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- 2026-10-12T1801 · [[NATO]]
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- 2026-10-12T1801 · [[U.S. Attorney General]]
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- 2026-10-12T1801 · [[William French Smith]]
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- 2026-10-12T1801 · [[William J. Casey]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Al-Yamamah]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Syrian Embassy in London]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Stoke Lodge]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Libya]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Belgium]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Brussels]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[September 11 attacks]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Scott Inquiry]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Operation NORTHWOODS]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[CIA Family Jewels]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Babalon Working]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Bay of Pigs]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Operation Gladio]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[National Security Archive]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Matrix Churchill]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[ITICO]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Cambridge Analytica]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[United Nations]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[NSA]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[GCHQ]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[DINA]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Mark Thatcher]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Margaret Thatcher]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Donald Trump]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Jose Bueso Rosa]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Alan Sanders]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Ronald LeGrand]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Robert McFarlane]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Patrice Lumumba]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Norwin Meneses]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Lyman Lemnitzer]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Leonard Leo]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Henry A. Kissinger]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[William Barr]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[James L. Dozier]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Carlos Cardoen]]
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- 2026-10-12T1800 · [[Alexander Acosta]]
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- 2026-10-12T1759 · [[Fred Hitz]]
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- 2026-10-12T1759 · [[Steve Bannon]]
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- 2026-10-12T1759 · [[James Eastland]]
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- 2026-10-12T1646 · [[Robert Maxwell]]
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- 2026-10-12T1641 · [[Unit 8200]]
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- 2026-10-12T1641 · [[Uruguay]]
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- 2026-10-12T1638 · [[Golda Meir]]
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- 2026-10-12T1638 · [[Reuben Yirador]]
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- 2026-10-12T1638 · [[Sasson Yishaek]]
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- 2026-10-12T1638 · [[NSA]]
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- 2026-10-12T1638 · [[NHAO]]
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- 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Skinwalker Ranch]]
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- 2026-10-12T1637 · [[National Institute for Discovery Science]]
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- 2026-10-12T1637 · [[Operation Paperclip]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Esquire]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Project Blue Book]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Robert McFarlane]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Project Azorian]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[LAKAM]]
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- 2026-10-12T1636 · [[Caspar Weinberger]]
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- 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Iran-Contra Affair]]
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- 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Ehud Barak]]
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- 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Amir Elichai]]
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- 2026-10-12T1635 · [[Operation NORTHWOODS]]
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- 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Carbyne]]
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- 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Amos Lapidot]]
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- 2026-10-12T1634 · [[Israel]]
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- 2026-10-12T1633 · [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident]]
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- 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Colm Kelleher]]
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- 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Agency for International Development]]
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- 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Yitzhak Shamir]]
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- 2026-10-12T1632 · [[Jonathan Pollard]]
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- 2026-10-12T1559 · [[James Moore]]
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- 2026-10-12T1558 · [[Lawrence Eagleburger]]
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- 2026-10-12T1558 · [[Kissinger Associates]]
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- 2026-10-12T1558 · [[BNL Scandal]]
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- 2026-10-12T1558 · [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]
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- 2026-10-12T1557 · [[R. Gordon Wasson]]
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- 2026-10-12T1557 · [[Frank Wisner]]
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- 2026-10-12T1557 · [[Time]]
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- 2026-10-12T1556 · [[Harry S. Truman]]
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- 2026-10-12T1556 · [[Stephen Kosslyn]]
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- 2026-10-12T1556 · [[Martin Nowak]]
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- 2026-10-12T1555 · [[Harvard University]]
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- 2026-10-12T1522 · [[William J. Casey]]
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- 2026-10-12T1522 · [[Timothy Leary]]
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- 2026-10-12T1520 · [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]
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- 2026-10-12T1520 · [[Clark Clifford]]
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- 2026-10-12T1520 · [[Securities and Exchange Commission]]
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- 2026-10-12T1520 · [[Radio Free Europe]]
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- 2026-10-12T1519 · [[Jonathan Beaty]]
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- 2026-10-12T1519 · [[Dark Alliance]]
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- 2026-10-12T1518 · [[Marvin Shoob]]
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- 2026-10-12T1518 · [[Frederick Lacey]]
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- 2026-10-12T1518 · [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program]]
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- 2026-10-12T1517 · [[Christopher Drogoul]]
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- 2026-10-12T1515 · [[Rockefeller Commission 1975]]
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- 2026-10-12T1515 · [[William Harvey]]
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- 2026-10-12T1513 · [[Robertson Panel]]
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- 2026-10-12T1513 · [[Abraham Feinberg]]
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- 2026-10-12T1512 · [[Project MKUltra]]
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- 2026-10-12T1511 · [[Bert Lance]]
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- 2026-10-12T1511 · [[Richard Helms]]
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- 2026-10-12T1511 · [[Kamal Adham]]
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- 2026-10-12T1510 · [[Financial General Bankshares]]
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- 2026-10-12T1510 · [[Faisal Saud al-Fulaij]]
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- 2026-10-12T1508 · [[Mohammed Rahim Motaghi Irvani]]
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- 2026-10-12T1505 · [[Robert S. McNamara]]
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- 2026-10-09T2351 · [[West Virginia]]
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- 2026-10-09T2351 · [[Operation Gold]]
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- 2026-10-09T2351 · [[Uri Geller]]
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- 2026-10-09T2351 · [[Gerald R. Ford]]
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ summary: "Alexander Acosta is the former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
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born: 1969-01-16
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location: "Miami, Florida (born)"
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created: 2026-06-20
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updated: 2026-09-25
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updated: 2026-10-12
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relations:
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- type: head_of
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with: "[[United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida]]"
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@ -100,29 +100,29 @@ The victims' broader effort to overturn the agreement ultimately failed at the a
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The review originated in a December 3, 2018 letter from Senator [[Ben Sasse]], chairman of a Senate Judiciary oversight subcommittee, citing the [[Miami Herald]] series; OPR opened its investigation on February 6, 2019. It recorded that a victims' attorney had raised allegations of improper influence in December 2010 and that OPR had declined to open an inquiry then in deference to the pending litigation. The Justice Department's [[Office of Professional Responsibility|Office of Professional Responsibility]] released a report on November 12, 2020, examining the conduct of Acosta and his subordinates in the Epstein matter. The report concluded that Acosta exercised "poor judgment" in resolving the federal investigation through a state plea agreement, but it did not find professional misconduct, stating that his decision to decline federal prosecution was within the scope of his authority and that there was no evidence the decision was based on corruption or other impermissible considerations.[^2][^7]
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OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^23]
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OPR located the "poor judgment" specifically in Acosta's failure to ensure that the state would notify the federally identified victims of Epstein's plea hearing, leaving victims uninformed about the proceeding that resolved an investigation about which the office had communicated with them for months. The report described the non-prosecution agreement as "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest" that had prompted the investigation, and it documented extensive concessions made to Epstein's lawyers. OPR found that Acosta's "application of federalism principles was too expansive, his view of the federal interest in prosecuting Epstein was too narrow, and his understanding of the state system was too imperfect to justify the decision to use the NPA," and that the three other supervisory subjects "left the USAO, were transitioning to other jobs, or were absent at critical junctures." It also concluded that the government's handling "gave victims and the public the misimpression that the government had colluded with Epstein's counsel to keep the NPA secret from the victims."[^7] The Executive Summary states that Acosta "made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein" through a state-based plea, and that he "participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms." It states that as United States attorney he had "plenary authority" to resolve the case as he deemed appropriate, and that he did not commit professional misconduct. It found that he exercised poor judgment both in choosing the non-prosecution agreement as the mechanism and in failing to make certain that the state would notify victims identified in the federal investigation of the state plea hearing.[^23] The summary records the agreement signed on September 24, 2007, the defense's request for review by the Criminal Division and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the June 23, 2008 determination that the deputy attorney general would not intervene, and the state plea of June 30, 2008.[^24] Before the report was final, the chief of the Public Corruption Unit of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the [[Southern District of New York]] reviewed the draft and on August 21, 2020 asked for two wording changes, which OPR accepted: "at least one victim known to be a minor" became "at least one victim believed to be a minor," described as "more accurately reflect[ing] our position in the bail arguments regarding Epstein," and a statement that investigators "were aware" Epstein used hidden cameras in his New York residence became that they "had learned" it.[^25]
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The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^24]
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The report also recorded internal dissent. The line prosecutor Ann Marie Villafana had objected to the access granted to Epstein's defense counsel and to meeting with them, and was overruled by supervisors; a footnote recorded her belief that an email from her supervisor [[Matthew Menchel|Matthew Menchel]] was meant to "put [her] in [her] place," while Menchel described her as having a history of resisting supervisory authority. OPR declined to refer Acosta or other prosecutors for disciplinary action on professional-responsibility grounds, a conclusion that victims' advocates characterized as a whitewash.[^26]
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One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^25]
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One of those supervisors was Matthew Menchel, chief of the office's Criminal Division, who left in August 2007, weeks before the agreement was signed, for the law firm [[Kobre & Kim]]. According to reporting on the full OPR report, Menchel had offered the 2007 plea terms to an Epstein lawyer he had formerly dated. Epstein estate records released by the [[House Oversight Committee]] in October 2025 show appointments, telephone calls, and dinners between Menchel and Epstein in 2011, 2013, and 2017. Menchel has said he had no business relationship with Epstein "at any point, not before, during or after my tenure," and has denied skiing with him, but did not deny meeting him after leaving the office.[^27]
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### Secretary of Labor and Resignation
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President [[Donald Trump|Donald Trump]] nominated Acosta as Secretary of Labor, and he was confirmed by the Senate on April 17, 2017 and sworn in that month, having previously chaired the National Labor Relations Board and served as dean of Florida International University's law school. The Florida agreement drew scrutiny during his 2017 confirmation but did not derail it; OPR recorded that at his March 2017 hearing he was "questioned only briefly about the Epstein case."[^1][^7]
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After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^26][^27]
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After the November 2018 Miami Herald investigation "Perversion of Justice" by [[Julie K. Brown|Julie K. Brown]] revived attention to the agreement, and after Epstein's July 2019 federal arrest in New York on new sex-trafficking charges, Acosta held a July 10, 2019, press conference defending his handling of the case, arguing that the state alternative had at least secured Epstein's registration as a sex offender and some jail time, and saying that the Palm Beach State Attorney's Office "was ready to allow Epstein to walk free with no jail time, nothing." Krischer answered the same day that Acosta's "recollection of the matter is completely wrong" and that "Mr. Acosta should not be allowed to rewrite history." He resigned on July 12, 2019, two days later, saying he did not want the controversy to distract from the administration's work and that it would be "selfish" to remain.[^1][^28][^29]
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On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^25][^28]
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On September 19, 2025 Acosta sat for a voluntary transcribed interview with the [[House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform|House Oversight Committee]] as part of its renewed inquiry into the federal handling of the Epstein and Maxwell cases; the committee released the transcript on October 17, 2025, together with Epstein estate records. Chairman [[James Comer|James Comer]] said Acosta had cooperated, and the committee separately sought records and testimony from other former officials. Acosta told the committee that prosecutors had avoided trial partly because some underage victims did not want to testify and a conviction was not assured, and he said he did not recall reading Villafaña's recommendation of a 60-count indictment. Lawmakers questioned him about the records of Menchel's later contacts with Epstein and about a photograph said to show the two skiing, which was not produced.[^27][^30]
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### Intelligence Claim
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In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^29][^30]
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In a July 2019 article for [[The Daily Beast|The Daily Beast]], journalist [[Vicky Ward|Vicky Ward]] reported that, according to an anonymous former senior [[White House]] official, Acosta had explained the lenient Epstein deal during his Labor Secretary vetting by saying he had been told that Epstein "belonged to intelligence" and to "leave it alone" because the matter was above his pay grade. Ward's report attributed the account to a single unnamed source, and commentators noted the source could not be independently confirmed. Ward had reported on Epstein for years and had earlier written a 2003 profile of him for Vanity Fair.[^31][^32]
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Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^31][^32]
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Acosta disputed the characterization. Asked about the reporting at his July 2019 press conference, he said he would "hesitate to take this reporting as fact." Under oath to Justice Department investigators he answered "no" when asked whether he had knowledge of Epstein being an intelligence asset, and the OPR review reported that none of the subjects it interviewed believed Epstein to have been an intelligence asset.[^33][^34]
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At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^28][^31]
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At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committee, Acosta again denied the intelligence account. Asked whether anyone had told him Epstein could not be prosecuted because he was an asset, he said "No one approached me and said that," and he stated that if there had been classified or secure information bearing on the case, established procedures would have been triggered that were never triggered. The intelligence claim remains an attributed, disputed assertion sourced to a single anonymous account rather than an established finding.[^30][^33]
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[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^33]
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[[William Barr]], Attorney General at the time of Epstein's 2019 arrest and death, was asked about the account in an August 18, 2025 deposition before the same committee. Asked whether he was aware of Acosta saying he had been told Epstein "belongs to intelligence and to leave it alone," Barr answered: "No. Other than what's ever been reported in articles over the years." He said he had "no reason to believe he was working for the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] or any intelligence agency, and I'm dubious about claims like that," offered the supposition that Epstein might, "like many other businessmen," have talked to intelligence officers who debrief well-connected people, and said that "if he was an American asset, as opposed to some businessman who shares stuff with the government, I would've heard about it from the intelligence agency."[^35]
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### Footnotes
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@ -148,14 +148,16 @@ At his September 19, 2025 transcribed interview with the House Oversight Committ
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[^20]: Opinion and Order, *Doe v. United States*, No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2019), ECF No. 478 (Marra, J.). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736/pdf/USCOURTS-flsd-9_08-cv-80736-2.pdf
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[^21]: *In re Wild*, No. 19-13843, 994 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. Apr. 15, 2021) (en banc), majority opinion at 2-3, 13; Branch, J., dissenting; Hull, J., dissenting. https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201913843.enb.pdf
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[^22]: Supreme Court of the United States, docket No. 21-351, order of February 22, 2022 denying certiorari. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-351.html
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[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
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[^24]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
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[^25]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
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[^26]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
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[^27]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
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[^28]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
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[^29]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
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[^30]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
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[^31]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, Executive Summary of the investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the 2006-2008 federal investigation of Jeffrey Epstein (November 2020), pp. 10-12. https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
|
||||
[^24]: Same Executive Summary, pp. 2-3.
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA00077309, DataSet 9, email, Chief, Public Corruption Unit, U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the Office of Professional Responsibility, "RE: Draft OPR Report," August 21, 2020. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00077309.pdf
|
||||
[^26]: "US Attorney Alex Acosta showed 'poor judgment' when giving Jeffrey Epstein state-based plea deal in 2008: DOJ," *ABC News,* November 12, 2020. https://abcnews.com/US/us-attorney-alex-acosta-showed-poor-judgment-giving/story?id=74178029 ; the Villafaña footnote passage appears in the body of the full OPR report of November 2020, not in the executive summary cited at note 7.
|
||||
[^27]: Debra Cassens Weiss, "Jeffrey Epstein had dinners with top criminal prosecutor in years following favorable deal, documents show," *ABA Journal,* October 20, 2025. https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/jeffrey-epstein-had-dinners-with-top-criminal-prosecutor-in-years-following-favorable-deal-documents-show
|
||||
[^28]: "Trump's Labor Secretary Alex Acosta resigns after criticism over Epstein deal," *Euronews,* July 12, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/12/trump-s-labor-secretary-alex-acosta-resigns-after-criticism-over-n1029226
|
||||
[^29]: "Former state's attorney pushes back against Acosta account of Epstein case," *The Hill,* July 10, 2019. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/452527-former-florida-state-attorney-pushes-back-against-acosta-account-of/
|
||||
[^30]: "Alex Acosta, former US attorney who negotiated Epstein's plea deal, appears before House Oversight Committee," *ABC News,* October 2025 (September 19, 2025 closed-door transcribed interview; transcript released October 17, 2025). https://abcnews.com/Politics/alex-acosta-former-us-attorney-negotiated-epsteins-plea/story?id=125731737
|
||||
[^31]: Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
|
||||
[^32]: "Did Jeffrey Epstein 'Belong to Intelligence'?," *Skeptic,* analyzing Vicky Ward's July 2019 Daily Beast report. https://www.skeptic.com/article/did-jeffrey-epstein-belong-to-intelligence/
|
||||
[^33]: "Acosta once said Epstein 'belonged to intelligence,'" *Newsweek,* July 2019. https://www.newsweek.com/alex-acosta-epstein-sex-trafficking-department-labor-1448568
|
||||
[^34]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, full report of November 2020 on the Southern District of Florida's resolution of the Epstein investigation (report body; the passage does not appear in the executive summary cited at note 7). https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
|
||||
[^35]: U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, deposition of William P. Barr, August 18, 2025, transcript released September 2025. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ tags:
|
|||
summary: "Chilean arms maker whose company supplied cluster bombs to Iraq in the 1980s, indicted in Miami in 1993 over zirconium exports, and named by Ari Ben-Menashe as a broker of CIA-backed arms channels."
|
||||
born: 1942-05-01
|
||||
location: "Santa Cruz, Chile"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: owned
|
||||
with: "[[Industrias Cardoen]]"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: owned
|
||||
with: "[[Swissco Management Group]]"
|
||||
role: "described by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1993-05
|
||||
role: "twenty-one count indictment, Southern District of Florida, May 26, 1993"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[Carlos Cardoen]] is a Chilean businessman and arms producer, owner of [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]]. He comes from an upper-class Chilean family of Italian descent. After attending university in the [[United States|U.S.]] and receiving a degree as a mining engineer, he returned to [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], after [[Augusto Pinochet|General Augusto Pinochet's]] 1973 coup d'état to work for the government-owned [[Chilean Mining Corporation]]. His job involved procuring explosives for mining, which became a lucrative business for him personally due to kickbacks.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -30,9 +30,9 @@ Cardoen later resigned and became a private contractor, securing a deal to suppl
|
|||
|
||||
After being rejected by Israel, Cardoen obtained a brokering license from the [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] (South Africa's government weapons manufacturer) with the help of the Chilean ambassador to [[South Africa]]. He then secured loans from Chilean banks and began operating as an arms producer and broker.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile, produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license. Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
|
||||
By 1985, Cardoen was selling arms to [[Iraq]], with the help of ARMSCOR and support from individuals connected to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], such as [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]]. He received blueprints for cluster bombs from Sanders and, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], produced these bombs with a covert U.S. license despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against Chile.[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3] Israel was interested in acquiring these bombs.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1985, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
|
||||
In 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Alan Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel, and was informed that Cardoen would sell to anyone who paid him. A few weeks later, Israel received cluster bombs from Santiago via diplomatic crate.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Gates]], then CIA deputy director for intelligence, was approached by [[Nachum Admoni]] ([[Mossad]] director) regarding U.S. support for Cardoen. Admoni expressed Israeli concerns about the support for Iraq, especially through Chile and South Africa. By this time, Cardoen owned two chemical weapons plants in Santiago, a cluster bomb factory in cooperation with Chile's military, and a third chemical weapons plant in [[Paraguay]]. He was also building a chemical weapons plant outside [[Baghdad]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -40,60 +40,62 @@ Cardoen's Santiago-produced chemical weapons and those from Paraguay used artill
|
|||
|
||||
In late 1986, Israel expressed concern about arms shipments to Iraq, with [[Yitzhak Shamir]] threatening to go to Congress. Robert Gates called a meeting in Santiago to calm the Israelis. Attendees included Cardoen, Gates, Senator [[John Tower]], [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]] (South African Military Intelligence), and [[Rodolfo Stange|Gen. Rodolfo Stange]] (Chilean Carabineros). At this meeting, U.S. officials made it clear they intended to maintain the arms channel to Iraq to bring Iraq into their sphere of influence, assuring Israel it would not be harmed. Cardoen continued to supply chemical weapons and cluster bombs to Iraq despite Israeli concerns.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^2]
|
||||
The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], in its October 24, 1991 report on the Gates nomination, recorded that Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing, and that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, which included analysis of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm them. The same report records that Cardoen denied meeting Gates in a letter of July 16, 1991 to the U.S. ambassador in Chile.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1988, Ari Ben-Menashe was sent to Chile to confront Cardoen. Ben-Menashe offered Cardoen a deal: Israel would license him to produce [[Uzi]]s, [[Galil assault rifles]], artillery shells, and mortars, and exclusively sell these materials throughout South America, in exchange for stopping his chemical trade with Iraq. Cardoen was given two weeks to consider the offer. During this visit, Cardoen introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Mark Thatcher]], implying Thatcher was involved in his business.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Cardoen was furious about Ben-Menashe's visit to his plant in Paraguay and his attempts to stop the trade. He claimed to have the backing of the Americans and the Chilean government, and threatened Israel if they interfered. He also revealed that Gates's office provided technology directly from the CIA, and that Ihsan Barbouti was a key link in his operations. He mentioned [[Alan Bond]] and British investors as backers.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^3] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
|
||||
In February 1989, Cardoen's plant in Paraguay was not closed down, thanks to [[Andres Rodriguez|President Andres Rodriguez]], who continued to rule the country with U.S. blessing. On May 26, 1993, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Florida in [[Miami]] returned a twenty-one count indictment against Cardoen, Industrias Cardoen Limitada (INCAR), Swissco Management Group, Inc., Franco Saffa, Jorge Burr, [[Edward A. Johnson]], Ronald W. Griffin and Teledyne Industries, Inc. d/b/a [[Teledyne Wah Chang Albany]].[^5] Ben-Menashe's account gives April 1992 and the U.S. Customs Service as the charging agency.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iquique and Baghdad
|
||||
|
||||
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^4]
|
||||
Cardoen's plant at [[Iquique]] turned out about a thousand cluster bombs a month with labor paid the equivalent of ninety dollars a month, and he priced them at about 7,000 dollars each, some 19,000 dollars below his European competitors. "I'll have to build [[Jimmy Carter]] a statue," he said. "If it hadn't been for the U.S. embargo we would never have invested in arms production here." His agent for Iraq, [[Nasser Beydoun]], who later sued him for 30 million dollars in commissions, carried his offer to Baghdad: "We can provide you with our cluster bombs at the lowest possible price." The first shipment, worth 21 million dollars, reached Iraq early in 1984, and Iraq came to supply about three quarters of his arms exports of 100 million dollars a year. Two American munitions plants were classified by American officials as scrap metal so that they could be exported to Chile. His Washington representative, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Rickertson, said: "It should have been quite evident to them that this was U.S. equipment because the placards on the bomb-making presses identified them."[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^4]
|
||||
A former contractor for the CIA described Cardoen as "an all-purpose asset, designed to be one of those offshore stockpilers of military equipment who could be used by the CIA to ship arms to the Afghan rebels, to the boys in Angola, or anywhere the U.S. needed some help." [[Howard Teicher]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff said of Robert Gates: "He was tight with Casey and with the [[White House]]. He was one of those who helped get things done." An associate of Cardoen, Robert Johnson, said he saw Gates arrive at Cardoen's house near Miami in the summer of 1986: "He and Cardoen had a series of meetings in 1986 and 1987. We needed an offshore supplier, and the Chileans were very cooperative." The White House said in July 1991: "The whole story is unfounded. There never were any sales, overt or covert, to Iraq or Iran through a third country. Mr. Gates never met with Carlos Cardoen." A subcontractor of his bought 330,000 power supplies from [[International Signal and Control|ISC]] and sent them on to a proximity fuse factory near Baghdad. The British journalist [[Jonathan Moyle]], who was inquiring into Cardoen's helicopter project, was found dead in a Santiago hotel on March 31, 1990.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miami arrest, Swissco and the Senate report
|
||||
|
||||
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^5][^6] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
|
||||
[[Kenneth R. Timmerman]] wrote that on August 2, 1983, U.S. Customs officers arrested Cardoen in Miami over night-vision goggles bound for Chile and that the case ended in a plea bargain with a 100,000 dollar fine on his company; a declaration by Howard Teicher dates the arrest to 1983 in a Miami sting concerning night-vision goggles bound for Cuba and Libya.[^7][^8] Teicher's corrective declaration of October 3, 1996 states that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^2] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^3] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^8]
|
||||
The Senate report records that the CIA employed [[James D. Theberge]] on its Senior Review Panel from January 1986 to January 1988, and that during much of that period he was a consultant to [[Swissco Management Group]], "a subsidiary of Cardoen Industries of Chile." Theberge had been U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1982 to 1985. The report states that Theberge disclosed the Swissco work and its Cardoen parentage in the personal history statement he gave the CIA in December 1985, that [[William J. Casey]], John McMahon and James Taylor were involved in his recruitment, and that there was no evidence Gates took part. It states that "Between 1984 and 1988, Cardoen Industries was of significant intelligence interest to CIA, which believed Cardoen was the primary supplier of cluster bombs to the Iraqi government, and an important supplier of other categories of ordnance to Iraq and other Middle Eastern states."[^4] Swissco Management Group, Inc. is among the eight defendants in the 1993 indictment.[^5] The Commerce Department order of September 11, 1995 states that Swissco Management Group, Inc., of Miami Lakes, was convicted on August 7, 1995 of exporting zirconium from the United States to Chile in violation of the terms of a Commerce export license.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miami property and the Graham fund-raiser
|
||||
|
||||
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^9]
|
||||
[[Justin Hibbard]] wrote in the *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine* in 2003 that Cardoen's Miami company Swissco invested Iraqi payments in Florida real estate; that the Commerce Department and the Customs Service announced a civil suit against Swissco in Miami on April 6, 1992, seeking to seize 30 million dollars in real estate; and that in August 1986 Cardoen helped organize a fund-raiser for U.S. Senator [[Bob Graham]] at the Miami home of the Swissco executive [[Anthony Mijares Jr.|Anthony Mijares]], which raised about 50,000 dollars.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^10]
|
||||
In September 2022 the Chilean investigative outlet [[CIPER Chile|CIPER]] reported that Cardoen's Miami investments grew into a real estate holding that it described, citing United States government estimates, as worth about 30 million dollars. CIPER reported that Graham and his wife sold Cardoen their house in [[Miami Lakes]] for 575,000 dollars, which is how Cardoen came to know Graham, then Florida's governor. CIPER also reported that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] seized Cardoen's checking accounts and real estate investments, including land, office complexes and subdivisions for a housing project, in Miami and Orlando, on suspicion of money laundering, and that the investigation was later dismissed after a settlement, with part of the assets returned to him.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Indictment, trial and extradition
|
||||
|
||||
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^11] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^3] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^3]
|
||||
The zirconium counts concern ordnance-grade zirconium sponge and compacts exported to Chile. The Eleventh Circuit wrote that Cardoen supplied the exporter with false end-use statements describing the zirconium as a booster material for industrial explosives, and that "The zirconium was used as an incendiary agent in cluster bombs that Cardoen was selling to Iraq for use in the Iran-Iraq war."[^13] The district court's order of 1994, reissued in 1995, noted Cardoen's "present fugitive status."[^5] On March 22, 1994 the court dismissed Counts II through VI against Teledyne on statute-of-limitations grounds.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^11] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^12]
|
||||
Edward A. Johnson, a sales manager at Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, was convicted by a jury on four counts, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 1998.[^13] A State Department notice records that Teledyne Industries pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida on January 26, 1995.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^3]
|
||||
A witness identified as "Linda C." of the CIA Directorate of Operations, who reviewed the agency file on Cardoen covering 1984 to 1993, testified at the classified-information hearing that Cardoen "was not an agent or source of intelligence for the United States government; on the contrary, Cardoen was a target; that is, an individual of intelligence interest to the government." The court adopted that conclusion for purposes of the hearing, and wrote that the Senate report "corroborates" it.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^6][^13]
|
||||
On January 31, 1995, Teicher signed a declaration in the case stating that "the CIA authorized, approved and assisted Cardoen in the manufacture and sale of cluster bombs." [[Robert Parry]] reported that the government sealed it as a state secret while attacking Teicher's credibility, and that Teicher was blocked from testifying.[^8][^15]
|
||||
|
||||
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^7]
|
||||
The United States served a corrective declaration signed by Teicher on October 3, 1996, with a notice of filing served November 8, 1996. In it Teicher wrote that attorneys for Teledyne had prepared the January declaration and faxed it to him, that he had not reviewed his National Security Council files since 1987, and that his statements in paragraphs 15 through 18 were his best memory and belief and not "categorical statements of fact." He wrote that he is "not aware of any specific evidence that the United States government or any government official or agency took steps to help Cardoen obtain any U.S.-origin components for use in cluster bombs." The corrective declaration does not address paragraphs 1 through 14 of the January declaration; as to paragraph 17 he wrote that, although he understood Cardoen had been arrested, "the other information in this paragraph is incorrect."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^14][^15]
|
||||
The United States formally requested Cardoen's extradition in March 2019. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reports that the Chilean Supreme Court rejected the request in March 2020; Emol reports that the Second Chamber of the Supreme Court unanimously rejected it on August 24, 2020, confirming a first rejection in March 2020 by the instructing minister Carlos Aranguiz, on grounds of dual criminality and prescription.[^16][^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
|
||||
[^3]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^4]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^5]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
|
||||
[^6]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
|
||||
[^7]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
|
||||
[^8]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
|
||||
[^9]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
|
||||
[^10]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
|
||||
[^11]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
|
||||
[^12]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
|
||||
[^13]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
|
||||
[^14]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
|
||||
[^15]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess. (October 24, 1991), section 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 186 to 188).
|
||||
[^5]: *United States v. Cardoen*, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (Highsmith, J.), No. 93-241-CR, reissued order on hearing under section 6 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (original order December 28, 1994), https://static.case.law/f-supp/898/cases/1563-01.json.
|
||||
[^6]: Friedman, Alan. *Spider's Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq*. Bantam, 1993, pp. 46-54, 64.
|
||||
[^7]: Kenneth R. Timmerman, *The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1991), p. 169.
|
||||
[^8]: Declaration of Howard Teicher, January 31, 1995, *United States v. Cardoen*, No. 93-241-CR-HIGHSMITH, as transcribed at http://spikethenews.blogspot.com/2016/01/the-teicher-affidavit.html.
|
||||
[^9]: Declaration of Howard R. Teicher (corrective), *United States v. Carlos Cardoen et al.*, No. 93-241-CR-Highsmith (S.D. Fla.), dated October 3, 1996, with the United States' notice of filing served November 8, 1996, paragraphs 2 to 7, https://archive.org/details/utf-893cr-241-de-679.
|
||||
[^10]: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, "Action Affecting Export Privileges; Swissco Management Group, Inc.; Order Denying Permission To Apply for or Use Export Licenses," dated September 11, 1995, 60 Federal Register 48964-48965 (September 21, 1995), FR Doc. 95-23363, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-09-21/pdf/95-23363.pdf.
|
||||
[^11]: Justin Hibbard, "The Chilean Connection," *San Francisco Chronicle Magazine*, March 2, 2003, https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/article/THE-CHILEAN-CONNECTION-Carlos-Cardoen-arms-2667085.php.
|
||||
[^12]: CIPER Chile, Alberto Arellano and Francisca Skoknic, "Los secretos de Carlos Cardoen en Panamá y la alerta por una de sus sociedades que fue vinculada a la venta de armas," September 14, 2022, https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/14/los-secretos-de-carlos-cardoen-en-panama-y-la-alerta-por-una-de-sus-sociedades-que-fue-vinculada-a-la-venta-de-armas/.
|
||||
[^13]: *United States v. Edward A. Johnson*, No. 95-5021 (11th Cir. Apr. 28, 1998), https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/19955021.OPN.pdf.
|
||||
[^14]: Department of State, Public Notice 2206, 60 Fed. Reg. 30151 (June 7, 1995), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1995-06-07/pdf/95-13834.pdf.
|
||||
[^15]: Robert Parry, "Iraqgate: Confession and Cover-up," *Extra!* (FAIR), 1995, as reposted at https://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0212/S00074.htm.
|
||||
[^16]: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, "Most wanted Chilean arms dealer concealed ties to companies with help from Panama's offshore industry," September 2022, https://www.icij.org/inside-icij/2022/09/most-wanted-chilean-arms-dealer-concealed-ties-to-companies-with-help-from-panamas-offshore-industry/.
|
||||
[^17]: "Suprema rechaza extradición Cardoen," Emol, August 24, 2020, https://www.emol.com/noticias/Nacional/2020/08/24/995884/Suprema-rechaza-extradicion-Cardoen.html.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ born: 1904-11-28
|
|||
died: 1986-02-19
|
||||
location: "Doddsville, Mississippi"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
James Oliver Eastland (November 28, 1904 to February 19, 1986) was born at [[Doddsville, Mississippi]], "only months after his father had orchestrated the gruesome lynching of a Black woman and her lover, who was accused of murdering Woods's twenty-one-year-old brother, James, in whose memory the newborn was named." His grandfather had bought more than 2,000 acres of [[Sunflower County, Mississippi|Sunflower County]] "for speculative purposes," and his father, Woods Eastland, a personal injury lawyer, made it a plantation. He studied at the [[University of Mississippi]], [[Vanderbilt University|Vanderbilt]], and the [[University of Alabama]], was admitted to the bar in 1927, and sat in the state legislature as a supporter of Governor [[Theodore G. Bilbo]]. When Senator [[Pat Harrison]] died in 1941, Woods Eastland declined the appointment and suggested his son. "The boy'll do it," said Governor [[Paul B. Johnson Sr.|Paul Johnson]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ On the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry he "zealously guarded the interests
|
|||
|
||||
### The Committees
|
||||
|
||||
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. In 1953 he became chairman of the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and in 1956 chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]], which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
|
||||
He left the Democratic ticket for the [[Dixiecrats]] in 1948. He joined the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] in 1951, became its chairman in 1955 and served as chairman until the Senate abolished the subcommittee in 1977.[^3] The subcommittee has been described as "a forum from which to hound suspected domestic subversives, especially those involved in civil rights activities and the labor movement," and he was chairman of the [[United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary|Judiciary Committee]] from the Eighty-fourth Congress through the Ninety-fifth Congress,[^4] which he made the "graveyard of civil rights legislation," blocking "more than one hundred civil rights measures." He told white audiences "that he once had special pockets sewn into his trousers so he could carry civil rights bills around with him to make sure no one called them up for consideration in his absence." Senator [[Herbert Lehman]] called him "a symbol of racism in America." The Episcopal Diocese of New York charged him with "subversion just as real and, because it comes from a U.S. Senator, far more dangerous than any perpetrated by the Communist Party." Senator [[Ted Kennedy]] praised the "scrupulously fair and even-handed manner in which he presided." [[Aaron Henry]] told him: "You have a master-servant philosophy with regard to blacks."[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Welch
|
||||
|
||||
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^3]
|
||||
On March 31, 1961, [[Robert Welch]] of the [[John Birch Society]] telegraphed Eastland asking the subcommittee to investigate the society. "None of our members will plead the Fifth Amendment." On July 3, 1962, Welch wrote that the society had spent "several thousand dollars" to send its members Eastland's speech "Is the Supreme Court Pro-Communist?" and closed "with admiration for both your patriotism and your courage."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^4]
|
||||
[[Wickliffe Draper]]'s money for the campaign against the Civil Rights Act went through the [[Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission]] of Eastland's state.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Hunts
|
||||
|
||||
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^5]
|
||||
"[[Nelson Bunker Hunt|Nelson Bunker]] and his father met President Nixon at the celebrated barbecue at [[John Connally]]'s Floresville ranch in the autumn of 1972. Soon after, Nelson Bunker huddled with [[Richard Kleindienst]], then the new boss of the Justice Department, at the plantation of Mississippi Senator James Eastland." The account came from Hunt sources. The wiretapping indictments of the [[Hunt brothers]] followed regardless.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Succession
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ Eastland became president pro tempore of the Senate in 1972 and "twice came with
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "James Oliver Eastland," *Mississippi Encyclopedia*. Center for Study of Southern Culture, University of Mississippi.
|
||||
[^2]: Morgan, Chester M. "James O. Eastland," *Mississippi History Now,* Mississippi Department of Archives and History, April 2011.
|
||||
[^3]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
|
||||
[^4]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
|
||||
[^5]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.
|
||||
[^3]: Senator James O. Eastland Collection, University of Mississippi, Modern Political Archives, File Series 4, Legislative, Subseries 10: Internal Security Subcommittee (finding aid). https://olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/archives/finding_docs/eastland/Eastland_File4_SS10.pdf
|
||||
[^4]: "EASTLAND, James Oliver," Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, entry E000018. https://bioguide.congress.gov/search/bio/E000018
|
||||
[^5]: Welch, Robert. Telegram to James O. Eastland, March 31, 1961, and letter, July 3, 1962, in Federal Bureau of Investigation files on the John Birch Society, compiled by Ernie Lazar from Freedom of Information Act releases.
|
||||
[^6]: Blackmon, Douglas A. "Silent Partner: How the South's Fight to Uphold Segregation Was Funded Up North," *The Wall Street Journal,* June 11, 1999, p. A1.
|
||||
[^7]: Porterfield, Bill. "H.L. Hunt's Long Goodbye," *Texas Monthly,* March 1975.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -8,22 +8,30 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Person
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
- Stargate
|
||||
summary: "Brigadier General James L."
|
||||
summary: "Brigadier General James L. Dozier was the U.S. Army deputy chief of staff at NATO's southern Europe command, kidnapped by the Red Brigades in Verona on December 17, 1981 and rescued January 28, 1982."
|
||||
born: 1931-04-10
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[U.S. Army]]"
|
||||
role: "Brigadier General; deputy chief of staff, NATO southern Europe command"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1982
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
location: "Arcadia, Florida"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1].
|
||||
Brigadier General James L. Dozier was a senior [[U.S. Army]] official and deputy chief of staff in the [[NATO]] Southern Command. On December 17, 1981, he was kidnapped from his penthouse apartment in Verona, [[Italy]], by the [[Red Brigades]], a Marxist-Leninist paramilitary group[^1]. A press clipping of the kidnapping describes him as "the highest-ranking U.S. officer in NATO's southern Europe command."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Dozier, a graduate of [[West Point]] and a [[Vietnam]] veteran, was reading a letter when his doorbell rang. Two young men, posing as plumbers, gained entry to his apartment. Dozier was attacked, and he and his wife, Judy, were bound and gagged. Dozier was then forced into a steamer trunk and secreted away in the back of a blue Fiat van[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^2][^3] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
|
||||
His abduction triggered a massive international response. The [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] offered a $2 million reward for information, and a Joint Special Operations Command team was dispatched to Italy. In Washington, the Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center of [[United States Army Intelligence and Security Command|INSCOM]], under Colonel Charles F. Scanlon, the command's deputy chief of staff for operations, asked the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] on December 18, 1981 to help provide [[Grill Flame]] derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for Dozier, and the first Grill Flame session on the case was held that day.[^3][^4] Jacobsen wrote that [[Dale Graff]] and the Grill Flame remote viewers at [[Fort Meade]] were tasked with providing intelligence to locate him.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1].
|
||||
Remote viewers, including [[Joe McMoneagle]], [[Hartleigh Trent]], and [[Ken Bell]], provided information that Dozier was still alive and in the same place. However, the information was often vague and disparate, making it difficult to pinpoint his exact location[^1]. A memorandum of March 23, 1982 from the Grill Flame project manager records a debriefing of Dozier on February 9, 1982, at which he was asked to review remote-viewing drawings made during the search and to comment on places and events of his captivity.[^5] A January 1982 Army message reported visions by several private individuals in Kent, Washington, concerning Dozier, describing a settlement called the "place of the shepherds" and a hallway behind metal bars.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Graff himself experienced vivid dreams and impressions, believing Dozier was held "upstairs in a room above a grocery store" in Padua. This information, combined with intelligence from a U.S. signals intelligence team, led Italian police to the exact street address where Dozier was being held[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^4] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^3] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^5]
|
||||
On Nightline in November 1995, Graff said of the Dozier case, "we had one viewer come up with the name of the city, Padua. We had another one come up with the name of the building he was in."[^7] INSCOM's 1983 briefing states that the drawing from the third session, on January 20, 1982, carried "NOTE THE NAME PADUA" and "WAS NOT FORWARDED TO ITALY," and that a drawing from the first session was used by a DIA analyst to brief the commander of the Southern European Task Force that the search should be concentrated in the Padua area two days before the rescue.[^4] A press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, stated that police confirmed a 22-year-old from Verona had revealed Dozier's place of captivity, an apartment above a grocery store in Padua.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
After 42 days in captivity, Dozier was rescued on January 28, 1982, by ten men from Italy's Central Operative Security Nucleus who stormed the apartment. He was found alive and was flown home to a hero's welcome, including an invitation to the [[White House]] from [[Ronald Reagan]][^1].
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -32,7 +40,10 @@ Despite the remote viewers' involvement, Dozier later stated that he finally fig
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
|
||||
[^2]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
|
||||
[^3]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
|
||||
[^4]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
|
||||
[^5]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.
|
||||
[^2]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240026-8, press clipping on the Red Brigades kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. Dozier. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100240026-8
|
||||
[^3]: Defense Intelligence Agency staff summary bearing the name of Jack Vorona, CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000700130004-8.pdf. The passage reads "was requested by COL C.F. Scanlon, the Deputy Chief of Staff: Operations, Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, INSCOM to assist in providing GRILL FLAME derived data to U.S. authorities in Europe concerning the search for BG Dozier." Other INSCOM documents in the collection (for example CIA-RDP96-00788R001100440042-7) identify COL Scanlon as DCSOPS, INSCOM, and two memoranda carry the signature block of Charles F. Scanlon (CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240002-4, CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250029-4).
|
||||
[^4]: US Army Intelligence and Security Command briefing on the Dozier search, 1983, CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R001700370002-3.pdf. The briefing reads "GENERAL DOZIER WAS KIDNAPPED THE EVENING OF 17 DECEMBER 1981. ON 18 DECEMBER, WE CONDUCTED OUR FIRST SESSION."
|
||||
[^5]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250001-4, memorandum of March 23, 1982 from Robert J. Jachim, GRILL FLAME project manager, on the debriefing of BG Dozier at the Command SCIF, Fort Meade, on February 9, 1982. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250001-4
|
||||
[^6]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250011-3, Army Intelligence and Security Command message of January 25, 1982 reporting visions concerning BG Dozier, including "THE PLACE OF THE SHEPHERDS." https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250011-3
|
||||
[^7]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News Nightline, November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7.
|
||||
[^8]: Press report datelined Rome, February 2, 1982, on General Dozier's press conference (publication not identified on the clipping), CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7, cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP96-00788R000100270006-7.pdf.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ summary: "Steve Bannon is the Breitbart chairman, Cambridge Analytica vice presi
|
|||
born: 1953-11-27
|
||||
location: "Norfolk, Virginia (born)"
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] (born November 27, 1953) is an American media executive and political strategist who served as executive chairman of [[Breitbart News|Breitbart News]] from 2012 (after founder [[Andrew Breitbart|Andrew Breitbart]]'s death) through 2016 and again 2017-2018, as vice president and secretary of [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] from June 2014 to August 2016, as chief executive of the [[Donald Trump|Trump]] 2016 presidential campaign from August 17, 2016, and as White House Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor to the President from January 20 to August 18, 2017. The [[Mercer family|Mercer family]] funded Breitbart, bankrolled Cambridge Analytica, and was instrumental in installing Bannon as Trump campaign CEO.[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Epstein sat for a videotaped interview with Bannon. A November 1, 2021 defense e
|
|||
[^4]: For the Breitbart-Gamergate pipeline, see the Gamergate page.
|
||||
[^5]: "The Mercers and Stephen Bannon: How a populist power base was funded and built." *Washington Post.* https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/mercer-bannon/ . For the June 2011 10 million dollar Breitbart investment, the Government Accountability Institute funding, and the *Clinton Cash* placement, see also "Steve Bannon used Robert Mercer's offshore millions to accuse Clinton of corruption." *ThinkProgress,* November 8, 2017.
|
||||
[^6]: Mayer, Jane. "New Evidence Emerges of Steve Bannon and Cambridge Analytica's Role in Brexit." *The New Yorker.*
|
||||
[^7]: "Christopher Wylie: Bannon wanted 'weapons' to fight a 'culture war' at Cambridge Analytica," testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018. *CBS News.* https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/senate-cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-live-stream-updates-today-2018-05-16 ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
|
||||
[^7]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8 and 9. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony ; and "How Steve Bannon used Cambridge Analytica to further his alt-right vision for America." *CNN,* March 30, 2018. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/30/politics/bannon-cambridge-analytica
|
||||
[^8]: Green, Joshua. *Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency.* Penguin Press, 2017. For the Make America Number 1 / Keep the Promise I super PAC and the Mercer contribution, see "Make America Number 1." *Ballotpedia.* https://ballotpedia.org/Make_America_Number_1
|
||||
[^9]: "Stephen Bannon removed from National Security Council." *Washington Post,* April 5, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/04/05/steven-bannon-no-longer-a-member-of-national-security-council/ ; Kuttner, Robert. "Steve Bannon, Unrepentant." *The American Prospect,* August 16, 2017. https://prospect.org/2017/08/16/steve-bannon-unrepentant/
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01615267, DataSet 10, iMessage log between Jeffrey Epstein and Steve Bannon, August 23, 2018. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01615267.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "son"
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
created: 2025-08-05
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
William P. Barr worked at the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] from 1973 to 1977 while attending law school at night. "During my tenure at CIA, 1973 to '77, the investigations of the agency started, and I moved to the legislative counsel's office," he recalled; as assistant legislative counsel under Director [[George H.W. Bush]] in 1976 he worked against legislation of Representatives [[Michael Harrington]] and [[Bella Abzug]] that would have required notice to people whose mail the agency had opened under [[HTLINGUAL]]. He then clerked for Judge [[Malcolm Wilkey]] of the [[United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit|D.C. Circuit]], a former head of the Justice Department's Criminal Division, who telephoned Bush for a reference. After private practice and the Reagan transition he joined the [[White House]] domestic policy staff, where he worked with [[C. Boyden Gray]], counsel to Vice President Bush. In 1988 he helped screen vice-presidential candidates through [[Robert Kimmitt]].[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ At the end of the administration Barr advised Bush to pardon [[Caspar Weinberger
|
|||
|
||||
Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019, before his confirmation as attorney general.[^5] His department oversaw the federal prosecution of [[Jeffrey Epstein]] that year. His father, [[Donald Barr]], was headmaster of the [[Dalton School]] in New York during the period in which Epstein, a college dropout, was hired there to teach; accounts differ on whether Donald Barr personally hired him.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
In a deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 18, 2025, Barr was asked whether he had recused himself from the Justice Department's review of the Florida prosecution and plea agreement of Epstein. He answered, "No, I didn't recuse myself." He said that the Southern District of New York investigation was "the only thing that I was aware of going on when I was there," and that "I don't recall playing a role in the review of that." He said he had considered whether to recuse from the New York matter, and that the decision not to recuse was made on input from the department's ethics office, by his recollection. Asked about the 2019 Office of Professional Responsibility inquiry into the Florida plea deal, he said, "I wasn't hovering over that or involved in that."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Asked about his father's role as headmaster of the Dalton School, Barr said, "It's not pertinent at all." Asked about [[Kirkland & Ellis]] representing Epstein in the non-prosecution negotiations, and about his former employment with the firm, he said, "I actually don't think I would've had to recuse myself from that. But I just was never involved in that."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Miller Center, University of Virginia. "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
|
||||
|
|
@ -88,3 +92,5 @@ Barr resigned from the board of [[Dominion Energy]] effective February 12, 2019,
|
|||
[^4]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993; Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
|
||||
[^5]: Dominion Energy, Inc. Proxy statement, 2019, SEC Form DEF 14A, director table, note 4. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/715957/000119312519085276/d693331ddef14a.htm
|
||||
[^6]: "The 'Epstein-Barr' Problem of New York City's Dalton School." *Law and Crime,* July 13, 2019, which states that Epstein was hired "by the school's headmaster Donald Barr in the mid 1970's". https://web.archive.org/web/2019/https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/the-epstein-barr-problem-of-new-york-citys-dalton-school/
|
||||
[^7]: Deposition of William P. Barr, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, August 18, 2025, pp. 47-48. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
|
||||
[^8]: Same transcript, pp. 51 and 92-93.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- "William Casey"
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- KeyFigure
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
start: 1971-04-14
|
||||
end: 1973-02-02
|
||||
fn: 16
|
||||
fn: 18
|
||||
---
|
||||
William Joseph Casey was born March 13, 1913, in Elmhurst, Queens, New York. He attended [[St. John's University]] and Fordham Law School, becoming a corporate and tax attorney. During World War II he served in the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS) under [[William J. Donovan|William "Wild Bill" Donovan]], rising to head the OSS's Secret Intelligence operations in Europe and coordinating the infiltration of agents into Nazi-controlled territory. After the war he became a wealthy lawyer and author of tax shelter guides. President [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] appointed him Chairman of the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] in 1971, a post he held through 1973. He managed [[Ronald Reagan]]'s 1980 presidential campaign. Reagan appointed him [[Director of Central Intelligence]] in January 1981, and he served as DCI until resigning due to illness in January 1987. He died May 6, 1987, at a hospital in Glen Cove, New York, having suffered a seizure in December 1986 and subsequently undergone brain surgery. He was subpoenaed to testify before the Senate [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] investigating committee but died before he could appear.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ Reagan approved the intelligence finding for covert operations in [[Nicaragua]]
|
|||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice had what Inspector General Hitz called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
|
||||
In early 1982, Casey and Attorney General [[William French Smith]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported to the [[Department of Justice]], and narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report.[^6] Gary Webb, after quoting [[Fred Hitz|Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^5] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^7] Robert Parry argued the timing proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Protecting Drug Traffickers
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -59,23 +59,23 @@ Casey decided not to raise allegations of [[Manuel Noriega|Noriega's]] cocaine t
|
|||
|
||||
### High Frontier correspondence
|
||||
|
||||
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^6] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^7]
|
||||
[[Daniel O. Graham]], the retired lieutenant general who directed the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from September 1974 to January 1, 1976, wrote to Casey about [[High Frontier]], the space defense group he had founded in 1981. On January 8, 1982 Casey wrote to Graham that the High Frontier prospectus was "very well done and deserving of close attention" and that he found "something of a disconnect" in its budget paragraphs, from a $35 billion figure to a higher $50 billion figure.[^8] Casey wrote to Graham on December 20, 1982 that he had enjoyed Graham's talk at the [[National Strategy Information Center]] breakfast and offered to arrange for Graham to exchange ideas with CIA officers knowledgeable about space and missile technology.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^8] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^9] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^10]
|
||||
On July 23, 1986 Graham wrote to Casey enclosing a paper titled "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", written after the loss of the shuttle Challenger, and urged Casey and [[Edwin Meese]] to "leave no stone unturned" in getting answers. A cover memorandum dated July 28, 1986, titled "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," carries Casey's instruction: "Please take the lead in drafting a response from me to General Graham."[^10] Casey replied on August 16, 1986, acknowledging Graham's letters of July 23 and 29, 1986, and rejected Graham's sabotage theory. He wrote that "we do not believe the U.S. space launch failures you cited were due to Soviet action," that the failures had been traced to "errors or procedural problems," and that "none of the investigations found any evidence of Soviet involvement."[^11] On December 8, 1986 Graham wrote to [[Robert Gates|Robert M. Gates]], then deputy director of the CIA, praising his assessment of Soviet strategic defense efforts, with a copy to Casey.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### National Intelligence Study Center
|
||||
|
||||
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^11]
|
||||
Casey is listed on the advisory board of the [[National Intelligence Study Center]] in Washington, alongside Graham and [[Paul Nitze]]. The board of directors of the center included [[Ray Cline]]. The center's invitation to an exhibit of intelligence books, dated November 3, 1983, carries these lists.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Recruitment of James D. Theberge to the Senior Review Panel
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^12] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^12] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^12] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^13] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^14] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^15]
|
||||
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, in its October 24, 1991 report on the nomination of Gates, named Casey as one of three CIA officials involved in the recruitment and selection of [[James D. Theberge]] for the Senior Review Panel, with Deputy Director [[John McMahon]] and Executive Director [[James Taylor]].[^14] The report states that "the Committee's documentary evidence makes clear that Director Casey was the CIA official most instrumental in recruiting Mr. Theberge."[^14] The report records that Theberge disclosed his consulting work for a Cardoen subsidiary in the personal history statement he submitted to the CIA in December 1985, and that he was hired on a three-days-per-week basis.[^14] CIA visitor records held in the reading room list Theberge as meeting the director at headquarters in November 1984 and, as "Ambassador Theberge," calling on the director on September 23, 1985.[^15] A routing sheet of August 12, 1985 confirms a courtesy call on the director at 1100 hours on August 14, 1985, twelve days after Theberge left his post in Chile, stating that he "has completed his tour in Chile and has no particular items to discuss."[^16] In a memorandum of August 19, 1985 titled "Soviet Game Plan," Casey told the Vice Chairman of the [[National Intelligence Council]]: "You will get in touch with Theberge, talk about the project generally, see what he has to contribute and perhaps have him do some work on the Latin America phase of it."[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Securities and Exchange Commission, 1971 to 1973
|
||||
|
||||
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^16] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^17]
|
||||
Casey served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973.[^18] During his chairmanship the commission was investigating the 1970 takeover of [[Investors Overseas Services]] by [[International Controls Corporation]]. The complaint filed in November 1972 described transfers of International Controls assets to entities controlled by [[Robert Vesco]].[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^18]
|
||||
The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a former majority leader of the New Jersey Senate, records that Sears conveyed Vesco's requests to [[John N. Mitchell]], then attorney general, in two letters and three meetings, and that Vesco hoped Mitchell could induce Casey "to monitor and limit the investigation." The opinion records that Mitchell telephoned Casey and arranged a meeting between Sears and the chairman. At that meeting Casey gave assurances that International Controls could respond to the investigation, and that he would personally review its claims of SEC harassment.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -83,17 +83,19 @@ The New Jersey Supreme Court's disciplinary opinion on [[Harry L. Sears]], a for
|
|||
[^2]: Sick, Gary. *October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan*. Times Books, 1991.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, October Surprise Task Force. *Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980*. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, January 1993.
|
||||
[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
|
||||
[^6]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
|
||||
[^7]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
|
||||
[^8]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
|
||||
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
|
||||
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
|
||||
[^11]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
|
||||
[^16]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^6]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^7]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
[^8]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, January 8, 1982, CIA-RDP83M00914R001900220074-1. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83m00914r001900220074-1
|
||||
[^9]: Letter, William J. Casey to Graham, December 20, 1982, CIA-RDP88B00443R001203980021-9, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88b00443r001203980021-9; the reading room also catalogues Graham's letter to Casey of December 9, 1982 under CIA-RDP83M00914R002400010001-8.
|
||||
[^10]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to William J. Casey, July 23, 1986, enclosing "Is the KGB Sabotaging SDI?", with the cover memorandum "Possible Soviet Sabotage of Our Space Program," July 28, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R001904460005-6.
|
||||
[^11]: Letter, William J. Casey to Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, August 16, 1986, CIA-RDP88B00443R002004470017-0.
|
||||
[^12]: Letter, Daniel O. Graham to Robert M. Gates, December 8, 1986, CIA-RDP88G01116R000700840002-1, copy to William J. Casey.
|
||||
[^13]: National Intelligence Study Center, invitation to the Russell J. Bowen collection exhibit, Georgetown University, November 3, 1983, CIA-RDP90-00806R000100430001-2.
