vault backup: 2026-10-14 17:47:52

00 - META/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,8 +1,53 @@
+- 2026-10-14T1658 · [[Amiram Nir]]
+- 2026-10-14T1658 · [[Yitzhak Rabin]]
+- 2026-10-14T1657 · [[Operation AJAX]]
+- 2026-10-14T1657 · [[Yehoshua Sagi]]
+- 2026-10-14T1657 · [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization]]
+- 2026-10-14T1657 · [[Safari Club]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[JM-WAVE]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Saudi Arabia]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Operation NORTHWOODS]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Operation Mongoose]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Boland Amendment]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Robert Kennedy]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Richard J. Kerr]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Moshe Hebroni]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Mohammed Jalali]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Michael Milken]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Henry A. Kissinger]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Edward Lansdale]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Robert Gates]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Rafael Eitan]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Nachum Admoni]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[James A. Baker III]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Jack Blum]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Elliott Abrams]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Edward P. Boland]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Dick Cheney]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Drexel Burnham]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Golani infantry brigade]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Kerry Committee]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Shas Party]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Australian Security Intelligence Service]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Paul C. Warnke]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[William French Smith]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Walt Rostow]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Uri Simchoni]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Richard Secord]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Oliver North]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Menachem Schneerson]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[John Poindexter]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Harry H. Schwartz]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[William Harvey]]
+- 2026-10-14T1656 · [[Robert McFarlane]]
 - 2026-10-14T1541 · [[Cornelius Blackshear]]
 - 2026-10-14T1541 · [[PayPal]]
 - 2026-10-14T1541 · [[Palantir Technologies]]
 - 2026-10-14T1540 · [[George Francis Bason, Jr.]]
-- 2026-10-14T1538 · [[Robert Kennedy]]
 - 2026-10-14T1538 · [[Joseph McCarthy]]
 - 2026-10-14T1538 · [[Odyssey Network]]
 - 2026-10-14T1538 · [[Samuel Goudsmit]]
@@ -16,7 +61,6 @@
 - 2026-10-14T1536 · [[Robert Owen]]
 - 2026-10-14T1536 · [[Felix Rodriguez]]
 - 2026-10-14T1536 · [[Eugene Hasenfus]]
-- 2026-10-14T1535 · [[Elliott Abrams]]
 - 2026-10-14T1533 · [[Dewey Clarridge]]
 - 2026-10-14T1533 · [[Iran-Contra Affair]]
 - 2026-10-14T1533 · [[Central Intelligence Agency]]
@@ -54,47 +98,3 @@
 - 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Operation Paperclip]]
 - 2026-10-14T1435 · [[PROMIS]]
 - 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Kissinger Associates]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[INSLAW]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[LEAA]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Department of Justice]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Gehlen Organization]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Combat 18]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Roger Whelan]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Peter Thiel]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Frederick G. Watts]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Charles R. Work]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Rene Schneider]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Walter Langer]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Morton H. Halperin]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Max Levchin]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Joan E. Jacoby]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Henry Murray]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Henry A. Kissinger]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Fred L. Lander III]]
-- 2026-10-14T1435 · [[Bill Hamilton]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Founders Fund]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Andreessen Horowitz]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Brian Quintenz]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Luana Lopes Lara]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Tarek Mansour]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Policy Analysis Market]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Polymarket]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Kalshi]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[1789 Capital]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Commodity Futures Trading Commission]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Donald Trump Jr.]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Shayne Coplan]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Y Combinator]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Sequoia Capital]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[DARPA]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Ron Wyden]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[John Poindexter]]
-- 2026-10-13T2011 · [[Mercer family]]
-- 2026-10-13T1851 · [[Turki bin Saud bin Mohammed Al Saud]]
-- 2026-10-13T1844 · [[OpenAI]]
-- 2026-10-13T1844 · [[Anduril Industries]]
-- 2026-10-13T1844 · [[Safari Club]]
-- 2026-10-13T1844 · [[Alexandre de Marenches]]
-- 2026-10-13T1844 · [[Sam Altman]]
-- 2026-10-13T1843 · [[Mukhabarat]]

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Ari Ben-Menashe.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ relations:
     role: "civilian, External Relations Department (per his 1992 account)"
     fn: 5
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 Ari Ben-Menashe is an Iranian-born Israeli-Canadian businessman, author, and lobbyist who describes himself as a former official of Israel's military intelligence, and who became a recurring source for claims about covert United States and Israeli arms dealing, the [[October Surprise]] theory, [[PROMIS]] software, [[Robert Maxwell]], and, in later years, [[Jeffrey Epstein]].[^1] He was born on December 4, 1951, in Tehran, [[Iran]], to an affluent Iraqi Jewish family; his father Gourdji was involved with [[LEHI]] (the Stern Gang) and knew [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^2][^3] His allegations have been influential in conspiracy literature while being repeatedly assessed as unreliable by courts, congressional investigators, and journalists.[^4]
@@ -39,51 +39,55 @@ Ben-Menashe's 1992 book dates his entry into the External Relations Department t
 
 The 1992 book reproduces letters of reference dated September 1987 on Israel Defence Forces External Relations Department letterhead. They are signed by Col. [[Pesah Melowany]] (September 4, 1987), Col. Yoav (September 6, 1987), a Dr. A. (September 14, 1987) and Col. [[Arieh Shur]], whose signature block reads "Colonel / Chief of External Relations" (September 14, 1987). Ben-Menashe presents the letters as evidence of his service in the department.[^7]
 
-Critics dispute the seniority he claims. Israel has generally characterized him as a low-level translator rather than a policy insider, and the journalist [[Steven Emerson]], writing in 1991, argued that Ben-Menashe had inflated a minor translating job into a record of "key positions."[^2] The Israeli government acknowledged that he had worked for military intelligence in a translation capacity but denied that he had held the senior operational role he described.[^8] The disagreement over his rank has shaped the reception of all his later claims, because his accounts of arms deals, the October Surprise, and Israeli operations rest on his asserted firsthand access rather than on corroborating documents or witnesses.[^2][^4]
+The October Surprise Task Force reported that the personnel file maintained by Israeli Military Intelligence records that Ben-Menashe worked in the External Relations Department from 1977 to 1987; that seven of his ten annual efficiency reports list him as a translator and the other three as a staff officer in an armaments unit; that he failed the preparatory training portion of the officer's course and omitted this from his testimony to the task force; and that on July 23, 1987 his superior Arieh Shur warned him about excessive personal leave, on the same day he wrote to his superiors that he wished to leave the Army, on September 9, 1987 he complained before the union of civilian employees of the Israel Defense Forces that he had served ten years as a translator without a significant promotion, and on September 15, 1987 he resigned from the Israel Defense Forces.[^8] The task force added that Israeli authorities interviewed David Kimche, Yehoshua Saguy, Rafi Eitan, a Samuel Moriah, Meir Meir and General Yitzhak Segev, each of whom said he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until he began making allegations in the American media in 1991, and that Yitzhak Hofi, head of Mossad from 1980 to 1982, told Israeli authorities that Ben-Menashe was never assigned to any mission by Mossad.[^9]
+
+Critics dispute the seniority he claims. Israel has generally characterized him as a low-level translator rather than a policy insider, and the journalist [[Steven Emerson]], writing in 1991, argued that Ben-Menashe had inflated a minor translating job into a record of "key positions."[^2] The Israeli government acknowledged that he had worked for military intelligence in a translation capacity but denied that he had held the senior operational role he described.[^10] The disagreement over his rank has shaped the reception of all his later claims, because his accounts of arms deals, the October Surprise, and Israeli operations rest on his asserted firsthand access rather than on corroborating documents or witnesses.[^2][^4]
 
 ### Arms Case and Acquittal
 
-Ben-Menashe first drew wide public attention when he was arrested in the United States in November 1989 and charged under the Arms Export Control Act with attempting to broker the sale of three Israeli-owned Lockheed [[C-130 Hercules]] transport aircraft to Iran, a deal valued at about 36 million dollars, using false end-user certificates.[^9] The prosecution was brought in the United States District Court for the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]], where the related rulings carried the caption United States v. Menashe.[^10] He spent nearly a year in custody before a jury acquitted him and a co-defendant on November 28, 1990, after his defense argued, and the jury accepted, that he had been acting under the authority of the Israeli government in a transaction tied to Israel's arms dealings with Iran.[^9]
+Ben-Menashe first drew wide public attention when he was arrested in the United States in November 1989 and charged under the Arms Export Control Act with attempting to broker the sale of three Israeli-owned Lockheed [[C-130 Hercules]] transport aircraft to Iran, a deal valued at about 36 million dollars, using false end-user certificates.[^11] The prosecution was brought in the United States District Court for the [[U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]], where the related rulings carried the caption United States v. Menashe.[^12] He spent nearly a year in custody before a jury acquitted him and a co-defendant on November 28, 1990, after his defense argued, and the jury accepted, that he had been acting under the authority of the Israeli government in a transaction tied to Israel's arms dealings with Iran.[^11]
 
-Israel denied that he had been authorized to act for it in the transaction, repeating the position that he had been only a translator.[^9] The acquittal nonetheless rested on the jury's willingness to credit his Israeli-agent defense, and he afterward cited the verdict as vindication of his broader account, even though the bodies that later examined his substantive claims rejected them.[^4][^11] The acquittal gave him a platform from which he expanded a series of claims about secret United States and Israeli arms networks, set out in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]].[^3]
+The first count of the indictment charged all three defendants with conspiring to sell American-made C-130 military cargo planes located in Israel to Iran, in violation of the [[Arms Export Control Act]]; a second count charged co-defendant [[Joseph O'Toole]] with conspiring to sell American-made anti-aircraft missiles located in Israel. In an opinion of August 1, 1990, Judge [[Louis L. Stanton]] denied co-defendant [[Richard St. Francis]]'s motion to dismiss on due process grounds, granted severance of the second count and of O'Toole from the first count, and noted that Ben-Menashe joined St. Francis's motions.[^13] The indictment said the scheme was revealed by an undercover Customs Service agent posing as an Iranian buyer.[^14] At the six-week trial, his attorney [[Thomas F.X. Dunn|Thomas Dunn]] contended that Ben-Menashe was a former intelligence operative who represented Yitzhak Shamir in an attempted arms-for-hostages deal in 1988 that was to include the release of four U.S. hostages and fell through when Shamir insisted that three Israeli soldiers also be freed. Prosecutors disputed his allegations of government-sanctioned arms deals with Iran, and Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Baruch Weiss]] said that Ben-Menashe was merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987. After the verdict Dunn said that his client claimed Israel had brokered arms deals with Iran between 1980 and 1988 that the U.S. government had covertly approved, among them the transaction that became the Iran-Contra scandal.[^14]
+
+Israel denied that he had been authorized to act for it in the transaction. At trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss said that he had been merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987.[^14] The acquittal nonetheless rested on the jury's willingness to credit his Israeli-agent defense, and he afterward cited the verdict as vindication of his broader account, even though the bodies that later examined his substantive claims rejected them.[^4][^15] The acquittal gave him a platform from which he expanded a series of claims about secret United States and Israeli arms networks, set out in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]].[^3]
 
 ### October Surprise and Iran-Contra Claims
 
-In Profits of War and in congressional testimony, Ben-Menashe alleged that Israeli officials, working with figures around the 1980 [[Ronald Reagan]] presidential campaign, arranged arms sales to Iran in exchange for delaying the release of American hostages until after the November 1980 election, the scenario known as the October Surprise.[^3] He claimed to have witnessed a Paris meeting in October 1980 attended by [[George H.W. Bush]], the campaign manager [[William J. Casey|William Casey]], and Iranian representatives.[^11]
+In Profits of War and in congressional testimony, Ben-Menashe alleged that Israeli officials, working with figures around the 1980 [[Ronald Reagan]] presidential campaign, arranged arms sales to Iran in exchange for delaying the release of American hostages until after the November 1980 election, the scenario known as the October Surprise.[^3] He claimed to have witnessed a Paris meeting in October 1980 attended by [[George H.W. Bush]], the campaign manager [[William J. Casey|William Casey]], and Iranian representatives.[^15]
 
 His detailed account named a sequence of secret meetings. He described [[Miles Copeland]]'s group of CIA-connected officers, Casey, [[Robert McFarlane]], and [[Earl Brian]] entering negotiations with the Iranians, and [[David Kimche]] of Mossad initiating an arms supply to Iran via [[South Africa]] in 1979. He placed first and second Madrid meetings in March and May 1980 involving [[Mehdi Karrubi]], Casey, McFarlane, [[Donald Gregg]], [[Robert Gates]], and Brian; an Amsterdam meeting in August 1980; and the October 1980 Paris meeting at which he says the hostage-release deal was sealed and after which he received 56 million dollars in [[Guatemala]] in December 1980, with 4 million for Brian and 52 million for the Iranian intermediary Kashani. The hostages were released on Reagan's inauguration day, January 20, 1981.[^3] He further alleged a 1980 to 1981 [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] arms pipeline, a role in the June 7, 1981 [[Israel Air Force]] strike on Iraq's Tammuz nuclear reactor, the recruitment of [[Daily Mirror]] foreign editor [[Nicholas Davies]] by Mossad, and the use of a slush fund (the [[Ora Group]]) to finance the [[Likud Party]] and "black" operations including, in his telling, the 1985 [[Achille Lauro]] hijacking.[^3]
 
-No official body endorsed this account. The [[House October Surprise Task Force]], chaired by Representative [[Lee Hamilton]], published its joint report on January 3, 1993, and rejected it, saying it had conclusive evidence from travel and passport records that Ben-Menashe was not in Paris when he claimed to have witnessed the meeting, and describing his testimony as "totally lacking in credibility," "demonstrably false from beginning to end," and "a total fabrication."[^11] A separate review of the Iran-Contra-related allegations conducted under Attorney General [[William Barr]] likewise found no credible basis for his key claims, and an earlier Senate examination reached similar conclusions.[^8][^11] The Senate Foreign Relations special counsel, Reid H. Weingarten, reporting to Senators [[Terry Sanford]] and [[James Jeffords]] on November 19, 1992, found that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," but that his "insistence upon placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and adventures" and his contradiction of credible witnesses and documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness," and did not rely on his testimony without independent corroboration.[^12]
+No official body endorsed this account. The [[House October Surprise Task Force]], chaired by Representative [[Lee Hamilton]], published its joint report on January 3, 1993, and rejected it, saying it had conclusive evidence from travel and passport records that Ben-Menashe was not in Paris when he claimed to have witnessed the meeting, and describing his testimony as "totally lacking in credibility," "demonstrably false from beginning to end," and "a total fabrication."[^15] The task force pinpoints the passport and personnel evidence: records the Government of Israel supplied, with Ben-Menashe's contemporaneous handwritten answers to the questions he was required to answer for the External Relations Department when traveling abroad, showed that he did not travel outside Israel in October 1980, and exit stamps on his civilian passport indicated the same; the task force wrote that his account of the October meetings, "like his other October Surprise allegations, is a total fabrication."[^16] A separate review of the Iran-Contra-related allegations conducted under Attorney General [[William Barr]] likewise found no credible basis for his key claims, and an earlier Senate examination reached similar conclusions.[^10][^15] The Senate Foreign Relations special counsel, Reid H. Weingarten, reporting to Senators [[Terry Sanford]] and [[James Jeffords]] on November 19, 1992, found that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," but that his "insistence upon placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and adventures" and his contradiction of credible witnesses and documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness," and did not rely on his testimony without independent corroboration.[^17]
 
 ### PROMIS Affidavits and INSLAW
 
-After the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death in August 1991, Ben-Menashe called [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]], and claimed that two FBI agents from Lexington, Kentucky, had been en route to Martinsburg to give Casolaro evidence that the FBI was illegally using PROMIS software, one of them disaffected because his superiors had refused to indict senior Reagan officials over the October Surprise.[^13] In affidavits submitted to the bankruptcy court in February and March 1991, he claimed personal knowledge of Earl Brian's involvement in international PROMIS distribution, alleging that Brian made a 1987 presentation to Israeli Military Intelligence claiming ownership of PROMIS rights, that [[Rafael Eitan]] received PROMIS from Brian and McFarlane in 1982 for Israeli signals intelligence, and that enhanced PROMIS was sold to the Israeli intelligence community, the Singapore Armed Forces, the Soviet Union, and Canada.[^14] These PROMIS-distribution claims were later amplified by [[Seymour Hersh]] in [[The Samson Option]] and [[Gordon Thomas]] in [[Gideon's Spies]].[^15][^16]
+After the journalist [[Danny Casolaro]]'s death in August 1991, Ben-Menashe called [[Bill Hamilton]], president of [[INSLAW|Inslaw]], and claimed that two FBI agents from Lexington, Kentucky, had been en route to Martinsburg to give Casolaro evidence that the FBI was illegally using PROMIS software, one of them disaffected because his superiors had refused to indict senior Reagan officials over the October Surprise.[^18] In affidavits submitted to the bankruptcy court in February and March 1991, he claimed personal knowledge of Earl Brian's involvement in international PROMIS distribution, alleging that Brian made a 1987 presentation to Israeli Military Intelligence claiming ownership of PROMIS rights, that [[Rafael Eitan]] received PROMIS from Brian and McFarlane in 1982 for Israeli signals intelligence, and that enhanced PROMIS was sold to the Israeli intelligence community, the Singapore Armed Forces, the Soviet Union, and Canada.[^19] These PROMIS-distribution claims were later amplified by [[Seymour Hersh]] in [[The Samson Option]] and [[Gordon Thomas]] in [[Gideon's Spies]].[^20][^21]
 
-In the first of two affidavits he submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia in the INSLAW case, dated February 17, 1991, Ben-Menashe said that in January 1989, while serving as a special consultant for intelligence affairs in the Israeli prime minister's office, he was told by [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms maker, that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and a representative of Iraqi military intelligence for the use of PROMIS.[^17] A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991, preserved in the Danny Casolaro papers, says the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile, where [[Industrias Cardoen]] had its headquarters, and that Brian called the allegations "nonsense."[^18] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] states that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration."[^17] The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] recorded in 1991 that Robert Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing and that the FBI and the CIA inspector general, reviewing Gates's calendar and travel records, found no credible evidence to confirm them.[^19]
+In the first of two affidavits he submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia in the INSLAW case, dated February 17, 1991, Ben-Menashe said that in January 1989, while serving as a special consultant for intelligence affairs in the Israeli prime minister's office, he was told by [[Carlos Cardoen]], the Chilean arms maker, that Cardoen had brokered a deal between Earl Brian and a representative of Iraqi military intelligence for the use of PROMIS.[^22] A *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* report of February 19, 1991, preserved in the Danny Casolaro papers, says the sale was consummated in Santiago, Chile, where [[Industrias Cardoen]] had its headquarters, and that Brian called the allegations "nonsense."[^23] The report of Special Counsel [[Nicholas J. Bua]] states that Ben-Menashe "makes a number of extraordinary claims, most of which are not subject to corroboration."[^22] The [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] recorded in 1991 that Robert Gates denied specific allegations made by Ben-Menashe at his confirmation hearing and that the FBI and the CIA inspector general, reviewing Gates's calendar and travel records, found no credible evidence to confirm them.[^24]
 
-The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejected these claims. When interviewed, Ben-Menashe gave a substantially different account, stating that he had no knowledge of the transfer of Inslaw's proprietary software, and that the "PROMIS" in his affidavits referred not to Inslaw's product but to an NSA program he called "Milon," a dictionary-compilation tool developed independently before Inslaw existed; he admitted he had allowed the Hamiltons and others to assume he meant Inslaw's PROMIS "to promote his book."[^14] The NSA confirmed that its own internal Product Related On-line Management Information System, also called PROMIS, was written in M204 rather than COBOL and was wholly unrelated to Inslaw's software. The House October Surprise Task Force, the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], and the special counsel all found his testimony fabricated and unsupported.[^14][^20]
+The special counsel Nicholas Bua, in his 1993 report on the Inslaw affair, rejected these claims. When interviewed, Ben-Menashe gave a substantially different account, stating that he had no knowledge of the transfer of Inslaw's proprietary software, and that the "PROMIS" in his affidavits referred not to Inslaw's product but to an NSA program he called "Milon," a dictionary-compilation tool developed independently before Inslaw existed; he admitted he had allowed the Hamiltons and others to assume he meant Inslaw's PROMIS "to promote his book."[^19] The NSA confirmed that its own internal Product Related On-line Management Information System, also called PROMIS, was written in M204 rather than COBOL and was wholly unrelated to Inslaw's software. The House October Surprise Task Force, the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]], and the special counsel all found his testimony fabricated and unsupported.[^19][^25]
 
 ### Claims about Robert Maxwell
 
-Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^21] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^15] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
+Ben-Menashe alleged that the publisher Robert Maxwell and Nicholas Davies were long-time assets of Israeli intelligence and that Maxwell had close ties to the prime minister's office.[^3] One specific claim concerned the 1986 case of the nuclear technician [[Mordechai Vanunu]], whose account of [[Dimona]] reached the Maxwell-owned [[Sunday Mirror]]; Ben-Menashe said Davies alerted Israeli intelligence to the approach and introduced him to Vanunu's intermediary [[Oscar Guerrero]], and that a Vanunu photograph published by the Sunday Mirror had been flown in from Israel, although the photograph in question had in fact been taken by the [[Sunday Times]] journalist [[Peter Hounam]], undercutting that detail.[^26] Hersh's 1991 book and the parliamentary statements that followed brought the Maxwell allegations into the open shortly before Maxwell's death, and Maxwell sued Hersh for libel.[^20] No declassified material has confirmed the allegations.[^4]
 
-Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^22] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^23]
+Seymour Hersh's 1991 book *The Samson Option* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^27] The book's account of the Davies arms firm, Ora Limited, and of Vanunu's 1986 compromise is attributed in the text to Ben-Menashe's account.[^28]
 
 ### Epstein and Maxwell Allegations
 
-Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^24] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^24]
+Beginning in 2019, Ben-Menashe gave interviews, including to the journalist [[Whitney Webb]] of MintPress News and to the outlet Narativ, in which he claimed that he had met Jeffrey Epstein and [[Ghislaine Maxwell]] in the 1980s, that he had seen Epstein in Robert Maxwell's offices, and that Maxwell had recruited Epstein for Israeli intelligence and introduced him as pre-approved by figures in Aman.[^29] He characterized the later Epstein operation as a "honeytrap" that gathered sexual blackmail material on powerful figures for Israeli intelligence.[^29]
 
-No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^25] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^25] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^25]
+No corroborating witness, document, or official admission has been produced to support these specific claims, and reviewers have noted that they rest solely on his own assertions against a documented record of unreliability.[^4][^30] His account also conflicts with the established chronology of Epstein's career, since Epstein's documented entry into Ghislaine Maxwell's circle is generally dated to the period after Robert Maxwell's 1991 death rather than to the 1980s meetings Ben-Menashe described.[^30] He has continued to make related claims, including a 2025 assertion that [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] held Epstein-related files, that likewise remain unverified.[^30]
 
 ### Lobbying and Consulting
 
-After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^26] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^27]
+After his intelligence-related notoriety, Ben-Menashe built a lobbying and consulting practice through the [[Montreal]]-based firm [[Dickens & Madson]], representing controversial governments and figures.[^31] His involvement with the government of [[Robert Mugabe]] in [[Zimbabwe]] featured in the treason prosecution of the opposition leader [[Morgan Tsvangirai]], built on a videotape in which prosecutors said Tsvangirai discussed the "elimination" of Mugabe with Ben-Menashe; Tsvangirai was acquitted of high treason on October 14, 2004, by Judge [[Paddington Garwe]] of the Harare High Court, who found no proof of the alleged request, ruled that Ben-Menashe's testimony had to be treated with caution, and called some of it clearly false.[^32]
 
-He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^26][^28] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^26]
+He later registered a 2 million dollar contract in March 2021 to lobby for the [[Myanmar]] military junta after its coup, agreeing to advise on evading United States sanctions, and took on engagements connected to [[Sudan]] and its militia leader [[Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo]], a roughly 12 million dollar Zimbabwe land transaction funded by the criminal financier [[Paul Le Roux]] in 2007 and 2008 in which the promised farmland was never delivered, a reported 1 million dollar arrangement with [[Kyrgyzstan]], and work tied to [[Libya]], the [[Republic of the Congo]], [[Venezuela]], and the [[Tigray]] conflict in [[Ethiopia]].[^31][^33] Washington figures quoted in profiles of his career described his reputation as "poisonous."[^31]
 
