossad's "acting director" Nachum Admoni to create an Iran-Israel Joint Committee of military intelligence and Mossad to supply arms to Iran; that [[David Kimche]], whom he called head of Tevel, was its senior member; and that after [[Yitzhak Shamir]] became prime minister members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.[^16][^17] The Mossad's own list gives Hofi as head from 1974 to 1982 and Admoni from 1982, and the Kahan Commission describes Admoni as deputy head until September 12, 1982.[^1][^14] The House October Surprise Task Force wrote that Eitan and Saguy had told the Israeli government they never met Ben-Menashe and that his Israeli military file showed work as a translator; Ben-Menashe was acquitted in New York in November 1990.[^18] See [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that in the fall of 1980 Begin ordered the military intelligence chief [[Yehoshua Sagi]] and the Mossad's "acting director" Nachum Admoni to create an Iran-Israel Joint Committee of military intelligence and Mossad to supply arms to Iran; that [[David Kimche]], whom he called head of Tevel, was its senior member; and that after Yitzhak Shamir became prime minister members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.[^19][^20] The Mossad's own list gives Hofi as head from 1974 to 1982 and Admoni from 1982, and the Kahan Commission describes Admoni as deputy head until September 12, 1982.[^1][^17] The House October Surprise Task Force wrote that Eitan and Saguy had told the Israeli government they never met Ben-Menashe and that his Israeli military file showed work as a translator; Ben-Menashe was acquitted in New York in November 1990.[^21] See [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].
### PROMIS, according to Ben-Menashe
Ben-Menashe wrote that Eitan, as counterterrorism adviser to Begin and then to Shamir, took an interest in the software program [[PROMIS]]; that in 1982 [[Earl Brian]] approached Eitan about selling it to foreign intelligence agencies; that Eitan decided to have a "trap door" installed to give Israeli agents access to the computers of any service that bought it; that Ben-Menashe recruited his childhood friend [[Yehuda Ben-Hanan]], of Software and Engineering Consultants in California, to build the external access; that Eitan selected Jordan to test it and that Brian sold it through his company [[Hadron]]; and that [[Robert Maxwell]] "made a fortune out of it" through his companies.[^19] See [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].
Ben-Menashe wrote that Eitan, as counterterrorism adviser to Begin and then to Shamir, took an interest in the software program [[PROMIS]]; that in 1982 [[Earl Brian]] approached Eitan about selling it to foreign intelligence agencies; that Eitan decided to have a "trap door" installed to give Israeli agents access to the computers of any service that bought it; that Ben-Menashe recruited his childhood friend [[Yehuda Ben-Hanan]], of Software and Engineering Consultants in California, to build the external access; that Eitan selected Jordan to test it and that Brian sold it through his company [[Hadron]]; and that [[Robert Maxwell]] "made a fortune out of it" through his companies.[^22] See [[PROMIS Software Scandal]].
### Vanunu and the Mirror Group, 1986
Hersh wrote that copies of the photographs [[Mordecai Vanunu]] took inside Dimona were made available in London, before the Sunday Times published, to an Israeli intelligence agent masquerading as an American reporter; that they were sent by courier to the office of Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], who ordered Mossad to get Vanunu out of London and into Israeli custody; that "no kidnapping could take place in England for diplomatic reasons"; and that Vanunu was enticed by a Mossad agent named Cindy Hanin Bentov (a pseudonym; see [[Cindy Hanin Bentov]]) to leave for Rome a few days before publication, where, according to Vanunu's account to relatives, he was drugged and returned to Israel by ship.[^20]
Hersh wrote that copies of the photographs [[Mordecai Vanunu]] took inside Dimona were made available in London, before the Sunday Times published, to an Israeli intelligence agent masquerading as an American reporter; that they were sent by courier to the office of Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], who ordered Mossad to get Vanunu out of London and into Israeli custody; that "no kidnapping could take place in England for diplomatic reasons"; and that Vanunu was enticed by a Mossad agent named Cindy Hanin Bentov (a pseudonym; see [[Cindy Hanin Bentov]]) to leave for Rome a few days before publication, where, according to Vanunu's account to relatives, he was drugged and returned to Israel by ship.[^23]
Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leadership he and others were told that "Peres said, 'Let's make him an example'" rather than assassinating him; that the foreign editor of the Daily Mirror, [[Nicholas Davies]], "provided the framework" for the Sunday Mirror's hostile story of September 28, which went to Maxwell, publisher of the Mirror Group; and that Maxwell told him "I know what has to happen. I have already spoken to your bosses."[^21] The Sunday Mirror's reporters Tony Frost and Mark Souster were ordered by their editor to take the photographs to the Israeli embassy; the senior deputy editor John C. Parker understood that Maxwell had given the order; the news editor Peter J. Miller said that "the line we were instructed to take cost the Sunday Mirror a world-beating exclusive"; and the editor Michael Malloy acknowledged discussing the story with Maxwell, said there was "nothing sinister or strange" in it, and recalled that Maxwell ordered the photographs shown to the Israelis.[^21] The Mirror staff statements are those of the persons named.
Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leadership he and others were told that "Peres said, 'Let's make him an example'" rather than assassinating him; that the foreign editor of the Daily Mirror, [[Nicholas Davies]], "provided the framework" for the Sunday Mirror's hostile story of September 28, which went to Maxwell, publisher of the Mirror Group; and that Maxwell told him "I know what has to happen. I have already spoken to your bosses."[^24] The Sunday Mirror's reporters Tony Frost and Mark Souster were ordered by their editor to take the photographs to the Israeli embassy; the senior deputy editor John C. Parker understood that Maxwell had given the order; the news editor Peter J. Miller said that "the line we were instructed to take cost the Sunday Mirror a world-beating exclusive"; and the editor Michael Malloy acknowledged discussing the story with Maxwell, said there was "nothing sinister or strange" in it, and recalled that Maxwell ordered the photographs shown to the Israelis.[^24] The Mirror staff statements are those of the persons named.
### Uri Geller
[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that, according to Geller, [[Moshe Dayan]] asked [[Uri Geller]] "Now, what can you do for Israel?"; that "so the story goes" Geller then met the military intelligence chief [[Aharon Yariv]] and officials of Mossad and [[Shin Bet]], was tested by them and began to work for them, viewing targets in Syria and elsewhere; and that Yariv, in an interview with the science writer John Wilhelm in the mid-1970s, denied ever meeting or consulting with Geller. Schnabel wrote that Geller says he later met secretly in hotel rooms in the United States with Israeli officials to brief them on his experiences at [[Stanford Research Institute]] and was warned "not to do certain things" there; that in one of Geller's stories a tape recorder started to play by itself at a meeting with Mossad officers; and that among the "wild surmises" in the air when CIA officials asked Puthoff about Geller was that he was "part of some Mossad disinformation project, designed to spook the Arabs into believing that Israel possessed a paranormal superman," or that Israeli intelligence wanted to infiltrate SRI. Several Israeli officials came to SRI in the summer of 1973; [[Hal Puthoff|Harold Puthoff]] "had the impression that they were from Israeli military intelligence," and they said that Geller had done "surprisingly good work for them against Middle Eastern military targets" and asked whether it was luck or verifiable psychic ability.[^22]
[[Jim Schnabel]] wrote that, according to Geller, [[Moshe Dayan]] asked [[Uri Geller]] "Now, what can you do for Israel?"; that "so the story goes" Geller then met the military intelligence chief [[Aharon Yariv]] and officials of Mossad and [[Shin Bet]], was tested by them and began to work for them, viewing targets in Syria and elsewhere; and that Yariv, in an interview with the science writer John Wilhelm in the mid-1970s, denied ever meeting or consulting with Geller. Schnabel wrote that Geller says he later met secretly in hotel rooms in the United States with Israeli officials to brief them on his experiences at [[Stanford Research Institute]] and was warned "not to do certain things" there; that in one of Geller's stories a tape recorder started to play by itself at a meeting with Mossad officers; and that among the "wild surmises" in the air when CIA officials asked Puthoff about Geller was that he was "part of some Mossad disinformation project, designed to spook the Arabs into believing that Israel possessed a paranormal superman," or that Israeli intelligence wanted to infiltrate SRI. Several Israeli officials came to SRI in the summer of 1973; [[Hal Puthoff|Harold Puthoff]] "had the impression that they were from Israeli military intelligence," and they said that Geller had done "surprisingly good work for them against Middle Eastern military targets" and asked whether it was luck or verifiable psychic ability.[^25]
### Footnotes
@ -159,18 +163,21 @@ Ben-Menashe told Hersh that after Vanunu's photographs reached the Israeli leade
[^5]: Feinstein, Tamara, ed., "The CIA Names File on Adolf Eichmann," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 150, March 24, 2005, citing the CIA Directorate of Operations file, vol. 1, document 49, and vol. 2, document 7. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB150/index.htm
[^6]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 21, "Israel's Nuclear Spy," pp. 288-289.
[^7]: Burr, William, and Avner Cohen, eds., "The Battle of the Letters, 1963," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 671, May 2, 2019, documents 17 and 22. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2019-05-02/battle-letters-1963-john-f-kennedy-david-ben-gurion-levi-eshkol-us-inspections-dimona
[^8]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
[^9]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^10]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
[^11]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision," pp. 180-181.
[^12]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 10 and commentary. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program The identification of Eitan's role is the posting's commentary.
[^13]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11; chapter 21, p. 294 footnote (Hofi and Sharon).
[^14]: Kahan Commission Report, sections on the Phalangists and the Mossad, on the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and on the head of the Mossad (note 2).
[^15]: Kahan Commission Report (note 2), recommendations on the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the head of the Mossad.
[^16]: Ben-Menashe, Ari, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, TrineDay, 2015 reprint of the 1992 edition, passages on the Joint Committee for Iran-Israel Relations, Tevel and the Mossad directorship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
[^17]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, passage on Begin's order to Sagi and Admoni in the fall of 1980.
[^18]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, January 3, 1993, section on Ben-Menashe (p. 97). https://archive.org/details/14148-h.rp.-1102 ; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 260 footnote (acquittal in November 1990).
[^19]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, chapter on PROMIS.
[^20]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 15, "The Tunnel," pp. 197-198.
[^21]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 22, "An Israeli Asset," pp. 311-315.
[^22]: Schnabel, Jim, *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies*, Dell, 1997, chapter 9, "The Trickster." Full text read at https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2
[^8]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles: Israel's Secret War against Hitler's Scientists in Egypt, 1954-1967_ (2013), chapter 16. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
[^9]: Roger Howard, _Operation Damocles_, chapter 1. https://archive.org/details/operationdamocle0000howa
[^10]: "Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's 7th prime minister, dies at 96," _Jewish Telegraphic Agency_, July 2012. https://www.jta.org/?p=1789432
[^11]: Robarge, David S. "Getting it Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War." *Studies in Intelligence* 49, no. 1 (March 2005). https://www.cia.gov/resources/csi/static/CIA-Analysis-1967-War.pdf
[^12]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 61, Memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, May 25, 1967, with attached CIA appraisal. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
[^13]: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Document 124, Memorandum for the Record by Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, June 1, 1967 (prepared June 2). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d124
[^14]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 13, "An Israeli Decision," pp. 180-181.
[^15]: National Security Archive, "The NUMEC Affair: Did Highly Enriched Uranium from the U.S. Aid Israel's Nuclear Weapons Program?" (November 2, 2016), Document 10 and commentary. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2016-11-02/numec-affair-did-highly-enriched-uranium-us-aid-israels-nuclear-weapons-program The identification of Eitan's role is the posting's commentary.
[^16]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 1, pp. 9-11; chapter 21, p. 294 footnote (Hofi and Sharon).
[^17]: Kahan Commission Report, sections on the Phalangists and the Mossad, on the Phalangists' entry into the camps, and on the head of the Mossad (note 2).
[^18]: Kahan Commission Report (note 2), recommendations on the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the head of the Mossad.
[^19]: Ben-Menashe, Ari, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, TrineDay, 2015 reprint of the 1992 edition, passages on the Joint Committee for Iran-Israel Relations, Tevel and the Mossad directorship. https://archive.org/details/profits-of-war-1992-ari-ben-menashe
[^20]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, passage on Begin's order to Sagi and Admoni in the fall of 1980.
[^21]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*, H. Rept. 102-1102, January 3, 1993, section on Ben-Menashe (p. 97). https://archive.org/details/14148-h.rp.-1102 ; Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 19, p. 260 footnote (acquittal in November 1990).
[^22]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, chapter on PROMIS.
[^23]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 15, "The Tunnel," pp. 197-198.
[^24]: Hersh, *The Samson Option*, chapter 22, "An Israeli Asset," pp. 311-315.
[^25]: Schnabel, Jim, *Remote Viewers: The Secret History of America's Psychic Spies*, Dell, 1997, chapter 9, "The Trickster." Full text read at https://archive.org/details/jim-schnabel-remote-viewers-the-secret-history-of-americas-psychic-spies_2

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Unit 8200.md
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@ -1,30 +1,239 @@
---
aliases:
- Unit 8200
- IDF Unit 8200
- Israeli Defense Forces Unit 8200
- Detachment 8200
- Unit S.M. 2
category: "Intelligence & Government"
tags:
- Program
- IntelligenceOperation
- Organization
- Unit8200
- Israel
category: "Intelligence Operation"
summary: "Unit 8200 is Israel's primary signals intelligence and code-breaking unit, housed at a base near Tel Aviv adjacent to a Mossad facility, operating under strict compartmentalized need-to-know protocols."