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, "American Ambassadors" visitor log, November 1984 (1045), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000100040012-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000100040012-4; visitor record, September 23, 1985 (1645), CREST document CIA-RDP93-00415R000200230005-0, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp93-00415r000200230005-0.
|
||||
[^16]: Central Intelligence Agency, "DCI 14 August 1985 Meeting with Mr. James D. Theberge, Former U.S. Ambassador to Chile," August 12, 1985, CREST document CIA-RDP87M00539R000801050023-0. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m00539r000801050023-0
|
||||
[^17]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Game Plan," memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council, August 19, 1985, signed William J. Casey, CREST document CIA-RDP97M00248R000500220030-9. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp97m00248r000500220030-9
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Historical Summary of Chairmen and Commissioners" (William Casey, Chairman, April 14, 1971 to February 2, 1973). https://www.sec.gov/about/sec-commissioners/sec-historical-summary-chairmen-commissioners
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, News Digest, November 28, 1972 (complaint of November 27, 1972 against Robert L. Vesco and 41 other defendants; transfers from International Controls Corp.; purchase in early 1971 of 6,000,000 shares of Investors Overseas Services). https://www.sec.gov/news/digest/1972/dig112872.pdf
|
||||
[^20]: In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175 (1976) (Supreme Court of New Jersey, disciplinary opinion; the requests conveyed by Sears to Mitchell, and the meeting Mitchell arranged between Sears and Casey). https://static.case.law/nj/71/cases/0175-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
summary: CIA Inspector General whose 1998 investigation and congressional testimony revealed the agency's secret 1982 agreement with the Justice Department exempting CIA assets from drug crimes reporting.
|
||||
born: 1939-10-14
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who conducted the agency's internal investigation into Contra drug trafficking and testified before Congress in March 1998 about his findings.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -17,6 +18,14 @@ Fred P. Hitz was the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Inspector General who condu
|
|||
|
||||
Appearing before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] in March 1998, Hitz delivered some of the most damaging admissions in the agency's history. "Let me be frank about what we are finding," Hitz testified. "There are instances where CIA did not, in an expeditious or consistent fashion, cut off relationships with individuals supporting the Contra program who were alleged to have engaged in drug trafficking activity." When Congressman Norman Dicks asked whether any of these allegations involved trafficking in the [[United States]], Hitz answered: "Yes."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1954 Origin and the 1975 Regulation
|
||||
|
||||
The arrangement that the 1982 agreement later formalized dated from 1954. According to a memorandum by [[Lawrence Houston]], the CIA's general counsel, Houston discussed the reporting of federal crimes with Deputy Attorney General [[William P. Rogers]] on February 18, 1954, and the two agreed that the CIA would determine whether a potential violation by persons associated with the agency was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution. The memorandum states that the arrangement rested on the belief that the CIA was in the best position to determine whether classified information might be revealed in such a prosecution.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1975 [[Richard Thornburgh]], then assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, reminded the agency of its duty under 28 U.S.C. 535, and the CIA general counsel, [[John Warner]], replied that any informal referral agreement from the past had been abrogated. The agency's headquarters regulation of November 28, 1975 provided that crimes by government officers would be reported to the Attorney General and added that "CIA will not exercise a prosecutorial function."[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
In an interview for PBS Frontline (Drug Wars), Hitz said his staff "weren't ever able to find a memorandum of conversation or any evidence that indicated why it was done," and: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
Hitz revealed that from 1982 to 1995, the CIA operated under a secret agreement with the Justice Department that exempted the agency from reporting drug crimes committed by its non-employees, a category defined to include agents, assets, and non-staff employees. The agreement was "hammered out" between CIA director William Casey and U.S. Attorney General William French Smith in 1982. "The period of 1982 to 1995 was one in which there was no official requirement to report on allegations of drug trafficking with respect to non-employees of the agency," Hitz testified.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -28,3 +37,7 @@ Hitz's 400-page report, released in late 1998, was filled with examples of CIA c
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue: "The damage that has been done"
|
||||
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story*, Findings paragraph 42. https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^3]: Same report, Findings paragraph 43 (letter of July 24, 1975; reply of July 29, 1975).
|
||||
[^4]: Same report, Findings paragraph 44.
|
||||
[^5]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Henry Kissinger
|
||||
- Kissinger
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- KeyFigure
|
||||
|
|
@ -119,37 +119,9 @@ On December 6, 1975, in Jakarta, Kissinger and President Ford met with Indonesia
|
|||
|
||||
### Telephone Transcripts
|
||||
|
||||
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. Upon leaving office in January 1977, Kissinger removed the transcripts as personal papers and secretly shipped them to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]] on October 29, 1976, before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access. State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] drafted a complaint against both the Archivist of the United States and the Secretary of State on February 13, 2001; the government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in August 2001. The collection runs to more than 15,000 pages. These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
|
||||
Beginning in January 1969, Kissinger had his telephone conversations transcribed for his office files, a practice that continued through his tenure as Secretary of State. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger arranged to move the transcripts as personal papers from his State Department office to Nelson Rockefeller's estate in [[Tarrytown, New York]], before arranging a donation to the Library of Congress under terms excluding public access.[^kissrc] State Department lawyers advised in 1975 and 1976 that the transcripts were not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as personal property, despite having been created by government secretaries using government resources. William Safire's January 14, 1976, *New York Times* column, "The Dead-Key Scrolls," first brought the issue to public attention. The [[National Security Archive]] began corresponding with the Archivist of the United States, [[John W. Carlin]], about recovering the transcripts in January 1999. A complaint written by its pro bono counsel at [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and its attorneys wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Department of Justice on April 25, 2001. The government recovered copies of the transcripts to the National Archives and State Department in 2001, and a State Department statement of August 8, 2001 credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the transcripts, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^nsa123] These materials are documented in NSAEBB Briefing Book No. 852.[^telcons]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 12.
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 16.
|
||||
[^bio]: Nobel Committee, "Henry Kissinger – Biographical," *NobelPrize.org*, 1973. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1973/kissinger/biographical/
|
||||
[^seminar]: Harvard Crimson, "Kissinger, Harvard and the FBI," November 16, 1979; Frank Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 312-315 (CIA cutout funding to Harvard International Seminar).
|
||||
[^ssp]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Brothers Fund records, Special Studies Project, RG 4, 1956-1964 (finding aid FA387), rockarch.org; *Prospect for America: The Rockefeller Panel Reports* (Doubleday, 1961).
|
||||
[^nwfp]: Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1957); Hoover Institution review, https://www.hoover.org/research/nuclear-weapons-and-foreign-policy-henry-kissinger-council-foreign-relations-1957
|
||||
[^state]: Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, "Henry A. (Heinz Alfred) Kissinger," *People - Department History*, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/kissinger-henry-a
|
||||
[^doc11]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.1: White House Telcon, Kissinger to Melvin Laird, March 15, 1969. Source: DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations.
|
||||
[^doc12]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.2: White House Telcon, Kissinger-Nixon, March 17, 1969. Source: DNSA.
|
||||
[^doc13]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.3: White House Telcon, General Wheeler to Kissinger, March 18, 1969. Source: DNSA.
|
||||
[^doc16]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.6: FBI Memorandum, "Colonel Alexander M. Haig Technical Surveillance Request," May 12, 1969. Source: Elliot Richardson Papers, Library of Congress.
|
||||
[^doc17]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 1.7: FBI J. Edgar Hoover Wiretap Surveillance Report to President Nixon, May 11, 1970. Source: Richard Nixon Presidential Library.
|
||||
[^halperin]: *Halperin v. Kissinger*, 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976); settled November 1992.
|
||||
[^chile]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 437, ed. Peter Kornbluh (September 11, 2013), Documents 1-10; *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Volume XXI, Chile, 1969-1973 (U.S. Government Publishing Office).
|
||||
[^condor]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 4.1: State Department Action Memorandum, "Operation Condor," August 30, 1976; Document 4.2: State Department Cable, "Actions Taken," September 16, 1976. Source: National Security Archive FOIA.
|
||||
[^doc32]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.2: State Department Memcon, "Secretary's Meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti," October 7, 1976. Source: FOIA release, November 2003.
|
||||
[^doc33]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 3.3: State Department Memo, "Foreign Minister Guzzetti Euphoric over Visit," October 19, 1976. Source: Argentina Declassification Project, August 20, 2002.
|
||||
[^doc51]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.1: U.S. Consulate Dacca Cable, "Dissent from U.S. Policy Toward East Pakistan," April 6, 1971. Source: NARA, RG 59, SN 70-73.
|
||||
[^doc52]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 829, Document 5.2: White House Memorandum for the President, "Policy Options Toward Pakistan," April 28, 1971. Source: NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 625.
|
||||
[^doc61]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62; Document 4: Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 (Secret/Nodis), December 6, 1975. Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A3.
|
||||
[^telcons]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 852, ed. William Burr (February 13, 2024), Documents 1-34; NSAEBB No. 123 (The Kissinger Telcons) and NSAEBB No. 263 (The Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts).
|
||||
[^c1]: Gerard Colby and Charlotte Dennett, *Thy Will Be Done: The Conquest of the Amazon*. HarperCollins, 1995. Ch. 25, 27.
|
||||
[^c2]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29.
|
||||
[^c3]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 24.
|
||||
[^friele]: Colby and Dennett, Ch. 29; Rockefeller Archive Center, Berent Friele Papers (FA468).
|
||||
[^qp1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XIX, National Security Policy*, document 42, editorial note on the Quantico II Panel, pp. 153-154, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v19/d42. Lists "Dr. Henry A. Kissinger of Harvard University" among the twelve invited on August 16, 1955.
|
||||
[^qp2]: "Psychological Aspects of United States Strategy: Source Book of Individual Papers," November 1955, CIA reading room copy, CIA-RDP86B00269R000300120001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp86b00269r000300120001-4. Contents, paper 16, "Psychological and Pressure Aspects of Negotiations with the USSR," by Henry A. Kissinger.
|
||||
[^qp3]: Daniel Morris Bessner, "The Night Watchman: Hans Speier and the Making of the American National Security State" (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2013), p. 261 and note 129, citing Gordon H. Chang, *Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972* (Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 151. Bessner's note 129 is on his list of the eleven members: it states that Henry Kissinger attended some sessions, as did members of the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, the Operations Coordinating Board and the NSC.
|
||||
[^qp4]: Bessner, "The Night Watchman," pp. 264-265 and note 146, citing Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (Simon & Schuster, 2005), pp. 90-91, on the two men's earlier contact at the first panel.
|
||||
[^qp5]: Rockefeller Archive Center, Nelson A. Rockefeller personal papers, Hugh Morrow Interviews, Series Q, Subseries 2, "Henry Kissinger Interview," Spring 1980, scope note, https://dimes.rockarch.org/collections/H45i6yf7MUHuaRwQVupvg5.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,10 +11,17 @@ tags:
|
|||
- SupremeCourt
|
||||
- JudicialCrisisNetwork
|
||||
- ConcordFund
|
||||
summary: "Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist, the longtime executive vice president of the Federalist Society, the principal architect of the Supreme Court conservative supermajority through the Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett confirmations, and the chairman of Teneo Network, who has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles to reshape the American judiciary."
|
||||
summary: "Leonard Leo is a conservative legal activist, longtime Federalist Society executive vice president and Teneo Network chairman, who directed roughly one billion dollars in dark-money spending through linked 501(c)(4) groups."
|
||||
location: "United States"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2023-07-11
|
||||
role: "requested information on his interactions with Supreme Court justices and records on his donor-group network; his counsel declined to provide it"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Leonard Leo is an American conservative legal activist who served as the longtime executive vice president of the [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] and who has been the principal architect of the [[Supreme Court|Supreme Court]]'s conservative supermajority through his role advising President [[Donald Trump]] on the selection and confirmation of [[Neil Gorsuch|Neil Gorsuch]] (2017), [[Brett Kavanaugh|Brett Kavanaugh]] (2018), and [[Amy Coney Barrett|Amy Coney Barrett]] (2020). Leo became chairman of the [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] in 2021 and has directed approximately one billion dollars in dark-money spending through a network of linked 501(c)(4) vehicles, including the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]), to reshape the American judiciary and, through the Teneo chairmanship, to extend the operational model across American institutional life.[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -29,7 +36,9 @@ The *ProPublica* profile "We Don't Talk About Leonard" (March 2023) is the found
|
|||
|
||||
Leo's dark-money operation runs through a network of linked 501(c)(4) organizations that permit political spending without donor disclosure. The primary vehicle is the Judicial Crisis Network (now the Concord Fund), which [[CREW|Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington]] reported brought in nearly 48.1 million dollars in a single reporting period to support the conservative judicial-confirmations project. The broader network of Leo-linked organizations has funneled over one billion dollars in undisclosed spending across the judicial-selection, political-advocacy, and institutional-influence operations, per the [[Alliance for Justice|Alliance for Justice]] and [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] investigations.[^2][^5][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply, and his counsel's letter to the Committee (July 2023) pushed back on the "dark money" and "phony front groups" characterizations. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
|
||||
The dark-money infrastructure operates through a layered structure of 501(c)(4) social-welfare organizations and 501(c)(3) charities that transfer funds to each other in chains designed to obscure the original donors. The [[Senate Judiciary Committee|Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Dick Durbin|Dick Durbin]] has sought Leo's records and testimony; Leo has declined to comply. The investigative record relies on leaked tax filings, whistleblower disclosures, and the reporting of ProPublica, CREW, and the Alliance for Justice.[^3][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 11, 2023, Chairman Durbin and Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, asked Leo for information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^7] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023 that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web," argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to his views, and said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. It closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Teneo Chairmanship and the Institutional Expansion
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
title: Lyman Lemnitzer
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- General Lemnitzer
|
||||
|
|
@ -13,13 +13,20 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- 1960s
|
||||
category: "Military"
|
||||
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962 who signed the Operation NORTHWOODS document proposing staged false-flag attacks against Americans to justify an invasion of Cuba, was transferred to command NATO forces in Europe after President Kennedy rejected the proposals and declined to reappoint him."
|
||||
summary: "General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1960 to 1962, signed the Operation NORTHWOODS memorandum, and then served as Supreme Allied Commander Europe from 1963 to 1969."
|
||||
born: 1899-08-29
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[NATO]]"
|
||||
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Europe"
|
||||
start: 1963-01-01
|
||||
end: 1969-07-01
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
died: 1988-11-12
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1960 to October 1962. His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^1]
|
||||
General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (August 29, 1899 - November 12, 1988) served as Chairman of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] from October 1, 1960 to September 30, 1962.[^1] His tenure as Chairman is primarily remembered in the historical record for his signature on [[Operation NORTHWOODS]] - the March 13, 1962 document proposing staged false-flag operations, including attacks on American citizens, that could be blamed on [[Cuba]] and used to justify a U.S. military invasion. The proposals were rejected by Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]] and President [[John F. Kennedy]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Military Career
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -33,15 +40,21 @@ The context for Operation NORTHWOODS was the problem that confronted U.S. milita
|
|||
|
||||
On March 13, 1962, Lemnitzer signed a document titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" and submitted it to Secretary of Defense McNamara. The document - which became publicly known as Operation NORTHWOODS after declassification in 1997 - proposed manufacturing the pretext for invasion through a series of false-flag operations. These included staging a Cuban attack on a U.S. Navy vessel at [[Guantanamo Bay]], organizing a fake "terror campaign" in Miami and Washington, D.C., staging aircraft incidents in which planes would be "attacked" by ostensibly Cuban aircraft, and explicitly contemplating staged incidents in which American civilians would be killed.
|
||||
|
||||
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in October 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^1]
|
||||
McNamara rejected the document. Kennedy's displeasure with Lemnitzer's overall approach to Cuba and civil-military relations was clear; when Lemnitzer's term as JCS Chairman expired in 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint him. Lemnitzer was instead appointed Supreme Allied Commander Europe ([[SACEUR]]), commanding NATO forces from 1963 to 1969.[^2] His move to the European command was announced in July 1962; at the news conference of July 23, 1962 Kennedy said Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^3] He became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on January 1, 1963, and he retired on July 1, 1969.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Career
|
||||
|
||||
In 1975 Lemnitzer served on the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (the [[Rockefeller Commission]]), and from 1976 to 1978 he served on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Significance
|
||||
|
||||
Lemnitzer's role in NORTHWOODS is historically significant primarily for what it reveals about how senior American military officers thought about manufactured pretexts for military action. The document is not unique in Cold War operational planning history - planners in multiple governments explored similar concepts - but its systematic treatment and formal submission through the chain of command make it an unusually clear record of such thinking.
|
||||
|
||||
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^2]
|
||||
The fact that Kennedy and McNamara rejected NORTHWOODS has been cited by historians as evidence that civilian oversight mechanisms functioned in this instance - the system produced the correct outcome despite the Joint Chiefs' submission of an extraordinary proposal. Critics note that the rejection was not accompanied by any disciplinary action against the officers involved, and that Lemnitzer's subsequent NATO command represented a promotion in terms of theater command authority.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
|
||||
[^2]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.
|
||||
[^1]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
|
||||
[^2]: Bamford, James. *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency.* Doubleday, 2001. Original document: "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (TS), JCS files, March 13, 1962; declassified 1997. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
|
||||
[^3]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
|
||||
[^4]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007. Prados, John. *The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength.* Dial Press, 1982.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- El Perico
|
||||
- El Maestro
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-08
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Organized Crime"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1989-02-08
|
||||
role: "sealed San Francisco indictment, conspiracy to distribute cocaine"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
fn: 20
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Sandra Smith]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
|
|
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1986-09
|
||||
end: 1991-11
|
||||
role: "San Francisco historical conspiracy case and 1989 fugitive file"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
fn: 20
|
||||
---
|
||||
Norwin Meneses Cantarero, born June 21, 1943, and known in Nicaragua as "El Rey de la Droga" and "El Perico," was a [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] cocaine trafficker who moved between [[Managua]], the [[San Francisco]] Bay Area and [[Costa Rica]].[^1] From 1980 the [[DEA]] and the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] opened a series of cases on his family's organization, in which his nephews and associates were convicted and he was not; from July 1986 the DEA's Costa Rica office used him as a source and then as an informant while the FBI in San Francisco was assembling a case against him; a sealed federal indictment followed in 1989; and Nicaraguan police arrested him on November 3, 1991 with 764 kilograms of cocaine.[^1][^2] [[Gary Webb]] wrote that he was the [[Cali Drug Cartel|Cali cartel's]] representative in Nicaragua and a recruiter, arms supplier and benefactor of the [[Contras]]; the Justice Department's Inspector General found he gave the Contras little, dealt with all sides, and had no CIA connection.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -81,63 +81,63 @@ Immigration records show that on September 11, 1980 Meneses was refused admissio
|
|||
|
||||
DEA agent [[Sandra Smith]], who worked in the San Francisco office from 1974 until 1984, opened her first case on the organization in July 1980, when police searching the San Francisco house of his nephew Roger Meneses found twenty pounds of cocaine; the charges were dismissed because the search followed an illegal traffic stop. In September 1981 a Baldwin Park police tip led her to follow a Los Angeles dealer, Julio Bermudez, who flew to San Francisco, visited a house in Dale City that belonged to [[Carlos Cabezas]] and then the house of another nephew, Jairo Meneses; Los Angeles police seized $12,000, three pounds of cocaine and a ledger entry "11-11 90,000 to Jairo," and Bermudez said he had gotten the drugs from Norwin Meneses. A November 16, 1981 search of Jairo's house produced $9,000 and ledgers, and prosecution was declined by Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Eric Swenson]] because no drugs were found. Smith filed a November 1981 affidavit stating that the DEA "has developed information over the past several years that the Meneses Family has been involved in the smuggling and distribution of cocaine in the San Francisco Bay Area"; she said she wanted a task force and was refused, which she attributed to the low status of women at the agency and not to the CIA, and she shredded her personal notes when she left in December 1984 after offering them to a colleague who declined. Her supervisor Saverio Weidl said she never asked him to lead a task force.[^1][^6] Webb wrote that Smith called the case "the only thing that I ever worked, in all the time I worked there, that I thought was really big."[^4] The San Jose paper's report that her investigation was halted for reasons "not clear" was examined by the Inspector General, who found no improper halt; he also noted that Smith's own surveillance report had recorded that Cabezas lived at the Dale City house, contrary to the newspaper.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
|
||||
The IRS opened a net-worth tax case in 1983 and closed it because it could establish income for only one year and Meneses could claim a cash hoard from Nicaragua. The San Francisco United States Attorney's Office had declined prosecution in the tax case that year because of weak or insufficient evidence, and the IRS concurred with that decision.[^7] DEA agent John Rotunno then ran two cases: undercover purchases from November 1983 to January 1984 led to nine arrests beginning in February 1984, including Roger Meneses, who received six years; and an informant's report that Norwin wanted him to run the San Francisco operation because he disapproved of Jairo's management led, on November 27, 1984, to the arrest of Jairo Meneses and [[Renato Pena]] after they delivered a kilogram to undercover officers. Jairo told Agent Thomas Ma that Norwin had supplied the cocaine and had been waiting at Jairo's house for the money, then fled to Costa Rica, and that the organization sold on consignment to ten to twelve buyers, one of them [[Danilo Blandon]]. Jairo and Pena pleaded guilty on June 10, 1985 and each received a year in a work-furlough facility. Ma opened a case on Norwin on January 23, 1985 and closed it in June 1986 because the informants' arrests made their information stale; he and Rotunno said no one pressured them.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The agent in the bowling alley
|
||||
|
||||
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^7] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
|
||||
Jairo Meneses's lawyer told the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility in June 1985 that Norwin had paid a DEA agent for information. Jairo said that in the summer of 1982 Norwin tried to hand the agent $5,000 in a bowling alley in Dale City and that he passed it on; Pena said he overheard the Meneses discuss it. The agent, and a confidential informant who said he had posed as a "crooked" agent to the Meneses, denied any payment; a DEA polygraph found Jairo deceptive and the FBI's July 1986 polygraphs found Jairo and Pena deceptive; the DEA cleared the agent on February 3, 1986. Meneses repeated the allegation to Gonzalez in February 1987, saying he paid the agent $5,000 "on numerous occasions." Pena told the Inspector General in 1997 that the agent warned Norwin weeks before the February 1983 Frogman arrests; he also told the Inspector General, which noted the conflict, that FBI agent Manuel Hinojosa had heard from him only of a paid San Francisco police officer. Webb wrote that Pena told the Justice Department of a DEA agent on Meneses's payroll who warned of the arrests of [[Julio Zavala]] and Cabezas.[^6][^8] A San Francisco economist given the pseudonym "David Morrison" told FBI agents on January 21, 1987 that a Customs officer had told him Meneses would have been arrested in 1983 or 1984 but for a warning from a corrupt DEA officer; Morrison told the Inspector General he had no first-hand information and that the Customs officer said no such thing.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Contras
|
||||
|
||||
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^8] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
|
||||
The records agree that Meneses attended Contra meetings in San Francisco and gave some money; they disagree on how much and why. Meneses told the CIA's Inspector General that between 1983 and 1984 his main role was recruiting Nicaraguans for the [[FDN]] at the request of [[Enrique Bermudez|Enrique Bermúdez]], that he sat on a fundraising committee without leading it, that he gave at most about $3,000 between 1982 and 1984, and that Bermúdez "was very strict and did not want anyone involved in drugs." He told the Justice Department he gave about $3,000 between 1982 and 1985 and denied that he or anyone sold drugs for the Contras.[^5][^9] Webb quoted Meneses as saying he became Bermúdez's "intelligence and security adviser in California," that Bermúdez was a friend since he was a lieutenant, that Edmundo had known Bermúdez since childhood, and that "nobody would join the Contra forces down there without my knowledge and approval." Webb cited [[Dennis Ainsworth]], a San Francisco Contra supporter, telling the FBI in 1987 that Meneses and Bermúdez dealt arms and drugs, and later telling Webb that Meneses "was national. And he was totally protected."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^9] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
|
||||
[[Adolfo Calero]] told the Inspector General he met Meneses at Contra social events in San Francisco, that Meneses never held an FDN position, that Bermúdez told him Meneses had visited the Contras' first Honduran camp and given the troops a crossbow, and that he would have remembered receiving $500. The Examiner reported on June 23, 1986 that Calero said he had met Meneses as many as four times.[^5] [[Edgar Chamorro]] told the Examiner that he and [[Frank Arana]] flew to San Francisco in October 1982 to name local FDN leaders, that Meneses stood in the back of the meeting, helped arrange a Los Angeles meeting the next day, and was "one of the main contacts in L.A."; Renato Pena, the self-styled FDN representative in northern California from late 1982 to mid-1984, told federal investigators in 1997 that he heard Meneses telephone Bermúdez in Honduras and relay requests for silencers, crossbows and military equipment.[^5][^10] The FDN representative who replaced Pena, Tony Navarro, said Meneses came to a couple of meetings, was never a member and, as far as he knew, gave nothing; the Contra supporter Carlos Rocha put Meneses's gifts at perhaps $5,000; "David Morrison" recalled hearing of a $40,000 donation in 1981 and that Meneses traded weapons for cocaine paste with the Sandinistas.[^5][^6] The Inspector General found Navarro, Rocha and LA CI-1 substantially credible and found no concrete evidence, "such as bank records or drug ledgers," that money from Blandón or Meneses reached the Contras; it concluded that Meneses's reputation preceded him in the exile community, so that people dealing with him "knew or should have known" his money was probably illicit.[^5] The Inspector General also reported that several people familiar with him said he "lacked any political allegiance and would deal with anyone who would provide cocaine at the lowest price," and that Jairo Meneses told prosecutors in 1986 he dealt with leaders of both the Contras and the Sandinistas, getting cocaine from Sandinista officials through Margarita Castana, a niece of the Sandinista commander Bayardo Arce.[^1][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^8]
|
||||
In April 1986 a DEA analyst interviewed an informant the Inspector General calls SR3, who had worked on the Meneses investigation for three years and was considered extremely reliable; SR3 said Meneses was trafficking both for himself and to raise money for the Contras, that some proceeds bought weapons in Colombia, and that Meneses boasted that "United States agents would assist him." SR3 had no first-hand knowledge beyond what Meneses told him.[^5] Pena told the DEA in the early 1980s that the CIA allowed the Contras to fly drugs into the United States; the Inspector General records he did not repeat it, and told the inspectors he made six to eight trips carrying $600,000 to nearly $1 million from San Francisco to a Colombian called "Carlos" in Los Angeles and returned with six to eight kilograms of cocaine each time, and that "Carlos" said "we are helping your cause with this drug thing."[^5] A CIA domestic station cable of October 22, 1982, relaying an INS informant, reported links between a religious organization and two Nicaraguan counter-revolutionary groups involving "an exchange in the US of narcotics for arms" and a planned meeting in Costa Rica; the November 3 follow-up named Pena as one of four FDN representatives; headquarters instructed the station on November 13 not to pursue it because of the involvement of United States persons and said on November 17 that the informant had probably been misinformed.[^5][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^9] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^8] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^10]
|
||||
Webb described Meneses's FDN role as public, with Contra functions at his homes, and cited Cornejo saying Meneses's "heart and soul was into the movement"; he also wrote that Meneses worked with [[Ronald Lister]] on weapons for El Salvador and the Contras, with Meneses telling investigators that "if I told you where we got them, governments would fall," and that he introduced Blandón through [[Donald Barrios]] and gave him the seminar on selling cocaine.[^10] Meneses told the Inspector General that he and Blandón grew up together and were related, that he knew nothing of Blandón's trafficking, and that Blandón "tended to exaggerate his importance."[^5][^9] He told Rosenfeld in 1986 that he had trafficked cocaine for about six months in 1982 and stopped because a relative became ill from it; the *Examiner* article ran two days before the House vote on the $100 million Contra aid package, Webb wrote, and drew no major newspaper's follow-up.[^5][^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Frogman network
|
||||
|
||||
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^7] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^11][^12] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^12][^13]
|
||||
Webb wrote that Meneses's Costa Rican pipeline ran through [[Horacio Pereira]] and [[Troilo Sanchez|Troilo Sánchez]], who supplied Peruvian cocaine hidden in woven baskets to Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas in San Francisco, with profits carried back to Costa Rica and Honduras.[^8] Cabezas told the Inspector General in 1997 that Meneses had no connection to the Zavala organization and was not affiliated with any Contra group; Troilo Sánchez said Pereira and Meneses had trafficked together since before Somoza fell; the FBI's November 8, 1982 teletype named Pereira "the major source of cocaine smuggling from Costa Rica to the United States."[^12][^13] The Senate's Kerry subcommittee reported that Pereira was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to 12 years; the Justice Department's inspectors were told he was dead.[^13][^14]
|
||||
|
||||
### Costa Rica
|
||||
|
||||
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^8][^14] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^15][^16] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^17]
|
||||
Jairo's account puts Meneses's flight to Costa Rica in late November 1984; an FBI report put his departure in 1985, when he sold his San Francisco properties; the Inspector General records that a 1984 DEA Costa Rica report already described him as living there and smuggling kilograms.[^1] CIA cables reported that on December 5, 1984 a station relayed allegations that Meneses, a trafficker called Tuto Munkel and Sebastian "Guachan" Gonzalez Mendieta were known as the "Nicaraguan Mafia, dealing in drugs, weapons smuggling and laundering of counterfeit money," and that Meneses owned a restaurant in which Gonzalez might have had an interest; a June 11, 1986 cable relayed that in August or September 1984 Meneses asked the Contra leader [[Fernando Chamorro|Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro]] to help "move drugs" to the United States; the CIA's inspectors found no record that it followed up.[^9][^15] An informant told the DEA that Meneses had political protection from Jose Marti Figueres, son of the former Costa Rican president, according to Webb, who also reported that the Costa Rican newspaper *La Nación* ran a series in December 1986 describing Meneses as a Contra financier hiding in the country.[^16][^17] A DEA cable of December 3, 1986 reported he had been identified as a major trafficker in the leading Costa Rican newspaper and was afraid of publicity or deportation.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### DEA source and informant, 1986 to 1990
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^17] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^15]
|
||||
In July 1986 Meneses went to the DEA's Costa Rica office and told agent [[Sandalio Gonzalez]] that he wanted to cooperate; Gonzalez's report listed three reasons: to clear a minor problem with the IRS, to end his drug trafficking, and to help President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s drug war and "total commitment to free his native land." Meneses named about twenty-one major traffickers, including Blandón, whom he called a Sandinista sympathizer distributing hundred-kilogram lots, and he refused to testify, to be seen near the embassy or to be a registered informant. Gonzalez treated him as a source of information and not an informant, which the DEA's manual defines differently and which kept him out of the DEA's informant database until 1987.[^18] Meneses told Webb he had helped the DEA in the case of the February 1985 murder of agent [[Kiki Camarena|Enrique "Kiki" Camarena]] and met the DEA attaché Robert J. Nieves in late 1985; Webb wrote that the claim could not be corroborated, though Gonzalez's report noted that Meneses "helped the DEA in the past."[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^17] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^16][^17][^18]
|
||||
On October 9, 1986 Gonzalez opened a DEA case on Blandón on Meneses's information. On December 21, 1986 Meneses and DEA CI-1, an experienced informant who claimed to have worked for the CIA years before in Europe and the Soviet Union, left Costa Rica for Los Angeles in a plan Gonzalez filed as "Operation Perico." They met Blandón and [[Ivan Torres]] on January 7 and 15, 1987, and DEA CI-1 recorded that the traffickers called Meneses "El Maestro" and treated him as retired from the business two or three years before. The Los Angeles DEA had agreed to the plan on December 23, after the departure; the DEA offices in Riverside and San Francisco and the FBI were not coordinated, and Aukland did not learn of it until January. Gonzalez's later reports quoted Torres on CIA tolerance of Contra trafficking and recorded that Pastora wished to enter cocaine trafficking to funnel money to the Contras and had asked Meneses to find a buyer for a DC-3 at Ilopango.[^18] Webb wrote that the informant was a CIA operative known as "Roberto," that the FBI in San Francisco issued warrants for both men and they fled, and that Meneses then said he would never return or testify; the Inspector General records DEA CI-1's claim of a warning from DEA agent Eddie Hill, which Hill denied, and found no FBI warrant in January 1987. The Mexican "Roberto" whom Troilo Sánchez said Meneses introduced to him in 1987 did not resemble the CIA contractor who used the alias Ivan Gómez.[^17][^18][^19]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^17] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^16] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^17]
|
||||
On January 29, 1987 the DEA's San Francisco office cabled that the FBI had "an indictable case against the CI" and asked whether an indictment "will result in national security problems with other agencies"; the Inspector General noted that the San Francisco FBI had source information that Meneses might have worked for the CIA and that the Iran-Contra independent counsel's inquiry was just beginning. On February 27, 1987 the San Francisco U.S. Attorney's Office wrote that, on assurances from Assistant U.S. Attorney Crossan Andersen in Los Angeles, it would defer prosecution because Meneses would "be required to plead guilty to a cocaine-related charge as part of his cooperation agreement"; no written agreement was found and Andersen and Swenson did not recall one, and the FBI placed its case in inactive status.[^18] Webb wrote that recently released Justice Department records show no such cooperation agreement existed.[^17] Meneses's conditions for returning, in June 1987, were anonymity, no testimony, contact only with named DEA personnel and restoration of resident status; headquarters refused on June 26 to guarantee that his identity would never come out in court, the Los Angeles case was declined on July 17, and Gonzalez nevertheless registered him as an informant on July 24, 1987, with a form that listed "no pending charges known at this time."[^6][^18]
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^19]
|
||||
In September 1987, on a visa waiver the DEA requested over State Department and CIA information that he was a narcotics kingpin, Meneses went with DEA CI-1 to Miami, where he met Blandón, and to San Francisco, where an FBI informant said he was telling associates he worked for the CIA; they returned in November and December 1987, producing a case against Aparicio Moreno. An INS stop in Miami in September 1988, when the DEA said it had not expected him, ended with his agreeing to leave. Gonzalez moved to Mexico City in January 1988 and agent James Rivera took over, working cases on cocaine from Panama through Costa Rica. Meneses traveled for the DEA to Miami, Los Angeles and Colombia in 1989, and the DEA deactivated him on December 23, 1989 because none of his cases "appears to have any chance of fruition." He was reactivated on May 10, 1990 after reporting that Blandón wanted help moving cocaine from Central America to Florida, paid $500, and closed on August 16, 1990. The DEA's payments totaled $7,377.50 in thirteen payments.[^2][^6][^20]
|
||||
|
||||
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^8][^19] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^19] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^19]
|
||||
Meanwhile the San Francisco FBI's Donald Hale wrote to headquarters in January 1988 that "it became apparent to the FBI that Norwin Meneses was, and may still be, an informant of DEA" and "an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency," on the word of a source who said Meneses was bragging that this was why he was not prosecuted. On April 15, 1988 headquarters relayed the CIA general counsel's reply, dated March 31, 1988, that a search found no information that Meneses was ever employed by or an informant for the CIA and that the CIA had no objection to prosecution.[^9][^20] A grand jury in San Francisco indicted Meneses on February 8, 1989 on two counts, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, from a 1984 sale to an undercover agent in which he was the source, and possession with intent to distribute, from a 1985 informant's report; the indictment was sealed and a no-bail warrant issued. Swenson wrote that the reason was "upcoming Statute of Limitations problems," and told Agent Stephen Tse in 1991 that the case was "old and very weak." The warrant was entered in the FBI's NCIC database on April 12, 1989; the indictment was unsealed on August 4, 1997.[^2][^20] Rivera said he did not know of the warrant when he requested a visa for Meneses that year. On January 22, 1990 the DEA's country attaché Ron Lard told an FBI legal attaché that Meneses was "a very valuable and current active DEA source," though he had been deactivated the previous month; the San Francisco FBI replied on February 12 that it would not have sought the indictment had it known. No extradition request was ever made, and a treaty with Costa Rica did not cover drug offenses.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Nicaragua, 1990 to 1997
|
||||
|
||||
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^20] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^19] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^8] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^20] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
|
||||
After the Sandinistas lost the 1990 election Meneses returned to Nicaragua, where, Webb wrote, he sought $12 million in confiscated holdings and recruited the former Sandinista intelligence officer [[Enrique Miranda]] to reopen his routes through concealed airstrips, including one near Rosita.[^21] In September 1991 a DEA informant told the Guatemala office he was driving a car loaded with cocaine from Managua to Houston for Meneses and Miranda, and DEA cases opened in Guatemala, Houston and Los Angeles; on September 23 Lard told the FBI that Meneses had contacted the DEA again, and agent Federico Villarreal met him two or three times in Managua, without a record of reactivation or payment.[^20] On November 3, 1991 the Nicaraguan National Police arrested Meneses, his half-brother Luis Enrique Meneses, Miranda, an engineer who concealed the cocaine, Carmelo Lacayo Briceño, and Carlos Francisco Merlo Bermúdez, seizing about 764 kilograms of cocaine and a kilogram of heroin being loaded into vehicles for the United States; a CIA station reported the arrest on November 4 and a DO update called him "the top Cali Cartel trafficker in Nicaragua."[^2][^9] Webb wrote that police chief Rene Vivas said Meneses told him "he had the backing of a higher power, a superpower" and was working for the United States to get Sandinista officials on drug charges, that Roger Mayorga complained that Villarreal had been meeting him secretly, and that the State Department pressed the Chamorro government to dismiss Vivas.[^21] Webb gave the seizure as 725 kilograms; the Inspector General and the CIA give 764. Villarreal told the Inspector General he did not send Meneses against the Sandinistas and that Meneses may have wanted to be able to say he was still working for the DEA.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^8][^21]
|
||||
Meneses was convicted on August 16, 1992 and sentenced to 300 months; Miranda received 168 months. The term was later reduced to twelve and a half years, and the U.S. Embassy reported his release on November 14, 1997.[^2] Webb and the journalist [[Georg Hodel]] interviewed him at Tipitapa prison in January 1996, where Webb wrote the guards murmured "Señor"; Meneses told the Justice Department's inspectors in April 1997 that he had never dealt drugs, that the Sandinistas set him up and that he never cooperated with any United States agency, and told the CIA's inspectors he never dealt with the CIA.[^1][^9][^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Miranda and Ilopango
|
||||
|
||||
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^22] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^8][^23]
|
||||
Miranda testified at the 1991 trial that Meneses financed the Contras with cocaine and that the Salvadoran Air Force landed his shipments at a Texas base. Webb relayed more: that cocaine from Colombia reached Costa Rican strips including the farm of the CIA-linked [[John Hull]], that [[Marcos Aguado]] and Meneses supervised loading at [[Ilopango Airbase]] onto aircraft of the Salvadoran Air Force and of [[Southern Air Transport]], and that guns went south and drugs north.[^23] Miranda told the Inspector General that his knowledge was all from Meneses and Aguado; that he said he had witnessed a shipment in Texas and, pressed, said he had not; that he had been paid about $3,500 a month by the CIA for eight months in 1985 and was accused of being a double agent; and that he had never raised Contra trafficking when the DEA debriefed him in 1996. The Inspector General concluded his allegations "lack substantial force"; the CIA's inspectors said he could provide nothing to corroborate them. Miranda also said the Sandinistas asked him in 1981 to recruit Meneses for their drug operation and that Meneses declined, telling him he was already selling for the Contras with CIA support and that he stopped in September 1985.[^9][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^24] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^25]
|
||||
The San Jose Mercury News reported on August 18, 1996 that at his 1991 trial Meneses testified that Aguado had sold him an auto transport trailer, which Meneses's men were stuffing with cocaine when Nicaraguan police arrived; Aguado was not charged, and the newspaper could not reach him. The newspaper also reported Meneses describing Aguado as one of his oldest friends, a Nicaraguan who worked for the Salvadoran air force high command.[^25] Webb put the trailer's price at $125,000 and wrote that Aguado, interviewed, denied knowing how Meneses would use it.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
### CIA records and the arrangement of the claims
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^8] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^8] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^15] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
|
||||
The CIA's Inspector General found that Meneses's name first appeared in agency files in 1983 and that its cables described him as the "kingpin of narcotics traffickers in Nicaragua prior to the fall of Somoza" and, in December 1984, as a Miami resident because of "unspecified drug related charges by the Costa Rican government"; that the agency answered the FBI's 1986 and 1988 inquiries and a September 3, 1987 State Department name trace with these reports and a denial of any relationship; and that on December 4, 1995, after the DEA warned that Meneses would claim to have trafficked for the CIA, headquarters asked a station about the "extensive entries" in its traces. The station replied it had nothing substantiating his Contra claims.[^9] The cable reads, in part, "DEA has been alerted that Meneses will undoubtedly claim that he was trafficking narcotics on behalf of CIA to generate money for the Contras."[^9] Webb wrote that Mayorga believed Meneses worked for the CIA in Costa Rica in money laundering through his brother Jaime's currency exchange and fronts including a restaurant across from the embassy, and that Cornejo said Meneses's business "expanded terrifically" while he was supposedly a DEA informant.[^16] The Inspector General reported that the FBI's San Francisco source and DEA agents heard Meneses claim CIA ties, that the CIA denied them every time it was asked, and that "some rumor and speculation" was "largely fueled by his own bragging."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The San Francisco DEA agent accused in 1985 told the Inspector General that Meneses, whom he met in 1982, called himself "a revolutionary and not interested in drug trafficking," and said he had the "impression" Meneses was moving guns for the Contras; the agent asked the CIA in San Francisco, which denied any connection.[^6] DEA CI-1 told the inspectors that Meneses said in 1986 or 1987 that when the Contra revolution began he met "American agents" he assumed were with the CIA and showed them how to cross into and out of Nicaragua.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Family
|
||||
|
||||
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^15] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^26] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^14][^15]
|
||||
Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area traffickers, Jairo as the son of Edmundo and Blandón's partner in Nicaraguan hotels and casinos; the Justice Department's inspectors could not locate Jairo and received an unconfirmed report that he was killed in Nicaragua in 1991 or 1992.[^5][^16] Webb described Rafael Cornejo as a Bay Area distributor for Meneses since the mid-1970s, convicted of tax evasion in 1985 and indicted for cocaine trafficking in 1992, against whom Blandón later cooperated.[^3][^27] Webb listed Marcos Aguado as a CIA-trained pilot and business associate; the CIA's Inspector General recorded that Miranda's allegations about Aguado could not be supported.[^15][^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -147,23 +147,24 @@ Webb listed the nephews Guillermo, Jaime and Jairo Meneses as Bay Area trafficke
|
|||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 3: "The brotherhood of military minds."
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IV, section B (OIG investigation regarding support of the Contras by Blandon and Meneses), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch04p2.htm
|
||||
[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections F-G ("David Morrison," alleged DEA corruption, DEA use of Meneses as an informant), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p2.htm
|
||||
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
|
||||
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
|
||||
[^9]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
|
||||
[^11]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^14]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
|
||||
[^15]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
|
||||
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
|
||||
[^18]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
|
||||
[^20]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
|
||||
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
|
||||
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
|
||||
[^24]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
|
||||
[^25]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, section on the 1983 tax case. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p1.htm
|
||||
[^8]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 5: "God, Fatherland and Freedom."
|
||||
[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Ross, Blandon, Meneses), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings1.html
|
||||
[^10]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 6: "They were doing their patriotic duty."
|
||||
[^11]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 15: "This thing is a tidal wave."
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX (Carlos Cabezas), sections A-E, https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p1.htm
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter IX, sections F-G (assessment of Cabezas' allegations), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch09p2.htm
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 59-60 (the San Francisco Frogman case, UDN-FARN and PCNE), https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^15]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume II: The Contra Story, October 8, 1998, section on Southern Front Contras, https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine2/south.html
|
||||
[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 11: "They were looking in the other direction."
|
||||
[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 20: "It is a sensitive matter."
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section G (the 1987 Los Angeles OCDETF investigation), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p4.htm
|
||||
[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation (96-0143-IG)*, Volume I: The California Story, January 29, 1998, Findings (Northern California story, the Frogman Case), https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/cocaine/findings2.html
|
||||
[^20]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III, sections H-I (the 1989 indictment and post-indictment activities), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p3.htm
|
||||
[^21]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 23: "He had the backing of a superpower."
|
||||
[^22]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Prologue: "It was like they didn't want to know."
|
||||
[^23]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 13: "The wrong kind of friends."
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter VII (Enrique Miranda-Jaime), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch07.htm
|
||||
[^25]: San Jose Mercury News, August 18, 1996 (Gary Webb, "Testimony Links U.S. to Drugs-Guns Trade Dealers Got Their 'Own Little Arsenal,'" Dark Alliance series), https://people.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clippings/da1.html
|
||||
[^26]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), Chapter 13, "The wrong kind of friends," and Cast of Characters.
|
||||
[^27]: U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter II, section K (the 1992 San Diego prosecution of Blandon), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch02p6.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
title: Patrice Lumumba
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Patrice Emery Lumumba
|
||||
|
|
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- Decolonization
|
||||
category: "Political Figure"
|
||||
summary: "Patrice Lumumba was the first democratically elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo (June 1960), deposed and delivered to Katangan forces by a CIA-backed conspiracy involving Joseph Mobutu within months of independence, and killed on January 17, 1961 - a case the Church Committee found involved CIA assassination planning, making him the emblematic victim of Cold War CIA intervention in African decolonization."
|
||||
summary: "Patrice Lumumba, first elected Prime Minister of the independent Congo, was deposed in 1960 and delivered to Katangan forces, and was killed on January 17, 1961; the Church Committee found CIA assassination planning."
|
||||
born: 1925-07-02
|
||||
died: 1961-01-17
|
||||
location: "Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), Congo"
|
||||
|
|
@ -26,7 +26,9 @@ Patrice Emery Lumumba (July 2, 1925 - January 17, 1961) was the first Prime Mini
|
|||
|
||||
The Belgian Congo achieved independence on June 30, 1960. Lumumba, who had won legislative elections as leader of the Mouvement National Congolais, became Prime Minister in a coalition government with President Joseph Kasavubu. The transition was immediately chaotic: the Congolese army mutinied against Belgian officers; Belgian paratroopers intervened to protect Belgian nationals; and the mineral-rich Katanga province, under [[Moise Tshombe]], declared independence with Belgian support on July 11, 1960.
|
||||
|
||||
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then appealed to the United States, which refused, and finally to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
|
||||
Lumumba appealed first to the [[United Nations]], which sent peacekeepers but declined to use them to reintegrate Katanga. He then went to the United States, and finally appealed to the [[Soviet Union]], which provided transport aircraft and military advisors. The Soviet connection was the critical factor in the American and Belgian decisions to seek Lumumba's removal: in the context of Cold War competition for influence in newly decolonized Africa, an independent Congolese government with Soviet ties represented an intolerable risk from the American perspective.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take the steps needed to provide the Congolese government with military assistance after the [[Katanga]] secession.[^2] On August 9, 1960, it reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^3] According to the Church Committee, Lumumba visited Washington in late July 1960, where Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] pledged economic aid, and after the events of September 5 and 14 he asked the United Nations force for protection.[^4] On February 21, 1961, the Council noted with deep regret the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that an immediate and impartial investigation be held into the circumstances of the deaths.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### CIA Involvement
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -40,7 +42,7 @@ The CIA facilitated Lumumba's capture by providing intelligence on his movements
|
|||
|
||||
### Church Committee Findings
|
||||
|
||||
The 1975 [[Church Committee]] investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
|
||||
The 1975 Church Committee investigated CIA involvement in Lumumba's death and found:
|
||||
|
||||
- CIA Director Dulles had authorized assassination planning targeting Lumumba
|
||||
- The CIA had prepared and dispatched a biological toxin specifically for use against him
|
||||
|
|
@ -53,9 +55,13 @@ The committee concluded that while the CIA had clearly planned and intended to a
|
|||
|
||||
Lumumba's death established the pattern of Cold War CIA intervention in African independence movements that characterized subsequent decades. His assassination brought Mobutu Sese Seko to power as a long-term CIA client who would rule the renamed country Zaire until 1997. The Congo became a staging ground for subsequent CIA operations, particularly during the [[Angola|Angolan]] civil war (1975-1991) when CIA-supplied [[Zaire]]-based forces supported [[UNITA]] against the [[MPLA]].
|
||||
|
||||
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^2]
|
||||
Lumumba's legacy in pan-African and anticolonial political tradition was significant; he became a martyred symbol of African self-determination. The Belgian government formally acknowledged Belgian involvement in his death in 2002.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. De Witte, Ludo. *The Assassination of Lumumba.* Verso, 2001.
|
||||
[^2]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraph 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20(1960)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section on the Congo. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20(1961)&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^6]: Weissman, Stephen R. "What Really Happened in Congo: The CIA, the Murder of Lumumba, and the Rise of Mobutu." *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2014.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 1984
|
||||
end: 1986-11
|
||||
role: "organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
- type: prosecuted
|
||||
with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1988-03-11
|
||||
end: 1992-12-24
|
||||
role: "pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992"
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
---
|
||||
Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor [[William Clark]], counselor to Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]], a staff member of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], and military aide to [[Henry Kissinger]] when Kissinger was national security adviser to [[Richard Nixon]]. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of [[Vietnam]], completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the [[United States Marine Corps]] as a lieutenant colonel.[^1] [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Final Report records that under Reagan the [[National Security Council]] staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the [[Iran]] and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, [[Oliver North]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -62,11 +62,11 @@ Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] gr
|
|||
|
||||
On January 6, 1984 the National Security Planning Group approved "immediate efforts to obtain additional funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources," the current $24 million appropriation to the [[Contras]] being enough only through June; McFarlane was responsible for carrying it out with North and the NSC staff member [[Constantine Menges]]. On February 21, 1984 he warned Reagan that the program would have to be curtailed by May or June unless new money was found.[^1][^2] In late March 1984 [[William J. Casey]] sent him a memorandum urging that Israel and other countries be asked for weapons and money, and in April McFarlane sent the NSC staff member [[Howard Teicher]] to ask the Israelis; the mission was unsuccessful, and when Secretary of State [[George Shultz]] learned of it from the embassy in [[Israel]] McFarlane told him Teicher had gone "on his own hook."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^3]
|
||||
In May 1984 he met the Saudi ambassador, Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], and explained Reagan's concern about the gap in Contra financing; days later Bandar volunteered $1 million a month. McFarlane obtained from North a Contra bank account number and gave it to Bandar. A Ministry of Defence memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial, the Guardian reported, showed that from 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales helped set up regular quarterly payments to Bandar from [[Al-Yamamah]] arms-deal funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction.[^3] He later testified that he told Reagan and Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] within a day or two, and that when he put the first contribution to the President on a card in the daily briefing book with the words that no one else knew of it, Reagan answered, in writing or orally, "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^1] At the June 25, 1984 National Security Planning Group meeting, where Shultz quoted Chief of Staff [[James Baker]] as calling third-country solicitations an "impeachable offense," McFarlane said: "I propose that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas [contras] until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." Walsh noted that none of the participants raised the fact that the Saudi solicitation had already occurred. Attorney General [[William French Smith]] ruled the next day that third-country funding was permissible so long as no U.S. funds were used and no repayment was expected.[^1] The [[Boland Amendment]] of October 1984 then barred funds of any agency "involved in intelligence activities" from supporting [[Nicaragua|Nicaraguan]] military or paramilitary operations "directly or indirectly."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane testified that in spring and summer of 1984 Reagan let it be known "very clearly" that the Contras were to be kept together "body and soul," and that he discussed the directive with his deputy [[Donald Fortier]] and with North; he said he told North that no one could "solicit, encourage, coerce, or broker the transmission of money" to the Contras. Walsh found that he assigned the work to North and that North kept him generally informed. A September 2, 1984 North request to approach a private donor for a "civilian" helicopter drew McFarlane's marginal note "I don't think this is legal."[^1] Walsh's conclusion on the arrangement was that Reagan "put McFarlane in a difficult position," and that McFarlane "put his subordinates in an equally difficult position by delegating to them the operational tasks."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^4] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^5]
|
||||
The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its last batch of [[Central Intelligence Agency]] money and Contra forces retreated from Nicaragua into [[Honduras]], McFarlane told the FDN leader [[Adolfo Calero]] it might be time to think about "cutting both our losses and theirs," after twelve months that had included the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, a bombing at [[Eden Pastora]]'s jungle headquarters and exposure of a CIA-printed terrorism manual.[^5] In February 1985 the Saudis agreed to give an additional $24 million, according to the New York Times editors' chronology of the Committees' report; Walsh puts the Saudi total at $32 million for the period, with [[Taiwan]] adding $2 million.[^1][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Contra memoranda and the 1985 letters to Congress
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -76,38 +76,39 @@ On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any memb
|
|||
|
||||
### The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^6] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^5][^7]
|
||||
McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^7] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^5] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
|
||||
On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^6] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^5] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
|
||||
McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calling on you from time to time" and wrote that he trusted McFarlane would "still permit me to call on you." On December 7 he attended the White House residence meeting on Iran, and on December 8 he flew to London with North to meet [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], Kimche and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1][^6] He stayed in contact with North and Poindexter on the NSC's PROFs computer system from a terminal at his home. On May 25, 1986 he arrived in [[Tehran]] with North and others carrying HAWK spare parts, and, according to Walsh, a cake; the party left on May 28 without a hostage release. North's contemporaneous note records that they were "heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." After the trip McFarlane and North briefed Reagan, Bush and Regan; Walsh records that McFarlane "was concerned about North's revelation regarding the Iran/contra diversion, but said he shared the information with no one," and recommended to Poindexter that North be returned to the Marine Corps.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Exposure, plea and pardon
|
||||
|
||||
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^8]
|
||||
After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^9]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^9] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^10] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^9]
|
||||
On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^10] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^11] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Esquire article and lawsuit
|
||||
|
||||
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^11] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^11]
|
||||
In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^12] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^11] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^11]
|
||||
McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^12] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Death
|
||||
|
||||
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^8]
|
||||
McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Division for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels, August 4, 1993), ch. 1, "United States v. Robert C. McFarlane" (citing McFarlane, North trial testimony, March 10 to 16, 1989; Select Committees testimony, May 11 to 13, 1987; SSCI testimony, December 7, 1986; NSPG minutes, June 25, 1984; Hill, Weinberger and Regan notes). https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
|
||||
[^2]: Brinkley, Joel, and Stephen Engelberg, eds. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, with the Minority Views*, abridged edition (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1988), "Iran-Contra Chronology," entry for February 21, 1984. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^3]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
|
||||
[^4]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
|
||||
[^5]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^6]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
|
||||
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
|
||||
[^8]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
|
||||
[^9]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
|
||||
[^11]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
|
||||
[^3]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
|
||||
[^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
|
||||
[^6]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
|
||||
[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
|
||||
[^8]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
|
||||
[^9]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
|
||||
[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
|
||||
[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
|
||||
[^12]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,18 +6,38 @@ tags:
|
|||
- CIA
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the Senate Judiciary Committee."
|
||||
summary: "Ronald LeGrand was the Senate Judiciary Committee's chief investigator who in May 1988 relayed to INSLAW a Justice Department source's allegations that the source later denied."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Senate Judiciary Committee]]"
|
||||
role: "chief investigator"
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. This source, who had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]], told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
|
||||
Ronald LeGrand was the Chief Investigator for the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]]. In late April 1988, he telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW]], to request a full briefing on the disputes between Inslaw and the [[Department of Justice|DOJ]]. Hamilton and his [[Nancy Hamilton|wife]] subsequently briefed LeGrand at Inslaw on the morning of May 11. Two days later, LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information from a trusted senior Justice Department career official. According to Cheri Seymour, this source had been in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department since the [[Watergate scandal]] under President [[Richard Nixon]]; the source told LeGrand to convey to the Hamiltons that "What you think happened, did happen. You are not crazy. But you do not know squat about how dirty the INSLAW case really is. If you ever learn even half of it, you will be sickened. INSLAW is a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice, in its breadth and depth, than [[Watergate]]. The Justice Department has been compromised at every level on the INSLAW case."[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The source also stated that [[Lowell Jensen]] engineered Inslaw's problems and relied on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]], and [[James Johnston]]. Miles Matthews allegedly stated in the presence of LeGrand's source that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source further indicated that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]], and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's malfeasance, and that while Richard and White were "pretty upset," they would not disclose what they knew except under subpoena and oath. The source also believed that documents related to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the DOJ, but suggested Inslaw should subpoena paperwork prepared by a Jensen subordinate regarding the purchase of large quantities of computer hardware for which senior DOJ career staff saw no justification.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, the Special Counsel's investigation found that LeGrand provided little corroboration of Hamilton's allegations during a sworn statement to House investigators.
|
||||
The source also informed INSLAW through LeGrand that the Criminal Division had served as the nerve center for the scheme to drive INSLAW out of business by engineering sham contract disputes. LeGrand's communication was a significant turning point for the Hamiltons, as it provided internal corroboration of their suspicions regarding the theft of the [[PROMIS]] software.[^1] However, in a sworn statement to House investigators LeGrand provided, in the words of the House report, "little corroboration" of Hamilton's allegations.
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand. The Special Counsel interviewed LeGrand's source, a long-time career employee of the Department of Justice, who stated that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or Inslaw, and had not heard any credible rumors about such misconduct. This source indicated that the subject of Inslaw came up during a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988. He suggested contacting Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him. The source denied ever mentioning Jensen, Richard, White, Johnston, or Knapp to LeGrand, and did not believe any of these individuals would be involved in any type of cover-up. Furthermore, the source denied that any statements attributed to him in Hamilton's affidavit were accurate, and he never said or believed any of the comments attributed to him, never had reason to believe that identified DOJ officials were involved in wrongdoing, or that Project Eagle documents were improperly shredded. The Special Counsel's investigation ultimately found no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior DOJ officials.[^2]
|
||||
LeGrand informed House investigators and the Special Counsel that, as far as he knew, none of the information provided to him by his source was obtained first-hand.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Later Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^3] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^4] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^5] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because Matthews was responsible for procurement in the Criminal Division and the source disliked or distrusted him; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand and did not believe any of them would be involved in any type of cover-up. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^5] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^5] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro’s Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal*. First Edition. TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64. https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^4]: Bua report (March 1993), section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, including the October 11, 1988 Richardson memorandum.
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, pp. 22-28, citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46. Bound with the Bua report: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^6]: Bua report, section 10, p. 114: "we contacted LeGrand, who no longer works for the Senate. LeGrand said he would tell us about his source's information, but would not disclose his source's identity."