 ### The McFarlane Libel Suit
 
-The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^29] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^29]
+The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the publisher of Profits of War, Sheridan Square Press, for libel over passages that linked McFarlane to the covert dealings Ben-Menashe described.[^34] The case, McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, reached the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ruled in 1996. Applying the [[actual malice]] standard required for a public figure, the court held that McFarlane could not show the publisher had acted with reckless disregard for the truth merely because Ben-Menashe was a doubtful source, and it affirmed dismissal of the suit. The outcome turned on the high bar a public-figure plaintiff must clear rather than on any finding that Ben-Menashe's account was true.[^34]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -94,25 +98,30 @@ The former national security adviser Robert McFarlane sued Ben-Menashe and the p
 [^5]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, chapter 3, "Love in the Time of Revolution" ("August 15, 1977. How could I ever forget my first day in the External Relations Department"; four branches at p. 26; "Starting in late September 1977, I became a Middle East commuter"). New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015. Lending copy: https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
 [^6]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War*, TrineDay reprint, 2015, pp. 209-210 (index "Lavee, Shimon, 210").
 [^7]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War*, TrineDay reprint, 2015, text of the 1989 trial chapter ("Mr. Ari Ben-Menashe has served in the Israel Defense Forces External Relations Department in key positions") and appendix, letters of reference dated September 4, 6 and 14, 1987.
-[^8]: "Espionage: Con Man or Key to a Mystery?," *Time,* 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718038/espionage-con-man-or-key-to-a-mystery/
+[^8]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 97-98. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
-[^9]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post,* 1990. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
+[^9]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.
-[^10]: United States v. Menashe, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
+[^10]: "Espionage: Con Man or Key to a Mystery?," *Time,* 1991. https://time.com/archive/6718038/espionage-con-man-or-key-to-a-mystery/
-[^11]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
+[^11]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post,* 1990. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
-[^12]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords,* S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 113. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021071829
+[^12]: United States v. Menashe, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
-[^13]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, on Ben-Menashe's call to Bill Hamilton after Casolaro's death.
+[^13]: *United States v. Menashe*, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), No. 90 Cr. 010 (LLS), memorandum and order of Judge Louis L. Stanton, August 1, 1990. https://static.case.law/f-supp/741/cases/1135-01.json
-[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the PROMIS affidavits, the "Milon" recantation, and the finding that Ben-Menashe's account offered no evidentiary support for the Inslaw allegations.
+[^14]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990 (dateline New York, November 28; statements of Thomas Dunn and Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss; the undercover Customs Service agent). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
-[^15]: "Fact or fiction? The claims of Ari Ben-Menashe," *Green Left,* 1992. https://www.greenleft.org.au/1992/42/fact-or-fiction-claims-ari-ben-menashe
+[^15]: "Probe by House finds no 'October surprise,'" *The Baltimore Sun,* 1993. https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-01-13-1993013111-story.html
-[^16]: Pipes, Daniel. "Gideon's Spies by Gordon Thomas," *Commentary,* 1999. https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/
+[^16]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 148.
-[^17]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
+[^17]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. *The "October Surprise" Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran: Report of the Special Counsel to Senator Terry Sanford and Senator James M. Jeffords,* S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 114. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/pst.000021071829
-[^18]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder of the Casolaro papers, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
+[^18]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010, on Ben-Menashe's call to Bill Hamilton after Casolaro's death.
-[^19]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
+[^19]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993, on the PROMIS affidavits, the "Milon" recantation, and the finding that Ben-Menashe's account offered no evidentiary support for the Inslaw allegations.
-[^20]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
+[^20]: "Fact or fiction? The claims of Ari Ben-Menashe," *Green Left,* 1992. https://www.greenleft.org.au/1992/42/fact-or-fiction-claims-ari-ben-menashe
-[^21]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
+[^21]: Pipes, Daniel. "Gideon's Spies by Gordon Thomas," *Commentary,* 1999. https://www.commentary.org/articles/daniel-pipes/gideons-spies-by-gordon-thomas/
-[^22]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
+[^22]: Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General regarding the allegations of INSLAW, Inc. (March 1993), pp. 73-74.
-[^23]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
+[^23]: *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 19, 1991, "Stolen Software Scattered: Affidavits Allege Sales To Iraqis And Israelis," clipping in the INSLAW folder of the Casolaro papers, https://archive.org/download/casolaro-notebooks/InslawIi_djvu.txt.
-[^24]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
+[^24]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
-[^25]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
+[^25]: "No wrong-doing in Inslaw affair, report says," *UPI,* 1993. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/06/17/No-wrong-doing-in-Inslaw-affair-report-says/5482740289600/
-[^26]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
+[^26]: "The Vanunu affair and the Sunday Mirror photograph," contemporaneous press reporting noting the photograph was taken by Sunday Times journalist Peter Hounam, undercutting Ben-Menashe's account.
-[^27]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
+[^27]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
-[^28]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
+[^28]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, pp. 309-310.
-[^29]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
+[^29]: "Former Israeli Spy Ari Ben-Menashe on Israel's Relationship with Epstein," *MintPress News,* 2019. https://www.mintpressnews.com/ari-ben-menashe-israel-relationship-jeffrey-epstein/263465/
+[^30]: "What did Ari Ben-Menashe claim about Jeffrey Epstein," *Factually,* 2025. https://factually.co/fact-checks/media/ari-ben-menashe-claims-jeffrey-epstein-mossad-d56c30
+[^31]: "The Man of Mystery Hustling Myanmar," *Washington Monthly,* 2021. https://washingtonmonthly.com/2021/03/13/the-man-of-mystery-hustling-myanmar/
+[^32]: "Tsvangirai acquitted of treason in Zimbabwe," *The Globe and Mail,* 2004. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/tsvangirai-acquitted-of-treason-in-zimbabwe/article18275151/
+[^33]: "The Curious Case of Bishkek's $1 Million Deal With Ex-Israeli Intelligence Worker," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,* 2021. https://www.rferl.org/a/the-curious-case-of-bishkek-s-1-million-deal-with-ex-israeli-intelligence-worker-/31033365.html
+[^34]: McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., 91 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Dick Cheney.md

@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Halliburton]]"
     role: "chief executive"
     end: 2000
-    fn: 4
+    fn: 5
 created: 2026-09-22
-updated: 2026-09-22
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 Richard Bruce Cheney was born in Lincoln, Nebraska, on January 30, 1941, and grew up in Casper, Wyoming. He was a congressional fellow in 1968, worked at the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Cost of Living Council, was deputy assistant to President [[Gerald R. Ford]] in 1974 and 1975 and his chief of staff from 1975 to 1977, represented Wyoming in the House from 1979 until March 17, 1989, was Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993, and was Vice President under [[George W. Bush]] from 2001 to 2009.[^1]
@@ -42,21 +42,24 @@ In June 1975, as deputy to the chief of staff, [[Donald Rumsfeld]], Cheney led t
 
 ### Iran-Contra
 
-As a House Republican on the Iran-Contra investigating committees, Cheney signed the minority report of November 1987, drafted principally by the committee staffer Michael Malbin. It held that "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government" and that "to whatever extent the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]] tried to prohibit such activity they were clearly unconstitutional."[^3]
+As a House Republican on the Iran-Contra investigating committees, Cheney signed the minority report of November 1987, drafted principally by the committee staffer Michael Malbin. The report quoted Federalist No. 70, "energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government," and stated that the Constitution protects the President's ability "to persuade U.S. citizens to engage voluntarily in otherwise legal activity to serve what they consider to be the national interest. That includes trying to persuade other countries to contribute their own funds for causes both countries support. To whatever extent the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]] tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional."[^3]
+
+On December 10, 1986, Cheney questioned [[Robert McFarlane]] before the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] about the Boland Amendment. McFarlane testified that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" [[Oliver North]] had violated it, and that a document search "turned up two or three inches of paper, that reported on contacts that did occur between Colonel North and myself, indeed the President and Contra leaders." The committees wrote that in this testimony McFarlane withheld his concerns about the documents and asserted that they proved North had fully complied with the Boland Amendment.[^4]
 
 ### Halliburton
 
-Cheney was chief executive of [[Halliburton]] in the late 1990s. [[Ray Hunt]] of [[Hunt Oil Company|Hunt Oil]] joined its board in 1998 and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million.[^4] As Vice President, he said on August 26, 2002, that the case of the Iraqi defector [[Hussein Kamel]] "should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself"; Kamel had told UN inspectors in August 1995 that Iraq's chemical, biological and missile stocks had been destroyed.[^5]
+Cheney was chief executive of [[Halliburton]] in the late 1990s. [[Ray Hunt]] of [[Hunt Oil Company|Hunt Oil]] joined its board in 1998 and went at once onto its compensation committee, which that year gave Cheney a bonus of 1.1 million dollars and restricted stock worth 1.5 million on a salary of 1.18 million.[^5] As Vice President, he said on August 26, 2002, that the case of the Iraqi defector [[Hussein Kamel]] "should serve as a reminder to all that we often learned more as the result of defections than we learned from the inspection regime itself"; Kamel had told UN inspectors in August 1995 that Iraq's chemical, biological and missile stocks had been destroyed.[^6]
 
 ### Allegations
 
-[[Cathy O'Brien]], who describes herself as a survivor of [[Project Monarch]] mind control, named Cheney among officials she said abused her, in *Trance Formation of America* (1995, with Mark Phillips). Her claims about named officials are uncorroborated.[^6]
+[[Cathy O'Brien]], who describes herself as a survivor of [[Project Monarch]] mind control, named Cheney among officials she said abused her, in *Trance Formation of America* (1995, with Mark Phillips). Her claims about named officials are uncorroborated.[^7]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives, "CHENEY, Richard Bruce." https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/10884
 [^2]: Prados, John, and Arturo Jimenez-Bacardi, eds. "Gerald Ford White House Altered Rockefeller Commission Report in 1975; Removed Section on CIA Assassination Plots." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 543, February 29, 2016, document 15. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2016-02-29/gerald-ford-white-house-altered-rockefeller-commission-report
-[^3]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, November 1987, minority report. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18221
+[^3]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair,* H. Rept. 100-433, S. Rept. 100-216, November 1987, minority report, minority views, ch. 1, p. 451, and ch. 2, p. 460. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/18221
-[^4]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
+[^4]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 6, p. 132 and nn. 193-194 (McFarlane before the House Intelligence Committee, Dec. 10, 1986). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
-[^5]: Rangwala, Glen. "The interview with Hussein Kamel," February 2003, quoting the UNSCOM and IAEA note of the meeting of August 22, 1995; Barry, John. *Newsweek,* March 3, 2003.
+[^5]: Halliburton Company, Schedule 14A proxy statement, 2004, Securities and Exchange Commission.
-[^6]: O'Brien, Cathy, and Mark Phillips. *Trance Formation of America.* 1995.
+[^6]: Rangwala, Glen. "The interview with Hussein Kamel," February 2003, quoting the UNSCOM and IAEA note of the meeting of August 22, 1995; Barry, John. *Newsweek,* March 3, 2003.
+[^7]: O'Brien, Cathy, and Mark Phillips. *Trance Formation of America.* 1995.

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Edward P. Boland.md

@@ -9,13 +9,19 @@ born: 1911-10-01
 died: 2001-11-04
 location: "Springfield, Massachusetts"
 ---
-Edward P. Boland was the Massachusetts Democratic congressman who sponsored the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]], the series of congressional provisions that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for covert military operations against [[Nicaragua]]. The amendments, passed between 1982 and 1984, were named after Boland as chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1]
+Edward P. Boland was the Massachusetts Democratic congressman who sponsored the [[Boland Amendment|Boland Amendments]], the series of congressional provisions that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for covert military operations against [[Nicaragua]]. The amendments, passed between 1982 and 1986, were named after Boland as chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1]
 
 ### The Boland Amendments
 
-The amendments sought to rein in the Reagan administration's covert war by prohibiting the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], [[National Security Council]], or any other U.S. government agency from providing military aid to the [[Contras]]. The legislation directly led to [[Oliver North]]'s illegal efforts to fund the Contras through alternative sources, including [[Iran]] arms sales proceeds, Saudi contributions, and [[Cocaine]] trafficking profits. The Boland Amendments exposed the tension between congressional oversight and executive branch determination to pursue the Contra war by any means necessary.[^2]
+The amendments sought to rein in the Reagan administration's covert war by restricting military aid to the [[Contras]]. The 1982 provision applied to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Department of Defense]]; the provisions of 1983 to 1986 extended to "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities," language the Iran-Contra committees' majority read to cover the [[National Security Council]] staff and the minority read not to.[^2] The legislation directly led to [[Oliver North]]'s illegal efforts to fund the Contras through alternative sources, including [[Iran]] arms sales proceeds, Saudi contributions, and [[Cocaine]] trafficking profits. The Boland Amendments exposed the tension between congressional oversight and executive branch determination to pursue the Contra war by any means necessary.[^3]
+
+On December 8, 1982, Boland offered a substitute to [[Tom Harkin]]'s amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill, telling the House that it was substantively identical to the restriction in the classified annex to the earlier intelligence authorization act and that the Administration had accepted it: "They do not like it, but it is agreeable to them." The House adopted his substitute 411 to 0 after rejecting Harkin's substitute, and the provision took effect on December 21, 1982.[^4] The House Intelligence Committee, of which he was chairman, reported the Boland-Zablocki bill in May 1983; the House passed it 228 to 195 on July 28, 1983, and the Senate never considered it.[^5] After the conference of December 1983 Boland described the fiscal 1984 compromise as "a $24 million cap on funding from whatever source." On October 10, 1984, he told the House that the provision then before it "clearly ends United States support for the war in Nicaragua," that "there are no exceptions to the prohibition," and that it "clearly prohibits any expenditure, including those from accounts for salaries and all support costs."[^6]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Glossary.
-[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
+[^2]: Public Law 97-377, sec. 793; Public Law 98-215, sec. 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475; Public Law 98-473, sec. 101 (sec. 8066(a)), 98 Stat. 1935; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 399, and minority views, ch. 6, pp. 491-497.
+[^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
+[^4]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 396; Public Law 97-377, sec. 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (Dec. 21, 1982). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE-96-Pg1830.pdf
+[^5]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, p. 34 and nn. 34-36.
+[^6]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 26, pp. 397-398 (citing 130 Cong. Rec. H11974 and H11980, daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984); Walsh, Final Report, vol. I, part III, n. 47. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Elliott Abrams.md

@@ -51,55 +51,55 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1991-10-07
-    fn: 34
+    fn: 37
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[National Security Council]]"
     start: 2001-06
     end: 2009-01
     role: "Senior director for democracy, human rights and international organizations; senior director for Near East and North African affairs; deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy"
-    fn: 39
+    fn: 42
   - type: head_of
     with: "[[Ethics and Public Policy Center]]"
     start: 1996
     end: 2001
-    fn: 39
+    fn: 42
   - type: member_of
     with: "[[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]]"
     start: 1999
     end: 2001
     role: "Member, chairman in 2001; reappointed 2012"
-    fn: 39
+    fn: 42
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Council on Foreign Relations]]"
     role: "Senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies"
-    fn: 39
+    fn: 42
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[State Department]]"
     start: 2019-01-25
     end: 2021-01
     role: "Special Representative for Venezuela"
-    fn: 44
+    fn: 47
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[State Department]]"
     start: 2020-08
     end: 2021-01
     role: "Special Representative for Iran"
-    fn: 46
+    fn: 49
   - type: relative_of
     with: "[[Midge Decter]]"
     role: "Mother-in-law"
     start: 1980
-    fn: 48
+    fn: 51
   - type: relative_of
     with: "[[Norman Podhoretz]]"
     role: "Stepfather-in-law"
     start: 1980
-    fn: 48
+    fn: 51
   - type: spouse_of
     with: "[[Rachel Abrams]]"
     start: 1980
     end: 2013-06-07
-    fn: 48
+    fn: 51
 ---
 Elliott Abrams (born January 24, 1948, New York City) was an Assistant Secretary of State in the Reagan administration who chaired the [[Restricted Interagency Group]] on Central America and served as the administration's chief advocate on Capitol Hill for aid to the [[Contras]].[^1] With [[Oliver North]] he persuaded the director of the [[NHAO]] to add North's courier to the office staff. He pleaded guilty in 1991 to withholding information from Congress and was pardoned by [[George H.W. Bush]] in December 1992.
 
@@ -107,79 +107,81 @@ Elliott Abrams (born January 24, 1948, New York City) was an Assistant Secretary
 
 Abrams joined the Reagan administration in January 1981 as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs and later became assistant secretary for human rights.[^2] On April 19, 1985 [[George P. Shultz]] offered him the post of assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, and a note by [[Charles Hill]] recorded Shultz's promise to "manage the emergence of E[lliott] A[brams] as King of L[atin] A[merica]."[^3] Abrams assumed the post in July 1985 and became responsible for Central America. The [[Boland Amendment]] had cut off aid to the Contras in October 1984, and Abrams became the administration's chief advocate on Capitol Hill for aid to the rebels.[^2]
 
-Abrams's notes of a September 4, 1985 meeting with Shultz record the instruction to "monitor Ollie," meaning North.[^4] Abrams later testified that his "working assumption" was that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff.[^5] He chaired the Restricted Interagency Group, the interagency body that coordinated policy on the region, with [[Alan Fiers]] of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s Central American Task Force and North as its principal members.[^6]
+Abrams's notes of a September 4, 1985 meeting with Shultz record the instruction to "monitor Ollie," meaning North.[^4] Abrams later testified that his "working assumption" was that the Boland Amendment applied to the NSC staff.[^5] He chaired the Restricted Interagency Group, the interagency body that coordinated policy on the region, with [[Alan Fiers]] of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s Central American Task Force and North as its principal members.[^6] In March 1985 Abrams's predecessor, [[A. Langhorne Motley]], told the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]: "even if today we wanted to go to third countries to encourage or solicit, we could not because there is a prohibition."[^7]
 
 ### Guatemala, 1983
 
-As assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, Abrams said in January 1983 that the administration was "quite encouraged" by the initial steps of Guatemala's President [[Efrain Rios Montt]], who had come to power in March 1982. He said that under Ríos Montt "There are many fewer abuses than there used to be," that the army's behavior had improved, and that the resumption of military sales should be viewed as "encouragement" to the new government. Asked about accounts by Guatemalan refugees in Mexico of massacres by the army, he said: "There are certainly refugees in Mexico whose towns suffered massacres by the military, but our sense is that this kind of gross behavior by the military is very substantially reduced under Rios Montt."[^7]
+As assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs, Abrams said in January 1983 that the administration was "quite encouraged" by the initial steps of Guatemala's President [[Efrain Rios Montt]], who had come to power in March 1982. He said that under Ríos Montt "There are many fewer abuses than there used to be," that the army's behavior had improved, and that the resumption of military sales should be viewed as "encouragement" to the new government. Asked about accounts by Guatemalan refugees in Mexico of massacres by the army, he said: "There are certainly refugees in Mexico whose towns suffered massacres by the military, but our sense is that this kind of gross behavior by the military is very substantially reduced under Rios Montt."[^8]
 
 ### El Mozote and the 1982 certification
 
-The [[Atlacatl Battalion]] detained the inhabitants of [[El Mozote]] in Morazán on December 10, 1981 and executed them on December 11, according to the [[United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador]]. The Commission identified more than 200 victims at El Mozote, and more than 500 identified victims across El Mozote and the other villages hit in the same operation.[^8] The massacre became public knowledge on January 27, 1982, when [[New York Times|The New York Times]] and [[Washington Post|The Washington Post]] published reports by [[Raymond Bonner]] and [[Alma Guillermoprieto]]. The Salvadoran authorities "categorically denied that a massacre had taken place."[^9]
+The [[Atlacatl Battalion]] detained the inhabitants of [[El Mozote]] in Morazán on December 10, 1981 and executed them on December 11, according to the [[United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador]]. The Commission identified more than 200 victims at El Mozote, and more than 500 identified victims across El Mozote and the other villages hit in the same operation.[^9] The massacre became public knowledge on January 27, 1982, when [[New York Times|The New York Times]] and [[Washington Post|The Washington Post]] published reports by [[Raymond Bonner]] and [[Alma Guillermoprieto]]. The Salvadoran authorities "categorically denied that a massacre had taken place."[^10]
 
-On February 8, 1982 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony on the President's January 28, 1982 certification of military aid to El Salvador. [[Thomas O. Enders]] read a summary of an embassy report on the village. The two officers who wrote it had approached El Mozote and interviewed refugees, and they concluded that it was "certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle."[^10] Enders's prepared statement said that the embassy found no evidence that government forces systematically massacred civilians, and that the number killed did not approach the 733 or 926 victims cited in press reports. The statement also said that insurgents had repeatedly fabricated or inflated mass-murder allegations.[^10]
+On February 8, 1982 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee heard testimony on the President's January 28, 1982 certification of military aid to El Salvador. [[Thomas O. Enders]] read a summary of an embassy report on the village. The two officers who wrote it had approached El Mozote and interviewed refugees, and they concluded that it was "certain that the guerrilla forces who established defensive positions in El Mozote did nothing to remove them from the path of battle."[^11] Enders's prepared statement said that the embassy found no evidence that government forces systematically massacred civilians, and that the number killed did not approach the 733 or 926 victims cited in press reports. The statement also said that insurgents had repeatedly fabricated or inflated mass-murder allegations.[^11]
 
-Abrams told the committee that the affair "appears to be an incident which is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas." He added: "Where the truth lies we are still attempting to find out."[^11] The Truth Commission later reported that the 1992 exhumation at El Mozote recovered 245 cartridge cases studied by ballistics analysts, 184 with headstamps identifying ammunition manufactured for the United States Government at Lake City, Missouri, and that all projectiles but one appeared to have been fired from United States-manufactured M-16 rifles.[^12]
+Abrams told the committee that the affair "appears to be an incident which is at least being significantly misused, at the very best, by the guerrillas." He added: "Where the truth lies we are still attempting to find out."[^12] The Truth Commission later reported that the 1992 exhumation at El Mozote recovered 245 cartridge cases studied by ballistics analysts, 184 with headstamps identifying ammunition manufactured for the United States Government at Lake City, Missouri, and that all projectiles but one appeared to have been fired from United States-manufactured M-16 rifles.[^13]
 
 ### The NHAO and North's network
 
-Congress appropriated $27 million in humanitarian assistance for the Contras in August 1985. On August 29, 1985 President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) inside the [[State Department]] to administer the money, and [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office.[^13] [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that North intruded in the office in two ways: he insisted that [[Richard Gadd]], who was assisting [[Richard Secord]] and North in lethal resupply, be the contractor for NHAO flights, and, with Abrams, he persuaded Duemling to add North's Central American courier, [[Robert Owen]], to the NHAO staff.[^13] Owen, in addition to handling traveler's checks for contra leaders, picked up and delivered $16,500 in cash.[^14]
+Congress appropriated $27 million in humanitarian assistance for the Contras in August 1985. On August 29, 1985 President [[Ronald Reagan]] created the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) inside the [[State Department]] to administer the money, and [[Robert W. Duemling]] set up the office.[^14] [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that North intruded in the office in two ways: he insisted that [[Richard Gadd]], who was assisting [[Richard Secord]] and North in lethal resupply, be the contractor for NHAO flights, and, with Abrams, he persuaded Duemling to add North's Central American courier, [[Robert Owen]], to the NHAO staff.[^14] Owen, in addition to handling traveler's checks for contra leaders, picked up and delivered $16,500 in cash.[^15]
 
-The congressional committees' 1987 report records that Owen applied to Duemling for an NHAO position in mid-September 1985 and that North recommended him as a "can do" person "who knows the scene." Duemling declined, and declined again after the three directors of the United Nicaraguan Opposition wrote asking for Owen's help. At a Restricted Interagency Group meeting on October 11, 1985, North complained about the NHAO flight impounded on October 10, saying it would not have happened had Owen been working for the NHAO. Duemling then agreed to fund a UNO contract with Owen's company, the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance, Inc.[^15]
+The congressional committees' 1987 report records that Owen applied to Duemling for an NHAO position in mid-September 1985 and that North recommended him as a "can do" person "who knows the scene." Duemling declined, and declined again after the three directors of the United Nicaraguan Opposition wrote asking for Owen's help. At a Restricted Interagency Group meeting on October 11, 1985, North complained about the NHAO flight impounded on October 10, saying it would not have happened had Owen been working for the NHAO. Duemling then agreed to fund a UNO contract with Owen's company, the Institute for Democracy, Education and Assistance, Inc.[^16]
 
-[[Gary Webb]] wrote in [[Dark Alliance]] that Duemling testified in a deposition to the Iran-Contra committees that he saw no necessity for a middleman, that North had Contra leaders write letters demanding Owen's hiring and lobbied Duemling's superior at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and that after one stormy meeting with North and Abrams, Abrams turned to Duemling and said: "Well, Bob, I suppose you probably ought to hire Owen." Webb wrote that Owen was given a $50,000 contract as a "facilitator" and that the minutes of the November 1985 meeting record Abrams and North agreeing that Owen "will be expendable if he becomes a political or diplomatic liability."[^16] A second version attributed to Webb gives the facilitator's pay as $6,000 a month and has Abrams telling Duemling, when Duemling opposed the hiring: "Well, he works for me." In that version the facilitator position was created to channel funds through North's network while maintaining the appearance of humanitarian aid.[^17]
+[[Gary Webb]] wrote in [[Dark Alliance]] that Duemling testified in a deposition to the Iran-Contra committees that he saw no necessity for a middleman, that North had Contra leaders write letters demanding Owen's hiring and lobbied Duemling's superior at the State Department, Assistant Secretary Abrams, and that after one stormy meeting with North and Abrams, Abrams turned to Duemling and said: "Well, Bob, I suppose you probably ought to hire Owen." Webb wrote that Owen was given a $50,000 contract as a "facilitator" and that the minutes of the November 1985 meeting record Abrams and North agreeing that Owen "will be expendable if he becomes a political or diplomatic liability."[^17] A second version attributed to Webb gives the facilitator's pay as $6,000 a month and has Abrams telling Duemling, when Duemling opposed the hiring: "Well, he works for me." In that version the facilitator position was created to channel funds through North's network while maintaining the appearance of humanitarian aid.[^18]
 
-On October 10, 1985 an NHAO aircraft flew directly from the United States to Honduras with a television crew on board. The Honduran government then rescinded its permission for NHAO planes to fly directly there from the United States. North proposed the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango air base]] in El Salvador as a transshipment point, and the NHAO planes were routed there.[^13]
+On October 10, 1985 an NHAO aircraft flew directly from the United States to Honduras with a television crew on board. The Honduran government then rescinded its permission for NHAO planes to fly directly there from the United States. North proposed the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango air base]] in El Salvador as a transshipment point, and the NHAO planes were routed there.[^14]
 
 ### Costa Rican airstrip and the RIG
 
-Within days after Shultz's "monitor Ollie" instruction, Abrams, North and Fiers met in Abrams's office, and Fiers briefed Abrams on a secret airfield in Costa Rica that the contra supply network was building.[^18] After the Costa Rican announcement of the airstrip, Abrams drafted a harshly worded cable to the Costa Rican government. Walsh recorded that a cable containing his message was stopped by Shultz aide Hill.[^19]
+Within days after Shultz's "monitor Ollie" instruction, Abrams, North and Fiers met in Abrams's office, and Fiers briefed Abrams on a secret airfield in Costa Rica that the contra supply network was building.[^19] After the Costa Rican announcement of the airstrip, Abrams drafted a harshly worded cable to the Costa Rican government. Walsh recorded that a cable containing his message was stopped by Shultz aide Hill.[^20]
 
-In September 1986 North proposed that Panamanian leader [[Manuel Noriega]] pay for sabotage inside Nicaragua, at a RIG meeting in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Richard Armitage]] on September 19. Walsh wrote that the decision was ultimately made not to have North cause the $1 million to be paid to Noriega. On September 20 Abrams met [[Nicholas Platt]] and Hill, and Hill's notes recorded the Noriega offer and "Wants our go-ahead."[^20]
+In September 1986 North proposed that Panamanian leader [[Manuel Noriega]] pay for sabotage inside Nicaragua, at a RIG meeting in the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [[Richard Armitage]] on September 19. Walsh wrote that the decision was ultimately made not to have North cause the $1 million to be paid to Noriega. On September 20 Abrams met [[Nicholas Platt]] and Hill, and Hill's notes recorded the Noriega offer and "Wants our go-ahead."[^21]
 