- SignalsIntelligence
- NSA
- Snowden
- Stuxnet
- Spyware
- NSOGroup
- Carbyne
- EhudBarak
- JeffreyEpstein
- Lavender
- Refuseniks
- AIMilitary
summary: "Unit 8200 is the Israeli Defense Forces' signals-intelligence and cyber unit whose alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms and whose commander was exposed as the author of an AI-warfare book in 2024."
start: 1952
location: "near Tel Aviv, Israel"
updated: 2026-10-09
location: "Glilot Camps, Ramat HaSharon, Israel"
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[Yoel Ben-Porat]]"
reverse: true
role: "unit commander, per Ben-Menashe's account"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Sasson Yishaek]]"
reverse: true
role: "number-two in the code-breaking department, later commander"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Reuben Yirador]]"
reverse: true
role: "department commander"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Shulamit Ingerman]]"
reverse: true
role: "cryptographer, head of the Iranian desk"
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]"
reverse: true
role: "Iranian desk, code-breaking department, per his own account"
start: 1975
end: 1977
fn: 2
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Yosef Zeira]]"
reverse: true
role: "department commander, per Ben-Menashe's account"
fn: 2
- type: head_of
with: "[[Yossi Sariel]]"
reverse: true
role: "commander"
end: 2024-09-12
fn: 23
- type: head_of
with: "[[Pinhas Buchris]]"
reverse: true
role: "commander; later director general of the Ministry of Defense"
fn: 31
- type: head_of
with: "[[Reuven Yerdor]]"
reverse: true
role: "in charge of the unit by early 1982, per Hersh's account"
end: 1982
fn: 34
- type: head_of
with: "[[Nadav Zafrir]]"
reverse: true
role: "commander, who established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command"
fn: 16
- type: member_of
with: "[[Aman]]"
fn: 1
- type: partner_of
with: "[[NSA]]"
start: 2009-03
role: "intelligence-sharing memorandum of understanding, reached in principle March 2009"
fn: 9
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Olympic Games]]"
role: "payload development, per Sanger's account"
fn: 5
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Minerva Project]]"
start: 2020-09
role: "admissions page headed Partner: IDF 8200"
fn: 24
---
[[Unit 8200]] is an [[Israel|Israeli]] Signals Intelligence (Sigint) unit, specializing in code-breaking. It is housed in a base located near a country club north of [[Tel Aviv]], with a nearby building known as "the villa" belonging to [[Mossad]], where top-secret security meetings were held. The unit operates on a need-to-know basis, with departments requiring special permission to access each other's areas.[^1]
Key personnel mentioned in connection with [[Unit 8200]] include Col. [[Yoel Ben-Porat]] (unit commander, known as Buffy), Lt. Col. [[Sasson Yishaek]] (number-two in code-breaking, later commander), Col. [[Reuben Yirador]] (department commander), and [[Shulamit Ingerman]] (head of the Iranian desk and a cryptographer).[^1]
[[Unit 8200]] is the signals-intelligence and cyber unit of the [[Israel Defense Forces]], attached to [[Aman]], the military intelligence directorate. Its central base is the Glilot Camps in [[Ramat HaSharon]], north of [[Tel Aviv]], close to the [[Mossad]] headquarters.[^1] Its alumni have founded surveillance and cybersecurity firms. A 2009 intelligence-sharing memorandum with the [[NSA]], disclosed in 2013, names the unit's counterpart only by its acronym. A 2014 refusal letter was signed by 43 of its veterans and reservists, and 2024 reporting tied the unit to AI-assisted targeting in the Gaza war.
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] was stationed in [[Unit 8200]]'s code-breaking department, specifically on the [[Iran|Iranian]] desk, from 1975 to 1977. He claims to have broken the [[Iran|Iranian]] diplomatic code, which allowed [[Israel|Israel]] to read coded messages faster than the [[Iran|Iranians]]. This breakthrough eliminated the need to "acquire" the weekly black book sent by diplomatic pouch to the [[Iran|Iranian]] embassy in [[Ramat Gan]].[^1]
### Glilot base and origins
[[Unit 8200]] was involved in monitoring [[Iran|Iranian]] communications through satellite stations in Bet Ella and listening stations in northern [[Israel]], the [[Sinai]], and overseas (e.g., [[Japan]], [[Italy]], [[Ethiopia]]). These stations intercepted traffic from the [[Iran|Iranian]] Foreign Ministry, Royal Court, [[SAVAK]], and [[Iran|Iranian]] military intelligence.[^1]
Ynet reported in August 2024 that the unit, designated Unit S.M. 2 when it moved to the Glilot base in 1952, was later renamed 8200. Sixteen years before that report, the army decided to evacuate most of the Glilot compound as part of a move to the [[Negev]]. The transition had been delayed repeatedly and was expected to take place in several phases over the following years.[^1]
In 1972, Col. [[Reuben Yirador]] decoded a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intercept (VENONA) that revealed the [[Soviet Union|Soviets]] were bugging the office of [[Golda Meir]], then Prime Minister of [[Israel]]. This discovery, along with [[Golda Meir|Meir's]] meeting with [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and her rejection of a peace settlement, informed [[Anwar Sadat]] and may have prompted the 1973 war.[^1]
In [[Profits of War]] (1992), [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] placed the base near a country club north of Tel Aviv, with a nearby building known as "the villa" that belonged to Mossad and housed top-secret security meetings. He wrote that the unit operated on a need-to-know basis and that its departments required special permission to enter one another's areas.[^2]
In 1976, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], while on duty in [[Unit 8200]], intercepted a telegram detailing [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] bribes paid to Defense Minister [[Shimon Peres]]. This information was subsequently covered up by superiors, including [[Yoel Ben-Porat|Buffy]] and [[Sasson Yishaek|Lt. Col. Yishaek]].[^1]
### Personnel in the record
Ben-Menashe named the unit's commander as [[Yoel Ben-Porat]], known as Buffy. He named [[Sasson Yishaek]] as the number-two officer in the code-breaking department and later its commander, [[Reuben Yirador]] as a department commander, and [[Shulamit Ingerman]] as a cryptographer who headed the [[Iran|Iranian]] desk.[^2] He also wrote that [[Yosef Zeira]], a department commander in the mid-1970s, briefed a small team on the 1976 rescue at [[Operation Entebbe]] and ordered its members into communications isolation for the duration of the operation.[^2]
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* (1991) that by early 1982 Brigadier General [[Reuven Yerdor]], known as Rudi, was in charge of the unit. Hersh wrote that Yerdor had been an officer of the Israeli signals-intelligence detachment (then Detachment 515, later 8200), had cracked a Soviet code, and traveled to [[Washington, D.C.]] every three months for liaison meetings with the [[NSA]]. According to Hersh, [[Yehoshua Saguy]], the head of Aman, gave Yerdor two packets of documents over the 1981-82 New Year holiday, one of them daily and weekly summaries of worldwide NSA intercepts, and Yerdor received American technical data on Syrian air defenses in May 1982. The spelling Yerdor differs from the Yirador of Ben-Menashe's account, and the two names may refer to the same officer.[^34]
### The Iranian desk and Ben-Menashe's account
Ben-Menashe wrote that he served on the Iranian desk of the code-breaking department from 1975 to 1977 and that he broke the Iranian diplomatic code. The break, he wrote, made it unnecessary to "acquire" the weekly black book sent by diplomatic pouch to the Iranian embassy in [[Ramat Gan]].[^2] He described satellite stations at [[Bet Ella]] and listening stations in northern [[Israel]], the [[Sinai]], and overseas in [[Japan]], [[Italy]] and [[Ethiopia]]. According to his account, these intercepted traffic from the Iranian Foreign Ministry, the Royal Court, [[SAVAK]] and Iranian military intelligence.[^2]
Ben-Menashe wrote that in 1972 Yirador decoded a [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] intercept showing that the Soviets were bugging the office of [[Golda Meir]], then prime minister. The account names the intercept VENONA, the name of a United States program that ran from 1943 until the NSA closed it in 1980 and that decrypted Soviet cables, mostly from 1943 to 1945.[^3] Ben-Menashe linked the discovery, together with Meir's meeting with [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and her rejection of a peace settlement, to [[Anwar Sadat]]'s understanding of Israel's position. He wrote that it may have prompted the 1973 war.[^2]
In 1976, Ben-Menashe wrote, he intercepted while on duty a telegram detailing [[Lockheed Aircraft Company|Lockheed]] bribes paid to Defense Minister [[Shimon Peres]]. The sum was $3.5 million, deposited in one of Peres's brother's business accounts in [[Europe]]. Superiors, including Buffy and Lt. Col. Yishaek, covered the information up, he wrote.[^2]
### Stuxnet and Olympic Games
In June 2012 [[David Sanger]] reported in *The New York Times* that President [[Barack Obama]] had accelerated cyberattacks against Iran's uranium enrichment program. The program had begun under the Bush administration and was code-named Olympic Games. A worm had escaped Iran's [[Natanz]] plant in the summer of 2010 and spread across the Internet. The last attack in the later series, the paper reported, "temporarily took out nearly 1,000 of the 5,000 centrifuges Iran had spinning at the time to purify uranium." The account drew on interviews with current and former American, European and Israeli officials, none of whom would allow their names to be used.[^4]
Sanger's book *Confront and Conceal* (2012) says that development of the payload enlisted Unit 8200, which had "deep intelligence about operations at Natanz", together with the NSA. The excerpt reported that bringing the Israelis on board was meant as a means to discourage a pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities.[^5]
### The Kaspersky intrusion
*The New York Times* reported on October 10, 2017 that Israeli intelligence officers had hacked into the network of the Russian antivirus company Kaspersky Lab and watched "in real time as Russian government hackers searched computers around the world for the code names of American intelligence programs." The paper wrote that the Israelis alerted the United States, that they gave their NSA counterparts screenshots and other documentation, and that the Department of Homeland Security's September 13, 2017 order removing Kaspersky products from federal agencies rested in large part on intelligence from Israel's 2014 intrusion. The article drew on people briefed on the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Israeli Embassy declined to comment and Kaspersky denied any involvement in the Russian operation.[^33]
Kaspersky had published a report in June 2015 on an intrusion into its own network that it named Duqu 2.0, after the Duqu malware that researchers had linked to the nation states behind Stuxnet. The Times wrote that the company did not name Israel in that report, that the attackers were interested in Kaspersky's work on the "Equation Group," the industry term for the NSA, and that other victims included hotels and venues used for the negotiations on the Iran nuclear agreement, from which Israel was excluded.[^33]
### The 2014 refusal letter
On September 11, 2014, a letter from 43 veterans and reservists of the unit was distributed to the media. Al Jazeera reported that it was addressed to the prime minister, the armed forces chief and the head of military intelligence. The letter declared: "We veterans of Unit 8200, reservists past and present, declare that we refuse to take part in activity against Palestinians and refuse to be tools to deepen the military control in the occupied territories." It was published less than three weeks after the Gaza offensive that killed more than 2,200 people.[^6]
[[Hanan Gefen]], a former commander of the unit, accused the signatories of a grave breach of trust. He said that if he were the serving commander he would put them on trial and remove them from the unit.[^6] Public radio coverage later that month carried the headline "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue."[^7]
In January 2015 the army dismissed some of the signatories. Ynet reported that the decision ended the reserve service of the refuseniks, who received letters stating they would not be called up for reserve duty in the future. The Military Intelligence Directorate noted that only a small part of the 43 had been called up in recent years, and then for a handful of days. Ynet reported that the dismissals followed the media storm the letter had created.[^8]
### The NSA memorandum of understanding
On September 11, 2013, [[The Guardian]] published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document "provided to the Guardian by whistleblower [[Edward Snowden]]." The reporters, [[Glenn Greenwald]], [[Laura Poitras]] and [[Ewen MacAskill]], wrote that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009" and that the memorandum described itself as an agreement "pertaining to the protection of US persons." The full text was published with the article.[^9][^10]
The memorandum states that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection." The counterpart is named ISNU, and the text does not name Unit 8200. The unit's role as the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military is the basis for the identification.[^1] Under the memorandum, Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year and was to consult the NSA's special liaison adviser when such data appeared. Communications to or from an official of the US government were to be destroyed "upon recognition." The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities."[^9]
The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content." It permits Israel to disseminate foreign intelligence concerning US persons derived from raw Sigint provided it does so "in a manner that does not identify the US person," and to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. The Guardian reported that Israeli personnel agreed not to deliberately target Americans identified in the data, that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing, and that the NSA spokesperson did not deny that personal data about Americans was included in the material sent.[^9]
The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. An NSA spokesperson said that "Any US person information that is acquired as a result of NSA's surveillance activities is handled under procedures that are designed to protect privacy rights." The Guardian also quoted a top-secret report dated September 2007 that described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."[^9]
### Alumni and the surveillance industry
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project wrote that veterans of Unit 8200 "are known to have helped develop" the technology of [[NSO Group]], the spyware company co-founded in 2010 by two high-school friends.[^11] The two, [[Shalev Hulio]] and [[Omri Lavie]], are described by some accounts as unit alumni. In a January 2019 profile by [[Ronen Bergman]], Ynet wrote that Hulio "didn't serve in the IDF's elite Unit 8200," that his final posting was as commander of a Home Front Command search and rescue team, and that one of two friends from Hugim High School in Haifa who developed the technology of an earlier company, CommuniTech, had served in Unit 8200. Bergman quoted a senior intelligence official who said NSO was "another example of Israel's strategic capabilities, which were developed to protect its citizens and its national security, that have been proliferated by former members of the intelligence community." Hulio denied the claim and said that an early employee, the engineer who began building the first offensive tool in August 2010, "may have served in Unit 8200" but that the technology did not come from there.[^26] The profile also names [[Niv Carmi]], who worked at the Prime Minister's Office as a student, as the technical expert the investor Eddy Shalev required the founders to bring in.[^26] The OCCRP quoted [[Gadi Aviran]], who founded the intelligence firm [[Terrogence]], telling The New Yorker in 2019: "There was this huge pipeline of talent coming out of the military every year."[^11]
### NSO Group litigation
[[WhatsApp]] sued NSO in October 2019 in the Northern District of California. A March 2020 order described the defendants, which the plaintiffs had attempted to serve through the Hague Convention, as Israeli entities.[^12] A July 2020 order described NSO as an Israeli limited liability company, described [[Q Cyber Technologies]] as an Israeli corporation and NSO's only active director and majority shareholder, and recorded the complaint's allegation that defendants sent malware through WhatsApp's system to about 1,400 mobile devices.[^13]
On December 20, 2024, Judge [[Phyllis Hamilton]] granted WhatsApp's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and California's Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act. She denied NSO's motion for summary judgment and granted the sanctions motion in part. The order considered terminating sanctions, preferred evidentiary sanctions, and called defendants' limitation of Pegasus source-code production "simply impracticable for a lawsuit that is to be litigated in this district." It stated that a trial would proceed only on damages.[^14]