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,11 +4,15 @@ tags:
|
|||
- IranContra
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
summary: "In late 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for Israel."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Alan Sanders]] was a businessman with links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. His cover was [[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.). He was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], specifically in the form of blueprints. This was done with a covert [[United States|U.S.]] license, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1]
|
||||
[[Alan Sanders]] was a businessman with links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. His cover was [[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.). He was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], specifically in the form of blueprints. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that this was done with a covert [[United States|U.S.]] license despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
In late 1985, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for [[Israel]]. Sanders made it clear that the sale of cluster bombs to [[Israel]] was prohibited by the [[United States|U.S.]]. However, he introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Richard Babayan]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] contract agent with close contacts with [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]], indicating that Cardoen would sell the bombs to [[Israel]].[^1]
|
||||
In late 1985, Ari Ben-Menashe approached Sanders to purchase cluster bombs for [[Israel]]. Sanders made it clear that the sale of cluster bombs to Israel was prohibited by the U.S.. However, he introduced Ben-Menashe to [[Richard Babayan]], a CIA contract agent with close contacts with Cardoen, indicating that Cardoen would sell the bombs to Israel.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Contra_War
|
||||
summary: Honduran general and CIA collaborator on the Contra project who was convicted of plotting a cocaine-financed assassination and coup, then received extraordinary leniency through Oliver North's intervention.
|
||||
location: "Honduras"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
Jose Bueso Rosa was a Honduran general and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] collaborator on the [[Contras|Contra]] project who was convicted in 1984 for plotting to assassinate Honduran president Roberto Suazo Cordova and stage a coup financed by a giant cocaine sale. Despite the severity of his crimes, he received extraordinary leniency through [[Oliver North]]'s intervention.[^1]
|
||||
Jose Bueso Rosa was a Honduran general and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] collaborator on the [[Contras|Contra]] project who was convicted in 1985 for plotting to assassinate Honduran president Roberto Suazo Cordova and stage a coup financed by a giant cocaine sale. Despite the severity of his crimes, he received extraordinary leniency through [[Oliver North]]'s intervention.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Cocaine Coup Plot
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -25,6 +26,15 @@ Bueso Rosa was one of the CIA's main collaborators in [[Honduras]] on the Contra
|
|||
|
||||
North and other officials launched an aggressive campaign to get Bueso Rosa lenient treatment. "Justice is justifiably upset that none of this info was made available to them prior to indictment," North complained. State Department official Francis McNeil testified that Colonel Nestor Pino "assert[ed] an American intelligence interest in Bueso Rosa, in getting Bueso Rosa off." An all-star collection of officials including Pino, William Bode, and the former DIA head appeared as character witnesses or sent glowing letters. North wrote that the objective was "to keep Bueso from feeling like he was lied to in legal process and start spilling the beans." Associate Attorney General [[Stephen Trott]] claimed he didn't know why he intervened, other than North telling him about possible release of "sensitive" information. McNeil testified he suspected "a narcotics angle" behind the frantic machinations. Bueso Rosa received five years and was deported after three years at Eglin Air Force Base. He later disclosed the CIA had equipped and trained the Honduran army's death squad, the 316 Battalion.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Sentence Reduction
|
||||
|
||||
The Kerry subcommittee reported that Bueso Rosa was convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova of Honduras, a plot to be financed from the sale in the United States of $40 million in cocaine seized in connection with it. The other defendants received sentences of as long as forty years. Senior United States officials intervened with a federal judge to reduce his sentence to five years, and officials of the United States government also ensured that he served his sentence in a minimum-security facility at a United States military base in Florida.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
According to [[Mark M. Richard]], deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, who described the matter in a deposition before the Iran-Contra committee, the Pentagon took the initiative in supporting the interventions. At a meeting, North, General Gorman, [[Elliott Abrams]] and Clarridge agreed that Bueso Rosa should be accommodated. Richard said that the State Department's position had changed, and he opposed the interventions. The subcommittee noted that the Justice Department had publicized the conspiracy as the most significant narco-terrorism case yet discovered, and that FBI director [[William Webster]] had said at the time of the arrests: "We don't want international terrorists to establish beachheads or bases for operations in the United States."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The subcommittee also reported that the government's factual admissions in the North trial, released April 6, 1989, stated that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral [[John Poindexter]] that Ambassador Negroponte, General Gorman, the senior CIA officer Clarridge and North had worked out arrangements with Bueso Rosa for support of the Contra resistance, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of those covert activities. The Justice Department objected strenuously to the leniency, and Francis McNeil testified that the intervention undermined Reagan administration policy on terrorism, narcotics and democracy.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 19: "He reports to people reporting to Bush"
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 121-122 (Bueso-Rosa section, including the deposition of Mark M. Richard before the Iran-Contra committee). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,25 +1,27 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
|
||||
created: 2024-04-25
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Person
|
||||
- DoJ
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
- Dark_Alliance_Investigation
|
||||
summary: "William French Smith (1917-1990) served as U.S. Attorney General from 1981 to 1985 under President Reagan, and as the first Reagan AG signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with CIA director William J. Casey that removed drug offenses from the list of crimes CIA assets were required to report to the Department of Justice."
|
||||
summary: "William French Smith was U.S. Attorney General from 1981 to 1985 under Reagan and signed the 1982 crimes-reporting Memorandum of Understanding with CIA director William J. Casey."
|
||||
born: 1917-08-26
|
||||
died: 1990-10-29
|
||||
location: "Wilton, New Hampshire"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
William French Smth was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with [[Central Intelligence Agency]] director [[William J. Casey]] that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. The agreement, hammered out between the CIA and Justice Department, fundamentally altered the relationship between intelligence operations and law enforcement.[^1]
|
||||
William French Smith was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who signed the secret 1982 Memorandum of Understanding with [[Central Intelligence Agency]] director [[William J. Casey]] that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. The agreement, hammered out between the CIA and Justice Department, fundamentally altered the relationship between intelligence operations and law enforcement.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that removed drug offenses from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department. Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. For thirteen years, the CIA and Justice maintained what Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way." The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^2]
|
||||
In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding under which narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department.[^2] Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. Gary Webb, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^3] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^4] The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^4]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ summary: "Donald Trump is the 45th and 47th President of the United States, whos
|
|||
born: 1946-06-14
|
||||
location: "Queens, New York City (born)"
|
||||
created: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-06-18
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United States]], serving 2017-2021 and 2025-present. His two administrations functioned as the political vehicle through which the [[Peter Thiel|Peter Thiel]] commercial network ([[Palantir Technologies|Palantir]] contracting expansion, [[Clearview AI]] seed funding, [[Founders Fund]] defense portfolio), the [[Leonard Leo|Leonard Leo]] judicial-selection network (the [[Neil Gorsuch|Gorsuch]], [[Brett Kavanaugh|Kavanaugh]], [[Amy Coney Barrett|Barrett]] Supreme Court confirmations), and the [[Jared Kushner|Jared Kushner]] [[Middle East]] network ([[Abraham Accords|Abraham Accords]], U.S.-[[Saudi Arabia|Saudi Arabia]] arms sales, the documented [[Mohammed bin Salman|MBS]] WhatsApp channel) exercised documented federal power. Thiel spoke at the 2016 [[Republican National Convention|Republican National Convention]] endorsing Trump, served on the transition executive committee, and placed associates including [[Kevin Harrington|Kevin Harrington]] on the [[National Security Council|National Security Council]].[^1][^2][^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,35 +27,35 @@ Donald Trump (born June 14, 1946) is the 45th and 47th [[President of the United
|
|||
|
||||
Thiel endorsed Trump at the July 2016 Republican National Convention in [[Cleveland|Cleveland]], the first openly gay speaker at a Republican convention in sixteen years, and donated over one million dollars to Trump-supporting super PACs alongside the [[Mercer family|Mercer family]], the Republican donors who funded [[Breitbart|Breitbart]] and the [[Cambridge Analytica|Cambridge Analytica]] data operation. After the November 2016 election, Trump placed Thiel on the transition team's executive committee. Thiel used the position to place Harrington as Senior Director for Strategic Planning on the National Security Council and a Thiel aide as White House Deputy Chief Technology Officer. *Politico* reported that companies Thiel backed, especially Palantir, stood to benefit from the transition role.[^1][^2][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^9]
|
||||
The Mercer family connection was the other documented channel of the 2016 operation. [[Robert Mercer|Robert Mercer]] and his daughter [[Rebekah Mercer|Rebekah Mercer]] funded Breitbart News (where [[Steve Bannon|Steve Bannon]] served as executive chairman before becoming the Trump campaign CEO in August 2016), Cambridge Analytica (the data-targeting firm that deployed psychographic profiling of voters using Facebook data acquired through the [[ Aleksandr Kogan | Aleksandr Kogan / Joseph Chancellor ]] academic-researcher channel), and the [[Government Accountability Institute|Government Accountability Institute]] (the research nonprofit that produced *Clinton Cash*). The Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure was the documented digital-and-media backbone of the 2016 campaign, and the convergence with the Thiel commercial network (Palantir, Founders Fund) through the shared Trump support produced the documented 2016 alignment of the [[Silicon Valley]] billionaire network with the Republican political operation.[^4][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Palantir Contracting Expansion
|
||||
|
||||
The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^5]
|
||||
The first Trump administration produced the documented expansion of Palantir's government contracting. The [[U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement|ICE]] contracts (FALCON, ICM, ImmigrationOS, ELITE) expanded through the administration's immigration-enforcement escalation. The [[Customs and Border Protection|CBP]] and [[Department of Defense|DoD]] contracts grew alongside the border-enforcement and defense-spending increases. The [[In-Q-Tel|In-Q-Tel]]-seeded relationship between Palantir and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] deepened as Palantir's Gotham platform became the standard data-fusion tool across multiple agencies. Thiel chaired Palantir throughout, while simultaneously placing associates in the NSC and running the [[Dialog]] convening network whose government-side attendees included the congressional oversight and military-command principals responsible for the agencies Palantir serves.[^3][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^5][^10]
|
||||
The second administration (2025-present) has extended the contracting expansion. ICE awarded Palantir the 30 million dollar [[ImmigrationOS|ImmigrationOS]] contract for the administration's mass-deportation operations. Palantir signed the January 2024 strategic partnership with the [[Israeli Ministry of Defense|Israeli Ministry of Defense]] for "war-related missions" in the [[Gaza war|Gaza war]], placing the [[Palantir Gotham|Gotham]] "AI-powered kill chain" platform in an active combat zone. The [[Anduril Industries|Anduril]] [[Sentry Tower|Sentry Tower]] deployment expanded to over 350 towers covering 30 percent of the southern border under a 363 million dollar CBP contract. The documented combination of Palantir (case management and targeting), Anduril (autonomous detection), and Clearview (facial identification) across the deportation and border-enforcement pipelines constitutes the commercial operation of the [[Thiel Influence Network|Thiel network]] against the documented target populations.[^3][^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Supreme Court and the Leo Network
|
||||
|
||||
Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^6]
|
||||
Trump's three Supreme Court appointments (Gorsuch 2017, Kavanaugh 2018, Barrett 2020) were selected and shepherded through the Leonard Leo / [[Federalist Society|Federalist Society]] pipeline. Leo advised Trump on all three selections and the [[Judicial Crisis Network|Judicial Crisis Network]] (now the [[Concord Fund|Concord Fund]]) dark-money operation funded the confirmation campaigns. The conservative supermajority produced by the confirmations has been the structural outcome that shapes U.S. law on reproductive rights, gun regulation, campaign finance, and executive power. The Leo operation and the Thiel operation overlap through the shared [[Teneo Network|Teneo Network]] institutional terrain and the shared 501(c)(4) dark-money infrastructure.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the he documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed the [[Christine Blasey Ford|Christine Blasey Ford]] sexual-assault allegations and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^6]
|
||||
The Kavanaugh confirmation (2018) was the most contested of the three and drew the documented engagement of the Thiel-aligned political infrastructure. The confirmation followed a sexual-assault allegation against Kavanaugh and the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] hearings, and the conservative dark-money operation that funded the confirmation campaign (the JCN / Concord Fund network) spent millions on advertising and grassroots mobilization. Leo personally managed the confirmation strategy. The Kavanaugh confirmation solidified the conservative supermajority that produced the 2022 [[Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization|Dobbs]] decision overturning [[Roe v. Wade|Roe v. Wade]].[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kushner Middle East Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^7]
|
||||
Kushner, Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor, handled the Middle East portfolio that produced the Abraham Accords (2020 normalization agreements between [[Israel|Israel]] and the [[United Arab Emirates|UAE]], [[Bahrain|Bahrain]], [[Sudan|Sudan]], and [[Morocco|Morocco]]). The accords broke with the prior U.S. framework that had conditioned normalization on Israeli-Palestinian progress, and Kushner led the negotiation alongside the administration's recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the [[Golan Heights|Golan Heights]] and the relocation of the U.S. embassy to [[Jerusalem|Jerusalem]].[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^7]
|
||||
The U.S.-Saudi Arabia arms sales proceeded over congressional opposition, with the administration invoking emergency authority to bypass the congressional review process. The arms sales ran through the period of the [[Jamal Khashoggi|Khashoggi]] murder (October 2018), after which the CIA assessed with high confidence that MBS had ordered the assassination. Kushner maintained his relationship with MBS after the murder and maintained the WhatsApp channel the CIA assessed as compromised.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^7]
|
||||
After the administration ended, the [[Public Investment Fund|Saudi sovereign wealth fund]] committed 2 billion dollars to Kushner's [[Affinity Partners|Affinity Partners]] fund despite the fund's own due-diligence panel rejecting the deal as "unsatisfactory in all aspects." The Kushner-MBS channel, the [[NSO Group|NSO Group]] Pegasus surveillance of Khashoggi's associates, and the Abraham Accords together constitute the documented Middle East policy outcome.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2024 Campaign and the Second Administration
|
||||
|
||||
Thiel funded the 2022 [[JD Vance|JD Vance]] Senate campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars) and the [[Blake Masters|Blake Masters]] campaign (approximately fifteen million dollars), and brokered Vance's selection as Trump's 2024 vice-presidential running mate. The Vance selection compressed a three-and-a-half-year path from private citizen to Vice President on a single-donor financial base.[^1][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^9]
|
||||
The [[Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]]'s [[Project 2025|Project 2025]] produced the personnel pipeline for the second administration. [[ProPublica|ProPublica]] reported that [[Paul Dans|Paul Dans]], the Project 2025 director, created a personnel database of over 10,000 vetted candidates ("a conservative LinkedIn") to staff a second Trump term. [[NBC News|NBC News]] reported that several prominent Project 2025 authors secured executive-branch roles. [[Center for American Progress|CAP]] documented that 80 percent of Project 2025's authors were former Trump administration officials or close advisors, and 140 people who worked for Trump contributed to the project. Trump publicly disavowed Project 2025 during the campaign but the personnel overlap is documented.[^1][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^8]
|
||||
The second Trump administration (2025-present) has produced the documented expansion of Palantir's ICE contracting (the 30 million dollar ImmigrationOS contract), the Palantir-Israel strategic partnership for "war-related missions" in the Gaza war, and the [[Department of Government Efficiency|DOGE]] access to federal systems. [[David Sacks|David Sacks]], the PayPal Mafia COO, received the White House AI and cryptocurrency czar appointment. The DOGE, led by [[Elon Musk|Musk]], produced the documented [[NLRB Data Exfiltration|NLRB data exfiltration]] with Russian IP login attempts and the documented exfiltration of union-organizing records.[^1][^3][^10]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Howard Lutnick|Howard Lutnick]], the [[Cantor Fitzgerald|Cantor Fitzgerald]] CEO whose Epstein emails are documented in the 2026 file releases, received the [[Secretary of Commerce|Secretary of Commerce]] appointment. [[Pam Bondi|Pam Bondi]] received the [[Attorney General|Attorney General]] appointment and was confirmed on February 4, 2025; a year later she co-signed the February 2026 report to Congress under the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]] that listed some 300 names of officials and public figures referenced in the [[Jeffrey Epstein|Epstein]] files, among them [[Elvis Presley|Elvis]], [[Princess Diana|Princess Diana]], and [[Kurt Cobain|Kurt Cobain]]. [[Todd Blanche|Todd Blanche]], the deputy attorney general who announced the 3.5 million page Epstein-files publication, was previously Trump's personal defense attorney in the Manhattan criminal case. The second-administration personnel pattern places documented Epstein-network contacts (Lutnick) and Epstein-files oversight figures (Bondi, Blanche) in the executive branch.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -73,12 +73,12 @@ The relationship returned as a political liability across 2025. As president, Tr
|
|||
[^2]: "Peter Thiel goes 'big league', joining Trump's presidential transition team." *The Guardian,* November 11, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/11/peter-thiel-joins-donald-trump-transition-team ; "Thiel could gain from Trump transition." *Politico,* December 2016. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/peter-thiel-trump-transition-benefits-232233
|
||||
[^3]: Cameron, Dell, and Yulia Almazova. "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society." *WIRED,* June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
|
||||
[^4]: "Who Is Kevin Harrington, the Peter Thiel Associate Who Just Joined the National Security Council Staff?" *Gizmodo,* February 2017. https://gizmodo.com/who-is-kevin-harrington-the-peter-thiel-associate-who-1791925769 ; "Disrupting the White House: Peter Thiel's Influence is Shaping the National Security Council." *Just Security,* 2017. https://www.justsecurity.org/37466/disrupting-white-house-peter-thiels-influence-shaping-national-security-council/
|
||||
[^5]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
|
||||
[^6]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^7]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
|
||||
[^8]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^9]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^10]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^5]: For the Mercer-Breitbart-Cambridge Analytica infrastructure, see the contemporaneous press coverage of the 2016 campaign digital operation and the Cambridge Analytica documentation. For the Government Accountability Institute and *Clinton Cash*, see the published record. For Project 2025: "Paul Dans, the Man Behind Project 2025's Most Radical Plans." *ProPublica.* https://www.propublica.org/article/project-2025-trump-campaign-heritage-foundation-paul-dans ; "The key Project 2025 authors now staffing the Trump administration." *NBC News.* https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/trump-administration/key-project-2025-authors-now-staffing-trump-administration-rcna195107
|
||||
[^6]: "ICE to Use ImmigrationOS by Palantir, a New AI System, to Track Immigrants' Movements." *American Immigration Council,* April 2025. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/ice-immigrationos-palantir-ai-track-immigrants/ ; "ICE enlists Palantir to develop all-seeing 'ImmigrationOS' eye to speed up deportations." *The Register,* April 21, 2025. https://www.theregister.com/2025/04/21/ice_enlists_palantir_to_develop/
|
||||
[^7]: "Anduril Wins $363 Million CBP Contract to Deploy Over 200 Extended Range AI Surveillance Towers." *The Defense News,* 2025. https://www.thedefensenews.com/Anduril-Wins-363-Million-CBP-Contract-to-Deploy-Over-200-Extended-Range-AI-Surveillance-Towers/ ; "CBP to strengthen 'tactical targeting,' 'counter-network analysis' with Clearview AI." *FedScoop,* 2026. https://fedscoop.com/dhs-cbp-contract-biometric-facial-recognition-ai/
|
||||
[^8]: "We Don't Talk About Leonard: The Man Behind the Right's Supreme Court Supermajority." *ProPublica,* March 2023. https://www.propublica.org/article/we-dont-talk-about-leonard-leo-supreme-court-supermajority
|
||||
[^9]: "Chairwoman Maloney Launches Probe of Saudi Government's $2 Billion Investment in Affinity Partners." House Committee on Oversight, June 2, 2022, citing the PIF screening panel that rated the firm's due diligence "unsatisfactory in all aspects" before MBS overruled it. https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairwoman-maloney-launches-probe-of-saudi-government-s-2-billion-investment-in
|
||||
[^10]: "Whistleblower details how DOGE may have taken sensitive NLRB data." *NPR,* April 15, 2025. https://www.npr.org/2025/04/15/nx-s1-5355896/doge-nlrb-elon-musk-spacex-security ; "User with Russian IP address tried to log into NLRB systems following DOGE access, whistleblower says." *Nextgov/FCW,* April 2025. https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2025/04/user-russian-ip-address-tried-log-nlrb-systems-following-doge-access-whistleblower-says/404574/
|
||||
[^11]: "Trump called Epstein a 'terrific guy' who enjoyed 'younger' women before denying relationship with him." *Washington Post,* July 8, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-called-epstein-a-terrific-guy-before-denying-relationship-with-him/2019/07/08/a01e0f00-a1be-11e9-bd56-eac6bb02d01d_story.html ; "Trump and Epstein: A Timeline of Their Relationship." *Time,* 2025. https://time.com/7333365/trump-epstein-relationship-timeline/
|
||||
[^12]: "What we know about the Trump-Epstein falling out." *PolitiFact,* July 31, 2025. https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jul/31/what-we-know-about-the-trump-epstein-falling-out/ ; "President Donald Trump explains why he kicked Jeffrey Epstein out of Mar-a-Lago." *Fox News,* 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/us/jeffrey-epstein-thrown-out-mar-a-lago-hiring-help-trump
|
||||
[^13]: "Birthday letter to Epstein bore Trump's signature, drawing of naked woman, Wall Street Journal reports." *CNN,* July 17, 2025. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/17/politics/epstein-birthday-letter-trump ; U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Files Transparency Act disclosures. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/doj-disclosures
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,43 +6,207 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Conservative
|
||||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
summary: "Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990, the longest-serving British PM of the twentieth century; her government cooperated closely with the Reagan administration on Cold War intelligence operations, including support for the Afghan mujahideen, while the Arms-to-Iraq and Matrix Churchill affairs implicated British officials and contractors in the same illicit arms networks examined by the Iran-Contra investigations."
|
||||
- ArmsToIraq
|
||||
- MatrixChurchill
|
||||
- AlYamamah
|
||||
- Spycatcher
|
||||
- GCHQ
|
||||
- Libya
|
||||
- Falklands
|
||||
- Brighton
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Margaret Thatcher
|
||||
- Margaret Hilda Thatcher
|
||||
- Baroness Thatcher
|
||||
- Lady Thatcher
|
||||
- Mrs. Thatcher
|
||||
summary: "Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990; the vault records her governments' Cold War, Al-Yamamah and Iraq arms-export, intelligence, Falklands and Libya decisions."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
born: 1925-10-13
|
||||
died: 2013-04-08
|
||||
location: "Grantham, Lincolnshire, United Kingdom"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[United Kingdom]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister"
|
||||
start: 1979-05-04
|
||||
end: 1990-11-28
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Conservative Party]]"
|
||||
role: "Leader"
|
||||
start: 1975-02
|
||||
end: 1990-11-28
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: relative_of
|
||||
with: "[[Mark Thatcher]]"
|
||||
role: "son"
|
||||
fn: 39
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Falklands War]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister"
|
||||
start: 1982-04-02
|
||||
end: 1982-06-14
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Al-Yamamah]]"
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister during the 1985 negotiation of the first agreement"
|
||||
start: 1985-04
|
||||
end: 1985-09
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[House of Lords]]"
|
||||
role: "Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven"
|
||||
start: 1992
|
||||
end: 2013-04-08
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
---
|
||||
Margaret Hilda Thatcher was born on October 13, 1925, in [[Grantham]], [[Lincolnshire]], the daughter of a grocer and local alderman, and died on April 8, 2013.[^1] She was Prime Minister of the [[United Kingdom]] from May 1979 to November 1990 and the first woman to hold the office. Her governments coordinated intelligence and military policy with the administration of [[Ronald Reagan]]. Her name recurs in the vault's records of the [[Iraq]] arms trade, the 1986 bombing of [[Libya]], the [[GCHQ]] trade union ban, the [[Spycatcher]] injunction, the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms contracts with [[Saudi Arabia]] and the child abuse allegations that involve figures in her circle.
|
||||
|
||||
Margaret Hilda Thatcher was born on October 13, 1925, in Grantham, Lincolnshire, the daughter of a grocer and local alderman. She studied chemistry at [[Oxford University]] before qualifying as a barrister. She won election to Parliament as the Conservative MP for Finchley in 1959. Following the Conservative defeat in two 1974 elections, she challenged and defeated Edward Heath for the party leadership in February 1975. The Conservatives won the general election of May 3, 1979, and Thatcher became Prime Minister, the first woman to hold the office.[^1]
|
||||
### Early career and election
|
||||
|
||||
### Cold War Alliance with Reagan
|
||||
Thatcher studied chemistry at [[Oxford University]] before qualifying as a barrister. She was elected Conservative member for [[Finchley]] in 1959. After the [[Conservative Party]] lost two general elections in 1974, she defeated [[Edward Heath]] for the party leadership in February 1975.[^1] The Conservatives won the general election of May 3, 1979, and Thatcher became Prime Minister the following day.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher and U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] formed the defining political partnership of the 1980s Western alliance. She had met Reagan in April 1975 and the two shared an ideological commitment to rolling back [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] influence. After Reagan's election in November 1980, the two governments coordinated intelligence and military policy throughout the decade. British [[MI6|Secret Intelligence Service]] cooperation with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] was formalized through joint operations in multiple theaters.[^1]
|
||||
### Brighton bombing
|
||||
|
||||
The most operationally significant joint effort was support for the Afghan resistance following the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The CIA's [[Operation Cyclone]], coordinating arms and funding flows to mujahideen factions through [[Pakistan|Pakistani]] [[ISI|Inter-Services Intelligence]], was complemented by British SAS training programs for Afghan fighters. Thatcher publicly backed the mujahideen, framing Soviet involvement as unprovoked aggression against a neighboring state.[^2]
|
||||
On October 12, 1984, the [[Irish Republican Army|Provisional Irish Republican Army]] detonated a long-delay bomb at the [[Grand Hotel, Brighton]] during the Conservative Party conference. The Prime Minister and senior members of her Cabinet were among the people in the hotel at the time, and a message read in the [[House of Lords]] on October 16 gave thanks for "the escape from assassination of the Prime Minister and other Ministers of the Crown."[^2] The Lords were told that four people had died and 32 were injured, and that the Provisional IRA had admitted responsibility.[^2] The Home Secretary, [[Leon Brittan]], told the [[House of Commons]] on October 22 that the purpose of the bomb "was no less than to strike a blow at the heart of our democracy by killing the majority of the Cabinet."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher permitted the United States to use British bases - specifically [[RAF Lakenheath]] and [[RAF Upper Heyford]] - for the April 1986 bombing of [[Libya]], Operation El Dorado Canyon, over [[Muammar Gaddafi]]. No other NATO ally granted overflight rights. The decision was politically controversial in Britain.[^1]
|
||||
A fifth person died on November 13, 1984: the wife of Scotland's Conservative Party leader, who died of the wounds she had received in the bombing.[^4] Thatcher wrote that when she went to the Royal Sussex County Hospital to see the injured after her conference speech, "Four people had already died," and that one of the injured women "was on a drip feed: she would die later."[^5] Five people died in all, and 34 were injured.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Falklands War and Intelligence
|
||||
[[Patrick Magee]] was arrested in Glasgow in June 1985. A palm print on a hotel registration card, made out in the false name Roy Walsh, led to the charge. On June 10, 1986, a jury at the [[Old Bailey]] convicted him on all counts, and he received eight life sentences, seven of them for the Brighton bombing. He was released in June 1999 under the early release scheme of the Good Friday Agreement after serving 14 years.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The Argentine invasion of the [[Falkland Islands]] on April 2, 1982, precipitated the most direct military crisis of Thatcher's tenure. The subsequent ten-week war saw the British task force recapture the islands by June 14, 1982. The [[NSA|National Security Agency]] and [[GCHQ]] cooperation on signals intelligence was central to British operational planning: American satellite and electronic intelligence was shared with British commanders, a level of cooperation that reflected both the alliance's depth and the personal relationship between Thatcher and Reagan.[^1]
|
||||
### Cold War alliance with Reagan
|
||||
|
||||
### Arms-to-Iraq and Matrix Churchill
|
||||
Thatcher and Reagan formed the central political partnership of the Western alliance in the 1980s. She had met Reagan in April 1975, and the two shared a commitment to rolling back [[Soviet Union|Soviet]] influence. After Reagan's election in November 1980, the two governments coordinated intelligence and military policy through the decade. British [[MI6|Secret Intelligence Service]] cooperation with the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] ran through joint operations in several theaters.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The Arms-to-Iraq affair was the British corollary to the same illicit weapons procurement networks that characterized the period of Western support for [[Saddam Hussein]] during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]. British machine-tool manufacturer [[Matrix Churchill]], based in Coventry, exported precision tooling to Iraq under export licenses approved by the [[Department of Trade and Industry]] despite [[MI6]] awareness that the machinery would be used for weapons production. Three Matrix Churchill directors were prosecuted in 1992 for breaching export controls; the trial collapsed when it emerged that ministers had signed public interest immunity certificates to suppress intelligence documents that would have exonerated the defendants.[^2]
|
||||
The most operationally significant joint effort was support for the [[Afghanistan|Afghan]] resistance after the Soviet invasion of December 1979. The CIA's [[Operation Cyclone]], which moved arms and funds to mujahideen factions through [[Pakistan]]'s [[Inter-Services Intelligence]], was complemented by British [[Special Air Service|SAS]] training programs for Afghan fighters.[^8] On January 24, 1980, the government's statement in the Commons, read by Lord Privy Seal [[Ian Gilmour]], said that "The Soviet action is a breach of all the conventions that have governed East-West relations for the past decade."[^9] Thatcher publicly backed the mujahideen, framing Soviet involvement as unprovoked aggression against a neighboring state.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The subsequent [[Scott Inquiry]], chaired by Sir Richard Scott, reported in February 1996 - after Thatcher had left office - and found that guidelines on arms exports to Iraq had been secretly changed by the government without informing Parliament. [[Mark Thatcher]], her son, was separately implicated in arms-related business dealings.
|
||||
### Falklands War
|
||||
|
||||
### Brighton Bombing
|
||||
The Argentine invasion of the [[Falkland Islands]] on April 2, 1982, began the most direct military crisis of Thatcher's tenure. The British task force recaptured the islands by June 14, 1982. On April 14, 1982, Thatcher told the Commons of [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]], the American Secretary of State, that his "tireless efforts" had included "two visits to this country and one to Buenos Aires."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 12, 1984, the [[Irish Republican Army]] detonated a long-delay bomb at the [[Grand Hotel, Brighton]], during the Conservative Party conference. The explosion killed five people and injured dozens. Thatcher and most of her Cabinet survived. The attack was carried out by IRA operative [[Patrick Magee]], who was arrested in Glasgow in June 1985 and sentenced to eight life terms.[^1]
|
||||
The American record of the war is published in the State Department's Foreign Relations series. On April 6, 1982, Thatcher sent Reagan a message that opened: "I am seeking your urgent help in bringing pressure to bear on Argentina to withdraw from the Falkland Islands," and asked for his "personal backing for the urgent introduction of economic and financial measures against Argentina."[^11] The same day, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, [[Francis West]], told Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] that "Intelligence reporting is shared between the US and the UK, under bilateral agreement and also under the aegis of NATO," that "Cooperation extends to compartmental, sensitive source programs, including SIGINT, COMINT, overhead and SOSUS," and that "Both real time and analytical intelligence is exchanged."[^12] A State Department action memorandum of April 6 recorded the view of its European Bureau that "a lack of support from the U.S. in the period ahead could threaten the life of the Thatcher Government" and recommended: "We should therefore proceed with logistics/intelligence support of the type requested while insisting on the greatest possible secrecy." Its Inter-American Bureau advised refusing British requests "that are not clearly required by existing agreements."[^13] [[NSA|National Security Agency]] and GCHQ cooperation on signals intelligence became part of British operational planning during the war, and American satellite and electronic intelligence was shared with British commanders.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Resignation and Legacy
|
||||
On April 10, 1982, in Buenos Aires, Haig told President [[Leopoldo Galtieri]], in the words of the American record, "that the reports that the US has furnished intelligence and satellite information to the UK are untrue. We denied the British request."[^14] On April 17, the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, [[Richard Burt]], listed among American interests "maintaining the Thatcher Government in power" and wrote that "The U.S. must be prepared to do what is necessary to see the UK prevail, and must be seen to be doing so at the appropriate time."[^15] A Defense Department list of British requests received on May 6 and 7, 1982, which Weinberger annotated on May 10 with the instruction "We should not require longer than 36 hours to act on any UK request," included encryption devices, infra-red flares, torpedoes, a close-in weapons system, night vision goggles, 50 limpet mines, and the direct relay of weather satellite information.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister on November 28, 1990, following a leadership challenge by [[Michael Heseltine]] that revealed she could not win the second ballot. She was succeeded by [[John Major]]. She was elevated to the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven in 1992. She died on April 8, 2013, at The Ritz hotel in London, following a stroke, aged 87.[^1]
|
||||
In April 1984, Thatcher answered questions from [[Tam Dalyell]] about the sinking of the [[ARA General Belgrano]]. She told the Commons that no official interviews or assistance had been given to the authors of The Sinking of the Belgrano "specifically in connection with their book," beyond comments on an article in International Defense Review.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Blunt disclosure of 1979
|
||||
|
||||
On November 21, 1979, Thatcher told the Commons that [[Anthony Blunt]] had been a Soviet agent. "Professor Blunt has admitted that he was recruited for Russian intelligence when he was at Cambridge before the war." She said that "There is no doubt that British interests were seriously damaged by his activities," but that "it is unlikely that British military operations or British lives were put at risk." She added that "the story that he jeopardised the lives of secret agents in the Netherlands is without foundation."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
### GCHQ trade union ban
|
||||
|
||||
On January 31, 1984, the Prime Minister told the Commons that "Certificates have been signed under successive Governments to except these services from the provisions of the Employment Protection Acts." The government removed trade union membership rights from staff at GCHQ in [[Cheltenham]] in January 1984. The [[Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978]] allowed a Minister to issue a certificate "for the purpose of safeguarding national security," and on February 1, 1984, the Prime Minister answered that "Such a certificate has been issued in the case of GCHQ."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Council of Civil Service Unions]] challenged the instruction in the High Court. On July 17, 1984, Thatcher told the Commons that Mr Justice Glidewell had found for the government on four of the five grounds of the challenge, but had concluded that "because of the lack of prior consultation with the unions concerned, the instruction given in this instance was invalid." She said that the finding "did not affect the certificates issued" under the Employment Protection Acts.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Libya bombing of April 1986
|
||||
|
||||
On April 15, 1986, Thatcher told the Commons that the President had sought British support and "agreement, in accordance with our long-standing arrangements, to the use in the operation of some United States aircraft based in this country." She said that Britain would support "action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities," and that "we would agree to the deployment of United States aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom for that purpose." She reported that the President had made clear that "use of F111 aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom was essential."[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The operation, Operation El Dorado Canyon, was flown from [[RAF Lakenheath]] and [[RAF Upper Heyford]] against targets associated with [[Muammar Gaddafi]] in Libya. Reagan thanked "our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission."[^22] Air Force Magazine reported that France, Germany, Italy and Spain refused to cooperate, which forced the F-111s to fly around France and Spain and through the Strait of Gibraltar.[^23] The decision was politically controversial in Britain.
|
||||
|
||||
### Spycatcher
|
||||
|
||||
The government's action against the memoir of former [[MI5]] officer [[Peter Wright]] was pursued through the courts of [[Australia]]. On November 7, 1986, the Prime Minister answered a question about the government's action against [[Heinemann Australia]] PTY Ltd. and Peter Wright, "for an order restraining the publication of Mr. Peter Wright's manuscripts."[^24] On November 20, 1986, the Prime Minister put the total cost to public funds of the court action, including legal costs and civil servants' fares and subsistence, at a figure that "is estimated to be of the order of £100,000."[^25] On November 21, 1986, the Prime Minister's written answer stated that "a total of nine persons have had cause to be sent by Her Majesty's Government to Australia in connection with the case of Mr. Peter Wright."[^26] Wright's memoir was published as Spycatcher in 1987.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Vanunu and the Israeli inquiries
|
||||
|
||||
Asked on November 7, 1986, whether she had had discussions with [[Shimon Peres]] or any other member of the Israeli government about [[Mordechai Vanunu]] before his departure from the United Kingdom, Thatcher answered "No."[^28] Asked on November 27, 1986, whether information had been passed from Her Majesty's Government sources to Israeli sources about Vanunu's presence in the United Kingdom, she again answered "No."[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Syrian Embassy and the Hindawi trial
|
||||
|
||||
On October 24, 1986, the Foreign Secretary, [[Geoffrey Howe]], told the Commons that the trial of [[Nezar Hindawi]] had ended that day. Hindawi "was found guilty of attempting to place a bomb on an El Al aircraft at Heathrow on 17 April and was sentenced to 45 years' imprisonment." Howe said that "There is conclusive evidence of Syrian official involvement with Hindawi," and that "We have therefore decided to break diplomatic relations with Syria." The Syrian ambassador was told to close his [[Syrian Embassy in London|embassy]] and leave the country within 14 days.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
### Al-Yamamah
|
||||
|
||||
Al-Yamamah ("the Dove" in Arabic) was the series of government-to-government arms agreements between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, with [[British Aerospace]] (later [[BAE Systems]]) as prime contractor. The first agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lancaster House in September 1985 by the Secretary of State for Defence, [[Michael Heseltine]], and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]; it is dated September 26, 1985, and covered 72 Tornado aircraft and 30 Hawk trainers, among other equipment.[^31][^32] Two further, more detailed agreements followed in 1986 and 1988, and the programme was extended in 1993 by an order for 48 more Tornados.[^31][^32]
|
||||
|
||||
Foreign Office files released to the [[National Archives]] and reported in 2016 record that Thatcher stopped in [[Riyadh]] in April 1985 on her way back from South Asia and met King [[Fahd]]. Heseltine approved the stop-over on the basis that it would allow her to complete the sale, and Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], then Saudi ambassador to the United States, invited her. A briefing document stated that it "seems unlikely that Prince Bandar would seek to engineer such a meeting unless something positive was likely to come out of it." The official record of the meeting was billed as one about regional developments and does not mention the aircraft. After the visit Thatcher wrote to Fahd: "I was glad that we were able to discuss a further matter privately over lunch. I look forward to receiving your majesty's personal envoy soon, in order that we may conclude this matter successfully."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The Guardian published in October 2006 documents that had been released to the National Archives in May of that year and were withdrawn by the Ministry of Defence after the paper approached it. One was a January 1986 telegram from [[Colin Chandler]], head of the Ministry's arms sales unit, who was in Riyadh with BAE executives. The Guardian reported from it that the price of each Tornado had been raised by 32 percent, from £16.3 million to £21.5 million, and that the total was to reach £5 billion against the £3.5 billion to £4 billion stated in the Memorandum. The same release contained a Ministry of Defence briefing prepared for Thatcher that described Prince Sultan as "not highly intelligent," and Foreign Office correspondence of 1985 sending Thatcher's chief aide at Number 10, [[Charles Powell]], a copy of an Arab magazine that alleged £600 million in secret commissions, with advice that officials "should simply refuse all comment."[^31] Lord Gilmour, who had been a minister under Thatcher, told BBC2's Newsnight, as the Guardian quoted him: "You either got the business and bribed, or you didn't bribe and didn't get the business."[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1992 the [[National Audit Office]] reported on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project. Its examination of project receipts and payments passing through the Ministry of Defence "found no evidence of commission payments being made to third parties." On February 27, 1992, in a private session of the [[Public Accounts Committee]], whose chairman was [[Robert Sheldon]], the Ministry's permanent secretary, Sir [[Michael Quinlan]], said: "The whole project operates under a seal of confidentiality. There is a very great sensitivity about the project on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government. Open Government is alien to them." Asked for an assurance that no public funds had gone the wrong way, Quinlan answered: "Yes, I can give you the assurance that there is no basis to support any suggestion that commission payments have been made using public funds."[^34] The report was not published. The Guardian reported in March 2024, after finding the papers in Sheldon's archive at the [[London School of Economics]], that only ten copies were printed and that only Sheldon and his deputy read it. The Guardian also reported that a Ministry memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial showed that in 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales had helped set up regular quarterly payments to Prince Bandar from Al-Yamamah funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction. BAE said all payments were made with the express approval of the United Kingdom government, and the Ministry said the funds remained the property of the Saudi government.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Serious Fraud Office]] launched an investigation into allegations of corruption against BAE on July 29, 2004, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah. By autumn 2006 it intended to examine Swiss bank accounts, and the judgment of the House of Lords records that the Saudi authorities responded with an explicit threat to withdraw from bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, to withdraw cooperation on the United Kingdom's strategic objectives in the Middle East and to end negotiations then in progress for the purchase of Typhoon aircraft. The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir [[Sherard Cowper-Coles]], told the Director that "British lives on British streets were at risk." The Prime Minister, [[Tony Blair]], sent the Attorney General a personal minute on December 8, 2006.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
On December 14, 2006, the Attorney General, [[Lord Goldsmith]], told the Lords that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office had decided to discontinue the investigation "following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security." He said he had obtained "the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries," who had expressed "the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation."[^37] [[The Corner House]] and Campaign Against Arms Trade challenged the decision. The Divisional Court quashed it on the ground that the Director had yielded to a threat. On July 30, 2008, the House of Lords allowed the Director's appeal in [[R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office]], holding the decision lawful. [[Lord Bingham]] wrote that what determined the decision was "the Director's judgment that the public interest in saving British lives outweighed the public interest in pursuing BAE to conviction."[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems pleaded guilty in the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] to conspiring to defraud the United States by making false statements about its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance program and to violating the Arms Export Control Act, and was fined $400 million by Judge John D. Bates. The Department of Justice stated that BAE took the role of prime contractor to the United Kingdom government in the mid-1980s after the formal understanding with Saudi Arabia, that its "support services" resulted in substantial benefits to a foreign public official of Saudi Arabia who was in a position of influence over sales of fighter jets, and that BAE undertook no adequate review or verification of more than $5 million in invoices submitted by one employee from May 2001 to early 2002.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mark Thatcher
|
||||
|
||||
On January 24, 1996, [[George Galloway]] told the Commons that commissions on the Al-Yamamah arms sales had been paid through middlemen, and named [[Mark Thatcher]] and [[Wafic Said]] among them. He described Mark Thatcher as "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time," who "was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said." Galloway also named [[Douglas Leese]] among the intermediaries and described [[Jonathan Aitken]] as Said's business partner.[^39] The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^40] The Guardian wrote in 2006 that all those involved had always denied the allegations.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that Mark Thatcher introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]] in 1983, and that Van Der Westhuizen connected Bull with [[ARMSCOR]] for the "supergun" project. Ben-Menashe wrote that Mark Thatcher was present at a late-1986 meeting in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]] and Van Der Westhuizen. He also wrote that Mark Thatcher presented himself to Ben-Menashe in Santiago in 1988 as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position, and that Mark Thatcher was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to Chile after the [[Falklands War]].[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 13, 2005, in the Cape High Court in [[Cape Town]], Mark Thatcher pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempting to contravene section 2 of South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act by agreeing to charter a helicopter, for which he paid $275,000. The text of the agreement stated: "The accused began to suspect that the helicopter might in fact be intended for use in ... mercenary activity [in the west African region]. Despite his misgivings the accused decided to invest money in the charter of the helicopter." His lawyers stated that he was not charged with any involvement in the attempted coup in [[Equatorial Guinea]]. Judge Abe Motala imposed a fine of three million rand, or five years in prison, and a further four-year sentence suspended for five years. Zimbabwe had jailed [[Simon Mann]], a friend of Mark Thatcher and a former British special services officer, with 65 other suspected mercenaries in September 2004.[^42][^43]
|
||||
|
||||
### Matrix Churchill and the Scott Inquiry
|
||||
|
||||
[[Matrix Churchill]], a machine-tool company based in Coventry, exported precision tooling to Iraq under export licenses approved by the [[Department of Trade and Industry]], despite MI6 awareness that the machinery would be used for weapons production. Three Matrix Churchill directors were prosecuted in 1992 for breaching export controls. The Arms-to-Iraq affair was the British corollary to the same illicit weapons procurement networks that characterized Western support for [[Saddam Hussein]] during the [[Iran-Iraq War]]. On November 18, 1992, the Prime Minister, [[John Major]], answered (holding answer of November 17) a Commons question on whether the papers supplied to defence counsel would be placed in the Library: "No. The papers were supplied to the defence for the purposes of the trial. Lord Justice Scott will have access to them."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
The trial collapsed after ministers' public interest immunity certificates kept intelligence documents from the defense. The allegation that ministers had signed the certificates to suppress intelligence documents that would have exonerated the defendants was made in the media. The government's account, given by [[Ian Lang]] to the Commons on February 15, 1996, recorded the charges "made and repeated in the media that the Ministers who signed the PII certificates were seeking to deprive defendants in a criminal trial of the means by which to clear themselves." Lang said that [[Richard Scott|Sir Richard Scott]] "concludes, after more than three years of painstaking investigation, that all Ministers who signed PII certificates did so without any impropriety."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Scott Inquiry]], commissioned by Major in November 1992 after the end of the Matrix Churchill trial, reported on February 15, 1996, after Thatcher had left office.[^45][^46] Lang quoted the report's finding that "following the ceasefire in 1988, but not before, Government policy towards the export of non-lethal military goods changed in a way that he believes should have been drawn to the attention of the House." He added that Scott "expressly accepts that they were sincere in doing so," while not agreeing "that they were correct in their belief."[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
### Stoke Lodge and the Elm Guest House allegations
|
||||
|
||||
The writer S. Dovey wrote that civic functions at [[Stoke Lodge]], the residence of the Australian High Commissioner in Kensington, were attended by Thatcher, [[Peter Morrison]], [[Peter Hayman]] and Brittan. Dovey also wrote that the chauffeur firm used by the residence employed men later convicted of child abuse and murder, and that reporting on a June 1982 police raid of the [[Elm Guest House]] may have stopped after intervention by Attorney General [[Michael Havers]].[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
### Resignation and later life
|
||||
|
||||
On November 22, 1990, Thatcher addressed the Commons in the debate on the motion of confidence in her government.[^48] She faced a leadership challenge from Heseltine in which she could not win the second ballot. She resigned as Prime Minister on November 28, 1990, and was succeeded by Major. She was elevated to the House of Lords as Baroness Thatcher of Kesteven in 1992. She died on April 8, 2013, at The Ritz hotel in London, following a stroke, aged 87.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Margaret Thatcher," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/biography/Margaret-Thatcher
|
||||
[^2]: Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.* Penguin, 2004.
|
||||
[^2]: Whitelaw, Viscount, statement on the Grand Hotel, Brighton, House of Lords, October 16, 1984, HL Deb vol. 455, cols. 884-8. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1984/oct/16/grand-hotel-brighton-bomb-explosion
|
||||
[^3]: Brittan, Leon, statement on the Brighton bomb incident, House of Commons, October 22, 1984, HC Deb vol. 65, cols. 440-5. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/oct/22/bomb-incident-brighton
|
||||
[^4]: "5th person dies from IRA bomb attack on Thatcher," *UPI,* November 13, 1984. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1984/11/13/5th-person-dies-from-IRA-bomb-attack-on-Thatcher/3748469170000/
|
||||
[^5]: Thatcher, Margaret, "Northern Ireland: The Brighton Bomb" (extract from *The Downing Street Years,* HarperCollins, 1993), Margaret Thatcher Foundation, document 109119. https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109119
|
||||
[^6]: "1984: Tory Cabinet escapes Brighton bomb," *BBC On This Day,* October 12, 1984. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_2531000/2531583.stm
|
||||
[^7]: "1986: Magee convicted of Brighton bombing," *BBC On This Day,* June 10, 1986. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/10/newsid_2510000/2510649.stm
|
||||
[^8]: Coll, Steve. *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.* Penguin, 2004.
|
||||
[^9]: Gilmour, Ian (Lord Privy Seal), statement on Afghanistan, House of Commons, January 24, 1980, HC Deb vol. 977, cols. 655-69. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1980/jan/24/afghanistan
|
||||
[^10]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on the Falkland Islands, House of Commons, April 14, 1982, HC Deb vol. 21, cols. 1146-208. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1982/apr/14/falkland-islands
|
||||
[^11]: Message From British Prime Minister Thatcher to President Reagan, London, April 6, 1982, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume XIII, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981-1984,* Document 68. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d68
|
||||
[^12]: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (West) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Washington, April 6, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 65. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d65
|
||||
[^13]: Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Scanlan), the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Enders), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Hormats) to Secretary of State Haig, Washington, April 6, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 69. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d69
|
||||
[^14]: Memorandum of Conversation, Buenos Aires, April 10, 1982 (Haig and President Galtieri), *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 90. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d90
|
||||
[^15]: Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Burt) to Acting Secretary of State Eagleburger, Washington, April 17, 1982, *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 143. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d143
|
||||
[^16]: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger, with attached list of requests received May 6-7, 1982 (Weinberger notation of May 10), *FRUS 1981-1988, Volume XIII,* Document 241. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d241
|
||||
[^17]: Thatcher, Margaret, answer on "The Sinking of the Belgrano," House of Commons, April 12, 1984, HC Deb vol. 58, col. 526. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/apr/12/the-sinking-of-the-belgrano
|
||||
[^18]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on Mr. Anthony Blunt, House of Commons, November 21, 1979, HC Deb vol. 974, cols. 402-520. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1979/nov/21/mr-anthony-blunt
|
||||
[^19]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answers on the intelligence services and trade union membership, House of Commons, January 31, 1984, HC Deb vol. 53, col. 120W, and February 1, 1984, HC Deb vol. 53, cols. 209-10W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1984/feb/01/trade-union-membership
|
||||
[^20]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on GCHQ, House of Commons, July 17, 1984, HC Deb vol. 64, cols. 171-86. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jul/17/gchq
|
||||
[^21]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on Libya, House of Commons, April 15, 1986, HC Deb vol. 95, cols. 729-39. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/apr/15/libya
|
||||
[^22]: Reagan, Ronald, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, April 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-air-strike-against-libya
|
||||
[^23]: "El Dorado Canyon," *Air Force Magazine,* March 1999 (Air & Space Forces Magazine archive). https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0399canyon/
|
||||
[^24]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the Wright memoirs, House of Commons, November 7, 1986, HC Deb vol. 103, cols. 631-2W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/07/wright-memoirs
|
||||
[^25]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the Australian court action, House of Commons, November 20, 1986, HC Deb vol. 105, col. 268W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/20/mr-peter-wright-australian-court-action
|
||||
[^26]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on the court case, House of Commons, November 21, 1986, HC Deb vol. 105, cols. 359-60W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/21/mr-peter-wright-court-case
|
||||
[^27]: Wright, Peter. *Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer.* Viking, 1987.
|
||||
[^28]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on Mr. M. Vanunu, House of Commons, November 7, 1986, HC Deb vol. 103, col. 632W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/07/mr-m-vanunu
|
||||
[^29]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on Mr. Mordechai Vanunu, House of Commons, November 27, 1986, HC Deb vol. 106, col. 299W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1986/nov/27/mr-mordechai-vanunu
|
||||
[^30]: Howe, Sir Geoffrey, statement on Anglo-Syrian relations, House of Commons, October 24, 1986, HC Deb vol. 102, cols. 1504-14. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/oct/24/anglo-syrian-relations
|
||||
[^31]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
|
||||
[^32]: Lewis, Mike, and Katherine Templar. *UK Personnel Supporting the Saudi Armed Forces: Risk, Knowledge and Accountability.* 2018, citing the Memorandum of Understanding for the Provision of Equipment and Services for the Royal Saudi Air Force, September 26, 1985, and UK National Archives file FCO 8/6055. https://www.mikelewisresearch.com/RSAFfinal.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: "Thatcher held secret Saudi talks to win huge arms deal, archives show," *Middle East Eye,* August 25, 2016 (reporting on Foreign Office files released to the National Archives). https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thatcher-held-secret-saudi-talks-win-huge-arms-deal-archives-show
|
||||
[^34]: Ministry of Defence Appropriation Accounts 1990-91, Class I, Vote 2, Defence Procurement: The Saudi Arabian Airforce Project (National Audit Office report, 1992), and summary minutes of the private session of the Committee of Public Accounts, February 27, 1992 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Ministry of Defence), in the papers of Robert Sheldon, London School of Economics, as published by The Guardian. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/24502904/collected-files-sheldon-papers-reduced.pdf
|
||||
[^35]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^36]: *R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office* [2008] UKHL 60 (House of Lords, July 30, 2008), on appeal from [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/60.html
|
||||
[^37]: Goldsmith, Lord (Attorney General), statement "BAE Systems: Al Yamamah Contract," House of Lords, December 14, 2006, HL Deb cols. 1711-8. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm
|
||||
[^38]: U.S. Department of Justice, "BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine," press release, March 1, 2010 (*United States v. BAE Systems plc,* D.D.C., Crim. No. 10-035, Judge John D. Bates). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine
|
||||
[^39]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^40]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
|
||||
[^41]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^42]: "Thatcher admits role in coup plot," *Al Jazeera,* January 13, 2005. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/1/13/thatcher-admits-role-in-coup-plot
|
||||
[^43]: "Thatcher's son pleads guilty in coup plot," Associated Press, January 13, 2005. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6818757
|
||||
[^44]: Major, John, written answer on Matrix Churchill, House of Commons, November 18, 1992, HC Deb vol. 214, cols. 216-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1992/nov/18/matrix-churchill
|
||||
[^45]: Lang, Ian, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report
|
||||
[^46]: Scott, Sir Richard. *Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.* HC 115, HMSO, February 15, 1996. Quoted in the Lang statement (Lang, February 15, 1996, above).
|
||||
[^47]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* 2023.
|
||||
[^48]: Thatcher, Margaret, speech in the debate on "Confidence in Her Majesty's Government," House of Commons, November 22, 1990, HC Deb vol. 181, cols. 439-518. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1990/nov/22/confidence-in-her-majestys-government
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -5,20 +5,41 @@ tags:
|
|||
- IranContra
|
||||
- ArmsDealer
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
summary: "In 1983, Thatcher introduced Gerald Bull to Gen."