 ### Brunei solicitation
 
-After a May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group meeting, Abrams raised with Shultz the solicitation of third countries. Shultz instructed him not to approach a large recipient of U.S. aid or a right-wing dictatorship such as Taiwan or South Korea.[^21] Abrams suggested the Sultan of [[Brunei]], and North told him to send no papers and say nothing further until North had talked with [[John Poindexter]]. Abrams lunched with Poindexter on June 11, 1986 and they discussed Brunei as a possible donor.[^21]
+After a May 16, 1986 National Security Planning Group meeting, Abrams raised with Shultz the solicitation of third countries. Shultz instructed him not to approach a large recipient of U.S. aid or a right-wing dictatorship such as Taiwan or South Korea.[^22] Abrams suggested the Sultan of [[Brunei]], and North told him to send no papers and say nothing further until North had talked with [[John Poindexter]]. Abrams lunched with Poindexter on June 11, 1986 and they discussed Brunei as a possible donor.[^22]
 
-In June 1986 Abrams obtained bank account information from North on a card typed by his secretary, [[Fawn Hall]]. Two account numbers were transposed, and the money went into the wrong account.[^21] Abrams solicited $10 million from the Sultan's defense minister, General Ibnu, in London on August 9, 1986, calling him under the name "Kenilworth." The Sultan ordered the transfer on August 19 from a Citibank account to [[Credit Suisse]] in Geneva, account 368430-22-1. A North notebook entry of September 15 refers to a deposit made about a week earlier and to a meeting with the Sultan the next day. On September 26 Ibnu told the U.S. ambassador that the Sultan had handled the transfer personally and that the recipient was "quite clear."[^22]
+In June 1986 Abrams obtained bank account information from North on a card typed by his secretary, [[Fawn Hall]]. Two account numbers were transposed, and the money went into the wrong account.[^22] Abrams solicited $10 million from the Sultan's defense minister, General Ibnu, in London on August 9, 1986, calling him under the name "Kenilworth." The congressional committees dated the meeting August 8, 1986.[^23] The Sultan ordered the transfer on August 19 from a Citibank account to [[Credit Suisse]] in Geneva, account 368430-22-1. A North notebook entry of September 15 refers to a deposit made about a week earlier and to a meeting with the Sultan the next day. On September 26 Ibnu told the U.S. ambassador that the Sultan had handled the transfer personally and that the recipient was "quite clear."[^24]
 
-The account North had supplied was for the Enterprise's Lake Resources account at Credit Suisse, 386.430.22.1. The number Abrams passed on was 368.430.22.1, and the deposit went there. Swiss authorities reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^23] Walsh recorded that the Brunei contribution passed through accounts "controlled by or on behalf of" [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman, and that Credit Suisse disclaimed him as the recipient in 1989. Questioned under an immunity agreement in October 1990, Rappaport said the account was not his and that he did not know whose account received the deposit. He also said he did not know North or Abrams.[^24]
+Shultz had been expected to make the approach to the Sultan on his Asia trip of June 23 and 24, 1986, carrying the index card with the account number; on the advice of U.S. Ambassador Barrington King he did not make a solicitation, and the card was not used on that trip.[^25] The committees wrote that North told Abrams the account was controlled by the Contras and that Abrams so informed Shultz; Walsh wrote that North told Abrams the use of the account North provided would permit more control by the U.S. Government.[^23][^25] The committees wrote that Abrams traveled to London under an alias and requested $10 million in "bridge financing"; asked what Brunei would receive in return, he answered: "Well, ... the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." The official asked, "What concrete do we get out of this?" and Abrams answered: "You don't get anything concrete out of it."[^23] The majority described the giving of the Lake Resources number as "a deliberate effort to divert funds solicited for humanitarian purposes to lethal ends, and was foiled only because of an error in the account number."[^7]
 
-The congressional committees' 1987 report recorded that Abrams described his late 1986 answers on third-country funding as "misleading." It also recorded his explanation that he had been promised confidentiality for Brunei and that "I did not believe I was authorized to" reveal the solicitation.[^25]
+The account North had supplied was for the Enterprise's Lake Resources account at Credit Suisse, 386.430.22.1. The number Abrams passed on was 368.430.22.1, and the deposit went there. Swiss authorities reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^26] Walsh recorded that the Brunei contribution passed through accounts "controlled by or on behalf of" [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman, and that Credit Suisse disclaimed him as the recipient in 1989. Questioned under an immunity agreement in October 1990, Rappaport said the account was not his and that he did not know whose account received the deposit. He also said he did not know North or Abrams.[^27]
+
+The congressional committees' 1987 report recorded that Abrams described his late 1986 answers on third-country funding as "misleading." It also recorded his explanation that he had been promised confidentiality for Brunei and that "I did not believe I was authorized to" reveal the solicitation.[^28]
 
 ### Hasenfus and the October 1986 testimony
 
-A C-123 aircraft carrying supplies to the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986, and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Abrams chaired a RIG meeting on the downed aircraft on October 8. The group discussed demands for access to Hasenfus, Salvadoran denials of contra support, press guidance, and [[Southern Air Transport]], which had been used for NHAO deliveries. Walsh recorded that Abrams phoned North about the incident and asked about the retrieval of the bodies of the two American crew members killed in the crash, but did not explicitly ask North whether he was connected with the aircraft.[^26]
+A C-123 aircraft carrying supplies to the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on October 5, 1986, and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Abrams chaired a RIG meeting on the downed aircraft on October 8. The group discussed demands for access to Hasenfus, Salvadoran denials of contra support, press guidance, and [[Southern Air Transport]], which had been used for NHAO deliveries. Walsh recorded that Abrams phoned North about the incident and asked about the retrieval of the bodies of the two American crew members killed in the crash, but did not explicitly ask North whether he was connected with the aircraft.[^29]
 
-On October 10, 1986 Abrams testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Walsh's report calls a closed session and the congressional committees' 1987 report calls an open hearing. He said that "there clearly is an elaborate supply system," and added: "It is not our supply system." He said that the administration's attitude was that the people supplying the contras were doing "a very good thing," and that "we do generally approve of what they are doing."[^27] Asked by [[John Kerry]] about foreign government assistance, Abrams said that "we have not received a dime from a foreign government, not a dime, from any foreign government."[^28] He told the committee that his "injunction from the Secretary of State is never to lie."[^28]
+On October 10, 1986 Abrams testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which Walsh's report calls a closed session and the congressional committees' 1987 report calls an open hearing. He said that "there clearly is an elaborate supply system," and added: "It is not our supply system." He said that the administration's attitude was that the people supplying the contras were doing "a very good thing," and that "we do generally approve of what they are doing."[^30] Asked by [[John Kerry]] about foreign government assistance, Abrams said that "we have not received a dime from a foreign government, not a dime, from any foreign government."[^31] He told the committee that his "injunction from the Secretary of State is never to lie."[^31]
 
-On October 14 Abrams told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that "that story about the Saudis to my knowledge is false," and that the claim of foreign government support was false as to 1985 and 1986.[^29] On October 15 he told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the U.S. government did not know who organized and paid for the flight. Asked whether anyone in the government did know, he said: "I wouldn't separate myself from the Government. We don't know."[^30]
+On October 14 Abrams told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that "that story about the Saudis to my knowledge is false," and that the claim of foreign government support was false as to 1985 and 1986.[^32] On October 15 he told a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee that the U.S. government did not know who organized and paid for the flight. Asked whether anyone in the government did know, he said: "I wouldn't separate myself from the Government. We don't know."[^33]
 
-Walsh's report concluded: "Abrams was not truthful with the congressional committees."[^31] On October 14 Abrams told HPSCI that it was his understanding that [[Donald Gregg]] knew [[Felix Rodriguez]] and had introduced him to the Salvadorans in 1984 to work with the Salvadoran Air Force. He added that the Vice President was aware of Rodriguez's involvement with the Salvadoran Air Force, but that there was no knowledge that Rodriguez had moved on to activities on behalf of the contras.[^32] After his plea, Abrams told the grand jury that he was concerned that Rodriguez "talked too much about the Vice President."[^33]
+Walsh's report concluded: "Abrams was not truthful with the congressional committees."[^34] On October 14 Abrams told HPSCI that it was his understanding that [[Donald Gregg]] knew [[Felix Rodriguez]] and had introduced him to the Salvadorans in 1984 to work with the Salvadoran Air Force. He added that the Vice President was aware of Rodriguez's involvement with the Salvadoran Air Force, but that there was no knowledge that Rodriguez had moved on to activities on behalf of the contras.[^35] After his plea, Abrams told the grand jury that he was concerned that Rodriguez "talked too much about the Vice President."[^36]
 
 ### Guilty plea and pardon
 
-On October 7, 1991 Abrams pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. The counts concerned his October 10, 1986 Senate testimony and his October 14, 1986 testimony to HPSCI about the Brunei solicitation.[^34] Abrams admitted that it was his belief "that disclosure of Lt. Col. North's activities in the resupply of the Contras would jeopardize final enactment" of a $100 million appropriation then pending.[^34] U.S. District Chief Judge [[Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.]] sentenced him on November 15, 1991 to two years' probation and 100 hours of community service.[^35]
+On October 7, 1991 Abrams pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress. The counts concerned his October 10, 1986 Senate testimony and his October 14, 1986 testimony to HPSCI about the Brunei solicitation.[^37] Abrams admitted that it was his belief "that disclosure of Lt. Col. North's activities in the resupply of the Contras would jeopardize final enactment" of a $100 million appropriation then pending.[^37] U.S. District Chief Judge [[Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr.]] sentenced him on November 15, 1991 to two years' probation and 100 hours of community service.[^38]
 
-Walsh's report described Abrams as the leading official of the denials, who "steadfastly denied before Congress and the public that the United States was involved in the resupply effort."[^36] On December 24, 1992 President Bush granted clemency to Abrams, [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Clair George]], Fiers and [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]]. Bush described the prosecutions as the "criminalization of policy differences."[^37] [[William Barr]] later said of Abrams that he was "very unjustly treated."[^38]
+Walsh's report described Abrams as the leading official of the denials, who "steadfastly denied before Congress and the public that the United States was involved in the resupply effort."[^39] On December 24, 1992 President Bush granted clemency to Abrams, [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[Clair George]], Fiers and [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]]. Bush described the prosecutions as the "criminalization of policy differences."[^40] [[William Barr]] later said of Abrams that he was "very unjustly treated."[^41]
 
 ### Later posts, 2001 to 2009
 
-Abrams joined the George W. Bush administration in June 2001 as senior director of the [[National Security Council]] for democracy, human rights and international organizations. From December 2002 to February 2005 he was senior director for Near East and North African affairs. From February 2005 to January 2009 he was deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy and supervised both the Near East and North African directorate and the democracy directorate.[^39]
+Abrams joined the George W. Bush administration in June 2001 as senior director of the [[National Security Council]] for democracy, human rights and international organizations. From December 2002 to February 2005 he was senior director for Near East and North African affairs. From February 2005 to January 2009 he was deputy national security adviser for global democracy strategy and supervised both the Near East and North African directorate and the democracy directorate.[^42]
 
-Abrams had led the [[Ethics and Public Policy Center]] from 1996 until he joined the White House staff. He served on the [[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]] from 1999 to 2001, chairing it in 2001, and was reappointed in 2012. He was also a member of the [[U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council]].[^39] Abrams was one of the signers of the [[Project for the New American Century]] Statement of Principles of June 3, 1997, whose other signers included [[Dick Cheney]], [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Paul Wolfowitz]], [[I. Lewis Libby]], [[Zalmay Khalilzad]], [[Jeb Bush]], [[Midge Decter]] and [[Norman Podhoretz]].[^40] He also signed the Project's letter of January 26, 1998 to President [[Bill Clinton]], which stated that American strategy toward Iraq "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." Its other signers included Armitage, [[John Bolton]], Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, [[Richard Perle]], [[Robert Kagan]], [[William Kristol]], [[R. James Woolsey]] and [[Robert Zoellick]].[^41]
+Abrams had led the [[Ethics and Public Policy Center]] from 1996 until he joined the White House staff. He served on the [[U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom]] from 1999 to 2001, chairing it in 2001, and was reappointed in 2012. He was also a member of the [[U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council]].[^42] Abrams was one of the signers of the [[Project for the New American Century]] Statement of Principles of June 3, 1997, whose other signers included [[Dick Cheney]], [[Donald Rumsfeld]], [[Paul Wolfowitz]], [[I. Lewis Libby]], [[Zalmay Khalilzad]], [[Jeb Bush]], [[Midge Decter]] and [[Norman Podhoretz]].[^43] He also signed the Project's letter of January 26, 1998 to President [[Bill Clinton]], which stated that American strategy toward Iraq "should aim, above all, at the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power." Its other signers included Armitage, [[John Bolton]], Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, [[Richard Perle]], [[Robert Kagan]], [[William Kristol]], [[R. James Woolsey]] and [[Robert Zoellick]].[^44]
 
-In April 2002 the Venezuelan government of [[Hugo Chavez|Hugo Chávez]] was briefly removed while Abrams was on the NSC staff. Democracy Now's 2020 summary stated that Abrams "was also linked to the 2002 attempted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez."[^42] The State Department's [[Office of Inspector General]], reviewing U.S. policy toward Venezuela from November 2001 to April 2002 at the request of Senator [[Christopher Dodd]], reported in July 2002 that "the embassy's and Department's contacts were heavily weighted toward individuals and groups known to be opponents of the Chávez government," and that "The opposition's willingness to talk to Embassy Caracas in detail about their plans against President Chávez and the embassy's willingness to listen may have left doubts about the sincerity of our professed opposition to undemocratic and unconstitutional means of removing President Chávez." The report limited the identities of those met to a classified annex, and concluded that the Inspector General "finds nothing to indicate that the Department or Embassy Caracas planned, participated in, aided, or encouraged the brief ouster of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April."[^43]
+In April 2002 the Venezuelan government of [[Hugo Chavez|Hugo Chávez]] was briefly removed while Abrams was on the NSC staff. Democracy Now's 2020 summary stated that Abrams "was also linked to the 2002 attempted coup against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez."[^45] The State Department's [[Office of Inspector General]], reviewing U.S. policy toward Venezuela from November 2001 to April 2002 at the request of Senator [[Christopher Dodd]], reported in July 2002 that "the embassy's and Department's contacts were heavily weighted toward individuals and groups known to be opponents of the Chávez government," and that "The opposition's willingness to talk to Embassy Caracas in detail about their plans against President Chávez and the embassy's willingness to listen may have left doubts about the sincerity of our professed opposition to undemocratic and unconstitutional means of removing President Chávez." The report limited the identities of those met to a classified annex, and concluded that the Inspector General "finds nothing to indicate that the Department or Embassy Caracas planned, participated in, aided, or encouraged the brief ouster of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in April."[^46]
 
 ### Venezuela and Iran appointments, 2019 to 2021
 
-Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] announced on January 25, 2019 that Abrams would be the United States envoy for Venezuela, with the task of helping "restore democracy," two days after the United States recognized [[Juan Guaido]] as interim president.[^44] He served as special representative for Venezuela.[^45] On August 6, 2020 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named him special representative for Iran, replacing [[Brian Hook]], and he kept the Venezuela post.[^46]
+Secretary of State [[Mike Pompeo]] announced on January 25, 2019 that Abrams would be the United States envoy for Venezuela, with the task of helping "restore democracy," two days after the United States recognized [[Juan Guaido]] as interim president.[^47] He served as special representative for Venezuela.[^48] On August 6, 2020 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named him special representative for Iran, replacing [[Brian Hook]], and he kept the Venezuela post.[^49]
 
 ### Commission and family
 
-In July 2023 President [[Joe Biden]] nominated Abrams to the [[U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy]].[^47]
+In July 2023 President [[Joe Biden]] nominated Abrams to the [[U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy]].[^50]
 
-Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by her first marriage, and Midge Decter married Norman Podhoretz in 1956, making Rachel his stepdaughter.[^48] A Times of Israel obituary of Rachel Abrams describes Podhoretz as Abrams's father.[^49] Rachel Abrams died on June 7, 2013.[^49]
+Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by her first marriage, and Midge Decter married Norman Podhoretz in 1956, making Rachel his stepdaughter.[^51] A Times of Israel obituary of Rachel Abrams describes Podhoretz as Abrams's father.[^52] Rachel Abrams died on June 7, 2013.[^52]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -189,46 +191,49 @@ Abrams married Rachel Decter in 1980. She was the daughter of Midge Decter by he
 [^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of North's Activities," nn. 4 to 5, quoting Abrams note of September 4, 1985 (ALW 0041285). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
 [^5]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 2, quoting Abrams, Select Committees testimony, June 2, 1987, p. 8. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
 [^6]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, opening section and "Abrams, North and the RIG." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^7]: Christian Science Monitor, "Administration defends plans to aid Guatemalan military," January 10, 1983 (interview with Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams). https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0110/011050.html
+[^7]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 26, pp. 403 and 405-406.
-[^8]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador*, S/25500 (1993), "Illustrative case: El Mozote," pp. 114 to 115. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
+[^8]: Christian Science Monitor, "Administration defends plans to aid Guatemalan military," January 10, 1983 (interview with Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams). https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0110/011050.html
-[^9]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, "Subsequent events," pp. 116 to 117. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
+[^9]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, *From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador*, S/25500 (1993), "Illustrative case: El Mozote," pp. 114 to 115. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
-[^10]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Certification Concerning Military Aid to El Salvador: Hearings*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., February 8 and March 11, 1982, testimony of Ambassador Thomas O. Enders and prepared statement. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
+[^10]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, "Subsequent events," pp. 116 to 117. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
-[^11]: Same hearing, February 8, 1982, testimony of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
+[^11]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Certification Concerning Military Aid to El Salvador: Hearings*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., February 8 and March 11, 1982, testimony of Ambassador Thomas O. Enders and prepared statement. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
-[^12]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, forensic report on the November 1992 exhumation, p. 119. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
+[^12]: Same hearing, February 8, 1982, testimony of Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152817_0062
-[^13]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams, North and NHAO." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^13]: Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, S/25500 (1993), El Mozote, forensic report on the November 1992 exhumation, p. 119. https://www.derechos.org/nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html
-[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, description of the Enterprise couriers (Owen). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
+[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams, North and NHAO." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^15]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), chapter on the NHAO program, discussion of Robert Owen. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
+[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, description of the Enterprise couriers (Owen). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
-[^16]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 12, citing the Duemling deposition (Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, August 30, 1987) and the Arcos deposition.
+[^16]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), chapter on the NHAO program, discussion of Robert Owen. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
-[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
+[^17]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 12, citing the Duemling deposition (Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, August 30, 1987) and the Arcos deposition.
-[^18]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of the Costa Rican Airstrip and the Southern Front." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^18]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998.
-[^19]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Costa Rican airstrip section (announcement and cable). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^19]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "Abrams' Knowledge of the Costa Rican Airstrip and the Southern Front." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^20]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, meetings of September 19 and 20, 1986, citing Hill notes of September 20, 1986 (ANS). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^20]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Costa Rican airstrip section (announcement and cable). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (instructions of May 1986, June 11 lunch, account card). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, meetings of September 19 and 20, 1986, citing Hill notes of September 20, 1986 (ANS). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (August 9 London meeting, August 19 transfer, North notebook of September 15, Bandar cables of September 15 to 26, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (instructions of May 1986, June 11 lunch, account card). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^23]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Brunei account and Swiss response. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
+[^23]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 3, p. 71 and nn. 134-142. https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
-[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Rappaport passages and n. 42. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
+[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" (August 9 London meeting, August 19 transfer, North notebook of September 15, Bandar cables of September 15 to 26, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^25]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (1987), section "Abrams' Brunei Testimony" and the Brunei solicitation section. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
+[^25]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation." https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^26]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Hasenfus Shootdown" and RIG meeting of October 8, 1986. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^26]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Brunei account and Swiss response. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
-[^27]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of October 10, 1986, nn. 70 to 74 (Abrams transcript, pp. 3 to 11, 48). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), describing "an October 10 open hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
+[^27]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 14, Rappaport passages and n. 42. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
-[^28]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Brunei section and nn. 107, 112 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, October 10, 1986, pp. 49, 75 to 76). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^28]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, With Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views* (1987), section "Abrams' Brunei Testimony" and the Brunei solicitation section. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
-[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 108 (HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, p. 21). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^29]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Hasenfus Shootdown" and RIG meeting of October 8, 1986. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, nn. 75 to 76 (House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 15, 1986, pp. 31 to 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony of October 10, 1986, nn. 70 to 74 (Abrams transcript, pp. 3 to 11, 48). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), describing "an October 10 open hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee." https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0391
-[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, closing section on the October 1986 testimony. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, Brunei section and nn. 107, 112 (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, October 10, 1986, pp. 49, 75 to 76). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Donald P. Gregg," text and n. 137 (Abrams, HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, pp. 23 to 24). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
+[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, n. 108 (HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, p. 21). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^33]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Abrams and North's General Recollections of Discussions with Gregg," n. 113 (Abrams grand jury testimony, November 6, 1991, p. 45). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
+[^33]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, nn. 75 to 76 (House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, October 15, 1986, pp. 31 to 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^34]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, plea section and n. 3 (Government's Statement of the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea, October 7, 1991, p. 4). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^34]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, closing section on the October 1986 testimony. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^35]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions, entry for Elliott Abrams (sentence by U.S. District Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., November 15, 1991). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
+[^35]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Donald P. Gregg," text and n. 137 (Abrams, HPSCI testimony, October 14, 1986, pp. 23 to 24). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
-[^36]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 27, "President Reagan," text and n. 66. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
+[^36]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 29, "Abrams and North's General Recollections of Discussions with Gregg," n. 113 (Abrams grand jury testimony, November 6, 1991, p. 45). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_29.htm
-[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 28, "George Bush," pardon section and n. 1. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_28.htm
+[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 25, plea section and n. 3 (Government's Statement of the Factual Basis for the Guilty Plea, October 7, 1991, p. 4). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
-[^38]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H.W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
+[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Summary of Prosecutions, entry for Elliott Abrams (sentence by U.S. District Chief Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr., November 15, 1991). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
-[^39]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, biography of Ambassador Elliott Abrams, hearing of November 19, 2014. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20141119/102753/HHRG-113-FA13-Bio-AbramsE-20141119.pdf
+[^39]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 27, "President Reagan," text and n. 66. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
-[^40]: Project for the New American Century, "Statement of Principles," June 3, 1997, Wayback Machine capture of April 7, 2002. https://web.archive.org/web/20020407145529/http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
+[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 28, "George Bush," pardon section and n. 1. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_28.htm
-[^41]: Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, Wayback Machine capture. https://web.archive.org/web/2003/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
+[^41]: Miller Center, University of Virginia, "William P. Barr Oral History," interview of April 5, 2001, George H.W. Bush Oral History Project. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/william-p-barr-oral-history
-[^42]: Democracy Now, headline and summary of August 7, 2020, "State Department Taps Elliott Abrams as Special Representative to Iran." https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
+[^42]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, biography of Ambassador Elliott Abrams, hearing of November 19, 2014. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA13/20141119/102753/HHRG-113-FA13-Bio-AbramsE-20141119.pdf
-[^43]: U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, *A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002*, Report No. 02-OIG-003 (July 2002), pp. 15 to 16 and Conclusion. https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/13682.pdf
+[^43]: Project for the New American Century, "Statement of Principles," June 3, 1997, Wayback Machine capture of April 7, 2002. https://web.archive.org/web/20020407145529/http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm
-[^44]: Voice of America, "US Appoints New Venezuela Envoy to Help 'Restore Democracy,'" January 25, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2019/01/mil-190125-voa05.htm
+[^44]: Project for the New American Century, letter to President Clinton, January 26, 1998, Wayback Machine capture. https://web.archive.org/web/2003/http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm
-[^45]: CBS News, "Elliott Abrams, convicted of lying about Iran-Contra, named special representative for Iran," August 6, 2020 (Abrams "has been serving as the special representative for Venezuela"). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elliott-abrams-iran-contra-named-special-representative-iran
+[^45]: Democracy Now, headline and summary of August 7, 2020, "State Department Taps Elliott Abrams as Special Representative to Iran." https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
-[^46]: Democracy Now, August 7, 2020 (announcement that Abrams becomes special representative for Iran and "will also continue as special representative for Venezuela"). https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
+[^46]: U.S. Department of State, Office of Inspector General, *A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela, November 2001 - April 2002*, Report No. 02-OIG-003 (July 2002), pp. 15 to 16 and Conclusion. https://www.stateoig.gov/uploads/report/report_pdf_file/13682.pdf
-[^47]: Democracy Now, headline of July 6, 2023, "Biden Nominates Elliott Abrams, Death Squad Backer Convicted of Lying to Congress, to Gov't Commission" (President Biden "has nominated Elliott Abrams to the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy"). https://democracynow.org/2023/7/6/headlines/biden_nominates_elliott_abrams_death_squad_backer_convicted_of_lying_to_congress_to_govt_commission
+[^47]: Voice of America, "US Appoints New Venezuela Envoy to Help 'Restore Democracy,'" January 25, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2019/01/mil-190125-voa05.htm
-[^48]: Jewish Chronicle, obituary of Midge Decter (marriage to Moshe Decter in 1947, daughters Rachel and Naomi; marriage to Norman Podhoretz in 1956; Rachel Decter's marriage to Elliott Abrams in 1980). https://thejc.com/news/obituary-leading-commentator-thinker-and-writer-midge-decter-uzeijpmg
+[^48]: CBS News, "Elliott Abrams, convicted of lying about Iran-Contra, named special representative for Iran," August 6, 2020 (Abrams "has been serving as the special representative for Venezuela"). https://www.cbsnews.com/news/elliott-abrams-iran-contra-named-special-representative-iran
-[^49]: Times of Israel, obituary of Rachel Abrams, June 10, 2013 ("Abrams died June 7 after battling stomach cancer for three years. She was 62."). https://www.timesofisrael.com/artist-and-writer-rachel-abrams-succumbs-to-cancer/
+[^49]: Democracy Now, August 7, 2020 (announcement that Abrams becomes special representative for Iran and "will also continue as special representative for Venezuela"). https://democracynow.org/2020/8/7/headlines/state_department_taps_elliott_abrams_as_special_representative_to_iran
+[^50]: Democracy Now, headline of July 6, 2023, "Biden Nominates Elliott Abrams, Death Squad Backer Convicted of Lying to Congress, to Gov't Commission" (President Biden "has nominated Elliott Abrams to the bipartisan U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy"). https://democracynow.org/2023/7/6/headlines/biden_nominates_elliott_abrams_death_squad_backer_convicted_of_lying_to_congress_to_govt_commission
+[^51]: Jewish Chronicle, obituary of Midge Decter (marriage to Moshe Decter in 1947, daughters Rachel and Naomi; marriage to Norman Podhoretz in 1956; Rachel Decter's marriage to Elliott Abrams in 1980). https://thejc.com/news/obituary-leading-commentator-thinker-and-writer-midge-decter-uzeijpmg
+[^52]: Times of Israel, obituary of Rachel Abrams, June 10, 2013 ("Abrams died June 7 after battling stomach cancer for three years. She was 62."). https://www.timesofisrael.com/artist-and-writer-rachel-abrams-succumbs-to-cancer/