On May 6, 2025 a jury returned a unanimous verdict of $444,719 in compensatory damages, the full amount WhatsApp sought, and $167,254,000 in punitive damages (Dkt. 736), a total of $167,698,719. The jury found that the defendants acted with malice, oppression or fraud.[^15][^27] On October 17, 2025 Judge Hamilton granted WhatsApp's motion for a permanent injunction and granted the defendants' motion for remittitur, reducing the punitive award to $4,002,471, the maximum she found permissible at a ratio of nine to one to compensatory damages under the Ninth Circuit's *Riley* framework. The order stated that the defendants had reverse-engineered WhatsApp's code to create a modified client and had repeatedly redesigned their software to avoid detection.[^27] WhatsApp accepted the remittitur on October 31, 2025. On November 12, 2025 the court entered a permanent injunction, which excluded the defendants' foreign sovereign customers and outside counsel from the parties it binds, and a final judgment of $4,447,190, consisting of $444,719 in compensatory and $4,002,471 in punitive damages.[^15][^28] On December 19, 2025 the court denied the defendants' motion to stay the injunction pending appeal.[^29]
### Alumni in SEC filings
Executive biographies in SEC filings also name the unit. The annual report on Form 20-F filed by [[Check Point Software Technologies]] on March 17, 2025 describes its chief executive, [[Nadav Zafrir]], as having "served as Commander of Unit 8200, Israel's elite military technology unit, where he established the Israel Defense Forces Cyber Command." The report also lists him as a director of [[SolarEdge Technologies]].[^16]
The annual report on Form 20-F for 2022 of [[HUB Cyber Security]] states that the company "was founded in 2017 by veterans of the elite Unit 8200 and Unit 81 of the Israeli Defense Forces."[^17] The 2024 proxy statement of [[Playtika Holding]] describes a vice president for customer relationship management and analytics as having served, before joining the company, "in the elite Israeli military unit 8200."[^18]
### Carbyne and the Epstein investments
Minutes of a meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd. (later [[Carbyne]]) on December 23, 2015 list as directors present Amir Elichai, Alex Dizengof, [[Ehud Barak]] and "Pinchas Bouchris," with the company's lawyer. The minutes record a resolution to seek $10 million from venture funds and a further investment of $500,000 by Barak expected by February 1, 2016. The minutes were among the records released in the Department of Justice's Epstein Library.[^30] Pinhas Buchris, identified in Calcalist's July 2019 reporting as "the former director of Israel's Unit 8200," sat on Carbyne's board in 2017 with Barak, Elichai and [[Nicole Junkermann]].[^31] In a December 2022 interview with Calcalist, Buchris described himself as a former officer of [[Sayeret Matkal]], commander of Unit 81 and of Unit 8200, and director general of the [[Ministry of Defense (Israel)|Ministry of Defense]], said he had introduced the unit to cyber operations in 1997, and spoke of his part in the 1976 [[Operation Entebbe]] rescue.[^32]
[[Forbes]] reported in February 2026 that Barak served on the company's board until 2019 and that [[Jeffrey Epstein]] invested through Barak.[^19] Epstein's stake was held through SUM (E.B.) Limited Partnership. In a February 28, 2019 email, the partnership's lawyer wrote that at the time of the initial investment it had received warrants for 61,251 Preferred A shares of Carbyne, and that exercising them would raise its holding from about 13 percent to about 26.33 percent. A later message in the chain told Epstein's lawyer [[Darren Indyke]] that [[Southern Trust Company]] had signed the additional investment agreement.[^35] On March 11, 2019, Barak wrote to Epstein in a thread that carried the subject line "Re: Carbyne warrants" and included a message forwarded by Indyke.[^20]
### Gaza targeting reporting, 2024
On April 3, 2024, [[+972 Magazine]] and [[Local Call]] published a report by [[Yuval Abraham]] describing an AI-based system called [[Lavender (targeting system)]]. The report says six Israeli intelligence officers who served in the Gaza war described its use in generating human targets, and that four of them said it had marked some 37,000 Palestinians as suspected Hamas militants.[^21] The same report describes tracking software, called "Where's Daddy?" in the reporting, that alerted targeting officers when marked individuals entered their homes.[^21]
The report says that the commander of Unit 8200 wrote the 2021 book *The Human-Machine Team* under the pen name "Brigadier General Y.S.", and that five sources in the unit confirmed him as its author. It also cites a 2023 lecture at [[Tel Aviv University]] by a colonel the report calls "Col. Yoav," commander of the unit's Data Science and AI center, whose slides +972 obtained.[^21]
The IDF told +972 and Local Call that it did not use artificial intelligence to incriminate targets, describing its tools as "auxiliary tools that assist officers in the process of incrimination." The army said each target is examined individually.[^21]
### The commander's identity
On April 5, 2024, The Guardian reported that the commander of Unit 8200, [[Yossi Sariel]], was the secret author of *The Human Machine Team*. The Guardian wrote that an electronic version of the book published on Amazon included an anonymous email address that traced to Sariel's name and to a private Google account, which exposed his unique ID and linked maps and calendar profiles. The Guardian reported that Sariel wrote the book with the army's permission after a year as a visiting researcher at the National Defense University in Washington.[^22]
An IDF spokesperson told the Guardian that the email address was not Sariel's personal one, but "dedicated specifically for issues to do with the book itself." The army later described the exposure of Sariel's personal details as "a mistake."[^22]
On September 12, 2024, Sariel announced his resignation as commander. In his letter he wrote: "I did not fulfill the mission as I expected of myself, nor as my subordinates, superiors and the citizens of Israel expected of me." The army said he would be replaced "in the coming period."[^23]
### Minerva University admissions
A page on the admissions site of [[Minerva Project]] was headed "Partner: IDF 8200" in a capture of September 21, 2020. The page states that "IDF unit 8200 alumni have the mature perspective and technological experience to both benefit from and contribute to Minerva's diverse undergraduate experience." It is published under the company's name and carries no statement attributed to [[Ben Nelson]].[^2]
A page on the admissions site of [[Minerva Project]] was headed "Partner: IDF 8200" in a capture of September 21, 2020. The page states that "IDF unit 8200 alumni have the mature perspective and technological experience to both benefit from and contribute to Minerva's diverse undergraduate experience." It is published under the company's name and carries no statement attributed to [[Ben Nelson]].[^24]
### Project 8200
A 2024 book by [[Frederick Atwater]] titled *Project 8200* presents remote-viewing transcripts concerning UAP bases. Records found do not establish whether [[Project 8200]] has any connection to this unit.[^25]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^2]: Minerva Schools at KGI, "Partner: IDF 8200," page captured September 21, 2020. https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/
[^1]: Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic
[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
[^3]: Wilson Center, "The Venona Project." The program began in 1943, decoded its first cable in 1946, and ran until the NSA shut it down in 1980; most of the cables date from 1943 to 1945. https://wilsoncenter.org/article/venona-project
[^4]: David E. Sanger, "Obama Ordered Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," *The New York Times*, June 1, 2012. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html
[^5]: David E. Sanger, *Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power* (2012), excerpt as reported by *The Register*, June 1, 2012. https://www.theregister.com/2012/06/01/stuxnet_joint_us_israeli_op/
[^6]: "Israeli reservists refuse to serve," *Al Jazeera*, September 13, 2014. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/9/13/israeli-reservists-refuse-to-serve
[^7]: "Snowden Reveal Makes Israeli Spies' Protest An American Issue," *WGBH*, September 22, 2014. https://www.wgbh.org/news/2014-09-22/snowden-reveal-makes-israeli-spies-protest-an-american-issue
[^8]: Yoav Zitun, "IDF dismisses several intel reservists over refusenik letter," *Ynetnews*, January 26, 2015. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/4619538
[^9]: Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel
[^10]: "NSA and Israeli intelligence: memorandum of understanding, full document," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document
[^11]: "Where NSO Group Came From and Why It's Just the Tip of the Iceberg," *OCCRP*, The Pegasus Project (article in the OCCRP series). https://www.occrp.org/en/project/the-pegasus-project/where-nso-group-came-from-and-why-its-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
[^12]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting in part and denying in part motion to set aside default judgment (Dkt. 41, March 25, 2020), at 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-0.pdf
[^13]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order on motions to dismiss (Dkt. 111, July 16, 2020), pp. 1-2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-5.pdf
[^14]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motions for summary judgment and sanctions (Dkt. 494, December 20, 2024), at 16. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-24.pdf
[^15]: *WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Final Judgment (Dkt. 810, November 12, 2025), p. 2, reciting the May 6, 2025 verdict (Dkt. 736) and the October 17, 2025 remittitur. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-44.pdf
[^16]: Check Point Software Technologies Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F, filed March 17, 2025. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1015922/000117891325000867/zk2532836.htm
[^17]: HUB Cyber Security Ltd., annual report on Form 20-F for 2022, filed August 15, 2023. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1905660/000121390023067760/f20f2022_hubcyber.htm
[^18]: Playtika Holding Corp., definitive proxy statement, filed April 26, 2024. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1828016/000182801624000011/playtika-20240425.htm
[^19]: Thomas Brewster, "Epstein Could Have Made $100 Million On A Secret Police Tech Investment With Ehud Barak," *Forbes*, February 10, 2026. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2026/02/10/epstein-police-surveillance-investments-with-ehud-barak/
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02632339, DataSet 11, email from Ehud Barak to Jeffrey Epstein, "Re: Carbyne warrants," March 11, 2019, with a forwarded message from Darren Indyke. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02632339.pdf
[^21]: Yuval Abraham, "'Lavender': The AI machine directing Israel's bombing spree in Gaza," *+972 Magazine* and *Local Call*, April 3, 2024. https://www.972mag.com/lavender-ai-israeli-army-gaza/
[^22]: "Exclusive: Yossi Sariel unmasked as head of Unit 8200 and architect of AI strategy after book written under pen name reveals his Google account," *The Guardian*, April 5, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/05/top-israeli-spy-chief-exposes-his-true-identity-in-online-security-lapse
[^23]: "Head of critical IDF intel unit resigns over Oct. 7 failure," *JNS*, September 12, 2024. https://www.jns.org/israel-news/head-of-critical-idf-intel-unit-resigns-over-oct-7-failure
[^24]: Minerva Schools at KGI, "Partner: IDF 8200," page captured September 21, 2020. https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/ (Internet Archive capture, https://web.archive.org/web/20200921120000id_/https://www.minerva.kgi.edu/partners/partner-idf-8200/)
[^25]: Frederick Atwater, *Project 8200: UFO/UAP Bases and Activities: The Original Remote Viewing Transcripts* (2024), ISBN-10 3911151047.
[^26]: Ronen Bergman, "Weaving a cyber web," *Ynetnews*, January 11, 2019. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5444998,00.html
[^27]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order re motion for permanent injunction, motion for remittitur or new trial, and motion to seal (Dkt. 802, October 17, 2025), pp. 1-2 and conclusion. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-40.pdf
[^28]: *WhatsApp LLC v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order granting plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction (Dkt. 809, November 12, 2025), p. 2. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-43.pdf
[^29]: *WhatsApp Inc. v. NSO Group Technologies Limited*, No. 4:19-cv-07123-PJH (N.D. Cal.), Order denying motion to stay permanent injunction (Dkt. 824, December 19, 2025). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123/pdf/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-07123-46.pdf
[^30]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01074544, DataSet 9, minutes of the meeting of the board of directors of Reporty Homeland Security Ltd., December 23, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01074544.pdf
[^31]: "The Ties That Bind: Ehud Barak's Business Network," *CTech (Calcalist)*, July 18, 2019. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctech/articles/0,7340,L-3766639,00.html
[^32]: "A Buchris story: The rise, fall, and comeback of an Israeli hero," *CTech (Calcalist)*, December 16, 2022. https://www.calcalistech.com/ctechnews/article/lwigv8m1o
[^33]: Nicole Perlroth and Scott Shane, "How Israel Caught Russian Hackers Scouring the World for U.S. Secrets," *The New York Times*, October 10, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/technology/kaspersky-lab-israel-russia-hacking.html
[^34]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991), ch. 21.
[^35]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA02634615, DataSet 11, email chain "Carbyne warrants," February 28 to March 14, 2019. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02634615.pdf

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20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Agency for International Development.md
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@ -1,32 +1,220 @@
---
created: 2026-06-13
updated: 2026-06-13
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Agency for International Development
aliases:
- USAID
- AID
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- US Agency for International Development
- Agency for International Development
tags:
- Organization
- USGovernment
- ColdWar
- LatinAmerica
- SoutheastAsia
- PoliceTraining
- OfficeOfPublicSafety
- ZunZuneo
- Vietnam
- Laos
- Uruguay
category: "U.S. Government"
summary: "The U.S. Agency for International Development is the federal foreign-aid agency established in 1961 whose Office of Public Safety provided police training in Latin America and Southeast Asia that served as cover for CIA operations and counterinsurgency interrogation programs."
summary: "The U.S. Agency for International Development, created in 1961, ran police training abroad through its Office of Public Safety from 1962 until Congress barred such aid in 1974."
start: 1961
location: "Washington, D.C."
relations:
- type: founded
with: "[[John F. Kennedy]]"
reverse: true
start: 1961-09-04
role: "signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that created the agency"
fn: 1
- type: head_of
with: "[[Byron Engle]]"
reverse: true
role: "Director, Office of Public Safety"
start: 1970
fn: 15
- type: head_of
with: "[[Lauren Goin]]"
reverse: true
role: "Director, AID Office of Public Safety"
start: 1975-01
fn: 21
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Dan Mitrione]]"
reverse: true
role: "public safety adviser; chief public safety adviser in Montevideo"
fn: 15
- type: funded
with: "[[International Police Academy]]"
role: "police academy in Washington, D.C. administered under AID"
fn: 20
- type: funded
with: "[[AIFLD]]"
start: 1962
role: "AID supplied most of the budget of the AFL-CIO's Latin American institute"
fn: 23
- type: investigated
with: "[[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]"
reverse: true
start: 1969
role: "hearing on AIFLD's Latin American programs"
fn: 22
- type: contractor_to
with: "[[Air America]]"
reverse: true
start: 1970
role: "air transport contracts with AID in Laos, funded in part by the CIA"
fn: 25
- type: funded
with: "[[ZunZuneo]]"
start: 2009
end: 2012-09
role: "Cuba text-messaging network, carried through contractors"
fn: 39
- type: contractor_to
with: "[[Creative Associates International]]"
reverse: true
start: 2009
role: "contractor that obtained Cuban cellphone numbers for the ZunZuneo project"
fn: 39
---
The Agency for International Development (USAID) is the [[United States]] government agency responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance, created in 1961 under the Foreign Assistance Act signed by President [[John F. Kennedy]]. Conceived as an instrument of [[Cold War]] development policy, it operated alongside and at times as cover for U.S. intelligence and counterinsurgency activity.[^1]
### Office of Public Safety
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the [[United States]] government agency responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. It was created in 1961 under the [[Foreign Assistance Act of 1961]], approved September 4, 1961, which was signed by President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1] Conceived as an instrument of [[Cold War]] development policy, it operated alongside and at times as cover for [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and counterinsurgency activity.[^2] Similar use of academic and development institutions appears in [[Project Camelot]].
