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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ summary: "Alexander Acosta is the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
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born: 1969-01-16
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location: "Miami, Florida (born)"
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created: 2026-06-20
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updated: 2026-09-25
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updated: 2026-10-12
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relations:
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida]]"
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@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ The victims' broader effort to overturn the agreement ultimately failed at the a
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The review originated in a December 3, 2018 letter from Senator [[Ben Sasse]], chairman of a Senate Judiciary oversight subcommittee, citing the [[Miami Herald]] series; OPR opened its investigation on February 6, 2019. It recorded that a victims' attorney had raised allegations of improper influence in December 2010 and that OPR had declined to open an inquiry then in deference to the pending litigation. The Justice Department's [[Office of Professional Responsibility|Office of Professional Responsibility]] released a report on November 12, 2020, examining the conduct of Acosta and his subordinates in the Epstein matter. The report concluded that Acosta exercised "poor judgment" in resolving the federal investigation through a state plea agreement, but it did not find professional misconduct, stating that his decision to decline federal prosecution was within the scope of his authority and that there was no evidence the decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations.[^2][^7]
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OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^23]
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OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] The Executive Summary states that Acosta "made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein" through a state-based plea, and that he "participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms." It states that as United States attorney he had "plenary authority" to resolve the case as he deemed appropriate, and that he did not commit professional misconduct. It found that he exercised poor judgment both in choosing the non-prosecution agreement as the mechanism and in failing to make certain that the state would notify victims identified in the federal investigation of the state plea hearing.[^23] The summary records the agreement signed on September 24, 2007, the defense's request for review by the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the June 23, 2008 determination that the deputy attorney general would not intervene, and the state plea of June 30, 2008.[^24] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^25]
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The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^24]
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The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^26]
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One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^25]
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One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^27]
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### Secretary of Labor and Resignation
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President [[Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] nominated Acosta as Secretary of Labor, and he was confirmed by the Senate on April 17, 2017 and sworn in that month, having previously chaired the National Labor Relations Board and served as dean of Florida International University's law school. The Florida agreement drew scrutiny during his 2017 confirmation but did not derail it; OPR recorded that at his March 2017 hearing he was "questioned only briefly about the Epstein case."[^1][^7]
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After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^26][^27]
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After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^28][^29]
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On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^25][^28]
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On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^27][^30]
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### Intelligence Claim
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In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^29][^30]
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In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^31][^32]
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Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^31][^32]
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Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^33][^34]
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At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^28][^31]
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At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^30][^33]
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[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^33]
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[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^35]
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### Footnotes
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@ -148,14 +148,16 @@ At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committ
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[^20]: Opinion and Order, *Doe v. United States*, No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 478 (Marra, J.). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736/pdf/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736-2.pdf
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[^21]: *In re Wild*, No. 19-13843, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021) (en banc), majority opinion at 2-3, 13; Branch, J., dissenting; Hull, J., dissenting. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913843.enb.pdf
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[^22]: Supreme Court of the United States, docket No. 21-351, order of February 22, 2022 denying certiorari. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-351.html
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[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
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[^24]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
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[^25]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
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[^26]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
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[^27]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
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[^28]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
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[^29]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
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[^30]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
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[^31]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
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[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
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[^33]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
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[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Executive Summary of the investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the 2006-2008 federal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein (November 2020), pp. 10-12. https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
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[^24]: Same Executive Summary, pp. 2-3.
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[^25]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
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[^26]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
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[^27]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
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[^28]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
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[^29]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
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[^30]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
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[^31]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
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[^32]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
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[^33]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
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[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
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[^35]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
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summary: "Chilean arms maker whose company supplied cluster bombs to Iraq in the 1980s, indicted in Miami in 1993 over zirconium exports, and named by Ari Ben-Menashe as a broker of CIA-backed arms channels."
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born: 1942-05-01
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location: "Santa Cruz, Chile"
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updated: 2026-10-08
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updated: 2026-10-12
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relations:
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- type: owned
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with: "[[Industrias Cardoen]]"
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fn: 3
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fn: 5
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- type: owned
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with: "[[Swissco Management Group]]"
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role: "described by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries"
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fn: 2
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fn: 4
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- type: prosecuted
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with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
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reverse: true
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start: 1993-05
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role: "twenty-one count indictment, Southern District of Florida, May 26, 1993"
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fn: 3
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fn: 5
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---
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[[Carlos Cardoen]] is a Chilean businessman and arms producer, owner of [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]]. He comes from an upper-class Chilean family of Italian descent. After attending university in the [[United States|U.S.]] and receiving a degree as a mining engineer, he returned to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], after [[Augusto Pinochet|General Augusto Pinochet's]] 1973 coup d'état to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]]. His job involved procuring explosives for mining, which became a lucrative business for him personally due to kickbacks.[^1]
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After being rejected by Israel, Cardoen obtained a brokering license from the [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] (South Africa's government weapons manufacturer) with the help of the Chilean ambassador to [[South Africa]]. He then secured loans from Chilean banks and began operating as an arms producer and broker.[^1]
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By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile, produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license. Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
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By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile.[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3] Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
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In 1985, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
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In 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
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[[Robert Gates]], then CIA deputy director for intelligence, was approached by [[Nachum Admoni]] ([[Mossad]] director) regarding U.S. support for Cardoen. Admoni expressed Israeli concerns about the support for Iraq, especially through Chile and South Africa. By this time, Cardoen owned two chemical weapons plants in Santiago, a cluster bomb factory in cooperation with Chile's military, and a third chemical weapons plant in [[Paraguay]]. He was also building a chemical weapons plant outside [[Baghdad]].[^1]
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In late 1986, Israel expressed concern about arms shipments to Iraq, with [[Yitzhak Shamir]] threatening to go to Congress. Robert Gates called a meeting in Santiago to calm the Israelis. Attendees included Cardoen, Gates, Senator [[John Tower]], [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]] (South African Military Intelligence), and [[Rodolfo Stange|Gen. Rodolfo Stange]] (Chilean Carabineros). At this meeting, U.S. officials made it clear they intended to maintain the arms channel to Iraq to bring Iraq into their sphere of influence, assuring Israel it would not be harmed. Cardoen continued to supply chemical weapons and cluster bombs to Iraq despite Israeli concerns.[^1]
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The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^2]
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The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^4]
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In September 1988, Ari Ben-Menashe was sent to Chile to confront Cardoen. Ben-Menashe offered Cardoen a deal: Israel would license him to produce [[Uzi]]s, [[Galil assault rifles]], artillery shells, and mortars, and exclusively sell these materials throughout South America, in exchange for stopping his chemical trade with Iraq. Cardoen was given two weeks to consider the offer. During this visit, Cardoen introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Mark Thatcher]], implying Thatcher was involved in his business.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Cardoen was furious about Ben-Menashe's visit to his plant in Paraguay and his attempts to stop the trade. He claimed to have the backing of the Americans and the Chilean government, and threatened Israel if they interfered. He also revealed that Gates's office provided technology directly from the CIA, and that Ihsan Barbouti was a key link in his operations. He mentioned [[Alan Bond]] and British investors as backers.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^3] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
|
||||
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^5] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iquique and Baghdad
|
||||
|
||||
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^4]
|
||||
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^4]
|
||||
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miami arrest, Swissco and the Senate report
|
||||
|
||||
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^5][^6] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
|
||||
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^7][^8] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^2] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^3] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^8]
|
||||
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^4] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^5] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miami property and the Graham fund-raiser
|
||||
|
||||
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^9]
|
||||
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^10]
|
||||
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Indictment, trial and extradition
|
||||
|
||||
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^11] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^3] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^3]
|
||||
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^13] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^5] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^11] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^12]
|
||||
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^13] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^3]
|
||||
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^6][^13]
|
||||
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^8][^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
|
||||
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^14][^15]
|
||||
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^16][^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
|
||||
[^3]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^4]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^5]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
|
||||
[^6]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
|
||||
[^7]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
|
||||
[^8]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
|
||||
[^9]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
|
||||
[^10]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
|
||||
[^11]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
|
||||
[^12]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
|
||||
[^13]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
|
||||
[^14]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
|
||||
[^15]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
|
||||
[^5]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^7]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
|
||||
[^8]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
|
||||
[^9]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
|
||||
[^10]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
|
||||
[^11]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
|
||||
[^12]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
|
||||
[^13]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
|
||||
[^14]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
|
||||
[^15]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
|
||||
[^16]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
|
||||
[^17]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ born: 1904-11-28
|
|||
died: 1986-02-19
|
||||
location: "Doddsville, Mississippi"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
James Oliver Eastland (November 28, 1904 to February 19, 1986) was born at [[Doddsville, Mississippi]], "only months after his father had orchestrated the gruesome lynching of a Black woman and her lover, who was accused of murdering Woods's twenty-one-year-old brother, James, in whose memory the newborn was named." His grandfather had bought more than 2,000 acres of [[Sunflower County, Mississippi|Sunflower County]] "for speculative purposes," and his father, Woods Eastland, a personal injury lawyer, made it a plantation. He studied at the [[University of Mississippi]], [[Vanderbilt University|Vanderbilt]], and the [[University of Alabama]], was admitted to the bar in 1927, and sat in the state legislature as a supporter of Governor [[Theodore G. Bilbo]]. When Senator [[Pat Harrison]] died in 1941, Woods Eastland declined the appointment and suggested his son. "The boy'll do it," said Governor [[Paul B. Johnson Sr.|Paul Johnson]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ On the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry he "zealously guarded the interests
|
|||
|
||||
### The Committees
|
||||
|
||||
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. In 1953 he became chairman of the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and in 1956 chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]], which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
|
||||
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. He joined the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, became its chairman in 1955 and served as chairman until the Senate abolished the subcommittee in 1977.[^3] The subcommittee has been described as "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and he was chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]] from the Eighty-fourth Congress through the Ninety-fifth Congress,[^4] which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Welch
|
||||
|
||||
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^3]
|
||||
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^4]
|
||||
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Hunts
|
||||
|
||||
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^5]
|
||||
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Succession
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ Eastland became president pro tempore of the Senate in 1972 and "twice came with
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "James Oliver Eastland," *Mississippi Encyclopedia*. Center for Study of Southern Culture, University of Mississippi.
|
||||
[^2]: Morgan, Chester M. "James O. Eastland," *Mississippi History Now,* Mississippi Department of Archives and History, April 2011.
|
||||
[^3]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
|
||||
[^4]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
|
||||
[^5]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.
|
||||
[^3]: Senator James O. Eastland Collection, University of Mississippi, Modern Political Archives, File Series 4, Legislative, Subseries 10: Internal Security Subcommittee (finding aid). https://olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/archives/finding_docs/eastland/Eastland_File4_SS10.pdf
|
||||
[^4]: "EASTLAND, James Oliver," Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, entry E000018. https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/E000018
|
||||
[^5]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
|
||||
[^6]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
|
||||
[^7]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,22 +8,30 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Person
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
- Stargate
|
||||
summary: "Brigadier General James L."
|
||||
summary: "Brigadier General James L. Dozier was the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff at NATO's southern Europe command, kidnapped by the Red Brigades in Verona on December 17, 1981 and rescued January 28, 1982."
|
||||
born: 1931-04-10
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[U.S. Army]]"
|
||||
role: "Brigadier General; deputy chief of staff, NATO southern Europe command"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1982
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
location: "Arcadia, Florida"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1].
|
||||
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1]. A press clipping of the kidnapping describes him as "the highest-ranking U.S. officer in NATO's southern Europe command."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Dozier, a graduate of [[West Point]] and a [[Vietnam]] veteran, was reading a letter when his doorbell rang. Two young men, posing as plumbers, gained entry to his apartment. Dozier was attacked, and he and his wife, Judy, were bound and gagged. Dozier was then forced into a steamer trunk and secreted away in the back of a blue Fiat van[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^2][^3] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
|
||||
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^3][^4] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1].
|
||||
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1]. A memorandum of March 23, 1982 from the Grill Flame project manager records a debriefing of Dozier on February 9, 1982, at which he was asked to review remote-viewing drawings made during the search and to comment on places and events of his captivity.[^5] A January 1982 Army message reported visions by several private individuals in Kent, Washington, concerning Dozier, describing a settlement called the "place of the shepherds" and a hallway behind metal bars.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Graff himself experienced vivid dreams and impressions, believing Dozier was held "upstairs in a room above a grocery store" in Padua. This information, combined with intelligence from a U.S. signals intelligence team, led Italian police to the exact street address where Dozier was being held[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^4] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^3] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^5]
|
||||
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^7] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^4] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
After 42 days in captivity, Dozier was rescued on January 28, 1982, by ten men from Italy's Central Operative Security Nucleus who stormed the apartment. He was found alive and was flown home to a hero's welcome, including an invitation to the [[White House]] from [[Ronald Reagan]][^1].