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Jack Blum.md

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ title: Jack Blum
 aliases:
   - Jack Blum
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-09-23
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 tags:
   - Person
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@ tags:
   - DarkAllianceInvestigation
   - ContraWar
   - Lawyer
-summary: "Former Senate investigator and chief counsel to Senator John Kerry's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for exposing the BCCI scandal and investigating Contra-connected drug trafficking."
+summary: "Former Senate investigator and special counsel to Senator John Kerry's Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for exposing the BCCI scandal and investigating Contra-connected drug trafficking."
 relations:
   - type: investigated
     with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
     start: 1988
     fn: 4
 ---
-Jack Blum is a former Senate investigator and chief counsel to [[Senator John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for his pivotal role in exposing the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] scandal. Described as a crusader and a moralist, Blum was known for his unwavering pursuit of truth, even when it meant challenging powerful institutions and individuals.[^1]
+Jack Blum is a former Senate investigator and special counsel to [[Senator John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, widely recognized for his pivotal role in exposing the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] scandal. Described as a crusader and a moralist, Blum was known for his unwavering pursuit of truth, even when it meant challenging powerful institutions and individuals.[^1]
 
 ### Early Career and Senate Investigations
 

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/James A. Baker III.md

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
     role: "received the Carter briefing book from Casey and passed it to the debate team"
     start: 1980
     end: 1980
-    fn: 7
+    fn: 9
   - type: head_of
     with: "[[United States Department of the Treasury]]"
     role: "Secretary of the Treasury"
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ relations:
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[BNL Scandal]]"
     role: "Secretary of State briefed on the case; interviewed by Independent Counsel Frederick Lacey"
-    fn: 13
+    fn: 15
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[White House]]"
     role: "chief of staff and senior counselor to President Bush"
@@ -90,29 +90,29 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Baker Botts]]"
     role: "senior partner"
     start: 1993-03
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 17
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Carlyle Group]]"
     role: "senior counselor"
     start: 1993
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 17
   - type: member_of
     with: "[[Carlyle Group]]"
     role: "executive officer and member of TCG Holdings; managing director of TCG Ventures"
-    fn: 16
+    fn: 18
   - type: director_of
     with: "[[Electronic Data Systems]]"
     role: "director; chairman of the governance committee"
     start: 1996
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 17
   - type: director_of
     with: "[[Reliant Energy]]"
     role: "director"
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 17
   - type: director_of
     with: "[[Rice University]]"
     role: "director"
-    fn: 15
+    fn: 17
   - type: director_of
     with: "[[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]"
     role: "board member"
@@ -125,20 +125,20 @@ relations:
     with: "[[George W. Bush]]"
     role: "campaign representative in the Florida recount"
     start: 2000-11-09
-    fn: 17
+    fn: 19
   - type: appointed
     with: "[[George W. Bush]]"
     reverse: true
     role: "personal envoy on Iraqi debt"
     start: 2003-12-05
-    fn: 22
+    fn: 24
   - type: head_of
     with: "[[Iraq Study Group]]"
     role: "co-chair"
     start: 2006-03-15
-    fn: 24
+    fn: 26
 created: 2026-10-01
-updated: 2026-10-01
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
 James Addison Baker III was born in [[Houston]] on April 28, 1930, graduated from [[Princeton University]] in 1952, served two years on active duty as a lieutenant in the [[United States Marine Corps]], took his law degree with honors from the [[University of Texas School of Law]] in 1957, and practiced with the Houston firm of [[Andrews & Kurth]] from 1957 to 1975.[^1] Through the influence of his first wife he entered Republican politics, chaired [[George H.W. Bush]]'s unsuccessful 1970 Senate campaign in [[Texas]], and in 1971 became finance chairman of the Republican Party, with a regional role in the 1972 reelection of [[Richard Nixon]].[^2] He served as the Chief of Staff under President [[Ronald Reagan]]. He was present at a meeting of Reagan's high command following the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor at [[Osirak bombing|Osirak]] in June 1981, where he agreed that some sanctions against [[Israel]] were essential.[^3]
@@ -151,61 +151,63 @@ His public service began in 1975, when President [[Gerald R. Ford]] appointed hi
 
 From 1981 to 1985 Baker was White House Chief of Staff.[^1] According to the national security adviser [[Richard V. Allen]], as recounted by [[Seymour Hersh]], at the meeting of Reagan's senior officials the morning after the Israeli raid on Osirak, Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] proposed canceling the sale of F-16 aircraft to Israel, and Vice President Bush and Baker agreed that some sanctions were essential; Reagan, Allen said, "rolled his eyes at me" and made clear he would take no such step. A scheduled delivery of four F-16s was suspended a few days later and quietly resumed two months after that.[^3]
 
+At the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, which Baker did not attend, Secretary of State [[George P. Shultz]] said: "another lawyer, Jim Baker, said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense." [[William J. Casey]] answered: "Jim Baker said that if we tried to get money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem and he was informed that the finding does provide for the participation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the funding does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an 'impeachable offense', and you heard him say that, George." Later in the meeting Casey said: "Jim Baker changed his mind as soon as he saw the finding and saw the language."[^5] In a deposition of June 22, 1987 Baker denied any knowledge of the contribution from the country the report calls "Country 2" (Saudi Arabia in Walsh's account), which McFarlane testified it was "likely" he had told Baker of in the spring of 1984, and said he did not recall "using that language or having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very close look at the question of legality and feeling that we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly."[^6]
+
 ### The Carter Briefing Papers
 
-In 1983 the [[Time (magazine)|Time]] correspondent [[Laurence Barrett]] wrote in *Gambling with History* that a Reagan campaign "mole" in the camp of President [[Jimmy Carter]] had "filched papers containing the main points the President planned to make" in the Cleveland debate of October 28, 1980, and that Baker, then a senior campaign adviser, "looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it." Baker said through an aide that he did not know how the papers were obtained. Representative [[Donald Albosta]], chairman of the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, wrote to Baker, to the budget director [[David Stockman]], to the communications director [[David Gergen]] and to the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[William J. Casey]], who had managed Reagan's 1980 campaign; Albosta said the matter "appears on the surface to be more serious than Watergate."[^5]
+In 1983 the [[Time (magazine)|Time]] correspondent [[Laurence Barrett]] wrote in *Gambling with History* that a Reagan campaign "mole" in the camp of President [[Jimmy Carter]] had "filched papers containing the main points the President planned to make" in the Cleveland debate of October 28, 1980, and that Baker, then a senior campaign adviser, "looked the other way when a dirty trick was perpetrated on Carter. He was grateful not to know the mechanics of it." Baker said through an aide that he did not know how the papers were obtained. Representative [[Donald Albosta]], chairman of the Human Resources Subcommittee of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee, wrote to Baker, to the budget director [[David Stockman]], to the communications director [[David Gergen]] and to the [[Director of Central Intelligence]] William J. Casey, who had managed Reagan's 1980 campaign; Albosta said the matter "appears on the surface to be more serious than Watergate."[^7]
 
-Casey replied on June 22, 1983: "I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make."[^6] Baker's letter, as reported in the [[Washington Post]], stated that "it is my best recollection" that Casey was the senior campaign official who gave him a large loose-leaf book in a black binder "that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter campaign," "with the suggestion that it might be of use to the [Reagan] Debate Briefing Team" headed by Gergen and [[Frank Hodsoll]], and that after thumbing through it he "passed it on." He called it a "compendium" of Carter administration policy positions, wrote that he had "no recollection that I ever received or saw any debate strategy or sensitive debating points prepared by the Carter campaign or Carter White House," and said he had "never, directly or indirectly" asked anyone to get it. Stockman said the material had been "useful" in preparing Reagan. The campaign consultant [[Myles Martel]] said he had urged Hodsoll to return it: "My impression was we had something we shouldn't have had." Casey then said he did not remember "any black book" but that he had sent Baker all papers that crossed his desk about the debate.[^7]
+Casey replied on June 22, 1983: "I have no recollection that I ever received, heard of or learned in any other way of a set of papers which laid out the Carter debate plan or the points which President Carter had planned to make."[^8] Baker's letter, as reported in the [[Washington Post]], stated that "it is my best recollection" that Casey was the senior campaign official who gave him a large loose-leaf book in a black binder "that was thought to have been given to the Reagan camp by someone with the Carter campaign," "with the suggestion that it might be of use to the [Reagan] Debate Briefing Team" headed by Gergen and [[Frank Hodsoll]], and that after thumbing through it he "passed it on." He called it a "compendium" of Carter administration policy positions, wrote that he had "no recollection that I ever received or saw any debate strategy or sensitive debating points prepared by the Carter campaign or Carter White House," and said he had "never, directly or indirectly" asked anyone to get it. Stockman said the material had been "useful" in preparing Reagan. The campaign consultant [[Myles Martel]] said he had urged Hodsoll to return it: "My impression was we had something we shouldn't have had." Casey then said he did not remember "any black book" but that he had sent Baker all papers that crossed his desk about the debate.[^9]
 
-On June 27, 1983, Carter's former pollster [[Patrick Caddell]] delivered to the White House a copy of what he said was the complete Carter briefing book. After Baker, Stockman and Gergen reviewed it, the White House said it appeared "a more finished, more sensitive briefing book than they recall," and that papers retrieved from Reagan campaign officials' files had been forwarded to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Baker had discussed the matter with Casey at a meeting the day before.[^8] In June 1984 the Democratic majority of the Albosta subcommittee reported that "the persons using these papers were aware that they were using Carter debate briefing materials" and that the foreign policy papers were "most likely" taken from the Carter [[National Security Council]] front office or the White House Situation Room. At a news conference on June 14, 1984, Reagan said that "no one" in his campaign had seen the briefing book and called the differing recollections of Baker and Casey "easily understandable."[^9]
+On June 27, 1983, Carter's former pollster [[Patrick Caddell]] delivered to the White House a copy of what he said was the complete Carter briefing book. After Baker, Stockman and Gergen reviewed it, the White House said it appeared "a more finished, more sensitive briefing book than they recall," and that papers retrieved from Reagan campaign officials' files had been forwarded to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]. Baker had discussed the matter with Casey at a meeting the day before.[^10] In June 1984 the Democratic majority of the Albosta subcommittee reported that "the persons using these papers were aware that they were using Carter debate briefing materials" and that the foreign policy papers were "most likely" taken from the Carter [[National Security Council]] front office or the White House Situation Room. At a news conference on June 14, 1984, Reagan said that "no one" in his campaign had seen the briefing book and called the differing recollections of Baker and Casey "easily understandable."[^11]
 
 ### Treasury and BCCI
 
 Baker became the sixty-seventh Secretary of the Treasury on February 3, 1985, exchanging jobs with [[Donald Regan]], and also chaired the President's Economic Policy Council. The Treasury Department credits him with guiding the 1986 tax reform bill through Congress and with "encouraging international economic cooperation by lowering the value of the dollar"; the State Department's historians describe him as "instrumental in passing the Plaza Accord of September 1985."[^1][^2][^4] He resigned on August 17, 1988, to chair the Bush campaign.[^4]
 
-Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin wrote in their 1992 history of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] that a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] report dated September 30, 1986, alleging BCCI's involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering and its secret control of [[First American Bankshares]], was distributed to the State, Treasury and Commerce departments but not to the [[Federal Reserve]], and that Regan, asked about it, said he did not recall seeing it and suggested it may have gone to Baker, his successor, who at the time was traveling in Morocco. They also wrote that in 1987 the Iranian businessman [[Mohammed Rahim Motaghi Irvani]], whom they describe as having multiple ties to BCCI, wrote to Baker, whom they identify as Bush's campaign manager, offering to help, and that the letter was forwarded to Baker by the former CIA director [[Richard Helms]] with a note describing Irvani as "a man of substance and decency"; the letter and Helms's cover note were released by the Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]]. They recorded that [[Jackson Stephens]], whose firm had gathered First American stock for BCCI's clients, was a member of Bush's "Team 100" and that his wife ran Bush's 1988 campaign in Arkansas.[^10]
+Peter Truell and Larry Gurwin wrote in their 1992 history of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] that a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] report dated September 30, 1986, alleging BCCI's involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering and its secret control of [[First American Bankshares]], was distributed to the State, Treasury and Commerce departments but not to the [[Federal Reserve]], and that Regan, asked about it, said he did not recall seeing it and suggested it may have gone to Baker, his successor, who at the time was traveling in Morocco. They also wrote that in 1987 the Iranian businessman [[Mohammed Rahim Motaghi Irvani]], whom they describe as having multiple ties to BCCI, wrote to Baker, whom they identify as Bush's campaign manager, offering to help, and that the letter was forwarded to Baker by the former CIA director [[Richard Helms]] with a note describing Irvani as "a man of substance and decency"; the letter and Helms's cover note were released by the Senate subcommittee chaired by [[John Kerry]]. They recorded that [[Jackson Stephens]], whose firm had gathered First American stock for BCCI's clients, was a member of Bush's "Team 100" and that his wife ran Bush's 1988 campaign in Arkansas.[^12]
 
 ### Secretary of State
 
-Baker was appointed Secretary of State on January 25, 1989, and served until August 23, 1992, the sixty-first holder of the office; he traveled to 90 countries.[^1][^2] On February 9, 1990, in Moscow, he told [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], according to the American memorandum of conversation released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]], that "if we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of [[NATO]], there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east." The Soviet record of the same meeting has him saying that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction." The same day [[Robert Gates]], deputy to the national security adviser [[Brent Scowcroft]], told the [[KGB]] chairman [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]] at the Lubyanka the same thing. On February 10 Baker wrote to Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] that he had asked Gorbachev whether he would prefer a unified Germany "tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position."[^11]
+Baker was appointed Secretary of State on January 25, 1989, and served until August 23, 1992, the sixty-first holder of the office; he traveled to 90 countries.[^1][^2] On February 9, 1990, in Moscow, he told [[Mikhail Gorbachev]], according to the American memorandum of conversation released under the [[Freedom of Information Act]], that "if we maintain a presence in a Germany that is a part of [[NATO]], there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east." The Soviet record of the same meeting has him saying that "not an inch of NATO's present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction." The same day [[Robert Gates]], deputy to the national security adviser [[Brent Scowcroft]], told the [[KGB]] chairman [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]] at the Lubyanka the same thing. On February 10 Baker wrote to Chancellor [[Helmut Kohl]] that he had asked Gorbachev whether he would prefer a unified Germany "tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position."[^13]
 
 ### Matrix Churchill and the BNL Prosecution
 
-An authentication certificate numbered 89/3648-2, dated March 14, 1989, attests the seal of the Ohio Secretary of State, [[Sherrod Brown]], on papers of the Cleveland firm [[Matrix Churchill]]. It reads: "In testimony whereof, I, James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Authentication Officer of the said Department," and is subscribed "James A. Baker III, Secretary of State. By Annie R. Maddux, Authentication Officer, Department of State." Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs]], placed it in the Congressional Record on August 10, 1992, with a similar document of May 10, 1989, issued over the name of Acting Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]]. Gonzalez said that Iraqis had taken control of Matrix Churchill in late 1988, that Iraqi law required American firms to be certified before opening a branch, that "unwittingly, in 1989 both James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburge[r] helped Matrix-Churchill establish its Baghdad branch," and that the State Department then held intelligence identifying the firm as an Iraqi front company.[^12][^13]
+An authentication certificate numbered 89/3648-2, dated March 14, 1989, attests the seal of the Ohio Secretary of State, [[Sherrod Brown]], on papers of the Cleveland firm [[Matrix Churchill]]. It reads: "In testimony whereof, I, James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Authentication Officer of the said Department," and is subscribed "James A. Baker III, Secretary of State. By Annie R. Maddux, Authentication Officer, Department of State." Representative [[Henry B. Gonzalez]], chairman of the [[House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs]], placed it in the Congressional Record on August 10, 1992, with a similar document of May 10, 1989, issued over the name of Acting Secretary [[Lawrence Eagleburger]]. Gonzalez said that Iraqis had taken control of Matrix Churchill in late 1988, that Iraqi law required American firms to be certified before opening a branch, that "unwittingly, in 1989 both James Baker and Lawrence Eagleburge[r] helped Matrix-Churchill establish its Baghdad branch," and that the State Department then held intelligence identifying the firm as an Iraqi front company.[^14][^15]
 
-Independent Counsel [[Frederick Lacey]], appointed by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on October 16, 1992, to investigate the handling of the prosecution of [[Christopher Drogoul]] and others in the [[BNL Scandal]], listed Baker among the people he and his staff had "spoken to, interviewed or deposed under oath." Lacey classified the second part of his report "Top Secret Codeword."[^13] He recorded that, according to the daily log of the Atlanta prosecutor [[Gale McKenzie]] in the fall of 1989, "then Secretary of State Baker was most interested in the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] case and was receiving frequent briefings," and that the Justice Department first contacted her office on October 26, 1989, when [[Robert Mueller]] called for information on the case; by the time of Lacey's inquiry Mueller was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.[^13]
+Independent Counsel [[Frederick Lacey]], appointed by Attorney General [[William Barr]] on October 16, 1992, to investigate the handling of the prosecution of [[Christopher Drogoul]] and others in the [[BNL Scandal]], listed Baker among the people he and his staff had "spoken to, interviewed or deposed under oath." Lacey classified the second part of his report "Top Secret Codeword."[^15] He recorded that, according to the daily log of the Atlanta prosecutor [[Gale McKenzie]] in the fall of 1989, "then Secretary of State Baker was most interested in the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro|BNL]] case and was receiving frequent briefings," and that the Justice Department first contacted her office on October 26, 1989, when [[Robert Mueller]] called for information on the case; by the time of Lacey's inquiry Mueller was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division.[^15]
 
-Lacey quoted an October 26, 1989, State Department memorandum to Baker from Kelly and Sofaer, sent through Kimmitt and McCormack, warning that "our ability to influence Iraqi policies in areas important to us, from Lebanon to the [[Middle East]] peace process, will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the [[Commodity Credit Corporation|CCC]] negotiations." On November 8, 1989, the Agriculture and State Departments overcame the resistance of the National Advisory Council and obtained approval of 1 billion dollars in [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|Commodity Credit Corporation]] guarantees for Iraq for fiscal 1990, of which one 500 million dollar tranche was released before the Gulf War. The two departments asserted at each stage that there was "no evidence to date that would lead us to recommend that the Department should not extend the guarantees," a claim Lacey called "inconsistent with McKenzie's statements to the contrary." He wrote that it was "not within my responsibility to address the wisdom of the decision." Citing a memorandum of April 17, 1990, from Kimmitt to Baker, he wrote that "as with the CCC program, political considerations have been brought to bear upon Eximbank decisions," while the [[Export-Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] had found Iraq "not creditworthy by any reasonable standard" in April 1989.[^13]
+Lacey quoted an October 26, 1989, State Department memorandum to Baker from Kelly and Sofaer, sent through Kimmitt and McCormack, warning that "our ability to influence Iraqi policies in areas important to us, from Lebanon to the [[Middle East]] peace process, will be heavily influenced by the outcome of the [[Commodity Credit Corporation|CCC]] negotiations." On November 8, 1989, the Agriculture and State Departments overcame the resistance of the National Advisory Council and obtained approval of 1 billion dollars in [[Commodity Credit Corporation Iraq Program|Commodity Credit Corporation]] guarantees for Iraq for fiscal 1990, of which one 500 million dollar tranche was released before the Gulf War. The two departments asserted at each stage that there was "no evidence to date that would lead us to recommend that the Department should not extend the guarantees," a claim Lacey called "inconsistent with McKenzie's statements to the contrary." He wrote that it was "not within my responsibility to address the wisdom of the decision." Citing a memorandum of April 17, 1990, from Kimmitt to Baker, he wrote that "as with the CCC program, political considerations have been brought to bear upon Eximbank decisions," while the [[Export-Import Bank of the United States|Export-Import Bank]] had found Iraq "not creditworthy by any reasonable standard" in April 1989.[^15]
 
-In the days before the February 1991 indictment, during the war with Iraq, the list of defendants grew to include the Jordanian businessman [[Wafai Dajani]], whose company handled grain for Iraq at [[Aqaba]] and whom Drogoul called "the brother of the Prince of Jordan," but Dajani and others "were removed as defendants a few days later at a February 13 meeting" of the Atlanta prosecutors and Justice Department officials, Mueller among them. At that meeting the State Department did not want the [[Central Bank of Iraq]] indicted while the Atlanta office still did, and the Treasury, Defense and State Departments, the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve then answered Mueller with a joint memorandum supporting indictment of [[Rafidain Bank]] but opposing indictment of the Central Bank. The prosecutors denied any State Department interference and said the decision not to indict Dajani was their own, for want of evidence. Lacey recorded that Dajani had paid Drogoul 100,000 dollars through a consulting position in 1990 and 1991 and was named as an unindicted co-conspirator. He found "absolutely no support" for reports that the Justice Department, "perhaps influenced by others in the Executive Branch," had imposed the theory of BNL as a victim on the Atlanta office.[^13]
+In the days before the February 1991 indictment, during the war with Iraq, the list of defendants grew to include the Jordanian businessman [[Wafai Dajani]], whose company handled grain for Iraq at [[Aqaba]] and whom Drogoul called "the brother of the Prince of Jordan," but Dajani and others "were removed as defendants a few days later at a February 13 meeting" of the Atlanta prosecutors and Justice Department officials, Mueller among them. At that meeting the State Department did not want the [[Central Bank of Iraq]] indicted while the Atlanta office still did, and the Treasury, Defense and State Departments, the Export-Import Bank and the Federal Reserve then answered Mueller with a joint memorandum supporting indictment of [[Rafidain Bank]] but opposing indictment of the Central Bank. The prosecutors denied any State Department interference and said the decision not to indict Dajani was their own, for want of evidence. Lacey recorded that Dajani had paid Drogoul 100,000 dollars through a consulting position in 1990 and 1991 and was named as an unindicted co-conspirator. He found "absolutely no support" for reports that the Justice Department, "perhaps influenced by others in the Executive Branch," had imposed the theory of BNL as a victim on the Atlanta office.[^15]
 
 ### Baker Botts and Foreign Principals
 
-Baker served as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.[^1] The Houston firm of [[Baker Botts]] was registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] as Baker & Botts, L.L.P., registration 4293, from September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003. Its foreign principals were the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, September 15, 1989, to April 30, 1993), the French chemical company [[Rhône-Poulenc]] (May 1, 1991, to February 13, 1996), Middle East Airlines Airliban of [[Lebanon]] (May 23, 1991, to November 1, 1993), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [[Yemen]] (April 22, 1992, to July 21, 2000), the Government of [[Abu Dhabi]] (July 29, 1992, to March 31, 1995) and the Japan External Trade Organization office in Houston (November 9, 1992, to September 30, 2003). In 1977 the firm had registered for the Indonesian state oil company [[Pertamina]], and from September 15, 2017, to October 12, 2018, it was registered for the Ministry of Financial Services and Home Affairs of the [[Cayman Islands]].[^14]
+Baker served as White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993.[^1] The Houston firm of [[Baker Botts]] was registered under the [[Foreign Agents Registration Act]] as Baker & Botts, L.L.P., registration 4293, from September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003. Its foreign principals were the Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, September 15, 1989, to April 30, 1993), the French chemical company [[Rhône-Poulenc]] (May 1, 1991, to February 13, 1996), Middle East Airlines Airliban of [[Lebanon]] (May 23, 1991, to November 1, 1993), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of [[Yemen]] (April 22, 1992, to July 21, 2000), the Government of [[Abu Dhabi]] (July 29, 1992, to March 31, 1995) and the Japan External Trade Organization office in Houston (November 9, 1992, to September 30, 2003). In 1977 the firm had registered for the Indonesian state oil company [[Pertamina]], and from September 15, 2017, to October 12, 2018, it was registered for the Ministry of Financial Services and Home Affairs of the [[Cayman Islands]].[^16]
 
 ### Carlyle and Corporate Boards
 
-Baker has been a senior partner of Baker Botts since March 1993 and was a senior counselor of the [[Carlyle Group]] from 1993. The 2002 proxy statement of [[Electronic Data Systems]], which had been split off from [[General Motors]] in June 1996, lists him as a director since 1996 and chairman of its governance committee, and as a director of [[Reliant Energy]], Reliant Resources, [[Rice University]] and the [[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]; it discloses that EDS retained Baker Botts for legal services during 2001.[^15]
+Baker has been a senior partner of Baker Botts since March 1993 and was a senior counselor of the [[Carlyle Group]] from 1993. The 2002 proxy statement of [[Electronic Data Systems]], which had been split off from [[General Motors]] in June 1996, lists him as a director since 1996 and chairman of its governance committee, and as a director of [[Reliant Energy]], Reliant Resources, [[Rice University]] and the [[Howard Hughes Medical Institute]]; it discloses that EDS retained Baker Botts for legal services during 2001.[^17]
 