From 1962 to 1974 USAID housed the Office of Public Safety (OPS), which trained foreign police forces in more than fifty countries. OPS ran the International Police Academy in [[Washington, D.C.]] and, in [[Latin America]] and Southeast Asia, provided equipment and instruction that extended to interrogation methods. The OPS adviser [[Dan Mitrione]], stationed in [[Uruguay]], became notorious for allegations that he taught torture techniques before his 1970 kidnapping and killing by the Tupamaros. Congress abolished OPS in 1974 after these abuses drew scrutiny.[^2]
### Police Programs Before the Office
### Intelligence Cover
Police assistance predated the Office of Public Safety. A memorandum from Acting Secretary of State [[Chester Bowles]] to President Kennedy in September 1961 describes police training to be administered by the [[International Cooperation Administration]] through its Public Safety program in [[Panama]], [[El Salvador]], [[Honduras]], and [[Guatemala]], with $726,000 obligated in fiscal 1961.[^3] In October 1961 the President's military representative, [[Maxwell Taylor]], reported that "AID is currently considering a proposal to establish a U.S. police academy, preferably in a Caribbean location such as the [[Panama Canal Zone|Canal Zone]]."[^4] In February 1962 Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] informed the President that AID was reviewing its Public Safety program for Latin America.[^5]
USAID missions repeatedly provided official cover for [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] officers, and OPS police-training programs gave the agency access to foreign internal-security services. The pattern paralleled the use of academic and development institutions documented in programs such as [[Project Camelot]].[^1][^2]
National Security Action Memorandum 124 of January 18, 1962 created the [[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)]], with the AID administrator among its members. The annex assigned [[Laos]], South [[Vietnam]] and [[Thailand]] to its cognizance.[^6]
An interagency committee chaired at the State Department by [[U. Alexis Johnson]] reported to the President on July 20, 1962. It described police assistance as "a very important but neglected part of our intensified effort to help emerging nations counter subversion and insurgency." It recommended that AID be charged with "operating and funding responsibility for all such programs, except for their covert aspects," that AID set up a senior professional office to manage police work, and that the government establish an international police academy under its own management. National Security Action Memorandum 177 of August 7, 1962 approved the recommendations.[^7]
### Office of Public Safety, 1962 to 1974
On March 14, 1963 the chairman of the Special Group, Johnson, told the President that the worldwide police program had risen from about $14 million in fiscal 1962 to about $30 million in fiscal 1963. He reported that AID had "centralized the administration of the program in a new Office of Public Safety located within AID," with police advisory missions in thirty countries and eight more planned.[^8] The office, usually called OPS, ran police advisers, equipment and training for foreign forces until the Foreign Assistance Acts of 1973 and 1974 ended the funding.
The program's footprint in [[Latin America]] grew through the 1960s. A June 1965 memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs recommended that the department "continue to push for an expanded Public Safety program to enable the police to deal more effectively with insurgency problems."[^9] A July 1967 review of seven countries with active or potential insurgencies directed that an expanded program for [[Ecuador]]'s rural police be worked out with AID/Public Safety.[^10] In October 1969 the American ambassador in [[Dominican Republic|Santo Domingo]] proposed that responsibility for the Dominican National Police's Department of Special Operations pass to AID's public safety program effective June 30, 1970.[^11] In August 1970 a memorandum to President Nixon reported that "a modest public safety program is being reinstituted in FY 1971 with a proposed budget of $118,000" in [[Bolivia]].[^12]
The public safety program itself began in 1954, with Indonesia the first recipient, and by the end of 1955 it included [[Iran]], South Korea and Cambodia. The Comptroller General reported in 1976 that the Office of Public Safety was set up in AID in 1962 and that the International Police Academy was established the following year. Over the life of the program 52 countries received technical assistance, and more than 10,700 police officers were trained in the United States, 5,204 of them graduates of the academy. The program peaked in fiscal 1968, when 34 countries received about $60 million and the office had about 590 employees; by the end of fiscal 1973 its staff had fallen to 240.[^13]
Senator [[Alan Cranston]] told the Senate in March 1992 that the program had been channelled mostly through the AID Office of Public Safety, and that by 1968 the government was spending $60 million annually to train police in 34 countries. He wrote that reports of torture and murder by U.S.-trained and U.S.-equipped police in Iran, Vietnam, [[Brazil]] and other countries had spurred the 1974 ban.[^14]
### Dan Mitrione in Uruguay
[[Dan Mitrione]] served as the office's chief public safety adviser in [[Montevideo]], [[Uruguay]], where the public safety program had begun in 1964.[^13] On August 11, 1970 Representative [[Gerald R. Ford]] told the House that the death Monday of an American citizen in Montevideo "at the hands of Communist terrorists" was "a senseless, savage, cowardly act." He commended [[Byron Engle]], the director of the Office of Public Safety in AID, for "the leading role he played in this effort" to secure Mitrione's release.[^15] The [[Tupamaro]] urban guerrillas kidnapped Mitrione in 1970 and demanded the release of 150 imprisoned Tupamaros; the government of President [[Jorge Pacheco Areco]] stated that it could not release them, and Mitrione's body was found on Monday, August 10, 1970.[^16]
[[A. J. Langguth]] wrote in Hidden Terrors (1978) that the Montevideo police were torturing prisoners with a rudimentary electric needle from Argentina when Mitrione arrived, that Mitrione arranged newer needles of varying thickness which a Uruguayan police officer understood to have come in through the embassy's diplomatic pouch, and that Mitrione conveyed instructions on the interrogation of Tupamaro suspects through senior Uruguayan officers. Langguth reported that Mitrione advised interrogators to learn a suspect's breaking point and reach it quickly, and that a police officer recalled Mitrione entering a room where a suspect was being given electric shocks. He also wrote that the police commissioner [[Alejandro Otero]] was told by a detainee that Mitrione had watched and assisted at an interrogation, which led Otero to complain to Mitrione.[^16]
[[Manuel Hevia Cosculluela]], a Cuban who had worked alongside Mitrione in Montevideo and who afterward appeared in Havana, gave a separate account in Pasaporte 11333: Ocho años con la CIA (Havana, 1978). Hevia wrote that Mitrione took part in a course for Uruguayan police in which beggars from the outskirts of Montevideo, and a woman, were used for a demonstration of electric shock at different voltages and of drugs, and that "the four of them died." Hevia attributed to Mitrione the maxim "the precise pain, in the precise place, in the precise amount, for the desired effect." In a statement reported in The New York Times of August 5, 1978, Hevia said that Mitrione had personally tortured four beggars to death with electric shocks.[^17] The Comptroller General reported in 1976 that congressional criticism of the public safety program in 1973 centered on charges that its advisers had "approved, advocated, or taught torture techniques to civil police in some countries."[^13]
Cranston's 1992 statement named Iran, Vietnam and Brazil among the countries where such reports arose.[^14]
### Congress Restricts Police Training, 1973 to 1975
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wrote on August 2, 1973 (Senate Report 93-377) that "United States participation in the highly sensitive area of public safety and police training unavoidably invites criticism from persons who seek to identify the United States with every act of local police brutality or oppression in any country in which this program operates. It matters little whether the charges can be substantiated."[^13] The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, enacted December 17, 1973, added section 112 to the 1961 act, which prohibited the use of funds made available under the act for police training or related programs in a foreign country; training of foreign police in the United States was not prohibited.[^13] On January 3, 1974 AID notified its missions that all public safety projects were to be phased out by August 17, 1974. At that time there were active programs in 17 countries and 95 advisers overseas. The scheduled phaseout dates included Bolivia and Panama in May, Colombia and Guatemala in June, Ecuador in July, and Laos, Thailand and Uruguay in August 1974.[^13]
In August 1973 the CIA's legislative summary quoted Senate Report 93-189, which explained the Senate bill's police-training prohibition: "The prohibition is meant to cover all advisory or training programs involving all phases of law enforcement, including prison administration." The same report stated that "We have troubles enough with police / community relations in our own society."[^18] The summary recorded that the House had rejected a floor amendment by Representative [[Michael Harrington]] that would have extended the prohibition to other acts.[^18]
Section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, approved December 30, 1974, added section 660 to the 1961 act. From July 1, 1975 no funds made available under the act could "be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government," with exemptions for certain drug enforcement authorities of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[^19] Cranston later said that "I and others in Congress prevailed and we banned foreign aid to police forces in 1974." He wrote that the ban remained virtually ironclad until 1985, and that a dozen exemptions had been granted in the meantime.[^14]
### International Police Academy
The Inter-American Police Academy in Panama trained 121 Latin American police officers by March 1963, and 272 trainees from other parts of the world received instruction in the United States during the period covered by the same memorandum.[^8] The International Police Academy in [[Washington, D.C.]] was the second training facility the office used.
AID closed the academy on February 28, 1975, and on March 1, 1975 the Customs Service took over the facilities.[^13] In January 1975 the columnist [[Jack Anderson]] reported that the academy had trained more than 5,000 foreign police over eleven years, drawn from 77 governments, and that it operated from an old street-car garage known as the "Car Barn." He reported that Senator [[James Abourezk]] had charged that the academy was a "CIA-controlled police training school under AID cover in Washington, D.C." Anderson wrote that some academy students had written theses "on the use of torture as one technique of interrogation of prisoners." He reported that the investigative reporters [[John Marks]] and [[Taylor Branch]] would report that the CIA had run a commercial cover, International Police Services, Inc., from a Washington brownstone from 1952 until a few months before the column.[^20] An academy spokesman, quoted by Anderson, insisted that "the CIA has never controlled the International Police Academy." The CIA told Anderson that all agency support for the academy had been terminated.[^20]
Anderson also quoted a letter from CIA Director [[William E. Colby]], dated August 1974, describing how "relationships" built with policemen through these programs had been useful in "obtaining foreign intelligence."[^20] A CIA routing sheet dated January 16, 1975 forwarded, for information, the reply that the AID Office of Public Safety, under its director [[Lauren Goin]], had sent to Anderson's inquiry about the CIA's relationship with the academy.[^21]
### Labor Institutes and AFL-CIO Programs
The American Institute for Free Labor Development ([[AIFLD]]), the [[AFL-CIO]]'s Latin American institute, was financed largely by AID. The opening statement at a [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] hearing in 1969 recorded that AIFLD had "received a little over $28 million in foreign aid funds for its operations in Latin America" since 1962.[^22] [[George Meany]], president of the AFL-CIO, testified in the same hearing.[^22]
[[William Greider]] of the [[Washington Post]] reported on April 21, 1969 that AID had supplied $16 million of the roughly $18 million AIFLD received from 1962 through 1967, which he put at 87 per cent of the money from the government. He reported that AID's deputy administrator, [[Rutherford Poats]], described the arrangement as "we are financing a union-to-union relationship."[^23] Greider's article was reprinted in the hearing record.[^22]
### Laos
The Special Group's assignment of Laos under NSAM 124 placed the country under the same interagency counterinsurgency mechanism that included the AID administrator.[^6] The March 1963 progress report records that an internal defense plan had been prepared for every assigned country except Laos, where, "owing to the unique situation, an Internal Defense Plan is not considered to be useful at this time."[^8]
The United States Operations Mission (USOM) was established in Vientiane in January 1955 to administer economic assistance, and at the end of that year a Programs Evaluation Office, staffed by reserve or retired military officers and described by the CIA historian William M. Leary as akin to a Military Assistance Advisory Group, was set up within USOM to handle military aid. Civil Air Transport, the predecessor of [[Air America]], flew its first rice airdrops for USOM in September 1955.[^24] By 1971 the military assistance program was, in the words of a Senate staff report, "operated ostensibly under AID in Laos," and the AID Requirements Office administered it.[^25]
A January 17, 1964 memorandum from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Special Group, reporting on a subcommittee review of support for foreign paramilitary forces, listed Laos as one of two countries then receiving covert U.S. support for paramilitary forces. It described a CIA program that had grown to about 19,000 armed Meo guerrillas (23,000 authorized), with further forces among the Yao, Kha and Lao, at a budget of $11,625,000 for fiscal 1963 and $14,008,000 for fiscal 1964. The memorandum stated that the covert air support, "conducted by an ostensibly private and commercial company, has been able to continue operations in Laos under USAID contractual arrangements and through the flexibility of CIA's cover and funding mechanisms."[^26]
On October 28, 1969 the Director of Central Intelligence appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on United States security agreements and commitments abroad, chaired by Senator [[Stuart Symington]]. A CIA record of the session lists as follow-up that Senator [[Mike Mansfield]] was promised a list of the directors of Air America.[^27] The subcommittee staff members [[James G. Lowenstein]] and [[Richard M. Moose]] visited Laos from April 22 to May 4, 1971, and their report, printed on August 3, 1971 with deletions made at the request of the State and Defense Departments and the CIA, stated that the AID program in fiscal 1971 was estimated at $52 million, that a partial total of estimated U.S. expenditure in Laos in that year was $284.2 million, and that "within Laos, the CIA trains and advises irregular forces, but until last week AID had provided these forces with rice in Military Regions I and II." It stated that the civilian air fleet in Laos, run by Air America, Continental Air Services and Lao Air Transport, operated "under contracts with AID, although funds are provided by AID, the Defense Department, CIA, and the State Department," with air transport contract costs in fiscal 1970 of $5 million for AID, a deleted amount for the CIA and $11.7 million for the AID Requirements Office. Half of AID's fixed-wing contract of $3.5 million was for refugee relief, and part of the CIA contract paid for flights carrying Americans to Long Tieng, Sam Thong and refugee sites.[^25]
On February 6, 1971 the New York Times reported that the General Accounting Office had concluded in two censored reports that much of the money allocated for assisting refugees in Laos had been used to finance paramilitary operations directed by the CIA, and that almost half the funds of AID's village health program were supporting military activities. The reports were released by Senator [[Edward M. Kennedy]], chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee on refugees. According to the Times, the subcommittee staff said the reports provided official documentation of the extent to which refugee programs had been used "as a cover by the C.I.A. for financing its military activities." An AID spokesman acknowledged that some assistance went to guerrilla forces but said that a larger percentage went to dependents. Kennedy said about half the refugee funds had gone to guerrilla operations, and the subcommittee estimated that 45 per cent of the more than 280,000 persons receiving refugee assistance in 279 villages in July 1970 were guerrillas and their dependents. Refugee assistance in the last fiscal year was $17 million.[^28]
A CIA memorandum for the record of January 6, 1972 describes a General Accounting Office official showing the CIA the final drafts of two further reports, on medical support and refugee programs in Laos, prepared for Kennedy's subcommittee from a survey in Laos in August and September 1971. At Kennedy's request the General Accounting Office had not submitted them to AID, State or the CIA for review. The memorandum compiled the CIA references in the reports, noted that an "AID/CIA Working Fund Agreement" appeared as an appendix to the medical support report, and set out two options: to accept the references and their classifications, or to insist that references to the CIA be removed from the unclassified sections.[^29] On May 3, 1972 a CIA officer wrote that an AID witness was to testify before Kennedy's subcommittee on May 9, and that "in view of largely unfounded allegations about CIA use of AID funds and facilities, there would be some benefit to a balanced unclassified discussion of these arrangements in open session."[^30] The Laos public safety program was among those phased out in August 1974.[^13]