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,7 +40,10 @@ Despite the remote viewers' involvement, Dozier later stated that he finally fig
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
|
||||
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
|
||||
[^3]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
|
||||
[^4]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
|
||||
[^5]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^2]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240026-8, press clipping on the Red Brigades kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. Dozier. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100240026-8
|
||||
[^3]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
|
||||
[^4]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
|
||||
[^5]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250001-4, memorandum of March 23, 1982 from Robert J. Jachim, GRILL FLAME project manager, on the debriefing of BG Dozier at the Command SCIF, Fort Meade, on February 9, 1982. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250001-4
|
||||
[^6]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250011-3, Army Intelligence and Security Command message of January 25, 1982 reporting visions concerning BG Dozier, including "THE PLACE OF THE SHEPHERDS." https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250011-3
|
||||
[^7]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
|
||||
[^8]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ summary: "Steve Bannon is the Breitbart chairman, Cambridge Analytica vice presi
|
|||
born: 1953-11-27
|
||||
location: "Norfolk, Virginia (born)"
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] (born November 27, 1953) is an American media executive and political strategist who served as executive chairman of [[Breitbart News|Breitbart News]] from 2012 (after founder [[Andrew Breitbart|Andrew Breitbart]]'s death) through 2016 and again 2017-2018, as vice president and secretary of [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] from June 2014 to August 2016, as chief executive of the [[Donald Trump|Trump]] 2016 presidential campaign from August 17, 2016, and as White House Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor to the President from January 20 to August 18, 2017. The [[Mercer family|Mercer family]] funded Breitbart, bankrolled Cambridge Analytica, and was instrumental in installing Bannon as Trump campaign CEO.[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Epstein sat for a videotaped interview with Bannon. A November 1, 2021 defense e
|
|||
[^4]: For the Breitbart-Gamergate pipeline, see the Gamergate page.
|
||||
[^5]: "The Mercers and Stephen Bannon: How a populist power base was funded and built." *Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/mercer-bannon/ . For the June 2011 10 million dollar Breitbart investment, the Government Accountability Institute funding, and the *Clinton Cash* placement, see also "Steve Bannon used Robert Mercer's offshore millions to accuse Clinton of corruption." *ThinkProgress,* November 8, 2017.
|
||||
[^6]: Mayer, Jane. "New Evidence Emerges of Steve Bannon and Cambridge Analytica's Role in Brexit." *The New Yorker.*
|
||||
[^7]: "Christopher Wylie: Bannon wanted 'weapons' to fight a 'culture war' at Cambridge Analytica," testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018. *CBS News.* https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/senate-cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-live-stream-updates-today-2018-05-16 ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
|
||||
[^7]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8 and 9. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
|
||||
[^8]: Green, Joshua. *Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency.* Penguin Press, 2017. For the Make America Number 1 / Keep the Promise I super PAC and the Mercer contribution, see "Make America Number 1." *Ballotpedia.* https://ballotpedia.org/Make_America_Number_1
|
||||
[^9]: "Stephen Bannon removed from National Security Council." *Washington Post,* April 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/04/05/steven-bannon-no-longer-a-member-of-national-security-council/ ; Kuttner, Robert. "Steve Bannon, Unrepentant." *The American Prospect,* August 16, 2017. https://prospect.org/2017/08/16/steve-bannon-unrepentant/
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01615267, DataSet 10, iMessage log between Jeffrey Epstein and Steve Bannon, August 23, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01615267.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "son"
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
created: 2025-08-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
William P. Barr worked at the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from 1973 to 1977 while attending law school at night. "During my tenure at CIA, 1973 to '77, the investigations of the agency started, and I moved to the legislative counsel's office," he recalled; as assistant legislative counsel under Director [[George H.W. Bush]] in 1976 he worked against legislation of Representatives [[Michael Harrington]] and [[Bella Abzug]] that would have required notice to people whose mail the agency had opened under [[HTLINGUAL]]. He then clerked for Judge [[Malcolm Wilkey]] of the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|D.C. Circuit]], a former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, who telephoned Bush for a reference. After private practice and the Reagan transition he joined the [[White House]] domestic policy staff, where he worked with [[C. Boyden Gray]], counsel to Vice President Bush. In 1988 he helped screen vice-presidential candidates through [[Robert Kimmitt]].[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ At the end of the administration Barr advised Bush to pardon [[Caspar Weinberger
|
|||
|
||||
Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019, before his confirmation as attorney general.[^5] His department oversaw the federal prosecution of [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that year. His father, [[Donald Barr]], was headmaster of the [[Dalton School]] in New York during the period in which Epstein, a college dropout, was hired there to teach; accounts differ on whether Donald Barr personally hired him.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
In a deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 18, 2025, Barr was asked whether he had recused himself from the Justice Department's review of the Florida prosecution and plea agreement of Epstein. He answered, "No, I didn't recuse myself." He said that the Southern District of New York investigation was "the only thing that I was aware of going on when I was there," and that "I don't recall playing a role in the review of that." He said he had considered whether to recuse from the New York matter, and that the decision not to recuse was made on input from the department's ethics office, by his recollection. Asked about the 2019 Office of Professional Responsibility inquiry into the Florida plea deal, he said, "I wasn't hovering over that or involved in that."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Asked about his father's role as headmaster of the Dalton School, Barr said, "It's not pertinent at all." Asked about [[Kirkland & Ellis]] representing Epstein in the non-prosecution negotiations, and about his former employment with the firm, he said, "I actually don't think I would've had to recuse myself from that. But I just was never involved in that."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Miller Center, University of Virginia. "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,3 +92,5 @@ Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019,
|
|||
[^4]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993; Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
|
||||
[^5]: Dominion Energy, Inc. Proxy statement, 2019, SEC Form DEF 14A, director table, note 4. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/715957/000119312519085276/d693331ddef14a.htm
|
||||
[^6]: "The 'Epstein-Barr' Problem of New York City's Dalton School." *Law and Crime,* July 13, 2019, which states that Epstein was hired "by the school's headmaster Donald Barr in the mid 1970's". https://web.archive.org/web/2019/https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/the-epstein-barr-problem-of-new-york-citys-dalton-school/
|
||||
[^7]: Deposition of William P. Barr, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, August 18, 2025, pp. 47-48. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
|
||||
[^8]: Same transcript, pp. 51 and 92-93.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- "William Casey"
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- KeyFigure
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
start: 1971-04-14
|
||||
end: 1973-02-02
|
||||
fn: 16
|
||||
fn: 18
|
||||
---
|
||||
William Joseph Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, Queens, New York. He attended [[St. John's University]] and Fordham Law School, becoming a corporate and tax attorney. During World War II he served in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) under [[William J. Donovan|William "Wild Bill" Donovan]], rising to head the OSS's Secret Intelligence operations in Europe and coordinating the infiltration of agents into Nazi-controlled territory. After the war he became a wealthy lawyer and author of tax shelter guides. President [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] appointed him Chairman of the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] in 1971, a post he held through 1973. He managed [[Ronald Reagan]]'s 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed him [[Director of Central Intelligence]] in January 1981, and he served as DCI until resigning due to illness in January 1987. He died May 6, 1987, at a hospital in Glen Cove, New York, having suffered a seizure in December 1986 and subsequently undergone brain surgery. He was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] investigating committee but died before he could appear.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Reagan approved the intelligence finding for covert operations in [[Nicaragua]]
|
|||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice had what Inspector General Hitz called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
|
||||
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report.[^6] Gary Webb, after quoting [[Fred Hitz|Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^5] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^7] Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Protecting Drug Traffickers
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,23 +59,23 @@ Casey decided not to raise allegations of [[Manuel Noriega|Noriega's]] cocaine t
|
|||
|
||||
### High Frontier correspondence
|
||||
|
||||
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^6] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^7]
|
||||
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^8] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^8] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^9] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^10]
|
||||
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^10] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^11] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### National Intelligence Study Center
|
||||
|
||||
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^11]
|
||||
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Recruitment of James D. Theberge to the Senior Review Panel
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^12] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^12] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^12] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^13] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^14] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^15]
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^14] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^14] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^14] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^15] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^16] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971 to 1973
|
||||
|
||||
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^16] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^17]
|
||||
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^18] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^18]
|
||||
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -83,17 +83,19 @@ The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a for
|
|||
[^2]: Sick, Gary. *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan*. Times Books, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force. *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 1993.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
|
||||
[^6]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
|
||||
[^7]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
|
||||
[^8]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
|
||||
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
|
||||
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
|
||||
[^11]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
|
||||
[^16]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^7]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
[^8]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
|
||||
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
|
||||
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
|
||||
[^11]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
|
||||
[^12]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
|
||||
[^13]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
|
||||
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
|
||||
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
|
||||
[^20]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
summary: CIA Inspector General whose 1998 investigation and congressional testimony revealed the agency's secret 1982 agreement with the Justice Department exempting CIA assets from drug crimes reporting.
|
||||
born: 1939-10-14
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who conducted the agency's internal investigation into Contra drug trafficking and testified before Congress in March 1998 about his findings.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +18,14 @@ Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who condu
|
|||
|
||||
Appearing before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998, Hitz delivered some of the most damaging admissions in the agency's history. "Let me be frank about what we are finding," Hitz testified. "There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity." When Congressman Norman Dicks asked whether any of these allegations involved trafficking in the [[United States]], Hitz answered: "Yes."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1954 Origin and the 1975 Regulation
|
||||
|
||||
The arrangement that the 1982 agreement later formalized dated from 1954. According to a memorandum by [[Lawrence Houston]], the CIA's general counsel, Houston discussed the reporting of federal crimes with Deputy Attorney General [[William P. Rogers]] on February 18, 1954, and the two agreed that the CIA would determine whether a potential violation by persons associated with the agency was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. The memorandum states that the arrangement rested on the belief that the CIA was in the best position to determine whether classified information might be revealed in such a prosecution.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1975 [[Richard Thornburgh]], then assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, reminded the agency of its duty under 28 U.S.C. 535, and the CIA general counsel, [[John Warner]], replied that any informal referral agreement from the past had been abrogated. The agency's headquarters regulation of November 28, 1975 provided that crimes by government officers would be reported to the Attorney General and added that "CIA will not exercise a prosecutorial function."[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
In an interview for PBS Frontline (Drug Wars), Hitz said his staff "weren't ever able to find a memorandum of conversation or any evidence that indicated why it was done," and: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
Hitz revealed that from 1982 to 1995, the CIA operated under a secret agreement with the Justice Department that exempted the agency from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees, a category defined to include agents, assets, and non-staff employees. The agreement was "hammered out" between CIA director William Casey and U.S. Attorney General William French Smith in 1982. "The period of 1982 to 1995 was one in which there was no official requirement to report on allegations of drug trafficking with respect to non-employees of the agency," Hitz testified.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,3 +37,7 @@ Hitz's 400-page report, released in late 1998, was filled with examples of CIA c
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story*, Findings paragraph 42. https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^3]: Same report, Findings paragraph 43 (letter of July 24, 1975; reply of July 29, 1975).