|
||||
summary: "Mark Thatcher, son of Margaret Thatcher, is an arms dealer named in the Commons in 1996 over Al-Yamamah commissions and pleaded guilty in South Africa in 2005 over a helicopter charter."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: relative_of
|
||||
with: "[[Margaret Thatcher]]"
|
||||
role: "mother"
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher]] is the son of British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]. He is an established arms dealer with significant connections in the international arms trade, particularly with [[Chile]] and [[South Africa]].[^1]
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher]] is the son of British Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]].[^1] He is an established arms dealer with significant connections in the international arms trade, particularly with [[Chile]] and [[South Africa]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1983, [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], chief of [[South African Defense Force]], who then connected Bull with [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] for his "supergun" project.[^1]
|
||||
In 1983, Thatcher introduced [[Gerald Bull]] to [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], chief of [[South African Defense Force]], who then connected Bull with [[Armscor|ARMSCOR]] for his "supergun" project.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was present at a meeting in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], in late 1986 with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]], and [[Pieter Van Der Westhuizen|Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen]], where the [[United States|U.S.]] reaffirmed its intention to maintain arms channels to [[Iraq]] through [[South Africa]] and [[Chile]].[^1]
|
||||
Thatcher was present at a meeting in [[Santiago]], Chile, in late 1986 with [[Carlos Cardoen]], [[Robert Gates]], Senator [[John Tower]], and Gen. Pieter Van Der Westhuizen, where the [[United States|U.S.]] reaffirmed its intention to maintain arms channels to [[Iraq]] through South Africa and Chile.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] indicated that [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was involved in his business, and that he had the backing of the [[United States|Americans]] and the Chilean government. [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] also had business dealings with [[South Africa]] for a long time, and was involved in providing military equipment through the [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] network to the [[Iraq|Iraqis]], including nuclear missile projects.[^1]
|
||||
Cardoen indicated that Thatcher was involved in his business, and that he had the backing of the Americans and the Chilean government. Thatcher also had business dealings with South Africa for a long time, and was involved in providing military equipment through the Cardoen network to the Iraqis, including nuclear missile projects.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1988, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] met [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] in [[Santiago]], [[Chile]], where [[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] presented himself as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position. He expressed admiration for [[Augusto Pinochet|Pinochet]] and discussed the [[Falklands War]], noting [[Chile]]'s support for [[United Kingdom|Britain]]. He also revealed that [[Carlos Cardoen|Cardoen]] received technology directly from the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] through [[Robert Gates|Gates's]] office.[^1]
|
||||
In 1988, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] met Thatcher in Santiago, Chile, where Thatcher presented himself as a private businessman with no connection to the British government, despite his mother's position. He expressed admiration for [[Augusto Pinochet|Pinochet]] and discussed the [[Falklands War]], noting Chile's support for [[United Kingdom|Britain]]. He also revealed that Cardoen received technology directly from the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] through Gates's office.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Mark Thatcher|Thatcher]] was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to [[Chile]] after the [[Falklands War]]. He was also linked to [[Ihsan Barbouti]] and [[Sarcis Sargalian]] in projects supplying [[Iraq]] with military equipment. [[Richard Babayan]], a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] contract agent, also controlled a network providing equipment for [[Iraq]].[^1]
|
||||
Thatcher was involved in the sale of 48 [[Chieftain tanks]] to Chile after the Falklands War. He was also linked to [[Ihsan Barbouti]] and [[Sarcis Sargalian]] in projects supplying Iraq with military equipment. [[Richard Babayan]], a CIA contract agent, also controlled a network providing equipment for Iraq.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Al-Yamamah allegations
|
||||
|
||||
On January 24, 1996, [[George Galloway]] told the Commons that commissions on the [[Al-Yamamah]] arms sales had been paid through middlemen, and named Mark Thatcher and [[Wafic Said]] among them. He described Mark Thatcher as "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time," who "was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said." Galloway also named [[Douglas Leese]] among the intermediaries and described [[Jonathan Aitken]] as Said's business partner.[^3] The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^4] The Guardian wrote in 2006 that it had been alleged that Thatcher's son received secret commissions from the deal and that all those involved had always denied the allegations.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Equatorial Guinea plea of 2005
|
||||
|
||||
On January 13, 2005, in the Cape High Court in [[Cape Town]], Mark Thatcher pleaded guilty under a plea agreement to attempting to contravene section 2 of South Africa's Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act by agreeing to charter a helicopter, for which he paid $275,000. The text of the agreement stated: "The accused began to suspect that the helicopter might in fact be intended for use in ... mercenary activity [in the west African region]. Despite his misgivings the accused decided to invest money in the charter of the helicopter." His lawyers stated that he was not charged with any involvement in the attempted coup in [[Equatorial Guinea]]. Judge Abe Motala imposed a fine of three million rand, or five years in prison, and a further four-year sentence suspended for five years. Zimbabwe had jailed [[Simon Mann]], a friend of Mark Thatcher and a former British special services officer, with 65 other suspected mercenaries in September 2004.[^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Margaret Thatcher," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/biography/Margaret-Thatcher
|
||||
[^2]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^3]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^4]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
|
||||
[^5]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
|
||||
[^6]: "Thatcher admits role in coup plot," *Al Jazeera,* January 13, 2005. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/1/13/thatcher-admits-role-in-coup-plot
|
||||
[^7]: "Thatcher's son pleads guilty in coup plot," Associated Press, January 13, 2005. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna6818757
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -16,29 +16,30 @@ summary: "Pinochet's secret police under Manuel Contreras, 1974 to 1977, which k
|
|||
start: 1974
|
||||
location: "Santiago, Chile"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional was the secret police of the government of General [[Augusto Pinochet]] in [[Chile]]. Colonel [[Manuel Contreras]] directed it from 1974 to 1977, and [[Pedro Espinoza]] was its director of operations. It was the organizing service of [[Operation Condor]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Killings Abroad
|
||||
|
||||
General [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]], were killed in [[Buenos Aires]] on September 30, 1974, by a bomb built by the American-born agent [[Michael Townley]]. The [[National Security Archive]] describes it as the service's first assassination outside Chile. On October 6, 1975, the [[Christian Democratic Party (Chile)|Christian Democratic]] leader [[Bernardo Leighton]] and his wife were shot and gravely wounded in [[Rome]] by Italian fascists led by [[Stefano delle Chiaie]], whom Townley had recruited. In July 1976 agents of the [[Mulchén Brigade]] beat to death [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish official of the [[United Nations]] in [[Santiago]], in the front yard of Townley's house. On September 21, 1976, Townley's bomb, placed with members of the [[Cuban Nationalist Movement]], killed [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]] in Washington.[^2]
|
||||
General [[Carlos Prats]] and his wife, [[Sofía Cuthbert]], were killed in [[Buenos Aires]] on September 30, 1974, by a bomb built by the American-born agent [[Michael Townley]]. The [[National Security Archive]] describes it as the service's first assassination outside Chile. On October 6, 1975, the [[Christian Democratic Party (Chile)|Christian Democratic]] leader [[Bernardo Leighton]] and his wife were shot and gravely wounded in [[Rome]] by Italian fascists led by [[Stefano delle Chiaie]], whom Townley had recruited. On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE), an agency of [[ECLAC]] in [[Santiago]], was kidnapped by DINA security agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] recorded that his body and car were left in a stream and that the Chilean courts determined that state agents participated in the crime and their identities were established.[^2] The Commission quoted the Chilean court record that he was detained by a group of military personnel assigned to DINA who formed part of its [[Mulchén Brigade]], taken in his own automobile to a building in the Lo Curro district, and there subjected to interrogation, physical duress and subsequent death.[^2] Michael Townley described the killing as a beating by Mulchén Brigade agents in the front yard of his house. On September 21, 1976, Townley's bomb, placed with members of the [[Cuban Nationalist Movement]], killed [[Orlando Letelier]] and [[Ronni Moffitt]] in Washington.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Passports
|
||||
|
||||
Humberto Álvarez Johannsen, sub-director of the consular directorate of the foreign ministry in 1976 and 1977, testified in March 1978 that for DINA officers "there existed a request, as far as I understand an official one, that the passport registry ledger not record any data concerning the actual holder of the passport issued," omitting photograph and identifying details, so that "the Consular Department kept no record whatsoever of the issuance of the passport to these officials," and the number given "approximated whatever was current on the day." The service kept its own office of tickets and freight, whose clerk Luis Humberto García González and his junior Sergio Molina described the mechanics of issuing false-name passports and buying tickets through the agency Exprinter. The two official passports carried to Washington in August 1976 by [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]] were, Riveros said, "handed to us ready by the passport staff at DINA"; the foreign minister, Admiral [[Patricio Carvajal]], denounced them to the Supreme Court on March 7, 1978, as passports 527/76 and 528/76, the civil registry reported on March 10 that no persons of those names existed, and the military prosecutor [[Héctor Orozco]] ordered the international police on May 1 to establish "what system the former DINA followed, in general, to obtain documentation to travel abroad."[^3]
|
||||
Humberto Álvarez Johannsen, sub-director of the consular directorate of the foreign ministry in 1976 and 1977, testified in March 1978 that for DINA officers "there existed a request, as far as I understand an official one, that the passport registry ledger not record any data concerning the actual holder of the passport issued," omitting photograph and identifying details, so that "the Consular Department kept no record whatsoever of the issuance of the passport to these officials," and the number given "approximated whatever was current on the day." The service kept its own office of tickets and freight, whose clerk Luis Humberto García González and his junior Sergio Molina described the mechanics of issuing false-name passports and buying tickets through the agency Exprinter. The two official passports carried to Washington in August 1976 by [[René Riveros]] and [[Rolando Mosqueira]] were, Riveros said, "handed to us ready by the passport staff at DINA"; the foreign minister, Admiral [[Patricio Carvajal]], denounced them to the Supreme Court on March 7, 1978, as passports 527/76 and 528/76, the civil registry reported on March 10 that no persons of those names existed, and the military prosecutor [[Héctor Orozco]] ordered the international police on May 1 to establish "what system the former DINA followed, in general, to obtain documentation to travel abroad."[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### The CIA
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] reported to Congress in 2000 that it had kept up liaison with Contreras from 1974 to 1977. By April 1975 its own reporting called him "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy" within the junta. An interagency committee directed that the relationship continue. A proposal to put Contreras on the payroll was overruled, and one payment was made to him in 1975 all the same. He met the deputy director, General [[Vernon Walters]], that August. The Archive's summary of the report was that "the head of Chile's feared secret police, DINA, was a paid CIA asset in 1975," and that contact went on after his agents had been to Washington to kill Letelier. It ended in November 1977.[^4]
|
||||
The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] reported to Congress in 2000 that it had kept up liaison with Contreras from 1974 to 1977. By April 1975 its own reporting called him "the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy" within the junta. An interagency committee directed that the relationship continue. A proposal to put Contreras on the payroll was overruled, and one payment was made to him in 1975 all the same. He met the deputy director, General [[Vernon Walters]], that August. The Archive's summary of the report was that "the head of Chile's feared secret police, DINA, was a paid CIA asset in 1975," and that contact went on after his agents had been to Washington to kill Letelier. It ended in November 1977.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
Townley pleaded guilty in Washington in August 1978 and testified against Contreras, Espinoza, [[Armando Fernandez Larios|Armando Fernández Larios]], and five Cubans. He served 62 months and entered the [[Witness Protection Program|witness protection program]]. [[Argentina]]'s request for his extradition in the Prats case was not granted. Contreras was convicted in Chile in 1995 and died in a military hospital on August 7, 2015, under sentences that came to more than 500 years.[^2][^5]
|
||||
Townley pleaded guilty in Washington in August 1978 and testified against Contreras, Espinoza, [[Armando Fernandez Larios|Armando Fernández Larios]], and five Cubans. He served 62 months and entered the [[Witness Protection Program|witness protection program]]. [[Argentina]]'s request for his extradition in the Prats case was not granted. Contreras was convicted in Chile in 1995 and died in a military hospital on August 7, 2015, under sentences that came to more than 500 years.[^3][^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," report to Congress under section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, September 18, 2000. https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/chile/index.html
|
||||
[^2]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofia Cuthbert," October 1, 2024. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia ; Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man," National Security Archive, November 22, 2023. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man
|
||||
[^3]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Humberto Álvarez Johannsen (March 20, 1978), Luis Humberto García González (April 12 and June 5, 1978), and Sergio Donato Molina Espinoza (June 1, 1978); denuncia of Patricio Carvajal Prado, March 7, 1978; Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, scan at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, orden amplia de investigar, May 1, 1978.
|
||||
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," report to Congress under section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, September 18, 2000. https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/chile/index.html National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," September 19, 2000. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
|
||||
[^5]: "Ex-Chile spy chief dies while serving 500-year sentence," Al Jazeera, August 8, 2015.
|
||||
[^2]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2 and the quoted Chilean court findings. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
|
||||
[^3]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofia Cuthbert," October 1, 2024. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia ; Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man," National Security Archive, November 22, 2023. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man
|
||||
[^4]: Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* ministro instructor Adolfo Bañados, tomo 1, at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, declaraciones of Humberto Álvarez Johannsen (March 20, 1978), Luis Humberto García González (April 12 and June 5, 1978), and Sergio Donato Molina Espinoza (June 1, 1978); denuncia of Patricio Carvajal Prado, March 7, 1978; Fiscalía Militar Ad-Hoc, Santiago, causa 192-78, as reproduced in *Proceso contra Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda y Pedro Espinoza Bravo,* tomo 2, at https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/MNC/Causa-Contreras-Espinoza-1991-2.pdf. Quotations translated from the Spanish, orden amplia de investigar, May 1, 1978.
|
||||
[^5]: Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," report to Congress under section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, September 18, 2000. https://irp.fas.org/cia/product/chile/index.html National Security Archive, "CIA Acknowledges Ties to Pinochet's Repression," September 19, 2000. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20000919/index.html
|
||||
[^6]: "Ex-Chile spy chief dies while serving 500-year sentence," Al Jazeera, August 8, 2015.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- FiveEyes
|
||||
- ECHELON
|
||||
- NSA
|
||||
summary: "GCHQ (Government Communications Headquarters) is the UK's signals intelligence agency, based in Cheltenham, whose partnership with the NSA under the UKUSA Agreement forms the core of the Five Eyes intelligence architecture; it is referenced throughout the vault's signals intelligence, Iran-Contra, and Cold War subjects."
|
||||
summary: "GCHQ is the UK signals intelligence agency in Cheltenham, whose UKUSA Agreement partnership with the NSA anchors the Five Eyes."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
location: "Cheltenham, Gloucestershire, United Kingdom"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) is the United Kingdom's signals in
|
|||
|
||||
GCHQ traces its origins to the Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, which broke German [[Enigma machine|Enigma]] codes and other Axis ciphers during [[World War II]] - one of the most consequential intelligence achievements in history. Following the war, GC&CS was reorganized as GCHQ and relocated from Bletchley to Eastcote and then to Cheltenham in 1952.
|
||||
|
||||
The [[UKUSA Agreement]] of 1946, between the United States and United Kingdom, established the framework for signals intelligence sharing that grew into the [[Five Eyes]] alliance. GCHQ and the [[NSA]] divided collection responsibilities geographically, shared raw signals intelligence, and exchanged analysis and personnel. The agreement was classified for decades; its existence became publicly acknowledged in 2010 when the British government released the text.[^1]
|
||||
The [[UKUSA Agreement]] of 1946, between the United States and United Kingdom, established the framework for signals intelligence sharing that grew into the [[Five Eyes]] alliance. GCHQ and the NSA divided collection responsibilities geographically, shared raw signals intelligence, and exchanged analysis and personnel. The agreement was classified for decades; its existence became publicly acknowledged in 2010 when the British government released the text.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### ECHELON Network
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,9 +34,11 @@ The 2001 European Parliament ECHELON Committee report confirmed GCHQ's role in t
|
|||
|
||||
One of the most controversial domestic events in GCHQ's institutional history was Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s January 1984 removal of trade union rights from GCHQ personnel. Thatcher justified the decision on national security grounds, arguing that union membership created loyalty conflicts for personnel handling classified material. The move generated significant political controversy. The ban remained in place until 1997 when the incoming Blair government reversed it.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The legal basis for the ban was a ministerial certificate. Section 138(4) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 enabled a Minister to issue a certificate "for the purpose of safeguarding national security," which disapplied the Act's protections for specified Crown employment, and such a certificate "has been issued in the case of GCHQ," the Prime Minister told the Commons in February 1984.[^3] On July 17, 1984, after the Council of Civil Service Unions had challenged the instruction, Thatcher told the Commons that Mr Justice Glidewell had found for the government on four of the five grounds, but had concluded that "because of the lack of prior consultation with the unions concerned, the instruction given in this instance was invalid." She said the finding "did not affect the certificates issued" under the Employment Protection Acts.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Post-Cold War and Snowden
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ's programs were among those revealed by [[NSA]] contractor [[Edward Snowden]] in 2013. Specifically, the TEMPORA program - GCHQ's interception of undersea fiber optic cables carrying internet traffic in bulk - was disclosed, along with GCHQ's sharing of data with the NSA. GCHQ was also revealed as having accessed NSA's [[PRISM]] program, which collected data from major U.S. internet companies. A parliamentary and legal controversy followed over whether GCHQ's bulk collection was legal under the [[Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act]] 2000.[^2]
|
||||
GCHQ's programs were among those revealed by NSA contractor [[Edward Snowden]] in 2013. Specifically, the TEMPORA program - GCHQ's interception of undersea fiber optic cables carrying internet traffic in bulk - was disclosed, along with GCHQ's sharing of data with the NSA. GCHQ was also revealed as having accessed NSA's [[PRISM]] program, which collected data from major U.S. internet companies. A parliamentary and legal controversy followed over whether GCHQ's bulk collection was legal under the [[Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act]] 2000.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Investigatory Powers Act]] 2016 subsequently established a new legal framework for GCHQ's bulk collection activities.
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -44,3 +46,5 @@ The [[Investigatory Powers Act]] 2016 subsequently established a new legal frame
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "GCHQ," UK Government. https://www.gchq.gov.uk/
|
||||
[^2]: European Parliament. *Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications (ECHELON interception system).* European Parliament, 2001.
|
||||
[^3]: Thatcher, Margaret, written answer on trade union membership, House of Commons, February 1, 1984, HC Deb vol. 53, cols. 209-10W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1984/feb/01/trade-union-membership
|
||||
[^4]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on GCHQ, House of Commons, July 17, 1984, HC Deb vol. 64, cols. 171-86. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1984/jul/17/gchq
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -108,6 +108,14 @@ The Guardian reported that the NSA declined to say whether the Foreign Intellige
|
|||
|
||||
The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack on the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] in July 2003, in response to a Freedom of Information Act request by [[A. Jay Cristol]] filed April 26, 2001. The letter of July 2, 2003, enclosed three recordings of Israeli communications in Hebrew, three transcripts and two summary reports, and states that "No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available" and that an EC-121 aircraft had collected conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield; it states that portions were withheld under Executive Order 12958 and under statutes including 18 U.S.C. 798 and Section 6 of Public Law 86-36.[^20] In January 2004 the agency's historian, [[David Hatch]], said the new material "doesn't settle much," according to the Financial Times, and that his reading of the air controller's conversations with two helicopter pilots "suggested strongly" that the Israelis did not know at first that the ship was American.[^21] On June 8, 2007, the NSA announced that it had finished its review of all material relating to the attack and had posted additional documents, stating: "It is not NSA's intention to prove or disprove any one set of conclusions, many of which can be drawn from a thorough review of this material."[^22] [[Oliver Kirby]], the NSA deputy director for operations/production in 1967, said in an interview of February 14, 2003 that within weeks of the attack he read transcripts of the Israeli pilots' conversations that made it "absolutely certain" the Israelis knew the ship was American.[^23] The Chicago Tribune reported on October 2, 2007 that the NSA's position was that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots; quoted Kirby as saying "I'm willing to swear on a stack of Bibles that we knew they knew"; quoted Michael Prostinak, a Hebrew linguist aboard the EC-121, as saying "there were more tapes than just the three on the Internet"; and reported that the posted tape designated A1104/A-02 begins at 2:29 p.m. local time and that a preceding tape designated A1104/A-01 is absent. An NSA media adviser did not respond to the Tribune's question about the difference.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### United Nations headquarters, Security Council delegations and Ndola
|
||||
|
||||
In September 1961, according to a commission of jurists reporting to the [[United Nations]] General Assembly in 2014, Charles Southall was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility near Nicosia, Cyprus, and recalled a recording played back shortly after midnight on the night of the crash that killed [[Dag Hammarskjöld]]. The Commission wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA."[^25] The Eminent Person reporting in 2019 recorded that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of NSA activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on the aircraft, that both had died by 2018, and that the United States had not responded substantively to requests for clarification made since 2015.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the NSA, to [[GCHQ]] asked for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003.[^27] [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ, was charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989; on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by Edward Snowden, that NSA experts had cracked the codes of the United Nations video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and that the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]] and an NSA bugging program, called Special Collection Service, in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Memorandum to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, "Communications Intelligence Activities," October 24, 1952, and NSCID No. 9, December 29, 1952, National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book 23, Documents 2a and 2b. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/ ; National Security Agency, "Origins of NSA" (Major General Ralph J. Canine first Director, November 4, 1952). https://irp.fas.org/nsa/oldind.html
|
||||
|
|
@ -134,3 +142,8 @@ The NSA released transcripts of intercepts made after the June 8, 1967, attack o
|
|||
[^22]: National Security Agency, "U.S.S. Liberty," release page (Wayback Machine 2007 capture). http://web.archive.org/web/2007/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty
|
||||
[^23]: David C. Walsh, "Former NSA Officials Agree," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2003. https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003/june/former-nsa-officials-agree
|
||||
[^24]: "New revelations in attack on American spy ship," *Chicago Tribune*, October 2, 2007. https://www.chicagotribune.com/2007/10/02/new-revelations-in-attack-on-american-spy-ship/
|
||||
[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 13.23 to 13.28 and 15.7. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^26]: Report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, September 12, 2019, paragraph 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^27]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq ; McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
|
||||
[^28]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
|
||||
[^29]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the Der Spiegel account. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters ; CBC News, "NSA spied on UN, leaked files show," August 2013. https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/nsa-spied-on-un-leaked-files-show-1.1306194
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -2,12 +2,19 @@
|
|||
category: "Intelligence & Government"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- "Senate Committee on the Judiciary"
|
||||
- "United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary"
|
||||
- "Senate Judiciary"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
- Congress
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
summary: "Standing Senate committee since 1816, overseeing the Justice Department and FBI and judicial nominations, whose chief investigator relayed a career official's INSLAW allegations to the company in 1988."
|
||||
- Epstein
|
||||
- JudicialNominations
|
||||
- CambridgeAnalytica
|
||||
- ChildSafety
|
||||
- InternalSecuritySubcommittee
|
||||
summary: "Standing Senate committee founded in 1816 that oversees the Justice Department and the FBI and considers judicial and Justice nominations, whose hearings and letters recur across the INSLAW, Epstein and nomination records."
|
||||
start: 1816-12-10
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
|
|
@ -15,32 +22,226 @@ relations:
|
|||
with: "[[Ronald LeGrand]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "chief investigator"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Leonard Leo]]"
|
||||
start: 2023
|
||||
role: "sought records and testimony on his donor network; he declined"
|
||||
fn: 7
|
||||
start: 2023-07-11
|
||||
role: "sought information on his interactions with Supreme Court justices and records on his donor-group network; his counsel declined"
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Dick Durbin]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2023-01-03
|
||||
end: 2025-01-03
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
fn: 28
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Dick Durbin]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2025-01-03
|
||||
role: "ranking member"
|
||||
fn: 33
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Chuck Grassley]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2025-01-03
|
||||
role: "chairman"
|
||||
fn: 32
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Griffin Bell]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1977-01-11
|
||||
end: 1977-01-19
|
||||
role: "nominee for Attorney General, confirmation hearings"
|
||||
fn: 18
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[William Bradford Reynolds]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1985-06-27
|
||||
role: "nominee for associate attorney general; committee vote against his nomination"
|
||||
fn: 19
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2026-07-15
|
||||
role: "nominee for Attorney General, confirmation hearing"
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Frank Carlucci]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1980
|
||||
role: "witness on S. 2216, Intelligence Identities Protection Act"
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Philip Agee]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1980
|
||||
role: "named in testimony on S. 2216"
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Andreas Lowenfeld]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1962-06-12
|
||||
role: "witness before the Internal Security Subcommittee, State Department security hearings"
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Curt Weldon]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2005-09-21
|
||||
role: "witness, Able Danger hearing"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Mark Zaid]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2005-09-21
|
||||
role: "witness, Able Danger hearing"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Christopher Wylie]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2018-05-16
|
||||
role: "witness, Cambridge Analytica hearing"
|
||||
fn: 27
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Jason Citron]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2024-01-31
|
||||
role: "witness, online child sexual exploitation hearing"
|
||||
fn: 29
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Neil M. Barofsky]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2026-02-03
|
||||
role: "witness, Nazi-linked accounts hearing"
|
||||
fn: 32
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[James Eastland]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1955
|
||||
end: 1977
|
||||
role: "chairman of the Internal Security Subcommittee"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Institute of Pacific Relations]]"
|
||||
start: 1951-07-25
|
||||
end: 1952-06-20
|
||||
role: "Internal Security Subcommittee hearings under Chairman Eastland; report of July 2, 1952"
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate established its Committee on the Judiciary on December 10, 1816, among its original standing committees. It oversees the [[Department of Justice]], including the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], and the Department of Homeland Security, and considers judicial and Justice Department nominations.[^1]
|
||||
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary is a standing committee of the United States Senate. The Senate created it on December 10, 1816, in the resolution that established its original standing committees.[^1][^2] It oversees the [[Department of Justice]], including the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]], and the [[Department of Homeland Security]], and it considers judicial and Justice Department nominations.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Internal Security Subcommittee
|
||||
|
||||
Senate Resolution 366 of the Eighty-first Congress, adopted on December 21, 1950, empowered a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee to make a continuing study of the administration of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and other laws on espionage and sabotage, and of the "extent, nature and effects of subversive activities in the United States."[^3] The body, formally the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, was known as the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] (SISS).[^4] [[Pat McCarran]] chaired it in the Eighty-second Congress, with [[James Eastland]], [[Herbert O'Conor]], [[Willis Smith]], [[Homer Ferguson]], [[William Jenner]] and [[Arthur Watkins]] as members; [[Robert Morris]] was special counsel, [[Benjamin Mandel]] director of research, and J. G. Sourwine counsel to the full committee.[^3] Jenner was chairman in 1953, when Morris was chief counsel and the subcommittee held hearings on "Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments" beginning April 10, 1953.[^5] Eastland, a member since 1951, became chairman in 1955 and remained chairman until the Senate abolished the subcommittee in 1977.[^4] A letter of May 9, 1955, from the subcommittee's chief investigator to [[Walter Pforzheimer]] of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], is printed on letterhead that lists Sourwine as chief counsel.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
From July 25, 1951, to June 20, 1952, a three-member subcommittee under Eastland (with McCarran and Ferguson) held hearings on the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]]. The subcommittee took possession of the institute's back files, found on the Lee, Massachusetts, farm of trustee E. C. Carter, and studied them for five months before the first witness testified. It took public testimony from 66 witnesses, among them a former Vice President of the United States, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, [[Owen Lattimore]], and the former Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral [[Roscoe Hillenkoetter]]; its staff examined about 20,000 documents, of which about 2,000 became exhibits.[^3][^7] The report, submitted by McCarran on July 2, 1952 as Senate Report 2050, concluded that the institute "has not maintained the character of an objective, scholarly, and research organization" and that it "has been considered by the American Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 21, 1972, Sourwine, by then chief counsel, telephoned the CIA's Office of Legislative Counsel and said that Chairman Eastland had instructed him to poll the subcommittee's members on releasing testimony given before it roughly twenty years earlier by agency witnesses including General [[Walter Bedell Smith]], [[Frank Wisner]] and Pforzheimer; the agency's memorandum of the call records that Sourwine offered to supply a copy of the transcript.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 12, 1962, the subcommittee, with Eastland as chairman, [[Thomas J. Dodd]] as vice chairman and Sourwine as counsel, took the testimony of [[Andreas Lowenfeld]] in its hearings on the State Department's new passport regulations (Part 3 of the hearings, 87th Congress). Lowenfeld, special assistant to the State Department's Legal Adviser since June 1961, told the subcommittee that he had been connected with the [[Center for International Studies]] at [[Massachusetts Institute of Technology|MIT]] in 1951 and 1952. Asked by Sourwine whether he had ever been connected in any way with the CIA, he answered: "Not in any direct way." He said the center "had some kind of contract with the CIA" and that he had never formally worked for the agency. Asked whether he knew that the center was a CIA operation, he said: "I was never formally told, but it became apparent." He told the subcommittee that Mr. [[Walter Rostow|Rostow]] was acting in charge of the center and that Mr. [[Max Millikan|Millikan]] came afterward, and that he had worked for Rostow as a staff member.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Intelligence Identities Protection Act
|
||||
|
||||
In 1980 the committee held a hearing on S. 2216, the Intelligence Identities Protection Act. Deputy [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Frank Carlucci]] testified that the problem "had its inception with faithless Government employees who went public with the names of CIA personnel, the most prominent of whom, of course, is [[Philip Agee|Phillip Agee]]." He added that the activity had since been "picked up by a number of people who are not former Government employees."[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### INSLAW
|
||||
|
||||
In mid-1979, when the FBI sought approval to buy a new front-end processor, the committee commissioned technical analyses from the [[OTA|Office of Technology Assessment]] and from [[INSLAW]].[^2] In May 1988 its chief investigator, [[Ronald LeGrand]], passed to [[Bill Hamilton]] of INSLAW what a senior career official of the department's Criminal Division had told him: "What you think happened, did happen," and that the division had been the center of the effort to drive the company out of business. According to Hamilton's 1989 affidavit, the source also believed "that documents relating to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside DOJ." The special counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] later interviewed the source, who said he had no first-hand knowledge of misconduct concerning INSLAW or [[PROMIS]] and had heard no credible rumors of it; LeGrand told House investigators and Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information was first-hand.[^3][^4]
|
||||
In mid-1979, when the FBI sought approval to buy a new front-end processor, the committee commissioned technical analyses from the [[OTA|Office of Technology Assessment]] and from [[INSLAW]].[^11] The Office of Technology Assessment report on a national criminal history system, issued in October 1982, was prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary. It records that in 1979 and 1980 Congress conditioned approval of the [[National Crime Information Center]] technology upgrade, including its front-end processor and mainframe computer, on a strict prohibition of message switching.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Nominations and Later Inquiries
|
||||
In late April 1988 [[Ronald LeGrand]], then the committee's chief investigator, telephoned [[Bill Hamilton]], president of INSLAW, and asked for a full briefing on the company's disputes with the department. Hamilton and his wife, [[Nancy Hamilton]], briefed him at the company's offices on the morning of May 11. Two days later LeGrand telephoned Hamilton with information that he said a trusted source had asked him to convey. LeGrand described the source as a senior career official in the department "with a title" whom he had known for 15 years.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 27, 1985, the committee voted 10 to 8 to reject President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s nomination of [[William Bradford Reynolds]] as associate attorney general.[^5] On May 16, 2018, [[Christopher Wylie]] testified to it that [[Steve Bannon]] had engaged [[SCL Group|SCL]], "a foreign military contractor," to build "an arsenal of informational weapons."[^6] Under Chairman [[Dick Durbin]] it sought the records and testimony of [[Leonard Leo]] on his network of conservative donor groups; on July 25, 2023, Leo's counsel declined to provide them.[^7]
|
||||
According to Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit, as quoted in the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua report]], the source said that "the INSLAW case was a lot dirtier for the Department of Justice than Watergate was, both in its breadth and in its depth," and that the "Justice Department has been compromised on the INSLAW case at every level." Hamilton's account of the message, as set out by [[Cheri Seymour]], begins with the words "What you think happened, did happen," and has the source describe the Criminal Division as the center of the effort to drive the company out of business.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
The affidavit, as quoted in the Bua report, names [[Lowell Jensen]], the Deputy Attorney General, as the official who engineered INSLAW's problems and who relied principally on [[Miles Matthews]], [[James Knapp]] and [[James Johnston]]. Matthews was quoted as saying, in the source's presence, that "Lowell [Jensen] wants to get INSLAW out of the way and give the business to friends." The source said that [[John Keeney]], [[Mark M. Richard|Mark Richard]] and [[Philip White]] knew "all about" Jensen's conduct and were "pretty upset," but would disclose what they knew only under subpoena and oath. The source believed that documents relating to [[Project Eagle]] were shredded inside the department.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand, a former Drug Enforcement Administration agent, was asked by House Judiciary Committee investigators to identify the trusted source so that they could contact that person, and he declined. He said he would consider giving a sworn statement if the committee made a request to Chairwoman [[Cardiss Collins]] of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation, to which he had moved from the Senate committee; the committee's chairman wrote to Collins on July 20, 1990. Investigators then made numerous attempts to schedule the statement, LeGrand left the Washington area without informing the committee, and the committee wrote to him again on November 20, 1990. On February 14, 1991, he gave a sworn statement in which, in the House report's words, he provided "little corroboration" of the Hamiltons' allegations. He attributed the discrepancy to "the unintentional merging of comments from different persons" that the Hamiltons had credited to the trusted source, and said that he had gathered information from several individuals during his inquiry.[^14] Asked whether the source had said that the INSLAW case was "a lot dirtier" than Watergate "both in its breadth and in its depth," he answered that the source had said there was more to the matter than people were aware of and had made a comparison to Watergate, but that he did not recall those words. He again declined to name the source.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], counsel to INSLAW, had sent a memorandum summarizing LeGrand's statements to [[Robin Ross]], an assistant to Attorney General [[Richard Thornburgh]].[^15] Hamilton's December 22, 1989 affidavit states that LeGrand had confirmed what he told Hamilton on several occasions after May 1988.[^16] LeGrand told House investigators and Special Counsel Bua that, as far as he knew, none of the information from his source was obtained first-hand, and he confirmed to both that he believed the source had given him some of the information reflected in Hamilton's affidavit.[^16] When Bua's team contacted LeGrand, who no longer worked for the Senate, he said he would describe the source's information but would not disclose the source's identity.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
LeGrand later gave a different account. At the Department of Justice's request, he submitted an affidavit, filed as a declaration in INSLAW's bankruptcy case (Case No. 85-0070), refuting INSLAW's claim that he had conveyed "highly specific" allegations to the Hamiltons. He stated that he had told them of "general allegations, rumors," and of information heard from different sources about various persons in the department. The House report describes the affidavit's assertion that the source had no personal knowledge of the department's handling of the matter as "striking," coming after several years of LeGrand's statements to William Hamilton, to the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and to the House committee. His sworn statement of February 14, 1991 to House investigators, his acknowledgment to House investigators and to Bua that the source had given him some of the information in Hamilton's affidavit, and the October 11, 1988 memorandum remain in the record beside the affidavit. The House report adds that Hamilton later alleged to the committee that Roger Pauley, a Justice Department official, was LeGrand's contact within the department.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
The source gave a further account on February 7, 1994, to the Justice Department review team that Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] ordered to examine Bua's report. The source had refused to be interviewed by Bua and by the House investigators; the review's report states that he agreed to be interviewed by the review team because of his respect for and confidence in Reno. The interview took place in a private dining room at a local club, with LeGrand and Morgan Frankel, Assistant Legal Counsel of the United States Senate, present. The source identified himself to the team, which stated that it verified that he is a long-time career employee of the department, and said that he had known LeGrand for about 20 years (Hamilton's affidavit gives 15). He told the team that he had no first-hand knowledge of any misconduct by anyone in relation to PROMIS or INSLAW and had heard no rumors he would consider credible; that the subject of INSLAW came up in a friendly conversation with LeGrand in 1987 or 1988; that he suggested LeGrand contact Miles Matthews because he did not particularly like or trust Matthews; and that he never mentioned Lowell Jensen, Mark Richard, Philip White, James Johnston or James Knapp to LeGrand. When the review team read him the passage from Hamilton's affidavit, he said that none of the statements or beliefs attributed to him were accurate, and that he had no reason to believe that documents relating to Project Eagle were improperly shredded.[^16] The review team wrote that it had concluded there was no credible evidence of a conspiracy involving Jensen or other senior department officials. In its own account Bua's report had recorded that Matthews, Knapp, Johnston, White, Keeney and Richard each denied knowledge of the wrongdoing described in Hamilton's affidavit.[^16] INSLAW's rebuttal to the Bua report had criticized the special counsel for not investigating the allegations attributed to the source.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
The Justice Department's 1994 review, which affirmed the special counsel's findings, concluded that there was "no credible evidence" that department officials conspired to steal the software developed by INSLAW, and recommended that the affair be closed. The same release reaffirmed police findings that the death of [[Danny Casolaro]], a free-lance journalist investigating the INSLAW matter, was a suicide.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Nominations
|
||||
|
||||
On January 11, 1977, the committee began hearings on the nomination of [[Griffin Bell]] as Attorney General. The hearings continued on January 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19 under Chairman James Eastland. Eastland told Bell on the first day: "Judge, you have been an outstanding lawyer and an outstanding member of the judiciary. You are honest and honorable. I will vote to confirm you."[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 27, 1985, the committee voted 10 to 8 to reject President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s nomination of [[William Bradford Reynolds]] as associate attorney general and declined to send it to the Senate floor.[^19][^20][^21] The committee then had ten Republicans and eight Democrats.[^20] Before the vote, Senator [[Dennis DeConcini]] had told Reynolds, "It is an issue of whether you told the truth here."[^20] Reagan's statement that day said that some members of the committee had used the confirmation process "to conduct an ideological assault on so superbly qualified a candidate."[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 27, 2018, under Chairman [[Chuck Grassley]], the committee continued its confirmation hearing on the nomination of [[Brett Kavanaugh]] to the Supreme Court with two witnesses, Kavanaugh and a woman who had alleged in a letter to the ranking member, Senator [[Dianne Feinstein]], that Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her at a party when both were in high school. Grassley said in his opening statement that none of six FBI background investigations of Kavanaugh since 1993 contained an issue of inappropriate sexual behavior. Kavanaugh testified: "I categorically and unequivocally deny the allegation against me."[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 15, 2026, the committee questioned [[Todd Blanche]], then acting Attorney General and the president's nominee for the permanent post, at his confirmation hearing.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
### Joint Narcotics Hearings
|
||||
|
||||
The committee and the [[Caucus on International Narcotics Control]] held joint hearings on [[Jamaica]]'s proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations on November 6, 1989, and on January 18 and March 27, 1990. The record was published in 1991.[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### Able Danger
|
||||
|
||||
On September 21, 2005, the committee, under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]], held a hearing titled "Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing" on a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program.[^25] Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott had "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000. He said that [[Erik Kleinsmith]], a former Army major and chief of intelligence, would testify that he had been ordered to destroy all Able Danger material, 2.5 terabytes of it.[^25] The FBI, the Defense Department and Kleinsmith, then of [[Lockheed Martin]], also presented testimony. Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] told the committee that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States, and that a chart listed Atta under "Brooklyn, New York," which prompted apprehension among Army lawyers and policy staff about compiling data on United States persons. He also said that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with the program.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### Cambridge Analytica
|
||||
|
||||
On May 16, 2018, the committee held a hearing titled "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy."[^26] [[Christopher Wylie]], a former employee of [[Cambridge Analytica]], testified. His written statement said that the firm was created by [[SCL Group|SCL]] with funding from [[Robert Mercer]], and that [[Steve Bannon]] was installed as its vice president. It said Bannon "engaged SCL, a foreign military contractor, to build an arsenal of informational weapons he could deploy on the American population."[^27] The statement also said that after a request for information from executives of [[Lukoil]] in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Child Safety
|
||||
|
||||
On November 20, 2023, Chairman [[Dick Durbin]] and Ranking Member [[Lindsey Graham]] announced subpoenas to the chief executives of [[Discord]], [[Snap Inc.]] and [[X Corp.]] to testify at a December 6 full committee hearing on online child sexual exploitation.[^28] The hearing was held on January 31, 2024, under the title "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis." [[Jason Citron]], chief executive and co-founder of Discord, testified.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
### Leonard Leo
|
||||
|
||||
Under Chairman Durbin the committee sought the records and testimony of [[Leonard Leo]] on his network of conservative donor groups.[^30] On July 11, 2023, Durbin and [[Sheldon Whitehouse]], chair of the Federal Courts subcommittee, wrote to Leo requesting information about his interactions with Supreme Court justices.[^31] Leo's counsel, [[David B. Rivkin Jr.]] of [[Baker & Hostetler]], replied on July 25, 2023, that the inquiry exceeded the constitutional limits on the committee's investigative authority and infringed Leo's First Amendment rights. The letter argued that the inquiry was motivated by hostility to Leo's views and quoted Whitehouse's description of Leo as "the little spider that you find at the center of the dark money web." It also said that the committee's ethics bill, S. 359, which the committee ordered reported on July 20, 2023, raised separation-of-powers objections. The letter declined to provide the requested information and closed: "We will not be part of that journey."[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Credit Suisse
|
||||
|
||||
On February 3, 2026, the committee held a hearing titled "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks." The hearing's chairman was Grassley and its ranking member was Durbin. [[Neil M. Barofsky]], the independent ombudsperson overseeing [[Credit Suisse]], testified that the bank had maintained previously unreported, and in one instance underreported, wartime account relationships with several instrumentalities of the Nazi government. These included the [[German Foreign Office]], which held at least four accounts at Credit Suisse under a pseudonym. He said that to date the investigation had determined that 628 individuals and 262 legal entities within its scope had account relationships with the bank, and he described a wartime account held by [[Leo Volk]], a senior SS officer and convicted war criminal, who used it to hold hundreds of thousands of Swiss francs. Barofsky described the bank as providing banking services, and premises, to an Argentine ratline, a smuggling operation organized by the Argentine government from an office in Bern called the "Argentine Immigration Office." He told the committee that [[UBS]] had begun a privilege review that withheld materials from his team, and that he expected the investigation to be completed within six months, with a final report to follow a few months after that.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### Epstein Files Oversight
|
||||
|
||||
On July 7, 2025, the Justice Department and the FBI released an unsigned memorandum on what it called an "exhaustive review of investigative holdings relating to Jeffrey Epstein." Its findings included that the review "revealed no incriminating 'client list.'" On July 18, Durbin, the committee's ranking member, wrote to [[Pam Bondi]] that the finding contradicted public statements she had made in February 2025. He wrote that, according to information his office had received, she had pressured the FBI to assign about 1,000 personnel in its Information Management Division to review roughly 100,000 Epstein-related records on 24-hour shifts. He wrote that his office had been told that personnel were instructed to "flag" any records in which President Trump was mentioned.[^33] The same day he wrote to [[Kash Patel]], the FBI director, with the same question about the flagging and about why the memorandum was unsigned.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]], enacted on November 19, 2025 as Public Law 119-38, required the attorney general, within fifteen days of completing the release of Epstein-related records, to report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees the categories of records released and withheld, a summary of redactions and their legal basis, and a list of government officials and politically exposed persons named in the released material, with no redactions permitted on that list.[^35] On February 14, 2026, Pam Bondi and Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche sent the Section 3 report on Department of Justice letterhead to Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Durbin and the chairman and ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee ([[Jim Jordan]] and [[Jamie Raskin]]). The letter stated that the department had released all records relating to nine categories, among them flight logs, communications about decisions to charge or not charge Epstein and his associates, communications concerning the destruction or concealment of records, and documentation of Epstein's detention and death. It stated that information covered by deliberative-process, work-product and attorney-client privileges was redacted in a limited amount, and that no material was redacted or withheld on the basis that it was properly classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. It stated that "politically exposed persons" was not defined in the Act and that reviewers were told to note all government officials and politically exposed persons named or referenced in any document, video or image. The list that follows, in alphabetical order, runs to several hundred names of persons whose names appear in the released files "at least once," among them Steve Bannon, [[Ehud Barak]], [[Julian Assange]], [[William Barr]] and [[Donald Trump]]. The letter states that some of those listed had extensive direct email contact with Epstein or [[Ghislaine Maxwell]], while others are mentioned only in a portion of a document, including press reporting, that on its face is unrelated to the Epstein and Maxwell matters.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "About the Committee." https://www.judiciary.senate.gov
|
||||
[^2]: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. *An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System.* OTA-CIS-161, October 1982, as cited on the INSLAW page.
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.,* March 1993, and *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report,* September 27, 1994, quoting Hamilton's affidavit of 1989.
|
||||
[^4]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^5]: *The Washington Post,* June 28, 1985, as cited on the William Bradford Reynolds page.
|
||||
[^6]: "Christopher Wylie: Bannon wanted 'weapons' to fight a 'culture war' at Cambridge Analytica," testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018. *CBS News.* https://www.cbsnews.com/live-news/senate-cambridge-analytica-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-live-stream-updates-today-2018-05-16
|
||||
[^7]: Leo counsel's letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, July 25, 2023. https://levin-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-7-25-Leo-counsels-ltr-to-Senate-Judiciary-declining-to-produce-requested-information.pdf ; "Inside the 'Private and Confidential' Conservative Group That Promises to 'Crush Liberal Dominance.'" *ProPublica,* March 15, 2023.
|
||||
[^1]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "About the Committee." https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/committee
|
||||
[^2]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, *History of the Committee on the Judiciary, 1816-1981*, S. Doc. 97-18, 97th Congress (1981), as listed in the Senate's committee histories. https://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/committeehistories.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Institute of Pacific Relations: Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, pursuant to S. Res. 366 (81st Congress)*, S. Rept. 82-2050, July 2, 1952, committee and subcommittee rosters, Introduction (pp. 1-2) and Conclusions (p. 223 and following). https://archive.org/details/instituteofpacif1952unit
|
||||
[^4]: Senator James O. Eastland Collection, University of Mississippi, Modern Political Archives, File Series 4, Legislative, Subseries 10: Internal Security Subcommittee (finding aid), stating that Eastland joined the subcommittee at its inception in 1951, became chair in 1955 and remained chair until the Senate abolished it in 1977. https://olemiss.edu/depts/general_library/archives/finding_docs/eastland/Eastland_File4_SS10.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments*, hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 83d Congress, 1st session, Part 1, April 10, 1953 (William E. Jenner, chairman; Robert Morris, chief counsel). https://archive.org/details/interlockingsubv0104unit
|
||||
[^6]: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee letterhead; letter from the subcommittee's chief investigator to Walter Pforzheimer, May 9, 1955, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP58-00597A000100240018-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp58-00597a000100240018-8
|
||||
[^7]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Institute of Pacific Relations: Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws*, 82d Congress, 1st session, Part 1, July 25, 26, 31, August 2 and 7, 1951 (roster of the subcommittee investigating the Institute of Pacific Relations: Eastland, chairman, McCarran, Ferguson). https://archive.org/details/instituteofpacif01unit
|
||||
[^8]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Legislative Counsel, memorandum for the record, "Telephone Call From Mr. J. Sourwine, Chief Counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee," January 21, 1972, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP74B00415R000200140126-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp74b00415r000200140126-2
|
||||
[^9]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *State Department Security: The New Passport Regulations*, hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, 87th Congress, Part 3, May 16, June 7, 12 and 19, 1962 (GPO, 1962), testimony of Andreas F. Lowenfeld, June 12, 1962 (index p. 329; the passage quoted is at p. 331 as excerpted in CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000400560007-3). CIA reading room copy of the volume: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp66b00403r000500120001-1 ; extract: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000400560007-3
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Intelligence Identities Protection Act, S. 2216*, hearing, Serial No. 96-86 (1980), testimony of Frank C. Carlucci. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP85-00003R000200080003-5. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp85-00003r000200080003-5
|
||||
[^11]: Office of Technology Assessment, *An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal History System* (Washington, October 1982), prepared at the request of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary; on congressional conditions on the NCIC technology upgrade in 1979 and 1980, see the report's discussion of message switching. https://ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/86624NCJRS.pdf
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, March 1993, section 10, "Ronald LeGrand," pp. 113-114, quoting William Hamilton's affidavit of December 1989. Copy: https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^13]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^14]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report*, H. Rept. 102-857 (1992), section 7, "Ronald LeGrand Denies INSLAW's Assertions," pp. 62-64 (including the footnote on Hamilton's allegation concerning Roger Pauley and the citation of LeGrand's declaration in Bankruptcy Case No. 85-0070). https://archive.org/stream/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport/TheInslawAffair_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^15]: Bua report, section 10, p. 113, quoting Hamilton's December 1989 affidavit on the October 11, 1988 memorandum from Elliot Richardson to Robin Ross.
|
||||
[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report on the Review of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua's Report on the Allegations of INSLAW, Inc.*, September 27, 1994, section IV.B.1, "Ronald LeGrand's Confidential Source," pp. 22-28, quoting Hamilton's affidavit of December 22, 1989 and citing Bua Report 113-120 and INSLAW Rebuttal 44-46; bound with the Bua report at https://archive.org/stream/InslawPROMISBuaReport/Inslaw%3APROMIS%20Bua%20Report_djvu.txt
|
||||
[^17]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "New Report Finds No Credible Basis for INSLAW Case, Recommends Matter Be Closed," September 27, 1994. https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/Pre_96/September94/555.txt.html
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Griffin B. Bell: Hearings on the prospective nomination of Griffin B. Bell, of Georgia, to be Attorney General*, 95th Congress, 1st session, January 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18 and 19, 1977 (GPO, 1977), opening day statement of Chairman Eastland. https://archive.org/details/griffinbbellhear00unit
|
||||
[^19]: Ronald Reagan, "Statement on Senate Action on the Nomination of William Bradford Reynolds To Be Associate Attorney General," June 27, 1985. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/259520
|
||||
[^20]: "Senate confirmation for senior Justice Department official is in jeopardy," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 20, 1985. https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0620/arey.html
|
||||
[^21]: "Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds says a Senate...," *United Press International*, August 28, 1985 ("The Senate Judiciary Committee, on a 10-8 vote, rejected Reynold's nomination"). https://www.upi.com/Archives/1985/08/28/Assistant-Attorney-General-William-Bradford-Reynolds-says-a-Senate/8603494049600/ ; see also the Reagan statement of June 27, 1985.
|
||||
[^22]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States*, S. Hrg. 115-545, Parts 1-2 (hearings of September 4-7 and September 27, 2018), continuation of the hearing, Thursday, September 27, 2018: opening statement of Chairman Grassley and testimony of Judge Kavanaugh. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg32765/html/CHRG-115shrg32765.htm
|
||||
[^23]: National Public Radio, "Todd Blanche's high-stakes confirmation hearing for attorney general is underway," July 15, 2026. https://www.npr.org/2026/07/15/nx-s1-5894750/todd-blanches-high-stakes-confirmation-hearing-for-attorney-general-is-underway
|
||||
[^24]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary and Caucus on International Narcotics Control, joint hearings on Jamaica's proposed comprehensive international anti-narcotics plan and on drug policy in the Andean nations, November 6, 1989, and January 18 and March 27, 1990, S. Hrg. 101-1228 (Government Printing Office, 1991). Catalog record: https://search.law.villanova.edu/Record/88328
|
||||
[^25]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39, testimony of Representative Curt Weldon (p. 5 and following), Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith, and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, hearing "Cambridge Analytica and the Future of Data Privacy," May 16, 2018. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/cambridge-analytica-and-the-future-of-data-privacy
|
||||
[^27]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 8, 9 and 32. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
|
||||
[^28]: Senate Committee on the Judiciary, press release, "Durbin, Graham Announce Subpoenas to Big Tech CEOs to Testify About Their Failure to Protect Children Online," November 20, 2023. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/releases/durbin-graham-announce-subpoenas-to-big-tech-ceos-to-testify-about-their-failure-to-protect-children-online
|
||||
[^29]: Jason Citron, testimony, "Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis," hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, January 31, 2024. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2024-01-31-testimony-citron
|
||||
[^30]: "Inside the 'Private and Confidential' Conservative Group That Promises to 'Crush Liberal Dominance,'" *ProPublica*, March 15, 2023.
|
||||
[^31]: David B. Rivkin Jr., Baker & Hostetler, letter to Senators Richard J. Durbin and Sheldon Whitehouse, July 25, 2023, responding to the committee's letter of July 11, 2023. https://levin-center.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/2023-7-25-Leo-counsels-ltr-to-Senate-Judiciary-declining-to-produce-requested-information.pdf
|
||||
[^32]: Testimony of Neil M. Barofsky, Independent Ombudsperson for Credit Suisse AG, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "The Truth Revealed: Hidden Facts Regarding Nazis and Swiss Banks," February 3, 2026. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/95317009-9c96-3e8f-f63d-04b7f29ef02f/2026-02-03_Testimony_Barofsky.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-ag-bondi-re-epstein?download=1
|
||||
[^34]: Senator Richard J. Durbin, Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, letter to FBI Director Kash Patel, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-fbi-director-patel-re-epstein?download=1
|
||||
[^35]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Public Law 119-38, 139 Stat. 656, sections 2 and 3, approved November 19, 2025. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ38/pdf/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
|
||||
[^36]: Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General, and Todd Blanche, Deputy Attorney General, letter to the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary, "Epstein Files Transparency Act: Section 3 Report to Congress," February 14, 2026, pp. 1-6. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1434856/dl ; coverage: "Justice Department lists hundreds of prominent people named in Epstein files in letter to Congress," *CNN*, February 15, 2026. https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/15/politics/doj-epstein-files-prominent-people
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,21 +1,255 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- United States Attorney General
|
||||
- Attorney General
|
||||
- Attorney General of the United States
|
||||
- Office of the Attorney General
|
||||
- U.S. Attorney General
|
||||
category: "U.S. Government"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- organization
|
||||
- u.s.-government
|
||||
- contra-war
|
||||
summary: The U.S. Attorney General is the nation's chief law enforcement officer, a position held during the Contra war by William French Smith and later Edwin Meese.
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- USGovernment
|
||||
- JusticeDepartment
|
||||
- ContraWar
|
||||
- CrimesReporting
|
||||
- Watergate
|
||||
- INSLAW
|
||||
- JeffreyEpstein
|
||||
- EpsteinFilesTransparencyAct
|
||||
summary: "The U.S. Attorney General is the nation's chief law enforcement officer; the office had crimes-reporting arrangements with the CIA beginning in a 1954 agreement letting the agency decide which of its personnel's crimes reached prosecutors."
|
||||
created: 2026-10-12
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[William French Smith]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1981
|
||||
end: 1985
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Edwin Meese]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
end: 1988
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Richard Thornburgh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1988
|
||||
end: 1991
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[William Barr]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1991-11
|
||||
end: 1993-01
|
||||
fn: 31
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Janet Reno]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1993
|
||||
end: 2001
|
||||
fn: 39
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Robert Kennedy]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1961
|
||||
end: 1964-09
|
||||
fn: 16
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[John N. Mitchell]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1969-01-21
|
||||
end: 1972-03-01
|
||||
fn: 18
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Griffin Bell]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 1977-01
|
||||
end: 1979-08
|
||||
fn: 28
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Pam Bondi]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Attorney General"
|
||||
start: 2025-02
|
||||
end: 2026-04-02
|
||||
fn: 40
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Todd Blanche]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "acting Attorney General from April 2, 2026; confirmed August 8, 2026"
|
||||
start: 2026-04-02
|
||||
fn: 43
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The U.S. Attorney General is the nation's chief law enforcement officer, a position held during the Contra war by William French Smith and later [[Ed Meese|Edwin Meese]]. The Attorney General's office was responsible for overseeing federal drug enforcement while simultaneously protecting [[Contras|Contra]]-connected drug traffickers.[^1]
|
||||
The U.S. Attorney General is the nation's chief law enforcement officer, a position held during the Contra war by [[William French Smith]] and later by [[Edwin Meese]]. [[Gary Webb]] wrote that the office oversaw federal drug enforcement while protecting [[Contras|Contra]]-connected drug traffickers.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Secret 1982 Agreement
|
||||
### The Office in Statute
|
||||
|
||||
In early 1982, Attorney General William French Smith and [[Central Intelligence Agency]] director [[William J. Casey]] signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding that exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting. Drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report, creating what Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]] later called "a gentleman's agreement to look the other way" that lasted thirteen years. The Attorney General's office also intervened to reduce sentences for Contra-connected drug traffickers like José Bueso Rosa and declined to prosecute [[Norwin Meneses]] despite extensive evidence of his trafficking activities.[^2]
|
||||
For purposes of the [[Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act]], "Attorney General" means the Attorney General, the Acting Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General. Section 102 of the 1978 act lets the President, "through the Attorney General," authorize electronic surveillance without a court order for up to one year if the Attorney General certifies in writing under oath the conditions the act sets out.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1954 Crimes-Reporting Arrangement
|
||||
|
||||
On February 18, 1954, [[Lawrence Houston]], general counsel of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], discussed the reporting of federal crimes with Deputy Attorney General [[William P. Rogers]]. According to Houston's memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, the two agreed that the CIA would decide whether a potential violation by persons associated with the agency was referred to the Justice Department for prosecution, because the agency was best placed to judge whether classified information might be revealed at trial. The memorandum records an obligation to refer matters that could be prosecuted without revealing classified information, with doubts resolved in favor of referral. The two agreed that no formal written agreement was needed.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
In the mid-1970s the arrangement became known and drew criticism in Congress.[^4] On July 24, 1975, [[Richard Thornburgh]], then assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, wrote to CIA general counsel [[John Warner]] to remind the agency of its duty under 28 U.S.C. 535 to report possible violations of Title 18 by government officers and employees. Warner replied on July 29 that "any other informal referral agreement that may have been in effect in the past was abrogated," while noting that the director was charged under the National Security Act of 1947 with protecting intelligence sources and methods, and that the CIA would seek the Justice Department's advice on cases that would be reported.[^4] The CIA headquarters regulation in force on November 28, 1975 required that crimes by agency officers be reported to the inspector general, who would inform the general counsel, and that crimes by government officers be reported to the Attorney General. It added that "CIA will not exercise a prosecutorial function."[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1982 Memorandum of Understanding
|
||||
|
||||
Attorney General William French Smith signed a crimes-reporting memorandum of understanding with the CIA on February 11, 1982, and [[William J. Casey]], the Director of Central Intelligence, signed it on March 2, 1982. The memorandum governed crimes reporting from March 2, 1982 to August 3, 1995.[^6] It defined "employee" for reporting purposes to cover staff and contract employees and former officers for offenses committed during their employment. Assets, agents and independent contractors fell into the non-employee category, whose list of reportable federal offenses did not include narcotics violations. The memorandum still required reporting of "any" federal law violation by employees, so narcotics violations by staff remained reportable.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Smith's letter of February 11, 1982 stated that the memorandum contained no formal requirement to report narcotics violations by non-employees, and urged continued cooperation with the Justice Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration. A Justice Department memorandum of February 8, 1985 stated explicitly that no such requirement existed and suggested that the memorandum would have to be renegotiated to add one.[^6] The memorandum also allowed the CIA general counsel to report any other possible offense when he believed it should be reported. The CIA used that discretion in 1984, when information linking a Southern Front Contra member to the trafficker Jorge Morales was reported to the Justice Department, and in a 1988 referral concerning another Contra official.[^7] The agency's inspector general found no information indicating that the non-inclusion of narcotics violations by assets was intended to protect Contra activities, and also found that the CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations that Contra-related organizations and individuals were involved in drug trafficking.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The text of Smith's letter was placed in the Congressional Record by Representative [[Maxine Waters]] in May 1998. [[Robert Parry]] reported that the letter described the matter as "the need to add narcotics violations to the list of reportable non-employee crimes," and that Smith wrote: "in view of the fine cooperation the Drug Enforcement Administration has received from CIA, no formal requirement regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in these procedures." Parry reported that Casey wrote to Smith on March 2, 1982 that he was "pleased that these procedures, which I believe strike the proper balance between enforcement of the law and protection of intelligence sources and methods, will now be forwarded to other agencies covered by them for signing by the heads of the agencies."[^8] On the House floor on July 17, 1998 Waters said that the CIA and the Attorney General "had a secret Memorandum of Understanding that allowed drug trafficking by CIA assets to go unreported to law enforcement."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
Webb's epilogue states that the memorandum exempted CIA assets from drug crimes reporting, that drug offenses were specifically removed from the list of crimes the CIA was required to report, and, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 House testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^1] The text of the memorandum, summarized above, shows narcotics violations by non-employees absent from the reporting list.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
Hitz, the CIA inspector general who wrote the report, said in an interview for the PBS series Frontline that his staff "weren't ever able to find a memorandum of conversation or any evidence that indicated why it was done," and that if agents or assets had been defined as employees, credible allegations of drug activity would have had to be reported to the Justice Department. He said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking." He added that the staff did find awareness that proven allegations "would destroy the whole purpose of the Contra endeavor," which did not translate into practical guidance for officers in the field.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
The memorandum was revised in August 1995. Under the revision, assets and independent contractors again counted as employees for reporting purposes, and narcotics violations were added to the list of non-employee offenses that had to be reported.[^11] For the thirteen years the 1982 memorandum governed, narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of reportable offenses.
|
||||
|
||||
### Contra Cases Before the Department
|
||||
|
||||
Webb wrote that the Attorney General's office intervened to reduce sentences for Contra-connected drug traffickers such as Bueso Rosa and declined to prosecute Norwin Meneses despite evidence of his trafficking.[^1] The records of the two cases show the following actors.