### Brazil, 1964
[[Lincoln Gordon]], the ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, was in Washington from March 13 to 22, 1964 for consultation and for the conference of U.S. ambassadors and AID mission directors to Latin America. According to a National Security Council staff memorandum of March 19, the AID director for Brazil, [[Jack B. Kubisch]], said at the conference that many people in Washington wanted the United States to stand off from Brazil until the Brazilians behaved, and that this ignored the many segments of Brazilian society that were with the United States.[^31] On March 28, 1964, three days before the coup against President [[Joao Goulart]], a State Department telegram to Gordon, cleared in substance at a White House meeting, stated that it was doubtful the United States could provide "plausible cover for naval operation," raised the attribution of unmarked arms to a U.S. covert operation, and asked: "Should we hold up approval or announcement of AID loans? Are other non-military measures desirable further to polarize situation to Goulart's disadvantage?"[^32]
Gordon replied on March 29 that he saw "no present point in foot-dragging on debt negotiations or hold action on AID loans, unless preceded by some clear indication of United States government concern with basic problem of Brazilian political regime," and that for "AID projects of direct interest to clearly democratic elements, such as Cemat, we believe approvals and announcements should continue." He wrote that suspending aid publicly, which "would be especially dramatic if wheat included," would be better done in response to more obvious political developments. The telegram was forwarded to the White House on March 30.[^33] On March 31 an interagency task force chaired by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State met to consider economic assistance to Brazil on the assumption that a "democratically-inclined pro-Western group" came to power, and recommended that creditor nations join a voluntary three-month moratorium on Brazil's debt payments.[^34]
After the coup of April 1, 1964, Gordon wrote to Assistant Secretary of State [[Thomas C. Mann]] on August 10, 1964 about the strategy of economic assistance, setting out orders of magnitude for outside support in which AID and the Export-Import Bank accounted for $250 million of a total of $650 million to $700 million, with a complementary program loan from AID.[^35] On November 2, 1964 AID Administrator [[David E. Bell]] approved a proposal to provide Brazil with $100 million for project loans and $150 million for a program loan "on the most concessionary terms legally available," and the United States and Brazil signed the agreement on December 14, 1964.[^36] The loans went to the government of President [[Humberto Castelo Branco]].
### Vietnam: CORDS and the Phoenix Program
The Office of Civil Operations and Rural Support (CORDS) was organized on May 28, 1967 under the commander of the [[U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]]. Its Public Safety Directorate developed policy for the U.S. public safety program and "advised and assisted the GVN National Police." A CORDS directorate negotiated resource levels with USAID and the Government of Vietnam.[^37] The Phung Hoang Directorate, which supported the Government of Vietnam's [[Phung Hoang Plan]] for intelligence coordination, had as its goal "the neutralization of the Viet Cong infrastructure." The National Archives states that the directorate was "known as the Phoenix program by the Americans assisting in the program."[^37] The Phoenix program is described on its own page, [[Phoenix Program]].
### Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office
Congress appropriated $27 million for humanitarian assistance to the [[Contras]] of [[Nicaragua]] in August 1985. On August 29, 1985 President Reagan created the [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] in the State Department to administer the funds, and Ambassador [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office within the department.[^38] The Iran-Contra independent counsel's report states that [[Oliver North]] intruded in the office's operations in at least two ways: by insisting that [[Richard B. Gadd]] be the contractor for NHAO flights, and by persuading Duemling to add [[Robert W. Owen]] to the staff. Duemling's notes also reflect that North volunteered the services of [[Felix Rodriguez]] for the humanitarian resupply.[^38]
### ZunZuneo
In 2009 [[Creative Associates International]], a Washington-based firm, obtained a half-million Cuban cellphone numbers for a text-messaging network called ZunZuneo, slang for a Cuban hummingbird's tweet. The Associated Press reported on April 3, 2014 that USAID funded the project and that its contractors concealed the American connection through front companies in Spain and the Cayman Islands.[^39] A 2010 memorandum from [[Mobile Accord]], one of the project's creators, stated that "There will be absolutely no mention of United States government involvement." The network reached at least 40,000 subscribers over more than two years.[^39]
USAID told the Associated Press that ZunZuneo stopped in September 2012 when a government grant ended. The agency said its work was found to be "consistent with U.S. law." Senator [[Patrick Leahy]] said that the program's clandestine nature "was not disclosed to the appropriations subcommittee with oversight responsibility." The project was publicly launched shortly after the 2009 arrest in [[Cuba]] of [[Alan Gross]], a USAID subcontractor.[^39]
### Closure in 2025
Executive Order 14169 of January 20, 2025, "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid," ordered a 90-day pause in new obligations and disbursements of foreign development assistance, to be enforced by the Office of Management and Budget, pending reviews of each program.[^40] On March 28, 2025 the State Department sent Congress a notification of its intent to realign certain USAID functions to the Department by July 1, 2025 and to discontinue the remaining functions. Senators who wrote to Secretary of State [[Marco Rubio]] on April 8, 2025 described the notification as ending USAID's status as an independent establishment in the executive branch and abolishing multiple USAID bureaus and offices.[^41]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Records of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Record Group 286, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.
[^2]: Langguth, A.J. *Hidden Terrors: The Truth About U.S. Police Operations in Latin America*. Pantheon, 1978.
[^1]: Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87-195, approved September 4, 1961, 75 Stat. 424. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-75/pdf/STATUTE-75-Pg424.pdf
[^2]: Records of the U.S. Agency for International Development, Record Group 286, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/286.html
[^3]: Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Bowles to President Kennedy, September 29, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XII, American Republics, document 85. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d85
[^4]: Memorandum from the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, October 7, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XII, document 87. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d87
[^5]: Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy, February 20, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XII, document 93. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d93
[^6]: National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, January 18, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, document 68. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d68
[^7]: Memorandum from the Interagency Committee on Police Assistance Programs to President Kennedy, July 20, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, document 99, citing National Security Action Memorandum 177 of August 7, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d99
[^8]: Memorandum from the Chairman of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) (Johnson) to President Kennedy, March 14, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, document 128. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d128
[^9]: Memorandum from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Sayre) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, June 12, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, document 75. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d75
[^10]: Memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, July 6, 1967, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 61. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d61
[^11]: Telegram 4140 from the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State, October 21, 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. E-10, Documents on American Republics, 1969-1972, document 272. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d272
[^12]: Memorandum from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Johnson to President Nixon, August 22, 1970, with interagency report "Insurgency in Bolivia: A Summary Statement," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, vol. E-10, document 90. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d90
[^13]: U.S. General Accounting Office, Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons, Report ID-76-5 to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, February 19, 1976, chapter 2 (quoting S. Rept. 93-377, August 2, 1973, p. 17, and describing section 112 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973) and chapter 3 (evolution of the program, phaseout steps, International Police Academy). https://www.gao.gov/assets/id-76-5.pdf
[^14]: Senator Alan Cranston, Senate statement, Congressional Record, March 5, 1992, p. S2874. https://irp.fas.org/gao/920300-train.htm
[^15]: Gerald R. Ford, House floor statement, August 11, 1970, "House Speech Assassination of Dan Mitrione, August 11, 1970," Ford Congressional Papers, Press Secretary and Speech File, Box D30, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0054/4526305.pdf
[^16]: A. J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors: The Truth About U.S. Police Operations in Latin America (New York: Pantheon, 1978), account of Mitrione's Montevideo posting (the Tupamaro demand for 150 prisoners, the discovery of the body on Monday, August 10, 1970, the electric needles, the interrogation of a labor official, and the Otero complaint).
[^17]: Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, Pasaporte 11333: Ocho años con la CIA (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1978), pp. 284-287; Hevia's later statement reported in The New York Times, August 5, 1978, p. 3.
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Foreign Aid Legislation: Restrictions and Prohibitions on Foreign Police Training," August 17, 1973, quoting Senate Report 93-189, pages 33-34, and House Report 93-388, page 93. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp75b00380r000600170041-7
[^19]: Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Public Law 93-559, section 30 (adding section 660, "Prohibiting Police Training"), approved December 30, 1974, 88 Stat. 1804. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-88/pdf/STATUTE-88-Pg1795.pdf
[^20]: Jack Anderson, column, The Washington Post, January 1975, reproduced in CIA reading room file CIA-RDP77M00144R000600140027-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp77m00144r000600140027-5
[^21]: Central Intelligence Agency routing and record sheet, January 16, 1975, forwarding the response of the Director, AID Office of Public Safety, Lauren Goin, to Jack Anderson's inquiry concerning the International Police Academy. CIA reading room, CIA-RDP77M00144R000600140027-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp77m00144r000600140027-5
[^22]: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, hearing on the American Institute for Free Labor Development, 91st Congress, 1st session, 1969, with statement of George Meany and reprinted press material. Serial CHRG-91shrg33948. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-91shrg33948/pdf/CHRG-91shrg33948.pdf
[^23]: William Greider, "Washington Post," April 21, 1969, reprinted in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing record cited in footnote 22. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-91shrg33948/pdf/CHRG-91shrg33948.pdf
[^24]: William M. Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974: Supporting the 'Secret War'," Central Intelligence Agency, Studies in Intelligence (reproduced at https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/cases/nat-sec/Vietnam/air-america.htm).
[^25]: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Laos: April 1971, a staff report prepared for the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad (James G. Lowenstein and Richard M. Moose), 92d Congress, committee print, August 3, 1971, sections IV (air operations) and VII (the AID program). CIA reading room, CIA-RDP73B00296R000300080001-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp73b00296r000300080001-0
[^26]: Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Scott) to the Special Group, January 17, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXVIII, Laos, document 1. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v28/d1
[^27]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, Memorandum for the Record, "DCI Briefing of Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of Senate Foreign Relations Committee - 28 October 1969," OLC 69-0905. CIA reading room, CIA-RDP72-00337R000100150001-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp72-00337r000100150001-1
[^28]: John W. Finney, "U.S. Refugee Aid in Laos Found to Help Guerrillas," The New York Times, Washington, February 6 [1971]. CIA reading room clipping, CIA-RDP73B00296R000200190001-9. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp73b00296r000200190001-9
[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, Memorandum for the Record, "References to CIA in GAO Reports on Medical Support and Refugee Programs in Laos," January 6, 1972. CIA reading room, CIA-RDP74B00415R000300220041-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp74b00415r000300220041-6
[^30]: Central Intelligence Agency, speed letter, "Senate Hearing on Refugee Problems in Laos," May 3, 1972. CIA reading room, CIA-RDP74B00415R000300210033-6. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp74b00415r000300210033-6
[^31]: Memorandum from Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), March 19, 1964, with editorial note on the Chiefs of Mission Conference, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico, document 185; Telegram from the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of State, March 18, 1964, document 184 (editorial note on Gordon's presence in Washington, March 13-22). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d185
[^32]: Telegram from the Department of State to the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon), March 28, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 190. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d190
[^33]: Telegram from the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Department of State, March 29, 1964 (forwarded to the White House March 30), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 191. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d191
[^34]: Editorial note, March 31, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 196. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d196
[^35]: Letter from the Ambassador to Brazil (Gordon) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann), August 10, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 215. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d215
[^36]: Memorandum from Robert M. Sayre of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), September 30, 1964, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. XXXI, document 216, editorial note on the November 2, 1964 approval by AID Administrator Bell and the December 14 signing. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d216
[^37]: National Archives and Records Administration, "The Office of Civil Operations and Rural Support (CORDS)," Military Records, Vietnam War. https://www.archives.gov/research/military/vietnam-war/civil-operations.html
[^38]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, chapter 25, citing the August 29, 1985 creation of NHAO and the Duemling notes of October 1, 1985. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
[^39]: Alberto Arce and Desmond Butler, "US secretly built 'Cuban Twitter' to stir unrest," Associated Press, April 3, 2014. Copy at Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/2014id_/https://www.ajc.com/ap/secretly-built-cuban-twitter-stir-unrest/mukdN97BXrDNcPoxJrS7IM/
[^40]: Executive Order 14169, "Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid," January 20, 2025, 90 FR 8619, section 3(a). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/30/2025-02091/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid
[^41]: Letter from Senators Chris Van Hollen, Jeanne Shaheen and others to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, April 8, 2025, describing the State Department's Congressional Notification of March 28, 2025. https://www.vanhollen.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/sfrc_state_reorg_letter.pdf ; United Press International, "State Department formally notifies Congress of dissolving USAID," March 28, 2025, quoting the Department's statement that it would be "realigning certain USAID functions to the Department by July 1, 2025." https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/03/28/State-Departmet-dissolving-USAID/8391743188530/

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---
created: 2026-06-13
updated: 2026-06-13
updated: 2026-10-12
title: Joint Chiefs of Staff
aliases:
- JCS
- Joint Chiefs
- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
tags:
- Organization
- USGovernment
- Military
- ColdWar
- JointChiefs
- OperationNorthwoods
- OperationMongoose
- BrotherSam
- GulfOfTonkin
- MoorerRadford
- IranContra
- CovertAction
- Counterinsurgency
- UAP
category: "U.S. Government"
summary: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the senior uniformed leaders of the U.S. armed forces who advise the president and secretary of defense, a body whose Cold War proposals included the 1962 Operation Northwoods plan for staged provocations against Cuba."