-Carlyle's Schedule 13D filings with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] list him among the executive officers of its holding entities. The filing of May 21, 2001, on [[Net2000 Communications]] names him among the executive officers of TC Group, L.L.C. and TCG Holdings, L.L.C. and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Frank Carlucci]], [[Richard Darman]], [[William Conway]], [[Daniel D'Aniello]], [[David Rubenstein]], [[Jerome Powell]], [[Glenn Youngkin]] and [[Afsaneh Beshloss]], and as one of nine managing directors of TCG Ventures, L.L.C.; the reporting entities included Cayman Islands partnerships, and the directors of TCG Ventures, Ltd. were Rubenstein and a British Virgin Islands company in care of [[Julius Baer]] Bank & Trust. The amendment of January 13, 2005, on [[Magellan Midstream Partners]] again lists him among the executive officers of TC Group and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Louis Gerstner]] and [[William Kennard]].[^16]
+Carlyle's Schedule 13D filings with the [[Securities and Exchange Commission]] list him among the executive officers of its holding entities. The filing of May 21, 2001, on [[Net2000 Communications]] names him among the executive officers of TC Group, L.L.C. and TCG Holdings, L.L.C. and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Frank Carlucci]], [[Richard Darman]], [[William Conway]], [[Daniel D'Aniello]], [[David Rubenstein]], [[Jerome Powell]], [[Glenn Youngkin]] and [[Afsaneh Beshloss]], and as one of nine managing directors of TCG Ventures, L.L.C.; the reporting entities included Cayman Islands partnerships, and the directors of TCG Ventures, Ltd. were Rubenstein and a British Virgin Islands company in care of [[Julius Baer]] Bank & Trust. The amendment of January 13, 2005, on [[Magellan Midstream Partners]] again lists him among the executive officers of TC Group and members of TCG Holdings, with [[Louis Gerstner]] and [[William Kennard]].[^18]
 
 ### Florida, 2000
 
-On November 9, 2000, Baker was in [[Tallahassee, Florida|Tallahassee]], identified by CNN as an observer for the Bush campaign "there to supervise a recount of the state vote in Florida on behalf of George W. Bush." He said he would meet the Florida secretary of state later that day and hoped to meet [[Warren Christopher]], whom the Gore campaign had sent "to do the exact same thing."[^17] On November 28 he introduced the senior litigation team for the contest of the result: [[Barry Richard]] of [[Greenberg Traurig]], [[Fred Bartlit]] and [[Philip Beck]] of Bartlit Beck in Chicago, and "two law partners of mine at Baker Botts in Houston, Texas," [[Irvin Terrell]] and [[Daryl Bristow]].[^18]
+On November 9, 2000, Baker was in [[Tallahassee, Florida|Tallahassee]], identified by CNN as an observer for the Bush campaign "there to supervise a recount of the state vote in Florida on behalf of George W. Bush." He said he would meet the Florida secretary of state later that day and hoped to meet [[Warren Christopher]], whom the Gore campaign had sent "to do the exact same thing."[^19] On November 28 he introduced the senior litigation team for the contest of the result: [[Barry Richard]] of [[Greenberg Traurig]], [[Fred Bartlit]] and [[Philip Beck]] of Bartlit Beck in Chicago, and "two law partners of mine at Baker Botts in Houston, Texas," [[Irvin Terrell]] and [[Daryl Bristow]].[^20]
 
 ### The Saudi Defense in the September 11 Litigation
 
-[[Michael Isikoff]] of [[Newsweek]] reported on April 15, 2003, that "a trio of lawyers from Baker Botts" had filed a motion for Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]], the Saudi defense minister, in the September 11 families' suit, arguing that he was immune and acknowledging that he had approved payments of about 266,000 dollars a year for 16 years to the [[International Islamic Relief Organization]] and grants of 52,000 dollars to the [[World Assembly of Muslim Youth]] as official acts. Isikoff wrote that Baker Botts "still boasts former secretary of State James Baker as one of its senior partners" and that its recent alumni included [[Robert Jordan]], President Bush's former personal lawyer and then ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The plaintiffs' lead lawyer, [[Ron Motley]], said: "We smoked out the prince."[^19] On November 14, 2003, Judge [[James Robertson]] of the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Sultan for his official acts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and those for his personal acts for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the claims against Prince [[Turki bin Faisal Al Saud|Turki]], the former head of Saudi general intelligence, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[^20] William H. Jeffress Jr. of Baker Botts appears among defense counsel in that opinion, and Jeffress, Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf and Jamie S. Kilberg of Baker Botts in the consolidated opinion of January 18, 2005, in the [[U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]].[^20][^21]
+[[Michael Isikoff]] of [[Newsweek]] reported on April 15, 2003, that "a trio of lawyers from Baker Botts" had filed a motion for Prince [[Sultan bin Abdulaziz]], the Saudi defense minister, in the September 11 families' suit, arguing that he was immune and acknowledging that he had approved payments of about 266,000 dollars a year for 16 years to the [[International Islamic Relief Organization]] and grants of 52,000 dollars to the [[World Assembly of Muslim Youth]] as official acts. Isikoff wrote that Baker Botts "still boasts former secretary of State James Baker as one of its senior partners" and that its recent alumni included [[Robert Jordan]], President Bush's former personal lawyer and then ambassador to [[Saudi Arabia]]. The plaintiffs' lead lawyer, [[Ron Motley]], said: "We smoked out the prince."[^21] On November 14, 2003, Judge [[James Robertson]] of the District of Columbia dismissed the claims against Sultan for his official acts for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and those for his personal acts for lack of personal jurisdiction, and dismissed the claims against Prince [[Turki bin Faisal Al Saud|Turki]], the former head of Saudi general intelligence, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.[^22] William H. Jeffress Jr. of Baker Botts appears among defense counsel in that opinion, and Jeffress, Christopher R. Cooper, Sara E. Kropf and Jamie S. Kilberg of Baker Botts in the consolidated opinion of January 18, 2005, in the [[U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York|Southern District of New York]].[^22][^23]
 
 ### The Iraqi Debt Envoy
 
-On December 5, 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] announced that "in response to a request from the Iraqi Governing Council" he had appointed Baker "to be my personal envoy on the issue of Iraqi debt," reporting directly to the President.[^22] [[Naomi Klein]] wrote in *[[The Nation]]* on November 1, 2004, that Baker was then senior counselor and an equity partner of Carlyle "with an estimated $180 million stake," that Saudi Arabia was among Iraq's largest creditors, that Carlyle and Baker Botts did extensive business with the Saudi royal family, and that on December 12, 2003, the [[New York Times]] had called editorially for him to resign from both. She wrote that documents obtained by The Nation showed a consortium including Carlyle and the [[Albright Group]] of the former Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] proposing to [[Kuwait]] that its claims on Iraq, as much as 57 billion dollars, be transferred to a foundation the consortium would control, with Kuwait investing 2 billion dollars in a private equity fund, half of it through Carlyle. The proposal, she reported, said the role of Carlyle figures including former President Bush, [[John Major]] and Baker was "now more limited" because of his appointment but that after his "retirement from his temporary position" they would "once again be free to play a more decisive role." On January 21, 2004, the day Baker met Kuwait's foreign minister as envoy, the consortium hand-delivered the proposal to the same minister.[^23]
+On December 5, 2003, President [[George W. Bush]] announced that "in response to a request from the Iraqi Governing Council" he had appointed Baker "to be my personal envoy on the issue of Iraqi debt," reporting directly to the President.[^24] [[Naomi Klein]] wrote in *[[The Nation]]* on November 1, 2004, that Baker was then senior counselor and an equity partner of Carlyle "with an estimated $180 million stake," that Saudi Arabia was among Iraq's largest creditors, that Carlyle and Baker Botts did extensive business with the Saudi royal family, and that on December 12, 2003, the [[New York Times]] had called editorially for him to resign from both. She wrote that documents obtained by The Nation showed a consortium including Carlyle and the [[Albright Group]] of the former Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] proposing to [[Kuwait]] that its claims on Iraq, as much as 57 billion dollars, be transferred to a foundation the consortium would control, with Kuwait investing 2 billion dollars in a private equity fund, half of it through Carlyle. The proposal, she reported, said the role of Carlyle figures including former President Bush, [[John Major]] and Baker was "now more limited" because of his appointment but that after his "retirement from his temporary position" they would "once again be free to play a more decisive role." On January 21, 2004, the day Baker met Kuwait's foreign minister as envoy, the consortium hand-delivered the proposal to the same minister.[^25]
 
-Carlyle's spokesman [[Chris Ullman]] told Klein that "neither the Carlyle Group nor James Baker wrote, edited or authorized this proposal to the Kuwait government," that Carlyle knew of the proposal and stood to receive a 1 billion dollar investment but "played no role in procuring that investment," and that after Baker's appointment Carlyle "explicitly restricted its role to only investing assets on behalf of Kuwait." The consortium's chief executive, Shahameen Sheikh, said the timing "had nothing to do with Mr. Baker's visit." Klein wrote that the White House and Baker's office did not respond to repeated requests for comment.[^23]
+Carlyle's spokesman [[Chris Ullman]] told Klein that "neither the Carlyle Group nor James Baker wrote, edited or authorized this proposal to the Kuwait government," that Carlyle knew of the proposal and stood to receive a 1 billion dollar investment but "played no role in procuring that investment," and that after Baker's appointment Carlyle "explicitly restricted its role to only investing assets on behalf of Kuwait." The consortium's chief executive, Shahameen Sheikh, said the timing "had nothing to do with Mr. Baker's visit." Klein wrote that the White House and Baker's office did not respond to repeated requests for comment.[^25]
 
 ### The Iraq Study Group
 
-In late 2005 Representative [[Frank Wolf]] asked the [[United States Institute of Peace]] to facilitate an assessment of Iraq with the [[James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy]] at Rice University, the [[Center for the Study of the Presidency]] and the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. Baker and the former Representative [[Lee Hamilton]] co-chaired the [[Iraq Study Group]], launched on March 15, 2006, at a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by Senator [[John Warner]]. Its members were Eagleburger, [[Vernon Jordan]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Sandra Day O'Connor]], [[Leon Panetta]], [[William Perry]], [[Charles Robb]] and [[Alan Simpson]]; the former CIA director Robert Gates was an active member until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. Recommendation 62 of its December 2006 report urged technical assistance to the Iraqi government "to prepare a draft oil law" creating "a fiscal and legal framework for investment," and Recommendation 63 urged that the [[United States]] "encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies" and help reorganize the national oil industry "as a commercial enterprise."[^24]
+In late 2005 Representative [[Frank Wolf]] asked the [[United States Institute of Peace]] to facilitate an assessment of Iraq with the [[James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy]] at Rice University, the [[Center for the Study of the Presidency]] and the [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. Baker and the former Representative [[Lee Hamilton]] co-chaired the [[Iraq Study Group]], launched on March 15, 2006, at a Capitol Hill meeting hosted by Senator [[John Warner]]. Its members were Eagleburger, [[Vernon Jordan]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Sandra Day O'Connor]], [[Leon Panetta]], [[William Perry]], [[Charles Robb]] and [[Alan Simpson]]; the former CIA director Robert Gates was an active member until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. Recommendation 62 of its December 2006 report urged technical assistance to the Iraqi government "to prepare a draft oil law" creating "a fiscal and legal framework for investment," and Recommendation 63 urged that the [[United States]] "encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector by the international community and by international energy companies" and help reorganize the national oil industry "as a commercial enterprise."[^26]
 
 ### Envoys and Commissions
 
@@ -213,7 +215,7 @@ From 1997 to 2004 Baker was the personal envoy of [[United Nations]] Secretary-G
 
 ### Political Contributions
 
-[[Federal Election Commission]] records itemize contributions from James A. Baker III of Houston: 1,000 dollars to George Bush for President on June 6, 1980, and 1,000 dollars on June 11, 1980, to the Connally for President Committee, with his employer given as Andrews Kurth Campbell & Jones; 1,000 dollars to Bush for President Inc. on March 16, 1999; 2,000 dollars to Bush-Cheney '04 Inc. on December 3, 2003, two days before his appointment as envoy; 15,000 dollars to the National Republican Senatorial Committee on April 11, 2006; 2,500 dollars to Romney for President Inc. on July 26, 2011, and July 5, 2012; 2,500 dollars to RickPerry.org on September 16, 2011, with his employer given as the Baker Institute; 2,700 dollars to Jeb 2016 Inc. on January 18, 2016; and 2,800 dollars to Team Graham on September 23, 2020, with Baker Botts as employer in the other filings.[^25]
+[[Federal Election Commission]] records itemize contributions from James A. Baker III of Houston: 1,000 dollars to George Bush for President on June 6, 1980, and 1,000 dollars on June 11, 1980, to the Connally for President Committee, with his employer given as Andrews Kurth Campbell & Jones; 1,000 dollars to Bush for President Inc. on March 16, 1999; 2,000 dollars to Bush-Cheney '04 Inc. on December 3, 2003, two days before his appointment as envoy; 15,000 dollars to the National Republican Senatorial Committee on April 11, 2006; 2,500 dollars to Romney for President Inc. on July 26, 2011, and July 5, 2012; 2,500 dollars to RickPerry.org on September 16, 2011, with his employer given as the Baker Institute; 2,700 dollars to Jeb 2016 Inc. on January 18, 2016; and 2,800 dollars to Team Graham on September 23, 2020, with Baker Botts as employer in the other filings.[^27]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -221,24 +223,26 @@ From 1997 to 2004 Baker was the personal envoy of [[United Nations]] Secretary-G
 [^2]: "James Addison Baker III," Biographies of the Secretaries of State and Principal Officers and Chiefs of Mission, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State (appointed January 25, 1989; termination of appointment August 23, 1992). https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/baker-james-addison
 [^3]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Random House, 1991, p. 9 (account of Richard V. Allen). https://archive.org/details/seymour-hersch-the-samson-option
 [^4]: "James A. Baker, III (1985 - 1988)," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Prior Secretaries. https://home.treasury.gov/about/history/prior-secretaries/james-a-baker-iii-1985-1988
-[^5]: "Casey fourth Reagan aide asked about '80 campaign incident," *Baltimore Sun*, Washington Bureau, June 22, 1983, reproduced in CIA Reading Room document C05560156. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-05560156
+[^5]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), pp. 1, 9 and 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf
-[^6]: Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Representative Don Albosta, June 22, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R001703320052-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85m00364r001703320052-2
+[^6]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, pp. 38-39 and nn. 145-151 (Baker Dep., June 22, 1987, at 8-9, 12; McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, May 11, 1987, at 53). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
-[^7]: Hoffman, David. "Casey Is Cited as Source of Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400039-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505400039-7
+[^7]: "Casey fourth Reagan aide asked about '80 campaign incident," *Baltimore Sun*, Washington Bureau, June 22, 1983, reproduced in CIA Reading Room document C05560156. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-05560156
-[^8]: Schram, Martin, and Lou Cannon. "1980 Debate 'Papers' Go To Justice," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020034-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201020034-3
+[^8]: Casey, William J., Director of Central Intelligence, letter to Representative Don Albosta, June 22, 1983, CIA-RDP85M00364R001703320052-2. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp85m00364r001703320052-2
-[^9]: Hoffman, David. "Reagan Says 'No One' Saw '80 Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1984, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390080-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505390080-3
+[^9]: Hoffman, David. "Casey Is Cited as Source of Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 24, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400039-7. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505400039-7
-[^10]: Truell, Peter, and Larry Gurwin. *False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992, pp. 365 and 382, with source notes. https://archive.org/details/bypetertruellauthorlarrygurwinauthorfalseprofitstheinsidestoryofbccitheworldsmos
+[^10]: Schram, Martin, and Lou Cannon. "1980 Debate 'Papers' Go To Justice," *Washington Post*, June 28, 1983, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00965R000201020034-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201020034-3
-[^11]: Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Tom Blanton. "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard," National Security Archive Briefing Book, December 12, 2017, Documents 05 (memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, February 9, 1990, U.S. Department of State FOIA 199504567), 06 (Gorbachev Foundation record of the same conversation), 07 (memorandum of conversation between Robert Gates and Vladimir Kryuchkov, February 9, 1990) and 08 (letter from Baker to Helmut Kohl, February 10, 1990). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
+[^11]: Hoffman, David. "Reagan Says 'No One' Saw '80 Briefing Book," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1984, reproduced in CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390080-3. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00552r000505390080-3
-[^12]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order, "US Armed Iraq Through BNL," section "Baker and Eagleburger Approve MCC Baghdad Branch," *Congressional Record*, House, August 10, 1992, reproducing Department of State authentication no. 89/3648-2 of March 14, 1989. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm
+[^12]: Truell, Peter, and Larry Gurwin. *False Profits: The Inside Story of BCCI, the World's Most Corrupt Financial Empire*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992, pp. 365 and 382, with source notes. https://archive.org/details/bypetertruellauthorlarrygurwinauthorfalseprofitstheinsidestoryofbccitheworldsmos
-[^13]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, pp. 1, 12, 37 n., 43, 68-74 and 102-104, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, hearing, 103d Cong., 1st sess., November 9, 1993, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 343-347, 355, 380, 386, 411-417 and 445-447. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
+[^13]: Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Tom Blanton. "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard," National Security Archive Briefing Book, December 12, 2017, Documents 05 (memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Baker, February 9, 1990, U.S. Department of State FOIA 199504567), 06 (Gorbachev Foundation record of the same conversation), 07 (memorandum of conversation between Robert Gates and Vladimir Kryuchkov, February 9, 1990) and 08 (letter from Baker to Helmut Kohl, February 10, 1990). https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
-[^14]: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act unit, registrant and foreign principal records for registration 4293 (Baker Botts L.L.P., September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003), registration 2833 (Baker & Botts, 1977) and registration 6464 (Baker Botts, LLP, 2017 to 2018), via the FARA eFile API. https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/ForeignPrincipals/json/Terminated/4293
+[^14]: Gonzalez, Henry B. Special order, "US Armed Iraq Through BNL," section "Baker and Eagleburger Approve MCC Baghdad Branch," *Congressional Record*, House, August 10, 1992, reproducing Department of State authentication no. 89/3648-2 of March 14, 1989. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1992_cr/h920810g.htm
-[^15]: Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Schedule 14A definitive proxy statement, filed March 6, 2002 ("Directors Standing for Election" and "Certain Transactions"), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR accession 0000950109-02-001187. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1007456/000095010902001187/ddef14a.htm
+[^15]: Lacey, Frederick B. "The Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Investigation: Report of the Independent Counsel," Part I, pp. 1, 12, 37 n., 43, 68-74 and 102-104, reproduced in House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, *Testimony of Former Employees of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*, hearing, 103d Cong., 1st sess., November 9, 1993, Serial No. 103-95, pp. 343-347, 355, 380, 386, 411-417 and 445-447. https://archive.org/details/testimonyofforme1994unit
-[^16]: Carlyle Venture Partners, L.P., et al., Schedule 13D, Net2000 Communications, Inc., filed May 21, 2001, Item 2 (accession 0000950133-01-501284); TC Group, L.L.C., et al., Schedule 13D/A, Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P., filed January 13, 2005, Schedule A-1 (accession 0001193125-05-006004), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099363/000095013301501284/w49431sc13d.txt ; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1126975/000119312505006004/0001193125-05-006004.txt
+[^16]: U.S. Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act unit, registrant and foreign principal records for registration 4293 (Baker Botts L.L.P., September 15, 1989, to September 30, 2003), registration 2833 (Baker & Botts, 1977) and registration 6464 (Baker Botts, LLP, 2017 to 2018), via the FARA eFile API. https://efile.fara.gov/api/v1/ForeignPrincipals/json/Terminated/4293
-[^17]: "Election 2000: James Baker Holds News Briefing on Progress of Florida Recount," CNN transcript, November 9, 2000. http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0011/09/se.03.html
+[^17]: Electronic Data Systems Corporation, Schedule 14A definitive proxy statement, filed March 6, 2002 ("Directors Standing for Election" and "Certain Transactions"), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR accession 0000950109-02-001187. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1007456/000095010902001187/ddef14a.htm
-[^18]: "Bush Legal Team Remarks," Tuesday, November 28, 2000, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/documents-related-the-2000-election-dispute-40
+[^18]: Carlyle Venture Partners, L.P., et al., Schedule 13D, Net2000 Communications, Inc., filed May 21, 2001, Item 2 (accession 0000950133-01-501284); TC Group, L.L.C., et al., Schedule 13D/A, Magellan Midstream Partners, L.P., filed January 13, 2005, Schedule A-1 (accession 0001193125-05-006004), Securities and Exchange Commission, EDGAR. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1099363/000095013301501284/w49431sc13d.txt ; https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1126975/000119312505006004/0001193125-05-006004.txt
-[^19]: Isikoff, Michael. "Terror Watch: A Legal Counterattack," *Newsweek*, April 15, 2003. https://www.newsweek.com/terror-watch-legal-counterattack-133991
+[^19]: "Election 2000: James Baker Holds News Briefing on Progress of Florida Recount," CNN transcript, November 9, 2000. http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0011/09/se.03.html
-[^20]: Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. November 14, 2003), list of counsel; described in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 781 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/burnett-v-baraka-inv-893111164
+[^20]: "Bush Legal Team Remarks," Tuesday, November 28, 2000, American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/documents-related-the-2000-election-dispute-40
-[^21]: In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. January 18, 2005), list of counsel. http://uniset.ca/other/cs5/349FSupp2d765.html
+[^21]: Isikoff, Michael. "Terror Watch: A Legal Counterattack," *Newsweek*, April 15, 2003. https://www.newsweek.com/terror-watch-legal-counterattack-133991
-[^22]: "Statement on James A. Baker III," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 5, 2003. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031205-3.html
+[^22]: Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment & Development Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. November 14, 2003), list of counsel; described in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765, 781 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/burnett-v-baraka-inv-893111164
-[^23]: Klein, Naomi. "James Baker's Double Life," *The Nation*, November 1, 2004, republished by Type Investigations. https://www.typeinvestigations.org/investigation/2004/11/01/james-bakers-double-life/
+[^23]: In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. January 18, 2005), list of counsel. http://uniset.ca/other/cs5/349FSupp2d765.html
-[^24]: *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006, Recommendations 62 and 63, pp. 55-56, and "Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations," p. 64. https://web.archive.org/web/2id_/http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf
+[^24]: "Statement on James A. Baker III," Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, December 5, 2003. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031205-3.html
-[^25]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized receipts for contributor "Baker, James A. III," Houston, Texas, 1980 to 2020, via the FEC API. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/
+[^25]: Klein, Naomi. "James Baker's Double Life," *The Nation*, November 1, 2004, republished by Type Investigations. https://www.typeinvestigations.org/investigation/2004/11/01/james-bakers-double-life/
+[^26]: *The Iraq Study Group Report*, December 2006, Recommendations 62 and 63, pp. 55-56, and "Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations," p. 64. https://web.archive.org/web/2id_/http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf
+[^27]: Federal Election Commission, Schedule A itemized receipts for contributor "Baker, James A. III," Houston, Texas, 1980 to 2020, via the FEC API. https://api.open.fec.gov/v1/schedules/schedule_a/

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Nachum Admoni.md

@@ -6,20 +6,22 @@ tags:
   - Politician
   - Israel
   - Military
-summary: "Acting and later full Director of Mossad who served on the Iran-Israel Joint Committee for supplying arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War."
+summary: "Acting and later full Director of Mossad who, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, served on the Iran-Israel Joint Committee for supplying arms to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War."
 born: 1929-11-21
 location: "Jerusalem, Mandatory Palestine"
 ---
 
-[[Nachum Admoni]] was the acting Director of [[Mossad]] and later its full Director. He was the first [[Mossad]] chief to be appointed from the bureaucracy rather than the military. He was appointed after [[Yekutiel Adam]], who was in line for the position, was assassinated.[^1]
+[[Nachum Admoni]] was the acting Director of [[Mossad]] and later its full Director. He was the first Mossad chief to be appointed from the bureaucracy rather than the military. He was appointed after [[Yekutiel Adam]], who was in line for the position, was assassinated.[^1]
 
-[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was involved in the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], which was assigned the task of supplying [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]]. He had equal power with the Director of [[Mossad]] on the subject of arms to [[Iran]].[^1]
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], Admoni was involved in the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], which was assigned the task of supplying [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]], and he had equal power with the Director of Mossad on the subject of arms to Iran.[^1] The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force identifies [[Yitzhak Hofi]] as head of Mossad during 1980 to 1982.[^2]
 
-[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was briefed by [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] on the [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence network's arms sales to [[Iran]] for [[George H.W. Bush|Vice President George Bush]] in July 1986. He also received a phone call from [[Robert Gates]] in early February 1989, expressing [[United States|U.S.]] unhappiness about [[Israel|Israeli]] activities in [[Chile]].[^1]
+Admoni was briefed by Ari Ben-Menashe on the [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence network's arms sales to Iran for [[George H.W. Bush|Vice President George Bush]] in July 1986. He also received a phone call from [[Robert Gates]] in early February 1989, expressing [[United States|U.S.]] unhappiness about Israeli activities in [[Chile]].[^1]
 
-[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] was involved in the decision to move [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] money, which was under [[Israel|Israeli]] control, to the [[East Bloc]] in 1989. He was one of the three signatories to the slush-fund accounts, along with [[Ari Ben-Menashe]].[^1]
+Admoni was involved in the decision to move [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] money, which was under Israeli control, to the [[East Bloc]] in 1989. He was one of the three signatories to the slush-fund accounts, along with Ari Ben-Menashe.[^1]
 
-[[Nachum Admoni|Admoni]] left [[Mossad]] in 1989, but continued to advise [[Yitzhak Shamir]] on intelligence matters. He later became the chair of a public utility in [[Israel]].[^1]
+Admoni left Mossad in 1989, but continued to advise [[Yitzhak Shamir]] on intelligence matters. He later became the chair of a public utility in Israel.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^2]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Rafael Eitan.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ aliases:
   - Rafi Eitan
   - Rafi the Stinker
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - Person
@@ -62,13 +62,17 @@ Eitan stated regarding PROMIS: "We can use that program to stamp out terrorism b
 
 Distribution of the backdoored software was handled in part through British media mogul [[Robert Maxwell]], who used his Israeli computer company [[Degem]] and a network of international holdings as vehicles for sales to intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide.[^8] Eitan's involvement in what became known as the [[PROMIS Software Scandal]] was never formally adjudicated; U.S. government investigations, including the [[Nicholas J. Bua|Bua Report]] (1993), found no credible evidence that enhanced PROMIS was distributed internationally.[^10]
 