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Kerry Committee]] reported in December 1988 that senior United States officials had intervened with a federal judge to reduce the sentence of the Honduran general [[Jose Bueso Rosa|José Bueso Rosa]] to five years. He had been convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova of Honduras, a plot to be financed from the sale in the United States of $40 million in cocaine seized in connection with it, and the other defendants received sentences of as long as forty years. Officials of the United States government also arranged for Bueso Rosa to serve his sentence in a minimum-security facility at a United States military base in Florida.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
According to [[Mark M. Richard]], deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, who described the matter in a deposition before the Iran-Contra committee, the Pentagon took the initiative in supporting the interventions, and at a meeting [[Oliver North]], General [[Paul Gorman]], [[Elliott Abrams]] and [[Dewey Clarridge]] agreed that Bueso Rosa should be accommodated. Richard said the State Department's position had changed, and he opposed the interventions. The subcommittee noted that the Justice Department had publicized the conspiracy as the most significant narco-terrorism case yet discovered, and that [[William Webster]], the FBI director, had said at the time of the arrests: "We don't want international terrorists to establish beachheads or bases for operations in the United States." [[Francis McNeil]] testified to the subcommittee that the successful intervention, over the objections of the Justice Department, undermined President Reagan's policies on terrorism, narcotics and democracy.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The subcommittee also reported that the government's factual admissions in the trial of Oliver North, released on April 6, 1989, stated that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral [[John Poindexter]] that Ambassador [[John Negroponte]], General Gorman of the Southern Command, the senior CIA officer Clarridge and North had worked out arrangements with Bueso Rosa for support of the Contra resistance, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of those covert activities.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
The Justice Department's own inspector general recorded a series of declinations in the case of [[Norwin Meneses]], a San Francisco cocaine trafficker. An assistant United States attorney in San Francisco had declined to prosecute him for car thefts, as the San Francisco FBI reported in 1979. In 1981 an assistant United States attorney, [[Eric Swenson]], declined to prosecute his nephew Jairo Meneses after an arrest in which no narcotics were found, and in 1983 the San Francisco United States Attorney's Office declined a tax case against Norwin Meneses for weak or insufficient evidence.[^13]
|
||||
|
||||
### Kennedy and the Mafia Overlaps, 1961 to 1964
|
||||
|
||||
[[Robert Kennedy]] served as attorney general under his brother from 1961 until 1964. A Justice Department deportation sent [[Carlos Marcello]] to Guatemala on April 4, 1961. An FBI memorandum of May 24, 1961 records the account of [[Paul Loeb]], chief of the CIA station in Guatemala City, who said that he understood Kennedy had conferred with [[Allen Dulles]] and asked for the CIA director's help in making Guatemala accept Marcello as a citizen.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] wrote that Kennedy "played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation, a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General."[^15] On May 7, 1962, CIA officers briefed the Attorney General on the operation that had used [[Johnny Roselli]], [[Sam Giancana]] and [[Robert Maheu]] against Fidel Castro, and on a wiretap the CIA had helped Maheu install. The Church Committee quoted the inspector general's conclusion that the Attorney General "was not told that the gambling syndicate operation had already been reactivated." On April 24, 1962, [[Herbert J. Miller]], assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division, had advised that the national interest would preclude prosecution based on the tap, and after the CIA briefing a decision was made not to prosecute.[^16] On October 7, 1963 [[J. Edgar Hoover]] asked the Attorney General's permission for a wiretap on [[Martin Luther King Jr.]]'s residence. According to a memorandum by [[Courtney Evans]], Kennedy noted on October 10 that "the last thing we could afford to have would be a discovery of a wiretap on King's residence."[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
### Mitchell, Chile and the Vesco Case
|
||||
|
||||
[[John N. Mitchell]] served as attorney general from January 21, 1969 until March 1, 1972.[^18] A Senate intelligence committee staff report on Chile records that on September 15, 1970, after Allende finished first in the Chilean presidential vote, [[Donald Kendall]] of PepsiCo introduced [[Agustin Edwards]], owner of [[El Mercurio]], to Attorney General Mitchell and to [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]].[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
Mitchell and [[Maurice Stans]], the former commerce secretary, were indicted in Manhattan in May 1973 on charges connected with a contribution from the financier [[Robert Vesco]]. A jury acquitted both of all nine counts on April 28, 1974. Vesco had fled the country. Mitchell still faced conspiracy, obstruction and perjury charges in Washington in connection with the Watergate cover-up.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
Two accounts of how Epstein came to [[Steven Hoffenberg]] survive. Hoffenberg told the journalist [[Vicky Ward]] that the two men were introduced by [[Douglas Leese]], a British defense contractor, and Epstein said they were introduced by Mitchell.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
### Ramsey Clark and the Shaw Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
On April 14, 1967, an FBI Domestic Intelligence Division note recorded that [[Ramsey Clark]], then attorney general, had told reporters that the bureau had investigated [[Clay Shaw]] and cleared him.[^22]
|
||||
|
||||
### Hubbard's 1951 Letter
|
||||
|
||||
In 1951 [[L. Ron Hubbard]] wrote to the Attorney General in Washington, claiming that Communist Party members had wiped out a half-million-dollar operation for him and that his life was in danger. The letter is preserved in the FBI's headquarters file on Hubbard.[^23] In the letter Hubbard also wrote that [[Sara Northrup]] "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck," and that she was "strangely intimate with many scientists of Los Alamos." The copy of the letter in the FBI headquarters file has the name after "attached herself to" redacted under exemptions b6 and b7C, and the copy in the FBI's separate Scientology file prints the name as [[Jack Parsons]].[^23][^24]
|
||||
|
||||
### Levi and the Letelier Investigation, 1976
|
||||
|
||||
At an October 21, 1976 meeting, Attorney General [[Edward Levi]] and other Justice Department officials discussed the investigation of the murder of [[Orlando Letelier]] with several of Letelier's colleagues and his widow, [[Isabel Letelier]]. The Washington Post reported that, according to several sources, the colleagues expressed misgivings about the CIA's role in the investigation and urged Levi to use formal subpoenas to obtain information from the agency, and that Levi rejected the proposal, saying that the CIA was cooperating and that such a move was not timely. The same account reported a belief at the CIA that Chilean operatives had not carried out the bombing, which [[George H. W. Bush]], the Director of Central Intelligence, was said to have expressed to Secretary of State Kissinger the week before.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
### Griffin Bell and the ITT Perjury Cases
|
||||
|
||||
[[Griffin Bell]] was attorney general from January 1977 to August 1979. The Justice Department charged two [[ITT Corporation]] executives in March 1978 with lying to the Senate about the company's 1973 testimony. A wire report of March 21, 1978 stated that CIA Director [[Stansfield Turner]] had met Bell on the preceding Thursday to express his concern.[^26] Three charges against one of them were dropped in August 1978, and the department dropped the perjury case against an ITT official in March 1979.[^27] The August 1979 guidelines that Bell issued under Executive Order 12036 were the ones the 1982 memorandum later replaced.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
### Meese, Wedtech and INSLAW
|
||||
|
||||
Before becoming attorney general, Meese was counselor to the President. A Senate subcommittee report transmitted in May 1988 on [[Wedtech]] recorded that the company contacted a San Francisco attorney, Mr. Wallach, a close friend of Meese, who contacted Meese and his deputy, [[James Jenkins]], on numerous occasions on Wedtech's behalf. Meese asked his staff to ensure that Wedtech received a "fair hearing" on an Army engine contract, and Jenkins convened a May 19, 1982 meeting of agency officials on the subject. In 1985, at Wallach's invitation, Meese entered a limited partnership with [[W. Franklyn Chinn]], a Wedtech consultant who later became a director of the company. Chinn and his associate, Rusty London, were paid more than $1.4 million in cash and stock in 1985 and 1986 for their services to Wedtech. Meese testified at the 1988 trial of [[Lyn Nofziger]] and Mark Bragg that he knew Wallach was a Welbilt consultant but did not know whether he was paid, and that he scanned what Wallach sent him but may have read as little as 10 percent of it carefully.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
Independent counsel [[James C. McKay]] filed an 814-page report on Meese that a three-judge panel made public on July 18, 1988, about two weeks after Meese announced his resignation. It reported seven areas of ethical concern, including a 1985 tax return that omitted capital gains. The Christian Science Monitor reported that McKay believed Meese violated the law by "willfully filing a materially false tax return," and that, in McKay's words, "the trier of fact would probably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Meese violated" the conflict-of-interest law in telecommunications matters in 1986 and 1987. He declined to prosecute in both areas, stating that the evidence showed Meese intended to file an amended return and pay the tax, and that there was "no evidence that Mr. Meese acted from motivation for personal gain." The report gave its greatest attention to Meese's involvement in a proposed Iraqi oil pipeline and found insufficient evidence to charge a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and found insufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing in his intervention for Wedtech.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
In the INSLAW dispute, the company's court pleadings described "a conspiracy among friends of Attorney General Meese" to obtain a lucrative automation contract from the Justice Department. The special counsel's report records that Hadron, a software company controlled by a long-time friend of Meese, offered to buy INSLAW, and that when [[Bill Hamilton|William Hamilton]] refused, the chairman of Hadron said, "We have ways of making you sell." A September 1989 staff study of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations found no proof that Meese, [[Lowell Jensen]], the deputy attorney general, or other Justice Department officials were involved in a conspiracy to ruin INSLAW or to steal its PROMIS software.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### Thornburgh and the INSLAW Claims
|
||||
|
||||
On October 11, 1988, [[Elliot Richardson]], then counsel to INSLAW, sent a memorandum to Robin Ross, an assistant to Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, summarizing statements from a source that had been relayed by a man named LeGrand.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
The House Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by [[Jack Brooks]], reported on September 10, 1992 (H. Rept. 102-857) that its investigation "largely supports the findings of two Federal courts that the Department 'took, converted, stole' INSLAW's Enhanced PROMIS by 'trickery, fraud and deceit,' and that this misappropriation involved officials at the highest levels of the Department of Justice." It reported that it could not reach a definitive conclusion on the allegation of a high-level conspiracy, in part because of the Department's lack of cooperation: Attorney General Thornburgh "repeatedly reneged on agreements" to provide access to information and witnesses, and the committee was compelled to subpoena him for documents, some of which the Department said had been misplaced or accidentally destroyed. The report recorded Richardson's contention to the committee that the circumstances constituted a possible criminal conspiracy involving Meese, Jensen, [[Earl Brian]] and Justice Department officials, quoted Deputy Attorney General Jensen's sworn statement that he regularly informed the Attorney General of all aspects of the contract, and recorded Meese's denial of any knowledge of bias against INSLAW. It noted sworn statements from witnesses including [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and [[Michael Riconosciuto]] that the software was distributed internationally, and wrote that "corroborating evidence for a number of their claims made under oath has been found." The Justice Department's firing of [[Anthony Pasciuto]] after he gave the Hamiltons information, and the recantation of the sworn statement of Judge Cornelius Blackshear after a conversation with a Justice Department lawyer, were set out as evidence of possible cover-up.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### Barr, the INSLAW Special Counsel and the BNL Inquiry
|
||||
|
||||
On November 7, 1991, Attorney General [[William Barr]] appointed Judge [[Nicholas J. Bua]] as special counsel to investigate all allegations of wrongdoing in connection with INSLAW.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
Barr told the Miller Center's oral history project that he regarded an independent counsel as unnecessary in the INSLAW and BNL matters because they did not meet the statutory test, and that on INSLAW he "could never quite understand what the allegation was." He said he announced the Bua appointment at his confirmation hearing in response to a question from Senator [[Paul Simon]], and had promised Bua "carte blanche."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
On the [[BNL Scandal|Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]] loans to Iraq, Barr told the same project that, in the face of congressional demands for an independent counsel, he used his "inherent authority to appoint outsiders to come in and conduct investigations." He said he first called former attorney general [[Benjamin Civiletti]], who wanted to do it but concluded he could not because of an upcoming trial, and then picked the retired judge [[Frederick Lacey]].[^33] Lacey's report states that Barr appointed him on October 16, 1992 as independent counsel under 28 C.F.R. Part 600; that on October 27 Barr accepted his recommendation to begin a preliminary investigation under the Independent Counsel statute and asked for a report by December 8, 1992; and that his appointment followed letters from Senator [[David Boren]] and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees about the Justice Department's conduct in the BNL prosecution of [[Christopher Drogoul]].[^34] The report, dated December 8, 1992, concluded that with the exception of the conduct of a Justice Department official named Kloske, the evidence was "clear and convincing" that intent to obstruct or cover up any aspect of the Drogoul prosecution was lacking, and that he had "found no credible evidence" that anyone in the Department or the Atlanta United States Attorney's Office acted to obstruct justice or make false statements. It added that his investigation "does suggest that a possible exception may exist with respect to the conduct of Mr. Kloske, and the Attorney General may wish to consider further investigation," and recommended that Barr notify the Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that there were no reasonable grounds to believe further investigation was warranted.[^34] Barr said in the interview that Lacey "came out with a report after the election saying that Iraqgate was all nonsense."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
In the same interview Barr said that at the end of the administration he advised [[George H.W. Bush]] to pardon [[Caspar Weinberger]] and "about five others," and of the [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] pardons: "I certainly did not oppose any of them."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
### Barr and the Epstein Prosecution
|
||||
|
||||
Barr was attorney general when the Southern District of New York prosecuted [[Jeffrey Epstein]] in 2019. In a deposition before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on August 18, 2025, Barr was asked whether he had recused himself from the Justice Department's review of the Florida prosecution and plea agreement. He answered, "No, I didn't recuse myself." He said the New York investigation was "the only thing that I was aware of going on when I was there," and, asked about the review, answered, "I don't recall playing a role in the review of that." He said he had considered whether to recuse from the New York matter, that the decision not to recuse was based on input from the department's ethics office by his recollection, and that "I wasn't hovering over that or involved in that" as to the department's 2019 inquiry into the Florida plea deal.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
Asked about his father's role as headmaster of the [[Dalton School]], Barr said "It's not pertinent at all." Asked whether he would investigate the non-prosecution agreement, in light of [[Kirkland & Ellis]]'s representation of Epstein in that matter and Barr's former employment with the firm, he said: "I actually don't think I would've had to recuse myself from that. But I just was never involved in that."[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 2007 Non-Prosecution Agreement
|
||||
|
||||
[[Alexander Acosta]] was the United States attorney for the Southern District of Florida when the federal investigation of Epstein was resolved. The non-prosecution agreement was signed on September 24, 2007. Epstein's defense sought review by the Criminal Division and then by the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, primarily on whether federal jurisdiction existed over what the defense called "a quintessentially state matter." On June 23, 2008 the Office of the Deputy Attorney General informed defense counsel that the deputy attorney general would not intervene, and Epstein pleaded guilty in state court on June 30, 2008.[^37]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Office of Professional Responsibility]] found in November 2020 that Acosta "made the pivotal decision to resolve the federal investigation of Epstein" through a state-based plea, and that he "participated in its drafting and approved it, with knowledge of its terms." The office stated that Acosta had "plenary authority" as United States attorney to resolve the case as he deemed appropriate. It found no clear and unambiguous standard that required Acosta to indict Epstein on federal charges or that prohibited his decision to defer prosecution to the state, and no evidence that the decision was based on corruption or on impermissible considerations such as Epstein's wealth, status or associations. It found no evidence that a breakfast meeting between Acosta and one of Epstein's defense counsel in October 2007 led to the agreement, which had been signed weeks earlier. OPR concluded that Acosta did not commit professional misconduct, but that the decision to resolve the federal investigation through the agreement "constitutes poor judgment" because the agreement was "a flawed mechanism for satisfying the federal interest," and that he also exercised poor judgment when he failed to make certain that the state would notify victims identified in the federal investigation of the state plea hearing.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
### Reno and the Wilcher Letter
|
||||
|
||||
Seymour wrote that [[Paul Wilcher]] hand-delivered a 100-page letter to Attorney General [[Janet Reno]] on May 21, 1993, claiming that holdover Justice Department employees from the Reagan and Bush administrations were responsible for a number of cover-ups unknown to the Attorney General. Wilcher was then investigating the October Surprise incident and the INSLAW case.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Epstein Files, 2025 and 2026
|
||||
|
||||
The Justice Department under [[Pam Bondi]] released a first phase of declassified Epstein files on February 27, 2025.[^40] On November 19, 2025 Congress enacted the [[Epstein Files Transparency Act]], Public Law 119-38. It required the attorney general to make publicly available within 30 days all unclassified Justice Department, FBI and United States Attorneys' office records relating to Epstein, permitted the attorney general to withhold or redact information identifying victims and certain other material, and required a report to the Judiciary committees within 15 days after the release was completed. Section 2(b) provides that "No record shall be withheld, delayed, or redacted on the basis of embarrassment, reputational harm, or political sensitivity, including to any government official, public figure, or foreign dignitary."[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
An unsigned Justice Department and FBI memorandum dated July 7, 2025 stated that the review of Epstein holdings, which included more than 300 gigabytes of data and physical evidence, "revealed no incriminating 'client list,'" that there was "no credible evidence found that Epstein blackmailed prominent individuals," and that "no further disclosure would be appropriate or warranted." It stated that FBI investigators concluded that Epstein committed suicide in his cell at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on August 10, 2019, and that the FBI's review of video footage confirmed that from about 10:40 p.m. on August 9 until about 6:30 a.m. the next morning nobody entered any of the tiers in the special housing unit.[^42] Senator [[Richard Durbin]] wrote to Bondi about the memorandum on July 18, 2025.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 2, 2026 [[Donald Trump]] announced that Bondi would leave office and that Deputy Attorney General [[Todd Blanche]] would serve as acting attorney general.[^43] The Senate confirmed Blanche as attorney general on August 8, 2026 by a vote of 50 to 49.[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
|
||||
[^2]: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, § 101(g) and § 102(a)(1). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Volume II, *The Contra Story*, Findings ¶ 42 (memorandum of Lawrence Houston, 1954). https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^4]: Same report, Findings ¶ 43 (Thornburgh letter of July 24, 1975; Warner reply of July 29, 1975).
|
||||
[^5]: Same report, Findings ¶ 44 (Headquarters Regulation 7-1 a(7), in force as of November 28, 1975).
|
||||
[^6]: Same report, Findings ¶¶ 24-25 (memorandum signed February 11 and March 2, 1982; governing dates March 2, 1982 to August 3, 1995; Smith letter of February 11, 1982; Justice Department memorandum of February 8, 1985).
|
||||
[^7]: Same report, Findings ¶ 34 (no information found of intent to protect Contra activities), ¶ 35 (inconsistent CIA handling of allegations), and ¶ 39 (general counsel's discretion; 1984 report on Jorge Morales; 1988 referral).
|
||||
[^8]: Robert Parry, "Contra-Cocaine: Evidence of Premeditation," Consortium News, June 1, 1998 (quoting the Smith letter of February 11, 1982 and the Casey letter of March 2, 1982, as placed in the Congressional Record by Representative Waters on May 7, 1998). https://consortiumnews.com/archive/crack12.html
|
||||
[^9]: Congressional Record, House, July 17, 1998, p. H5847-H5848 (remarks of Representative Waters). https://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1998_cr/h980717-cia.htm
|
||||
[^10]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
|
||||
[^11]: Same report, Findings ¶ 26 (August 1995 revision).
|
||||
[^12]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), pp. 121-122 (Bueso-Rosa section, including the deposition of Mark M. Richard before the Iran-Contra committee). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, *The CIA-Contra-Crack Cocaine Controversy* (December 1997), Chapter III (Norwin Meneses), https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/archive/special/9712/ch03p1.htm
|
||||
[^14]: Federal Bureau of Investigation, memorandum, R. O. Lallier to A. H. Belmont, May 24, 1961, file 92-2713-175,176, NARA record 124-10210-10327 (reporting the account of Paul Loeb).
|
||||
[^15]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (S. Rept. 94-465, 1975), p. 140. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
|
||||
[^16]: Same report, pp. 131-134 (May 7, 1962 briefing; quotation of the Inspector General's report; Herbert J. Miller's advice of April 24, 1962).
|
||||
[^17]: Church Committee, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book III (1976), Section IV.B, pp. 115-116 (Evans memoranda of October 10 and 21, 1963; Hoover memorandum of October 7, 1963).
|
||||
[^18]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, "John Newton Mitchell," Attorneys General biography. https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/mitchell-john-newton
|
||||
[^19]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973* (staff report, December 18, 1975), p. 11. https://archive.org/details/CovertActionInChile196373
|
||||
[^20]: Associated Press, "Jury acquits Mitchell, Stans," *State News* (Michigan State University), April 29, 1974, p. 1. https://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/state_news/1974/state_news_19740429.pdf
|
||||
[^21]: Vicky Ward, "The Talented Mr. Epstein," *Vanity Fair,* March 2003, https://vickyward.com/article/the-talented-mr-epstein/ ; Vicky Ward, "Jeffrey Epstein's Sick Story Played Out for Years in Plain Sight," *The Daily Beast,* July 9, 2019, https://www.thedailybeast.com/jeffrey-epsteins-sick-story-played-out-for-years-in-plain-sight/
|
||||
[^22]: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Domestic Intelligence Division, informative note, April 14, 1967, JFK Assassination Records Collection, record 124-10369-10048.
|
||||
[^23]: L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1." https://archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1
|
||||
[^24]: L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI file "Church of Scientology / L. Ron Hubbard," Part 5. https://archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard
|
||||
[^25]: "No New Leads Uncovered by Letelier Probe," *The Washington Post,* November 1, 1976, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP99-00498R000100020097-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp99-00498r000100020097-6
|
||||
[^26]: "2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," wire report, March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030069-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp09t00207r001000030069-7
|
||||
[^27]: "2 ITT Men Charged with Senate Lies," wire report, March 21, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030069-7; "3 Charges Dropped Against ITT Executive," *The Washington Star,* August 9, 1978, CIA Reading Room document CIA-RDP09T00207R001000030079-6; "U.S. Drops ITT Official's Perjury Case," *The Washington Post,* March 8, 1979.
|
||||
[^28]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation* (96-0143-IG), Volume II, *The Contra Story*, discussion of the 1982 memorandum and the August 1979 guidelines promulgated by Attorney General Bell under Executive Order 12036. https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, *Wedtech: A Review of Federal Procurement Decisions* (letter of transmittal May 4, 1988), pp. 12-13. https://archive.org/details/WedtechReport
|
||||
[^30]: Barbara Bradley, "Meese probe ends; scrutiny of attorney generalship continues," *The Christian Science Monitor,* July 19, 1988, quoting the report of Independent Counsel James C. McKay. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0719/aed.html
|
||||
[^31]: U.S. Department of Justice, *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* (March 1993), Introduction, and the sections on the Hadron offer, the INSLAW pleadings, the September 1989 Senate staff study, and the October 11, 1988 Richardson memorandum. https://archive.org/details/InslawPROMISBuaReport
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report,* H. Rept. 102-857 (September 10, 1992), Summary, pp. 1-12. https://archive.org/details/InslawAffairInvestigativeReport
|
||||
[^33]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H. W. Bush Oral History Project (remarks on Bua, Lacey, Civiletti, inherent authority, and the pardons). https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
|
||||
[^34]: Lacey, Frederick B., "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, December 8, 1992, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro,* Serial No. 103-95 (1994), pp. 343-345 (appointment, letter of October 27, 1992) and pp. 523, 531-532 (conclusions and recommendation). https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
|
||||
[^35]: Deposition of William P. Barr, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, August 18, 2025, pp. 47-48 and 51. https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Barr-Transcript.pdf
|
||||
[^36]: Same transcript, pp. 51 and 92-93.
|
||||
[^37]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility, *Investigation into the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the Investigation,* Executive Summary, November 2020, pp. 2-3. https://www.justice.gov/opr/page/file/1336471/dl
|
||||
[^38]: Same, pp. 10-12.
|
||||
[^39]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
|
||||
[^40]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, press release, "Attorney General Pamela Bondi Releases First Phase of Declassified Epstein Files," February 27, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-pamela-bondi-releases-first-phase-declassified-epstein-files
|
||||
[^41]: Epstein Files Transparency Act, Pub. L. 119-38, 139 Stat. 656 (enacted November 19, 2025), §§ 2(a), 2(c)(1) and 3. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ38/pdf/PLAW-119publ38.pdf
|
||||
[^42]: U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation, unsigned memorandum, July 7, 2025. https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1407001/dl?inline ; Senator Richard J. Durbin, letter to Attorney General Pam Bondi, July 18, 2025. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/2025-07-18-rjd-letter-to-ag-bondi-re-epstein?download=1
|
||||
[^43]: "Trump fires Pam Bondi as attorney general, installs Todd Blanche as acting AG," CBS News, April 2, 2026. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-pam-bondi-attorney-general/
|
||||
[^44]: U.S. Senate, Roll Call Vote 119th Congress, 2nd Session, Vote No. 230, on the nomination of Todd Blanche to be Attorney General (PN1078), August 8, 2026, 50 yeas and 49 nays. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1192/vote_119_2_00230.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,37 +1,195 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "International Organization"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- NATO
|
||||
- Gladio
|
||||
- StayBehind
|
||||
- ColdWar
|
||||
- StrategyOfTension
|
||||
- SHAPE
|
||||
- Intelligence
|
||||
- Military
|
||||
summary: "NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is the Western military alliance whose Cold War infrastructure included the Gladio stay-behind networks documented in this vault; its Brussels headquarters is adjacent to the Belgian elite networks investigated in the Dutroux affair, and its expansion and intelligence coordination mechanisms are referenced throughout vault subjects."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
- Belgium
|
||||
- Italy
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- NATO
|
||||
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization
|
||||
- North Atlantic Treaty
|
||||
- North Atlantic Alliance
|
||||
summary: "NATO is the Western military alliance founded in 1949 whose Clandestine Planning Committee and Allied Clandestine Committee dealt with the stay-behind networks that Italian and Belgian parliaments investigated in 1990 and 1991."
|
||||
location: "Brussels, Belgium"
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[Belgium]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1949-04-04
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[Italy]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1949-04-04
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: member_of
|
||||
with: "[[West Germany]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1955-05-09
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Operation Gladio]]"
|
||||
start: 1956-11-26
|
||||
role: "stay-behind agreement of the Italian and American services; the NATO-level Clandestine Planning Committee and Allied Clandestine Committee handled the networks"
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Lyman Lemnitzer]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Europe"
|
||||
start: 1963-01-01
|
||||
end: 1969-07-01
|
||||
fn: 23
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Europe"
|
||||
start: 1974
|
||||
end: 1979
|
||||
fn: 24
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Isaac C. Kidd Jr.]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic"
|
||||
start: 1975
|
||||
end: 1978
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[David K. E. Bruce]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council"
|
||||
start: 1974-10-17
|
||||
end: 1976-02-12
|
||||
fn: 26
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Commissione Stragi]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Italian parliamentary commission on terrorism and the massacres; the Gladio documentation was placed before it in 1990"
|
||||
fn: 13
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Belgian Senate]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "parliamentary inquiry into an international clandestine intelligence network in Belgium, rapporteurs Erdman and Hasquin"
|
||||
start: 1991-10-01
|
||||
fn: 17
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance founded on April 4, 1949, when twelve founding members - the [[United States]], Canada, the United Kingdom, France, [[Belgium]], the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy - signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington. The treaty's Article 5 commits members to mutual defense, treating an attack on any one member as an attack on all. NATO's current headquarters is located in Brussels, [[Belgium]], having moved there in 1967 when France under [[Charles de Gaulle]] withdrew from the integrated military command and expelled NATO from French soil.[^1]
|
||||
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance founded on April 4, 1949, when twelve states signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington: the [[United States]], [[Canada]], the [[United Kingdom]], [[France]], [[Belgium]], the [[Netherlands]], [[Luxembourg]], [[Denmark]], [[Norway]], [[Iceland]], [[Portugal]] and [[Italy]].[^1] Article 5 of the treaty provides that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."[^1] [[Greece]] joined in 1952 and [[West Germany]] in 1955.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gladio and Stay-Behind Networks
|
||||
|
||||
The most consequential covert dimension of NATO documented in this vault is [[Operation Gladio]] - the NATO-wide network of stay-behind organizations established in the late 1940s to provide armed resistance in the event of a Soviet invasion or communist political takeover. The networks were organized under the authority of what NATO termed the "Clandestine Planning Committee" and the "Allied Co-ordination Committee," and were implemented by national intelligence services with CIA and [[MI6]] technical support.
|
||||
|
||||
The Gladio networks are documented to have existed in at minimum 14 NATO member states, including [[Italy]], [[Belgium]], [[Germany]], France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, and Austria. Italian Prime Minister [[Giulio Andreotti]] confirmed Gladio's existence in October 1990 following a parliamentary investigation prompted by Italian judge [[Felice Casson]]'s discovery of the network's records in a military intelligence archive in Rome. The Belgian network, known as [[SDRA8]], has been linked by investigators to the unsolved [[Brabant massacres]] of 1983-1985.[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### NATO Intelligence Sharing
|
||||
|
||||
NATO's integrated military command structure required unprecedented peacetime intelligence sharing among its members, creating institutional frameworks for signals intelligence (through the [[UKUSA Agreement]] and SIGINT sharing protocols), human intelligence liaison, and counterintelligence coordination. The CIA operated as the dominant partner in these arrangements, with American intelligence budgets and collection capabilities dwarfing those of most allies. NATO's nuclear planning arrangements also required sharing of classified nuclear targeting and weapon deployment data with allied governments.[^1]
|
||||
The alliance's headquarters are in [[Brussels]], Belgium, at Evere. The Belgian Senate's 1991 report places the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe ([[SHAPE]]) at Casteau, and records that American commands were moved from Rocquencourt to Casteau after [[Charles de Gaulle]] withdrew France from the integrated military command.[^3] In 1967 the headquarters moved to Belgium after France withdrew from the integrated command and expelled NATO from French soil.[^3][^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Cold War Role
|
||||
|
||||
NATO's primary Cold War function was deterring a Soviet conventional military attack on Western [[Europe]] through the threat of American nuclear retaliation. The alliance maintained large conventional forces in [[Germany]] - particularly the U.S. Army's VII Corps and V Corps - alongside nuclear weapons pre-positioned at various European bases. The [[INF Treaty]] of 1987 between [[Ronald Reagan]] and Mikhail Gorbachev, which eliminated intermediate-range nuclear missiles, was a significant Cold War NATO diplomatic moment.
|
||||
NATO's primary Cold War function was deterring a Soviet conventional attack on Western [[Europe]] through the threat of American nuclear retaliation. The alliance maintained large conventional forces in [[Germany]], particularly the U.S. Army's VII Corps and V Corps, alongside nuclear weapons pre-positioned at European bases.[^4] The [[INF Treaty]] of 1987 between [[Ronald Reagan]] and [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], which eliminated intermediate-range nuclear missiles, was a diplomatic milestone of the period.
|
||||
|
||||
After the [[Cold War]], NATO expanded eastward to include former Warsaw Pact members, despite Russian objections. The alliance's Article 5 was invoked for the first time after the September 11, 2001 attacks, leading to NATO's deployment in [[Afghanistan]].[^1]
|
||||
The integrated command required peacetime exchange of intelligence among members. The [[UKUSA Agreement]] and signals intelligence protocols, liaison between human intelligence services, and counterintelligence coordination were the main channels, with the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] as the largest partner. NATO's nuclear planning also required classified targeting and deployment data to pass to allied governments.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
After the [[Cold War]] ended, NATO admitted former Warsaw Pact members over Russian objections. Article 5 was invoked for the first time after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and NATO deployed to [[Afghanistan]].[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### Stay-Behind Committees: the CPC and the ACC
|
||||
|
||||
The stay-behind networks were run through two multinational bodies that sat around the NATO command structure. The Italian parliamentary commission's 1992 report, Doc. XXIII n. 51, traces the first, the Clandestine Planning Committee (CPC). A British member of the service sent the head of the Italian service, SIFAR, a letter on April 7, 1952 informing him that the committee had been set up at the initiative of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. It was formally constituted in August 1951 under the SHAPE Standing Group, with representatives of the French, British and American services, and the SACEUR had asked that the services of the other NATO countries be added. Italy first attended a CPC meeting as an associate member on May 19, 1959.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The report describes the second body, the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC), as created in 1958 on the initiative of the SACEUR and the CPC, with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as participants. Italy joined on April 15, 1964, shortly after West Germany.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The Belgian Senate inquiry describes the Belgian branch of the CPC as the liaison between the Belgian services and the major NATO commands, above all SHAPE. It records that the Belgian CPC secretariat was a branch of SDRA, the military unit, and that no members of SDRA VIII or of the STC/Mob unit of the Sûreté took part in the CPC's work. The commission then asked why a body attached to SHAPE attended ACC meetings when the witnesses claimed the ACC had nothing to do with NATO's mission.[^7] Two witnesses told the commission that the Belgian CPC secretariat was abolished on April 1, 1991.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
The Italian report dates the bilateral work of the Italian and American services to 1953 and 1954, when land was acquired for the Capo Marargiu base near Alghero in Sardinia and construction began with CIA financing under Colonel Santini. The name Gladio is first recorded at an October 18, 1956 meeting between SIFAR (Colonel Giulio Fettarappa Sandri and Major Mario Accasto) and the CIA (Bob Porter and John Edwards). The accord on the post-occupation Italian-American clandestine network exists in a text restated on November 26, 1956; the Italian approval of the American draft was communicated on November 29, and the accord was fixed as in force from November 28, 1956, the date of the first document in the Gladio series.[^9] The same report says the stay-behind networks, already organized in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, were later extended to Denmark and Norway and to the German and Austrian territories under Allied control.[^10] [[Daniele Ganser]]'s study lists stay-behind networks in at least fourteen European states, among them Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Portugal, Turkey, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway and the non-member Austria.[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
### Italy and the 1990 Disclosure
|
||||
|
||||
Italian investigators linked the Italian branch, [[Operation Gladio]], to the bombings of the [[strategy of tension]]. [[Felice Casson]], the magistrate who was working on the 1972 [[Peteano bombing]], obtained documents on the network. In 1984 [[Vincenzo Vinciguerra]], an [[Ordine Nuovo]] member who had become a state's witness, testified that stay-behind networks connected to NATO had organized attacks carried out by neofascist operatives, with military intelligence providing protection. The attacks in his account include the [[Piazza Fontana bombing]].[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 24, 1990, Prime Minister [[Giulio Andreotti]] told the Chamber of Deputies that the structure "esiste nel quadro della NATO" (exists within the framework of NATO). He described it as a network providing, in case of occupation by enemy forces, "una rete di salvaguardia, sia informativa sia di reazione" (a network of safeguard, both informational and of reaction), all within the framework of the Alliance. He also told the Chamber that he had opened the archives completely to Casson.[^13] The Italian government's figures, transmitted to the parliamentary commission, put the membership at dissolution at 622 persons, 45 of them deceased, covering 1958 to 1990: 408 members of the cells and 214 of the rapid-deployment units. Recruitment had been started for 1,915 names, two thirds of which ended negatively, and a file was kept on each. The commission recorded that 127 of the 622 were enrolled before the required information on them had been gathered, and that 24 were proposed or confirmed although they had belonged to the Fascist party, the Italian Social Republic or the Decima MAS.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
A parliamentary question filed in Bonn on November 12, 1990 summarized the Italian statements. It said that Andreotti had confirmed the existence of a parallel NATO intelligence service under the name "Organisation Gladio" into the 1980s and possibly later, and that its basis was a secret addendum to the accession declarations of new NATO members. The question records that the former Greek prime minister [[Andreas Papandreou|Papandreou]] had confirmed the same basis for Greece and an activity under the codename "Haut des roten Berges." These are the questioners' statements, not findings.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
### The European Parliament Resolution
|
||||
|
||||
On November 22, 1990 the [[European Parliament]] adopted a joint resolution on the Gladio affair, replacing five motions, published in the Official Journal C 324 of December 24, 1990 (page 201).[^16] Its recitals refer to "the existence for 40 years of a clandestine parallel intelligence and armed operations organization in several Member States of the Community," state that for over 40 years "this organization has escaped all democratic controls and has been run by the secret services of the states concerned in collaboration with NATO," and record that "in certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof) were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by, various judicial inquiries." The operative paragraphs condemn "the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks" and call for "a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organizations," including "the possible collusion of the secret services of Member States or third countries"; protest "vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network"; call on the member state governments "to dismantle all clandestine military and paramilitary networks"; call on the judiciaries concerned to clarify any action taken "to destabilize the democratic structure of the Member States"; request national parliamentary committees of inquiry to draw up a complete list of such organizations; and instruct the President to forward the resolution to the Commission, the Council, the Secretary-General of NATO, the member state governments and the United States Government.[^16]
|
||||
|
||||
### Belgium and the SDRA8 Network
|
||||
|
||||
The Belgian network, [[SDRA8]] (SDRA VIII), was the subject of a parliamentary inquiry into the existence in Belgium of an international clandestine intelligence network. The report by Erdman and Hasquin is dated October 1, 1991. It examines two units, the STC/Mob branch of the [[Sûreté de l'État|Sûreté]] and the SDRA VIII unit.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
The inquiry looked at the [[Brabant massacres]], the robberies and killings attributed to the Brabant gang (the Bende van Nijvel) from early 1982 to November 1985, ending with the attack on a supermarket at Aalst. Twenty-eight people died and no one has been convicted; the limitation period, due to expire in 2015, was extended by ten years.[^18] Daniele Ganser dates the massacres 1983 to 1985.[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
The Senate report records that the magistrates in the Brabant investigation had turned first to the structure of the military and civil intelligence services and then to the stay-behind networks, and had interviewed the acting administrator-general of the Sûreté, the chief of the military service and Colonel Bodart on the subject. It also records that the chiefs of SDRA VIII and STC/Mob and several instructors did not give the magistrates the identities of their agents, citing their undertaking not to reveal them.[^20] Ganser wrote that the senators ordered Raes (director of the Sûreté from 1977 to 1990 and chief of STC/Mob) and Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Legrand (chief of SDRA8) to supply the names, or at least the birth dates, of the stay-behind agents; that both refused although the Justice Minister and the Defense Minister had ordered them to cooperate; and that in the end the senators could not identify the men behind the Brabant terror. He quotes Legrand: "there remain very good reasons not to reveal the names of the clandestines." He wrote also that Legrand answered in Le Soir with a coded notice addressed to "Dear friends in Operation Stay Behind, section SDRA8," ending "Adolphe is looking well!"[^19]
|
||||
|
||||
Daniele Ganser recounted the documentary maker Allan Francovich's thesis that segments of the Belgian stay-behind may have cooperated with the far-right Westland New Post; the statement of the former gendarme Martial Lekeu that members of the gendarmerie and the army were involved in the killings and that he was told to keep quiet when he reported it in December 1983; and the account of the Westland New Post member Michel Libert that from 1982 to 1985 his group, "with cover from the Gendarmerie, with cover from Security," surveyed supermarkets on orders whose purpose he was not told.[^11] The Senate, in its own finding, wrote that on the elements available to it no direct link could be established between SDRA VIII and STC/Mob on one side and the persons and organizations investigated in 1980 and 1988 on the other, and that no known instructor or recruiter of either unit was, in any capacity, involved in the judicial investigation into the Brabant killings. The same section records that a Sûreté official, a military intelligence officer, a court-appointed expert in several Brabant cases and a gendarmerie officer all had sustained relations in the same period with Major Bougerol, that two of them belonged with him to a confraternity (the hospitaliers of Notre-Dame d'Aulne), and that a member of the B.S.R. who had attended at least one far-right meeting acted as an investigating agent in files on the Brabant killings.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### U.S. Commanders and Envoys
|
||||
|
||||
[[Lyman Lemnitzer]] served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until September 30, 1962. His move to Europe was announced in July 1962: at the news conference of July 23, 1962 [[John F. Kennedy]] answered a question on his "swift appointment" as Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe on the retirement of General Lauris Norstad, said Norstad's resignation would take effect October 1, and said Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^21] The Joint Staff's history records that Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962 and that his departure, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place on January 2, 1963.[^22] He became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe on January 1, 1963, a post he held until his retirement on July 1, 1969.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.]] was announced in September 1974 as the successor to General Andrew J. Goodpaster as SACEUR, and he held the post until 1979.[^24] The Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Council appointed [[Isaac C. Kidd Jr.]] Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic in March 1975, to succeed Admiral Ralph W. Cousins.[^25] [[David K. E. Bruce]] was appointed U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council on October 17, 1974 and left the post on February 12, 1976.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Vernon Walters]] wrote that after the war he served as aide to [[W. Averell Harriman]] at Marshall Plan headquarters in Paris, then helped establish NATO's Supreme Headquarters in 1951, and that during the 1950s he was aide and interpreter to Presidents [[Harry Truman]] and [[Dwight Eisenhower]] at international summits.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Dozier and the Red Brigades
|
||||
|
||||
[[James L. Dozier]] was kidnapped from his apartment in Verona, Italy, on December 17, 1981 by the [[Red Brigades]]. A press clipping in the CIA reading room describes him as "the highest-ranking U.S. officer in NATO's southern Europe command."[^28] A memorandum of March 23, 1982 from the [[Grill Flame]] project manager records a debriefing of Dozier on February 9, 1982, at which he was asked to review remote-viewing drawings made during the search and to comment on places and events of his captivity.[^29] A January 1982 Army message reported visions by several private individuals in Kent, Washington, that concerned Dozier. The visions described a settlement called the "place of the shepherds" and a hallway behind metal bars, and the message records that the visions linked the settlement to Dozier's whereabouts.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
### Narut and the 1975 Oslo Conference
|
||||
|
||||
[[Commander Narut]], a Navy clinical psychologist stationed in Naples, was reported by [[The Sunday Times|the Sunday Times]] on July 6, 1975 to have disclosed at a NATO conference in Oslo a Navy program to select and condition covert assassins. The Pentagon denied the report the same day. Narut partially withdrew his most specific claim within days, and [[Peter Watson]], the paper's science correspondent who wrote the story, did not withdraw it.[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
Retired Army sergeant major [[Robert O. Dean]] has said in speeches and online postings that while stationed at SHAPE in the mid-1960s he read a classified document titled "The Assessment: An Evaluation of a Possible Threat to NATO Forces in Europe," which studied UFOs and the potential threat they posed to NATO.[^32] In a 1995 interview Dean said he held a "cosmic" clearance at SHAPE and found the document in the war-room vault in 1964. He described its origin as NATO detections of unidentified objects crossing from the Soviet Union over the Warsaw Pact countries and central Europe and vanishing over the Norwegian Sea, and a three-year military investigation in which aircraft sent to track "large metallic, circular objects" were outflown. He called the resulting report "mind-boggling" and said it found that "there was no military threat involved, because these dudes have enough technology that if they had wanted to take us over, they apparently had the ability to do it."[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The SHAPE Historical Office has said it has been asked many times for a copy and has analyzed a photograph said to show the cover. It concluded that the cover page is a forgery and that SHAPE "prepared no report on UFOs during the 1960s." The office states that it takes no position on whether UFOs exist.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### Corporate and Political Links
|
||||
|
||||
In June 2026 WIRED reported on a leaked registration list for the 2026 retreat of the [[Dialog]] society, which [[Peter Thiel]] co-founded. The registration records list General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO's supreme allied commander Europe and head of U.S. European Command.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Liege]] pickup point for American matériel bought from NATO stocks in Europe appears in the account of [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who described Israeli chartered cargo flights collecting the matériel for transfer to Iran.[^35] [[Barbara Honegger]] alleged in her 1989 book on the [[October Surprise]] that a heroin-smuggling network in Italy was used to launder NATO arms stocks for diversion to Iran, with the involvement of Italian intelligence officers linked to the [[P2]] lodge.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization
|
||||
[^2]: Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe.* Frank Cass, 2005.
|
||||
[^1]: North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, April 4, 1949, Article 5 and the signatory list. NATO official text. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
|
||||
[^2]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/8452, Kleine Anfrage, November 12, 1990, which gives the accession years of Italy (1949), Greece (1952) and the Federal Republic of Germany (1955). https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/084/1108452.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), "Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international," rapport fait au nom de la commission par MM. Erdman et Hasquin, October 1, 1991. Passages on the NATO headquarters at Evere, SHAPE at Casteau, and the transfer of commands from Rocquencourt to Casteau after France's withdrawal from the integrated commands. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^4]: "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/topic/North-Atlantic-Treaty-Organization
|
||||
[^5]: Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi, *Relazione sull'inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all'operazione Gladio*, Doc. XXIII n. 51, approved April 1992, chapter "La storia di Gladio," on the CPC, the letter of April 7, 1952 from Peter Frazier, and Italy's associate membership from May 19, 1959. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^6]: Same report, chapter "La storia di Gladio," on the Allied Clandestine Committee created in 1958 and Italy's entry on April 15, 1964. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^7]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), section on the Belgian branch of the Clandestine Planning Committee, report page 23. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^8]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), same section, on the abolition of the Belgian CPC secretariat on April 1, 1991, as stated by two witnesses. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^9]: Same report of 1992, chapter "La storia di Gladio," on the land purchases and CIA-financed works at Capo Marargiu (1953 and 1954), the meeting of October 18, 1956, the restatement text of November 26, 1956 (annex 2), the approval of November 29 and the entry into force from November 28, 1956 (document "Gladio/1"). Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^10]: Same report of 1992, chapter on the origins of the stay-behind networks, on the networks in France, the Netherlands and Belgium, their extension to Denmark and Norway, and the German and Austrian territories under Allied control. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^11]: Daniele Ganser, *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe* (Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 139-144. https://archive.org/details/natos-secret-armies-operation-gladio-and-terrorism-in-western-europe-contemporar
|
||||
[^12]: Vincenzo Vinciguerra, testimony to the Italian investigating magistrates, 1984, as cited for this passage.
|
||||
[^13]: Camera dei deputati, X Legislatura, *Discussioni*, seduta del 24 ottobre 1990 (no. 537), statement of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti. Translated from the Italian. https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0537/sed0537.pdf
|
||||
[^14]: Same report of 1992, note 9 to the chapter on the organization of Gladio, on the 622 members at dissolution, the 408 and 214 split, the 1,915 names and the 127 and 24 cases. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 11/8452, Kleine Anfrage of the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen group, November 12, 1990. Translated from the German. https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/11/084/1108452.pdf
|
||||
[^16]: European Parliament, Resolution on the Gladio affair, November 22, 1990, replacing motions B3-2021, B3-2058, B3-2068, B3-2078 and B3-2087/90, Official Journal of the European Communities C 324, December 24, 1990, p. 201 (EUR-Lex CELEX 51990IP2021). English text of recitals A to G and paragraphs 1 to 8 as reproduced at https://www.voltairenet.org/article219618.html
|
||||
[^17]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), title page and the table of contents chapters on the STC/Mob and SDRA VIII units. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^18]: Joery Matthys, "Ghosts from a (terrorist?) past: the Brabant Killers in Belgium," Leiden Security and Global Affairs Blog, November 13, 2017, on the series beginning in early 1982, ending with the Aalst supermarket robbery of November 1985, and the ten-year extension of the limitation period. https://www.leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/ghosts-from-a-terrorist-past-the-brabant-killers-in-belgium
|
||||
[^19]: Daniele Ganser, "Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO's Secret Stay-Behind Armies," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2005, pp. 84-85 (Belgium section), citing the Belgian Senate inquiry. https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=diplo_ir
|
||||
[^20]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), section on the Brabant investigations and the STC/Mob and SDRA VIII units. The French text reads "aucun lien direct n'a pu être établi entre S.D.R.A. VIII et S.T.C./Mob. d'une part et les personnes et organisations qui firent l'objet des enquêtes de 1980 et 1988" and "aucun instructeur ou recruteur connu du S.T.C./Mob. ou du S.D.R.A. VIII n'est impliqué." https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^21]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962, answer on General Lemnitzer and General Norstad. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
|
||||
[^22]: Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. VIII, chapter on NATO, on Norstad's July 1962 announcement and the January 2, 1963 departure. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V008.pdf
|
||||
[^23]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
|
||||
[^24]: Office of the White House Press Secretary, announcement of the appointment of General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, replacing General Andrew J. Goodpaster. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0248/whpr19740916-010.pdf
|
||||
[^25]: Office of the White House Press Secretary, March 19, 1975, notice of the appointment of Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr. as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to succeed Admiral Ralph W. Cousins. Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. https://fordlibrarymuseum.gov/sites/default/files/pdf_documents/library/document/0248/whpr19750319-007.pdf
|
||||
[^26]: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, biography of David K. E. Bruce, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/bruce-david-kirkpatrick-este
|
||||
[^27]: Vernon A. Walters, *Silent Missions* (Doubleday, 1978).
|
||||
[^28]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100240026-8, press clipping on the Red Brigades kidnapping of Brigadier General James L. Dozier, describing him as "the highest-ranking U.S. officer in NATO's southern Europe command." https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100240026-8
|
||||
[^29]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250001-4, memorandum of March 23, 1982 from Robert J. Jachim, GRILL FLAME project manager, on the debriefing of BG Dozier at the Command SCIF, Fort Meade, on February 9, 1982. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250001-4
|
||||
[^30]: CIA-RDP96-00788R000100250011-3, Army Intelligence and Security Command message of January 25, 1982 reporting visions concerning BG Dozier, including "THE PLACE OF THE SHEPHERDS." https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp96-00788r000100250011-3
|
||||
[^31]: Peter Watson, "The Strange Tale of Commander Narut," *The Sunday Times* (London), July 6, 1975.
|
||||
[^32]: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Historical Office, statement on the alleged 1960s SHAPE "Assessment" of UFOs, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2023). It names Robert O. Dean and quotes the title of the document he described. https://web.archive.org/web/2023/https://shape.nato.int/page2148213115
|
||||
[^33]: "Bob Dean is flying high," *Tucson Weekly*, June 29, 1995, quoting Dean. https://www.tucsonweekly.com/tw/06-29-95/cover.htm
|
||||
[^34]: Dell Cameron and Yulia Almazova, "Leak Exposes Members of Peter Thiel's Secretive 'Dialog' Society," *WIRED*, June 16, 2026. https://www.wired.com/story/leak-exposes-members-of-peter-thiels-secretive-dialog-society/
|
||||
[^35]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992).
|
||||
[^36]: Barbara Honegger, *October Surprise* (1989).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,38 +1,264 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "International Organization"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- International
|
||||
- UnitedNations
|
||||
- Intelligence
|
||||
- UNSecurityCouncil
|
||||
- ColdWar
|
||||
summary: "The United Nations is the international organization founded in 1945 that appears throughout this vault primarily as an institutional arena for Cold War conflicts and covert operations: the Security Council veto dynamic that constrained collective responses to U.S.- and Soviet-backed proxy wars, the Oil-for-Food scandal that implicated international figures in Iraqi sanctions evasion, and the UNSCOM weapons inspection program."
|
||||
- Congo
|
||||
- DagHammarskjold
|
||||
- PatriceLumumba
|
||||
- Iraq
|
||||
- OilForFood
|
||||
- UNSCOM
|
||||
- KurtWaldheim
|
||||
- NSA
|
||||
- Intelligence
|
||||
- Epstein
|
||||
- UFO
|
||||
- Grenada
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- United Nations
|
||||
- UN
|
||||
- U.N.
|
||||
- United Nations Organization
|
||||
summary: "The United Nations is the 1945 international organization whose record here runs through the Congo, Dag Hammarskjöld's death, Iraqi inspections, Oil-for-Food, NSA penetration, and Grenada's UFO item."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
location: "New York City, New York"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Dag Hammarskjöld]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1953-04
|
||||
end: 1961-09-18
|
||||
role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
- type: head_of
|
||||
with: "[[Kurt Waldheim]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1972-01-01
|
||||
end: 1981-12-31
|
||||
role: "Secretary-General of the United Nations"
|
||||
fn: 54
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Folke Bernadotte]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1948-05-14
|
||||
role: "United Nations Mediator in Palestine"
|
||||
fn: 15
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Benon Sevan]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Executive Director of the Oil-for-Food Programme"
|
||||
fn: 53
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Mohamed Chande Othman]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 2017
|
||||
role: "Eminent Person on the death of Dag Hammarskjöld"
|
||||
fn: 34
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[Cyrus Vance]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1991-10-08
|
||||
end: 1993-05
|
||||
role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yugoslavia"
|
||||
fn: 66
|
||||
- type: appointed
|
||||
with: "[[James A. Baker III]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1997
|
||||
end: 2004
|
||||
role: "Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara"
|
||||
fn: 67
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The United Nations is an international organization founded on October 24, 1945, by 51 original member states following [[World War II]]. Its founding charter established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The Security Council holds primary responsibility for international peace and security; its five permanent members ([[United States]], United Kingdom, France, [[Soviet Union|Russia]], and China) hold veto power over substantive resolutions. Headquarters is located in [[New York City]].[^1]
|
||||
The United Nations is an international organization founded on October 24, 1945, by 51 original member states following [[World War II]]. Its charter established six principal organs: the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General. The Security Council holds primary responsibility for international peace and security. Its five permanent members, the [[United States]], the United Kingdom, France, [[Soviet Union|Russia]], and China, hold a veto over substantive resolutions, which require nine votes including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Headquarters is in [[New York City]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Cold War Role
|
||||
### Security Council and the Cold War
|
||||
|
||||
The UN Security Council's veto structure largely paralyzed the organization as a collective security mechanism during the Cold War, as the United States and Soviet Union each blocked resolutions adverse to their clients. The United States used its veto to protect [[Israel]] from resolutions censuring its occupation policies; the Soviet Union used its veto to protect clients including [[Cuba]], [[Syria]], and [[Vietnam]]. This dynamic meant that most of the proxy conflicts documented in this vault - the Contra war in [[Nicaragua]], the covert operations in [[El Salvador]] and [[Guatemala]], Soviet operations in [[Afghanistan]] - proceeded without effective UN constraint.[^1]
|
||||
The first veto was cast by the Soviet Union on February 16, 1946, on a draft resolution concerning the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria. The first United States veto followed on March 17, 1970, on a draft concerning Southern Rhodesia.[^2] On September 10, 1972, the United States vetoed S/10784, a draft submitted by Guinea, Somalia and Yugoslavia that called on the parties to the Middle East conflict to "cease immediately all military operations and to exercise the greatest restraint."[^3] Later United States vetoes on Middle East drafts included S/10974 (July 1973, the Middle East situation and the occupied territories), S/11898 (December 1975, [[Israel|Israeli]] air attacks against [[Lebanon]]) and S/11940 (January 1976, Palestinian self-determination and withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967); the United States cast the only negative vote on each.[^4] The same tabulation lists further United States vetoes on Middle East drafts in the following decades.
|
||||
|
||||
### UNSCOM and Iraq Inspections
|
||||
The United States also vetoed the Security Council draft on the 1983 invasion of [[Grenada]] (S/16077/Rev.1, October 27, 1983, 13-1-1), Nicaragua's draft on the mining of its ports (S/16463, April 4, 1984, 13-1-1), and the draft on compliance with the International Court of Justice judgment in Nicaragua's case against the United States (S/18428, October 28, 1986, 11-1-3).[^5] No Security Council measure came out of the Contra war in [[Nicaragua]], and the covert operations in [[El Salvador]] and [[Guatemala]] proceeded without effective United Nations constraint.