summary: "Senior uniformed advisers to the president and defense secretary, whose 1961-62 Northwoods papers proposed staged incidents to justify war with Cuba and whose members appear in the Moorer-Radford and Iran-Contra records."
start: 1942
location: "Arlington, Virginia"
relations:
- type: head_of
with: "[[Lyman Lemnitzer]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1960-10-01
end: 1962-10-01
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[Maxwell Taylor]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1962-10-01
end: 1964-07-01
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[Earle G. Wheeler]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1964-07-03
end: 1970-07-02
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[Thomas H. Moorer]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1970-07-02
end: 1974-06-30
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[Arthur W. Radford]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1953-08-15
end: 1957-08-15
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[John W. Vessey, Jr.]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1982
end: 1985-09-30
fn: 5
- type: head_of
with: "[[William J. Crowe, Jr.]]"
reverse: true
role: "chairman"
start: 1985-10-01
fn: 5
- type: member_of
with: "[[Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)]]"
role: "Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, named member under NSAM 124"
start: 1962-01-18
fn: 10
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation NORTHWOODS]]"
role: "submitted JCS 1969/321 pretext memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara"
start: 1962-03-13
fn: 16
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Mongoose]]"
role: "Joint Staff pretext list, and JCS answer of April 10, 1962 that a Cuba invasion was needed"
start: 1961-11
end: 1962-04-10
fn: 15
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Brother Sam]]"
role: "JCS assigned the code name and issued the implementing instructions"
start: 1964-03-31
fn: 22
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]]"
role: "JCS orders for the DeSoto patrol and attendance at the August 4, 1964 Pentagon meeting"
start: 1964-08-02
end: 1964-08-04
fn: 24
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Moorer-Radford Affair]]"
role: "JCS liaison office at the National Security Council received documents taken from briefcases"
start: 1970-09
end: 1971-12
fn: 26
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
role: "chairmen and senior officers in 1985 Iran and hostage-rescue discussions"
start: 1985-03
end: 1985-11
fn: 37
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Project Azorian]]"
role: "Chairman Moorer's August 28, 1972 memorandum to the 40 Committee stated he could not support the mission"
start: 1972-08-28
fn: 36
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Operation Paperclip]]"
role: "Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, a subcommittee agency of its Joint Intelligence Committee, operated the program; the 1946 policy statement was based on JCS recommendations"
start: 1945
end: 1962-10-15
fn: 6
- type: participant_in
with: "[[Grill Flame]]"
role: "Joint Staff Special Operations Division evaluated the unit's Iran hostage reports"
start: 1979-11-23
end: 1981-01-13
fn: 51
---
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the body of senior uniformed leaders of the [[United States]] armed forces who serve as the principal military advisers to the president, the [[National Security Council]], and the secretary of defense. Formed during [[World War II]] and given statutory basis by the [[National Security Act of 1947]], the JCS comprise a chairman, a vice chairman, and the chiefs of the military services.[^1]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the senior uniformed leaders of the [[United States]] armed forces who advise the president, the [[National Security Council]], and the secretary of defense. The JCS took shape during [[World War II]] and were given a statutory basis by the [[National Security Act of 1947]], which named the chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force as its members. A chairman was added in 1949 and a vice chairman in 1986.[^1][^2][^3][^4]
### Statutory basis
Section 211 of the 1947 act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the National Military Establishment, composed of the Army chief of staff, the chief of naval operations, the Air Force chief of staff, and the chief of staff to the commander in chief if there was one. Its duties included preparing strategic plans, providing strategic direction of the armed forces, and establishing unified commands, and the Joint Chiefs "shall act as the principal military advisers to the President and the Secretary of Defense."[^1] The chairmanship was created by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, and [[Omar N. Bradley]] was sworn in as the first chairman on August 16, 1949.[^2] The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created the vice chairman position, and [[Robert T. Herres]] took office as the first vice chairman on February 6, 1987.[^3]
### Chairmen
The Joint History Office of the chairman's office records that [[Arthur W. Radford]] succeeded Bradley in August 1953, that [[Nathan F. Twining]] succeeded Radford in August 1957, and that [[Lyman Lemnitzer]] became chairman on October 1, 1960. [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] chose Lemnitzer, in the president's judgment less parochial than his two predecessors.[^5] After the failure of the [[Bay of Pigs invasion]], Lemnitzer's standing at the White House "dropped sharply," and [[John F. Kennedy|President Kennedy]] recalled [[Maxwell Taylor]] to serve as military representative of the president. Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman on October 1, 1962.[^5] [[Earle G. Wheeler]] became chairman on July 3, 1964, and [[Thomas H. Moorer]] on July 2, 1970. The history says Moorer sometimes acted on behalf of the Joint Chiefs, informing the service chiefs only afterward, if at all.[^5] [[John W. Vessey, Jr.]] followed in 1982 and retired on September 30, 1985. [[William J. Crowe, Jr.]] became chairman on October 1, 1985.[^5]
### Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency and Operation Paperclip
The [[Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency]] (JIOA) was established in 1945 as a subcommittee of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a committee composed of the Army's director of intelligence, the chief of naval intelligence, the assistant chief of Air Staff-2 and a representative of the [[Department of State]]. The JIOA was given direct responsibility for operating the foreign scientist program, code-named Overcast and then [[Operation Paperclip|Paperclip]]. Its duties included administering the program's policies and procedures, compiling dossiers, and liaison with British intelligence officers operating a similar project, and it took over many of the activities of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee when that body ended.[^6]
On August 30, 1946 Acting Secretary of State [[Dean Acheson]] sent [[Harry S. Truman|President Truman]] a memorandum, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States," presenting a statement of policy to expand Paperclip to between 800 and 1,000 specialists, with the War Department responsible "for excluding from the program persons with Nazi or militaristic records." The memorandum stated: "This statement is based on recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and has been approved by the State, War and Navy Departments." Truman's notation reads "approved 9/3/46."[^7] Appendix B of the policy paper, SWNCC 257/22, provided that the specialists selected by the War and Navy Departments and those nominated by the Commerce Department would be consolidated, coordinated with the British, and "certified by a designated agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" (identified in the text as the JIOA) as the list of German and Austrian specialists in science and technology, and that the War Department would supply biographical and professional data on specialists arriving in the United States to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]], the JIOA and the technical services.[^8]
The JIOA's foreign scientist case files, 1945 to 1958, comprise personnel dossiers on more than 1,500 German and other foreign scientists, technicians and engineers brought to the United States under Paperclip and similar programs, among them the dossiers of Georg Rickhey, Walter Schreiber and [[Arthur Rudolph]]; the dossier of [[Wernher von Braun]] was never transferred to the National Archives. The JIOA was disbanded in 1962, and its records passed from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on October 15, 1962.[^6][^9]
### Special Activities and the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)
On January 18, 1962, National Security Action Memorandum 124 established the [[Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)]] under the military representative of the president as chairman. Its members included the attorney general, the deputy under secretary of state for political affairs, the deputy secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of central intelligence, the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, and the administrator of the Agency for International Development.[^10] The Joint Staff's counterinsurgency office, the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, is described in the JCS history as recently created in 1962. [[Victor H. Krulak]], a Marine major general, held that post and attended the September 1962 conference in the Panama Canal Zone with [[Robert S. McNamara]] and Lemnitzer.[^11]
### Operation Northwoods
In March 1962 the Joint Chiefs, under Chairman [[Lyman Lemnitzer]], approved and forwarded to Secretary of Defense [[Robert S. McNamara]] a plan code-named Operation Northwoods, which proposed manufacturing pretexts for war with [[Cuba]], including staged terrorist attacks on American soil and the faked shoot-down of civilian aircraft to be blamed on the [[Fidel Castro|Castro]] government. The civilian leadership rejected the plan, and it remained classified until its release in 1997 through the [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] [[Assassination Records Review Board]].[^2]
The [[Operation NORTHWOODS|Northwoods]] papers had an earlier origin. On April 26, 1961, a Joint Chiefs memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara, JCSM-278-61, reviewed the Bay of Pigs invasion and recommended a military plan to overthrow the [[Fidel Castro|Castro]] government in [[Cuba]]. The memorandum cited Operation Plan 312-61 as one "which has previously been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," and said: "One action that is recommended is the creation of an incident which will provide justification for the overthrow of the Castro government by the United States."[^12] The memorandum was signed for the Joint Chiefs by Earle G. Wheeler, who signed above the typed signature of [[Arleigh Burke]], the chief of naval operations.[^12]
### Counterinsurgency Oversight
On March 6, 1962, [[Edward Lansdale]], chief of operations of [[Operation Mongoose]] and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, wrote to the State Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, [[Richard Goodwin]], that he was asking the Defense representative, [[William H. Craig|General Craig]], "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^13] Brigadier General William H. Craig, U.S. Army, was the Defense Department's project officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962 and the Joint Chiefs' representative on Lansdale's interagency group; a member of the Joint Staff's Plans and Policy Division (J-5), he transmitted that group's requests to the Joint Staff and, when more help was needed, passed tasks to staff elements not cleared for Mongoose without stating their origin or purpose. In July 1962 he was succeeded by Brigadier General Benjamin Harris, who worked in the recently created office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities.[^14] The JCS history records that the Joint Staff then drew up a list of manufactured incidents: attacks, riots and sabotage at Guantanamo, a blown-up unmanned ship near Havana or Santiago de Cuba, faked assassination attempts and terrorist bombings in Florida and Washington, the sinking of a boatload of Cuban refugees, a staged filibuster against a Caribbean state, the downing of a civilian airliner that was in fact a drone, and the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Air Force fighter. According to the history, none of these incidents was supposed to involve actual killing.[^15]
Through the Cold War the JCS sat at the center of covert-action oversight, providing military representation on the interagency bodies that supervised counterinsurgency policy and reviewed [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] paramilitary operations.[^1]
Lemnitzer signed the response, dated March 13, 1962, a memorandum entitled "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)." The Joint Chiefs recommended that the proposed memorandum "be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes," and that responsibility "for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^16] The Joint Secretariat's cover note of March 12, 1962, numbered JCS 1969/321, records that the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations that month.[^17] The March 5 request from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for pretexts was followed on March 8 by a memorandum from the chief of naval operations, "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)," which the Joint Chiefs' submission cites in its discussion of a course of action the Navy had proposed for generated instances in the Guantanamo area.[^18]
The enclosure states that its courses of action are "arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order." They include a series of incidents in and around Guantanamo meant to give "genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces": rumors on clandestine radio, Cuban exiles in uniform staging an attack over the fence, mortar shells lobbed into the base, and mock funerals for victims of a staged attack.[^19] A "Remember the Maine" incident was proposed in several forms, among them the destruction of a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay or of an unmanned vessel near Havana or Santiago, and a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington. The annex also proposed that a duplicate, prepared at Eglin Air Force Base, of an aircraft registered to a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] proprietary company in Miami would carry passengers under aliases on a chartered flight whose route would cross Cuba, while the real aircraft flew on as a drone that broadcast a "MAY DAY" report of attack by Cuban MiGs before it was destroyed.[^19]
James Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer soon after the document reached him, left no doubt about his reaction. The paper remained classified until its release in 1997 under the [[Assassination Records Review Board]].[^20] In July 1962 Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer, who was assigned to command NATO forces in Europe.[^5]
On April 5, 1962, the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its "basic philosophy with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention." Maxwell Taylor put two questions to the service chiefs, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so. The JCS history records that the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both five days later.[^15] On April 12, [[John McCone]] recorded in his notes of the April 11 Special Group (Augmented) meeting that a JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions had been discussed and added: "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^21]
### Operation Brother Sam and the Gulf of Tonkin
On March 31, 1964, the Joint Chiefs assigned the code name "[[Operation Brother Sam|Brother Sam]]" to the planned support of anti-Goulart forces in Brazil, under instructions implementing decisions in a State Department telegram to the embassy at Rio de Janeiro. The code name appears in telegram 5591 from the JCS to the Atlantic Command the same day.[^22]
On July 27, 1964, the Joint Chiefs sent McNamara a memorandum on actions relevant to South Vietnam. Only three options met its criteria, one of which was "selected air missions using non-US unmarked aircraft against prime military targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."[^23] On August 2, 1964, Chairman Wheeler sent Admiral [[Ulysses S. Grant Sharp|Sharp]], commander in chief of the Pacific, telegram JCS 7680 authorizing the continuation of the DeSoto patrol in the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin]], with the closest approach to the North Vietnamese coast set at 11 miles. A follow-up message, JCS 7681, that evening stated that if the destroyers were attacked in international waters the commander should destroy the attacking forces, and that "pursuit into hostile waters or air space is not authorized."[^24] On August 4, at 11:40 a.m., McNamara, Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [[Marshall Green]] met with the Joint Chiefs at the [[Pentagon]], while the destroyer [[USS Maddox]] reported that an attack from unidentified vessels appeared imminent.[^25] At 12:04 p.m. the civilians moved to McNamara's office, where the options were refined to three, while the Joint Chiefs stayed in the dining room until 1:49 p.m. At their direction, General Burchinal telephoned McNamara at the White House to recommend the sharp limited response option.[^25]
### The Moorer-Radford affair
The [[Moorer-Radford Affair]] began with an inquiry into leaks of material to the columnist [[Jack Anderson]] in December 1971. The inquiry identified a Navy yeoman, [[Charles Radford]], assigned since September 1970 to the Joint Chiefs liaison office at the National Security Council, as the source of papers taken from the briefcases of [[Henry A. Kissinger]] and [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]] and passed to the Joint Chiefs through the liaison office heads, Rear Admiral [[Rembrandt Robinson]] and his successor, Rear Admiral [[Robert O. Welander]].[^26] The Foreign Relations volume records that [[H. R. Haldeman]] wrote in his diary that the yeoman was "the almost certain source" of the leaks, and that the president was shocked and agreed that strong action had to be taken, "but very carefully, since we don't want to blow up the whole relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^26] At the December 21, 1971 meeting, [[John N. Mitchell]] warned that prosecution or a public confrontation would mean "You would have the Joint Chiefs allied on that side directly against you," and urged that the liaison office be moved out of the NSC and back to the Pentagon.[^26] A December 22 editorial note records the subsequent discussion of the Radford-Joint Chiefs pipeline.[^27] On December 24, 1971, [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] told Mitchell that "Our best interests are served by not, you know, raising holy hell," and Radford was transferred to the Northwest.[^28]