|
||||
[^4]: Same report, Findings paragraph 44.
|
||||
[^5]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Henry Kissinger
|
||||
- Kissinger
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- KeyFigure
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,37 +119,9 @@ On December 6, 1975, in Jakarta, Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesia
|
|||
|
||||
### Telephone Transcripts
|
||||
|
||||
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. Upon leaving office in January 1977, Kissinger removed the transcripts as personal papers and secretly shipped them to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]] on October 29, 1976, before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access. State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] drafted a complaint against both the Archivist of the United States and the Secretary of State on February 13, 2001; the government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in August 2001. The collection runs to more than 15,000 pages. These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
|
||||
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access.[^kissrc] State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^nsa123] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
|
||||
[^bio]: Nobel Committee, "Henry Kissinger – Biographical," *NobelPrize.org*, 1973. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/biographical/
|
||||
[^seminar]: Harvard Crimson, "Kissinger, Harvard and the FBI," November 16, 1979; Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 312-315 (CIA cutout funding to Harvard International Seminar).
|
||||
[^ssp]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Brothers Fund records, Special Studies Project, RG 4, 1956-1964 (finding aid FA387), rockarch.org; *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961).
|
||||
[^nwfp]: Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957); Hoover Institution review, https://www.hoover.org/research/nuclear-weapons-and-foreign-policy-henry-kissinger-council-foreign-relations-1957
|
||||
[^state]: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Henry A. (Heinz Alfred) Kissinger," *People - Department History*, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-a
|
||||
[^doc11]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.1: White House Telcon, Kissinger to Melvin Laird, March 15, 1969. Source: DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations.
|
||||
[^doc12]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.2: White House Telcon, Kissinger-Nixon, March 17, 1969. Source: DNSA.
|
||||
[^doc13]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.3: White House Telcon, General Wheeler to Kissinger, March 18, 1969. Source: DNSA.
|
||||
[^doc16]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.6: FBI Memorandum, "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request," May 12, 1969. Source: Elliot Richardson Papers, Library of Congress.
|
||||
[^doc17]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.7: FBI J. Edgar Hoover Wiretap Surveillance Report to President Nixon, May 11, 1970. Source: Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
|
||||
[^halperin]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976); settled November 1992.
|
||||
[^chile]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, ed. Peter Kornbluh (September 11, 2013), Documents 1-10; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973 (U.S. Government Publishing Office).
|
||||
[^condor]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 4.1: State Department Action Memorandum, "Operation Condor," August 30, 1976; Document 4.2: State Department Cable, "Actions Taken," September 16, 1976. Source: National Security Archive FOIA.
|
||||
[^doc32]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.2: State Department Memcon, "Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti," October 7, 1976. Source: FOIA release, November 2003.
|
||||
[^doc33]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.3: State Department Memo, "Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric over Visit," October 19, 1976. Source: Argentina Declassification Project, August 20, 2002.
|
||||
[^doc51]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.1: U.S. Consulate Dacca Cable, "Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan," April 6, 1971. Source: NARA, RG 59, SN 70-73.
|
||||
[^doc52]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.2: White House Memorandum for the President, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," April 28, 1971. Source: NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625.
|
||||
[^doc61]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62; Document 4: Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 (Secret/Nodis), December 6, 1975. Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3.
|
||||
[^telcons]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 852, ed. William Burr (February 13, 2024), Documents 1-34; NSAEBB No. 123 (The Kissinger Telcons) and NSAEBB No. 263 (The Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts).
|
||||
[^c1]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995. Ch. 25, 27.
|
||||
[^c2]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
|
||||
[^c3]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 24.
|
||||
[^friele]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29; Rockefeller Archive Center, Berent Friele Papers (FA468).
|
||||
[^qp1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy*, document 42, editorial note on the Quantico II Panel, pp. 153-154, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d42. Lists "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University" among the twelve invited on August 16, 1955.
|
||||
[^qp2]: "Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy: Source Book of Individual Papers," November 1955, CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00269r000300120001-4. Contents, paper 16, "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR," by Henry A. Kissinger.
|
||||
[^qp3]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2013), p. 261 and note 129, citing Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 151. Bessner's note 129 is on his list of the eleven members: it states that Henry Kissinger attended some sessions, as did members of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Operations Coordinating Board and the NSC.
|
||||
[^qp4]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 264-265 and note 146, citing Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 2005), pp. 90-91, on the two men's earlier contact at the first panel.
|
||||
[^qp5]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, Hugh Morrow Interviews, Series Q, Subseries 2, "Henry Kissinger Interview," Spring 1980, scope note, https://dimes.rockarch.org/collections/H45i6yf7MUHuaRwQVupvg5.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,10 +11,17 @@ tags:
|
|||
- SupremeCourt
|
||||
- JudicialCrisisNetwork
|
||||
- ConcordFund
|
||||
summary: "Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist, the longtime executive vice president of the Federalist Society, the principal architect of the Supreme Court conservative supermajority through the Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett confirmations, and the chairman of Teneo Network, who has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles to reshape the American judiciary."
|
||||
summary: "Leonard Leo is a conservative legal activist, longtime Federalist Society executive vice president and Teneo Network chairman, who directed roughly one billion dollars in dark-money spending through linked 501(c)(4) groups."
|
||||
location: "United States"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2023-07-11
|
||||
role: "requested information on his interactions with Supreme Court justices and records on his donor-group network; his counsel declined to provide it"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist who served as the longtime executive vice president of the [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] and who has been the principal architect of the [[Supreme Court|Supreme Court]]'s conservative supermajority through his role advising President [[Donald Trump]] on the selection and confirmation of [[Neil Gorsuch|Neil Gorsuch]] (2017), [[Brett Kavanaugh|Brett Kavanaugh]] (2018), and [[Amy Coney Barrett|Amy Coney Barrett]] (2020). Leo became chairman of the [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] in 2021 and has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles, including the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]), to reshape the American judiciary and, through the Teneo chairmanship, to extend the operational model across American institutional life.[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,7 +36,9 @@ The *ProPublica* profile "We Don't Talk About Leonard" (March 2023) is the found
|
|||
|
||||
Leo's dark-money operation runs through a network of linked 501(c)(4) organizations that permit political spending without donor disclosure. The primary vehicle is the Judicial Crisis Network (now the Concord Fund), which [[CREW|Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington]] reported brought in nearly 48.1 million dollars in a single reporting period to support the conservative judicial-confirmations project. The broader network of Leo-linked organizations has funneled over one billion dollars in undisclosed spending across the judicial-selection, political-advocacy, and institutional-influence operations, per the [[Alliance for Justice|Alliance for Justice]] and [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] investigations.[^2][^5][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply, and his counsel's letter to the Committee (July 2023) pushed back on the "dark money" and "phony front groups" characterizations. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
|
||||
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 11, 2023, Chairman Durbin and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, asked Leo for information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^7] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023 that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web," argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to his views, and said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. It closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Teneo Chairmanship and the Institutional Expansion
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
title: Lyman Lemnitzer
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- General Lemnitzer
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,13 +13,20 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Military"
|
||||
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962 who signed the Operation NORTHWOODS document proposing staged false-flag attacks against Americans to justify an invasion of Cuba, was transferred to command NATO forces in Europe after President Kennedy rejected the proposals and declined to reappoint him."
|
||||
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, signed the Operation NORTHWOODS memorandum, and then served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1963 to 1969."
|
||||
born: 1899-08-29
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[NATO]]"
|
||||
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Europe"
|
||||
start: 1963-01-01
|
||||
end: 1969-07-01
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
died: 1988-11-12
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1960 to October 1962. His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1]
|
||||
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1, 1960 to September 30, 1962.[^1] His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Military Career
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -33,15 +40,21 @@ The context for Operation NORTHWOODS was the problem that confronted U.S. milita
|
|||
|
||||
On March 13, 1962, Lemnitzer signed a document titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" and submitted it to Secretary of Defense McNamara. The document - which became publicly known as Operation NORTHWOODS after declassification in 1997 - proposed manufacturing the pretext for invasion through a series of false-flag operations. These included staging a Cuban attack on a U.S. Navy vessel at [[Guantanamo Bay]], organizing a fake "terror campaign" in Miami and Washington, D.C., staging aircraft incidents in which planes would be "attacked" by ostensibly Cuban aircraft, and explicitly contemplating staged incidents in which American civilians would be killed.
|
||||
|
||||
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in October 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^1]
|
||||
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^2] His move to the European command was announced in July 1962; at the news conference of July 23, 1962 Kennedy said Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^3] He became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on January 1, 1963, and he retired on July 1, 1969.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Career
|
||||
|
||||
In 1975 Lemnitzer served on the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (the [[Rockefeller Commission]]), and from 1976 to 1978 he served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Significance
|
||||
|
||||
Lemnitzer's role in NORTHWOODS is historically significant primarily for what it reveals about how senior American military officers thought about manufactured pretexts for military action. The document is not unique in Cold War operational planning history - planners in multiple governments explored similar concepts - but its systematic treatment and formal submission through the chain of command make it an unusually clear record of such thinking.