|
||||
|
||||
Following the [[Gulf War]], the UN Security Council established the [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) under Resolution 687 (April 1991) to verify the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs and ballistic missiles. UNSCOM operated in [[Iraq]] from 1991 until December 1998, when [[Saddam Hussein]]'s government expelled the inspectors. The inspections were technically groundbreaking but operationally compromised: UNSCOM's executive chairman [[Richard Butler]] and earlier chair [[Rolf Ekeus]] later acknowledged that the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] had used UNSCOM's communications infrastructure to conduct intelligence collection beyond the mandate of weapons verification.[^2]
|
||||
On January 7, 1980, the Council voted 13-2-0 on S/13729, the draft on the Soviet intervention in [[Afghanistan]]; two days later resolution 462 recorded "the lack of unanimity of its permanent members" that had "prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility" and called an emergency special session of the General Assembly.[^6] That session's resolution ES-6/2 of January 14, 1980 called for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.[^7] The Soviet Union cast the veto when drafts on [[Vietnam|Viet Nam]]'s intervention in Cambodia (S/13027, January 15, 1979) and on the China-Viet Nam border (S/13162, March 16, 1979) failed 13-2-0, and Russia and China vetoed a series of drafts on [[Syria]] beginning with S/2011/612 in October 2011.[^8] The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 came before the Council on a United States draft (S/5182, October 22, 1962) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of offensive weapons from [[Cuba]] and for a United Nations observer corps.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) in 1999. UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
|
||||
When the Security Council was blocked, the General Assembly acted in the 1956 crises. On November 2, 1956, its first emergency special session called for an immediate cease-fire in the fighting around the Suez Canal and the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines.[^10] On November 4, its second emergency special session addressed the situation in [[Hungary]] caused by foreign intervention.[^11] On November 1, [[Imre Nagy]]'s cabinet had decided unanimously, [[János Kádár]] included, to renounce Hungary's membership in the [[Warsaw Pact]] and declare neutrality, and the government asked the Secretary-General in a telegram to place the question on the United Nations agenda with special dispatch and asked the four great powers to help defend the country's neutrality.[^12]
|
||||
|
||||
### Oil-for-Food Scandal
|
||||
On July 7, 1950, the Security Council requested that the United States designate the commander of the forces made available to a unified command in Korea, in the [[Korean War]].[^13] [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that [[David Ben-Gurion]] had secretly offered to send Israeli troops to fight alongside United Nations forces in South Korea, and that [[Harry S. Truman]] declined the offer, reportedly fearing it would bind him to a security arrangement with Israel.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) and operational from December 1996, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision. A 2004-2005 independent inquiry chaired by former U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman [[Paul Volcker]] found that the programme had been corrupted by systematic kickback schemes in which Iraqi officials collected surcharges on oil contracts and suppliers inflated invoices. The inquiry identified approximately 2,200 companies and individuals from 66 countries as having paid surcharges to the Iraqi government, including officials at UN member states and individuals connected to [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, who was found to have received allocations.[^2]
|
||||
### Israel and the Bernadotte mission
|
||||
|
||||
### Other Relevant Bodies
|
||||
On May 14, 1948, the General Assembly authorized a United Nations Mediator in Palestine.[^15] The post went to Count [[Folke Bernadotte]]. Bernadotte was assassinated in [[Jerusalem]] on September 17, 1948, in the part of the city under Jewish control, together with a French United Nations observer.[^16] On September 20, 1948, [[Anthony Eden]] told the [[House of Commons]] that he felt sure the whole House would join in deploring "the callous and the seemingly purposeless assassination of Count Bernadotte."[^17] The General Assembly's resolution of December 11, 1948, on the Palestinian refugees resolved that refugees wishing to return to their homes should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid to those who chose not to return.[^18]
|
||||
|
||||
The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC), a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]], received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks. [[UNICEF]]'s institutional name was exploited by the [[CRIES]] pedophile network in Belgium, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986.
|
||||
### Congo, Lumumba, and the death of Dag Hammarskjöld
|
||||
|
||||
On July 14, 1960, the Security Council authorized the Secretary-General to take the steps needed to provide the Congolese government with military assistance after the [[Katanga]] secession.[^19] On August 9, 1960, it called on [[Belgium]] to withdraw its troops from Katanga and reaffirmed that the United Nations Force in the Congo "will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."[^20] [[Patrice Lumumba]], who had appealed to the United Nations, visited Washington in late July 1960, where Secretary of State [[Christian Herter]] pledged economic aid. After he was dismissed by [[Joseph Kasavubu]] on September 5 and lost the power struggle to Kasavubu and [[Joseph Mobutu]], who seized power on September 14, Lumumba asked the United Nations force for protection.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Church Committee]] documented the American side of the same weeks. A cable of August 18, 1960 from [[Bronson Tweedy]], chief of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s Africa Division, referred to "your and our belief Lumumba must be removed if possible"; on August 19 [[Richard Bissell]] cabled "You are authorized proceed with operation" to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group; and on August 26 [[Allen Dulles]] cabled the Leopoldville station that "targets of opportunity may present themselves to you" and authorized up to $100,000 for "crash programs."[^22] The Committee reported that in the fall of 1960 two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba, that poisons were sent to the Congo and that exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba, and wrote that it "does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing" by Congolese rivals in early 1961. On the question of authority, the Committee wrote that the chain of events was "strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the plot to assassinate Lumumba was authorized by President Eisenhower," while the countervailing testimony and the ambiguity of the records precluded a finding that the President intended an assassination effort.[^23]
|
||||
|
||||
Lumumba was transferred on January 17, 1961 to the custody of the Katanga authorities, who announced his death several weeks later.[^21] On February 21, 1961, the Security Council noted "with deep regret" the announced killing of Lumumba, [[Maurice Mpolo]] and [[Joseph Okito]], urged the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the [[Congo]] of all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and of mercenaries, provided for the use of force, as a last resort, to prevent civil war, and decided that "an immediate and impartial investigation be held in order to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues and that the perpetrators of these crimes be punished."[^24]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the second Secretary-General, died on the night of September 17 and 18, 1961, when a Swedish aircraft carrying sixteen people, flight SE-BDY, crashed near [[Ndola]] in what was then [[Northern Rhodesia]]. All aboard died. The Rhodesian civil aviation board of investigation found no definitive cause and could not rule out a "wilful act of some person or persons unknown"; a Rhodesian commission of inquiry under Chief Justice Sir John Clayden reported in February 1962 that the pilots had allowed the aircraft to descend too low; and the United Nations commission of inquiry reported in April 1962 that it had found no evidence of sabotage or attack but that these possibilities could not be excluded, and was unable to determine the cause.[^25] On October 26, 1962, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1759 (XVII), which took note of that report and requested the Secretary-General to inform the Assembly of any new evidence.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2013 a commission of jurists chaired by Sir [[Stephen Sedley]], assembled by an enabling committee under [[Lord Lea of Crondall]] rather than by the United Nations, and including [[Hans Corell]], [[Richard Goldstone]] and [[Wilhelmina Thomassen]], reported on whether the evidence would justify reopening the inquiry. Its report recorded that "there appear also to be relevant but classified records held by the US National Security Agency." It set out the account of Charles Southall, who in September 1961 was stationed at the NSA naval communications facility in Cyprus and recalled that shortly after midnight on the night of the crash a recording was played back in which a male voice said "I see a transport plane coming low. All the lights are on. I'm going down to make a run on it. Yes, it's the Transair DC6. It's the plane," followed by the sound of cannon fire and the words "I've hit it. There are flames. It's going down. It's crashing."[^27] The Commission concluded: "There is persuasive evidence that the aircraft was subjected to some form of attack or threat as it circled to land at Ndola." It also wrote that "from the broader evidence of the US National Security Agency's worldwide monitoring activities in and about 1961, it is highly likely that the entirety of the local and regional Ndola radio traffic on the night of 17-18 September 1961 was tracked and recorded by the NSA, and possibly also by the CIA," and that the sabotage claim was not capable of verification.[^28]
|
||||
|
||||
The Independent Panel of Experts, appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246 and headed by [[Mohamed Chande Othman]], reported in July 2015. It assigned moderate probative value to nine new eyewitness accounts of more than one aircraft in the air, to the claims of two persons who heard or read alleged intercepts of an attack on SE-BDY, to new information on the air capability of Katanga, and to the possibility that communications from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine were intercepted. It found that claims by mercenaries that they shot the aircraft down lacked credibility.[^29] In December 2016 the General Assembly, by resolution 71/260, requested the Secretary-General to appoint an eminent person, urged all Member States to release relevant records, and encouraged them to declassify records that "remain classified, more than 50 years after the fact."[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 5, 2017, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of Othman, appointed as Eminent Person. The transmittal letter records his conclusion "that it is almost certain that Dag Hammarskjöld and the members of the party accompanying him were not assassinated after landing and that all passengers died from injuries sustained during the plane crash, either instantaneously or soon after," and that he "considered it plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause of the crash." Othman cited "ample eyewitness evidence that tends to establish that there was more than one aircraft in the air at the time flight SE-BDY made its approach to Ndola, that any aircraft present other than flight SE-BDY was a jet and that flight SE-BDY was on fire before it collided with the ground," and wrote that SE-BDY "may have been fired upon or otherwise actively engaged by one or more other aircraft." He noted that "it remains possible that the crash was an accident caused by pilot error without external interference," that it was "not possible at present to conclude whether sabotage was a cause," and "a lack of access to original documents concerning an 'Operation Celeste'" relating to the hypothesis that a bomb had been planted on the aircraft.[^31] He further concluded "that the burden of proof has now shifted to Member States to show that they have conducted a full review of records and archives in their custody or possession, including those that remain classified, for potentially relevant information."[^31]
|
||||
|
||||
The eight Member States identified in April and May 2017 as most likely to hold relevant information were Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States; responses came from Belgium, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.[^32] The report stated that new information from the United Kingdom, the United States, the United Nations and individuals "appears to establish that Rhodesian and United Kingdom authorities intercepted United Nations communications in the Congo in 1961," and that the United States confirmed "for the first time" the presence of its military assets in and around Ndola on the night of the crash, including between one and three Dakota aircraft with equipment able to intercept, transmit and receive communications over long distances. Of the two American personnel who had claimed to have heard or read a transmission about an attack, Southall had died in 2015, and the service record of the other, Paul Abram, a United States Air Force Security Services officer, was confirmed by the United States only in July 2017, with information that disputed his location at the time.[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The report of September 12, 2019 reaffirmed those conclusions: "My work under the current mandate does not provide grounds to disturb either finding," namely that it was plausible that an external attack or threat was a cause and that the burden of proof had shifted to Member States.[^34] In 2018 the Eminent Person requested fourteen Member States to each appoint an independent and high-ranking official to review their intelligence, security and defence archives: Angola, Belgium, Canada, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Germany, Portugal, the Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.[^35] The Secretary-General's letter recorded new information on probable intercepts by Member States of relevant communications, the capacity of the armed forces of Katanga or others to stage an attack, including with aircraft and airstrips, the presence in the area of foreign paramilitary personnel, including pilots, and intelligence personnel, and further information on the [[South African Institute for Maritime Research]] in the context of Operation Celeste. It also recorded that not all Member States appointed an Independent Appointee, that searches had not been exhaustive in all, and that the burden of proof remained with Member States.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The 2019 report stated that Member States including the United Kingdom and the United States received intercepts of communications of the United Nations Operation in the Congo throughout 1961, including encoded communications on sensitive military matters, discussed at a high level by the British High Commissioner Lord Alport, the United States Consul in Elisabethville William C. Canup and the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky. It stated that communications sent from Hammarskjöld's CX-52 cryptographic machine "appear to have been intercepted by British and United States signals and intelligence agencies," that two United States personnel confirmed as working for or in support of National Security Agency activities said they overheard a transmission or recording of an attack on flight SE-BDY, that both had died by 2018 without a substantive response from the United States to requests for clarification made since 2015, and that it had not been possible to conclude whether sabotage was a cause, owing in part to difficulties in obtaining access to documentation in South Africa.[^36]
|
||||
|
||||
### Cuba and the United Nations
|
||||
|
||||
On April 15, 1961, the day of the air raids that preceded the invasion at the [[Bay of Pigs]], the General Assembly's First Committee heard Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] accuse the United States of aggression, and [[Adlai Stevenson]] told the committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^37] On April 16, Stevenson cabled the Department of State, for the Secretary of State ([[Dean Rusk]]) and Dulles, that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Roa "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^38] The operation ended on April 19, 1961, with the capture of its exile force.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
### Iraq: sanctions, inspections, and Oil-for-Food
|
||||
|
||||
The Security Council condemned the invasion of [[Kuwait]] by [[Iraq]] and decided on August 6, 1990 that all States should prevent trade with Iraq, in the aftermath of the [[Gulf War]].[^40] Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, set the cease-fire terms and provided for a special commission to verify the destruction of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.[^41] The [[UN Special Commission|United Nations Special Commission]] (UNSCOM) operated in Iraq from 1991. UNSCOM evacuated all of its personnel from Iraq in December 1998, immediately before the American and British strikes, and Iraq has barred arms inspections since.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
[[Barton Gellman]] reported in the [[Washington Post]] on March 2, 1999 that United States intelligence services had infiltrated agents and espionage equipment for three years into the arms control teams to eavesdrop on the Iraqi military without the knowledge of UNSCOM. According to that report, the technicians who installed the commission's remote camera monitoring system in 1996 were intelligence operatives, the repeater stations they built contained antennas that intercepted Iraqi microwave military communications, and at least two technicians lent to run the system were employees of the CIA's clandestine service. A second channel, code-named Shake the Tree, used commercial scanners to intercept Iraqi radio transmissions; it was known to UNSCOM's leaders, was disclosed by the Post and the [[Boston Globe]] in January 1999, and was confirmed by the United States government that month. Gellman wrote that the United States decided not to inform Executive Chairman [[Rolf Ekeus]] or his successor [[Richard Butler]] about the second operation, and that the CIA notified [[Charles Duelfer]], the American deputy to both, to help ensure that headquarters staff did not interfere.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
Ekeus said in that report that he did not believe covert antennas could have been built into the video relay system, and that if the United States had used UNSCOM cover for espionage "we have always stood against that"; he cited the 1991 inspection in which American team leaders reported directly to Washington, which, in his words, "we stopped." Butler's spokesman said Butler had no knowledge of the allegations, and Gellman reported that Butler was quoted in a private conversation as saying "If all this stuff turns out to be true, then Rolf Ekeus and I have been played for suckers, haven't we?"[^42] In a [[PBS]] [[Frontline (PBS)|Frontline]] interview, Butler said that he had approved "gifts to us, of persons and technology" to crack Iraqi deceit, that he had disapproved of some proposals as edging "towards a line that we shouldn't cross," and that he could not know whether others were piggy-backing on UNSCOM without telling him.[^43] Gellman told Frontline that when [[David Kay]] was in the parking lot and smuggled out documents in 1991, Washington heard of their contents as soon as New York, that Ekeus was angry and forbade direct communications like that, and that he was "quite confident they continued."[^44] The [[Financial Times]] reported on July 30, 2002 that Ekeus told the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet that he had learned after leaving his position that the United States had placed two of its own agents among the inspectors.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
On January 6, 1999, the spokesman for the Secretary-General, [[Fred Eckhard]], told the noon briefing that the Secretary-General had "no evidence of any kind" that UNSCOM had assisted United States intelligence, and that Butler had "categorically denied them" when the Secretary-General asked him.[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
UNSCOM was succeeded by [[UNMOVIC]] (UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission), established by Security Council resolution 1284 on December 17, 1999.[^47] UNMOVIC inspectors under [[Hans Blix]] were in Iraq when the United States and United Kingdom invaded in March 2003, asserting that [[Saddam Hussein]] retained prohibited weapons programs. No such programs were found.
|
||||
|
||||
The UN inspection effort also employed [[Karen Jansen]], a U.S. Army major and United Nations inspector who worked on the search for Iraqi biological weapons sites. [[Ruth Sinai]] reported for the [[Associated Press]] that Jansen carried sketches of two sites where the Iraqi leader had supposedly stashed biological weapons, produced by [[Ed Dames]] of [[Psi]], a private firm specializing in remote viewing, and that the sketches were generated through remote viewing.[^48]
|
||||
|
||||
The Oil-for-Food Programme, established under Security Council Resolution 986 of April 14, 1995, permitted Iraq to sell oil in order to purchase food and medicine under UN supervision, and became operational in December 1996.[^49] The Independent Inquiry Committee chaired by [[Paul Volcker]], a former chairman of the [[Federal Reserve]], issued its final report on October 27, 2005. The report found that more than 2,200 companies had paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in the form of inland transportation fees, after-sales-service fees, or both, and listed 2,253 companies in its humanitarian kickback tables. Oil surcharges were paid in connection with the contracts of 139 companies.[^50] The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 28, 2005 that the report named companies and individuals from 66 countries as having sent kickbacks to Saddam Hussein's government, and from 40 countries as having paid illegal oil surcharges.[^51] The report also stated that Iraq dispensed oil allocations to a wide array of individuals and groups "whom it considered influential in their respective countries and who espoused pro-Iraq views or organized anti-sanctions activities," and that Iraq favored companies from countries it perceived as friendly, in particular permanent members of the Security Council.[^52]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee's findings on [[Benon Sevan]], the programme's executive director, were that he corruptly received oil allocations and cash proceeds from 1998 through 2001. The proceeds passed through a business controlled by [[Fakhry Abdelnour]] and reached a Swiss bank account controlled by [[Fred Nadler]], the brother-in-law of former Secretary-General [[Boutros Boutros-Ghali]]. The committee also described an Iraqi scheme in 1996 to bribe Boutros-Ghali through [[Samir Vincent]], and wrote that it did not have evidence that Boutros-Ghali took part in or was aware of any of this corrupt activity.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
### Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
|
||||
|
||||
[[Kurt Waldheim]] served as the fourth Secretary-General from January 1, 1972, to December 31, 1981.[^54] He was elected President of [[Austria]] in 1986. On December 14, 1987, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that the United States had placed him on its watch list for unwanted aliens, that [[Neil Sher]] of the Justice Department's Office of Special Investigations said the documents behind the decision showed direct involvement in atrocities and could not be handed over to the international commission of historians that Waldheim had convened, and that Waldheim again rejected charges that he participated in reprisals against civilians or in the deportation of Jews to concentration camps.[^55]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 27, 2001, the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] opened the CIA's name files on Waldheim, together with files on [[Adolf Hitler]], [[Klaus Barbie]], [[Adolf Eichmann]], [[Josef Mengele]], and [[Heinrich Müller]]. The Archives stated that Waldheim had not been an intelligence resource for the United States, and that the CIA could not conclude that the Soviet Union had used or blackmailed Waldheim with information about his Nazi past.[^56]
|
||||
|
||||
### Penetration of UN communications
|
||||
|
||||
A January 31, 2003 email from [[Frank Koza]], chief of staff of the Regional Targets section of the [[National Security Agency]], to the British signals agency [[GCHQ]] asked for insight into plans to vote on Iraq-related resolutions and for a "surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea." [[The Observer]] published the memo on March 2, 2003 under the headline "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war"; its article described the targets as the delegations of Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Mexico, Guinea and Pakistan, the "Middle Six," and quoted the memo's request for the "whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises." The Observer reported that three former intelligence operatives judged the memo authentic and that the NSA switchboard connected its reporters to Koza's extension.[^57][^58]
|
||||
|
||||
The memo was leaked by [[Katharine Gun]], who worked at GCHQ. She had been charged under section 1 of the Official Secrets Act 1989, and on February 25, 2004 the Crown offered no evidence at the Central Criminal Court. The Attorney General's statement to Parliament said that the evidential deficiency related to the prosecution's inability "to disprove the defence of necessity to be raised on the particular facts of this case," and that the determination had nothing to do with advice given by the Attorney General on the legality of the Iraq war.[^59]
|
||||
|
||||
In August 2013 [[Der Spiegel]] reported, on the basis of documents obtained by [[Edward Snowden]], that the National Security Agency had bugged the United Nations' New York headquarters. According to the report, NSA experts cracked the codes of the UN video conferencing system in the summer of 2012, and the number of decoded communications rose from 12 to 458 within three weeks. The same documents reportedly showed collection against the [[International Atomic Energy Agency]], which is part of the UN system, and an NSA bugging program in more than 80 embassies and consulates.[^60]
|
||||
|
||||
### Chile, arms embargoes, and the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control
|
||||
|
||||
[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that [[Alan Sanders]] of [[ITICO]] supplied blueprints for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]], and that Cardoen produced the bombs under a covert United States license despite a United Nations arms embargo against Chile.[^61] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977, adopted unanimously under Chapter VII, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^62][^63]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 14, 1976, [[Carmelo Soria]], a Spanish-Chilean official of the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) of [[ECLAC]], was kidnapped by [[DINA]] agents as he left work and was murdered. The [[Inter-American Commission on Human Rights]] found in Report 133/99 that his body and car were left in a stream, that the Chilean courts had determined that State agents participated in the crime and their identities were established, that Chile had violated his rights, and that the self-amnesty decree law was incompatible with the American Convention.[^64]
|
||||
|
||||
In an October 1991 affidavit given to [[Bill Hamilton]] of [[INSLAW]], [[Lester Coleman]] stated that third-party funds, including from the [[United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control]] in [[Vienna]], were generally made available for the purchase of the PROMIS systems that a DEA proprietary company sold to drug abuse control agencies in several Middle Eastern countries.[^65] The fund was a precursor to the [[UN Office on Drugs and Crime]]. The fund received funding from sources connected to the CIA-backed anti-narcotics efforts that intersected with the Contra resupply networks.
|
||||
|
||||
### Envoys and mediators
|
||||
|
||||
Security Council resolution 721 of November 27, 1991 approved the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to Yugoslavia, a post held from October 8, 1991 by [[Cyrus Vance]].[^66] In resolution 1495 of July 31, 2003 the Council supported the peace plan for self-determination of the people of [[Western Sahara]] presented by the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, [[James A. Baker III]], who served in that role from 1997 to 2004.[^67]
|
||||
|
||||
### CRIES and UNICEF
|
||||
|
||||
The [[CRIES]] (Study and Research Center on Children and Sexuality) was a Belgian group whose members were convicted in Brussels in March 1988. A UPI report of March 7, 1988 stated that sixteen people were convicted of participating in a child sex ring that used a laboratory in the cellar of a [[UNICEF]] office to develop photographs, that Jozef Verbeeck, the former director of UNICEF's Brussels office, received two years in prison, and that CRIES served as a cover organization for the ring.[^68] UNICEF's institutional name was exploited by the CRIES network, which used a UNICEF umbrella for operations until the connection was exposed in 1986. S. Dovey wrote that the X-witness dossier compiled under Judge [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] after the 1996 appeal described the network as having used UNICEF in the production of pornography.[^69]
|
||||
|
||||
### Epstein-linked diplomacy
|
||||
|
||||
Between November 2015 and January 2017, [[Jeffrey Epstein]] exchanged iMessages with [[Vitaly Churkin]], Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations from April 2006 until his death. The Justice Department's Epstein productions include a message log beginning November 16, 2015, in which Epstein wrote, "I'm in town wed- fri if you have time . Jeffrey Epstein."[^70] On August 28, 2016 Epstein wrote to Churkin, "Ehud Barak and TOM Barrack at house tomorw . You are always welcome," and an email from his office that day recorded that Churkin would join the lunch with Epstein, [[Ehud Barak]] and [[Tom Barrack]]; on September 6, 2016 Epstein offered an introduction to [[Tom Pritzker]], and the logs reference a meeting with [[Larry Summers]] in January 2016.[^71]
|
||||
|
||||
Churkin collapsed in his office in February 2017 and died on February 20, 2017, at the age of 64. [[CBS News]] reported on March 10, 2017 that the State Department had asked the city in writing on February 24 not to reveal the autopsy results, because Churkin's diplomatic immunity survives his death, and that the city's law department then told the medical examiner's office not to release further information.[^72]
|
||||
|
||||
### Unidentified flying objects at the United Nations
|
||||
|
||||
In July 1968, [[J. Allen Hynek]] told the [[House Committee on Science and Astronautics]] that "the United States seek the cooperation of the United Nations in establishing a means for the impartial and free interchange among nations of information about, and reports of, unidentified flying objects," which he described as "a sort of international clearinghouse for the exchange of information on this subject," and that Congress should establish a UFO Scientific Board of Inquiry.[^73]
|
||||
|
||||
On July 7, 1978, Grenada's Deputy Permanent Representative asked for the inclusion on the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly of an item entitled "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena," with an explanatory memorandum; the General Assembly allocated it to the Special Political Committee on September 20, 1978.[^74] In the general debate on October 12, 1978, [[Eric Gairy]], the prime minister of Grenada, told the General Assembly that the subject of unidentified flying objects should be studied with research coordinated by United Nations organizations, and that a centre for UFO research might be established in Grenada.[^75]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 27, 1978, Gairy introduced to the Special Political Committee draft resolution A/SPC/33/L.20, which would have recommended that the United Nations, in consultation with the appropriate specialized agencies, "initiate, conduct and co-ordinate research into the nature and origin of unidentified flying objects," asked the Secretary-General to invite Member States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to submit information and proposals by May 31, 1979, and provided for a group of experts to meet during the sessions of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. After consultations the Committee agreed by consensus on a draft decision, and Grenada did not press the draft resolution to a vote.[^74] The decision, adopted by consensus by the General Assembly on December 18, 1978 as decision 33/426, took note of Grenada's statements and draft resolutions, invited interested Member States to co-ordinate at the national level scientific research and investigation into extraterrestrial life, including unidentified flying objects, requested the Secretary-General to transmit the Grenada statements and documentation to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space for its 1979 session, and provided that the Committee would permit Grenada, at its request, to present its views.[^76]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1994, [[Laurance Rockefeller]] wrote to the White House science adviser, [[John H. Gibbons]], that preliminary talks had been held about a United Nations conference on extraterrestrial intelligence.[^77]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "United Nations," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/topic/United-Nations
|
||||
[^2]: Volcker, Paul, et al. *Report of the Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme.* 2005.
|
||||
[^1]: "Charter of the United Nations," signed June 26, 1945, in force October 24, 1945; Article 27 on Security Council voting. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
|
||||
[^2]: Security Council Report, "The Veto," Security Council working methods: first veto cast by the USSR on February 16, 1946 on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon and Syria (S/PV.23); first United States veto March 17, 1970. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, document S/10784, "Guinea, Somalia and Yugoslavia: draft resolution," September 10, 1972. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F10784&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^4]: Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto" (table of vetoes and drafts not adopted), rows for September 10, 1972 (S/10784, 13-1-1), July 1973 (S/10974), December 1975 (S/11898) and January 1976 (S/11940). https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working%20methods_the%20veto-3.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto" (table), rows for October 27, 1983 (S/16077/Rev.1), April 4, 1984 (S/16463) and October 28, 1986 (S/18428, S/PV.2718); drafts S/16463 and S/18428 at https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F16463&l=en&t=pdf and https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F18428&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^6]: United Nations Security Council, document S/13729 (draft resolution, January 6, 1980) and resolution 462 (1980), January 9, 1980; Security Council Report veto table, row for January 7-9, 1980 (S/PV.2190, 13-2-0). https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F462%281980%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^7]: United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Emergency Special Session, resolution ES-6/2, January 14, 1980, "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2FES-6%2F2&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^8]: Security Council Report, "The Security Council Veto" (table), rows for January 15, 1979 (S/13027, S/PV.2112), March 16, 1979 (S/13162, S/PV.2129) and S/2011/612 (Syria, 9-2-4). Each 1979 draft failed 13-2-0, and the thirteen affirmative votes listed do not include the USSR. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/working%20methods_the%20veto-3.pdf
|
||||
[^9]: United Nations Security Council, document S/5182, "United States of America: draft resolution," October 22, 1962. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2F5182&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^10]: United Nations General Assembly, First Emergency Special Session, resolution 997 (ES-I), November 2, 1956, on the Middle East. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F997%20%28ES-I%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^11]: United Nations General Assembly, Second Emergency Special Session, resolution 1004 (ES-II), November 4, 1956, "The situation in Hungary." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1004%20%28ES-II%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^12]: "Minutes of the Nagy Government's Fourth Cabinet Meeting, November 1, 1956," Document No. 7, National Security Archive, George Washington University. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB76/doc7.pdf
|
||||
[^13]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 84 (1950), July 7, 1950. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F84%20%281950%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^14]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.* Random House, 1991.
|
||||
[^15]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 186 (S-2), May 14, 1948, "Appointment and terms of reference of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F186%20%28S-2%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^16]: *Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48*, "Tributes to Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot," and the index entry for document A/648, Progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, dated September 18, 1948.
|
||||
[^17]: House of Commons, "Count Bernadotte (Assassination)," HC Deb 20 September 1948, vol. 456, col. 521. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1948/sep/20/count-bernadotte-assassination
|
||||
[^18]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 194 (III), December 11, 1948, paragraph 11. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F194%20%28III%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^19]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 143 (1960), July 14, 1960, "The Congo Question," paragraph 2. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F143%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^20]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 146 (1960), August 9, 1960, paragraphs 2 and 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F146%20%281960%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^21]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 1975, section on the Congo (Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July 1960; dismissal of September 5; request to the United Nations force for protection; transfer to Katanga on January 17, 1961). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^22]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, section "Dulles Cable to Leopoldville: August 26, 1960," quoting CIA cables of August 18, 19 and 26, 1960. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^23]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots,* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975, summary of the evidence concerning Patrice Lumumba, and findings and conclusions on Presidential authorization. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
|
||||
[^24]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 161 (1961), February 21, 1961, preamble and paragraphs 1 to 4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F161%20%281961%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^25]: Commission of Jurists on the Inquiry into the Death of Dag Hammarskjöld, annexed to the letter of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, 2014, paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 9.1 to 9.4. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^26]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 1759 (XVII), October 26, 1962, "Report of the Commission of investigation into the conditions and circumstances resulting in the tragic death of Mr. Dag Hammarskjold and of members of the party accompanying him." https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F1759%20%28XVII%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^27]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 1.5, 2.5 and 13.23 to 13.28. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^28]: United Nations General Assembly document A/68/800, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.7 to 15.10. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F68%2F800&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^29]: Independent Panel of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 69/246, report transmitted by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly document A/70/132, July 2, 2015, summary of key findings. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F70%2F132&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^30]: United Nations General Assembly, resolution 71/260, December 23, 2016, paragraphs 1 to 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2FRES%2F71%2F260&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^31]: Report of the Eminent Person, Mohamed Chande Othman, transmitted by letter of the Secretary-General dated September 5, 2017, United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, transmittal letter. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^32]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 4 and 6. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^33]: United Nations General Assembly document A/71/1042, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 7 and 8. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F71%2F1042&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^34]: Letter dated September 12, 2019 from the Secretary-General, attaching the report of the Eminent Person, United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, transmittal letter and report paragraphs 2, 3 and 33. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^35]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraph 3. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^36]: United Nations General Assembly document A/73/973, report of the Eminent Person, paragraphs 11 and 16 to 19. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F73%2F973&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^37]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
|
||||
[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
|
||||
[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," October 1961, declassified 1998; published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998.
|
||||
[^40]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 661 (1990), August 6, 1990. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F661%20%281990%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^41]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 687 (1991), April 3, 1991. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F687%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^42]: Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.," *Washington Post,* March 2, 1999, p. A1. https://web.archive.org/web/2005/https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/march99/unscom2.htm
|
||||
[^43]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Richard Butler. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/butler.html
|
||||
[^44]: PBS *Frontline,* "Spying on Saddam," interview with Barton Gellman. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/unscom/interviews/gellman.html
|
||||
[^45]: *Financial Times,* July 30, 2002, reporting Rolf Ekeus's interview with *Svenska Dagbladet,* as quoted at https://www.eurotrib.com/?op=displaystory&sid=2007%2F5%2F31%2F16410%2F6211
|
||||
[^46]: United Nations, noon briefing by the spokesman for the Secretary-General, Fred Eckhard, January 6, 1999. https://press.un.org/en/1999/19990106.db010699.html
|
||||
[^47]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1284 (1999), December 17, 1999. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1284%20%281999%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^48]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis.* Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
|
||||
[^49]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 986 (1995), April 14, 1995. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F986%20%281995%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^50]: Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
|
||||
[^51]: Grier, Peter. "UN Team Names Firms in Oil-for-Food Scandal," *Christian Science Monitor,* October 28, 2005. https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/oilforfood/2005/1028fifthreport.htm
|
||||
[^52]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Introduction and Executive Summary, on oil allocations and countries perceived as friendly to Iraq. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
|
||||
[^53]: Independent Inquiry Committee, *Final Report,* October 27, 2005, Chapter Seven, "Financial Review of the Former Secretary-General," and the Committee's findings on Benon Sevan, Fakhry Abdelnour and Fred Nadler. https://web.archive.org/web/20051028130508/http://www.iic-offp.org/documents/IIC%20Final%20Report%2027Oct2005.pdf
|
||||
[^54]: United Nations, "Former Secretaries-General," Kurt Waldheim, January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1981. https://www.un.org/sg/en/node/401498
|
||||
[^55]: Jewish Telegraphic Agency, "Waldheim Denies New Charges of Involvement in Atrocities," December 14, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/waldheim-denies-new-charges-of-involvement-in-atrocities
|
||||
[^56]: National Archives and Records Administration, press release nr01-61, April 27, 2001. https://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2001/nr01-61
|
||||
[^57]: Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy and Peter Beaumont. "Revealed: US dirty tricks to win vote on Iraq war," *The Observer,* March 2, 2003. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq
|
||||
[^58]: McGovern, Ray. "When Truth Tried to Stop War," *Consortium News,* January 31, 2013, quoting the Koza email of January 31, 2003. https://consortiumnews.com/2013/01/31/when-truth-tried-to-stop-war/
|
||||
[^59]: House of Commons, "Katharine Gun," HC Deb 26 February 2004, vol. 418, cc. 427-40, statement of the Attorney General read by the Solicitor-General. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/2004/feb/26/katharine-gun
|
||||
[^60]: Al Jazeera, "Report: US bugged UN headquarters," August 25, 2013, reporting the *Der Spiegel* account of documents obtained by Edward Snowden. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2013/8/25/report-us-bugged-un-headquarters
|
||||
[^61]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^62]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^63]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^64]: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 133/99, Case 11.725, Carmelo Soria Espinoza (Chile), November 19, 1999, paragraphs 1 and 2. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/cases/133-99.html
|
||||
[^65]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, reporting Lester Coleman's October 1991 affidavit.
|
||||
[^66]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 721 (1991), November 27, 1991, paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F721%20%281991%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^67]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 1495 (2003), July 31, 2003, preamble and paragraph 1. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F1495%20%282003%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^68]: "Child sex ring run out of UNICEF office," United Press International, Brussels, March 7, 1988. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/03/07/Child-sex-ring-run-out-of-UNICEF-office/2464573714000/
|
||||
[^69]: Dovey, S. *Eye of the Chickenhawk.* Thehotstar, 2023, drawing on Bulté, Annemie, Douglas De Coninck and Marie-Jeanne Van Heeswyck, *De X-dossiers: wat België niet mocht weten over de zaak-Dutroux,* Houtekiet, 1999.
|
||||
[^70]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619434, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," November 16, 2015 to February 23, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619434.pdf
|
||||
[^71]: U.S. Department of Justice, Epstein Library, EFTA01619438, DataSet 10, iMessage log with contact "Vitaly Churkin," May 23, 2016 to September 7, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01619438.pdf ; EFTA02044775, email "Churkin to join lunch tomorrow as well," August 28, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA02044775.pdf ; EFTA01619434, message of January 13, 2016.
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||||
[^72]: "Russia Ambassador Vitaly Churkin's cause of death won't be released," *CBS News / Associated Press,* March 10, 2017. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/russia-ambassador-cause-of-death-wont-be-released/
|
||||
[^73]: Hynek, J. Allen, statement at the *Symposium on Unidentified Flying Objects,* Hearings before the Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 2d session, July 29, 1968, pp. 14-15. https://nicap.org/books/1968Sym/1968_UFO_Symposium.pdf
|
||||
[^74]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, document A/33/512, "Establishment of an agency or a department of the United Nations for undertaking, co-ordinating and disseminating the results of research into unidentified flying objects and related phenomena: Report of the Special Political Committee," December 16, 1978, paragraphs 1 to 9. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2F512&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^75]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, plenary meeting record A/33/PV.32, October 12, 1978, statement of Sir Eric Gairy, paragraphs 225 to 236. Verbatim record: https://un-project.org/debate/33/3504/
|
||||
[^76]: United Nations General Assembly, 33rd session, 87th plenary meeting, December 18, 1978, record A/33/PV.87, report of the Special Political Committee on agenda item 126 (A/33/512), decision 33/426. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=A%2F33%2FPV.87&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^77]: Melvin R. Laird to Laurance Rockefeller, May 9, 1994, and Rockefeller to John H. Gibbons, June 1, 1994, attached to http://www.paradigmresearchgroup.org/Rockefeller%20Documents/RID-6-13-94.htm
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -108,14 +108,14 @@ relations:
|
|||
start: 2017-05
|
||||
end: 2020-10-02
|
||||
role: "formal investigation into data analytics in political campaigns"
|
||||
fn: 37
|
||||
fn: 38
|
||||
- type: subject_of
|
||||
with: "[[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]]"
|
||||
end: 2020-08-18
|
||||
role: "Volume 5 of the committee's Russia report examined the company"
|
||||
fn: 2
|
||||
created: 2026-10-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Cambridge Analytica, formally Cambridge Analytica LLC, was a [[Delaware]] limited liability company formed in December 2013 with its principal office at 597 Fifth Avenue in [[New York City]], and part of the family of companies of the British firm [[SCL Group]].[^1] [[Robert Mercer]] capitalized the company, [[Steve Bannon]] served on its board, and its chief executive officer was [[Alexander Nix]].[^2] The company filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in the [[United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York]] on May 17, 2018 ([[In re Cambridge Analytica LLC]], Case No. 18-11500-shl).[^3]
|
||||
|
|
@ -164,27 +164,27 @@ The committee obtained a campaign data team presentation of August 22, 2016 with
|
|||
|
||||
### Russian and WikiLeaks contacts
|
||||
|
||||
Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^30] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^30] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^30]
|
||||
Wylie said that from spring 2014 through 2015 Cambridge Analytica representatives met representatives of Lukoil, that Nix's presentations included discussion of rumor and disinformation campaigns, and that in May 2018 he told the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] that Lukoil "has formal information sharing agreements with the Russian Federal Security Service."[^30][^31] His written statement said that after a request for information from Lukoil executives in the spring of 2014, Cambridge Analytica discussed with Lukoil its experience with "foreign disinformation, rumour campaigns, microtargeting and its American data assets."[^31] Kaiser told the committee the discussions concerned a customer loyalty application for Lukoil's stations in Turkey, said she was told the data could also be useful for political activities there, and furnished a February 2015 presentation prepared by SCL Commercial; neither she nor Wylie believed that a contract resulted, and the committee stated that it did not independently corroborate the allegation that Lukoil intended to use the company to affect elections.[^30] The committee noted that the [[Office of Foreign Assets Control]] had added Lukoil to its Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List on September 12, 2014.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^31] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^31]
|
||||
Wylie also told the committee that in spring 2014 Bannon approved focus groups about [[Vladimir Putin]] and Russian expansionism preparatory to a predictive model, and that Bannon and [[Konstantin Kilimnik]] were two of three people likely responsible for the idea.[^32] [[Sam Patten]], a consultant who worked for the company in Nigeria, Mexico, Kosovo and the Czech Republic, told the committee there was "no connection" between Kilimnik and Cambridge Analytica; Kaiser said that on the Nigerian project the company may have assisted its client in retaining former Israeli intelligence officers working privately to conduct opposition research.[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^32] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^33] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^33] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^34]
|
||||
The committee reported open-source accounts that during the 2016 campaign Nix emailed [[Julian Assange]] about the possible release of [[Hillary Clinton]]'s deleted emails, and that Assange said in October 2017 that [[WikiLeaks]] had rejected an approach by Cambridge Analytica. The committee obtained no additional information, and Bannon and others close to the campaign said they had no prior awareness of the contact.[^33] The committee also recorded that it was unable to obtain the company's corporate communications, which were in the hands of United Kingdom authorities, and that Nix "generally disregarded the Committee's requests for an appearance."[^34] It found "no convincing evidence that Russia's government or intelligence services worked with or through" Cambridge Analytica, Psy Group or Colt Ventures in furtherance of the 2016 interference.[^34] Cambridge Analytica, LLC is named among the respondents in matters under review 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 before the Federal Election Commission, in which Commissioners Shana Broussard and Ellen Weintraub issued a statement of reasons citing Volume 5 after a certification dated April 22, 2021; the text of the statement concerns the Russian Federation, the Internet Research Agency and the Trump committee and does not mention Cambridge Analytica outside the caption.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### Regulatory and criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom
|
||||
|
||||
The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^35] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^36] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^37]
|
||||
The Information Commissioner's Office issued a monetary penalty notice of £500,000 to Facebook on October 25, 2018, the highest fine permitted under the Data Protection Act 1998, citing lack of transparency and security failures relating to the harvesting of data.[^36] The office also executed a warrant at the company's premises at 8 p.m. on March 23, 2018, seized servers and other material, and reported that Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections entered administration on May 3, 2018, that an enforcement notice of May 4, 2018 required it to answer a subject access request from the American academic [[David Carroll]] that had been made in January 2017, and that the deadline of June 3, 2018 passed without compliance.[^18] The office reported that Nix and Kogan had declined invitations to voluntary interviews under caution and that it would have issued a substantial fine had the company not been in administration.[^18] SCL Elections pleaded guilty at [[Hendon Magistrates' Court]] on January 9, 2019, the day set for trial, to failing to comply with the enforcement notice; press reports gave the penalty as a fine of £15,000 with £6,000 in costs and a victim surcharge of £170.[^37] The Information Commissioner's 2020 letter to Parliament gives the fine as £18,000.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^37] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^37]
|
||||
On October 2, 2020 the Information Commissioner, [[Elizabeth Denham]], wrote to the chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee that the office had concluded its investigation, that the company had purchased commercially available data amounting at one estimate to more than 130 billion data points, mostly about United States voters, to combine with Facebook-derived data from Kogan, that its models were mostly built from "off the shelf" tools, that the office found no further evidence to change its view that the company was not involved in the European Union referendum campaign beyond early inquiries about UK Independence Party data, and that it found no additional evidence of Russian involvement in the servers it obtained.[^38] The letter also reported evidence that in its last stages the company was drawing up plans to move its data offshore to avoid regulatory scrutiny, which it did not carry out before it ceased trading.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^38] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^39]
|
||||
The Insolvency Service announced in September 2020 that Nix had given an undertaking disqualifying him from acting as a company director for seven years from October 5, 2020, having, in the service's words, caused or permitted SCL Elections or associated companies to act with a lack of commercial probity by marketing services including "bribery or honey trap stings, voter disengagement campaigns, obtaining information to discredit political opponents and spreading information anonymously in political campaigns." The service did not say whether any such services were performed, and Nix told Reuters he had made no admission of wrongdoing.[^39] The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee had recorded in February 2019 that the Insolvency Service was investigating the directors of SCL Elections, SCL Group, SCL Analytics, SCL Commercial, SCL Social and Cambridge Analytica (UK) under the [[Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986]].[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
### Emerdata and the end of the group
|
||||
|
||||
Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^40] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^40] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^40] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^40]
|
||||
Emerdata Limited (Companies House number 10911848) was incorporated on August 11, 2017 with Wheatland as a director, and its persons with significant control from incorporation were Wheatland and Dr Alexander Bruce Tayler, each holding more than 25 percent and up to 50 percent until January 23, 2018.[^41] From January 23, 2018 the register shows Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, with an address on Orange Street in Wilmington, Delaware, as holder of more than 50 percent and less than 75 percent of shares and votes until August 9, 2022; since that date the register carries a statement that there is no registrable person.[^41] The register records the officers appointed on January 23, 2018 as Nix (resigned March 28, 2018), Johnson Chun Shun Ko (resigned May 9, 2018), Cheng Peng (resigned May 8, 2018) and Ahmad Al Khatib (resigned May 7, 2018); Tayler was a director again from March 28 to April 18, 2018, Gary Ka Chun Tiu from June 12, 2018 to December 3, 2024, and Wheatland until May 22, 2019.[^41] Rebekah and Jennifer Mercer were appointed directors on March 16, 2018 and remained in office as of the register consulted on October 1, 2026, with [[Jacquelyn James-Varga]] (appointed May 22, 2019) and Bradley David Golub (appointed December 3, 2024).[^41]
|
||||
|
||||
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^39] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^39] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^39]
|
||||
The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee reported in February 2019 that Emerdata had not gone into administration, was the largest creditor of SCL Elections and was paying the administration costs, and listed shareholders as of August 10, 2018 that included Cambridge Analytica Holdings LLC, Tayler, Wheatland, trusts for the benefit of Rebekah, Jennifer and Heather Mercer, Alexander and Catherine Nix, five members of the Marland family, Henry and Roger Gabb, Nigel and Alexander Oakes, and Reza Saddlou-Bundy.[^40] The committee recommended that the [[National Crime Agency]] investigate the connections between SCL Elections and Emerdata.[^40] The committee also reported that SCL Insight Limited, owned by Nigel Oakes, had been spun off in the 2017 reorganization.[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^40] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^41]
|
||||
Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin Stanyon and Nedim Patrick Ailyan as practitioners, records a cessation to act on April 8, 2026, and gives the registered office as care of Opus Restructuring LLP, Milton Keynes.[^41] SCL Group Limited, SCL Elections Limited and Cambridge Analytica (UK) Limited were in administration from May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019, then in compulsory liquidation on a petition of August 13, 2018, which concluded on September 1, 2025; the first two were dissolved on January 31, 2026 and the third on January 30, 2026.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -218,14 +218,15 @@ Emerdata entered administration on December 9, 2024, the register names Benjamin
|
|||
[^28]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 672 and note 4348 (Kaiser transcript, pp. 40 to 43). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^29]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 675 to 678 and notes 4367 to 4379 (Parscale transcript, pp. 53 to 60; Trump Data Team Presentation, August 22, 2016, FLYNN_SSCI_00011770 and 00011773; FBI FD-302 of Rick Gates, October 29, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 161 to 164). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^30]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 670 to 671 and notes 4334 to 4341 (Wylie proffer; Wylie written statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee, May 16, 2018; Kaiser transcript, pp. 66 to 67 and 121 to 123; SCL Commercial presentation for Lukoil, February 18, 2015; OFAC listing of September 12, 2014). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^31]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^34]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
|
||||
[^35]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
|
||||
[^36]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
|
||||
[^37]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
|
||||
[^38]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
|
||||
[^39]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
|
||||
[^40]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
|
||||
[^41]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency
|
||||
[^31]: Christopher Wylie, written statement, "In the Matter of Cambridge Analytica and Other Related Issues," Senate Committee on the Judiciary, May 16, 2018, paragraphs 32 and 33. https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/06/03/2026/05-16-18-wylie-testimony
|
||||
[^32]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, p. 668 and notes 4318 to 4325 (Wylie proffer; Patten transcript, pp. 29 to 38; Kaiser transcript, pp. 67 to 68; Bannon transcript, pp. 253 to 256). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^33]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 678 to 679 and notes 4380 to 4383 (Betsy Swan, "Trump Data Guru Alexander Nix: I Tried To Team Up With Julian Assange," *The Daily Beast*, October 25, 2017; Kara Scannell, Dana Bash and Marshall Cohen, CNN, October 25, 2017). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^34]: U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities*, report released August 18, 2020, pp. 663 to 664 (section introduction, "Committee did not examine the effectiveness of the work these companies may have conducted"; limitations including Nix's non-appearance and the seizure of the company's corporate communications by U.K. authorities). https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf
|
||||
[^35]: Federal Election Commission, Statement of Reasons of Commissioners Shana M. Broussard and Ellen L. Weintraub, MURs 7207, 7268, 7274 and 7623 (Russian Federation; Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.; Donald J. Trump; H. Russell Taub; Cambridge Analytica, LLC; Internet Research Agency; Paul Manafort), note 2 (certification dated April 22, 2021). https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7207/7207_47.pdf
|
||||
[^36]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns: A report to Parliament*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.4 (p. 38). https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2018/nov/uk-ico-report-investigation-into-use-of-data-political-campaigns-6-11-18.pdf
|
||||
[^37]: UK Information Commissioner's Office, *Investigation into the use of data analytics in political campaigns*, November 6, 2018, section 3.2.3 (trial set for January 9, 2019 at Hendon Magistrates' Court); "Cambridge Analytica Pleads Guilty In UK Data Access Case," *MediaPost*, January 9, 2019 (fine of £15,000, costs of £6,000, victim surcharge of £170, citing the ICO announcement) https://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/330338/ ; Ellen Tannam, "Cambridge Analytica owner hit with £15,000 fine for disobeying UK ICO," *Silicon Republic*, January 2019 (District Judge Kenneth Grant: "wilful disregard of the enforcement notice") https://www.siliconrepublic.com/enterprise/cambridge-analytica-scl-fine
|
||||
[^38]: Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner, letter to Julian Knight MP, Chair, Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, reference ICO/O/ED/L/RTL/0181, October 2, 2020, paragraphs 3 to 15. https://cy.ico.org.uk/media2/migrated/2618383/20201002_ico-o-ed-l-rtl-0181_to-julian-knight-mp.pdf
|
||||
[^39]: "Ex-Cambridge Analytica head banned from running firms in UK," Reuters, published by Al Jazeera, September 25, 2020 (statement of the Insolvency Service of September 24, 2020; Mark Bruce, chief investigator; disqualification from October 5, 2020). https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/9/25/uk-bans-ex-cambridge-analytica-boss-for-unethical-services
|
||||
[^40]: House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, *Disinformation and "fake news": Final Report*, HC 1791, February 18, 2019, paragraphs 285 to 290, 296 and notes 327 to 329 and 338. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf
|
||||
[^41]: Companies House, EMERDATA LIMITED (company number 10911848), overview, officers, persons with significant control and insolvency pages, viewed October 1, 2026; personal appointments pages for Jennifer Lynne Mercer, Rebekah Anne Mercer, Jacquelyn James-Varga and Bradley David Golub. https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/10911848
|
||||
[^42]: Companies House, insolvency pages for SCL GROUP LIMITED (05514098), SCL ELECTIONS LIMITED (08256225) and CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA(UK) LIMITED (09375920), viewed October 1, 2026 (administration May 3, 2018 to April 17, 2019; compulsory liquidation, petition August 13, 2018, winding up commenced April 17, 2019 and concluded September 1, 2025; dissolved January 31, 2026, January 31, 2026 and January 30, 2026). https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/05514098/insolvency
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,8 +6,12 @@ tags:
|
|||
category: "Private Organization"
|
||||
summary: "ITICO (Integrated Technologies International Co.) was a company that served as a cover for Alan Sanders, who had links to the Central Intelligence Agency."
|
||||
location: "USA"
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
[[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.) was a company that served as a cover for [[Alan Sanders]], who had links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. Through [[ITICO]], Sanders was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]] in the form of blueprints, despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1]
|
||||
[[ITICO]] (Integrated Technologies International Co.) was a company that served as a cover for [[Alan Sanders]], who had links to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]. Through ITICO, Sanders was involved in supplying technology for cluster bombs to [[Carlos Cardoen]] in the form of blueprints. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that this was done despite a [[United Nations]] arms embargo against [[Chile]].[^1] Security Council resolution 232 of December 16, 1966 imposed mandatory measures against Southern Rhodesia, including a prohibition on the sale or shipment of arms, and resolution 418 of November 4, 1977 imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.[^2][^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 232 (1966), December 16, 1966. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F232%20%281966%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
[^3]: United Nations Security Council, resolution 418 (1977), November 4, 1977. https://documents.un.org/api/symbol/access?s=S%2FRES%2F418%20%281977%29&l=en&t=pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ summary: "British machine tool maker bought in 1987 by an Iraqi military procure
|
|||
start: 1987
|
||||
location: "England"
|
||||
created: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-21
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Matrix Churchill Ltd was a British machine tool manufacturer with an American affiliate, Matrix-Churchill Corporation, in [[Cleveland, Ohio|Cleveland]]. In 1987 it was bought by a holding company controlled from [[Baghdad]] by [[Iraq]]'s [[Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization]]. Its American arm bought for Iraqi projects with money from the [[Atlanta]] branch of [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]]. Three directors were tried at the [[Old Bailey]] in 1992 for deceiving the export licensing authorities. The trial collapsed, and the collapse produced the [[Scott Inquiry]].[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
|
@ -36,9 +36,11 @@ In the [[United States]] the network comprised Matrix-Churchill Corporation, [[B
|
|||
|
||||
Prime Minister [[John Major]] announced a judicial inquiry on November 10 and told the Commons that ministers who failed to cooperate "can expect to lose their jobs." [[Robin Cook]] said for the [[Labour Party]]: "This is a political scandal, not a legal failure. The deception went right to the top." The writer [[Anthony Sampson]] said the affair showed "a deeper dishonesty and irresponsibility than is normal, even in the arms trade." In a parallel case, [[Paul Grecian]] of the fuse maker [[Ordtec]], had been convicted at [[Reading Crown Court]] and lost his appeal on February 25, 1992, after ministers withheld documents in the same way.[^2][^5]
|
||||
|
||||
On November 18, 1992, in answer to a Commons question on whether the papers supplied to defence counsel would be placed in the Library, the Prime Minister replied (holding answer of November 17): "No. The papers were supplied to the defence for the purposes of the trial. Lord Justice Scott will have access to them."[^6] The Scott inquiry was commissioned in November 1992 following the end of the trial. In the government's statement on the report, [[Ian Lang]] said that Scott "concludes, after more than three years of painstaking investigation, that all Ministers who signed PII certificates did so without any impropriety."[^7] The charges Lang answered, "made and repeated in the media," were that ministers who signed the certificates "were seeking to deprive defendants in a criminal trial of the means by which to clear themselves."[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Credit
|
||||
|
||||
The report of Sir [[Richard Scott]] found that the [[Export Credits Guarantee Department]] had created an undisclosed defence allocation within its Iraqi credit line in September 1985 and enlarged it that December, that Parliament first learned of it through an oblique reference in a departmental memorandum of November 6, 1991, and that Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] initialed a [[Secret Intelligence Service]] report on the trade dated November 30, 1987. Scott also recorded that in June 1988 a British company told officials it believed it was making missile parts for Iraq, and that no action followed until late 1989.[^6]
|
||||
The report of Sir [[Richard Scott]] found that the [[Export Credits Guarantee Department]] had created an undisclosed defence allocation within its Iraqi credit line in September 1985 and enlarged it that December, that Parliament first learned of it through an oblique reference in a departmental memorandum of November 6, 1991, and that Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]] initialed a [[Secret Intelligence Service]] report on the trade dated November 30, 1987. Scott also recorded that in June 1988 a British company told officials it believed it was making missile parts for Iraq, and that no action followed until late 1989.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -47,4 +49,6 @@ The report of Sir [[Richard Scott]] found that the [[Export Credits Guarantee De
|
|||
[^3]: "Government's Response to Defense Motions for List of Unindicted Co-Conspirators," United States v. Drogoul, No. 1:91-CR-078 (N.D. Ga. September 12, 1991), reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Serial No. 103-95, November 9, 1993.
|
||||
[^4]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Serial No. 103-95. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
|
||||
[^5]: R v. Blackledge and Others, Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), February 25, 1992; Gonzalez, Henry B. "Update on BNL Investigation," *Congressional Record,* House, January 21, 1993.
|
||||
[^6]: Newton, Scott. Review of Davina Miller, *Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq* (Cassell, 1996), *Lobster* 32, citing Scott Report paragraphs D2.111, D2.120, D4.30, and G12.30.
|
||||
[^6]: Major, John, written answer on Matrix Churchill, House of Commons, November 18, 1992, HC Deb vol. 214, cols. 216-7W. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/written_answers/1992/nov/18/matrix-churchill
|
||||
[^7]: Lang, Ian, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report
|
||||
[^8]: Newton, Scott. Review of Davina Miller, *Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq* (Cassell, 1996), *Lobster* 32, citing Scott Report paragraphs D2.111, D2.120, D4.30, and G12.30.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,37 +1,252 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Private Organization"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- "NSArchive"
|
||||
- "National Security Archives"
|
||||
- "National Security Archive Fund"
|
||||
- "National Security Archive Fund, Inc."
|
||||
- "Fund for Peace National Security Archive"
|
||||
category: "Private Organization"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- FOIA
|
||||
- Declassification
|
||||
- Archive
|
||||
summary: "Nongovernmental research institute and FOIA litigant at George Washington University, founded in 1985, whose suits and briefing books released the Family Jewels, the Bay of Pigs inspector general's report and Gottlieb's testimony."
|
||||
- PeterKornbluh
|
||||
- FOIALitigation
|
||||
- ChileDeclassification
|
||||
- FoundationFunding
|
||||
- AbleArcher83
|
||||
summary: "Nongovernmental research institute at George Washington University, founded in 1985, whose FOIA requests, suits and electronic briefing books have published the Family Jewels, the Bay of Pigs inspector general's report and Sidney Gottlieb's 1975 testimony."