+### Ben-Menashe's Claims
+
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that Eitan was an initial member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] in 1980 and that, after [[Yitzhak Shamir]] became prime minister, Eitan ran it.[^11] The October Surprise Task Force reported that Ben-Menashe said Eitan confirmed to him reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between [[William J. Casey]] and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], in the presence of [[Yehoshua Sagi|Yehoshua Saguy]]; that Eitan told the Government of Israel that he did not know Ben-Menashe and had never met him; and that Saguy told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe. The task force wrote that credible testimonial and documentary evidence show Ben-Menashe "to be totally lacking in credibility regarding his allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980."[^12] Israeli authorities also reported to the task force that Eitan, with Kimche, Saguy and others, had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until 1991.[^13]
+
 ### Dr. Ben Orr
 
-The documentary trace of an Israeli visitor to the Department of Justice is two memoranda of [[Jack Rugh]], the department's deputy project manager on the INSLAW contract. On May 6, 1983, Rugh wrote that "Brick Brewer recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request... I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it, along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16," and on May 12 he recorded delivery of the materials to [[C. Madison Brewer]] for transmittal. The version so recorded was the public-domain [[LEAA]] one. Eitan, in the account he gave Thomas and Dillon, was Dr. Orr, travelling on a forged passport in the identity of a real retired prosecutor, "Dr Benjamin Orr, an assistant public prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice in Tel Aviv," who first flew to the United States on December 19, 1982, met Brewer, and returned in February 1983 to be shown the enhanced PROMIS at INSLAW's own offices by Bill Hamilton and [[Nancy Hamilton]], after which Brewer handed him a tape from an office cupboard; Hamilton is quoted recalling eyes "like a computer, tracking everything."[^11]
+The documentary trace of an Israeli visitor to the Department of Justice is two memoranda of [[Jack Rugh]], the department's deputy project manager on the INSLAW contract. On May 6, 1983, Rugh wrote that "Brick Brewer recently instructed me to make a copy of an LEAA version of PROMIS available to Dr. Ben Orr, a representative of the Government of Israel. Dr. Orr called me to discuss that request... I have made a copy of the LEM DEC version of PROMIS and will provide it, along with the corresponding documentation, to Dr. Orr before he leaves the United States for Israel on May 16," and on May 12 he recorded delivery of the materials to [[C. Madison Brewer]] for transmittal. The version so recorded was the public-domain [[LEAA]] one. Eitan, in the account he gave Thomas and Dillon, was Dr. Orr, travelling on a forged passport in the identity of a real retired prosecutor, "Dr Benjamin Orr, an assistant public prosecutor in the Ministry of Justice in Tel Aviv," who first flew to the United States on December 19, 1982, met Brewer, and returned in February 1983 to be shown the enhanced PROMIS at INSLAW's own offices by Bill Hamilton and [[Nancy Hamilton]], after which Brewer handed him a tape from an office cupboard; Hamilton is quoted recalling eyes "like a computer, tracking everything."[^14]
 
 ### Later Career
 
-Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March 2006 and joined [[Ehud Olmert]]'s coalition, in which he served as minister for pensioner affairs; in October 2008 he told a German magazine that Iran's president should be kidnapped and tried at The Hague. Of the Eichmann capture he told Gordon Thomas that "almost every published fact about the capture of Eichmann is pure bullshit. I know because I personally am the man who captured him."[^12]
+Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March 2006 and joined [[Ehud Olmert]]'s coalition, in which he served as minister for pensioner affairs; in October 2008 he told a German magazine that Iran's president should be kidnapped and tried at The Hague. Of the Eichmann capture he told Gordon Thomas that "almost every published fact about the capture of Eichmann is pure bullshit. I know because I personally am the man who captured him."[^15]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -82,5 +86,8 @@ Eitan founded the Pensioners' Party, Gil, which won seven Knesset seats in March
 [^8]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad.* St. Martin's Press, 1999.
 [^9]: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary. *The INSLAW Affair: Investigative Report.* House Report 102-857, 102nd Congress, 2nd Session, September 10, 1992.
 [^10]: U.S. Department of Justice. *Report of Special Counsel Nicholas J. Bua to the Attorney General of the United States Regarding the Allegations of Inslaw, Inc.* March 1993.
-[^11]: House Report 102-857, September 10, 1992, reproducing Rugh's memoranda of May 6 and 12, 1983, which do not identify Dr. Orr; Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon, *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy,* Carroll and Graf, 2002. https://archive.org/details/robert-maxwell-israels-superspy-2002 The February 1983 visit in the book and the May 1983 transfer in the memoranda are not the same transaction, and no record reconciles them.
+[^11]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
-[^12]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies,* 2009 edition. https://archive.org/details/gideons-spies
+[^12]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^13]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.
+[^14]: House Report 102-857, September 10, 1992, reproducing Rugh's memoranda of May 6 and 12, 1983, which do not identify Dr. Orr; Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon, *Robert Maxwell, Israel's Superspy,* Carroll and Graf, 2002. https://archive.org/details/robert-maxwell-israels-superspy-2002 The February 1983 visit in the book and the May 1983 transfer in the memoranda are not the same transaction, and no record reconciles them.
+[^15]: Thomas, Gordon. *Gideon's Spies,* 2009 edition. https://archive.org/details/gideons-spies

10 - PEOPLE/(A-G)/Robert Gates.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-updated: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-14
 aliases:
   - Robert Gates
   - Bob Gates
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@ In its October 24, 1991 report on Gates's nomination, the [[Senate Select Commit
 
 The committee also reported that, while investigating relationships between Gates and Cardoen, it received information about a relationship between [[Industrias Cardoen|Cardoen Industries]] and a former part-time senior CIA employee, [[James D. Theberge]]. The report states that "There is no evidence that the nominee, Mr. Gates, participated in either his recruitment or selection" to the Senior Review Panel. In written answers printed in the report, Gates said that he had moved the panel's organization from the Directorate of Intelligence to the Director's area when he became deputy director for intelligence in January 1982, that decisions on panel members were made by the Director, and that "I do not recall meeting Ambassador Theberge prior to his joining the SRP." He wrote that he was "unaware of his [Theberge's] relationships, his connection to the SWISSCO Management Group, or any connection to the Carlos Cardoen Group."[^4]
 
+### Ben-Menashe's allegations, 1991
+
+During Gates's 1991 confirmation hearings to be director of Central Intelligence, [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] alleged to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Gates conspired with the Reagan-Bush campaign to delay the release of the American hostages and was present at various meetings, including those in Paris. Gates, under oath, denied the allegations. The committee reported that investigations by the FBI and the CIA inspector general, including analyses of Gates's calendar and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm Ben-Menashe's allegations; the October Surprise Task Force wrote that it was aware of no evidence to the contrary.[^5][^6] In Ben-Menashe's 1992 book, Gates dealt directly with [[David Kimche]] on Israeli arms sales to Iran, and approved the sale of unsophisticated weapons to Iran in early 1981; the book also places Gates at meetings with [[Mehdi Karrubi]] in Madrid in 1980. In July 1987, according to Ben-Menashe, [[Mohammed Jalali]] met Gates in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue.[^7]
+
 ### Publications
 *   *From the Shadows* (1997)
 
@@ -42,3 +46,6 @@ The committee also reported that, while investigating relationships between Gate
 [^2]: Jacobsen, Annie. *Phenomena: The Secret History of the U.S. Government's Investigations into Extrasensory Perception and Psychokinesis*. Little, Brown and Company, 2017.
 [^3]: "Psychic Spies: Cold War Whimsy or Secret Weapon?," ABC News *Nightline,* November 28, 1995, Radio TV Reports transcript for the CIA Public Affairs Staff, CIA-RDP99-01448R000402140001-7, read in the archive.org mirror of the CIA FOIA Reading Room.
 [^4]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st sess., October 24, 1991, section 5, PDF pages 186 to 188. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf
+[^5]: U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, *Nomination of Robert M. Gates to be Director of Central Intelligence*, S. Exec. Rept. 102-19 (October 24, 1991), sections 4 and 5, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-filesations-10219.pdf (PDF pages 185 to 187).
+[^6]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 172. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^7]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Edward Lansdale.md

@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-05-15
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: Edward Lansdale
 aliases:
   - Edward Geary Lansdale
+  - Edward G. Lansdale
+  - Edward Lansdale
+  - Ed Lansdale
+  - E. G. Lansdale
+  - Lansdale
 tags:
   - Person
   - CIA
@@ -11,51 +16,249 @@ tags:
   - Philippines
   - Vietnam
   - AntiCastro
+  - OSS
   - Counterinsurgency
+  - OperationMongoose
+  - SaigonMilitaryMission
+  - Huk
+  - ChurchCommittee
+  - Assassination
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
-summary: "Major General Edward Lansdale was the U.S. Air Force's preeminent counterinsurgency theorist, credited with suppressing the Huk insurgency in the Philippines by backing Ramon Magsaysay (1950-1953), advising Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam (1954-1956), and directing Operation Mongoose against Castro (1961-1962) under Robert Kennedy's oversight, becoming the partial model for the protagonists in both The Quiet American and The Ugly American."
+summary: "Edward Lansdale was an Air Force officer whose Philippine counterinsurgency work, Saigon mission and Operation Mongoose role made him a central figure in covert action against Vietnam and Cuba."
 born: 1908-02-06
 died: 1987-02-23
 location: "Washington, D.C."
+relations:
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Office of Strategic Services]]"
+    role: "intelligence officer"
+    start: 1942
+    end: 1945
+    fn: 2
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[United States Air Force]]"
+    role: "officer"
+    start: 1947
+    end: 1963-10-31
+    fn: 2
+  - type: partner_of
+    with: "[[Ramon Magsaysay]]"
+    role: "U.S. adviser to the Philippine defense secretary and later president"
+    start: 1950
+    end: 1953
+    fn: 4
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Saigon Military Mission]]"
+    role: "chief"
+    start: 1954-06-01
+    end: 1956
+    fn: 7
+  - type: partner_of
+    with: "[[Ngo Dinh Diem]]"
+    role: "U.S. adviser to Diem"
+    start: 1954
+    end: 1956
+    fn: 15
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[Robert Kennedy]]"
+    role: "wrote to the Attorney General on the Cuba project"
+    start: 1961-11-30
+    fn: 27
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Operation Mongoose]]"
+    role: "chief of operations"
+    start: 1961-11-30
+    end: 1962-11
+    fn: 28
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[Maxwell Taylor]]"
+    role: "Special Group (Augmented) chairman"
+    start: 1961-11-30
+    end: 1962-11
+    fn: 29
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[William Harvey]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "CIA project officer for Operation Mongoose"
+    start: 1962
+    end: 1962
+    fn: 30
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Operation NORTHWOODS]]"
+    role: "requested pretexts for military intervention through the Mongoose interagency group"
+    start: 1962-03-06
+    end: 1962-03-13
+    fn: 44
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Church Committee]]"
+    reverse: true
+    fn: 29
+  - type: reported_to
+    with: "[[Ellsworth Bunker]]"
+    role: "assistant to the ambassador, U.S. Mission to South Vietnam"
+    start: 1967
+    end: 1968
+    fn: 2
+  - type: appointed
+    with: "[[Henry Cabot Lodge]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "special assistant to the ambassador, later senior liaison officer"
+    start: 1965-08
+    end: 1968
+    fn: 55
 ---
 
-Edward Geary Lansdale (February 6, 1908 - February 23, 1987) was a [[United States Air Force]] officer and intelligence operative who shaped American counterinsurgency doctrine through practical success in the [[Philippines]] and controversial engagement in [[Vietnam|South Vietnam]], and who directed [[Operation Mongoose]] - the Kennedy administration's post-[[Bay of Pigs]] program to overthrow [[Fidel Castro]] - until its suspension following the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].[^1]
+Edward Geary Lansdale (1908-1987) was an [[United States Air Force]] officer and intelligence operative whose counterinsurgency work in the [[Philippines]] and [[Vietnam]] shaped American counterinsurgency doctrine, and who served as chief of operations of [[Operation Mongoose]], the Kennedy administration's covert program against [[Fidel Castro]], from November 1961 until the program was suspended after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].[^1]
 
-### Philippines and Counterinsurgency Doctrine
+### Early career
 
-Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in 1950 as an Air Force officer attached to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] during the Huk insurgency - an armed communist-led peasant rebellion (Hukbalahap) that threatened the Manila government. Working closely with [[Ramon Magsaysay]], first as Defense Secretary and then as President, Lansdale developed an approach to counterinsurgency that emphasized political reform over military force: redressing peasant grievances, creating a professional and non-corrupt military, civic action programs, and psychological operations rather than indiscriminate repression.
+Lansdale was born in Detroit on February 6, 1908. He served with the [[Office of Strategic Services]] from 1942 to 1945, was promoted to lieutenant in the U.S. Army in 1943, and served in military intelligence for the duration of the war.[^2] From 1945 to 1948 he was chief of an intelligence division and extended his stay in the Philippines at AFWESPAC and PHILRYCOM, where he helped the Philippine Army rebuild its intelligence services. He was commissioned a captain in the Air Force in 1947 with the temporary rank of major, taught at the Strategic Intelligence School at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, in 1948, and received a temporary promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1949.[^2]
 
-The Huk insurgency was effectively ended by 1953. American policy circles attributed this success to Lansdale's methods, and Magsaysay's election as President in 1953 (which Lansdale helped engineer) was seen as validating the approach: a popular anti-communist leader defeating both insurgency and corruption simultaneously.
+[[Fletcher Prouty|L. Fletcher Prouty]] wrote in 1992 that Lansdale entered the OSS soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor and later said that he had left it to serve in army intelligence, and that in November 1949 Lansdale was brought into the [[Office of Policy Coordination]], the covert action office directed by [[Frank Wisner]], who had headed the OSS section in Romania during the war. Prouty wrote that Lansdale worked there under Col. [[Richard G. Stilwell]] in the planning staff of the Far East division.[^3]
 
-This Philippine model - counterinsurgency as political as much as military work - became the basis for American counterinsurgency doctrine and for Lansdale's subsequent assignments.[^1]
+### Philippines, 1950 to 1953
 
-### Vietnam: Saigon Military Mission
+Lansdale arrived in the Philippines in 1950 as an Air Force officer attached to the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] during the [[Hukbalahap|Huk]] insurgency, an armed communist-led peasant rebellion that threatened the Manila government.[^1] His transfer to the [[Joint United States Military Advisory Group]] came at the request of President [[Elpidio Quirino]], to advise the Philippine Army's intelligence services in the campaign against the Huks, and he received a temporary promotion to colonel in 1951.[^2] The Army's history of the campaign places Lansdale's first meeting with [[Ramon Magsaysay]] at a reception at Fort Myer, where Magsaysay had just been named Philippine defense secretary. The study says that Magsaysay then asked President Quirino to request Lansdale's assignment to JUSMAG, and that Lansdale arrived with his assistant, Maj. [[Charles T. R. Bohannan]].[^4]
 
-Lansdale arrived in Saigon in June 1954, days before the Geneva Accords ended the First Indochina War. He headed the Saigon Military Mission (SMM), a covert operation tasked with building support for the anti-communist government of [[Ngo Dinh Diem]] and undermining the communist North Vietnamese government.
+Working with Magsaysay, Lansdale developed an approach to counterinsurgency that emphasized political reform over military force: redressing peasant grievances, creating a professional and less corrupt military, civic action programs, and psychological operations rather than indiscriminate repression.[^1] The Huk insurgency was effectively ended by 1953. Magsaysay's election as president in 1953, which Lansdale helped engineer, was seen at the time as validating the approach: a popular anti-communist leader defeating insurgency and corruption at once.[^1] The approach became the basis for American counterinsurgency doctrine and for Lansdale's later assignments.[^1]
 
-The SMM conducted psychological operations and sabotage in North Vietnam, helped orchestrate the movement of approximately 900,000 Catholic Vietnamese from North to South following partition, and worked to stabilize Diem's government against internal challenges from the Binh Xuyen criminal organization and dissident military factions. Lansdale developed a personal relationship with Diem and provided the political counsel that helped Diem survive the turbulent 1954-1956 period.
+The Army's study describes the psychological warfare that ran alongside the patrols. Scout-Ranger units distributed propaganda leaflets covertly in areas the guerrillas considered secure, and the most successful was called "The Eye," which left each finder uncertain how far his territory had been penetrated. The study also describes altered cartridges, with dynamite in place of powder, planted in Huk weapon caches, so that a guerrilla could not tell whether his supply had been tampered with by a government agent.[^5] In his memoir Lansdale wrote that one combat psywar squad planted stories among the residents of a town of an asuang, a vampire, living on the hill where the Huks were based, then ambushed a Huk patrol, snatched its last man and "punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion." He described a second technique, the "eye of God," which he had heard of from the siege of Caen and from spotter-aircraft and loudspeaker-tank teams in Europe during World War II: exact intelligence on individual enemy soldiers was broadcast by loudspeaker so that each "couldn't hide from an all-seeing eye."[^6]
 
-Graham Greene's novel *The Quiet American* (1955) drew partially on Lansdale's activities and persona in Vietnam, though Greene's portrayal was decidedly unflattering. William Lederer and Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* (1958) featured Colonel Edwin Hillandale, a more sympathetic character clearly modeled on Lansdale.[^1]
+### Saigon Military Mission, 1954 to 1956
 
-Lansdale returned to Vietnam for a second tour in 1965-1968 in a senior advisory capacity under Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]], but with far less operational authority than his earlier mission. He was recalled in 1968 without having achieved the political reform he believed essential to South Vietnam's survival.
+In 1953 Lansdale was a member of Lt. Gen. [[John W. O'Daniel]]'s mission to the French forces in Indochina, as an adviser on special counter-guerrilla operations.[^2] He arrived in Saigon on June 1, 1954, about seven weeks before the Geneva Agreements of July 21, 1954 ended the [[First Indochina War]]. He headed the [[Saigon Military Mission]] (SMM), an American team that the mission's own report says was born at a Washington policy meeting early in 1954.[^7] The report gives the team's broad mission as paramilitary operations against the enemy and political-psychological warfare.[^8] O'Daniel and the embassy chargé [[Robert McClintock]] had arranged Lansdale's appointment as assistant air attaché, and secret communications with Washington ran through the Saigon station of the CIA.[^9]
 
-### Operation Mongoose
+The report, which the [[Pentagon Papers]] reprinted as Document 95, describes a black propaganda strike that the team engineered in Hanoi before the [[Viet Minh]] took the city: leaflets signed by the Viet Minh gave residents instructions for the takeover, including items on property and money. A later leaflet, attributed to the Viet Minh Resistance Committee, was prepared for the transport of southern Viet Minh to the North under the Geneva agreement. The report also records that the idea for [[Operation Brotherhood]], a program of volunteer medical teams for South Vietnam, was born at an SMM conference in 1954, and that the chief suggested [[Donald R. Heath|Ambassador Heath]] call a U.S. meeting to plan a single Vietnamese refugee agency under a commissioner appointed by Diem.[^10]
 
-After the Bay of Pigs disaster in April 1961, the Kennedy administration created Operation Mongoose to renew efforts against Castro through covert means. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] chaired the [[Special Group]] (Augmented) overseeing the program; Lansdale was appointed its operational director in November 1961.
+The report records that [[Ngo Dinh Diem|Diem]] arrived in Saigon on July 7, 1954, and that Diem made an agreement with General [[Trinh Minh The]], leader of some 3,000 [[Cao Dai]] dissidents near Tay Ninh, to give him financial support in return for armed support to the government if needed.[^10] Some 900,000 civilians exercised their option under Article 14(d) of the armistice to move from the North to the South, among them more than 600,000 Catholics, an estimated 65 percent of North Vietnam's Catholics.[^11] The northern team under Maj. [[Lucien Conein]] supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French as part of its cover duties.[^12] In September 1954 the team attempted to destroy the modern presses of the largest printing establishment in the north, which intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Viet Minh; Viet Minh security agents had already moved into the plant.[^13] In its last days in Hanoi, before the city was evacuated on October 9, 1954, the team contaminated the oil supply of the bus company for a gradual wreckage of engines and took the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad, working with a CIA special technical team in Japan.[^14] Lansdale developed a personal relationship with Diem and provided the political counsel that helped Diem survive the turbulent 1954 to 1956 period.[^1] The team also worked to stabilize Diem's government against challenges from the Binh Xuyen criminal organization and dissident military factions. The Pentagon's study says that in 1955 and 1956 Lansdale "was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South Vietnam."[^15]
 
-Mongoose was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War. At its peak, the CIA's [[JM-WAVE|JM/WAVE]] station in Miami employed over 400 officers and had more than 3,000 Cuban exile agents on its payroll. Operations targeted Cuban economic infrastructure (sabotage), developed internal resistance networks, and maintained assassination planning tracks through [[William Harvey]]'s [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] program.
+The report describes the mission's part in the dispute between Diem and the army chief of staff, General [[Nguyen Van Hinh]], who had selected October 26, 1954 for an attack on the presidential palace. The mission invited two of Hinh's officers to the Philippines on the pretext of an official trip, and the report states that the attack did not take place. Ambassador [[J. Lawton Collins]], who arrived on November 8, applied pressure on Hinh, and Hinh left for Paris on November 29.[^16] In the Philippines the mission built up Freedom Company, a non-profit Philippine corporation backed by President Magsaysay to supply Filipinos experienced in fighting the Huks, and the United States backed a small Freedom Company training camp in a hidden valley on the Clark Air Base reservation.[^17] In January 1955 the mission borrowed Magsaysay's senior aide, Col. [[Napoleon Valeriano]], to reorganize the Presidential Guard Battalion for Diem.[^18]
 
-Lansdale's relationship with Harvey was persistently antagonistic. Harvey believed Mongoose's operational security was compromised by Robert Kennedy's direct involvement; Lansdale regarded Harvey's insubordination and alcoholism as operational liabilities. Harvey unilaterally dispatched teams into Cuba during the October 1962 missile crisis, directly violating administration policy, leading to his transfer to Rome. Mongoose was effectively suspended during the missile crisis and formally reduced in scope thereafter.[^2]
+The report also describes an almanac for popular sale in the northern cities, for which Vietnamese astrologers were hired to write predictions of disasters for certain Viet Minh leaders and undertakings and of unity in the south, work the report says was "based on our concept of the use of astrology for psywar in Southeast Asia." Copies were shipped by air to Haiphong and smuggled into Viet Minh territory.[^18] On January 11, 1955 Collins announced Lansdale's transfer from the ambassador's staff to the Training Relations and Instruction Mission under O'Daniel, to head its National Security division, with authority to coordinate all U.S. agencies in Vietnam in that work.[^18]
 
-### Legacy
+[[Graham Greene]]'s novel [[The Quiet American]] (1955) drew partly on Lansdale's activities and persona in Vietnam, and Greene's portrayal is decidedly unflattering.[^19] [[William Lederer]] and [[Eugene Burdick]]'s [[The Ugly American]] (1958) featured Colonel Edwin Hillandale, a more sympathetic character. [[Mary McGrory]] wrote in a [[Washington Star]] article on Lodge's second Saigon mission that Lansdale was widely regarded as the prototype of the harmonica-playing Colonel Hillandale of that novel.[^20]
 
-Lansdale represented a specific strand of Cold War American engagement with the Third World: the belief that communist insurgencies could be countered by winning popular support rather than by military force alone, and that American counterinsurgency advisors could translate this theory into practice in specific contexts. His Philippine success was real; his Vietnam engagement contributed to a trajectory that ended in American defeat.
+### Diem and the Pentagon, 1955 to 1961
 
-His operational career raised questions that remained relevant through later U.S. counterinsurgency experiences: whether the Philippine model was transferable to different political cultures, whether American advisors could substitute for indigenous political leadership, and whether covert operations could produce durable political outcomes.
+Lansdale went to the office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington in 1957 as deputy assistant secretary for special operations, served on the staff of the President's Committee on Military Assistance (the Draper Committee) in 1959, and received a temporary promotion to brigadier general in 1960.[^2] In 1961 he held special operations posts in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A letter of January 30, 1961 styles him the deputy assistant for special operations, and a memorandum of June 26, 1961 styles him the assistant for special operations.[^21][^22] The Defense Department's Vietnam study identifies him as Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale of the [[Office of Special Operations]] in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, abbreviated OSO/OSD.[^23]
 