|
||||
|
||||
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^2]
|
||||
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
|
||||
[^2]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
|
||||
[^2]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
|
||||
[^3]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
|
||||
[^4]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- El Perico
|
||||
- El Maestro
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Organized Crime"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1989-02-08
|
||||
role: "sealed San Francisco indictment, conspiracy to distribute cocaine"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
fn: 20
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Sandra Smith]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1986-09
|
||||
end: 1991-11
|
||||
role: "San Francisco historical conspiracy case and 1989 fugitive file"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
fn: 20
|
||||
---
|
||||
Norwin Meneses Cantarero, born June 21, 1943, and known in Nicaragua as "El Rey de la Droga" and "El Perico," was a [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] cocaine trafficker who moved between [[Managua]], the [[San Francisco]] Bay Area and [[Costa Rica]].[^1] From 1980 the [[DEA]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] opened a series of cases on his family's organization, in which his nephews and associates were convicted and he was not; from July 1986 the DEA's Costa Rica office used him as a source and then as an informant while the FBI in San Francisco was assembling a case against him; a sealed federal indictment followed in 1989; and Nicaraguan police arrested him on November 3, 1991 with 764 kilograms of cocaine.[^1][^2] [[Gary Webb]] wrote that he was the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel's]] representative in Nicaragua and a recruiter, arms supplier and benefactor of the [[Contras]]; the Justice Department's Inspector General found he gave the Contras little, dealt with all sides, and had no CIA connection.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -81,63 +81,63 @@ Immigration records show that on September 11, 1980 Meneses was refused admissio
|
|||
|
||||
DEA agent [[Sandra Smith]], who worked in the San Francisco office from 1974 until 1984, opened her first case on the organization in July 1980, when police searching the San Francisco house of his nephew Roger Meneses found twenty pounds of cocaine; the charges were dismissed because the search followed an illegal traffic stop. In September 1981 a Baldwin Park police tip led her to follow a Los Angeles dealer, Julio Bermudez, who flew to San Francisco, visited a house in Dale City that belonged to [[Carlos Cabezas]] and then the house of another nephew, Jairo Meneses; Los Angeles police seized $12,000, three pounds of cocaine and a ledger entry "11-11 90,000 to Jairo," and Bermudez said he had gotten the drugs from Norwin Meneses. A November 16, 1981 search of Jairo's house produced $9,000 and ledgers, and prosecution was declined by Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Eric Swenson]] because no drugs were found. Smith filed a November 1981 affidavit stating that the DEA "has developed information over the past several years that the Meneses Family has been involved in the smuggling and distribution of cocaine in the San Francisco Bay Area"; she said she wanted a task force and was refused, which she attributed to the low status of women at the agency and not to the CIA, and she shredded her personal notes when she left in December 1984 after offering them to a colleague who declined. Her supervisor Saverio Weidl said she never asked him to lead a task force.[^1][^6] Webb wrote that Smith called the case "the only thing that I ever worked, in all the time I worked there, that I thought was really big."[^4] The San Jose paper's report that her investigation was halted for reasons "not clear" was examined by the Inspector General, who found no improper halt; he also noted that Smith's own surveillance report had recorded that Cabezas lived at the Dale City house, contrary to the newspaper.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
|
||||
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. The San Francisco United States Attorney's Office had declined prosecution in the tax case that year because of weak or insufficient evidence, and the IRS concurred with that decision.[^7] DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The agent in the bowling alley
|
||||
|
||||
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^7] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
|
||||
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^8] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Contras
|
||||
|
||||
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^8] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
|
||||
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^9] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^9] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
|
||||
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^10] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^8]
|
||||
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^9] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^8] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^10]
|
||||
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^10] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^9] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Frogman network
|
||||
|
||||
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^7] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^11][^12] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^12][^13]
|
||||
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^8] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^12][^13] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^13][^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Costa Rica
|
||||
|
||||
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^8][^14] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^15][^16] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^17]
|
||||
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^9][^15] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^16][^17] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### DEA source and informant, 1986 to 1990
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^17] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^15]
|
||||
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^18] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^17] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^16][^17][^18]
|
||||
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^18] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^17][^18][^19]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^17] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^16] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^17]
|
||||
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^18] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^17] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^18]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^19]
|
||||
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^20]
|
||||
|
||||
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^8][^19] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^19] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^19]
|
||||
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^9][^20] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^20] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Nicaragua, 1990 to 1997
|
||||
|
||||
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^20] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^19] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^8] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^20] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
|
||||
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^21] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^20] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^9] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^21] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^8][^21]
|
||||
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^9][^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miranda and Ilopango
|
||||
|
||||
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^22] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^8][^23]
|
||||
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^23] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^9][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^24] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^25]
|
||||
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^25] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### CIA records and the arrangement of the claims
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^8] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^8] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^15] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
|
||||
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^9] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^9] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^16] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The San Francisco DEA agent accused in 1985 told the Inspector General that Meneses, whom he met in 1982, called himself "a revolutionary and not interested in drug trafficking," and said he had the "impression" Meneses was moving guns for the Contras; the agent asked the CIA in San Francisco, which denied any connection.[^6] DEA CI-1 told the inspectors that Meneses said in 1986 or 1987 that when the Contra revolution began he met "American agents" he assumed were with the CIA and showed them how to cross into and out of Nicaragua.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Family
|
||||
|
||||
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^15] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^26] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^14][^15]
|
||||
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^16] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^27] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^15][^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -147,23 +147,24 @@ Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area trafficke
|
|||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 3: "The brotherhood of military minds."
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IV, section B (OIG investigation regarding support of the Contras by Blandon and Meneses), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch04p2.htm
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections F-G ("David Morrison," alleged DEA corruption, DEA use of Meneses as an informant), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p2.htm
|
||||
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
|
||||
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
|
||||
[^9]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
|
||||
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
|
||||
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
|
||||
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
|
||||
[^20]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
|
||||
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
|
||||
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
|
||||
[^24]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
|
||||
[^25]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, section on the 1983 tax case. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p1.htm
|
||||
[^8]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
|
||||
[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
|
||||
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^11]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
|
||||
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
|
||||
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
|
||||
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
|
||||
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
|
||||
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
|
||||
[^23]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
|
||||
[^25]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
|
||||
[^26]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
|
||||
[^27]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
title: Patrice Lumumba
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Patrice Emery Lumumba
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- Decolonization
|
||||
category: "Political Figure"
|
||||
summary: "Patrice Lumumba was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo (June 1960), deposed and delivered to Katangan forces by a CIA-backed conspiracy involving Joseph Mobutu within months of independence, and killed on January 17, 1961 - a case the Church Committee found involved CIA assassination planning, making him the emblematic victim of Cold War CIA intervention in African decolonization."
|
||||
summary: "Patrice Lumumba, first elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo, was deposed in 1960 and delivered to Katangan forces, and was killed on January 17, 1961; the Church Committee found CIA assassination planning."
|
||||
born: 1925-07-02
|
||||
died: 1961-01-17
|
||||
location: "Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Congo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ Patrice Emery Lumumba (July 2, 1925 - January 17, 1961) was the first Prime Mini
|
|||
|
||||
The Belgian Congo achieved independence on June 30, 1960. Lumumba, who had won legislative elections as leader of the Mouvement National Congolais, became Prime Minister in a coalition government with President Joseph Kasavubu. The transition was immediately chaotic: the Congolese army mutinied against Belgian officers; Belgian paratroopers intervened to protect Belgian nationals; and the mineral-rich Katanga province, under [[Moise Tshombe]], declared independence with Belgian support on July 11, 1960.
|
||||
|
||||
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then appealed to the United States, which refused, and finally to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
|
||||
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then went to the United States, and finally appealed to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take the steps needed to provide the Congolese government with military assistance after the [[Katanga]] secession.[^2] On August 9, 1960, it reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^3] According to the Church Committee, Lumumba visited Washington in late July 1960, where Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] pledged economic aid, and after the events of September 5 and 14 he asked the United Nations force for protection.[^4] On February 21, 1961, the Council noted with deep regret the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that an immediate and impartial investigation be held into the circumstances of the deaths.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### CIA Involvement
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ The CIA facilitated Lumumba's capture by providing intelligence on his movements
|
|||
|
||||
### Church Committee Findings
|
||||
|
||||
The 1975 [[Church Committee]] investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
|
||||
The 1975 Church Committee investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
|
||||
|
||||
- CIA Director Dulles had authorized assassination planning targeting Lumumba
|
||||
- The CIA had prepared and dispatched a biological toxin specifically for use against him
|
||||
|
|
@ -53,9 +55,13 @@ The committee concluded that while the CIA had clearly planned and intended to a
|
|||
|
||||
Lumumba's death established the pattern of Cold War CIA intervention in African independence movements that characterized subsequent decades. His assassination brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power as a long-term CIA client who would rule the renamed country Zaire until 1997. The Congo became a staging ground for subsequent CIA operations, particularly during the [[Angola|Angolan]] civil war (1975-1991) when CIA-supplied [[Zaire]]-based forces supported [[UNITA]] against the [[MPLA]].
|
||||
|
||||
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^2]
|
||||
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^2]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraph 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20(1961)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^6]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1984
|
||||
end: 1986-11
|
||||
role: "organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1988-03-11
|
||||
end: 1992-12-24
|
||||
role: "pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992"
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
---
|
||||
Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor [[William Clark]], counselor to Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]], a staff member of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], and military aide to [[Henry Kissinger]] when Kissinger was national security adviser to [[Richard Nixon]]. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of [[Vietnam]], completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the [[United States Marine Corps]] as a lieutenant colonel.[^1] [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Final Report records that under Reagan the [[National Security Council]] staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the [[Iran]] and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, [[Oliver North]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] gr
|
|||
|
||||
On January 6, 1984 the National Security Planning Group approved "immediate efforts to obtain additional funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources," the current $24 million appropriation to the [[Contras]] being enough only through June; McFarlane was responsible for carrying it out with North and the NSC staff member [[Constantine Menges]]. On February 21, 1984 he warned Reagan that the program would have to be curtailed by May or June unless new money was found.[^1][^2] In late March 1984 [[William J. Casey]] sent him a memorandum urging that Israel and other countries be asked for weapons and money, and in April McFarlane sent the NSC staff member [[Howard Teicher]] to ask the Israelis; the mission was unsuccessful, and when Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] learned of it from the embassy in [[Israel]] McFarlane told him Teicher had gone "on his own hook."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^3]
|
||||
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. A Ministry of Defence memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial, the Guardian reported, showed that from 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales helped set up regular quarterly payments to Bandar from [[Al-Yamamah]] arms-deal funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction.[^3] He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane testified that in spring and summer of 1984 Reagan let it be known "very clearly" that the Contras were to be kept together "body and soul," and that he discussed the directive with his deputy [[Donald Fortier]] and with North; he said he told North that no one could "solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker the transmission of money" to the Contras. Walsh found that he assigned the work to North and that North kept him generally informed. A September 2, 1984 North request to approach a private donor for a "civilian" helicopter drew McFarlane's marginal note "I don't think this is legal."[^1] Walsh's conclusion on the arrangement was that Reagan "put McFarlane in a difficult position," and that McFarlane "put his subordinates in an equally difficult position by delegating to them the operational tasks."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^4] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^5]
|
||||
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^5] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Contra memoranda and the 1985 letters to Congress
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,38 +76,39 @@ On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any memb
|
|||
|
||||
### The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^6] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^5][^7]
|
||||
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^7] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^5] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
|
||||
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^6] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^5] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
|
||||
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^6] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposure, plea and pardon
|
||||
|
||||
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^8]
|
||||
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^9] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^10] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^9]
|
||||
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^10] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^11] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Esquire article and lawsuit
|
||||
|
||||
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^11] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^11]
|
||||
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^12] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^11] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^11]
|
||||
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^12] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Death
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^8]
|
||||
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, August 4, 1993), ch. 1, "United States v. Robert C. McFarlane" (citing McFarlane, North trial testimony, March 10 to 16, 1989; Select Committees testimony, May 11 to 13, 1987; SSCI testimony, December 7, 1986; NSPG minutes, June 25, 1984; Hill, Weinberger and Regan notes). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
|
||||
[^2]: Brinkley, Joel, and Stephen Engelberg, eds. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with the Minority Views*, abridged edition (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1988), "Iran-Contra Chronology," entry for February 21, 1984. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
|
||||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
|
||||
[^5]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^6]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
|
||||
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
|
||||
[^8]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
|
||||
[^9]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
|
||||
[^11]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
|
||||
[^3]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
|
||||
[^6]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
|
||||
[^8]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
|
||||
[^9]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
|
||||
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
|
||||
[^12]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,18 +6,38 @@ tags:
|
|||
- CIA
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the Senate Judiciary Committee."
|
||||
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Senate Judiciary Committee's chief investigator who in May 1988 relayed to INSLAW a Justice Department source's allegations that the source later denied."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
|
||||
role: "chief investigator"
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. This source, who had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]], told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
|
||||
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. According to Cheri Seymour, this source had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]]; the source told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The source also stated that [[Lowell Jensen]] engineered Inslaw's problems and relied on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]], and [[James Johnston]]. Miles Matthews allegedly stated in the presence of LeGrand's source that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source further indicated that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]], and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's malfeasance, and that while Richard and White were "pretty upset," they would not disclose what they knew except under subpoena and oath. The source also believed that documents related to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the DOJ, but suggested Inslaw should subpoena paperwork prepared by a Jensen subordinate regarding the purchase of large quantities of computer hardware for which senior DOJ career staff saw no justification.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, the Special Counsel's investigation found that LeGrand provided little corroboration of Hamilton's allegations during a sworn statement to House investigators.
|
||||
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, in a sworn statement to House investigators LeGrand provided, in the words of the House report, "little corroboration" of Hamilton's allegations.
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand. The Special Counsel interviewed LeGrand's source, a long-time career employee of the Department of Justice, who stated that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or Inslaw, and had not heard any credible rumors about such misconduct. This source indicated that the subject of Inslaw came up during a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988. He suggested contacting Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him. The source denied ever mentioning Jensen, Richard, White, Johnston, or Knapp to LeGrand, and did not believe any of these individuals would be involved in any type of cover-up. Furthermore, the source denied that any statements attributed to him in Hamilton's affidavit were accurate, and he never said or believed any of the comments attributed to him, never had reason to believe that identified DOJ officials were involved in wrongdoing, or that Project Eagle documents were improperly shredded. The Special Counsel's investigation ultimately found no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior DOJ officials.[^2]
|
||||
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^3] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^4] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^5] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand and did not believe any of them would be involved in any type of cover-up. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^5] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64. https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^4]: Bua report (March 1993), section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, including the October 11, 1988 Richardson memorandum.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, pp. 22-28, citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46. Bound with the Bua report: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^6]: Bua report, section 10, p. 114: "we contacted LeGrand, who no longer works for the Senate. LeGrand said he would tell us about his source's information, but would not disclose his source's identity."