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
location: "Washington, D.C."
|
||||
created: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-09-22
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: founded
|
||||
with: "[[Scott Armstrong]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "founding director"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
end: 1989
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Thomas S. Blanton]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "executive director"
|
||||
start: 1992
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Malcolm Byrne]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "deputy director; director of research"
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
- type: employed_by
|
||||
with: "[[Peter Kornbluh]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "director of the Cuba and Chile Documentation Projects"
|
||||
fn: 6
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Edgar N. James]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "board chair"
|
||||
start: 2019
|
||||
end: 2025
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Nancy E. Soderberg]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "vice chair"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Cliff Sloan]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "secretary"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: director_of
|
||||
with: "[[Vivian Schiller]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "director"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "20 grants listed in the foundation's database, 1985 to 2025, totaling $9,968,770"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
fn: 9
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Carnegie Corporation of New York]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "payments for archival programs on U.S.-Russia relations and nuclear security"
|
||||
start: 2020
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Ford Foundation]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "grants for freedom of information, Colombia and Cuba projects"
|
||||
start: 2013
|
||||
fn: 11
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Foundation to Promote Open Society]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "general support"
|
||||
start: 2020
|
||||
end: 2021
|
||||
fn: 12
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[William and Flora Hewlett Foundation]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Cyber Vault"
|
||||
start: 2021
|
||||
end: 2022
|
||||
fn: 13
|
||||
- type: funded
|
||||
with: "[[Bernard and Anne Spitzer Charitable Trust]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "general purpose"
|
||||
start: 2021
|
||||
end: 2024
|
||||
fn: 14
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President]]"
|
||||
role: "plaintiff"
|
||||
start: 1989-01-19
|
||||
fn: 21
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The National Security Archive, at George Washington University in Washington, was "founded in 1985 by journalists and scholars to check rising government secrecy." It describes itself as an investigative journalism center, a research institute, a library of declassified documents, a leading nonprofit user of the [[Freedom of Information Act]], a public interest law firm and a publisher of former secrets.[^1]
|
||||
The National Security Archive is a nongovernmental research institute and library at [[George Washington University]] in Washington, D.C. It was founded in 1985 by journalists and scholars to check rising government secrecy. The Archive describes itself as an investigative journalism center, a research institute on international affairs, a library and archive of declassified U.S. documents, a leading nonprofit user of the [[Freedom of Information Act]], a public interest law firm and a publisher of former secrets.[^1] Its legal entity is the National Security Archive Fund, Inc., a District of Columbia nonprofit.[^2] Until 1998 its press releases described it as a project of the nonprofit [[Fund for Peace]], Inc.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Releases Forced or Published
|
||||
### Founding and Leadership
|
||||
|
||||
After a two-year effort under the Freedom of Information Act, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] declassified on February 22, 1998, the 1961 report of its inspector general, Lyman Kirkpatrick, on the [[Bay of Pigs]], published that year as *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, edited by the archive's [[Peter Kornbluh]].[^2] The CIA released the [[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]], under Director [[Michael Hayden]], on June 26, 2007, after a lawsuit by the archive.[^3] On February 13, 2001, the archive drafted a complaint against the Archivist of the [[United States]] and the Secretary of State over the telephone transcripts that [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]] had removed on leaving office and shipped to [[Nelson Rockefeller]]'s estate; the government recovered copies in August 2001.[^4]
|
||||
[[Scott Armstrong]], formerly of the [[Washington Post]], served as founding director from 1985 to 1989. The Archive credits him with the vision for what the organization became.[^4] Its list of founders also names [[Raymond Bonner]] of the [[New York Times]], Congressman [[Jim Moody]] of Wisconsin, [[Ruth Chojnacki]], who worked for Moody and ran the Central America Papers Project he started in 1984, [[Morton H. Halperin]], who provided space for the papers at the [[American Civil Liberties Union]] Washington Office in 1984 and sponsored the Archive in 1985 through the Fund for Peace and the [[Center for National Security Studies]], and [[Stephen R. Paschke]], who set up the financial records in 1985 as chief financial officer of the Fund for Peace and is the Archive's vice president for finance.[^4] The list adds [[Jeffrey T. Richelson]], [[John Prados]] and [[Stan Norris]], who with Bonner and Armstrong formed an early 1980s discussion group on SI/TK-BYEMAN documents that shared documents and declassification requests.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
Its electronic briefing books have published the planning record of the 1964 coup in Brazil, in No. 118 (2004), edited by Kornbluh, and No. 465 (2014), edited by Kornbluh and James G. Hershberg;[^5] the drafts showing that the [[Gerald Ford]] [[White House]] altered the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]]'s report, including [[Dick Cheney]]'s handwritten comments, in 2016;[^6] the 1978 confession of the DINA agent [[Michael Townley]] in 2023;[^7] documents on the assassination of General [[Carlos Prats]] in 2024;[^8] and in October 2025 the transcripts of [[Sidney Gottlieb]]'s Top Secret testimony to the [[Church Committee]] in October 1975.[^9] In 2025 it added a note to its 2000 publication of [[State Department]] documents on the killing of [[Charles Horman]] stating that the theory of an American role was now in doubt.[^10]
|
||||
Board chairs were [[John Shattuck]] (1985 to 1989), [[Walter B. Slocombe]] (1989 to 1992), [[Joseph N. Onek]] (1989 to 1994), [[Russell Hemenway]] (1994 to 2014), [[Sheila S. Coronel]] (2014 to 2019) and [[Edgar N. James]] (2019 to 2025).[^4] [[Thomas S. Blanton]] has served as executive director since 1992 and is listed as president on the current governance page.[^4][^5] [[Malcolm Byrne]] served as deputy director and is listed as director of research.[^4][^6] [[Peter Kornbluh]] is director of the Cuba and Chile Documentation Projects.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Board and Officers
|
||||
|
||||
The Archive's Form 990 for 2023 lists as directors Edgar N. James (chair), [[Nancy E. Soderberg]] (vice chair), [[Cliff Sloan]] (secretary), [[Nancy Kranich]] (treasurer), [[Michael Abramowitz]], Sheila S. Coronel, [[Sajit Gandhi]], [[Danielle R. Holley]] and [[Vivian Schiller]], with Thomas S. Blanton as director and president, Malcolm M. Byrne as vice president for programs and Stephen R. Paschke as vice president for finance. The returns for 2021, 2022 and 2024 list the same slate. The reportable compensation shown for Blanton was $175,000 in each of those years and for Paschke $140,000.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
The governance page gives these biographical lines for the directors. Soderberg is described as a former U.S. Alternate Representative to the [[United Nations]], former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, former Staff Director of the [[National Security Council]], former vice president of the [[International Crisis Group]] and chair of the [[Public Interest Declassification Board]] from January 2012. Sloan is described as a retired partner of [[Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom]], Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the [[State Department]] in 2013 and 2014 and general counsel of Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive from 2000 to 2008. Abramowitz is described as director of [[Voice of America]] News, former president of [[Freedom House]], former director of the National Institute for Holocaust Education of the [[United States Holocaust Memorial Museum]] and former White House correspondent and national editor of the Washington Post. Gandhi is described as a senior professional staff member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and a former Presidential Management Fellow at the State Department. Schiller is described as executive director of [[Aspen Digital]], former president and chief executive of [[National Public Radio]], former head of news partnerships at [[Twitter]], former chief digital officer of [[NBC News]] and former senior vice president of the [[New York Times Company]]. James is described as a partner of James & Hoffman and pro bono litigator for the Archive; Kranich as a former president of the [[American Library Association]]; Coronel as director of the Toni Stabile Center for Investigative Journalism at [[Columbia University]]; and Holley as president of [[Mount Holyoke College]].[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
The advisory board listed on the same page includes [[Anne Cahn]], described as a former [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]] and [[Department of Defense]] staffer and author of *Killing Detente*; [[Thomas Susman]], described as director of the American Bar Association Washington Office, former counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee and co-author of the 1974 Freedom of Information Act amendments; [[Philip Brenner]], described as the lead plaintiff in the Archive's lawsuit for Cuban Missile Crisis documents; [[David Alan Rosenberg]], a professor of maritime strategy at the [[National War College]]; [[John Dinges]]; [[Tina Rosenberg]]; [[Joan Hoff]]; [[Akira Iriye]]; [[Rosemary Chalk]]; [[Herbert N. Foerstel]]; [[Susan Brynteson]]; and [[Jack Siggins]]. The page lists in memoriam Russell Hemenway as chair of the Board of Directors from 1999 to 2014, [[John Steinbruner]] on the Board of Advisors from 1985 to 2015, Gen. [[William Y. Smith]] on the Board of Directors from 1999 to 2016 and [[Richard Steckel]] on the Board of Advisors from 1994 to 2015.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### Funders and Filings
|
||||
|
||||
The funders page lists the [[Carnegie Corporation of New York]], the [[Ford Foundation]] and its program-related investment division, the [[John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation]], the [[J. Roderick MacArthur Foundation]], the [[Democracy Fund]], the [[William and Flora Hewlett Foundation]], the [[John S. and James L. Knight Foundation]] and [[Fundación Ford]] in [[Santiago]], Chile.[^8] The founding funders named in the Archive's 2025 anniversary booklet are Ruth Adams, the Arca Foundation, Anne Bartley, the Deer Creek Foundation, the Field Foundation, the Ford Foundation, Lance Lindblom, both MacArthur foundations, Stewart Mott, Aryeh Neier, the Norman Foundation, Gary Sick, Philip M. Stern and Margery Tabankin.[^4] The Carnegie Corporation published a collection of the Archive's declassified documents under the title "Carnegie Results: The National Security Archive," covering Area 51 and the Cuban Missile Crisis among other topics.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The MacArthur Foundation's grants database lists 20 grants to the Archive totaling $9,968,770. Eleven are made out to the Fund for Peace National Security Archive: $25,000 in 1985 "To provide seed money for planning and development"; $200,000 in 1986 "To establish this organization, a central repository for all documentation released under the Freedom of Information Act and the Mandatory Declassification Review procedures"; $200,000 in 1987; $200,000 in 1988; $500,000 in 1990; $50,000 in 1992 for the Cuba Documentation Project; $300,000 in 1993 for "Recovering the Secret History of Eastern Europe and Russia"; $543,770 in 1995; $330,000 in 1996; $150,000 in 1997; and $600,000 in 1998 for the Project on Openness and Archives in Latin America. Nine are made out to the National Security Archive Fund: $600,000 in 1999 "To establish a reserve fund"; $900,000 in 2000 for "greater transparency in U.S. foreign policy and intelligence operations and for special projects in Mexico and Cuba"; $200,000 in 2001; $1,000,000 in 2003 for general operations; $900,000 in 2010 for the International Human Rights Evidence Program; $1,500,000 in 2013 for international human rights and nuclear security; $620,000 in 2016 and $900,000 in 2018 for the Nuclear Risks Documentation Project; and $250,000 in 2025 for general operations.[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
The Carnegie Corporation's Form 990-PF reports payments to the National Security Archive Fund of $546,000 in the fiscal year ended September 30, 2020, $404,000 in 2021, $555,000 and $200,000 in 2022, $395,000 in 2023, and $560,000 and $175,000 in 2024. The larger payments are described as for archival programs on U.S.-Russia relations, nuclear security and cooperative threat reduction, and the smaller as for a study on nuclear targeting, civilian casualties and the laws of war. The returns list further approved payments of $404,000 (2020 return), $395,000 (2022 return), and $390,000 and $125,000 (2024 return).[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
The Ford Foundation's Form 990-PF for 2020 lists payments to the Archive of $250,000 to use freedom of information laws to access, analyze and publish evidence of grave human rights violations, $100,000 for the Colombia Truth Commission Documentation Project and $50,000 for a collaborative effort with Cuban historians; the return for 2021 lists $100,000 for the Colombia project and $75,000 for the Cuba effort. The foundation's grants database lists a $100,000 grant approved in May 2021 for the Colombia project, and a $63,000 grant approved in July 2013 for the IFTI Watch and freedominfo.org project on the openness practices of global institutions that make the rules for finance, trade and economic development.[^11] The [[Foundation to Promote Open Society]] reported grants of $185,000 in 2020 and $300,000 in 2021 for general support.[^12] The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation reported payments of $250,000 and $50,000 in 2021 and $130,000 in 2022 for the creation of a Cyber Vault and its website.[^13] The Bernard and Anne Spitzer Charitable Trust reported general-purpose payments of $300,000 in 2021, $300,000 in 2022, $650,000 in 2023 and $350,000 in 2024.[^14]
|
||||
|
||||
Form 990 filings for the National Security Archive Fund, Inc. (employer identification number 22-2127884) show total revenue for tax years 2011 through 2023 ranging from $1,483,438 in 2014 to $4,482,160 in 2013, and contributions ranging from $834,300 in 2012 to $3,955,097 in 2013. For 2023 the filing reports total revenue of $2,400,353, functional expenses of $2,638,330 and year-end assets of $2,675,321. For 2024 it reports revenue of $1,807,989, contributions of $1,272,164, expenses of $2,531,878, year-end assets of $2,147,279 and 22 employees.[^2][^15]
|
||||
|
||||
### Fee Status Under the Freedom of Information Act
|
||||
|
||||
In 1988 the Archive challenged the Department of Defense over its fee category. The District Court found the dispute ripe but granted the Defense Department summary judgment.[^16] On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the Archive "is not an educational institution" and that "it is a representative of the news media by reason of its publication activities," so that it could be charged only duplication costs for requests furthering that function.[^17]
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] reached different conclusions. In September 2004 it placed the National Security Archive Fund in the news media fee category. In October 2004 it withheld the 2004 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in full under Exemptions 1 and 3, and on September 30, 2005 the District Court granted the CIA summary judgment and dismissed the case.[^18] In 2005 the CIA had also placed the Archive itself in its "all other" category, and the Archive sued in 2006. The CIA then acknowledged it had acted in error and granted news media status, which mooted the claims about past requests. The court dismissed the rest for lack of jurisdiction.[^19] In November 2008 the court granted the Archive's motion for reconsideration.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President
|
||||
|
||||
On January 19, 1989, the final day of the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] presidency, the Archive filed several Freedom of Information Act requests for all material stored on the [[Executive Office of the President]] and National Security Council electronic communications systems from their installation in the mid-1980s. The same day the plaintiffs filed suit for a declaration that the electronic documents were federal and presidential records and an injunction against their destruction. The plaintiffs were Scott Armstrong, [[Gary M. Stern]], [[Eddie Becker]], the Archive, the Center for National Security Studies, the [[American Historical Association]] and the American Library Association. The defendants included the White House Communications Agency and Acting Archivist of the United States [[Trudy Peterson]].[^21] The Executive Office of the President had used the [[PROFS]] electronic mail system, which ceased operations in 1992. The National Security Council kept its own PROFS system and a similar system called All-In-One.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1991 the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing, that the President is not an agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the Presidential Records Act impliedly precluded judicial review of the President's record decisions, while the agency guidelines remained reviewable.[^22] On January 6, 1993, the District Court ruled that the electronic communications on these systems were federal records within the Federal Records Act, found the agencies' practices arbitrary and capricious, and enjoined the Archivist to preserve electronic federal records, including backup tapes. On May 21, 1993, it held the defendants in civil contempt over the preservation orders. The rulings are reported at 810 F. Supp. 335 and 821 F. Supp. 761.[^21] The D.C. Circuit's opinion of August 13, 1993 found that the electronic communications systems contain preservable records.[^21]
|
||||
|
||||
A February 14, 1995 memorandum opinion by Judge Charles R. Richey recounted the case as filed in 1989 at the close of the Reagan administration.[^23] On August 29, 1995, after a July 28, 1995 opinion ordering in camera review of four of seventeen documents, the court granted summary judgment to the government on 88 White House Intelligence Summaries that had been reprocessed.[^24] On August 2, 1996, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court on the question of whether the National Security Council is an agency under the FOIA. The panel held that the NSC is not an agency because it operates close to the President, who chairs it, and does not exercise substantial independent authority.[^25]
|
||||
|
||||
The Archive states that it has filed more than 75 Freedom of Information lawsuits against the U.S. government, 30 of them successful, and that its White House e-mail lawsuits against the Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations preserved 220 million electronic records, 22 million of them recovered from the George W. Bush White House when the Obama administration settled the case in 2009.[^26]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2019 the Archive joined [[Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington]] in a suit over White House use of message-deleting applications under the Presidential Records Act. The district court held that nothing in the Act "obligates the President to perform any duty with the requisite level of specificity that mandamus requires," and the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal on May 28, 2019.[^27]
|
||||
|
||||
### Bay of Pigs and the Official History
|
||||
|
||||
The Archive's Cuba project obtained the declassification of the CIA's 1961 inspector general's report on the [[Bay of Pigs]], written by [[Lyman Kirkpatrick]] as the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation." The Archive's press release of February 22, 1998 announced that the 150-page report had been made public that day after a two-year Freedom of Information Act effort, with Kornbluh as the requester. The release stated that CIA director [[John McCone]] had ordered all but one copy destroyed and that the original, with rebuttals by the officials in charge of the invasion, remained in a safe in the director's office. It quoted an attached memorandum by [[Charles P. Cabell]], then deputy director: "In unfriendly hands, it can become a weapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of the Agency."[^3] The report was published that year as *Bay of Pigs Declassified*, edited by Peter Kornbluh.[^28] On June 4, 1998 the CIA, under Director [[George Tenet]], announced the transfer to the [[National Archives and Records Administration]] of about 3,200 pages of Bay of Pigs records, and stated that the Inspector General's assessment and the Directorate of Plans' response had been released in February 1998 to the Archive in response to a FOIA request.[^29]
|
||||
|
||||
The CIA released only Volume III of the five-volume official history by its staff historian [[Jack B. Pfeiffer]] that year, under the Kennedy Assassination Records Act. The volume was found in the National Archives in 2005 by the Villanova political scientist [[David Barrett]] and posted on his university's website. Pfeiffer had himself sued in 1987 for Volume V, and the court accepted the CIA's position that the volume could not be declassified.[^30]
|
||||
|
||||
The Archive requested Volumes I, II, IV and V in August 2005. It filed suit on April 14, 2011, and on July 25, 2011, the CIA released Volumes I, II and IV. In May 2012 the District Court granted the CIA summary judgment on Volume V, a draft, under the deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5.[^31] The D.C. Circuit affirmed on May 20, 2014, in an opinion by Judge Kavanaugh. The panel held that a draft of an agency's official history is pre-decisional and deliberative and that the draft of Volume V "is exempt in its entirety under Exemption 5."[^32]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Perroots Memorandum
|
||||
|
||||
In January 1989, as [[Leonard Perroots]], a lieutenant general of the U.S. Air Force, was retiring, he wrote an "End of Tour Report Addendum." The D.C. Circuit's opinion describes the background in these words: in 1983, "during the Cold War, Leonard H. Perroots, then an Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the United States Air Forces in Europe, allegedly recommended a course of action to his Commander in response to an elevated alert status demonstrated by the military forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ('Soviet Union'), which helped avert a nuclear crisis." In the addendum he wrote to "detail the 'chain of events' from 1983 to help the U.S. Intelligence Community learn lessons 'as relates to our [Indications and Warning] capability and exercise planning.'"[^33]
|
||||
|
||||
The Archive describes the 1983 events as the Soviet reaction to [[Able Archer 83]], a NATO command post exercise held in November 1983, and states that Perroots served as director of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] from 1985 to 1989. According to the Archive, the addendum reported that signals intelligence showed the Soviet 4th Air Army issuing an alert that "included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons," that it warned of an "ominous picture," and that it warned the exercise could have led to "a potentially disastrous situation." The Archive states that the addendum set off an all-source investigation by the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]], whose report was declassified in 2015 after a 12-year appeals effort by the Archive through an interagency panel.[^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The State Department published a transcribed version of the memorandum in February 2021 in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983 to March 1985*. The volume thanked CIA staff "for arranging full access to CIA records" and stated that its declassification review "began in 2015 and was completed in 2019." Six months later the Archive filed a FOIA request with the CIA for the memorandum, and in October 2021 it sued. In April 2022 the CIA provided Perroots' cover letter and a completely redacted copy of the memorandum, citing Exemptions 1 and 3. On October 4, 2022 Judge [[James E. Boasberg]] granted the CIA summary judgment, finding that the CIA was not properly involved in the disclosure to the Foreign Relations volume and so had not waived the exemptions, and on November 16, 2022 the court denied the Archive's motion to amend the judgment. The Archive was represented pro bono by [[Beveridge & Diamond]].[^33][^34]
|
||||
|
||||
The D.C. Circuit affirmed on June 7, 2024 in an opinion for the court by Circuit Judge Childs, joined by Circuit Judge Rao and Senior Circuit Judge Ginsburg. The court stated that the Archive had conceded that the response was justified under Exemptions 1 and 3 and held that the CIA had not waived them by the publication in the Foreign Relations volume.[^33] According to the Archive's account of November 14, 2025, which cites reporting by the Washington Post, a State Department official confirmed that the Department had republished the volume without a 15-page appendix on Able Archer 83 that contained the memorandum, a CIA response to it and a 1988 memorandum on Oleg Gordievsky's reporting. The official told the Post that the Department removed the documents because the Archive's case "was litigated in District Court and the Court of Appeals and [b]oth courts upheld withholding the information," and that "[t]he Department was not required to provide public notice." The Archive states that the Court of Appeals "said nothing about removing the already published record" from the volume.[^35]
|
||||
|
||||
### Records Requests Over the Years
|
||||
|
||||
Electronic Briefing Book No. 2, "The Contras, Cocaine, and U.S. Covert Operations," prints the handwritten notebooks of [[Oliver North]] that the Archive obtained through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed in 1989. It includes North's entry for August 9, 1985, which summarizes a meeting with [[Robert Owen]], his liaison with the contras.[^36] The notebooks bear on the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].
|
||||
|
||||
Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, "The Kissinger Telcons," was posted on May 26, 2004, five years after the Archive initiated legal action to compel the State Department and the National Archives to recover the transcripts of [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]]'s telephone calls. On October 29, 1976, while still Secretary of State, Kissinger had arranged to move the telephone notes from the State Department to the New York estate of [[Nelson Rockefeller]], and the Supreme Court held in 1980 that the Freedom of Information Act did not reach the transcripts.[^37][^38] The Archive's correspondence with the Archivist of the [[United States]] [[John W. Carlin]] began in January 1999. A complaint written by pro bono counsel Lee Rubin and Craig Isenberg of [[Mayer Brown]] was presented to the Archivist and the Secretary of State on January 25, 2001, and attorneys for the Archive wrote again to the State Department, the National Archives and the Justice Department on April 25, 2001. The State Department announced on August 8, 2001, that Kissinger had provided copies of the transcripts to the department, and a statement by spokesman Richard Boucher credited the Archive with prompting the recovery. The Archive's account states that the transcripts had been held at the [[Library of Congress]] under a 1976 deed of gift. On May 26, 2004 the National Archives released about 20,000 pages of the telcons, covering Kissinger's service from 1969 to August 1974.[^38]
|
||||
|
||||
On June 21, 2007 the Archive posted the CIA's "[[CIA Family Jewels|Family Jewels]]," the compilation that Director James Schlesinger had ordered on May 9, 1973 and that [[William Colby]] assembled into 693 pages. The posting reports that CIA director [[Michael Hayden]] announced that day that the agency was declassifying the full file, which had been the subject of multiple Freedom of Information Act requests over the years and of which only a few dozen heavily censored pages had been declassified. Thomas Blanton was quoted: "This is the first voluntary CIA declassification of controversial material since George Tenet in 1998 reneged on the 1990s promises of greater openness at the Agency." Hayden also announced the declassification of some 11,000 pages of the CAESAR, POLO and ESAU papers and hundreds of pages on the A-12. The Archive separately obtained and posted a six-page summary prepared by Justice Department lawyers after a CIA briefing in December 1974 and the memorandum of conversation of the January 3, 1975 briefing of President [[Gerald R. Ford]]. On June 26, 2007 the 702-page collection was delivered to the Archive at about 11:30 a.m., fifteen years after the Archive filed its Freedom of Information Act request for the documents.[^39]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2001 the Archive posted a memorandum of March 13, 1962, from the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] to the Secretary of Defense, signed by Chairman [[Lyman Lemnitzer]], under the subject "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)." It responds to a request from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, for "brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba," and recommends forwarding the enclosed memorandum as a preliminary planning submission. The request for pretexts belongs to the planning record of [[Operation NORTHWOODS]].[^40]
|
||||
|
||||
Its electronic briefing books have published the planning record of the 1964 coup in [[Brazil]]. No. 118, "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup," was edited by Kornbluh in 2004, and No. 465, "Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup," was edited by [[James G. Hershberg]] and Kornbluh and posted on April 2, 2014.[^41] No. 118 includes the planning for tankers carrying petroleum and a naval task force to be positioned for intervention in the overthrow of [[Joao Goulart]] on April 1, 1964.[^42]
|
||||
|
||||
In 1998 the Archive's Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, "Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973," by Peter Kornbluh, appeared on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the coup in [[Chile]].[^43] Electronic Briefing Book No. 33, "New Information on the Murders of U.S. Citizens [[Charles Horman]] and [[Frank Teruggi]] by the Chilean Military," was published on June 30, 2000, under Kornbluh as project director.[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
In November 2023 the Archive posted documents on the confessions of [[Michael Townley]], an agent of [[DINA]], including a letter in which Townley wrote in March 1978: "I accuse the government of Chile of my death." Townley was turned over to the FBI on April 8, 1978.[^45] In October 2024 it published documents on the assassination of General [[Carlos Prats]] and [[Sofía Cuthbert]] by a car bomb in [[Buenos Aires]].[^46] In 2025 the Archive's posting *Chile in Their Hearts* challenged the theory that Charles Horman was targeted because he "knew too much."[^47] An editor's note added to the 2000 posting states that "new information has emerged casting doubt on the theory that the U.S. had a role in Charles Horman's death or that he was killed because he had stumbled across evidence of U.S. involvement in the Chilean coup."[^44]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2016 the Archive published documents on the editing of the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]] report by the Ford [[White House]], including handwritten edits by [[Dick Cheney]] to the commission's draft and the removal, on White House orders, of the report's entire 86-page section on CIA plots to assassinate foreign leaders.[^48] In October 2025 the Archive published the Top Secret transcripts of [[Sidney Gottlieb]]'s testimony to the [[Church Committee]], given in closed hearings held October 15 to 18, 1975, together with declassified CIA memoranda on [[Project MKUltra|MKULTRA]]. The transcripts had been classified Top Secret at the time and were released through FOIA.[^49]
|
||||
|
||||
In 2012 the Archive published its collection on [[Jonathan Pollard]], compiled by Richelson, which includes a 1987 CIA damage assessment. The assessment was initially heavily redacted and was later substantially restored after an Archive appeal to an interagency panel.[^50] Electronic Briefing Book No. 434, "The Secret History of the U-2 and Area 51," edited by Richelson and posted on August 15, 2013, collects the CIA history of the U-2 and OXCART programs by Gregory Pedlow and Donald Welzenbach, with material on [[Area 51]].[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: National Security Archive, "About the National Security Archive." https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about
|
||||
[^2]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998, as cited on the Bay of Pigs page.
|
||||
[^3]: CIA FOIA Reading Room, "The Family Jewels," released 2007, as cited on the CIA Family Jewels page.
|
||||
[^4]: National Security Archive Briefing Book No. 852, ed. William Burr, February 13, 2024; NSAEBB No. 123, "The Kissinger Telcons," and No. 263.
|
||||
[^5]: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 118, "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup," ed. Peter Kornbluh, March 31, 2004; No. 465, "Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup," ed. James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh, 2014.
|
||||
[^6]: National Security Archive, "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975," February 29, 2016, as cited on the Rockefeller Commission 1975 page.
|
||||
[^7]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man." National Security Archive, November 22, 2023. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man
|
||||
[^8]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert." National Security Archive, October 1, 2024. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
|
||||
[^9]: National Security Archive, "Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025, as cited on the Sidney Gottlieb page.
|
||||
[^10]: Kornbluh, Peter, ed. "Chile in Their Hearts." National Security Archive, May 7, 2025, as cited on the Charles Horman page.
|
||||
[^2]: ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer, National Security Archive Fund Inc., EIN 22-2127884, filings for tax years 2011 to 2023 (total revenue, contributions, functional expenses and assets). https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/api/v2/organizations/222127884.json and Form 990 for tax year 2023, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/download-filing?path=IRS%2F222127884_202312_990_2025030723163126.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: National Security Archive, press release "Scathing CIA Critique on Bay of Pigs Declassified," February 22, 1998 (contact Peter Kornbluh; the Archive described as "a project of the nonprofit Fund for Peace, Inc."). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/19980222.htm
|
||||
[^4]: National Security Archive, "The National Security Archive 1985 to 2025," anniversary booklet with founders, founding funders, board chairs and executive directors. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/2025-12/Celebrating%20%2040%20YEARS%20%288c%29.pdf The governance page (note below) gives 1999 to 2014 for Russell Hemenway's term as chair of the Board of Directors.
|
||||
[^5]: National Security Archive, "Governance" (Board of Directors, President, In Memoriam and Advisory Board, with the biographical lines quoted). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about/governance
|
||||
[^6]: National Security Archive, "Staff and Fellows." Lists Malcolm Byrne as deputy director and research director, and Peter Kornbluh as director of the Cuba and Chile Documentation Projects. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about/staff-fellows
|
||||
[^7]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of the National Security Archive Fund Inc., EIN 22-2127884, Part VII (officers, directors and key employees), tax years 2021 to 2024 (return IDs 202243189349308164, 202323189349304972, 202423209349305017 and 202513189349305171, from the IRS TEOS e-file XML batches 2022_TEOS_XML_02A, 2023_TEOS_XML_11A, 2024_TEOS_XML_11A and 2025_TEOS_XML_11D). https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2024/2024_TEOS_XML_11A.zip
|
||||
[^8]: National Security Archive, "Funders and Supporters." https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about/funders-supporters
|
||||
[^9]: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, grants database, grantee pages "Fund for Peace National Security Archive" (11 grants, 1985 to 1998) and "National Security Archive Fund" (9 grants, 1999 to 2025), grant amounts, years and purposes as listed. https://www.macfound.org/grantee/fund-for-peace-national-security-archive-683/ and https://www.macfound.org/grantee/national-security-archive-fund-29961/
|
||||
[^10]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-PF of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, EIN 13-1628151, Part XV (grants and contributions paid during the year and approved for future payment), fiscal years ended September 30, 2020 to 2024 (returns 202131949349100773, 202241899349100304, 202342269349100709, 202442259349101009 and 202531929349101203). https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_07A.zip
|
||||
[^11]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-PF of the Ford Foundation, EIN 13-1684331, Part XV, calendar years 2020 and 2021 (returns 202123199349107292 and 202203199349101880; https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2021/2021_TEOS_XML_01A.zip and https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2022/2022_TEOS_XML_02A.zip); Ford Foundation, grants database entries 120611 (IFTI Watch/freedominfo.org Project, $63,000, July 2013) and 140176 (Colombia Truth Commission Documentation Project, $100,000, May 2021). https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/our-grants/awarded-grants/grants-database/national-security-archive-fund-120611/ and https://www.fordfoundation.org/work/our-grants/awarded-grants/grants-database/national-security-archive-fund-140176/
|
||||
[^12]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-PF of the Foundation to Promote Open Society, EIN 26-3753801, Part XV, calendar years 2020 and 2021 (returns 202113519349100511 and 202213209349101601). https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2021/2021_TEOS_XML_01A.zip and https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2022/2022_TEOS_XML_02A.zip
|
||||
[^13]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-PF of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, EIN 94-1655673, Part XV, calendar years 2021 and 2022 (returns 202233189349104163 and 202343179349104459). https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2022/2022_TEOS_XML_02A.zip and https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2023/2023_TEOS_XML_11A.zip
|
||||
[^14]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990-PF of the Bernard and Anne Spitzer Charitable Trust, EIN 13-7298842, Part XV, calendar years 2021 to 2024 (returns 202203189349106530, 202303189349102710, 202403189349101555 and 202513119349100441). https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_11D.zip and the corresponding 2022, 2023 and 2024 batches
|
||||
[^15]: Internal Revenue Service, Form 990 of the National Security Archive Fund Inc., tax year 2024 (return 202513189349305171): revenue, contributions, expenses, assets and employee count. https://apps.irs.gov/pub/epostcard/990/xml/2025/2025_TEOS_XML_11D.zip
|
||||
[^16]: National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, 690 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. June 16, 1988). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2359370/national-security-archive-v-us-department-of-defense/
|
||||
[^17]: National Security Archive v. U.S. Department of Defense, 880 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Ginsburg, J.). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/526958/national-security-archive-v-us-department-of-defense/
|
||||
[^18]: National Security Archive Fund, Inc. v. Central Intelligence Agency, 402 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2005), Civ. A. 04-1821 (RMC). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2426293/national-security-archive-fund-inc-v-central-intelligence-agency/
|
||||
[^19]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, 564 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. July 14, 2008), Civil Action No. 06-1080 (GK). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1407597/national-security-archive-v-central-intelligence-agency/
|
||||
[^20]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, 584 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2008), Civil Action No. 06-1080 (GK), granting reconsideration. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2356756/national-security-archive-v-central-intelligence-agency/
|
||||
[^21]: Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 1993), Nos. 93-5002 et al., describing 810 F. Supp. 335 (D.D.C. 1993) and 821 F. Supp. 761 (D.D.C. 1993), and the January 19, 1989 requests and suit. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7025904/armstrong-v-executive-office-of-the-president/
|
||||
[^22]: Scott Armstrong v. George Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 1991), No. 90-5173. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/555040/scott-armstrong-v-george-bush/
|
||||
[^23]: Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1995), Civ. A. No. 89-142 (CRR). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1396736/armstrong-v-executive-office-of-the-president/
|
||||
[^24]: Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 897 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 1995), Civ. A. No. 89-0142 (CRR), on the July 28, 1995 opinion and the reprocessing of 88 White House Intelligence Summaries. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1470396/armstrong-v-executive-office-of-the-president/
|
||||
[^25]: Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 2, 1996), Nos. 95-5057 and 95-5061, reversed. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/722513/scott-armstrong-appelleescross-appellants-v-executive-office-of/
|
||||
[^26]: National Security Archive, "Accomplishments." https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about/accomplishments
|
||||
[^27]: Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 924 F.3d 602 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2019), No. 18-5150, affirming dismissal of the mandamus petition by CREW and the National Security Archive; district court quoted at 302 F. Supp. 3d 127. https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4623612/citizens-for-responsibility-ethics-in-wash-natl-sec-archive-v-trump/
|
||||
[^28]: National Security Archive, "Bay of Pigs: 40 Years After," listing Peter Kornbluh, *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New Press, 1998). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/bayofpigs/
|
||||
[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, press release "CIA Releases Documents Pertaining to Bay of Pigs," June 4, 1998. https://irp.fas.org/cia/news/pr060498.html
|
||||
[^30]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 341, "CIA Sued for 'Holding History Hostage' on Bay of Pigs Invasion." Covers the 1998 declassification of the Inspector General's Survey and of Volume III, the 1987 Pfeiffer suit, the 2005 discovery of Volume III by David Barrett, and the 2011 suit. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB341/index.htm
|
||||
[^31]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, 859 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. May 10, 2012), Civil Action No. 11-724 (GK). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2662444/national-security-archive-v-central-intelligence-agency/
|
||||
[^32]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, 752 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2014), No. 12-5201 (Kavanaugh, J.). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2675034/national-security-archive-v-central-intelligence-agency/
|
||||
[^33]: National Security Archive v. Central Intelligence Agency, No. 23-5017 (D.C. Cir. June 7, 2024) (Childs, J.; Rao, J.; Ginsburg, Sr. J.), affirming No. 1:21-cv-02857 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2022, 2022 WL 5062523) and the order of Nov. 16, 2022 (2022 WL 18493099). https://media.cadc.uscourts.gov/opinions/docs/2024/06/23-5017-2058350.pdf
|
||||
[^34]: National Security Archive, "The Censored History of Able Archer 83," November 14, 2025, with the 2021 posting "Able Archer War Scare 'Potentially Disastrous'," February 17, 2021. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/able-archer-83/2025-11-14/censored-history-able-archer-83 and https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/aa83/2021-02-17/able-archer-war-scare-potentially-disastrous
|
||||
[^35]: National Security Archive, "The Censored History of Able Archer 83," November 14, 2025, reporting the Washington Post's account and the State Department official's statements. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/able-archer-83/2025-11-14/censored-history-able-archer-83
|
||||
[^36]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 2, "The Contras, Cocaine, and U.S. Covert Operations." https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/index.html
|
||||
[^37]: Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980) (statement of facts on the October 29, 1976 removal of the telephone notes to the Rockefeller estate). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/445/136
|
||||
[^38]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, "The Kissinger Telcons," posted May 26, 2004. Document list includes the correspondence with Archivist John W. Carlin of January 15 and 21, 1999, the complaint presented January 25, 2001, the attorneys' letter of April 25, 2001, and State Department press release "Former Secretary of State Kissinger Provides Department with Documents," August 8, 2001. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/index.htm
|
||||
[^39]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, "The CIA's Family Jewels," posted June 21, 2007, updated June 26, 2007. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^40]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, signed by L. L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, with its enclosure, as posted by the National Security Archive in 2001. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
|
||||
[^41]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 118, "Brazil Marks 40th Anniversary of Military Coup," edited by Peter Kornbluh, 2004, and Electronic Briefing Book No. 465, "Brazil Marks 50th Anniversary of Military Coup," edited by James G. Hershberg and Peter Kornbluh, posted April 2, 2014. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/ and https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB465/
|
||||
[^42]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 118, introduction and planning documents on the 1964 coup. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/
|
||||
[^43]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 8, "Chile and the United States: Declassified Documents Relating to the Military Coup, September 11, 1973," by Peter Kornbluh. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/nsaebb8.htm
|
||||
[^44]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 33, "New Information on the Murders of U.S. Citizens Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi by the Chilean Military," published June 30, 2000, with the editor's note cross-referencing "CHILE IN THEIR HEARTS, published May 7, 2025." https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB33/index.html
|
||||
[^45]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Dictatorship Declassified: Confessions of a DINA Hit Man," November 22, 2023, Kornbluh, ed. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man
|
||||
[^46]: National Security Archive, "The Pinochet Regime at 50: The Assassination of General Carlos Prats and Sofía Cuthbert," October 1, 2024. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2024-10-01/pinochet-regime-50-assassination-general-carlos-prats-and-sofia
|
||||
[^47]: National Security Archive, "Chile in Their Hearts," May 7, 2025. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2025-05-07/chile-their-hearts
|
||||
[^48]: National Security Archive, "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975," Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, February 29, 2016, edited by John Prados and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
|
||||
[^49]: National Security Archive, "The Top Secret Testimony of CIA's MKULTRA Chief, 50 Years Later," October 30, 2025. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/dnsa-intelligence/2025-10-30/top-secret-testimony-cias-mkultra-chief-50-years-later
|
||||
[^50]: National Security Archive, "Jonathan Pollard: Revisiting a Still Sensitive Case," Electronic Briefing Book No. 407, edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson, posted December 14, 2012. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2012-12-14/jonathan-pollard-spy-case-cias-1987-damage-assessment-declassified and https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB407/
|
||||
[^51]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 434, "The Secret History of the U-2 and Area 51," edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson, posted August 15, 2013. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB434/
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Stay-Behind Networks
|
||||
- NATO Stay-Behind
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Program
|
||||
- NATO
|
||||
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ summary: "Operation Gladio was the Italian branch of the NATO stay-behind networ
|
|||
start: 1956-01-01
|
||||
end: 1990-11-27
|
||||
location: "Rome, Italy (primary); Brussels, Belgium (NATO coordination)"
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[NATO]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
start: 1956-11-26
|
||||
role: "stay-behind agreement between the Italian and American services, with the NATO-level Clandestine Planning Committee and Allied Clandestine Committee"
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Operation Gladio was the cryptonym for the [[Italy|Italian]] branch of a covert network of NATO-sponsored "stay-behind" armies established across Western Europe beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the [[Cold War]]. The network was organized under the auspices of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and British intelligence to provide a resistance and sabotage infrastructure that would operate behind enemy lines in the event of a Soviet invasion or communist takeover. In Italy, the stay-behind network was linked by parliamentary investigators to the "strategy of tension" - a series of right-wing terrorist bombings from 1969 to 1984 blamed on left-wing groups that were intended to create political conditions justifying authoritarian government.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -34,7 +41,9 @@ The concept of stay-behind networks developed from British wartime planning for
|
|||
|
||||
The Italian network was formally named "Gladio" after the Roman short sword. It operated under the nominal supervision of SIFAR (the Italian military intelligence service, predecessor to SISMI) and maintained a parallel existence through Italy's successive government changes. Arms caches were hidden throughout Italy; members received training in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and stay-behind operations; and a command structure linked to NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) in Naples coordinated the network with analogous organizations in other NATO member states.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
The stay-behind infrastructure extended across at least 16 NATO and affiliated countries under coordinating bodies at NATO headquarters. Each national network had a local name - Gladio in Italy, SDRA8 in Belgium, P-26 in Switzerland, and analogous names in other countries - and operated with varying degrees of knowledge at the governmental level.[^2]
|
||||
The stay-behind arrangements were extended from France, the Netherlands and Belgium to Denmark, Norway and the German and Austrian territories under Allied control.[^2] Each national network had a local name - Gladio in Italy, [[SDRA8]] in Belgium, P-26 in Switzerland, and analogous names in other countries - and operated with varying degrees of knowledge at the governmental level.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
The Italian commission's 1992 report records that the Italian and American services began work in 1953 and 1954, when land was acquired for the Capo Marargiu base near Alghero in Sardinia and construction began with CIA financing. The name Gladio is first recorded at an October 18, 1956 meeting between SIFAR and the CIA's Bob Porter and John Edwards, and the accord entered into force from November 28, 1956 (the restatement text is dated November 26).[^4] The same report records 622 members at dissolution, 45 of them deceased (408 in cells and 214 in rapid-deployment units, 1958 to 1990), 1,915 names put through recruitment, and 24 members who had belonged to the Fascist party, the Italian Social Republic or the Decima MAS.[^4]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Strategy of Tension
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -52,13 +61,13 @@ The [[Bologna railway station bombing]] of August 2, 1980, which killed 85 peopl
|
|||
|
||||
### Licio Gelli and Propaganda Due
|
||||
|
||||
The strategy of tension investigations repeatedly intersected with the [[Propaganda Due|P2]] Masonic lodge headed by [[Licio Gelli]]. P2's membership list, discovered in March 1981 when Gelli's villa was searched, included senior officers from all branches of the Italian military and intelligence services, politicians from multiple parties, magistrates, financiers, and media figures. The overlap between P2 membership and Gladio-connected networks led investigators to conclude that the lodge served as a coordinating mechanism across the Italian security establishment that allowed the strategy of tension to continue without exposure.[^3]
|
||||
The strategy of tension investigations repeatedly intersected with the [[Propaganda Due|P2]] Masonic lodge headed by [[Licio Gelli]]. P2's membership list, discovered in March 1981 when Gelli's villa was searched, included senior officers from all branches of the Italian military and intelligence services, politicians from multiple parties, magistrates, financiers, and media figures. The overlap between P2 membership and Gladio-connected networks led investigators to conclude that the lodge served as a coordinating mechanism across the Italian security establishment that allowed the strategy of tension to continue without exposure.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The 1990 Disclosure
|
||||
|
||||
Italian Prime Minister [[Giulio Andreotti]] first acknowledged the structure to the parliamentary commission on terrorism and massacres (the Stragi commission) on August 3, 1990, saying that according to the services its NATO-model activities had continued "until 1972". On October 18, 1990 he sent the commission a document, "Il cosiddetto SID parallelo, il caso Gladio", which showed the structure still active in 1990; the commission's 1992 report called the two statements contradictory. The SISMI director [[Fulvio Martini]] had issued a circular on August 8, 1990 redirecting Gladio toward the fight against drugs. On October 24, 1990 Andreotti addressed the Chamber of Deputies, describing a NATO-framework "safeguard network, both informational and of reaction", and said that after a letter from magistrate [[Felice Casson]] to the commission's chairman he had held back the document and sent a revised text within 24 hours. Casson had obtained documents establishing the Gladio network's existence and connection to the Peteano bombing while investigating that case. Andreotti decreed Gladio's dissolution on November 27, 1990.[^4][^5]
|
||||
Italian Prime Minister [[Giulio Andreotti]] first acknowledged the structure to the parliamentary commission on terrorism and massacres (the Stragi commission) on August 3, 1990, saying that according to the services its NATO-model activities had continued "until 1972". On October 18, 1990 he sent the commission a document, "Il cosiddetto SID parallelo, il caso Gladio", which showed the structure still active in 1990; the commission's 1992 report called the two statements contradictory. The SISMI director [[Fulvio Martini]] had issued a circular on August 8, 1990 redirecting Gladio toward the fight against drugs. On October 24, 1990 Andreotti addressed the Chamber of Deputies, describing a NATO-framework "safeguard network, both informational and of reaction", and said that after a letter from magistrate [[Felice Casson]] to the commission's chairman he had held back the document and sent a revised text within 24 hours. Casson had obtained documents establishing the Gladio network's existence and connection to the Peteano bombing while investigating that case. Andreotti decreed Gladio's dissolution on November 27, 1990.[^6][^7]
|
||||
|
||||
Andreotti's disclosure triggered immediate political controversy in Italy and across Europe, where governments faced questions about whether analogous networks existed in their own countries. The [[European Parliament]] passed a resolution on November 22, 1990 condemning the stay-behind networks as a threat to democratic governance and calling on member states to investigate and disclose their networks' activities.[^2]
|
||||
Andreotti's disclosure triggered immediate political controversy in Italy and across Europe, where governments faced questions about whether analogous networks existed in their own countries. The [[European Parliament]] adopted a joint resolution on the Gladio affair on November 22, 1990, replacing five motions. It condemned "the clandestine creation of manipulative and operational networks," called for "a full investigation into the nature, structure, aims and all other aspects of these clandestine organizations," protested "vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE and in NATO of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network," and called on the governments of the member states "to dismantle all clandestine military and paramilitary networks."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### Italian Parliamentary Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -66,12 +75,17 @@ The Italian Senate's Commission on the Massacres (Commissione parlamentare d'inc
|
|||
|
||||
### Belgian Dimension
|
||||
|
||||
In [[Belgium]], the stay-behind network SDRA8 was investigated in connection with the [[Brabant Massacres]] - a series of supermarket robberies and mass killings in 1982-1985 that killed 28 people and have never been officially solved. Investigators established links between SDRA8-connected figures and the gang suspected of the massacres, raising questions about whether the Belgian network's activities paralleled Italy's strategy of tension. The Belgian investigation remained unresolved; no prosecutions were brought for the massacres, and the statute of limitations on the killings expired in 2015.[^2]
|
||||
In [[Belgium]], the stay-behind network SDRA8 was investigated in connection with the [[Brabant Massacres]] - a series of supermarket robberies and mass killings in 1982-1985 that killed 28 people and have never been officially solved. [[Daniele Ganser]] wrote that investigators linked the SDRA8 network to the Brabant killings.[^1] The Belgian Senate inquiry, reporting on October 1, 1991, found that no direct link could be established between SDRA VIII and the STC/Mob branch of the Sûreté on one side and the persons and organizations investigated in 1980 and 1988 on the other, and that no known instructor or recruiter of either unit was involved in the judicial investigation into the Brabant killings. The same report records that the chiefs of SDRA VIII and STC/Mob did not give the magistrates the identities of their agents, and that personnel of the Sûreté, the military service, the gendarmerie and a court-appointed expert had sustained contacts with Major Bougerol.[^9] The Belgian investigation remained unresolved; no one has been convicted, and the limitation period due to expire in 2015 was extended by ten years.[^10] Ganser dates the massacres 1983 to 1985; the Leiden account dates the series from early 1982 to the Aalst supermarket attack of November 1985.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe.* Frank Cass, 2005. This is the primary comprehensive scholarly account based on official documents and parliamentary investigations. Italian Senate Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia. Final Reports, 2000-2001.
|
||||
[^2]: European Parliament. Resolution on the Gladio Affair, November 22, 1990. Colby, William, and Peter Forbath. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1978 (background on CIA stay-behind organization methodology).
|
||||
[^3]: Willan, Philip. *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy.* Constable, 1991. Flamini, Gianni. *Il Partito del Golpe.* Bovolenta, 1982-1985 (Italian documentary account of P2/Gladio intersection).
|
||||
[^4]: Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi, *Relazione sull'inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all'operazione Gladio*, Doc. XXIII n. 51, approved April 14-15, 1992, pp. 12-13, 29-30. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: Camera dei deputati, X Legislatura, *Discussioni*, seduta del 24 ottobre 1990 (no. 537), *Resoconto stenografico*, pp. 71561-71562. Translated from the Italian. https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0537/sed0537.pdf
|
||||
[^2]: Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi, *Relazione sull'inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all'operazione Gladio*, Doc. XXIII n. 51, approved April 1992, chapter on the origins of the stay-behind networks. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Colby, William, and Peter Forbath. *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1978 (background on CIA stay-behind organization methodology).
|
||||
[^4]: Same report, chapters "La storia di Gladio" and on the organization of Gladio (note 9). Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: Willan, Philip. *Puppetmasters: The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy.* Constable, 1991. Flamini, Gianni. *Il Partito del Golpe.* Bovolenta, 1982-1985 (Italian documentary account of P2/Gladio intersection).
|
||||
[^6]: Commissione parlamentare d'inchiesta sul terrorismo in Italia e sulle cause della mancata individuazione dei responsabili delle stragi, *Relazione sull'inchiesta condotta sulle vicende connesse all'operazione Gladio*, Doc. XXIII n. 51, approved April 14-15, 1992, pp. 12-13, 29-30. Translated from the Italian. https://www.parlamento.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/BGT/909971.pdf
|
||||
[^7]: Camera dei deputati, X Legislatura, *Discussioni*, seduta del 24 ottobre 1990 (no. 537), *Resoconto stenografico*, pp. 71561-71562. Translated from the Italian. https://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg10/lavori/stenografici/sed0537/sed0537.pdf
|
||||
[^8]: European Parliament, Resolution on the Gladio affair, November 22, 1990, Official Journal of the European Communities C 324, December 24, 1990, p. 201 (CELEX 51990IP2021); English text as reproduced at https://www.voltairenet.org/article219618.html
|
||||
[^9]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), "Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international," rapport Erdman et Hasquin, October 1, 1991, section on the Brabant investigations. The French text reads "aucun lien direct n'a pu être établi" and "aucun instructeur ou recruteur connu du S.T.C./Mob. ou du S.D.R.A. VIII n'est impliqué." https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^10]: Joery Matthys, "Ghosts from a (terrorist?) past: the Brabant Killers in Belgium," Leiden Security and Global Affairs Blog, November 13, 2017. https://www.leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/ghosts-from-a-terrorist-past-the-brabant-killers-in-belgium . Daniele Ganser, "Terrorism in Western Europe: An Approach to NATO's Secret Stay-Behind Armies," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2005, pp. 84-85. https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1122&context=diplo_ir
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-16
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
title: Bay of Pigs Invasion
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Bay of Pigs
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ The original air plan called for over 40 sorties before the invasion. Kennedy ap
|
|||
|
||||
The cover story required that the attacking aircraft appear to be defecting Cuban air force pilots. Exile pilot Mario Zuñiga was presented to the media as a Cuban defector who had participated in the attack. The story collapsed within hours: journalists noticed the B-26 had a solid metal nose cone with gun mounts, while Castro's B-26s used plastic nose cones with wing-mounted guns, and the guns were sealed with masking tape.
|
||||
|
||||
[[Adlai Stevenson]], the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, had been deliberately kept uninformed and had brandished CIA-provided photographs at the UN General Assembly insisting the raids were carried out by defecting Cuban pilots. When the Soviet ambassador exposed the deception, Stevenson was furious and pressed Washington to stop the operation. His exposure as an unwitting instrument of a collapsed cover story became a significant factor in the decision to cancel the D-Day follow-up strikes.[^1]
|
||||
[[Adlai Stevenson]], the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, had been deliberately kept uninformed and had brandished CIA-provided photographs at the UN General Assembly insisting the raids were carried out by defecting Cuban pilots. When the Soviet ambassador exposed the deception, Stevenson was furious and pressed Washington to stop the operation. His exposure as an unwitting instrument of a collapsed cover story became a significant factor in the decision to cancel the D-Day follow-up strikes.[^1] On April 15, 1961 Stevenson told the General Assembly's First Committee that according to his information the raids had been carried out by defectors from the Cuban Air Force who had landed in Florida and asked for political asylum.[^2] On April 16 he cabled the Department of State, for Secretary of State Dean Rusk and [[Allen Dulles]], that he was "greatly disturbed by clear indications" that the bombing incidents "were launched in part at least from outside Cuba," that his answers to Cuban Foreign Minister [[Raúl Roa]] "were hastily concocted in Department, and revised by me at last minute on assumption this was clear case of attacks by defectors inside Cuba," and that he did not understand why he had not been "warned and provided pre-prepared material."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### The D-Day Air Strike Cancellation
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Four American volunteers flying B-26 combat missions were killed on April 19: Ma
|
|||
|
||||
The invasion was compromised through multiple simultaneous channels. Cuban G2 had penetrated Brigade 2506 training camps in Guatemala with double agents who filed detailed intelligence reports from at least January 1961. The scale of the Camp Trax operation could not be concealed from local populations or regional intelligence services.
|
||||
|
||||
The Miami exile community was equally porous. Plans were "common knowledge" among Cuban exiles and Havana's intelligence had ready access to refugee networks in [[Miami]]. On January 10, 1961, the New York Times published an account of exile training in Guatemala. On April 7, 1961, reporter Tad Szulc filed a story - toned down at Kennedy's personal request - reporting U.S. experts were training an exile invasion force. Kennedy's private reaction: "I can't believe what I'm reading! Castro doesn't need agents over here. All he has to do is read our papers!"[^2]
|
||||
The Miami exile community was equally porous. Plans were "common knowledge" among Cuban exiles and Havana's intelligence had ready access to refugee networks in [[Miami]]. On January 10, 1961, the New York Times published an account of exile training in Guatemala. On April 7, 1961, reporter Tad Szulc filed a story - toned down at Kennedy's personal request - reporting U.S. experts were training an exile invasion force. Kennedy's private reaction: "I can't believe what I'm reading! Castro doesn't need agents over here. All he has to do is read our papers!"[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Kirkpatrick IG Report and Its Suppression
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick completed "The Inspector General's Surve
|
|||
|
||||
Among the report's documented findings: the operation received the CIA's "lowest-ranked case officers"; staffing was insufficient at all levels; Spanish-language deficiencies plagued the training program; the CIA treated Cuban exile leaders as "puppets" rather than building genuine partnership; and the agency had "conducted an overt military operation beyond Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability."
|
||||
|
||||
Kirkpatrick distributed copies to [[Allen Dulles]], McCone, the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]], and [[Robert Kennedy]] - circumventing normal IG channels and causing what witnesses described as an "extremely stormy session" between Dulles and Kirkpatrick. McCone ordered all but one of approximately 20 copies destroyed; the surviving copy remained locked in the DCI's safe.
|
||||
Kirkpatrick distributed copies to Allen Dulles, McCone, the [[President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]], and [[Robert Kennedy]] - circumventing normal IG channels and causing what witnesses described as an "extremely stormy session" between Dulles and Kirkpatrick. McCone ordered all but one of approximately 20 copies destroyed; the surviving copy remained locked in the DCI's safe.
|
||||
|
||||
[[Tracy Barnes]], Bissell's deputy and the operation's Washington coordinator, authored a formal response characterizing the report as "an incompetent job," "biased," and "malicious." Bissell argued that political deniability requirements and senior policy makers bore primary responsibility. McCone bound both documents together as a paired submission to the PFIAB.
|
||||
|
||||
CIA historian Jack Pfeiffer's five-volume internal history (written 1979-1984) sided against Kirkpatrick across all five volumes, alleging he was motivated by desire for Bissell's position. CIA Chief Historian David Robarge, authorizing the 2016 public release of Pfeiffer's Vol. V, acknowledged Pfeiffer's draft suffered from "serious shortcomings in scholarship" and a "polemical tone."
|
||||
|
||||
The Kirkpatrick report remained classified for 36 years, declassified on February 22, 1998, following a two-year FOIA effort by the [[National Security Archive]]. It was published in full as Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New Press, 1998).[^2]
|
||||
The Kirkpatrick report remained classified for 36 years, declassified on February 22, 1998, following a two-year FOIA effort by the [[National Security Archive]]. It was published in full as Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (New Press, 1998).[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Taylor Commission
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -105,16 +105,18 @@ Of approximately 1,400 Brigade members: 114 were killed in battle; approximately
|
|||
|
||||
Robert Kennedy secretly recruited [[New York]] attorney James B. Donovan - who had negotiated the [[Rudolf Abel]] spy exchange - to reopen prisoner talks in June 1962. Donovan worked pro bono. Negotiations were disrupted by the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] in October 1962 but resumed. On December 21, 1962, Donovan and Castro signed an agreement: 1,113 surviving prisoners were exchanged for $53 million in food, medicines, and other humanitarian supplies, raised through private donations from pharmaceutical companies and other sources.