-Lansdale died in Washington on February 23, 1987.[^1]
+Lansdale's January 1961 report on Vietnam, submitted after a visit to Saigon, argued that the United States had to keep supporting Diem, and the Defense Department study notes that memoirs by [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr.|Arthur Schlesinger]] and [[Roger Hilsman]] describe the report as shocking the president about conditions in Vietnam.[^23] A letter Lansdale wrote to Diem on January 30, 1961 is in the Lansdale Papers at the [[Hoover Institution]].[^21]
+
+The Defense study says Lansdale served as executive officer of the task force that [[Roswell Gilpatric]] organized to review Vietnam, and that he proposed the task force be given a continuing, dominant role in managing the Vietnamese enterprise.[^23] In October 1961 he met [[Ngo Dinh Nhu]] in Saigon and reported the conversation to [[Maxwell Taylor]], the president's military representative.[^24]
+
+### Operation Mongoose, 1961 to 1962
+
+After the [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion of April 1961, the Kennedy administration renewed covert efforts against Castro. At a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 President [[John F. Kennedy]] authorized a new program. [[Robert Kennedy]]'s handwritten notes of the meeting list "Lansdale (the Ugly American)" among those present, record that Robert Kennedy assigned Lansdale to survey the situation in Cuba, and describe the aim of stirring things up on the island with espionage, sabotage and general disorder, run by Cubans themselves.[^25]
+
+On November 28, 1961 Lansdale wrote to Gen. [[Samuel T. Williams]] that a "crash project" from his superior had taken him away from the follow-through on the Taylor group's reports. The published volume identifies the project as a Cuba effort that Attorney General Kennedy had asked him to take up.[^26] On November 30, 1961 he sent Robert Kennedy a memorandum on the "day of decision" for the project, arguing that the intelligence estimate circulated against it was inadequate on the internal situation.[^27] A later program review states that the November 30 directive set the goal of the program and named Lansdale as chief of operations, with operational lieutenants from [[Department of State|State]], Defense and the CIA.[^28]
+
+The [[Church Committee]] records that Kennedy appointed General Maxwell Taylor chairman of the [[Special Group (Augmented)]], and that Robert Kennedy played an active role in the program, a role unrelated to his position as attorney general.[^29] Lansdale was designated chief of operations. The committee also records that [[William Harvey]] was put in charge of the CIA's [[Task Force W]] in late 1961 or early 1962, a unit that employed approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and its Miami station.[^29] Harvey's memorandum to Lansdale of July 24, 1962 stated that as of July 23, 477 CIA staff personnel were devoting full time to the effort.[^30]
+
+Lansdale's review of the first phase, dated July 25, 1962, reported that recruitment of third-country nationals and the start of Cuban collection nets had made Operation Mongoose "numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state."[^31] Taylor's memorandum to the president of August 17, 1962 described the program as generating the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country.[^32] Sabotage was part of the plan. On October 8, 1962 Harvey asked Lansdale to put before the Special Group a request for policy approval to sabotage Cuban-owned vessels "wherever and whenever secure access to them can be attained," normally in non-Bloc ports.[^33] Operations targeted Cuban economic infrastructure through sabotage, developed internal resistance networks, and maintained assassination planning tracks through Harvey's [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] program.[^34] At its peak the [[JM-WAVE]] station in Miami had more than 3,000 Cuban exile agents on its payroll. Lansdale's relationship with Harvey was persistently antagonistic. Harvey believed that Robert Kennedy's direct involvement compromised the operation's security, and Lansdale regarded Harvey's insubordination and alcoholism as operational liabilities.[^34] Mongoose was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War.
+
+Planning tasks were set in January 1962. On January 18 Lansdale assigned 32 tasks to the participating agencies.[^35] In a memorandum of January 20 to the members of the Caribbean Survey Group he wrote that "we are in a combat situation" in which "we have been given full command."[^36] On January 19 he added Task 33, a plan to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by chemical means. Lansdale testified that the agents were nonlethal and meant to keep workers away from the fields for 24 to 48 hours. The task was approved for planning with a notation that it required a policy determination, and after a study showed it unfeasible it was cancelled without reaching the Special Group.[^37] A January 26 memorandum asked State and Defense for an early determination of when the United States might use military force in the Cuba project.[^38]
+
+The committee describes Lansdale's six-phase schedule as one that the Special Group did not approve for implementation, and reports that only its first, intelligence-collection phase was approved for January through August 1962. The March 14, 1962 guidelines stated that "During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks."[^39]
+
+Parrott, an assistant to the president's military representative, testified before the Church Committee in 1975 about a plan for removing Castro that he attributed to Lansdale. In Parrott's account, the plan consisted of spreading word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro, with an American submarine to surface off Cuba and send up starshells as the sign. Parrott said that somebody dubbed the plan "Elimination by Illumination."[^40][^41]
+
+Lansdale testified in 1975 that "touchdown play," a phrase in his memoranda, was a breezy way of referring to a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime, and the committee reports that the examples in his January 1962 memorandum contained no indication of assassination.[^37]
+
+On February 20, 1962 Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule designed to culminate in October 1962 with "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." For its "Resistance" phase he listed "attacks on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders," with the notation that "Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police G-2 officials" and that chemical warfare agents should be fully considered. Lansdale testified that the "actions" and "attack" in that component meant killing. He testified that early in the program he had suggested to working-level representatives of the participating agencies that they contact "criminal elements" for intelligence and for "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba, and he conceded that his proposal to recruit gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targeted killing of individuals.[^42] On January 30, 1962 Craig forwarded to Lansdale a concept called Operation Bounty, a system of financial rewards for killing or delivering alive known Communists, with leaflets listing rewards from $5,000 for an informer to $100,000 for government officials and a reward of 2 cents for Castro. Lansdale testified that the figure was designed to denigrate Castro and that he tabled the concept, which he never brought before the Special Group (Augmented).[^43]
+
+### Operation NORTHWOODS and the pretexts question
+
+At a March 5, 1962 meeting chaired by Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]], Rusk spoke of "other tracks" which might be opened for the United States to achieve its objective, and there was joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed. On March 6, 1962 Lansdale wrote to [[Richard Goodwin]], the deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, that General Taylor had asked him to report on these alternate "tracks" to the Special Group he chaired. He was asking the Defense representative, [[William H. Craig]], for "a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention," and he asked State for a companion statement.[^44] A [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] memorandum of March 13, 1962, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba," answered with a set of pretexts for military action. That plan is known as [[Operation NORTHWOODS]].[^45]
+
+### Castro assassination questions, 1975
+
+Lansdale's own account of assassination planning appeared in an [[Associated Press]] interview published by [[The Washington Post]] on May 1, 1975. He said that, acting on orders delivered through an intermediary, he developed plans for removing Castro by any means, including assassination, and that he was assigned to the project in 1962, when the United States first received intelligence that Castro was prepared to install Soviet-made missiles in Cuba.[^46] He declined to name the intermediary and said it was not [[McGeorge Bundy]] but someone "much more intimate."[^46] Of the project he said, "I just wanted to see if the United States had any such capabilities," and he said he was "working for the highest authority in the land." [[Robert McNamara]] objected to the description of Lansdale as his assistant in August 1962, saying "I had no personal knowledge of what he was doing."[^46]
+
+The Associated Press identified Lansdale as the author of an August 1962 memorandum, then in the possession of the [[Rockefeller Commission 1975|Rockefeller Commission]], which authoritative sources said gave the CIA authority to develop contingency plans for the assassination of Castro. Lansdale said he did not remember the memorandum but acknowledged that it would not have been incompatible with his assigned task. He confirmed that the phrase "something like that," used in describing the project, included the possibility of assassination.[^46]
+
+The August 13, 1962 memorandum that the Church Committee quotes directed Harvey to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in a proposed Phase II plan. Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to [[Richard Helms]] attached Lansdale's memorandum with the words excised.[^47] On August 6, 1962 Lansdale had reviewed Harvey's draft operational plan.[^48] The Special Group met on August 16, 1962 and approved Lansdale's paper subject to detailed actions, and [[John McCone]]'s record of the meeting notes a difference between Lansdale and the CIA over the position McCone had taken on the plan.[^49]
+
+### The missile crisis and the end of the program
+
+Harvey testified before the committee that during the October 1962 crisis he ordered agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation, that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone ordered the agent operations stopped. On October 30, 1962 the Special Group ordered a halt to all sabotage operations, citing Lansdale's memorandum for the record.[^50] The committee's chronology records that Operation Mongoose ended in November 1962.[^51] The program was formally reduced in scope after the crisis.
+
+Harvey was appointed chief of the CIA station in Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^52] [[Evan Thomas|Thomas]] wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^53] Lansdale retired from the Air Force on October 31, 1963, was awarded a second Distinguished Service Medal for his counterinsurgency work, and became a consultant to the director of Food for Peace at the White House.[^2]
+
+### Return to Vietnam, 1965 to 1968
+
+Lansdale returned to Vietnam in 1965. A CIA memorandum for the record, of August 1965, summarizes a Washington meeting on his mission, attended by officials from State, including [[Walt Rostow]], from the White House, from [[United States Agency for International Development|AID]] and [[United States Information Agency|USIA]], and from the CIA, including [[William Colby]]. At that meeting Lansdale described his concept of the mission as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do, and as unifying the efforts of the American mission.[^54]
+
+Congressional remarks by Representative [[Claude Pepper]], reprinting a Washington Post item of August 20, 1965, described Lansdale as being sent to South Vietnam as a special assistant to Ambassador [[Henry Cabot Lodge]].[^55] The Pentagon Papers state that Lansdale "never got to Vietnam until Cabot Lodge brought him out later in 1965," despite four requests from Diem and recommendations from Cottrell, the Taylor report and William Bundy that he be sent.[^56] In late August 1965 Lodge announced Lansdale's appointment as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the South Vietnamese government's CRCC.[^57]
+
+His 1965 post carried less operational authority than his earlier mission. A New York World Journal Tribune article of March 26, 1967 reported that Lansdale had returned to Vietnam in September 1965 with Lodge, under the unusual and rather vague title of senior liaison officer, with ministerial rank, as a member of a ten-man mission council.[^58] The senior liaison office staff worked on winning support in the Vietnamese countryside, and President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] also appointed Lansdale a minister. From 1967 to 1968 he was an assistant to Ambassador [[Ellsworth Bunker]] at the U.S. Mission in South Vietnam.[^2] Lansdale was recalled in 1968 without the political reform he believed essential to South Vietnam's survival.[^1]
+
+Lansdale died in McLean, Virginia, on February 23, 1987.[^2]
+
+### Fletcher Prouty's claims
+
+Col. L. Fletcher Prouty wrote about Lansdale in two publications, one placing him in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other connecting him to the story of President Kennedy's assassination. In a 1986 article in [[Freedom (magazine)|Freedom]], Prouty wrote that he and Lansdale flew to [[Fort Gordon]], Georgia, on November 1, 1960 to collect elements of a Civil Affairs and Military Government curriculum, and that both were then assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prouty described Lansdale as a principal proponent of what he called the "Mao doctrine" of counterinsurgency, which he wrote was introduced into the White House under the guise of a mutual security program.[^59]
+
+In his 1992 book on the assassination and Vietnam, Prouty asked where the Joint Chiefs, Lansdale and [[Allen Dulles]] were when the guns sounded in the streets of Dallas. He wrote that Cuban exile groups from Louisiana and their instructors became suspects in the investigation, that many of them were later recruited into the larger program Operation Mongoose under Lansdale, and that the identification of [[Lee Harvey Oswald]] as the scapegoat served as a cover story.[^60]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Currey, Cecil B. *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American.* Houghton Mifflin, 1988. Lansdale, Edward Geary. *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia.* Harper & Row, 1972.
+[^1]: Currey, Cecil B. *Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American*. Houghton Mifflin, 1988.
-[^2]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995. Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975.
+[^2]: Hoover Institution Library & Archives, *Register of the Edward Geary Lansdale papers, 1910-1987*, Online Archive of California, biographical chronology (born Detroit, February 6, 1908; O.S.S. 1942-1945; JUSMAG 1950; O'Daniel mission 1953; Saigon 1954-1956; Office of the Secretary of Defense 1957, 1959, 1960 and 1961; retirement October 31, 1963; senior liaison officer 1965-1967; assistant to Ambassador Bunker 1967-1968; death at McLean, Virginia, February 23, 1987). https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf6v19n8cp/
+[^3]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*. Carol Publishing Group, 1992, on Lansdale's OSS service and his assignment to the Office of Policy Coordination in November 1949. https://archive.org/details/jfkciavietnamplo0000prou_r5p5
+[^4]: Greenberg, Lawrence M. *The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1986, section on Lansdale's JUSMAG assignment and the Magsaysay request. https://archive.org/details/hukbalahapinsurr00lawr
+[^5]: Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap Insurrection*, section on psychological warfare operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, describing the Scout-Ranger leaflets, "The Eye," and the altered-cartridge tactic. https://archive.org/details/hukbalahapinsurr00lawr
+[^6]: Edward Geary Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972; reprint, New York: Fordham University Press, 1991), pp. 72-75. https://archive.org/details/inmidstofwarsame0000lans
+[^7]: Saigon Military Mission report, excerpted as Document 95 in *The Pentagon Papers, The Senator Gravel Edition*, vol. I, pp. 573-574, on the mission's origin in a Washington policy meeting and the arrival of Lansdale in Saigon on June 1, 1954. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^8]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 573-574, on the mission's broad statement of purpose. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^9]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 574, on the assistant air attache cover arranged by O'Daniel and McClintock and the communications through the CIA station. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^10]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 574-579, covering the Diem arrival of July 7, 1954 (p. 575), the refugee commission proposal and Operation Brotherhood (p. 576), the black propaganda strike in Hanoi (pp. 578-579) and the Viet Minh leaflet for the southern transport (p. 579), and the Diem agreement with Trinh Minh The (p. 578). https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^11]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 289-291, on the some 900,000 civilians who exercised their option under Article 14(d) of the armistice (pp. 289-290) and the estimated 65 percent of North Vietnam's Catholics, more than 600,000 in all, who moved south (p. 291). https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^12]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 577, on the northern team's cover duties supervising the Hanoi refugee airlift. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^13]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 578, on the attempt to destroy the Hanoi printing presses in September 1954. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^14]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, p. 579, on the evacuation of Hanoi on October 9, 1954, the contamination of the bus company oil supply and the delayed sabotage of the railroad. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^15]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 2, Part IV.B.1, sections on the Lansdale report of January 1961 and the Taylor mission, quoting the Defense Department's statement that Lansdale "was a key figure in installing and establishing Diem as President of South Vietnam." DTIC ADA542557. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557
+[^16]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 577-580, on the dispute between Diem and General Hinh, the invitation to the Philippines on October 26, 1954, the arrival of Collins on November 8 and Hinh's departure on November 29. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^17]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 580-581, on Freedom Company and the training camp on the Clark Air Base reservation. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^18]: Saigon Military Mission report, *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. I, pp. 581-582, on the almanac, the transfer to the Training Relations and Instruction Mission and the loan of Colonel Valeriano. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapersth01unit
+[^19]: Greene, Graham. *The Quiet American*. Heinemann, 1955.
+[^20]: McGrory, Mary. "'Old Asia Hand' Going Back But Highly Effective," *Washington Star*, undated clipping on Lodge's second mission to Vietnam. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430064-8. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430064-8
+[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 6, Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to President Diem, Washington, January 30, 1961. Source line: Hoover Institution, Lansdale Papers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d6
+[^22]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 73, Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric), Washington, June 26, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d73
+[^23]: *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Department of Defense study, Book 2, Part IV.B.1, "Evolution of the War: The Kennedy Program and Commitments, 1961," sections on the Lansdale report of January 1961, the Gilpatric task force, and Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD. DTIC ADA542557. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA542557
+[^24]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 182, Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to the President's Military Representative (Taylor), Saigon, October 21, 1961, on Lansdale's talk with Ngo Dinh Nhu on October 19. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d182
+[^25]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 270, Editorial Note on the November 3, 1961 meeting, quoting Robert Kennedy's handwritten notes, which list "Lansdale (the Ugly American)." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d270
+[^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. I, doc. 293, Letter From the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale) to General Samuel T. Williams, Washington, November 28, 1961. Source line: Hoover Institution Archives, Williams Papers. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d293
+[^27]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 277, Memorandum From General Edward Lansdale to Attorney General Kennedy, Washington, November 30, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d277
+[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 309, Program Review, Washington, March 2, 1962, entry for November 30, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d309
+[^29]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 140-141, on Taylor's chairmanship of the Special Group (Augmented), Lansdale's appointment as chief of operations, Robert Kennedy's role, and Task Force W. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^30]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 359, Memorandum From the CIA Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), Washington, July 24, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d359
+[^31]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 360, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Special Group (Augmented), Washington, July 25, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d360
+[^32]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 380, Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, Washington, August 17, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d380
+[^33]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10, Memorandum From the CIA Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), Washington, October 8, 1962, "Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ship." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10
+[^34]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
+[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 142-143, on the January 18, 1962 assignment of 32 tasks. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^36]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 293, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Members of the Caribbean Survey Group, Washington, January 20, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d293
+[^37]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 143, on Task 33, Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975 (p. 29), and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975 (p. 45) on the "touchdown play." https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^38]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 297, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), Washington, January 26, 1962, "Tasks 29 and 33, Cuba Project." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d297
+[^39]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 143-145, on the six-phase schedule, the approval of the first phase, and the Guidelines for Operation MONGOOSE of March 14, 1962. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^40]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 142 n. 2, quoting the testimony of Parrott, July 10, 1975, pp. 49-50. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^41]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 414, Memorandum From the Assistant to the President's Military Representative (Parrott) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), Washington, September 6, 1962, identifying Parrott's office. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d414
+[^42]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 143-144, on the February 20, 1962 six-phase schedule and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975, pp. 104-107. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^43]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 144, on Operation Bounty, citing Craig's memorandum to Lansdale of January 30, 1962 and Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975, p. 26. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^44]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 310, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Goodwin), Washington, March 6, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
+[^45]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba," memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, March 13, 1962, National Security Archive, Operation Northwoods documents. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/index.htm
+[^46]: Martin, David C., Associated Press, "Plan to Slay Castro Tied to JFK Orders," *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1975. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP90-01208R000100160011-4. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-01208r000100160011-4
+[^47]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 161-163, on Lansdale's memorandum of August 13, 1962, Harvey's memorandum to Helms of August 14, and the August 10, 1962 meeting. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^48]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 366, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the CIA Operations Officer (Harvey), Washington, August 6, 1962, "CIA Draft Operational Plan B+." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d366
+[^49]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 378, Memorandum of Meeting, Washington, August 16, 1962, prepared by McCone. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d378
+[^50]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 148, citing Harvey's testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, on the agent teams and McCone's order, and citing Lansdale's memorandum for the record of October 30, 1962 on the halt. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^51]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, chronology, p. 293, "November: Operation MONGOOSE ends." https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^52]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. CIA reading room document 01228805. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
+[^53]: Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA*. Simon & Schuster, 1995.
+[^54]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965, participants including Unger, Lansdale, Rostow, Colby and Bohannan. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
+[^55]: Congressional Record, 89th Congress, August 1965, remarks of Rep. Claude Pepper extending remarks with a Washington Post item of August 20, 1965, on Lansdale's appointment as special assistant to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430053-0. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430053-0
+[^56]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. II, pp. 126-130, on Lansdale's arrival in Vietnam in 1965 and the four requests from Diem. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapers025197
+[^57]: *Pentagon Papers*, Gravel ed., vol. II, pp. 364-366, on Lodge's announcement in late August 1965 of Lansdale as chairman of the U.S. Mission liaison group to the GVN CRCC. https://archive.org/details/pentagonpapers025197
+[^58]: *New York World Journal Tribune*, March 26, 1967, on Lansdale's title and position in the U.S. Embassy. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00001R000300430002-6. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00001r000300430002-6
+[^59]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. "Building to the Final Confrontation: John F. Kennedy vs. the CIA," *Freedom*, July 1986, on the Fort Gordon trip of November 1, 1960 and the "Mao doctrine." https://archive.org/details/building-to-the-final-confrontation-john-f.-kennedy-vs.-the-cia-by-l.-fletcher-p
+[^60]: Prouty, L. Fletcher. *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam, and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*. Carol Publishing Group, 1992, chapters on the Kennedy-era covert programs and on the assassination. https://archive.org/details/jfkciavietnamplo0000prou_r5p5

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Henry A. Kissinger.md

@@ -124,7 +124,6 @@ relations:
     start: 1986-07-01
     end: 1988-06-30
     fn: 65
-
 ---
 
 Henry Alfred Kissinger (1923 to 2023) was a German-born American political scientist and diplomat who served as [[United States Secretary of State]] and as National Security Advisor under Presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald R. Ford]]. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that in the fall of 1967, while a [[Harvard University]] professor and consultant on [[Vietnam]] to the [[Lyndon B. Johnson|Johnson]] administration, Kissinger visited [[Tel Aviv]] to teach for a week at the Israeli Defense College, and that at the end of that course he went to [[William N. Dale]]'s office in the embassy and sent an urgent, top-secret message to the [[White House]] warning about [[Dimona]] and concluding that [[Israel]] was making nuclear warheads.[^1]
@@ -281,7 +280,7 @@ Gonzalez also reported that Eagleburger was at a meeting between the bank's mana
 
 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's December 1992 report on [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] by [[John Kerry]] and [[Hank Brown]] devotes its chapter 20 to Kissinger Associates. It states that from the fall of 1986 through early 1989 BCCI initiated contacts with the firm, which then had five partners (Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III); that Stoga and a retired Brazilian ambassador working as a Kissinger Associates consultant, Sergio Correa da Costa, explored ways to link BCCI's banks with the firm's services; and that the discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence," after which Kissinger Associates referred BCCI to its director William D. Rogers and the law firm [[Arnold & Porter]]. Letters of November 3, 1986 set da Costa's terms at $40,000 a year plus 10 to 20 percent of fees on transactions he arranged, and da Costa told Kissinger in them that he would also work for BCCI. In the summer of 1987 da Costa wrote to the firm about "that amusing luncheon with the BNL crowd." On September 20, 1987 da Costa invited Kissinger to a dinner at the plantation of the BCCI shareholder [[Ghaith Pharaon]], suggesting Pharaon as a client; the report states that Kissinger declined the invitation.[^66]
 
-In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee wrote that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts," and that the firm refused to provide its client list to the subcommittee.[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
+In a letter of January 30, 1992 to Kerry, the firm's attorney [[Lloyd Cutler]] wrote that Kissinger Associates "have never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder." The committee's electronic text, published by the Federation of American Scientists, adds the comment that the account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts"; the Government Printing Office print omits that comment, and both editions record that the firm declined to provide its client list to the subcommittee. The printed chapter says the contacts "extended over a period of 2 years" and adds a paragraph stating that "in each case reviewed by the Subcommittee, Kissinger declined the overtures."[^66] A note by Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists on the copy of the report published by that organization states that Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger," pressed after its release for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in chapter 20, so that the Government Printing Office edition differs slightly from the committee's softcopy.[^66]
 
 ### Telephone Transcripts
 

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Michael Milken.md

@@ -5,16 +5,17 @@ tags:
   - IranContra
   - CIA
   - Israel
-summary: "Large amounts of money from the arms sales to Iran were funneled through American banks and held at Drexel Burnham, contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds."
+summary: "According to Ari Ben-Menashe, money from the arms sales to Iran was held at Drexel Burnham, adding to Milken's firm's ability to underwrite junk bonds."
 born: 1946-07-04
 location: "Encino, California, USA"
 ---
 
-[[Michael Milken]] was a prominent stockbroker known for building his junk-bond fortune at the brokerage house [[Drexel Burnham]]. His activities intersected with the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund.
+[[Michael Milken]] was a prominent stockbroker known for building his junk-bond fortune at the brokerage house [[Drexel Burnham]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], his activities intersected with the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund.
 
-Large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]] were funneled through [[United States|American]] banks and held at [[Drexel Burnham]], contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds. These deposits were managed on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies.[^1]
+Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]] were funneled through [[United States|American]] banks and held at Drexel Burnham, contributing to Milken's firm's stature and its ability to underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds, and that these deposits were managed on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies.[^1]
 
-In 1987, the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel, a decision that contributed to Milken's growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel Burnham.[^1]
+He wrote that in 1987 the Iran-Israel Joint Committee decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel, a decision that contributed to Milken's growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel Burnham.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Mohammed Jalali.md

@@ -8,15 +8,16 @@ tags:
 summary: "Colonel Mohammed Jalali was the Defense Minister of Iran."
 ---
 
-Colonel [[Mohammed Jalali]] was the Defense Minister of [[Iran]]. He was a key figure in the [[Iran|Iranian]] government's arms procurement during the [[Iran-Iraq War]] and had direct dealings with [[Israel|Israeli]] and [[United States|U.S.]] officials.[^1]
+Colonel [[Mohammed Jalali]] was the Defense Minister of [[Iran]]. He was a key figure in the Iranian government's arms procurement during the [[Iran-Iraq War]] and had direct dealings with [[Israel|Israeli]] and [[United States|U.S.]] officials.[^1]
 
-[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] worked with the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Israeli Joint Committee]] and was involved in negotiations for arms sales to [[Iran]]. In July 1987, he met with [[Robert Gates]] in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to [[Iran]] would continue despite the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] scandal. He also expressed concern about the [[United States|U.S.]] supporting the supply of chemical weapons to [[Iraq]].[^1]
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], Jalali worked with the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Israeli Joint Committee]] and was involved in negotiations for arms sales to Iran, and in July 1987 he met with [[Robert Gates]] in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue despite the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] scandal. He also expressed concern about the U.S. supporting the supply of chemical weapons to [[Iraq]].[^1]
 
-In late 1985, [[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] was part of a faction within the [[Iran|Iranian]] Supreme Council that was loyal to [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Hojjat El-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]]. He opposed the [[Oliver North|North]]-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] second channel for arms sales to [[Iran]], and [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Rafsanjani]] assured [[Israel|Israel]] that there would be no sales through these new people.[^1]
+In late 1985, Jalali was part of a faction within the Iranian Supreme Council that was loyal to [[Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani|Hojjat El-Islam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani]]. He opposed the [[Oliver North|North]]-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] second channel for arms sales to Iran, and Rafsanjani assured Israel that there would be no sales through these new people.[^1]
 
-[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] was involved in the deal concerning the three [[C-130]] aircraft. He requested these planes in exchange for the release of three [[Israel|Israeli]] soldiers held in [[Lebanon]]. He also pushed for the payment to [[Chile]] for [[F-5E Tiger-2|F-5E]] aircraft and was in favor of leaking to the press that [[Iran]] was in business with [[Santiago]].[^1]
+Jalali was involved in the deal concerning the three [[C-130]] aircraft. He requested these planes in exchange for the release of three Israeli soldiers held in [[Lebanon]]. He also pushed for the payment to [[Chile]] for [[F-5E Tiger-2|F-5E]] aircraft and was in favor of leaking to the press that Iran was in business with [[Santiago]].[^1]
 
-[[Mohammed Jalali|Jalali]] is mentioned as being retired and living in [[Iran]] with a second home in [[London]] as of 1992.[^1]
+Jalali is mentioned as being retired and living in Iran with a second home in [[London]] as of 1992.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Moshe Hebroni.md

@@ -5,13 +5,14 @@ tags:
 summary: "Major Moshe Hebroni was the chief of staff for the director of Israeli Military Intelligence, Yehoshua Sagi."
 ---
 
-Major [[Moshe Hebroni]] was the chief of staff for the director of [[Mossad]], [[Yehoshua Sagi]]. He was a member of the initial [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^1]
+Major [[Moshe Hebroni]] was the chief of staff for the director of Israeli Military Intelligence, [[Yehoshua Sagi]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], he was a member of the initial [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^1]
 