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,11 +4,15 @@ tags:
|
|||
- IranContra
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
summary: "In late 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Alan Sanders]] was a businessman with links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. His cover was [[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.). He was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], specifically in the form of blueprints. This was done with a covert [[United States|U.S.]] license, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1]
|
||||
[[Alan Sanders]] was a businessman with links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. His cover was [[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.). He was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], specifically in the form of blueprints. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that this was done with a covert [[United States|U.S.]] license despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
In late 1985, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for [[Israel]]. Sanders made it clear that the sale of cluster bombs to [[Israel]] was prohibited by the [[United States|U.S.]]. However, he introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Richard Babayan]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] contract agent with close contacts with [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]], indicating that Cardoen would sell the bombs to [[Israel]].[^1]
|
||||
In late 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for [[Israel]]. Sanders made it clear that the sale of cluster bombs to Israel was prohibited by the U.S.. However, he introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Richard Babayan]], a CIA contract agent with close contacts with Cardoen, indicating that Cardoen would sell the bombs to Israel.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Contra_War
|
||||
summary: Honduran general and CIA collaborator on the Contra project who was convicted of plotting a cocaine-financed assassination and coup, then received extraordinary leniency through Oliver North's intervention.
|
||||
location: "Honduras"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Jose Bueso Rosa was a Honduran general and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] collaborator on the [[Contras|Contra]] project who was convicted in 1984 for plotting to assassinate Honduran president Roberto Suazo Cordova and stage a coup financed by a giant cocaine sale. Despite the severity of his crimes, he received extraordinary leniency through [[Oliver North]]'s intervention.[^1]
|
||||
Jose Bueso Rosa was a Honduran general and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] collaborator on the [[Contras|Contra]] project who was convicted in 1985 for plotting to assassinate Honduran president Roberto Suazo Cordova and stage a coup financed by a giant cocaine sale. Despite the severity of his crimes, he received extraordinary leniency through [[Oliver North]]'s intervention.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Cocaine Coup Plot
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,6 +26,15 @@ Bueso Rosa was one of the CIA's main collaborators in [[Honduras]] on the Contra
|
|||
|
||||
North and other officials launched an aggressive campaign to get Bueso Rosa lenient treatment. "Justice is justifiably upset that none of this info was made available to them prior to indictment," North complained. State Department official Francis McNeil testified that Colonel Nestor Pino "assert[ed] an American intelligence interest in Bueso Rosa, in getting Bueso Rosa off." An all-star collection of officials including Pino, William Bode, and the former DIA head appeared as character witnesses or sent glowing letters. North wrote that the objective was "to keep Bueso from feeling like he was lied to in legal process and start spilling the beans." Associate Attorney General [[Stephen Trott]] claimed he didn't know why he intervened, other than North telling him about possible release of "sensitive" information. McNeil testified he suspected "a narcotics angle" behind the frantic machinations. Bueso Rosa received five years and was deported after three years at Eglin Air Force Base. He later disclosed the CIA had equipped and trained the Honduran army's death squad, the 316 Battalion.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Sentence Reduction
|
||||
|
||||
The Kerry subcommittee reported that Bueso Rosa was convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova of Honduras, a plot to be financed from the sale in the United States of $40 million in cocaine seized in connection with it. The other defendants received sentences of as long as forty years. Senior United States officials intervened with a federal judge to reduce his sentence to five years, and officials of the United States government also ensured that he served his sentence in a minimum-security facility at a United States military base in Florida.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
According to [[Mark M. Richard]], deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, who described the matter in a deposition before the Iran-Contra committee, the Pentagon took the initiative in supporting the interventions. At a meeting, North, General Gorman, [[Elliott Abrams]] and Clarridge agreed that Bueso Rosa should be accommodated. Richard said that the State Department's position had changed, and he opposed the interventions. The subcommittee noted that the Justice Department had publicized the conspiracy as the most significant narco-terrorism case yet discovered, and that FBI director [[William Webster]] had said at the time of the arrests: "We don't want international terrorists to establish beachheads or bases for operations in the United States."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The subcommittee also reported that the government's factual admissions in the North trial, released April 6, 1989, stated that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral [[John Poindexter]] that Ambassador Negroponte, General Gorman, the senior CIA officer Clarridge and North had worked out arrangements with Bueso Rosa for support of the Contra resistance, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of those covert activities. The Justice Department objected strenuously to the leniency, and Francis McNeil testified that the intervention undermined Reagan administration policy on terrorism, narcotics and democracy.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 19: "He reports to people reporting to Bush"
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 121-122 (Bueso-Rosa section, including the deposition of Mark M. Richard before the Iran-Contra committee). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
- Dark_Alliance_Investigation
|
||||
summary: "William French Smith (1917-1990) served as U.S. Attorney General from 1981 to 1985 under President Reagan, and as the first Reagan AG signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with CIA director William J. Casey that removed drug offenses from the list of crimes CIA assets were required to report to the Department of Justice."
|
||||
summary: "William French Smith was U.S. Attorney General from 1981 to 1985 under Reagan and signed the 1982 crimes-reporting Memorandum of Understanding with CIA director William J. Casey."
|
||||
born: 1917-08-26
|
||||
died: 1990-10-29
|
||||
location: "Wilton, New Hampshire"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
William French Smth was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with [[Central Intelligence Agency]] director [[William J. Casey]] that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. The agreement, hammered out between the CIA and Justice Department, fundamentally altered the relationship between intelligence operations and law enforcement.[^1]
|
||||
William French Smith was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with [[Central Intelligence Agency]] director [[William J. Casey]] that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. The agreement, hammered out between the CIA and Justice Department, fundamentally altered the relationship between intelligence operations and law enforcement.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that removed drug offenses from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice maintained what Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^2]
|
||||
In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding under which narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department.[^2] Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. Gary Webb, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^3] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^4] The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^4]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ summary: "Donald Trump is the 45th and 47th President of the United States, whos
|
|||
born: 1946-06-14
|
||||
location: "Queens, New York City (born)"
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving 2017-2021 and 2025-present. His two administrations functioned as the political vehicle through which the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network ([[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]] contracting expansion, [[Clearview AI]] seed funding, [[Founders Fund]] defense portfolio), the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network (the [[Neil Gorsuch|Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Kavanaugh]], [[Amy Coney Barrett|Barrett]] Supreme Court confirmations), and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East]] network ([[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]], U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales, the documented [[Mohammed bin Salman|MBS]] WhatsApp channel) exercised documented federal power. Thiel spoke at the 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] endorsing Trump, served on the transition executive committee, and placed associates including [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]].[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,35 +27,35 @@ Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United
|
|||
|
||||
Thiel endorsed Trump at the July 2016 Republican National Convention in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years, and donated over one million dollars to Trump-supporting super PACs alongside the [[Mercer family|Mercer family]], the Republican donors who funded [[Breitbart|Breitbart]] and the [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] data operation. After the November 2016 election, Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place Harrington as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. *Politico* reported that companies Thiel backed, especially Palantir, stood to benefit from the transition role.[^1][^2][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^9]
|
||||
The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Palantir Contracting Expansion
|
||||
|
||||
The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^5]
|
||||
The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^5][^10]
|
||||
The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Supreme Court and the Leo Network
|
||||
|
||||
Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^6]
|
||||
Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the he documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed the [[Christine Blasey Ford|Christine Blasey Ford]] sexual-assault allegations and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^6]
|
||||
The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed a sexual-assault allegation against Kavanaugh and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kushner Middle East Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^7]
|
||||
Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^7]
|
||||
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^7]
|
||||
After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2024 Campaign and the Second Administration
|
||||
|
||||
Thiel funded the 2022 [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] Senate campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars) and the [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars), and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate. The Vance selection compressed a three-and-a-half-year path from private citizen to Vice President on a single-donor financial base.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^9]
|
||||
The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^8]
|
||||
The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^10]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], the [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]] CEO whose Epstein emails are documented in the 2026 file releases, received the [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] appointment. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] received the [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] appointment and was confirmed on February 4, 2025; a year later she co-signed the February 2026 report to Congress under the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]] that listed some 300 names of officials and public figures referenced in the [[Jeffrey Epstein|Epstein]] files, among them [[Elvis Presley|Elvis]], [[Princess Diana|Princess Diana]], and [[Kurt Cobain|Kurt Cobain]]. [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]], the deputy attorney general who announced the 3.5 million page Epstein-files publication, was previously Trump's personal defense attorney in the Manhattan criminal case. The second-administration personnel pattern places documented Epstein-network contacts (Lutnick) and Epstein-files oversight figures (Bondi, Blanche) in the executive branch.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ The relationship returned as a political liability across 2025. As president, Tr
|
|||
[^2]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233
|
||||
[^3]: Cameron, Dell, and Yulia Almazova. "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
|
||||
[^4]: "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769 ; "Disrupting the White House: Peter Thiel's Influence is Shaping the National Security Council." *Just Security,* 2017. https://www.justsecurity.org/37466/disrupting-white-house-peter-thiels-influence-shaping-national-security-council/
|
||||
[^5]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
|
||||
[^6]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^7]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
|
||||
[^8]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^9]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^10]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^5]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^6]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
|
||||
[^7]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^8]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^9]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
|
||||
[^10]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^11]: "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html ; "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025. https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
|
||||
[^12]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
|
||||
[^13]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump ; U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Files Transparency Act disclosures. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/doj-disclosures
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,43 +6,207 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Conservative
|
||||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
summary: "Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990, the longest-serving British PM of the twentieth century; her government cooperated closely with the Reagan administration on Cold War intelligence operations, including support for the Afghan mujahideen, while the Arms-to-Iraq and Matrix Churchill affairs implicated British officials and contractors in the same illicit arms networks examined by the Iran-Contra investigations."
|
||||
- ArmsToIraq
|
||||
- MatrixChurchill
|
||||
- AlYamamah
|
||||
- Spycatcher
|
||||
- GCHQ
|
||||
- Libya
|
||||
- Falklands
|
||||
- Brighton
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Margaret Thatcher
|
||||
- Margaret Hilda Thatcher
|
||||
- Baroness Thatcher
|
||||
- Lady Thatcher
|
||||
- Mrs. Thatcher
|
||||
summary: "Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990; the vault records her governments' Cold War, Al-Yamamah and Iraq arms-export, intelligence, Falklands and Libya decisions."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
born: 1925-10-13
|
||||
died: 2013-04-08
|
||||
location: "Grantham, Lincolnshire, United Kingdom"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[United Kingdom]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister"
|
||||
start: 1979-05-04
|
||||
end: 1990-11-28
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Conservative Party]]"
|
||||
role: "Leader"
|
||||
start: 1975-02
|
||||
end: 1990-11-28
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: relative_of
|
||||
with: "[[Mark Thatcher]]"
|
||||
role: "son"
|
||||
fn: 39
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Falklands War]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister"
|
||||
start: 1982-04-02
|
||||
end: 1982-06-14
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Al-Yamamah]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister during the 1985 negotiation of the first agreement"
|
||||
start: 1985-04
|
||||
end: 1985-09
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[House of Lords]]"
|
||||
role: "Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven"
|
||||
start: 1992
|
||||
end: 2013-04-08
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
---
|
||||
Margaret Hilda Thatcher was born on October 13, 1925, in [[Grantham]], [[Lincolnshire]], the daughter of a grocer and local alderman, and died on April 8, 2013.[^1] She was Prime Minister of the [[United Kingdom]] from May 1979 to November 1990 and the first woman to hold the office. Her governments coordinated intelligence and military policy with the administration of [[Ronald Reagan]]. Her name recurs in the vault's records of the [[Iraq]] arms trade, the 1986 bombing of [[Libya]], the [[GCHQ]] trade union ban, the [[Spycatcher]] injunction, the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms contracts with [[Saudi Arabia]] and the child abuse allegations that involve figures in her circle.