On February 20, 1974, Radford testified before the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] that he had taken secret White House documents on the Vietnam peace talks and other matters at the request of two Pentagon admirals, beginning in 1970. The [[United Press International]] report says Radford named Robinson, who had been killed in a helicopter crash in Vietnam, as the officer who first taught him to take information the Joint Chiefs wanted, and said that Welander continued passing information to the office of Moorer. It quotes one of Moorer's aides telling him in the Pentagon: "Radford, you do good work." The same report says Moorer and Kissinger had both dismissed the pilfering as the independent work of an overzealous enlisted man. [[Harold Hughes]] said the testimony should trigger a deeper investigation and that "We must track down the other parties who were involved in this and question them to verify Radford's testimony." The committee chairman was [[John C. Stennis]].[^29] The Chairmanship history records that during the 1971 and 1972 operations the commanders were in direct telephone contact with the Chairman several times a day, and that the directions relayed were carried out without informing the Chiefs in advance.[^30]
On March 7, 1974, [[J. Fred Buzhardt]], formerly general counsel of the Defense Department and then counsel to the president, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the report he had delivered to Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]] on January 10, 1972. He testified that on December 14, 1971, the day Anderson's column appeared, Welander reported that its information came from four documents to which, he believed, only persons in his office had access, and that within the office access to all of them belonged to Welander, Radford and Chief Yeoman William R. Sessoms; that six persons were polygraphed, Welander and Sessoms with negative reactions and Radford with what he called "a positive reaction" on questions about disclosures to Anderson; that Radford's access to classified material was terminated on December 16, 1971; and that Radford was transferred to the Naval Reserve Training Center in Salem, Oregon.[^31] Buzhardt testified that Radford told investigators that he had routinely obtained information for Welander by surreptitious means from the National Security Council staff, including documents taken on Kissinger's first trip to China and on several of Haig's trips to Southeast Asia, that Welander said he had informed the chairman generally of the way the trip documents were obtained, and that Moorer told him he had assumed he had authorized access to all that came through the liaison staff.[^32] Questioned by Senator [[Sam Nunn]], Buzhardt said of Moorer: "He did not specifically recall having ever been told how they were obtained."[^33] Asked by Senator [[Stuart Symington]] whether he knew where the decision against prosecuting Radford was made, Buzhardt answered: "It was communicated to me by Mr. Laird. Mr. Ehrlichman was involved in the investigation, the Attorney General was involved, as I know now, the matter was discussed with the President. But where the decision was actually made I don't know."[^34] Questioned by Senator Harold Hughes about an attempt to have Welander sign a statement of fact, Buzhardt said: "I guess I am not surprised that, not particularly surprised that Mr. Ehrlichman would ask Admiral Welander to sign a statement. I am no more surprised that Admiral Welander refused."[^35]
### Project Azorian
The CIA's own account of [[Project Azorian]], the Hughes Glomar Explorer program, records that on August 15, 1972 Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Kenneth Rush]] forwarded to [[Richard Helms]] copies of three memoranda on the project from the chief of naval operations, [[Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.]], the assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, Dr. Hall, and the Defense Intelligence Agency director, Vice Admiral de Poix. All three, to varying degrees, judged the expected intelligence gain lower than the ad hoc committee's estimate, pointed to escalating costs and political risks, and generally felt that the program should be terminated; Zumwalt, while not recommending immediate termination, stated strong reservations. On August 28, 1972, Moorer, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, wrote to the 40 Committee that he could not support the proposed mission. He cited the reduced intelligence value of the target after the sinking of the submarine in March 1968, the escalating costs, and the possibility of a strong Soviet reaction if the nature of the activity became known. Helms answered on September 14 with a memorandum urging that the program continue. On September 18, 1972, Rush wrote that, because of continuing relationships and negotiations with the Soviet Union, he believed it undesirable to execute the mission as then planned, estimated the chances of technical success at 20 to 30 percent, and believed that the program should be terminated. On December 11, 1972, the President decided to continue the project, with the 40 Committee exercising policy supervision, in a memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to the committee's principals.[^36]
### Iran-Contra
The [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] record in [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s report on Defense Department officers places Vessey, then chairman, in several conversations. Vessey recalled that [[Caspar Weinberger]] told him "incredulously," after a White House meeting in the summer of 1985, that someone had proposed contacts with Iran.[^37] Vessey also recalled that Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]] told him on two occasions that the Saudis were funding the contras, that on each occasion he reported the statement to Weinberger, and that Weinberger responded that he did not want the issue to become public; Vessey recalled as well that he or Weinberger, in a White House conversation with [[Robert McFarlane]], urged McFarlane to support a proposed arms sale to Saudi Arabia because the Saudis were funding the contras. In his April 17, 1987 deposition to the Select Committees Vessey described one occasion on which Bandar told him of a contribution to the contras.[^38] Weinberger's daily notes for March 13, 1985, made after a meeting with Vessey ("Jack Vessey in office alone"), record that he "passed on to him Jack Vessey's report that Bandar is giving $25 million to Contras" in a call to McFarlane the same day, and that he suggested "covert non-lethal aid of $14 mil."[^39] The memorandum for the record of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence [[John N. McMahon]] on the breakfast of March 15, 1985 among Weinberger, [[William J. Casey]] and McMahon records Weinberger's statement that he had heard that Bandar had earmarked $25 million for the contras in $5 million increments.[^40] Walsh dates a meeting in Weinberger's office, attended by McFarlane, [[Colin Powell]] and [[Charles Gabriel]], the acting chairman, to August 22, 1985, on the basis of Weinberger's diary, which records an Israeli message that two Iranians had offered to return some hostages.[^41] Weinberger's diary for November 21, 1985 records William J. Crowe, Jr. in office, regarding the president's decisions at Geneva and hostage rescue attempts.[^42]
### Unidentified anomalous phenomena
The Joint Chiefs of Staff published JANAP 146, the joint communication instructions for reporting vital intelligence sightings. An Air Force memorandum of October 20, 1948 to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee, stamped received October 26, 1948, and titled "Communication Instructions for Reporting Military Intelligence Sightings (CIRMIS) - JANAP 146," states that the Director of Communications had requested that the document be tabled for review and that "subject document was published without prior coordination with any intelligence agency."[^43] A chronology of the publication compiled for the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena lists JANAP 146(A) of September 25, 1950 as the start of CIRVIS reporting for commercial and military pilots and the first edition to add unidentified flying objects to the sighting categories.[^44]
JANAP 146(C), promulgated by the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee on March 10, 1954 as an unclassified publication superseding 146(B), directs under article 201 that sightings of "Unidentified flying objects" be reported by aircraft while airborne, and under article 301 that the same category be reported "Immediately" by waterborne sources. Article 308 provides that all persons aware of the contents or existence of a MERINT report are governed by the Communications Act of 1934 and the Espionage Laws, that such reports "contain information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, 18 U.S. Code, 793 and 794," and that the unauthorized transmission or revelation of their contents "in any manner is prohibited."[^45] JANAP 146(E), issued in March 1966 as a Canadian-United States publication, lists "Unidentified flying objects" among the CIRVIS sightings and states in article 208 that reports "contain information affecting the national defense of the United States and Canada" and that "Any person who makes an unauthorized transmission or disclosure of such a report may be liable to prosecution under Title 18 of the US Code 793, Chapter 37, or the Canadian Official Secrets Act of 1939, as amended," adding that "This should not be construed as requiring classification of CIRVIS messages." Change No. 2 of May 17, 1977 directs CIRVIS-related photography to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.[^46]
A December 1973 newspaper article in the CIA reading room, reviewing [[Donald Keyhoe]]'s book on the subject, describes the directive as a Joint Chiefs of Staff secrecy directive covering armed forces airmen and airliner pilots, which directs immediate transmission of sighting data to the aerospace command and the nearest military command. Keyhoe is quoted on the directive: "Under the provisions of JANAP-146," Keyhoe explains, "hundreds of pilots reporting UFOs have been strictly muzzled and are still officially silenced."[^47]
[[Luis Elizondo]] wrote that in 2016 the Joint Staff declined to give [[Jay Stratton]]'s OPLAN Interloper an Alternative Compensatory Control Measures designation.[^48] The Department of Homeland Security special access program proposal for [[KONA BLUE]], prepared in 2011 and released by DHS to the Department of Defense in February 2024, describes an Oral History Initiative to identify sources, and states: "Over past decades a number of high-level individuals in the military, intelligence, and even political sectors of our government have had various level of exposure/access to this subject area. This has included agency directors, members of the JCS and very senior individuals in the Executive Branch." The proposal adds that "Oral histories from individuals of the caliber referenced above are critical to this mission."[^49]
### Grill Flame evaluations
On November 21, 1979 Jackie Keith of the [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command]], who represented the command on a Joint Chiefs of Staff task force established for the Iran hostage crisis, asked Lieutenant Colonel [[Murray Watt]] whether the [[Grill Flame|GRILL FLAME]] remote viewing unit's assets could be used on the crisis.[^50] The final evaluation of the unit's hostage-situation reports, covering November 23, 1979 through January 13, 1981, was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Lenahan of the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff, Special Operations Division. In a memorandum of March 16, 1981 Watt wrote that the Joint Chiefs rated 37 percent of the reports as having some correlation or use and that his office, studying Lenahan's comments, raised the figure "to only 45%."[^51]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, U.S. National Archives and Records Administration.
[^2]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. Doubleday, 2001, Chapter 2 (reproducing JCS memorandum 1969/321, 13 March 1962).
[^1]: National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 80-253, sections 211 and 212, 61 Stat. 495, 1947. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-61/pdf/STATUTE-61-Pg495.pdf
[^2]: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999* (Washington, 2000), chapter "The First Chairman" and Appendix 1 (extracts of Public Law 81-216, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, August 10, 1949). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit
[^3]: Joint History Office, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999*, chapter "The Vice Chairmen" and Appendix 2 (extracts of Public Law 99-433, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, October 1, 1986). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit
[^4]: Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record Group 218, National Archives and Records Administration. https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/218.html
[^5]: Joint History Office, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999*, chapter "The 1960s: Civilian Encroachment" (pp. 17-19, on Lemnitzer, Taylor and the second-term decision), chapter "The 1970s: Dealing with the Impact of Vietnam" (pp. 26-28, on Wheeler and Moorer), and the chairman sketches for Radford, Twining, Vessey and Crowe. https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit
[^6]: National Archives and Records Administration, Nazi War Crimes and Japanese Imperial Government Records Interagency Working Group, "Records of the Secretary of Defense (RG 330): Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency," notice and description of "Foreign Scientist Case Files 1945-1958 (Entry A1-1B)." https://www.archives.gov/iwg/declassified-records/rg-330-defense-secretary
[^7]: Acheson, memorandum for the President, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists in the United States," stamped August 30, 1946, with the notation "approved 9/3/46," Harry S. Truman Library document set on Operation Paperclip (FOIA release printed April 21, 2009), PDF page 13. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/trumanlibrary-paperclip.pdf
[^8]: SWNCC 257/22, Appendix B, "Interim Exploitation of German and Austrian Specialists under Project Paperclip," paragraphs 2a and 3, Harry S. Truman Library document set on Operation Paperclip (PDF page 14). https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/trumanlibrary-paperclip.pdf
[^9]: National Archives and Records Administration, Guide to Federal Records, Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, entry 330.11.2, "Records of the Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency" (transferred to OSD from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 15, 1962; general correspondence 1946-52, foreign scientist case files 1945-58, Defense Scientist Immigration Program records 1958-70). https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/330.html
[^10]: National Security Action Memorandum No. 124, "Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)," January 18, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. II, document 26. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d26
[^11]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11 and notes, including the September 1962 Panama Canal Zone conference with Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities; the note on the office "recently created" in 1962; and "SACSA-M 18-62 to DJS, 6 Mar 62, CJCS 334 Special Group (Counterinsurgency)." https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^12]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-278-61, "Cuba," April 26, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 178. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d178
[^13]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
[^14]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11 and note 2 (Craig as JCS representative on Lansdale's group; member of J-5; succeeded in July 1962 by Brigadier General Benjamin Harris); and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, list of persons ("Craig, Brigadier General William H., Department of Defense Project Officer for Operation Mongoose until June 1962"). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10
[^15]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, "The Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 158-160 (Operation Mongoose, the list of manufactured incidents, the April 5, 1962 Special Group conclusion, and the Joint Chiefs' answer five days later, April 10). https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
[^16]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1969/321, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with Enclosure A (PDF pp. 1, 4 and 6). Declassified 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^17]: Joint Secretariat (F. J. Blouin and M. J. Ingelido), "Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Northwoods (S)," JCS 1969/321, March 12, 1962, page 2165, with the approval note (PDF pp. 2-3). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^18]: Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, memorandum for General Craig, "Operation MONGOOSE," March 5, 1962, and Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)," March 8, 1962, both cited in the footnotes to the Joint Chiefs' submission (PDF p. 5), and paragraph 3 of the submission (PDF p. 1). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^19]: JCS 1969/321, Enclosure A, appendix and annex "Pretexts to Justify US Military Intervention in Cuba" (PDF pp. 5-10), including the Guantanamo incidents, the "Remember the Maine" items, and paragraph 8 on the chartered airliner and the duplicate aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
[^20]: James Bamford, *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency* (New York: Doubleday, 2001), chapter 2, reproducing JCS memorandum 1969/321 of March 13, 1962.