|
||||
|
||||
Kennedy welcomed the released prisoners at the Orange Bowl in Miami on December 29, 1962. Brigade 2506 presented Kennedy with their battle flag; Kennedy stated he would return it "to a free Havana." He never did.[^2]
|
||||
Kennedy welcomed the released prisoners at the Orange Bowl in Miami on December 29, 1962. Brigade 2506 presented Kennedy with their battle flag; Kennedy stated he would return it "to a free Havana." He never did.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Veterans and Later Operations
|
||||
|
||||
Brigade 2506 veterans became the CIA's organizational core for subsequent Cuba operations and reappeared across later covert programs. [[Felix Rodriguez]], a veteran who had participated in the capture of [[Che Guevara]] in Bolivia, managed the Contra resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] in the 1980s under the alias "Max Gomez." [[Howard Hunt]], the Bay of Pigs political officer responsible for the [[Cuban Revolutionary Council]] exile leadership, recruited Bay of Pigs veterans for the Watergate burglary team. Three of the Watergate burglars - [[Bernard Barker]], Eugenio Martinez, and [[Frank Sturgis]] - were Bay of Pigs veterans with continuing CIA relationships. Hunt's Bay of Pigs role, and the CIA's desire to contain investigation into it, was a recurring element of the Watergate cover-up narrative.[^3]
|
||||
Brigade 2506 veterans became the CIA's organizational core for subsequent Cuba operations and reappeared across later covert programs. [[Felix Rodriguez]], a veteran who had participated in the capture of [[Che Guevara]] in Bolivia, managed the Contra resupply operation at [[Ilopango Airbase]] in [[El Salvador]] in the 1980s under the alias "Max Gomez." [[Howard Hunt]], the Bay of Pigs political officer responsible for the [[Cuban Revolutionary Council]] exile leadership, recruited Bay of Pigs veterans for the Watergate burglary team. Three of the Watergate burglars - [[Bernard Barker]], Eugenio Martinez, and [[Frank Sturgis]] - were Bay of Pigs veterans with continuing CIA relationships. Hunt's Bay of Pigs role, and the CIA's desire to contain investigation into it, was a recurring element of the Watergate cover-up narrative.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: CIA Inspector General. "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation." October 1961; declassified February 22, 1998. Published in Kornbluh, Peter, ed. *Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba.* New Press, 1998. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X (Cuba, January 1961-September 1962), Documents 108, 169, 198. U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10.
|
||||
[^2]: Cuba Study Group (Taylor Commission). Final Report. June 13, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 169. CIA Official History, Vols. I-V (Pfeiffer, 1979-1984). National Security Archive, nsarchive.gwu.edu, NSAEBB353 (2011) and NSAEBB564 (2016). Wyden, Peter. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story.* Simon & Schuster, 1979.
|
||||
[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.
|
||||
[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 104, editorial note on the meeting of the Political (First) Committee of April 15, 1961 (U.N. doc. A/C.1/SR.1149). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d104
|
||||
[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963,* Volume X, Document 105, Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, April 16, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d105
|
||||
[^4]: Cuba Study Group, Memorandum No. 1, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," June 13, 1961, paragraph 43, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume X, Cuba, January 1961-September 1962, Document 231. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d231
|
||||
[^5]: Memorandum from General C.P. Cabell to the Cuba Study Group, May 9, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, Volume X, Document 108. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d108
|
||||
[^6]: Cuba Study Group (Taylor Commission). Final Report. June 13, 1961. FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 169. CIA Official History, Vols. I-V (Pfeiffer, 1979-1984). National Security Archive, nsarchive.gwu.edu, NSAEBB353 (2011) and NSAEBB564 (2016). Wyden, Peter. *Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story.* Simon & Schuster, 1979.
|
||||
[^7]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Hougan, Jim. *Secret Agenda: Watergate, Deep Throat, and the CIA.* Random House, 1984.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
end: 1946-02-27
|
||||
role: "the woman who arrived on January 19, 1946 and was taken by Parsons as his 'elemental' and magical partner; married Parsons October 19, 1946"
|
||||
fn: 5
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The Babalon Working was a series of rituals carried out by [[Jack Parsons]] and [[L. Ron Hubbard]] at 1003 South Orange Grove Avenue in [[Pasadena]], California, in the first quarter of 1946. Parsons headed the [[Agape Lodge]] of the [[Ordo Templi Orientis]] under the authority of [[Aleister Crowley]]; Hubbard, a Naval Reserve lieutenant who had moved into the house, acted as scribe and seer.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ Bogdan names the partnership Allied Enterprises, formed in January 1946 to buy y
|
|||
|
||||
[[The Sunday Times]] of London published on October 5, 1969 an account by [[Alexander Mitchell]] headed "The Odd Beginning of Ron Hubbard's Career," based on papers owned by "a former admirer of Crowley," whom the article describes as an expert on Crowley's magic. It says that from January 4 to 15, 1946 Parsons and Hubbard held a nightly ritual, "faithfully described in Parsons' diary," played a Prokofiev violin concerto and later Rachmaninoff's Isle of the Dead, and that Hubbard served as high priest in a series of ceremonies in which Parsons and the girl shared sex. It quotes the Parsons record: "The Scribe (Hubbard) said ... She is the flame of life, power of darkness, she destroys with a glance, she may take thy soul." The owner of the papers is quoted as saying that Parsons "was completely under Hubbard's domination." A clipping of the article is in the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]]'s [[Scientology|Church of Scientology]] file (see the page on Hubbard).[^17] The Church of Scientology, which according to Bogdan paid a settlement to the newspaper, made a statement, printed in the issue of December 28, 1969, saying that the Ordo Templi Orientis practiced "savage and bestial rites" and that Hubbard had been "sent in to handle the situation" at 1003 Orange Grove: "Hubbard's mission was successful far beyond anyone's expectations. The house was torn down. Hubbard rescued a girl they were using. The black magic group was dispersed and destroyed and has never recovered."[^1] Bogdan writes that Hubbard never spoke publicly about Parsons or the Working.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]], preserved in an FBI file, Hubbard wrote that Sara Northrup "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck."[^18] The FBI opened its own file on Parsons in September 1950; the released file does not mention Hubbard.[^19]
|
||||
In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]], preserved in an FBI file, Hubbard wrote that Sara Northrup "had attached herself to a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert, during the war and when she left him he was a wreck."[^18] The copy of the letter in the FBI headquarters file on Hubbard has the name after "attached herself to" blacked out under exemptions b6 and b7C, with "the rocket expert" following, while the copy in the FBI's Church of Scientology file, Part 5, prints it as "a Jack Parsons, the rocket expert."[^18][^19] The same letter continues that Northrup was "strangely intimate with many scientists of Los Alamos" (headquarters file copy).[^19] The FBI opened its own file on Parsons in September 1950; the released file does not mention Hubbard.[^20]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -99,4 +100,5 @@ In a letter of May 1951 to the [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General
|
|||
[^16]: Newspaper account of the complaint of Sara Northrup Hubbard, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1," archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1.
|
||||
[^17]: Mitchell, Alexander, "The Odd Beginning of Ron Hubbard's Career," The Sunday Times (London), October 5, 1969, clipping in FBI file "Church of Scientology/L. Ron Hubbard," Part 6, forwarded by the FBI Washington Field Office in June 1974, archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard.
|
||||
[^18]: Hubbard, L. Ron, letter to the Attorney General, Wichita, Kansas, May 1951, FBI file "Church of Scientology/L. Ron Hubbard," Part 5, archive.org/details/churchofscientologyl.ronhubbard.
|
||||
[^19]: FBI Parsons file 65-59589, Parts 1 and 2, archive.org/details/JohnParsons.
|
||||
[^19]: L. Ron Hubbard, letter to the Attorney General, 1951, in FBI headquarters file "Hubbard, L. Ron HQ-1" (name redacted under b6/b7C). https://archive.org/details/HubbardL.RonHQ1
|
||||
[^20]: FBI Parsons file 65-59589, Parts 1 and 2, archive.org/details/JohnParsons.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
109
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Al-Yamamah.md
Normal file
109
40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Al-Yamamah.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- "Al-Yamamah"
|
||||
- "Al Yamamah"
|
||||
- "Al-Yamamah arms deal"
|
||||
- "Al Yamamah arms deal"
|
||||
- "Al-Yamamah contracts"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Event
|
||||
- ArmsDeal
|
||||
- SaudiArabia
|
||||
- UnitedKingdom
|
||||
- BAESystems
|
||||
- Corruption
|
||||
- AlYamamah
|
||||
- SeriousFraudOffice
|
||||
summary: "Al-Yamamah was the British-Saudi government arms agreement series begun in September 1985 with British Aerospace as prime contractor, the subject of a suppressed 1992 audit and a halted 2004 fraud investigation."
|
||||
start: 1985-09-26
|
||||
location: "London, United Kingdom; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia"
|
||||
created: 2026-10-12
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
relations:
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Margaret Thatcher]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Prime Minister during the 1985 negotiation of the first agreement"
|
||||
start: 1985-04
|
||||
end: 1985-09
|
||||
fn: 3
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Michael Heseltine]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Secretary of State for Defence; signed the 1985 Memorandum of Understanding"
|
||||
start: 1985-09-26
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "Saudi Defence Minister; signed the 1985 Memorandum of Understanding"
|
||||
start: 1985-09-26
|
||||
fn: 1
|
||||
- type: participant_in
|
||||
with: "[[British Aerospace]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "prime contractor"
|
||||
start: 1985
|
||||
fn: 10
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[National Audit Office]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "report on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project, not published"
|
||||
start: 1992
|
||||
fn: 4
|
||||
- type: investigated
|
||||
with: "[[Serious Fraud Office]]"
|
||||
reverse: true
|
||||
role: "investigation into BAE corruption allegations, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah; discontinued December 14, 2006"
|
||||
start: 2004-07-29
|
||||
end: 2006-12-14
|
||||
fn: 8
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Al-Yamamah ("the Dove" in Arabic) was the series of government-to-government arms agreements between the [[United Kingdom]] and [[Saudi Arabia]], with [[British Aerospace]] (later [[BAE Systems]]) as prime contractor. The first agreement was a Memorandum of Understanding signed at Lancaster House on September 26, 1985 by the Secretary of State for Defence, [[Michael Heseltine]], and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]]. It covered 72 Tornado aircraft and 30 Hawk trainers, among other equipment. Two further, more detailed agreements followed in 1986 and 1988, and the programme was extended in 1993 by an order for 48 more Tornados.[^1][^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Riyadh visit of April 1985
|
||||
|
||||
Foreign Office files released to the [[National Archives]] and reported in 2016 record that [[Margaret Thatcher]] stopped in [[Riyadh]] in April 1985 on her way back from South Asia and met King [[Fahd]]. Heseltine approved the stop-over on the basis that it would allow her to complete the sale, and Prince [[Bandar bin Sultan]], then Saudi ambassador to the United States, invited her. A briefing document stated that it "seems unlikely that Prince Bandar would seek to engineer such a meeting unless something positive was likely to come out of it." The official record of the meeting was billed as one about regional developments and does not mention the aircraft. After the visit Thatcher wrote to Fahd: "I was glad that we were able to discuss a further matter privately over lunch. I look forward to receiving your majesty's personal envoy soon, in order that we may conclude this matter successfully."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### The released papers of 2006
|
||||
|
||||
The Guardian published in October 2006 documents that had been released to the National Archives in May of that year and were withdrawn by the Ministry of Defence after the paper approached it. One was a January 1986 telegram from [[Colin Chandler]], head of the Ministry's arms sales unit, who was in Riyadh with BAE executives. The Guardian reported from it that the price of each Tornado had been raised by 32 percent, from £16.3 million to £21.5 million, and that the total was to reach £5 billion against the £3.5 billion to £4 billion stated in the Memorandum. The same release contained a Ministry of Defence briefing prepared for Thatcher that described Prince Sultan as "not highly intelligent," and Foreign Office correspondence of 1985 sending Thatcher's chief aide at Number 10, [[Charles Powell]], a copy of an Arab magazine that alleged £600 million in secret commissions, with advice that officials "should simply refuse all comment."[^1] Lord Gilmour, who had been a minister under Thatcher, told BBC2's Newsnight, as the Guardian quoted him: "You either got the business and bribed, or you didn't bribe and didn't get the business."[^1] The Guardian also wrote that all those involved had always denied the allegations of secret commissions.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### The National Audit Office report of 1992
|
||||
|
||||
In 1992 the [[National Audit Office]] reported on the Saudi Arabian Airforce Project. Its examination of project receipts and payments passing through the Ministry of Defence "found no evidence of commission payments being made to third parties." On February 27, 1992, in a private session of the [[Public Accounts Committee]], whose chairman was [[Robert Sheldon]], the Ministry's permanent secretary, Sir [[Michael Quinlan]], said: "The whole project operates under a seal of confidentiality. There is a very great sensitivity about the project on the part of the Saudi Arabian Government. Open Government is alien to them." Asked for an assurance that no public funds had gone the wrong way, Quinlan answered: "Yes, I can give you the assurance that there is no basis to support any suggestion that commission payments have been made using public funds."[^4] The report was not published. The Guardian reported in March 2024, after finding the papers in Sheldon's archive at the [[London School of Economics]], that only ten copies were printed and that only Sheldon and his deputy read it. The Guardian also reported that a Ministry memorandum disclosed at a later criminal trial showed that in 1988 the Ministry's head of arms sales had helped set up regular quarterly payments to Prince Bandar from Al-Yamamah funds, which BAE made on the Ministry's instruction. BAE said all payments were made with the express approval of the United Kingdom government, and the Ministry said the funds remained the property of the Saudi government.[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Commons speech of January 1996
|
||||
|
||||
On January 24, 1996, in a Commons adjournment debate on Saudi Arabia, [[George Galloway]] told the House that the contract "was landed by British Aerospace as a result of corruption on an unprecedented scale," and that "enormous bribes and commissions of up to 30 per cent. of the multi-billion pound deal were paid," shared between the Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, his family, and the sons of King Fahd, "notably Prince Mohammed." He said a "whole gang of middlemen" in London made millions of pounds in pay-offs, among them [[Wafic Said]], whom he described as a business partner of [[Jonathan Aitken]], and [[Mark Thatcher]], "the son of the then Prime Minister, who gave 10 Downing street as his address at the time, but who was later given his own house and other lavish benefits by Wafic Said and who has become mysteriously and inordinately rich." He said that some of the secret commissions had been handled by British Aerospace through a British businessman, [[Douglas Leese]], and that the National Audit Office report of Sir [[John Bourn]] had been "suppressed by the Select Committee on Public Accounts for more than three years." He also described Colonel Thomas Dooley, an executive of [[Sikorsky]], as testifying in a United States court that Prince Bandar told him what bribes must be paid in a "competition for bribes" over Black Hawk helicopters.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
The writer [[Paul Foot]] wrote in 1998 that it had become "common knowledge" that Mark Thatcher enriched himself by £12 million from the Al-Yamamah deals, that Thatcher himself never denied it or sued anyone for mentioning it, and that no one, including the authors of a book on the subject, could produce a single hard fact to prove it.[^7]
|
||||
|
||||
### The Serious Fraud Office investigation, 2004 to 2006
|
||||
|
||||
The [[Serious Fraud Office]] launched an investigation into allegations of corruption against BAE on July 29, 2004, one aspect of which concerned Al-Yamamah. By autumn 2006 it intended to examine Swiss bank accounts, and the judgment of the House of Lords records that the Saudi authorities responded with an explicit threat to withdraw from bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, to withdraw cooperation on the United Kingdom's strategic objectives in the Middle East and to end negotiations then in progress for the purchase of Typhoon aircraft. The ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Sir [[Sherard Cowper-Coles]], told the Director that "British lives on British streets were at risk." The Prime Minister, [[Tony Blair]], sent the Attorney General a personal minute on December 8, 2006.[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
On December 14, 2006, the Attorney General, [[Lord Goldsmith]], told the Lords that the Director of the Serious Fraud Office had decided to discontinue the investigation "following representations that have been made both to the Attorney General and the Director concerning the need to safeguard national and international security." He said he had obtained "the views of the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defence Secretaries," who had expressed "the clear view that continuation of the investigation would cause serious damage to UK/Saudi security, intelligence and diplomatic co-operation."[^9]
|
||||
|
||||
### Judicial review
|
||||
|
||||
[[The Corner House]] and Campaign Against Arms Trade challenged the decision. The Divisional Court quashed it on the ground that the Director had yielded to a threat. On July 30, 2008, the House of Lords allowed the Director's appeal in [[R (Corner House Research) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office]], holding the decision lawful. [[Lord Bingham]] wrote that what determined the decision was "the Director's judgment that the public interest in saving British lives outweighed the public interest in pursuing BAE to conviction."[^8]
|
||||
|
||||
### BAE Systems plea of 2010
|
||||
|
||||
On March 1, 2010, BAE Systems pleaded guilty in the [[United States District Court for the District of Columbia]] to conspiring to defraud the United States by making false statements about its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance program and to violating the Arms Export Control Act, and was fined $400 million by Judge John D. Bates. The Department of Justice stated that BAE took the role of prime contractor to the United Kingdom government in the mid-1980s after the formal understanding with Saudi Arabia, that its "support services" resulted in substantial benefits to a foreign public official of Saudi Arabia who was in a position of influence over sales of fighter jets, and that BAE undertook no adequate review or verification of more than $5 million in invoices submitted by one employee from May 2001 to early 2002.[^10]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Leigh, David, and Rob Evans, "The secret Whitehall telegram that reveals truth behind controversial Saudi arms deal," *The Guardian,* October 27, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/oct/28/bae.whitehall
|
||||
[^2]: Lewis, Mike, and Katherine Templar. *UK Personnel Supporting the Saudi Armed Forces: Risk, Knowledge and Accountability.* 2018, citing the Memorandum of Understanding for the Provision of Equipment and Services for the Royal Saudi Air Force, September 26, 1985, and UK National Archives file FCO 8/6055. https://www.mikelewisresearch.com/RSAFfinal.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: "Thatcher held secret Saudi talks to win huge arms deal, archives show," *Middle East Eye,* August 25, 2016 (reporting on Foreign Office files released to the National Archives). https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/thatcher-held-secret-saudi-talks-win-huge-arms-deal-archives-show
|
||||
[^4]: Ministry of Defence Appropriation Accounts 1990-91, Class I, Vote 2, Defence Procurement: The Saudi Arabian Airforce Project (National Audit Office report, 1992), and summary minutes of the private session of the Committee of Public Accounts, February 27, 1992 (Sir Michael Quinlan, Ministry of Defence), in the papers of Robert Sheldon, London School of Economics, as published by The Guardian. https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/24502904/collected-files-sheldon-papers-reduced.pdf
|
||||
[^5]: "Suppressed report on UK-Saudi arms deal discovered in archive," *The Guardian,* March 24, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/mar/24/al-yamamah-arms-deal-report-discovery-anti-corruption-mod-nao-britain-saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^6]: Galloway, George, speech on Saudi Arabia, House of Commons, January 24, 1996, HC Deb vol. 270, cols. 453-62. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/jan/24/saudi-arabia
|
||||
[^7]: Foot, Paul, "Prince and Pimp," *London Review of Books,* vol. 20, no. 1, January 1, 1998. https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v20/n01/paul-foot/prince-and-pimp
|
||||
[^8]: *R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office* [2008] UKHL 60 (House of Lords, July 30, 2008), on appeal from [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/60.html
|
||||
[^9]: Goldsmith, Lord (Attorney General), statement "BAE Systems: Al Yamamah Contract," House of Lords, December 14, 2006, HL Deb cols. 1711-8. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/61214-0014.htm
|
||||
[^10]: U.S. Department of Justice, "BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine," press release, March 1, 2010 (*United States v. BAE Systems plc,* D.D.C., Crim. No. 10-035, Judge John D. Bates). https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine
|
||||
|
|
@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
|
|||
- Family Jewels
|
||||
- Potential Flap Activities
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-09
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
category: "Intelligence Scandal"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Event
|
||||
|
|
@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ Schlesinger transmitted the document to his successor as DCI, [[William Colby]],
|
|||
|
||||
Colby's disclosure of the Family Jewels to the Church Committee in 1975 was part of what CIA traditionalists called the "Halloween Massacre" - the moment when Colby's approach to congressional oversight became apparent to the full intelligence community. President Ford fired Colby as DCI in November 1975 (and also fired Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, in the same announcement), though Colby continued serving through the transition to his successor George H.W. Bush.
|
||||
|
||||
The Family Jewels was partially declassified and released by the CIA under then-DCI [[Michael Hayden]] on June 26, 2007, following a FOIA lawsuit by the [[National Security Archive]]. The released version remains redacted in substantial portions. The unredacted document can be accessed through the CIA's FOIA Reading Room: cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels.[^1]
|
||||
The Family Jewels was partially declassified and released by the CIA under then-DCI [[Michael Hayden]] on June 26, 2007. The [[National Security Archive]] posted the file on June 21, 2007 after Hayden announced that day that the agency was declassifying it, and wrote that the 702-page collection reached it on June 26, fifteen years after it filed a Freedom of Information Act request; [[Thomas S. Blanton]] called the release "the first voluntary CIA declassification of controversial material since George Tenet in 1998 reneged on the 1990s promises of greater openness at the Agency."[^2] The released version remains redacted in substantial portions. The unredacted document can be accessed through the CIA's FOIA Reading Room: cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Surveillance of Jack Anderson, 1972
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ A separate memorandum in the compilation, signed by [[Ted Shackley]] of the West
|
|||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: CIA FOIA Reading Room, "The Family Jewels," cia.gov/readingroom/collection/family-jewels (released 2007). Church Committee, S. Rept. 94-755, April 26, 1976. Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 316-327.
|
||||
[^2]: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Security, submission of May 16, 1973 for the "Family Jewels" compilation, section "CELOTEX II," CIA Reading Room document 0001451843. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels
|
||||
[^2]: National Security Archive, Electronic Briefing Book No. 222, "The CIA's Family Jewels," posted June 21, 2007, updated June 26, 2007. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB222/index.htm
|
||||
[^3]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels" compilation, memorandum from Richard Helms to Henry Kissinger, September 9, 1972. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels
|
||||
[^4]: Central Intelligence Agency, "Family Jewels" compilation, memorandum on Anderson's column concerning ITT and Howard Hunt, 1973. https://archive.org/details/CIA-Family-Jewels
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wro
|
|||
|
||||
On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]
|
||||
|
||||
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962, Kennedy declined to reappoint Lemnitzer as JCS Chairman when his term expired; Lemnitzer was transferred to command [[NATO]] forces in Europe. The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
|
||||
Bamford wrote that McNamara rejected the proposals and that Kennedy, meeting with Lemnitzer shortly after receiving the document, left no doubt about his reaction.[^1] In July 1962 Kennedy announced Lemnitzer's move to Europe in place of a second term as Chairman; at his news conference of July 23, 1962 he said Norstad's resignation would take effect October 1 and that Lemnitzer "could have retired in October and there would have been a vacancy as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^12] Lemnitzer's term as Chairman ended on September 30, 1962, and he became Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command on November 1, 1962 and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of [[NATO]] forces on January 1, 1963.[^13] The Joint Staff history records that Norstad announced his retirement in July 1962 and that his own departure, delayed by the Cuban missile crisis, took place on January 2, 1963.[^14] The direct connection between NORTHWOODS and Lemnitzer's removal was not confirmed at the time but became a subject of historical interpretation after declassification.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Declassification and Significance
|
||||
|
||||
The document remained classified for thirty-five years and was among the records released in 1997 under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, which required declassification of documents relating to the Kennedy assassination regardless of their original security designation. NORTHWOODS was included because it was part of the operational planning environment in which Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs were operating in 1962-1963.
|
||||
|
||||
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^12]
|
||||
James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency*. The NORTHWOODS document became one of the most frequently cited pieces of evidence in discussions of false-flag operations, government deception, and conspiracy theory - used both by legitimate researchers documenting Cold War operational planning and by conspiracy theorists arguing that subsequent events (the [[Gulf of Tonkin Incident|Gulf of Tonkin incident]], 9/11) followed the template NORTHWOODS had proposed.[^15]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -79,4 +79,7 @@ James Bamford brought the document to wide public attention in his 2001 book *Bo
|
|||
[^9]: Guidelines for Operation Mongoose and editorial note quoting U. Alexis Johnson's handwritten covering memorandum of March 16, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 314. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d314
|
||||
[^10]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
|
||||
[^11]: Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McCone on the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. X, Document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
|
||||
[^12]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
|
||||
[^12]: John F. Kennedy, news conference no. 39, July 23, 1962. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-39
|
||||
[^13]: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, biography of General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer, archived copy (Wayback Machine, 2024). https://web.archive.org/web/2024/https://www.jcs.mil/About/The-Joint-Staff/Chairman/General-Lyman-Louis-Lemnitzer
|
||||
[^14]: Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. VIII, chapter on NATO. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V008.pdf
|
||||
[^15]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.* Doubleday, 2007.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- ArmsToIraq
|
||||
- Intelligence
|
||||
- ParliamentaryDeception
|
||||
summary: "The Scott Inquiry (formally the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions) was a British judicial inquiry conducted 1992-1996 by Lord Justice Richard Scott, which examined the Thatcher and Major governments' secret relaxation of arms export guidelines to Iraq and the subsequent deception of Parliament; it produced a 1,800-page report finding systematic ministerial concealment and the improper use of public interest immunity certificates to suppress evidence in the Matrix Churchill prosecution."
|
||||
summary: "The Scott Inquiry (1992-1996), led by Lord Justice Richard Scott, examined British arms exports to Iraq and the Matrix Churchill prosecution, and reported on February 15, 1996."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-15
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
start: 1992-11-10
|
||||
end: 1996-02-15
|
||||
location: "United Kingdom"
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The Matrix Churchill prosecution collapsed when the trial judge allowed the supp
|
|||
|
||||
Scott's 1,800-page report, published February 15, 1996, made the following principal findings:
|
||||
|
||||
- The Thatcher government had secretly relaxed the Howe Guidelines on arms exports to Iraq in 1988, following the Iran-Iraq War ceasefire, without public acknowledgment.
|
||||
- The Thatcher government relaxed the Howe Guidelines on arms exports to Iraq after the 1988 ceasefire. In the words [[Ian Lang]] quoted from the report to the Commons, government policy "following the ceasefire in 1988, but not before, ... changed in a way that he believes should have been drawn to the attention of the House."[^3]
|
||||
- Ministers had given "designedly uninformative" (Scott's phrase) answers to Parliamentary questions about the export guidelines, amounting to deliberate misleading of Parliament even if not technically false.
|
||||
- Public Interest Immunity certificates had been improperly used in the Matrix Churchill prosecution - not to protect genuine national security secrets but to protect the government from political embarrassment.
|
||||
- [[MI6]] had been running Paul Henderson as a source for years during the period when his company was being prosecuted; the prosecution of a cooperating intelligence source was characterized as a serious institutional failure.
|
||||
|
|
@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ Scott's 1,800-page report, published February 15, 1996, made the following princ
|
|||
|
||||
Scott specifically declined to conclude that ministers had acted in bad faith, which became the subject of intensive political controversy: the government argued that Scott's findings did not amount to the condemnations they contained, while opposition parties argued the ministerial conduct described was dishonest by any reasonable standard.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Government statement of February 15, 1996
|
||||
|
||||
On February 15, 1996, the President of the Board of Trade, Ian Lang, made a statement to the Commons on the report. He said that "Both Ministers and officials believed at the time that they were applying policy in a way that remained within the existing guidelines and Sir Richard expressly accepts that they were sincere in doing so." He said that the report "demonstrates that that allegation is false and without foundation," referring to the charge that ministers who signed public interest immunity certificates sought to deprive defendants of the means to clear themselves. Lang reported that Scott concluded "that all Ministers who signed PII certificates did so without any impropriety."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Political Impact
|
||||
|
||||
The Scott Report's publication in February 1996 was a major political event. The government attempted to suppress the report's impact by giving ministers access to advance copies while giving opposition politicians only ninety minutes to read the 1,800-page document before the Parliamentary debate. The parliamentary session that followed - in which the government survived a vote of confidence on the Scott findings by a single vote - was one of the closest in post-war British parliamentary history.
|
||||
|
|
@ -49,3 +53,4 @@ The [[Arms-to-Iraq]] affair and Scott Inquiry, taken together, established that
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: Scott, Lord Justice Richard. *Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.* HMSO, February 1996.
|
||||
[^2]: Norton-Taylor, Richard. *Truth is a Difficult Concept: Inside the Scott Inquiry.* Fourth Estate, 1995.
|
||||
[^3]: Lang, Ian, statement on the Scott Report, House of Commons, February 15, 1996, HC Deb vol. 271, cols. 1139-64. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1996/feb/15/scott-report
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ relations:
|
|||
role: "accountability review of CIA performance before the attacks"
|
||||
fn: 25
|
||||
created: 2026-10-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-01
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
The September 11 attacks were four coordinated hijackings of [[United States]] airliners carried out on September 11, 2001, by members of [[al-Qaeda]]. [[American Airlines]] Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the [[World Trade Center]] at 8:46:40, [[United Airlines]] Flight 175 struck the South Tower at 9:03:11, American Airlines Flight 77 struck the [[Pentagon]] at 9:37:46, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03:11. The [[9/11 Commission]] counted 2,973 deaths, which it described as the largest loss of life from a hostile attack on United States soil.[^1]
|
||||
|
|
@ -148,27 +148,27 @@ The 9/11 Commission's report reached the same conclusion and in a note described
|
|||
|
||||
### Able Danger
|
||||
|
||||
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] Attorney [[Mark Zaid]] testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
|
||||
On September 21, 2005 the [[Senate Judiciary Committee]] under Chairman [[Arlen Specter]] held a hearing on Able Danger, a Defense Department counterterrorism data-analysis program. Representative [[Curt Weldon]] testified that Captain Philpott "identified absolutely Mohammed Atta as a part of the Brooklyn cell" in January and February 2000, that an official had been ordered to destroy up to 2.5 terabytes of Able Danger data, and that an FBI employee had arranged three meetings with the FBI Washington Field Office in September 2000 that Defense Department officials cancelled at the last minute.[^42] The hearing took witnesses from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Gary M. Bald), the Defense Department (William Dugan) and industry ([[Erik Kleinsmith]], then of [[Lockheed Martin]]), and a second panel of Attorney [[Mark Zaid]], who told the committee that most of his testimony was hearsay, because it rested on what he had been told by people associated with Able Danger.[^43][^44] Zaid also testified that Able Danger never identified Atta in the United States and that a chart listing Atta under "Brooklyn, New York" prompted concern among Army lawyers about compiling data on United States persons.[^43]
|
||||
|
||||
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^44]
|
||||
A letter from former Commissioner [[Slade Gorton]] entered in the hearing record stated that the notes of Commission staff of a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel [[Anthony Shaffer]] made no mention of Atta, that the White House lawyer present agreed, and that the [[Department of Defense]] had provided all relevant Able Danger documents to the Commission. The letter stated that the Department of Defense said Shaffer worked on the program for a total of 27 days and lost his security clearance in March 2004.[^45]
|
||||
|
||||
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^45]
|
||||
The Department of Defense Inspector General report of September 18, 2006 concluded that Able Danger team members did not identify Atta or any other hijacker before the attacks. It found that the chart witnesses remembered was a May 1999 Orion Scientific chart of 53 terrorists, including a Brooklyn cell, which did not include Atta, that four witnesses who recalled seeing Atta on a chart gave recollections that were not accurate, and that witnesses in a position to know denied that Able Danger members were barred from meeting the FBI.[^46]
|
||||
|
||||
### Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act
|
||||
|
||||
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^46]
|
||||
Families of victims and others sued Saudi Arabia and other defendants in the multidistrict litigation *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, 03-md-1570, in the Southern District of New York before Judge [[George B. Daniels]]. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia first moved to dismiss in 2004 on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 29, 2015, Daniels granted a motion to dismiss on that ground.[^47]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^47] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^48] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^49] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^50]
|
||||
On September 21, 2016, the Senate voted 71 to 27 to table a motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39, a resolution disapproving a proposed sale of M1A1/A2 Abrams tank structures and other defense equipment to Saudi Arabia.[^48] On September 20, 2016, the law firm Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck had written to Saudi Foreign Minister [[Adel al-Jubeir]] accepting an engagement as "policy counsel for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in connection with the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA)," at $100,000 a month "until JASTA becomes law or until March 31, 2017, whichever is later." The firm registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] on September 22, 2016, describing its activity as communicating "with Members of Congress and members of the executive branch regarding" JASTA and its passage into law.[^49] Squire Patton Boggs registered on September 20, 2016 for the Center for Studies and Media Affairs at the Saudi Royal Court, to provide "legal and strategic policy advice and advocacy on foreign policy and related issues," and reported receiving $400,000 from that principal on April 1, 2017.[^50] The FARA bulk registry lists foreign principal registrations for Saudi Arabian principals in September 2016 by Squire Patton Boggs, S.G.R. LLC Government Relations and Lobbying and FGS Global on September 20, Brownstein on September 22, King & Spalding on September 26, and the Podesta Group on September 30.[^51]
|
||||
|
||||
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^51] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^52]
|
||||
On September 28, 2016, the Senate voted 97 to 1 to override the President's veto of S. 2040, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act. [[Harry Reid]] voted no; [[Tim Kaine]] and [[Bernie Sanders]] did not vote.[^52] The act, Public Law 114-222, created an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for physical injury or death in the United States caused by an act of international terrorism and a tortious act of a foreign state or its officials, employees or agents acting within the scope of their office, employment or agency.[^53]
|
||||
|
||||
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^53]
|
||||
The Second Circuit vacated the 2015 decision on request of the parties. In 2018 Daniels held that plaintiffs' allegations of direct liability were insufficient but that vicarious liability was reasonably articulated, and ordered limited jurisdictional discovery on whether Thumairy, Bayoumi and their agents acted at the direction of more senior Saudi officials in assisting Hazmi and Mihdhar. Magistrate Judge [[Sarah Netburn]] supervised the discovery. Saudi Arabia filed its renewed motion on October 6, 2023, and Daniels heard argument on July 31, 2024.[^54]
|
||||
|
||||
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^54]
|
||||
On August 28, 2025, Daniels denied the motion. His decision records that Bayoumi worked for Saudi Arabia's civil aviation agency from 1977 and was sent to San Diego in 1994, paid through Dallah Avco, with the title of senior data processing technician and without performing that work; that plaintiffs contend he was a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that he testified he never was a Saudi intelligence officer; that Thumairy held diplomatic status from 1996 to 2003 and that from 1999 to 2001 a bank account he had opened received significant funds from Prince Abdulaziz, a senior Saudi cabinet member, which Thumairy said were used for charitable donations and mosque expenses; that Thumairy testified he did not recall meeting Hazmi or Mihdhar and never gave instructions to assist them; and that a mosque congregant testified that no one, including Thumairy, told him to help the hijackers. It records that Akram Alzamari told the FBI that the congregant had said Thumairy asked him to look after two "significant" people, and that Alzamari testified in 2020 that the FBI's notes of that statement were erroneous.[^55]
|
||||
|
||||
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^55]
|
||||
The decision records that Bayoumi made at least 93 calls to the Saudi Embassy between January 19 and March 24, 2000, 30 of them to its Islamic Affairs Department; that from March to April 2000 his monthly compensation from Dallah Avco more than doubled, with the personnel form giving "promotion" as the reason; that he filmed a one-hour video of [[Washington, D.C.]] in June 1999 including the Capitol; and that a notepad seized from his home in the [[United Kingdom]] in September 2001 contained a sketch of an airplane with notes on height and distance, which he testified was an equation he had memorized. It records that the hijackers rented a room in Lemon Grove from Abdussattar Shaikh, an FBI informant since 1994 whom the Justice Department Inspector General's report described as given a $100,000 payment in July 2003, and that Shaikh told the FBI he believed Bayoumi was an agent of the Saudi government. It records that after the attacks Saudi Arabia's Foreign Ministry told Thumairy not to return to the United States, that Jarrah wrote on November 9, 2001 that Thumairy was not a suspect and asked that he return to work, that the King and the Foreign Ministry approved his return on November 28, 2001, and that the State Department revoked his visa on March 21, 2003.[^56]
|
||||
|
||||
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^56]
|
||||
The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the roles played by Bayoumi, Thumairy, and KSA," that Saudi Arabia's explanations were "either self-contradictory or not strong enough" to overcome the inference that it had employed them to assist the hijackers, and that many facts, including whether the February 2000 meetings were planned, were disputed and would be resolved at trial. It concludes: "Plaintiffs' claims will proceed to decision on their merits."[^57]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -215,16 +215,17 @@ The decision states that plaintiffs had provided "reasonable evidence as to the
|
|||
[^41]: *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 172 and note 130 (p. 499).
|
||||
[^42]: Statement of Representative Curt Weldon, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., S. Hrg. 109-311 (September 21, 2005), pp. 6-13. https://archive.org/details/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-109shrg25409
|
||||
[^43]: Testimony of Mark S. Zaid, S. Hrg. 109-311, p. 31.
|
||||
[^44]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
|
||||
[^45]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
|
||||
[^46]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
|
||||
[^47]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
|
||||
[^48]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
|
||||
[^49]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
|
||||
[^51]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
|
||||
[^52]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
|
||||
[^53]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
|
||||
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
|
||||
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
|
||||
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.
|
||||
[^44]: U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, *Able Danger and Intelligence Information Sharing*, hearing, September 21, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, Serial No. J-109-39 (Government Printing Office, 2006), witness list and testimony of Gary M. Bald, William Dugan, Erik Kleinsmith and Mark S. Zaid (pp. 21-22). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-109shrg25409/pdf/CHRG-109shrg25409.pdf
|
||||
[^45]: Slade Gorton to Senators Specter and Leahy, letter of September 20, 2005, S. Hrg. 109-311, pp. 57-58.
|
||||
[^46]: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, *Alleged Misconduct by Senior DoD Officials Concerning the Able Danger Program and Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Shaffer, U.S. Army Reserve*, September 18, 2006, p. 3 and Figure 1. https://documents2.theblackvault.com/documents/dia/FOIA-0238-2016.pdf
|
||||
[^47]: *In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001*, No. 03-md-1570 (GBD)(SN) (S.D.N.Y.), Memorandum Decision and Order of August 28, 2025, ECF No. 11182, pp. 1-2 (citing 134 F. Supp. 3d 774 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). https://assets.alm.com/56/48/0c58055d436488d8aaee80d07ca1/03-md-01570-11182-2.pdf
|
||||
[^48]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 145 (September 21, 2016), motion to table the motion to discharge S.J.Res. 39. https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00145.htm
|
||||
[^49]: Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, registration statement exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 5870, received September 22, 2016, with fee agreement letter of September 20, 2016 to H.E. Adel Al-Jubeir. https://efile.fara.gov/docs/5870-Exhibit-AB-20160922-4.pdf
|
||||
[^50]: Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, exhibits A and B, FARA registration no. 2165, received September 20, 2016, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Exhibit-AB-20160920-67.pdf; supplemental statement for January 1 to June 30, 2017, received August 1, 2017, https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2165-Supplemental-Statement-20170801-26.pdf
|
||||
[^51]: Department of Justice, FARA bulk data file "FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals," foreign principal registration dates for registrants 2165, 6379, 5666, 5870, 6307 and 5926, accessed October 1, 2026. https://efile.fara.gov/bulk/zip/FARA_All_ForeignPrincipals.csv.zip
|
||||
[^52]: United States Senate, roll call vote 114th Congress, 2nd Session, vote 148 (September 28, 2016), "Shall the Bill S. 2040 Pass, the Objections of the President of the United States to the Contrary Notwithstanding?" https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1142/vote_114_2_00148.htm
|
||||
[^53]: Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852 (September 28, 2016), codified at 28 U.S.C. section 1605B. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-114publ222/html/PLAW-114publ222.htm
|
||||
[^54]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 2-4.
|
||||
[^55]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 10-13.
|
||||
[^56]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 14-15, 23-24, 27-29.
|
||||
[^57]: ECF No. 11182, pp. 43-45.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "City"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- City
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- EU
|
||||
- Intelligence
|
||||
- Gladio
|
||||
summary: "Brussels is the capital of Belgium and the headquarters of NATO and the European Union; it appears in this vault as the administrative center through which NATO's Gladio stay-behind network and Belgian intelligence operated, and through its proximity to the Knokke-Heist area central to the Dutroux X-Dossier investigation."
|
||||
summary: "Brussels is the capital of Belgium, the site of NATO headquarters at Evere and the European Union institutions, and where the Belgian Senate inquiry into a clandestine intelligence network sat in 1991."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
location: "Brussels, Belgium"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ Brussels (Bruxelles/Brussel) is the capital of [[Belgium]] and the most importan
|
|||
|
||||
### NATO Headquarters
|
||||
|
||||
[[NATO]]'s headquarters, known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), relocated from [[Paris]] to Brussels in 1967 when French President [[Charles de Gaulle]] withdrew France from NATO's integrated military command and expelled NATO forces from French soil. NATO's political headquarters (the North Atlantic Council) subsequently moved from Paris to a purpose-built facility in Evere, northeast of Brussels. The move made Brussels the de facto capital of the Western alliance's military and political coordination infrastructure.[^1]
|
||||
NATO's political headquarters are at Evere in the Brussels region. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe ([[SHAPE]]) is at Casteau, outside the city, and the American commands were transferred there from Rocquencourt after [[Charles de Gaulle]] withdrew France from the integrated military command.[^2] The North Atlantic Council subsequently moved from Paris to a purpose-built facility in Evere, northeast of Brussels. The move made Brussels the de facto capital of the Western alliance's military and political coordination infrastructure.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
NATO's presence in Brussels meant the city also hosted the intelligence liaison offices of all NATO member states' intelligence services, including CIA Europe operations, [[MI6]], the [[BND]], and the services of smaller member states. This concentration of intelligence officers in a relatively small city created an intensive intelligence environment. Belgium's own intelligence service, the [[Surete de l'Etat]] (state security), maintained its headquarters in Brussels with liaison responsibilities to the allied services.[^2]
|
||||
NATO's presence in Brussels meant the city also hosted the intelligence liaison offices of all NATO member states' intelligence services, including CIA Europe operations, [[MI6]], the [[BND]], and the services of smaller member states. This concentration of intelligence officers in a relatively small city created an intensive intelligence environment. Belgium's own intelligence service, the [[Surete de l'Etat]] (state security), maintained its headquarters in Brussels with liaison responsibilities to the allied services.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### European Union
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -27,11 +27,12 @@ The European Commission, European Parliament (which alternates with Strasbourg),
|
|||
|
||||
### Gladio and Belgian Intelligence
|
||||
|
||||
[[Belgium]]'s [[Gladio]] stay-behind network - known as [[SDRA8]] within military intelligence - was administered through Brussels-based military intelligence structures. The Gladio network's weapons caches were distributed across Belgium. Following the October 1990 Italian disclosure of Gladio's existence, Belgian parliamentary investigations revealed that the Belgian network had possible connections to the [[Brabant massacres]] of 1983-1985, which killed 28 people in supermarket attacks that investigators believed exceeded any rational criminal purpose.[^2]
|
||||
Belgium's [[Gladio]] stay-behind network - known as [[SDRA8]] within military intelligence - was administered through Brussels-based military intelligence structures. The Gladio network's weapons caches were distributed across Belgium. Following the October 1990 Italian disclosure of Gladio's existence, Belgian parliamentary investigations revealed that the Belgian network had possible connections to the [[Brabant massacres]] (early 1982 to November 1985; [[Daniele Ganser]] dates them 1983 to 1985), which killed 28 people in supermarket attacks that investigators believed exceeded any rational criminal purpose.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Brussels was also the city from which the Belgian political and judicial establishments operated - the same establishments implicated in the [[X-Dossier]] testimonies collected during the [[Marc Dutroux]] investigation. While the abuse events described by witnesses occurred primarily in [[Knokke-Heist]] and other locations, the political and judicial figures named were based in the Brussels governmental world.
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Brussels," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/place/Brussels
|
||||
[^2]: Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe.* Frank Cass, 2005.
|
||||
[^2]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), "Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international," rapport fait au nom de la commission par MM. Erdman et Hasquin, October 1, 1991. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
[^3]: Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe.* Frank Cass, 2005.
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "Country"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Country
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- NATO
|
||||
- Gladio
|
||||
- Elite
|
||||
summary: "Belgium is the location of the Marc Dutroux child abduction and murder case, the X-Dossier investigation into elite pedophile networks, NATO headquarters, and was also implicated in the Gladio stay-behind network; its political and aristocratic establishment figures are named throughout the vault's Dutroux investigation materials."
|
||||
summary: "Belgium is the location of the Dutroux case and the X-Dossier, of NATO headquarters, and of the SDRA8 stay-behind network examined by a 1991 Senate inquiry and linked by Ganser to the Brabant massacres."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
location: "Brussels, Belgium"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,17 +21,18 @@ Belgium became the focus of international attention in 1996 following the discov
|
|||
|
||||
The investigation generated the [[X-Dossier]], a collection of testimony from multiple witnesses who described vast elite networks of organized child sexual abuse involving aristocrats, politicians, judges, and businesspeople. Key witnesses included X1 ([[Regina Louf]], a survivor who described years of abuse organized by figures including [[Jean-Michel Nihoul]] and connected to the upper levels of Belgian society) and X2, who described events at estates and villas in the [[Knokke-Heist]] area connected to [[Count Leopold Lippens]], [[Count Maurice Auguste Lippens]], and [[Etienne Davignon]]. Named figures also included [[Paul Vanden Boeynants]], former Prime Minister of Belgium, and [[Baron Benoit de Bonvoisin]].[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
Belgian investigative magistrate [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] was controversially removed from the case in 1997 after attending a fundraising dinner for the victims' families, a decision that triggered mass public protests. The removal was widely interpreted as an attempt to shield powerful figures from investigation. Dutroux was ultimately convicted in 2004 of the murders of [[An Marchal]], [[Eefje Lambrecks]], [[Julie Lejeune]], and [[Melissa Russo]], as well as the abduction and rape of additional victims.[^1]
|
||||
Belgian investigative magistrate [[Jean-Marc Connerotte]] was controversially removed from the case in 1997 after attending a fundraising dinner for the victims' families, a decision that triggered mass public protests. The removal was widely interpreted as an attempt to shield powerful figures from investigation. Dutroux was ultimately convicted in 2004 of the murders of [[An Marchal]], [[Eefje Lambrecks]], Julie Lejeune, and Melissa Russo, as well as the abduction and rape of additional victims.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### NATO and Brussels
|
||||
|
||||
Belgium hosts [[NATO]] headquarters in Brussels, established there in 1967 after [[Charles de Gaulle]] expelled NATO from French soil. NATO's military command structure, intelligence sharing mechanisms, and nuclear planning group are coordinated from Brussels. The Belgian intelligence service [[SURETE DE L'ETAT]] (State Security) maintained liaison relationships with partner services, and Belgian military intelligence had connections to the [[Gladio]] stay-behind network.[^2]
|
||||
Belgium hosts NATO headquarters in Brussels, established there in 1967 after [[Charles de Gaulle]] expelled NATO from French soil. NATO's headquarters are at Evere in the Brussels region, and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe ([[SHAPE]]) is at Casteau, where the American commands were transferred from Rocquencourt after France left the integrated military command.[^3] The Belgian intelligence service [[SURETE DE L'ETAT]] (State Security) maintained liaison relationships with partner services, and Belgian military intelligence had connections to the [[Gladio]] stay-behind network.[^2] In 1991 a Belgian Senate inquiry into an international clandestine intelligence network examined two units, the STC/Mob branch of the Sûreté and SDRA VIII. It recorded that the Belgian secretariat of the NATO Clandestine Planning Committee was a branch of SDRA and that the secretariat was abolished on April 1, 1991, according to two witnesses.[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
### Gladio and the Strategy of Tension
|
||||
|
||||
Belgium was among the NATO member states that hosted a Gladio stay-behind network during the Cold War. The Belgian network - known as [[SDRA8]] within military intelligence - maintained weapons caches and a trained paramilitary personnel roster, as in other NATO countries. Belgian investigations following the 1990 Italian disclosure of Gladio's existence revealed that the Belgian network had possible connections to the unsolved [[Brabant massacres]] of 1983-1985, in which a gang killed 28 people in supermarket robberies whose apparent purpose exceeded any criminal rationale - suggesting, to investigators, a connection to stay-behind network operations designed to destabilize the political landscape.[^1]
|
||||
Belgium was among the NATO member states that hosted a Gladio stay-behind network during the Cold War. The Belgian network - known as [[SDRA8]] within military intelligence - maintained weapons caches and a trained paramilitary personnel roster, as in other NATO countries. Belgian investigations following the 1990 Italian disclosure of Gladio's existence revealed that the Belgian network had possible connections to the unsolved [[Brabant massacres]] (early 1982 to November 1985; [[Daniele Ganser]] dates them 1983 to 1985), in which a gang killed 28 people in supermarket robberies whose apparent purpose exceeded any criminal rationale - suggesting, to investigators, a connection to stay-behind network operations designed to destabilize the political landscape.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: "Belgium," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/place/Belgium
|
||||
[^2]: "Belgian X-Dossiers of the Dutroux Affair: the Accused," Institute for the Study of Globalization and Covert Politics, 2007. https://www.isgp-studies.com/belgian-x-dossiers-of-the-marc-dutroux-affair-the-accused
|
||||
[^3]: Belgian Senate, Doc. 1117-4 (1990-1991), "Enquête parlementaire sur l'existence en Belgique d'un réseau de renseignements clandestin international," rapport fait au nom de la commission par MM. Erdman et Hasquin, October 1, 1991. https://senate.be/lexdocs/S0523/S05231297.pdf
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
category: "Country"
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Country
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,9 +7,9 @@ tags:
|
|||
- Gaddafi
|
||||
- Lockerbie
|
||||
- IranContra
|
||||
summary: "Libya under Muammar Gaddafi was a CIA target for covert destabilization operations throughout the 1980s, a state that financed and trained international terrorist networks, the perpetrator of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing, and a node in illicit arms procurement networks that intersect with Iran-Contra and PROMIS subjects in this vault."
|
||||
summary: "Libya under Muammar Gaddafi was a CIA covert-action target in the 1980s, tied to the 1988 Lockerbie bombing and to arms procurement networks intersecting Iran-Contra and PROMIS."
|
||||
created: 2026-05-14
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
location: "Tripoli, Libya"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -21,9 +21,13 @@ Gaddafi's government, which he styled the "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab
|
|||
|
||||
In April 1984, a gunman inside the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in London fired into a crowd of protesters outside, killing British police constable [[Yvonne Fletcher]]. Libya broke diplomatic relations with Britain following the incident. On April 15, 1986, the United States bombed Tripoli and Benghazi in [[Operation El Dorado Canyon]], targeting Gaddafi's personal compound and intelligence facilities, after a Libyan-linked bombing of a Berlin disco killed American soldiers. The operation was launched from British bases with [[Margaret Thatcher]]'s approval.[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
On April 15, 1986, Thatcher told the Commons that the President had sought British agreement "to the use in the operation of some United States aircraft based in this country." She said that Britain would support "action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities," and that "we would agree to the deployment of United States aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom for that purpose." She reported that the President had made clear that "use of F111 aircraft from bases in the United Kingdom was essential."[^3]
|
||||
|
||||
Reagan's address of April 14, 1986 thanked "our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission."[^4] Air Force Magazine reported that France, Germany, Italy and Spain refused to cooperate, which forced the F-111s to fly around France and Spain and through the Strait of Gibraltar, and that the aircraft flew from [[RAF Lakenheath]] and [[RAF Upper Heyford]].[^5]
|
||||
|
||||
### PROMIS Connection
|
||||
|
||||
[[Angela Dellafiora]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] analyst working in the [[Stargate Project]] remote viewing program, reportedly described a Libyan chemical weapons facility in a remote viewing session. More directly, Libya was among the countries to which [[PROMIS]] software was allegedly distributed in a backdoor-equipped version, according to accounts from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and [[Michael Riconosciuto]]. Libyan intelligence's use of PROMIS-derived case management software would have given U.S. and Israeli intelligence access to Libyan operations.[^3]
|
||||
[[Angela Dellafiora]], the [[Defense Intelligence Agency|DIA]] analyst working in the [[Stargate Project]] remote viewing program, reportedly described a Libyan chemical weapons facility in a remote viewing session. More directly, Libya was among the countries to which [[PROMIS]] software was allegedly distributed in a backdoor-equipped version, according to accounts from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] and [[Michael Riconosciuto]]. Libyan intelligence's use of PROMIS-derived case management software would have given U.S. and Israeli intelligence access to Libyan operations.[^6]
|
||||
|
||||
### Lockerbie
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -37,4 +41,7 @@ Gaddafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011, during the NATO-supported u
|
|||
|
||||
[^1]: "Libya," *Encyclopaedia Britannica.* https://www.britannica.com/place/Libya
|
||||
[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. "Target Gaddafi," *New York Times Magazine,* February 22, 1987.
|
||||
[^3]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^3]: Thatcher, Margaret, statement on Libya, House of Commons, April 15, 1986, HC Deb vol. 95, cols. 729-39. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/apr/15/libya
|
||||
[^4]: Reagan, Ronald, Address to the Nation on the United States Air Strike Against Libya, April 14, 1986, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/address-nation-united-states-air-strike-against-libya
|
||||
[^5]: "El Dorado Canyon," *Air Force Magazine,* March 1999. https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0399canyon/
|
||||
[^6]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network.* Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
title: Stoke Lodge
|
||||
aliases:
|
||||
- Stoke Lodge
|
||||
created: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-05-17
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Location
|
||||
- DiplomaticResidence
|
||||
|
|
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ location: "Kensington, London, UK"
|
|||
---
|
||||
Stoke Lodge was the Australian High Commissioner's residence in Kensington, London. Sir [[Gordon Freeth]] served as Australian High Commissioner while residing there. [[Martin Allen]], aged 15, disappeared in November 1979. Allen was the son of the chief chauffeur to Sir Gordon Freeth, and Martin's family lived in the caretaker's cottage on the grounds of Stoke Lodge. The boy disappeared while traveling to Kings Cross station[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
Stoke Lodge regularly hosted civic functions attended by prominent officials. Regular visitors included Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]], deputy-director of MI6 [[Peter Hayman]] (a known pedophile), Margaret Thatcher's private secretary [[Peter Morrison]] (an alleged pedophile), and Home Secretary [[Leon Brittan]].[^1]
|
||||
The writer S. Dovey wrote that Stoke Lodge regularly hosted civic functions attended by prominent officials, and named as regular visitors Prime Minister [[Margaret Thatcher]], deputy-director of MI6 [[Peter Hayman]] (a known pedophile), Thatcher's private secretary [[Peter Morrison]] (an alleged pedophile), and Home Secretary [[Leon Brittan]].[^1]
|
||||
|
||||
### Australian Intelligence Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ The chauffeur company used by the Australian High Commission had numerous convic
|
|||
|
||||
### Missing Evidence and Investigation Suppression
|
||||
|
||||
During [[Operation Orchid]] (the 1980s investigation into [[Sidney Cooke]]), files pertaining to links between Cooke's gang and the [[Elm Guest House]] were found to be missing when detectives checked original case files in 2014. This pattern of missing evidence characterized many investigations into VIP pedophile networks, suggesting systematic efforts to obstruct justice and protect powerful individuals involved in child abuse and trafficking[^1].
|
||||
During [[Operation Orchid]] (the 1980s investigation into Sidney Cooke), files pertaining to links between Cooke's gang and the [[Elm Guest House]] were found to be missing when detectives checked original case files in 2014. This pattern of missing evidence characterized many investigations into VIP pedophile networks, suggesting systematic efforts to obstruct justice and protect powerful individuals involved in child abuse and trafficking[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
The investigation into Martin Allen's disappearance and the connections to Stoke Lodge faced similar challenges. The involvement of diplomatic personnel, intelligence officials, and high-level political figures created significant obstacles to thorough investigation. The international dimension of the case, involving Australian intelligence and UK law enforcement, added further complexity to efforts to uncover the truth about what occurred at Stoke Lodge and its connections to broader trafficking networks[^1].
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
---
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- Organization
|
||||
- Government
|
||||
|
|
@ -7,8 +7,11 @@ tags:
|
|||
- UK
|
||||
category: "Landmark"
|
||||
summary: "The Syrian Embassy in London was implicated in a 1986 plot to bomb an El Al plane, orchestrated by Rafi Eitan to discredit Syria."
|
||||
updated: 2026-10-12
|
||||
---
|
||||
The [[Syrian Embassy in London]] was implicated in a 1986 plot to bomb an [[El Al]] plane, orchestrated by [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]] to discredit [[Syria]]. [[Nezar Hindawi]] was instructed to meet with a Syrian intelligence officer at the embassy, leading him to believe his actions were for the Arab cause. Following the foiled plot, [[Margaret Thatcher|Margaret Thatcher's]] government closed down the embassy in London.[^1]
|
||||
The [[Syrian Embassy in London]] was implicated in a 1986 plot to bomb an [[El Al]] plane. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that the plot was orchestrated by [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi Eitan]] to discredit [[Syria]], and that [[Nezar Hindawi]] was instructed to meet with a Syrian intelligence officer at the embassy, leading him to believe his actions were for the Arab cause.[^1] On October 24, 1986, Foreign Secretary [[Geoffrey Howe]] told the Commons that the government had decided to break diplomatic relations with Syria. The Syrian ambassador, Dr. Haydar, was told to close his embassy and leave the country within 14 days.[^2] Howe also told the Commons: "There is conclusive evidence of Syrian official involvement with Hindawi." He said the Syrian Government's claim that its staff dealt with Hindawi "throughout as a bona fide journalist" was "frankly incredible."[^2]
|
||||
|
||||
### Footnotes
|
||||
|
||||
[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
|
||||
[^2]: Howe, Sir Geoffrey, statement on Anglo-Syrian relations, House of Commons, October 24, 1986, HC Deb vol. 102, cols. 1504-14. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1986/oct/24/anglo-syrian-relations
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
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Reference in a new issue