|
||||
|
||||
Margaret Hilda Thatcher was born on October 13, 1925, in Grantham, Lincolnshire, the daughter of a grocer and local alderman. She studied chemistry at [[Oxford University]] before qualifying as a barrister. She won election to Parliament as the Conservative MP for Finchley in 1959. Following the Conservative defeat in two 1974 elections, she challenged and defeated Edward Heath for the party leadership in February 1975. The Conservatives won the general election of May 3, 1979, and Thatcher became Prime Minister, the first woman to hold the office.[^1]
|
||||
### Early career and election
|
||||
|
||||
### Cold War Alliance with Reagan
|
||||
Thatcher studied chemistry at [[Oxford University]] before qualifying as a barrister. She was elected Conservative member for [[Finchley]] in 1959. After the [[Conservative Party]] lost two general elections in 1974, she defeated [[Edward Heath]] for the party leadership in February 1975.[^1] The Conservatives won the general election of May 3, 1979, and Thatcher became Prime Minister the following day.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher and U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] formed the defining political partnership of the 1980s Western alliance. She had met Reagan in April 1975 and the two shared an ideological commitment to rolling back [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] influence. After Reagan's election in November 1980, the two governments coordinated intelligence and military policy throughout the decade. British [[MI6|Secret Intelligence Service]] cooperation with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] was formalized through joint operations in multiple theaters.[^1]
|
||||
### Brighton bombing
|
||||
|
||||
The most operationally significant joint effort was support for the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The CIA's [[Operation Cyclone]], coordinating arms and funding flows to mujahideen factions through [[Pakistan|Pakistani]] [[ISI|Inter-Services Intelligence]], was complemented by British SAS training programs for Afghan fighters. Thatcher publicly backed the mujahideen, framing Soviet involvement as unprovoked aggression against a neighboring state.[^2]
|
||||
On October 12, 1984, the [[Irish Republican Army|Provisional Irish Republican Army]] detonated a long-delay bomb at the [[Grand Hotel, Brighton]] during the Conservative Party conference. The Prime Minister and senior members of her Cabinet were among the people in the hotel at the time, and a message read in the [[House of Lords]] on October 16 gave thanks for "the escape from assassination of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown."[^2] The Lords were told that four people had died and 32 were injured, and that the Provisional IRA had admitted responsibility.[^2] The Home Secretary, [[Leon Brittan]], told the [[House of Commons]] on October 22 that the purpose of the bomb "was no less than to strike a blow at the heart of our democracy by killing the majority of the Cabinet."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher permitted the United States to use British bases - specifically [[RAF Lakenheath]] and [[RAF Upper Heyford]] - for the April 1986 bombing of [[Libya]], Operation El Dorado Canyon, over [[Muammar Gaddafi]]. No other NATO ally granted overflight rights. The decision was politically controversial in Britain.[^1]
|
||||
A fifth person died on November 13, 1984: the wife of Scotland's Conservative Party leader, who died of the wounds she had received in the bombing.[^4] Thatcher wrote that when she went to the Royal Sussex County Hospital to see the injured after her conference speech, "Four people had already died," and that one of the injured women "was on a drip feed: she would die later."[^5] Five people died in all, and 34 were injured.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Falklands War and Intelligence
|
||||
[[Patrick Magee]] was arrested in Glasgow in June 1985. A palm print on a hotel registration card, made out in the false name Roy Walsh, led to the charge. On June 10, 1986, a jury at the [[Old Bailey]] convicted him on all counts, and he received eight life sentences, seven of them for the Brighton bombing. He was released in June 1999 under the early release scheme of the Good Friday Agreement after serving 14 years.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The Argentine invasion of the [[Falkland Islands]] on April 2, 1982, precipitated the most direct military crisis of Thatcher's tenure. The subsequent ten-week war saw the British task force recapture the islands by June 14, 1982. The [[NSA|National Security Agency]] and [[GCHQ]] cooperation on signals intelligence was central to British operational planning: American satellite and electronic intelligence was shared with British commanders, a level of cooperation that reflected both the alliance's depth and the personal relationship between Thatcher and Reagan.[^1]
|
||||
### Cold War alliance with Reagan
|
||||
|
||||
### Arms-to-Iraq and Matrix Churchill
|
||||
Thatcher and Reagan formed the central political partnership of the Western alliance in the 1980s. She had met Reagan in April 1975, and the two shared a commitment to rolling back [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] influence. After Reagan's election in November 1980, the two governments coordinated intelligence and military policy through the decade. British [[MI6|Secret Intelligence Service]] cooperation with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] ran through joint operations in several theaters.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Arms-to-Iraq affair was the British corollary to the same illicit weapons procurement networks that characterized the period of Western support for [[Saddam Hussein]] during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]. British machine-tool manufacturer [[Matrix Churchill]], based in Coventry, exported precision tooling to Iraq under export licenses approved by the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] despite [[MI6]] awareness that the machinery would be used for weapons production. Three Matrix Churchill directors were prosecuted in 1992 for breaching export controls; the trial collapsed when it emerged that ministers had signed public interest immunity certificates to suppress intelligence documents that would have exonerated the defendants.[^2]
|
||||
The most operationally significant joint effort was support for the [[Afghanistan|Afghan]] resistance after the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The CIA's [[Operation Cyclone]], which moved arms and funds to mujahideen factions through [[Pakistan]]'s [[Inter-Services Intelligence]], was complemented by British [[Special Air Service|SAS]] training programs for Afghan fighters.[^8] On January 24, 1980, the government's statement in the Commons, read by Lord Privy Seal [[Ian Gilmour]], said that "The Soviet action is a breach of all the conventions that have governed East-West relations for the past decade."[^9] Thatcher publicly backed the mujahideen, framing Soviet involvement as unprovoked aggression against a neighboring state.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The subsequent [[Scott Inquiry]], chaired by Sir Richard Scott, reported in February 1996 - after Thatcher had left office - and found that guidelines on arms exports to Iraq had been secretly changed by the government without informing Parliament. [[Mark Thatcher]], her son, was separately implicated in arms-related business dealings.
|
||||
### Falklands War
|
||||
|
||||
### Brighton Bombing
|
||||
The Argentine invasion of the [[Falkland Islands]] on April 2, 1982, began the most direct military crisis of Thatcher's tenure. The British task force recaptured the islands by June 14, 1982. On April 14, 1982, Thatcher told the Commons of [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]], the American Secretary of State, that his "tireless efforts" had included "two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 12, 1984, the [[Irish Republican Army]] detonated a long-delay bomb at the [[Grand Hotel, Brighton]], during the Conservative Party conference. The explosion killed five people and injured dozens. Thatcher and most of her Cabinet survived. The attack was carried out by IRA operative [[Patrick Magee]], who was arrested in Glasgow in June 1985 and sentenced to eight life terms.[^1]
|
||||
The American record of the war is published in the State Department's Foreign Relations series. On April 6, 1982, Thatcher sent Reagan a message that opened: "I am seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands," and asked for his "personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina."[^11] The same day, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Francis West]], told Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] that "Intelligence reporting is shared between the US and the UK, under bilateral agreement and also under the aegis of NATO," that "Cooperation extends to compartmental, sensitive source programs, including SIGINT, COMINT, overhead and SOSUS," and that "Both real time and analytical intelligence is exchanged."[^12] A State Department action memorandum of April 6 recorded the view of its European Bureau that "a lack of support from the U.S. in the period ahead could threaten the life of the Thatcher Government" and recommended: "We should therefore proceed with logistics/intelligence support of the type requested while insisting on the greatest possible secrecy." Its Inter-American Bureau advised refusing British requests "that are not clearly required by existing agreements."[^13] [[NSA|National Security Agency]] and GCHQ cooperation on signals intelligence became part of British operational planning during the war, and American satellite and electronic intelligence was shared with British commanders.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Resignation and Legacy
|
||||
On April 10, 1982, in Buenos Aires, Haig told President [[Leopoldo Galtieri]], in the words of the American record, "that the reports that the US has furnished intelligence and satellite information to the UK are untrue. We denied the British request."[^14] On April 17, the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, [[Richard Burt]], listed among American interests "maintaining the Thatcher Government in power" and wrote that "The U.S. must be prepared to do what is necessary to see the UK prevail, and must be seen to be doing so at the appropriate time."[^15] A Defense Department list of British requests received on May 6 and 7, 1982, which Weinberger annotated on May 10 with the instruction "We should not require longer than 36 hours to act on any UK request," included encryption devices, infra-red flares, torpedoes, a close-in weapons system, night vision goggles, 50 limpet mines, and the direct relay of weather satellite information.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister on November 28, 1990, following a leadership challenge by [[Michael Heseltine]] that revealed she could not win the second ballot. She was succeeded by [[John Major]]. She was elevated to the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven in 1992. She died on April 8, 2013, at The Ritz hotel in London, following a stroke, aged 87.[^1]
|
||||
In April 1984, Thatcher answered questions from [[Tam Dalyell]] about the sinking of the [[ARA General Belgrano]]. She told the Commons that no official interviews or assistance had been given to the authors of The Sinking of the Belgrano "specifically in connection with their book," beyond comments on an article in International Defense Review.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Blunt disclosure of 1979
|
||||
|
||||
On November 21, 1979, Thatcher told the Commons that [[Anthony Blunt]] had been a Soviet agent. "Professor Blunt has admitted that he was recruited for Russian intelligence when he was at Cambridge before the war." She said that "There is no doubt that British interests were seriously damaged by his activities," but that "it is unlikely that British military operations or British lives were put at risk." She added that "the story that he jeopardised the lives of secret agents in the Netherlands is without foundation."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### GCHQ trade union ban
|
||||
|
||||
On January 31, 1984, the Prime Minister told the Commons that "Certificates have been signed under successive Governments to except these services from the provisions of the Employment Protection Acts." The government removed trade union membership rights from staff at GCHQ in [[Cheltenham]] in January 1984. The [[Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978]] allowed a Minister to issue a certificate "for the purpose of safeguarding national security," and on February 1, 1984, the Prime Minister answered that "Such a certificate has been issued in the case of GCHQ."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Council of Civil Service Unions]] challenged the instruction in the High Court. On July 17, 1984, Thatcher told the Commons that Mr Justice Glidewell had found for the government on four of the five grounds of the challenge, but had concluded that "because of the lack of prior consultation with the unions concerned, the instruction given in this instance was invalid." She said that the finding "did not affect the certificates issued" under the Employment Protection Acts.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Libya bombing of April 1986
|
||||
|
||||
On April 15, 1986, Thatcher told the Commons that the President had sought British support and "agreement, in accordance with our long-standing arrangements, to the use in the operation of some United States aircraft based in this country." She said that Britain would support "action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities," and that "we would agree to the deployment of United States aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom for that purpose." She reported that the President had made clear that "use of F111 aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom was essential."[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The operation, Operation El Dorado Canyon, was flown from [[RAF Lakenheath]] and [[RAF Upper Heyford]] against targets associated with [[Muammar Gaddafi]] in Libya. Reagan thanked "our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission."[^22] Air Force Magazine reported that France, Germany, Italy and Spain refused to cooperate, which forced the F-111s to fly around France and Spain and through the Strait of Gibraltar.[^23] The decision was politically controversial in Britain.