[^21]: John A. McCone, memorandum for the record on the April 11, 1962 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, April 12, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
[^22]: Department of State to Embassy in Brazil, telegram 1301, March 31, 1964, with editorial note that the JCS assigned the code name "Brother Sam" (telegram 5591, JCS to CINCLANT, March 31, 1964), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XXXI, document 198. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v31/d198
[^23]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Actions Relevant to South Vietnam," July 27, 1964, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, document 252. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d252
[^24]: Wheeler to Sharp, JCS 7680, August 2, 1964, 12:25 p.m., and JCS 7681, August 2, 1964, 6:49 p.m., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, documents 259 and 261. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d259 and https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d261
[^25]: Editorial note on the destroyer Maddox report of August 4, 1964, and the Pentagon meeting of McNamara, Rusk, Bundy, Green and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. I, documents 272 and 276. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v01/d276
[^26]: Editorial note on the Radford-Joint Chiefs of Staff case, citing The Haldeman Diaries and the White House tape of the conversation among Nixon, Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman on December 21, 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, document 164. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d164
[^27]: Editorial note on the December 22, 1971 Oval Office exchange between Nixon and Haldeman, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, document 165. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d165
[^28]: Transcript of the telephone conversation between Nixon and Haig, December 24, 1971, with the Nixon-Mitchell conversation of the same date cited in the editorial material, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. II, document 166. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v02/d166
[^29]: "Pentagon spied on White House?," United Press International report from Washington, February 20, 1974, published in the *Oregon Daily Emerald* (Eugene, Oregon), February 21, 1974, p. 8. https://oregonnews.uoregon.edu/lccn/2004260239/1974-02-21/ed-1/seq-8/
[^30]: Joint History Office, *The Chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1949-1999*, chapter "The 1970s: Dealing with the Impact of Vietnam" (pp. 26-28, on the Moorer chairmanship and the operations of 1971 and 1972). https://archive.org/details/chairmanshipofjoOOunit
[^31]: Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Transmittal of Documents from the National Security Council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, hearing, 93d Cong., 2d sess., part 3, March 7, 1974 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), testimony of J. Fred Buzhardt, pp. 4-7. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf
[^32]: Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 7-8 (Radford's statements in his first polygraph examination; Welander's and Moorer's accounts to Buzhardt). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf
[^33]: Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, p. 34. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf
[^34]: Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 15-16. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf
[^35]: Hearing, part 3, March 7, 1974, pp. 24-25. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-93shrg31536p3/pdf/CHRG-93shrg31536p3.pdf
[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Project Azorian: The Story of the Hughes Glomar Explorer," section "Early Political Feasibility Evaluation by 40 Committee," CIA reading room item 0005301269. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0005301269
[^37]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, Part VIII, notes 10 and 165 (Vessey, Select Committees deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 30-31; Weinberger diary, March 13, 1985, ALZ 0039320B-C). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^38]: Walsh, Part VIII, note 168 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, pp. 6-7, and Select Committees Deposition, April 17, 1987, pp. 5-8), note 169 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, p. 7, and February 11, 1987, p. 1) and note 170 (Vessey, FBI 302, June 11, 1992, p. 7, and deposition pp. 8-9). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^39]: Walsh, Part VIII, text and note 165 (Weinberger diary, March 13, 1985, ALZ 0039320B-C). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^40]: Walsh, Part VIII, text and note 167 (McMahon, memorandum for the record, March 15, 1985, ER 26,187-88 and ER 92-00116-17). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^41]: Walsh, Part VIII, citing the Weinberger diary of August 22, 1985 (ALZ 0039606-07) and the calendar corroboration, and Colin Powell's deposition of June 19, 1987 on the summer 1985 meeting. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^42]: Walsh, Part VIII, citing the Weinberger diary of November 21, 1985 (ALZ 0039802-03). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_viii.htm
[^43]: Air Force memorandum (AFOIR-CO) for the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee, "Communication Instructions for Reporting Military Intelligence Sightings (CIRMIS) - JANAP 146," October 20, 1948, received October 26, 1948, declassified, National Archives (NN3 941612). http://www.nicap.org/directives/Tabling%20of%20JANAP%20146%20by%20Joint%20Intel%20Committee%201948-10-26%20NARA.pdf
[^44]: "JANAP 146; History and Evolution," chronology (US Regulation, date issued, key differences) circulated by the National Investigations Committee on Aerial Phenomena, November 20, 2006, compiled from A. F. Rullan. http://www.nicap.org/directives/146hist.htm
[^45]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Communications-Electronics Committee, JANAP 146(C), *Communication Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings from Airborne and Waterborne Sources*, March 10, 1954, letter of promulgation and articles 201, 301 and 308. http://www.nicap.org/directives/JANAP-146C%20March%201954.htm
[^46]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JANAP 146(E), *Canadian-United States Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence Sightings (CIRVIS/MERINT)*, March 1966, with Change No. 2, May 17, 1977, articles 201 and 208 and the photography instructions. http://www.nicap.org/directives/JANAP-146E_March%201966.htm
[^47]: CIA reading room item cia-rdp90-00552r000303250002-8, newspaper article "U.S. Officials Persist in Secrecy, But UFOs Real, Claims Authority," December 1, 1973, reviewing Donald E. Keyhoe's *Aliens from Space* (1973). https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000303250002-8
[^48]: Luis Elizondo, *Imminent: Inside the Pentagon's Hunt for UFOs* (New York: William Morrow, 2024), pp. 147 to 202 (Interloper at pp. 147 and 186).
[^49]: Department of Homeland Security, KONA BLUE prospective special access program records, Special Access Program proposal, Oral History Initiative, pp. 8-9 of 17 (DHS-003-6-0006/11), released with the letter of Acting Deputy Secretary Kristie Canegallo to Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks, February 5, 2024. https://static.foxnews.com/foxnews.com/content/uploads/2024/06/AARO_DHS_Kona_Blue.pdf
[^50]: Murray B. Watt, "INSCOM GRILL FLAME Involvement in Iran," memorandum for the record, December 3, 1979, CIA-RDP96-00788R002000240018-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r002000240018-6
[^51]: Murray B. Watt, memorandum for Colonel Chad B. White, "GRILL FLAME Evaluation in Support of Iranian Hostage Situation," March 16, 1981, CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp96-00788r001000340001-4

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@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
---
category: "U.S. Government"
updated: 2026-10-12
relations:
- type: employed_by
with: "[[Robert Owen]]"
reverse: true
role: "staff member added at Oliver North's urging"
start: 1985
fn: 2
start: 1985
location: "Washington, D.C., USA"
tags:
- Organization
- Drug_Trafficking
- United_States
- 1980s
- Contra_War
summary: The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office was a State Department unit hijacked by Oliver North to distribute aid to the Contras through companies owned and operated by drug traffickers.
---
The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) was created in mid-1985 to oversee delivery of $27 million in "humanitarian" aid Congress agreed to give the [[Contras]]. [[Oliver North]] and the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] first tried to place the operation inside the [[National Security Council]] for direct control, but when that failed, North "hijacked" it from the [[State Department]], according to CIA official [[Alan Fiers]].[^1]
### North's Control
President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the office in the State Department on August 29, 1985 to administer the $27 million in humanitarian assistance that Congress appropriated that month, and Ambassador [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office within the department.[^2] Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] reported that North also intruded in the office's operations by insisting that [[Richard B. Gadd]], who was assisting [[Richard Secord]] and North in the lethal resupply, be the contractor to transport NHAO flights and, with [[Elliott Abrams]], persuading Duemling to add North's Central American courier, [[Robert Owen]], to the staff.[^2]
North pressured the NHAO to hire his aide Rob Owen as a $50,000 "facilitator" - a move opposed by NHAO director Robert Duemling, who said he didn't see the need for a middleman. North had Contra leaders write letters demanding Owen's hiring and lobbied Duemling's superior, Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. After one meeting, Abrams told Duemling: "Well, Bob, I suppose you probably ought to hire Owen." Meeting minutes show Abrams and North agreed Owen "will be expendable if he becomes a political or diplomatic liability" and could be dismissed as "an experiment that hadn't worked out."[^1]
### Drug Trafficker Contractors
The NHAO hired companies run by drug traffickers to deliver aid. [[Frigorificos de Puntarenas]], created by the [[Medellin Cartel|Medellín cartel]] as a money-laundering front, received more than $260,000 in taxpayer funds. [[DIACSA]], a Miami aircraft company used for years as the U.S. headquarters of Floyd Carlton's Panamanian drug-smuggling venture with [[Manuel Noriega]], was hired despite being penetrated by an undercover DEA agent at the time. Vortex Aviation, operated by Detroit drug dealer [[Michael Palmer]], received contracts despite the CIA knowing Palmer was dealing drugs. [[SETCO]], owned by Honduran drug kingpin [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]], was the "principal company used by the Contras in Honduras."[^1]
### CIA Guidance
Fiers confirmed the CIA guided the selection of these carriers: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Duemling testified that North instructed him not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements, which seemed to be working perfectly well." When the GAO audited the NHAO's broker accounts, it could not trace most of the money. Of $4.4 million that went into the accounts, less than $1 million could be accounted for. The rest was traced to offshore banks and disappeared.[^1]
### Footnotes
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 12: "This guy talks to God"
[^2]: Lawrence E. Walsh, Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters, chapter 25. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm

27
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
created: 2025-03-05
updated: 2026-10-08
updated: 2026-10-12
title: NSA
aliases:
- NSA
@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ relations:
start: 1975
end: 1975
fn: 2
- type: partner_of
with: "[[Unit 8200]]"
start: 2009-03
role: "memorandum of understanding on raw signals-intelligence sharing, reached in principle March 2009 (counterpart named ISNU)"
fn: 18
---
- type: head_of
with: "[[Bobby Ray Inman]]"
@ -93,9 +98,15 @@ In [[Ground Saucer Watch]] v. CIA (D.D.C., Civil Action 78-859) the Central Inte
[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote in *The Samson Option* that a former NSA official told him the KH-11 satellite, launched in December 1976, was considered the most important advance of its time in reconnaissance photography, that every military and civilian intelligence agency had an urgent requirement for its imagery, and that the NSA, responsible for all communications intelligence, had a role in scheduling the satellite to maximize collection. Hersh wrote that [[Jimmy Carter]]'s decision in March 1979 to give [[Israel]] direct access to KH-11 photographs disrupted that scheduling and was unpopular within the NSA and other agencies, and that during the [[Ronald Reagan]] administration it was learned that Israeli military officers were permitted to attend Pentagon meetings where future KH-11 missions and orbital paths were discussed, which dismayed some NSA officials.[^17]
### Memorandum of understanding with the Israeli signals unit
On September 11, 2013, [[The Guardian]] published the text of an undated, five-page memorandum of understanding between the NSA and its Israeli counterpart, from a top-secret document provided to the Guardian by [[Edward Snowden]]. The Guardian reported that the deal "was reached in principle in March 2009." The memorandum says that the NSA "routinely sends ISNU [the Israeli Sigint National Unit] minimized and unminimized raw collection," so that the material is not filtered in advance to remove communications of US citizens. The memorandum defines raw Sigint as including "unevaluated and unminimized transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata and content," and permits Israel to release US person identities to outside parties with the NSA's written permission. Israel could keep "any files containing the identities of US persons" for up to a year.[^18] The memorandum states that "This agreement is not intended to create any legally enforceable rights" and is neither an international agreement nor a legally binding instrument. The NSA was to "regularly review a sample of files transferred to ISNU to validate the absence of US persons' identities." The text does not name [[Unit 8200]]; the unit is the signals-intelligence arm of the Israeli military.[^19]
The Guardian reported that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court had been asked to approve the sharing. A top-secret report dated September 2007, also quoted by the Guardian, described the relationship as "overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of Israel."[^18]
### USS Liberty intercepts, 2003 to 2007
The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^18] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^19] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^20] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^21] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^22]
The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^20] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^21] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^22] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^23] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^24]
### Footnotes
@ -116,8 +127,10 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
[^15]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair*, H. Rept. 102-857, September 10, 1992, pp. 67 to 68, https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport. The report records these statements as Aviv's account to committee investigators.
[^16]: Affidavit of Eugene F. Yeates, Chief, Office of Policy, National Security Agency, *Citizens Against Unidentified Flying Objects Secrecy v. National Security Agency*, Civil Action No. 80-1562 (D.D.C. 1980), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf (archived copy: https://web.archive.org/web/2020/https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ufo/assets/files/affadavit_yeates.pdf).
[^17]: Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (Random House, 1991). Hersh attributes the account of the KH-11 scheduling to an unnamed former NSA official.
[^18]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
[^19]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
[^20]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^21]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^22]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
[^18]: Glenn Greenwald, Laura Poitras and Ewen MacAskill, "Secret Deal Allows NSA to Share Americans' Data With Israel," *The Guardian*, September 11, 2013 (reprinted by AlterNet). https://www.alternet.org/2013/09/secret-deal-allows-nsa-share-americans-data-israel ; memorandum full-text page, *The Guardian*, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/11/nsa-israel-intelligence-memorandum-understanding-document
[^19]: Ynet, "Intelligence and Cyberwarfare: Israeli locations Hezbollah targeted for destruction," August 25, 2024. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sy3etztic
[^20]: National Security Agency, letter from Louis F. Giles, Director of Policy, to A. Jay Cristol, FOIA Case 40039A, July 2, 2003. https://irp.fas.org/nsa/liberty.html
[^21]: Guy Dinmore, *Financial Times*, January 13, 2004, reprinted by the History News Network. https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/3027
[^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
[^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
[^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/