|
||||
|
||||
### Spycatcher
|
||||
|
||||
The government's action against the memoir of former [[MI5]] officer [[Peter Wright]] was pursued through the courts of [[Australia]]. On November 7, 1986, the Prime Minister answered a question about the government's action against [[Heinemann Australia]] PTY Ltd. and Peter Wright, "for an order restraining the publication of Mr. Peter Wright's manuscripts."[^24] On November 20, 1986, the Prime Minister put the total cost to public funds of the court action, including legal costs and civil servants' fares and subsistence, at a figure that "is estimated to be of the order of £100,000."[^25] On November 21, 1986, the Prime Minister's written answer stated that "a total of nine persons have had cause to be sent by Her Majesty's Government to Australia in connection with the case of Mr. Peter Wright."[^26] Wright's memoir was published as Spycatcher in 1987.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Vanunu and the Israeli inquiries
|
||||
|
||||
Asked on November 7, 1986, whether she had had discussions with [[Shimon Peres]] or any other member of the Israeli government about [[Mordechai Vanunu]] before his departure from the United Kingdom, Thatcher answered "No."[^28] Asked on November 27, 1986, whether information had been passed from Her Majesty's Government sources to Israeli sources about Vanunu's presence in the United Kingdom, she again answered "No."[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Syrian Embassy and the Hindawi trial
|
||||
|
||||
On October 24, 1986, the Foreign Secretary, [[Geoffrey Howe]], told the Commons that the trial of [[Nezar Hindawi]] had ended that day. Hindawi "was found guilty of attempting to place a bomb on an El Al aircraft at Heathrow on 17 April and was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment." Howe said that "There is conclusive evidence of Syrian official involvement with Hindawi," and that "We have therefore decided to break diplomatic relations with Syria." The Syrian ambassador was told to close his [[Syrian Embassy in London|embassy]] and leave the country within 14 days.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
### Al-Yamamah
|
||||
|
||||
Al-Yamamah ("the Dove" in Arabic) was the series of government-to-government arms agreements between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, with [[British Aerospace]] (later [[BAE Systems]]) as prime contractor. The first agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lancaster House in September 1985 by the Secretary of State for Defence, [[Michael Heseltine]], and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]; it is dated September 26, 1985, and covered 72 Tornado aircraft and 30 Hawk trainers, among other equipment.[^31][^32] Two further, more detailed agreements followed in 1986 and 1988, and the programme was extended in 1993 by an order for 48 more Tornados.[^31][^32]
|
||||
|
||||
Foreign Office files released to the [[National Archives]] and reported in 2016 record that Thatcher stopped in [[Riyadh]] in April 1985 on her way back from South Asia and met King [[Fahd]]. Heseltine approved the stop-over on the basis that it would allow her to complete the sale, and Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], then Saudi ambassador to the United States, invited her. A briefing document stated that it "seems unlikely that Prince Bandar would seek to engineer such a meeting unless something positive was likely to come out of it." The official record of the meeting was billed as one about regional developments and does not mention the aircraft. After the visit Thatcher wrote to Fahd: "I was glad that we were able to discuss a further matter privately over lunch. I look forward to receiving your majesty's personal envoy soon, in order that we may conclude this matter successfully."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The Guardian published in October 2006 documents that had been released to the National Archives in May of that year and were withdrawn by the Ministry of Defence after the paper approached it. One was a January 1986 telegram from [[Colin Chandler]], head of the Ministry's arms sales unit, who was in Riyadh with BAE executives. The Guardian reported from it that the price of each Tornado had been raised by 32 percent, from £16.3 million to £21.5 million, and that the total was to reach £5 billion against the £3.5 billion to £4 billion stated in the Memorandum. The same release contained a Ministry of Defence briefing prepared for Thatcher that described Prince Sultan as "not highly intelligent," and Foreign Office correspondence of 1985 sending Thatcher's chief aide at Number 10, [[Charles Powell]], a copy of an Arab magazine that alleged £600 million in secret commissions, with advice that officials "should simply refuse all comment."[^31] Lord Gilmour, who had been a minister under Thatcher, told BBC2's Newsnight, as the Guardian quoted him: "You either got the business and bribed, or you didn't bribe and didn't get the business."[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1992 the [[National Audit Office]] reported on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project. Its examination of project receipts and payments passing through the Ministry of Defence "found no evidence of commission payments being made to third parties." On February 27, 1992, in a private session of the [[Public Accounts Committee]], whose chairman was [[Robert Sheldon]], the Ministry's permanent secretary, Sir [[Michael Quinlan]], said: "The whole project operates under a seal of confidentiality. There is a very great sensitivity about the project on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government. Open Government is alien to them." Asked for an assurance that no public funds had gone the wrong way, Quinlan answered: "Yes, I can give you the assurance that there is no basis to support any suggestion that commission payments have been made using public funds."[^34] The report was not published. The Guardian reported in March 2024, after finding the papers in Sheldon's archive at the [[London School of Economics]], that only ten copies were printed and that only Sheldon and his deputy read it. The Guardian also reported that a Ministry memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial showed that in 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales had helped set up regular quarterly payments to Prince Bandar from Al-Yamamah funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction. BAE said all payments were made with the express approval of the United Kingdom government, and the Ministry said the funds remained the property of the Saudi government.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Serious Fraud Office]] launched an investigation into allegations of corruption against BAE on July 29, 2004, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah. By autumn 2006 it intended to examine Swiss bank accounts, and the judgment of the House of Lords records that the Saudi authorities responded with an explicit threat to withdraw from bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, to withdraw cooperation on the United Kingdom's strategic objectives in the Middle East and to end negotiations then in progress for the purchase of Typhoon aircraft. The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir [[Sherard Cowper-Coles]], told the Director that "British lives on British streets were at risk." The Prime Minister, [[Tony Blair]], sent the Attorney General a personal minute on December 8, 2006.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
On December 14, 2006, the Attorney General, [[Lord Goldsmith]], told the Lords that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office had decided to discontinue the investigation "following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security." He said he had obtained "the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries," who had expressed "the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation."[^37] [[The Corner House]] and Campaign Against Arms Trade challenged the decision. The Divisional Court quashed it on the ground that the Director had yielded to a threat. On July 30, 2008, the House of Lords allowed the Director's appeal in [[R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office]], holding the decision lawful. [[Lord Bingham]] wrote that what determined the decision was "the Director's judgment that the public interest in saving British lives outweighed the public interest in pursuing BAE to conviction."[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems pleaded guilty in the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] to conspiring to defraud the United States by making false statements about its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance program and to violating the Arms Export Control Act, and was fined $400 million by Judge John D. Bates. The Department of Justice stated that BAE took the role of prime contractor to the United Kingdom government in the mid-1980s after the formal understanding with Saudi Arabia, that its "support services" resulted in substantial benefits to a foreign public official of Saudi Arabia who was in a position of influence over sales of fighter jets, and that BAE undertook no adequate review or verification of more than $5 million in invoices submitted by one employee from May 2001 to early 2002.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mark Thatcher
|
||||
|
||||
On January 24, 1996, [[George Galloway]] told the Commons that commissions on the Al-Yamamah arms sales had been paid through middlemen, and named [[Mark Thatcher]] and [[Wafic Said]] among them. He described Mark Thatcher as "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time," who "was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said." Galloway also named [[Douglas Leese]] among the intermediaries and described [[Jonathan Aitken]] as Said's business partner.[^39] The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^40] The Guardian wrote in 2006 that all those involved had always denied the allegations.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that Mark Thatcher introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]] in 1983, and that Van Der Westhuizen connected Bull with [[ARMSCOR]] for the "supergun" project. Ben-Menashe wrote that Mark Thatcher was present at a late-1986 meeting in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]] and Van Der Westhuizen. He also wrote that Mark Thatcher presented himself to Ben-Menashe in Santiago in 1988 as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position, and that Mark Thatcher was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to Chile after the [[Falklands War]].[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 13, 2005, in the Cape High Court in [[Cape Town]], Mark Thatcher pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempting to contravene section 2 of South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act by agreeing to charter a helicopter, for which he paid $275,000. The text of the agreement stated: "The accused began to suspect that the helicopter might in fact be intended for use in ... mercenary activity [in the west African region]. Despite his misgivings the accused decided to invest money in the charter of the helicopter." His lawyers stated that he was not charged with any involvement in the attempted coup in [[Equatorial Guinea]]. Judge Abe Motala imposed a fine of three million rand, or five years in prison, and a further four-year sentence suspended for five years. Zimbabwe had jailed [[Simon Mann]], a friend of Mark Thatcher and a former British special services officer, with 65 other suspected mercenaries in September 2004.[^42][^43]
|
||||
|
||||
### Matrix Churchill and the Scott Inquiry
|
||||
|
||||
[[Matrix Churchill]], a machine-tool company based in Coventry, exported precision tooling to Iraq under export licenses approved by the [[Department of Trade and Industry]], despite MI6 awareness that the machinery would be used for weapons production. Three Matrix Churchill directors were prosecuted in 1992 for breaching export controls. The Arms-to-Iraq affair was the British corollary to the same illicit weapons procurement networks that characterized Western support for [[Saddam Hussein]] during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]. On November 18, 1992, the Prime Minister, [[John Major]], answered (holding answer of November 17) a Commons question on whether the papers supplied to defence counsel would be placed in the Library: "No. The papers were supplied to the defence for the purposes of the trial. Lord Justice Scott will have access to them."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
The trial collapsed after ministers' public interest immunity certificates kept intelligence documents from the defense. The allegation that ministers had signed the certificates to suppress intelligence documents that would have exonerated the defendants was made in the media. The government's account, given by [[Ian Lang]] to the Commons on February 15, 1996, recorded the charges "made and repeated in the media that the Ministers who signed the PII certificates were seeking to deprive defendants in a criminal trial of the means by which to clear themselves." Lang said that [[Richard Scott|Sir Richard Scott]] "concludes, after more than three years of painstaking investigation, that all Ministers who signed PII certificates did so without any impropriety."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Scott Inquiry]], commissioned by Major in November 1992 after the end of the Matrix Churchill trial, reported on February 15, 1996, after Thatcher had left office.[^45][^46] Lang quoted the report's finding that "following the ceasefire in 1988, but not before, Government policy towards the export of non-lethal military goods changed in a way that he believes should have been drawn to the attention of the House." He added that Scott "expressly accepts that they were sincere in doing so," while not agreeing "that they were correct in their belief."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### Stoke Lodge and the Elm Guest House allegations
|
||||
|
||||
The writer S. Dovey wrote that civic functions at [[Stoke Lodge]], the residence of the Australian High Commissioner in Kensington, were attended by Thatcher, [[Peter Morrison]], [[Peter Hayman]] and Brittan. Dovey also wrote that the chauffeur firm used by the residence employed men later convicted of child abuse and murder, and that reporting on a June 1982 police raid of the [[Elm Guest House]] may have stopped after intervention by Attorney General [[Michael Havers]].[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### Resignation and later life
|
||||
|
||||
On November 22, 1990, Thatcher addressed the Commons in the debate on the motion of confidence in her government.[^48] She faced a leadership challenge from Heseltine in which she could not win the second ballot. She resigned as Prime Minister on November 28, 1990, and was succeeded by Major. She was elevated to the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven in 1992. She died on April 8, 2013, at The Ritz hotel in London, following a stroke, aged 87.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Margaret Thatcher," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/biography/Margaret-Thatcher
|
||||
[^2]: Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.* Penguin, 2004.
|
||||
[^2]: Whitelaw, Viscount, statement on the Grand Hotel, Brighton, House of Lords, October 16, 1984, HL Deb vol. 455, cols. 884-8. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1984/oct/16/grand-hotel-brighton-bomb-explosion
|
||||
[^3]: Brittan, Leon, statement on the Brighton bomb incident, House of Commons, October 22, 1984, HC Deb vol. 65, cols. 440-5. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/oct/22/bomb-incident-brighton
|
||||
[^4]: "5th person dies from IRA bomb attack on Thatcher," *UPI,* November 13, 1984. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/11/13/5th-person-dies-from-IRA-bomb-attack-on-Thatcher/3748469170000/
|
||||
[^5]: Thatcher, Margaret, "Northern Ireland: The Brighton Bomb" (extract from *The Downing Street Years,* HarperCollins, 1993), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 109119. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109119
|
||||
[^6]: "1984: Tory Cabinet escapes Brighton bomb," *BBC On This Day,* October 12, 1984. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_2531000/2531583.stm
|
||||
[^7]: "1986: Magee convicted of Brighton bombing," *BBC On This Day,* June 10, 1986. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/10/newsid_2510000/2510649.stm
|
||||
[^8]: Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.* Penguin, 2004.
|
||||
[^9]: Gilmour, Ian (Lord Privy Seal), statement on Afghanistan, House of Commons, January 24, 1980, HC Deb vol. 977, cols. 655-69. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1980/jan/24/afghanistan
|
||||
[^10]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on the Falkland Islands, House of Commons, April 14, 1982, HC Deb vol. 21, cols. 1146-208. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/apr/14/falkland-islands
|
||||
[^11]: Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan, London, April 6, 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984,* Document 68. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d68
|
||||
[^12]: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (West) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Washington, April 6, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 65. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d65
|
||||
[^13]: Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Scanlan), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to Secretary of State Haig, Washington, April 6, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 69. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d69
|
||||
[^14]: Memorandum of Conversation, Buenos Aires, April 10, 1982 (Haig and President Galtieri), *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 90. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d90
|
||||
[^15]: Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, Washington, April 17, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 143. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d143
|
||||
[^16]: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, with attached list of requests received May 6-7, 1982 (Weinberger notation of May 10), *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 241. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d241
|
||||
[^17]: Thatcher, Margaret, answer on "The Sinking of the Belgrano," House of Commons, April 12, 1984, HC Deb vol. 58, col. 526. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/apr/12/the-sinking-of-the-belgrano
|
||||
[^18]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on Mr. Anthony Blunt, House of Commons, November 21, 1979, HC Deb vol. 974, cols. 402-520. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1979/nov/21/mr-anthony-blunt
|
||||
[^19]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answers on the intelligence services and trade union membership, House of Commons, January 31, 1984, HC Deb vol. 53, col. 120W, and February 1, 1984, HC Deb vol. 53, cols. 209-10W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1984/feb/01/trade-union-membership
|
||||
[^20]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on GCHQ, House of Commons, July 17, 1984, HC Deb vol. 64, cols. 171-86. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jul/17/gchq
|
||||
[^21]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on Libya, House of Commons, April 15, 1986, HC Deb vol. 95, cols. 729-39. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/apr/15/libya
|
||||
[^22]: Reagan, Ronald, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, April 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-air-strike-against-libya
|
||||
[^23]: "El Dorado Canyon," *Air Force Magazine,* March 1999 (Air & Space Forces Magazine archive). https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0399canyon/
|
||||
[^24]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the Wright memoirs, House of Commons, November 7, 1986, HC Deb vol. 103, cols. 631-2W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/07/wright-memoirs
|
||||
[^25]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the Australian court action, House of Commons, November 20, 1986, HC Deb vol. 105, col. 268W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/20/mr-peter-wright-australian-court-action
|
||||
[^26]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the court case, House of Commons, November 21, 1986, HC Deb vol. 105, cols. 359-60W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/21/mr-peter-wright-court-case
|
||||
[^27]: Wright, Peter. *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer.* Viking, 1987.
|
||||
[^28]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on Mr. M. Vanunu, House of Commons, November 7, 1986, HC Deb vol. 103, col. 632W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/07/mr-m-vanunu
|
||||
[^29]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on Mr. Mordechai Vanunu, House of Commons, November 27, 1986, HC Deb vol. 106, col. 299W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/27/mr-mordechai-vanunu
|
||||
[^30]: Howe, Sir Geoffrey, statement on Anglo-Syrian relations, House of Commons, October 24, 1986, HC Deb vol. 102, cols. 1504-14. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/oct/24/anglo-syrian-relations
|
||||
[^31]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
|
||||
[^32]: Lewis, Mike, and Katherine Templar. *UK Personnel Supporting the Saudi Armed Forces: Risk, Knowledge and Accountability.* 2018, citing the Memorandum of Understanding for the Provision of Equipment and Services for the Royal Saudi Air Force, September 26, 1985, and UK National Archives file FCO 8/6055. https://www.mikelewisresearch.com/RSAFfinal.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: "Thatcher held secret Saudi talks to win huge arms deal, archives show," *Middle East Eye,* August 25, 2016 (reporting on Foreign Office files released to the National Archives). https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thatcher-held-secret-saudi-talks-win-huge-arms-deal-archives-show
|
||||
[^34]: Ministry of Defence Appropriation Accounts 1990-91, Class I, Vote 2, Defence Procurement: The Saudi Arabian Airforce Project (National Audit Office report, 1992), and summary minutes of the private session of the Committee of Public Accounts, February 27, 1992 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Ministry of Defence), in the papers of Robert Sheldon, London School of Economics, as published by The Guardian. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/24502904/collected-files-sheldon-papers-reduced.pdf
|
||||
[^35]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^36]: *R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office* [2008] UKHL 60 (House of Lords, July 30, 2008), on appeal from [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/60.html
|
||||
[^37]: Goldsmith, Lord (Attorney General), statement "BAE Systems: Al Yamamah Contract," House of Lords, December 14, 2006, HL Deb cols. 1711-8. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm
|
||||
[^38]: U.S. Department of Justice, "BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine," press release, March 1, 2010 (*United States v. BAE Systems plc,* D.D.C., Crim. No. 10-035, Judge John D. Bates). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine
|
||||
[^39]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^40]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
|
||||
[^41]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^42]: "Thatcher admits role in coup plot," *Al Jazeera,* January 13, 2005. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/1/13/thatcher-admits-role-in-coup-plot
|
||||
[^43]: "Thatcher's son pleads guilty in coup plot," Associated Press, January 13, 2005. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6818757
|
||||
[^44]: Major, John, written answer on Matrix Churchill, House of Commons, November 18, 1992, HC Deb vol. 214, cols. 216-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1992/nov/18/matrix-churchill
|
||||
[^45]: Lang, Ian, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report
|
||||
[^46]: Scott, Sir Richard. *Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.* HC 115, HMSO, February 15, 1996. Quoted in the Lang statement (Lang, February 15, 1996, above).
|
||||
[^47]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* 2023.
|
||||
[^48]: Thatcher, Margaret, speech in the debate on "Confidence in Her Majesty's Government," House of Commons, November 22, 1990, HC Deb vol. 181, cols. 439-518. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/nov/22/confidence-in-her-majestys-government
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,20 +5,41 @@ tags:
|
|||
- IranContra
|
||||
- ArmsDealer
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
summary: "In 1983, Thatcher introduced Gerald Bull to Gen."
|
||||
summary: "Mark Thatcher, son of Margaret Thatcher, is an arms dealer named in the Commons in 1996 over Al-Yamamah commissions and pleaded guilty in South Africa in 2005 over a helicopter charter."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: relative_of
|
||||
with: "[[Margaret Thatcher]]"
|
||||
role: "mother"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher]] is the son of British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]. He is an established arms dealer with significant connections in the international arms trade, particularly with [[Chile]] and [[South Africa]].[^1]
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher]] is the son of British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]].[^1] He is an established arms dealer with significant connections in the international arms trade, particularly with [[Chile]] and [[South Africa]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1983, [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], chief of [[South African Defense Force]], who then connected Bull with [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] for his "supergun" project.[^1]
|
||||
In 1983, Thatcher introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], chief of [[South African Defense Force]], who then connected Bull with [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] for his "supergun" project.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was present at a meeting in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], in late 1986 with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]], and [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], where the [[United States|U.S.]] reaffirmed its intention to maintain arms channels to [[Iraq]] through [[South Africa]] and [[Chile]].[^1]
|
||||
Thatcher was present at a meeting in [[Santiago]], Chile, in late 1986 with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]], and Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen, where the [[United States|U.S.]] reaffirmed its intention to maintain arms channels to [[Iraq]] through South Africa and Chile.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] indicated that [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was involved in his business, and that he had the backing of the [[United States|Americans]] and the Chilean government. [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] also had business dealings with [[South Africa]] for a long time, and was involved in providing military equipment through the [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] network to the [[Iraq|Iraqis]], including nuclear missile projects.[^1]
|
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Cardoen indicated that Thatcher was involved in his business, and that he had the backing of the Americans and the Chilean government. Thatcher also had business dealings with South Africa for a long time, and was involved in providing military equipment through the Cardoen network to the Iraqis, including nuclear missile projects.[^2]
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In 1988, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] met [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], where [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] presented himself as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position. He expressed admiration for [[Augusto Pinochet|Pinochet]] and discussed the [[Falklands War]], noting [[Chile]]'s support for [[United Kingdom|Britain]]. He also revealed that [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] received technology directly from the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] through [[Robert Gates|Gates's]] office.[^1]
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In 1988, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] met Thatcher in Santiago, Chile, where Thatcher presented himself as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position. He expressed admiration for [[Augusto Pinochet|Pinochet]] and discussed the [[Falklands War]], noting Chile's support for [[United Kingdom|Britain]]. He also revealed that Cardoen received technology directly from the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] through Gates's office.[^2]
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[[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to [[Chile]] after the [[Falklands War]]. He was also linked to [[Ihsan Barbouti]] and [[Sarcis Sargalian]] in projects supplying [[Iraq]] with military equipment. [[Richard Babayan]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] contract agent, also controlled a network providing equipment for [[Iraq]].[^1]
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Thatcher was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to Chile after the Falklands War. He was also linked to [[Ihsan Barbouti]] and [[Sarcis Sargalian]] in projects supplying Iraq with military equipment. [[Richard Babayan]], a CIA contract agent, also controlled a network providing equipment for Iraq.[^2]
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### Al-Yamamah allegations
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On January 24, 1996, [[George Galloway]] told the Commons that commissions on the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms sales had been paid through middlemen, and named Mark Thatcher and [[Wafic Said]] among them. He described Mark Thatcher as "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time," who "was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said." Galloway also named [[Douglas Leese]] among the intermediaries and described [[Jonathan Aitken]] as Said's business partner.[^3] The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^4] The Guardian wrote in 2006 that it had been alleged that Thatcher's son received secret commissions from the deal and that all those involved had always denied the allegations.[^5]
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### Equatorial Guinea plea of 2005
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On January 13, 2005, in the Cape High Court in [[Cape Town]], Mark Thatcher pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempting to contravene section 2 of South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act by agreeing to charter a helicopter, for which he paid $275,000. The text of the agreement stated: "The accused began to suspect that the helicopter might in fact be intended for use in ... mercenary activity [in the west African region]. Despite his misgivings the accused decided to invest money in the charter of the helicopter." His lawyers stated that he was not charged with any involvement in the attempted coup in [[Equatorial Guinea]]. Judge Abe Motala imposed a fine of three million rand, or five years in prison, and a further four-year sentence suspended for five years. Zimbabwe had jailed [[Simon Mann]], a friend of Mark Thatcher and a former British special services officer, with 65 other suspected mercenaries in September 2004.[^6][^7]
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### Footnotes
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[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
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[^1]: "Margaret Thatcher," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/biography/Margaret-Thatcher
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[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
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[^3]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
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[^4]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
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[^5]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
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[^6]: "Thatcher admits role in coup plot," *Al Jazeera,* January 13, 2005. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/1/13/thatcher-admits-role-in-coup-plot
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[^7]: "Thatcher's son pleads guilty in coup plot," Associated Press, January 13, 2005. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6818757
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