-[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was involved in expediting the export license for tires sold to [[Iran]] in April 1980. He also received a call from [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] regarding [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani's]] request for military aid from [[Israel]], and instructed [[Ari Ben-Menashe|Ben-Menashe]] to bring [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani]] directly to the general headquarters of [[Israel|IDF]]/MI.[^1]
+Hebroni was involved in expediting the export license for tires sold to [[Iran]] in April 1980. He also received a call from Ari Ben-Menashe regarding [[Sayeed Mehdi Kashani|Kashani's]] request for military aid from [[Israel]], and instructed Ben-Menashe to bring Kashani directly to the general headquarters of IDF/MI.[^1]
 
-[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was the duty officer who received the letter from [[Pierre Gemayel]] to [[Ariel Sharon]] warning of the impending [[Sabra and Shatila massacres]]. He made copies of the letter and informed [[Yehoshua Sagi|Sagi]]. After the massacres, [[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] was allowed to spend three months as head of branch in the External Relations Department, a period during which he could remove any documentation that might implicate him and [[Yehoshua Sagi|Sagi]] in the massacres.[^1]
+Hebroni was the duty officer who received the letter from [[Pierre Gemayel]] to [[Ariel Sharon]] warning of the impending [[Sabra and Shatila massacres]]. He made copies of the letter and informed Sagi. After the massacres, Hebroni was allowed to spend three months as head of branch in the External Relations Department, a period during which he could remove any documentation that might implicate him and Sagi in the massacres.[^1]
 
-[[Moshe Hebroni|Hebroni]] later worked for the [[Jewish Agency]] and was an unofficial adviser to [[Yitzhak Shamir]] after leaving [[Mossad]] in 1989. He confirmed [[Ari Ben-Menashe|Ben-Menashe's]] access to highly sensitive intelligence material.[^1]
+Hebroni later worked for the [[Jewish Agency]] and was an unofficial adviser to [[Yitzhak Shamir]] after leaving [[Mossad]] in 1989. He confirmed Ben-Menashe's access to highly sensitive intelligence material.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Richard J. Kerr.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ relations:
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Central Intelligence Agency]]"
     role: "acting director"
-    fn: 7
+    fn: 8
 ---
 Richard J. Kerr served as Acting [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Director. In 1991, he confirmed that the agency had used [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International|BCCI]] to move money around the world.[^1]
 
@@ -19,13 +19,13 @@ Richard J. Kerr served as Acting [[Central Intelligence Agency]] Director. In 19
 
 Kerr appeared before Senator [[John Kerry]]'s Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations on October 25, 1991, to discuss the CIA's knowledge of BCCI's activities.[^2] He stated that the CIA had not been involved with a BCCI "black network" of thugs and assassins, nor had it used BCCI for arms sales to [[Iran]] or diversion of funds for the [[Nicaraguan Contras]].[^3] He also denied that the CIA had a relationship with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] or had placed him on a watch list.[^4]
 
-Despite these denials, Kerr admitted that the CIA did maintain accounts with BCCI, describing them as normal operational accounts.[^5] The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry subcommittee]]'s report suggested that [[William J. Casey]]'s actions, including any role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], were undertaken in his position as an adviser to the President, rather than as Director of the CIA, allowing them to be undocumented and deniable.[^6]
+Despite these denials, Kerr admitted that the CIA did maintain accounts with BCCI, describing them as normal operational accounts.[^5] The Kerry-Brown report states that he acknowledged the agency's extensive use of First American as a repository for "normal banking" and savings accounts.[^6] The [[Kerry Committee|Kerry subcommittee]]'s report suggested that [[William J. Casey]]'s actions, including any role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair]], were undertaken in his position as an adviser to the President, rather than as Director of the CIA, allowing them to be undocumented and deniable.[^7]
 
 ### Testimony
 
-Kerr first spoke publicly on BCCI on August 2, 1991. In open testimony on October 25, 1991, he told the subcommittee: "As an intelligence officer for 30 years, I find myself a little reluctant in an open hearing to talk about intelligence, intelligence sources, and intelligence methods." The subcommittee learned from him that the agency had produced not two memoranda on BCCI but hundreds, disseminated to other agencies, and that it had told the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Treasury]] of BCCI's secret ownership of [[First American Bank]] in 1985. In closed session the following week he acknowledged that several questions he had refused to answer in public did not concern classified information, but that he had been "uncomfortable discussing information in public that might embarrass the [[United States]], or any U.S. agency or official."[^7]
+Kerr first spoke publicly on BCCI on August 2, 1991. In open testimony on October 25, 1991, he told the subcommittee: "As an intelligence officer for 30 years, I find myself a little reluctant in an open hearing to talk about intelligence, intelligence sources, and intelligence methods." The subcommittee learned from him that the agency had produced not two memoranda on BCCI but hundreds, disseminated to other agencies, and that it had told the [[United States Department of the Treasury|Treasury]] of BCCI's secret ownership of [[First American Bank]] in 1985. In closed session the following week he acknowledged that several questions he had refused to answer in public did not concern classified information, but that he had been "uncomfortable discussing information in public that might embarrass the [[United States]], or any U.S. agency or official."[^8]
 
-He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI," a characterization a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit confirmed according to a briefing given to subcommittee staff, and acknowledged that the agency had made "extensive use of First American" for "normal banking" and savings accounts, which neither [[Clark Clifford]] nor [[Robert Altman]] had known of before the summer of 1991. He testified that "allegations that the Agency had any direct or indirect relationship with Abedi or recruited him for CIA activities are absolutely baseless." The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that the official record he presented was "by and large, accurately represented," but contained gaps concerning [[Kamal Adham]], [[A. R. (Abdul Raouf) Khalil|Abdul Raouf Khalil]] and [[Adnan Khashoggi]] "which strain belief."[^7]
+He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI," a characterization a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit confirmed according to a briefing given to subcommittee staff, and acknowledged that the agency had made "extensive use of First American" for "normal banking" and savings accounts, which neither [[Clark Clifford]] nor [[Robert Altman]] had known of before the summer of 1991. He testified that "allegations that the Agency had any direct or indirect relationship with Abedi or recruited him for CIA activities are absolutely baseless." The [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] found that the official record he presented was "by and large, accurately represented," but contained gaps concerning [[Kamal Adham]], [[A. R. (Abdul Raouf) Khalil|Abdul Raouf Khalil]] and [[Adnan Khashoggi]] "which strain belief."[^8]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -34,5 +34,6 @@ He described the agency's use of BCCI for intelligence gathering as "limited and
 [^3]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
 [^4]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
 [^5]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 149.
-[^6]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
+[^6]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, p. 292. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
-[^7]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
+[^7]: Beaty, Jonathan and Gwynne, S. C. *The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride into the Secret Heart of BCCI*. New York: Random House, 1993, p. 348.
+[^8]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 11, "BCCI, the CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert Kennedy.md

@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ On March 16, 1964, Branch 4 of the Covert Action Staff requested covert security
 
 A [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] deportation sent [[Carlos Marcello]] to [[Guatemala]] on April 4, 1961. A May 24, 1961 [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] memorandum from R. O. Lallier to A. H. Belmont, reporting a May 12 interview in Guatemala City, records the account of [[Paul Loeb]], chief of the CIA station there. Loeb said it was his understanding that Attorney General Kennedy had conferred with [[Allen Dulles]] and asked for the CIA director's help in making certain Guatemala accepted Marcello as a citizen, and that he received instructions from headquarters to give the matter special handling. Loeb said he then approached President [[Miguel Ydigoras]], who insisted that the matter be handled quietly, and that he was at the airport when Marcello arrived on a U.S. Border Patrol plane to find 15 to 20 reporters waiting. According to the memorandum, Marcello was to be returned to the United States on or about May 10 but did not appear at the airport, and Loeb was convinced he was living on a farm in the interior of Guatemala.[^10]
 
-On November 1, 1961, the White House aide [[Richard Goodwin]] wrote to President Kennedy that "the Attorney General would be the most effective commander" of a "command operation" for Cuba. After a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 on a new program against [[Fidel Castro]], Kennedy's handwritten notes read: "My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists." A presidential memorandum of November 22 assigned the direction of the program to the Attorney General, with [[Edward Lansdale]] as his chief of operations; the version issued on November 30 placed the program "under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations," and assigned the Attorney General no direction role.[^11]
+On November 1, 1961, the White House aide [[Richard Goodwin]] wrote to President Kennedy that "the Attorney General would be the most effective commander" of a "command operation" for Cuba. After a White House meeting on November 3, 1961 on a new program against [[Fidel Castro]], Kennedy's handwritten notes read: "My idea is to stir things up on island with espionage, sabotage, general disorder, run & operated by Cubans themselves with every group but Batistaites & Communists." The notes list [[Edward Lansdale]] among those present as "Lansdale (the Ugly American)," record McNamara saying that he would make Lansdale available, and record Robert Kennedy assigning him "to make survey of situation in Cuba."[^11] A presidential memorandum of November 22 assigned the direction of the program to the Attorney General, with Edward Lansdale as his chief of operations; the version issued on November 30 placed the program "under the general guidance of General Lansdale, acting as Chief of Operations," and assigned the Attorney General no direction role.[^11]
 
 The program, [[Operation Mongoose]], was overseen by a group called the Special Group (Augmented) ([[NSC Special Group|Special Group (Augmented)]]), consisting of the regular Special Group members ([[McGeorge Bundy]], [[U. Alexis Johnson]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], [[John McCone]] and [[Lyman Lemnitzer]]) augmented by Robert Kennedy and General [[Maxwell Taylor]]. President Kennedy appointed Taylor chairman of the group. The State Department editors of the Foreign Relations series wrote that Robert Kennedy "was the principal motive force within the group and the informal link between the group and the President," and the [[Church Committee]] wrote that Kennedy "played an active role in the MONGOOSE Operation, a role unrelated to his position as Attorney General."[^11][^12] The Church Committee also records Goodwin's proposal that Kennedy head Mongoose and the President's decision to give Lansdale the coordinating task instead.[^12]
 

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/Robert McFarlane.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane
   - Robert Carl McFarlane
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
@@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ relations:
     start: 1984
     end: 1986-11
     role: "organized third-country Contra funding, an early advocate of the Iran arms sales, and led the May 1986 mission to Tehran"
-    fn: 8
+    fn: 12
   - type: prosecuted
     with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
     reverse: true
     start: 1988-03-11
     end: 1992-12-24
     role: "pleaded guilty March 11, 1988 to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress; sentenced March 3, 1989; pardoned December 24, 1992"
-    fn: 10
+    fn: 14
 ---
 Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane was a [[United States Naval Academy|Naval Academy]] graduate and Marine Corps officer who served as President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s national security adviser from October 1983 to December 1985. Before that he had been deputy to his predecessor [[William Clark]], counselor to Secretary of State [[Alexander Haig]], a staff member of the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]], and military aide to [[Henry Kissinger]] when Kissinger was national security adviser to [[Richard Nixon]]. He commanded the first U.S. Marine battery to land in the Republic of [[Vietnam]], completed two tours, received a Bronze Star, and resigned from the [[United States Marine Corps]] as a lieutenant colonel.[^1] [[Lawrence Walsh]]'s Final Report records that under Reagan the [[National Security Council]] staff "at times became operational, taking on primary responsibility for the execution of the [[Iran]] and contra covert operations," and that McFarlane "did not shrink from the operational tasks that were of high personal interest to the President," delegating some of them to his deputy director of political-military affairs, [[Oliver North]].[^1]
 
@@ -72,11 +72,13 @@ The writer [[Gary Webb]] reported that in January 1985, as the [[FDN]] spent its
 
 McFarlane received North's written reports throughout 1985. Walsh lists six "problem documents" that the NSC general counsel [[Paul Thompson]] pulled from the NSC's System IV file in August 1985 after Representatives [[Michael Barnes]] and [[Lee Hamilton]] asked about press reports of North's activity: a December 4, 1984 memorandum on Chinese SA-7 missiles shipped under false [[Guatemala|Guatemalan]] end-user certificates and on a British security expert for Calero; a February 6, 1985 memorandum proposing that the Nicaraguan merchant ship Monimbo be seized or sunk; a March 5, 1985 memorandum on compensating Guatemala; a March 16, 1985 "Fallback Plan" in which McFarlane marked an additional $25 to $30 million from the Saudis "doubtful"; an April 11, 1985 memorandum reporting that Contra strength had grown from 9,500 to more than 16,000; and a May 31, 1985 memorandum on the delivery of lethal supplies.[^1] On October 30, 1985 North's "Reconnaissance Overflights" memorandum, which told McFarlane that the intelligence would be air-dropped with two Honduran recoilless rifles to sink arms carriers, was marked by [[John Poindexter]] "President approved."[^1]
 
-On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law" and that "we did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties"; his September 12 letter to Barnes and an October 7 reply to Hamilton's questions said North had not "used his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies." On October 17, 1985 he showed Barnes a stack of NSC documents that could not leave the White House; Barnes did not take up the offer, and McFarlane did not answer his request of October 29 for the documents.[^1] North's secretary [[Fawn Hall]] later altered five of the six documents in November 1986.[^1] Asked at North's 1989 trial whether he lied to Congress, McFarlane said: "At the time I didn't believe it but at the time I was wrong and I admit that," and explained that "you don't lie. You put your own interpretation on what the truth is."[^1]
+On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote Hamilton that "at no time did I or any member of the National Security Council staff violate the letter or spirit of the law" and that "we did not solicit funds or other support for military or paramilitary activities either from Americans or third parties"; his September 12 letter to Barnes and an October 7 reply to Hamilton's questions said North had not "used his influence to facilitate the movement of supplies."[^7] On October 17, 1985 he showed Barnes a stack of NSC documents that could not leave the White House; Barnes did not take up the offer, and McFarlane did not answer his request of October 29 for the documents.[^1] North's secretary [[Fawn Hall]] later altered five of the six documents in November 1986.[^1] Asked at North's 1989 trial whether he lied to Congress, McFarlane said: "At the time I didn't believe it but at the time I was wrong and I admit that," and explained that "you don't lie. You put your own interpretation on what the truth is."[^1]
+
+Walsh wrote that McFarlane "decided to lie about North's activities in a series of letters to Barnes and Hamilton in September-October 1985."[^8] McFarlane told the Iran-Contra committees that he interpreted the Boland Amendment "that the NSC was not to itself get involved in military or paramilitary activities or replicating the CIA function in those domains," and at the public hearings said: "If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing?"[^9] On December 10, 1986, answering questions from Representative [[Dick Cheney]] before the House Intelligence Committee, McFarlane testified that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" North had violated the Boland Amendment; the committees wrote that he withheld his concerns about the documents he had reviewed.[^10]
 
 ### The Iran initiative, 1985 to 1986
 
-McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^7] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^8]
+McFarlane and Casey were, in Walsh's words, "the chief advocates of weapons sales to Iran in exchange for the release of American hostages." Walsh wrote that McFarlane "apparently played no role in approving or implementing the Iran/contra diversion."[^11] In spring 1985 McFarlane sent the NSC consultant [[Michael Ledeen]] to Israel; Ledeen testified they had "an understanding that neither of us would keep anything in writing." Ledeen met Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] on May 3, 1985. On June 17, 1985 McFarlane circulated a draft National Security Decision Directive recommending the sale of military equipment to Iran; Shultz and Secretary of Defense [[Caspar Weinberger]] opposed it and Casey endorsed it. The Final Report's overall conclusions state that the Iran operations were carried out with the knowledge of Reagan, Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, McFarlane and Poindexter, of whom only Weinberger and Shultz dissented.[^1][^6][^12]
 
 On July 3, 1985 [[David Kimche]], director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, met McFarlane in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]]. McFarlane's recollection was that there was no request for arms and no linkage to the hostages, though Kimche mentioned that arms might be raised later, and that Reagan then approved a political dialogue. On August 2, 1985 Kimche asked, "What if Israel were to deliver the TOWs, not the United States, would that be different?" McFarlane testified that Reagan "decided that he would approve Israel's delivery of ... TOW missiles, and that if Israel came to us to purchase replacements they could do that." Israel shipped 96 TOW missiles on August 20, 1985 and 408 on September 14, 1985, the day the Reverend Benjamin Weir was released.[^1][^6] Walsh found that McFarlane "stood alone" in insisting that Reagan had approved the earliest sales and the replenishment, and that "it was only after contemporary notes recording the events in question were discovered late in Independent Counsel's investigation" (notes of [[Charles Hill]], Weinberger and Chief of Staff [[Donald Regan]] obtained in 1990, 1991 and 1992) that much of what he said could be verified.[^1] Weinberger's notes of a December 7, 1985 White House meeting record his objection that the U.S. embargo made such a sale illegal even through Israel.[^1]
 
@@ -84,19 +86,19 @@ McFarlane resigned on December 4, 1985; Reagan told reporters he would be "calli
 
 ### Exposure, plea and pardon
 
-After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^9]
+After the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa published the story on November 3, 1986, McFarlane publicly called the reports "fanciful" on November 6. On November 8, 1986 he sent North a PROFs message with the subject "Audit trail": "I hope to daylights that someone has been purging the [intelligence] files on this episode."[^1] In February 1987 he was taken to a hospital after an overdose of Valium the day before he was due to testify to the [[Tower Commission]]; Walsh records that he attempted suicide in February 1987 and that the Independent Counsel weighed it when deciding on a plea.[^1][^13]
 
-On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^10] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^11] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^10]
+On March 11, 1988 McFarlane pleaded guilty to four misdemeanors of unlawfully withholding information from Congress: his September 5, 1985 reply to Hamilton, his September 12, 1985 reply to Barnes, his October 7, 1985 response to Hamilton's questions, and his December 8, 1986 testimony to the [[House Committee on Foreign Affairs|House Foreign Affairs Committee]] that third-country financing was "beyond my ken." He agreed to cooperate, was named an unindicted co-conspirator in Count One of the March 1988 indictment of Poindexter, North, [[Richard Secord]] and [[Albert Hakim]], and on March 3, 1989 was sentenced to two years' probation, 200 hours of community service and a $20,000 fine. The Independent Counsel gave up felony charges of conspiracy, false statements and obstruction in the plea, and wrote that the prosecution of North and Poindexter "would be seriously hampered by the jury's realization that McFarlane, their superior, had been permitted to plead guilty to crimes less severe than those for which his subordinates were on trial."[^1][^14] After he testified in 1991 that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to the dismissal of the remaining charges against North.[^15] President George H.W. Bush pardoned McFarlane on December 24, 1992, with Caspar Weinberger, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], [[Clair George]] and [[Alan Fiers]].[^14]
 
 ### Esquire article and lawsuit
 
-In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^12] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^12]
+In October 1991 [[Esquire]] published an article by [[Craig Unger]] that quoted [[Ari Ben-Menashe]]. According to the court's account of the article, Ben-Menashe said that McFarlane had been recruited by [[Rafael Eitan]] and that "McFarlane was the famous Mr. X in the [[Jonathan Pollard|Pollard]] case."[^16] The article attributed the recruitment statement to a sworn affidavit that [[Elliot Richardson]] submitted in the [[INSLAW]] litigation for one of his clients. The appeals court found that the recruitment clause "is not in the affidavit," that the affidavit's text "supports only the idea of a 'special relationship'" between McFarlane and [[Earl Brian]] and Israeli intelligence, and recorded that McFarlane "does not dispute that Ben-Menashe made these assertions to Unger."[^16]
 
-McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^12] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^12]
+McFarlane sued the magazine for libel. On January 30, 1996 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the judgment for Esquire. The district court had held that no reasonable jury could find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and that it had no personal jurisdiction over Unger.[^16] The article, as the opinion quotes it, continues: "In Pollard's case there were persistent allegations about another, unnamed American who secretly worked for the Israelis."[^16]
 
 ### Death
 
-McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^9]
+McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his son Scott McFarlane said the cause was an exacerbation of a lung condition.[^13]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -106,9 +108,13 @@ McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at a hospital in Lansing, Michigan, aged 84; his
 [^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, "The Funding Cut-Off," quoting the Boland Amendment of October 1984. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
 [^5]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, ch. 10, "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it."
 [^6]: Brinkley and Engelberg, eds., *Report of the Congressional Committees*, "Iran-Contra Chronology," entries for February 1985, May 3, June 17, July to September 1985, December 4 to 8, 1985. https://archive.org/details/reportofcongres00unit
-[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
+[^7]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 1, nn. 60-62 (letters of Sept. 5, Sept. 12 and Oct. 7, 1985); ch. 2; ch. 4, nn. 57-58; part III. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
-[^8]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
+[^8]: Walsh, vol. I, part I, nn. 17-18. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
-[^9]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
+[^9]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 400 and nn. 48, 66.
-[^10]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
+[^10]: Iran-Contra report, majority views, ch. 6, p. 132 and nn. 193-194.
-[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
+[^11]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,* vol. I, part II. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
-[^12]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json
+[^12]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary, "Overall Conclusions." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
+[^13]: "Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, Reagan national security adviser, dies at 84." Associated Press, May 13, 2022. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2022/05/13/nation/robert-bud-mcfarlane-reagan-national-security-adviser-dies-84
+[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, "Summary of Prosecutions" and ch. 1, section "The Guilty Plea." https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/summpros.htm
+[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, "United States v. Oliver L. North," section on the dismissal of September 16, 1991. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm
+[^16]: *McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine*, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996), No. 94-7137, decided January 30, 1996. https://static.case.law/f3d/74/cases/1296-01.json

10 - PEOPLE/(H-M)/William Harvey.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: William Harvey
 aliases:
   - Bill Harvey
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ relations:
     with: "[[CIA Rome Station]]"
     role: "chief of station"
     start: 1963
-    fn: 36
+    fn: 38
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Operation Gold]]"
     role: "Berlin base chief running the tunnel with MI6"
@@ -140,57 +140,59 @@ Martin wrote that Lansdale told the Senate committee that [[John F. Kennedy]] ha
 
 On August 13, 1962 Lansdale directed Harvey to include an option for the "liquidation of leaders" in a proposed Phase II plan for Mongoose.[^24] Harvey's memorandum of August 14 to Richard Helms attached Lansdale's memorandum with the words excised, and stated that the Special Group (Augmented) "is not expecting any written comments or study on this point."[^24] McCone said that McNamara agreed Lansdale's memorandum should be withdrawn.[^24] Harvey's August 14 memorandum to Helms recorded: "It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record." McCone's April 14, 1967 memorandum to Helms states that McCone took immediate exception to a suggestion to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro.[^26] [[Walter Elder]], McCone's executive assistant, testified that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after the August 10 meeting.[^27]
 
+On August 6, 1962 Lansdale, as chief of operations, replied to Harvey's draft operational plan. He wrote that, "As requested by you in our meeting Monday afternoon, I have read your draft operational plan," and that he "found little basis to say that these were either additional or possible within the context of contributing to the mission as stated." He questioned three items, among them the suggestion that the CIA could generate strikes inside Cuba ("If we have no assets inside Cuba, then why is this now called a possibility?"), and asked Harvey to initial each item he believed was really possible.[^28] On August 16, after that day's meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), Lansdale sent Harvey a memorandum headed "Actions by Cuban Refugees." It said that the Phase II program should give full attention to the desirability of the Cubans liberating Cuba with United States help, and that Bundy had requested that this field of effort be made part of the Phase II guidelines; it proposed that Harvey designate his deputy, Bruce Cheever, to be responsible for the CIA's action. A typed note attached to the copy states that General Taylor asked that action be withheld on the memorandum until further word from him.[^29]
+
 ### Roselli and the Poison Pills
 
-On November 16, 1961, Bissell asked Harvey to take over the gambling-syndicate operation from [[Sheffield Edwards]], and they discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba."[^28] Bissell testified that the operation was not reactivated until after he left the agency in February 1962.[^28]
+On November 16, 1961, Bissell asked Harvey to take over the gambling-syndicate operation from [[Sheffield Edwards]], and they discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE program to Cuba."[^30] Bissell testified that the operation was not reactivated until after he left the agency in February 1962.[^30]
 
-In early April 1962 Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms, asked Edwards to put him in touch with [[Johnny Roselli]]. A 1976 CIA memorandum dates Harvey's taking over as case officer to May 1962.[^29] Harvey told Roselli to stop dealing with [[Robert Maheu]] and [[Sam Giancana]], whom Harvey had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus."[^28]
+In early April 1962 Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms, asked Edwards to put him in touch with [[Johnny Roselli]]. A 1976 CIA memorandum dates Harvey's taking over as case officer to May 1962.[^31] Harvey told Roselli to stop dealing with [[Robert Maheu]] and [[Sam Giancana]], whom Harvey had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus."[^30]
 
-Four poison pills were given to the support chief on April 18, 1962. Harvey arrived in [[Miami]] on April 21 and gave them to Roselli, who was already in touch with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pill passage before the [[Bay of Pigs invasion|Bay of Pigs]].[^28] Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli.[^28]
+Four poison pills were given to the support chief on April 18, 1962. Harvey arrived in [[Miami]] on April 21 and gave them to Roselli, who was already in touch with the same Cuban who had been involved in the pill passage before the [[Bay of Pigs invasion|Bay of Pigs]].[^30] Harvey procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar costing about $5,000. Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented a truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot, where the keys were given to Roselli.[^30]
 
-Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would take place. In early January 1963 he paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. The second three-man team never left for Cuba, the reason given being that "conditions" in Cuba were not right.[^28] Harvey ended the operation in mid-February 1963 at a meeting with Roselli in [[Los Angeles]].[^28]
+Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Harvey testified that by then he had grave doubts that the operation would take place. In early January 1963 he paid Roselli $2,700 to defray the Cuban's expenses. The second three-man team never left for Cuba, the reason given being that "conditions" in Cuba were not right.[^30] Harvey ended the operation in mid-February 1963 at a meeting with Roselli in [[Los Angeles]].[^30]
 
-In early 1963 Harvey told his underworld contacts that the CIA was no longer interested in assassinating Castro. The FBI learned of this in June 1963.[^30]
+In early 1963 Harvey told his underworld contacts that the CIA was no longer interested in assassinating Castro. The FBI learned of this in June 1963.[^32]
 
-Harvey's operations involving Roselli began in early 1962 and ended in February 1963. Harvey, and to a lesser extent [[James O'Connell]], remained in contact with Roselli from 1964 to about 1970.[^29]
+Harvey's operations involving Roselli began in early 1962 and ended in February 1963. Harvey, and to a lesser extent [[James O'Connell]], remained in contact with Roselli from 1964 to about 1970.[^31]
 
-In June 1963, before Harvey went on another assignment, he and Roselli had a farewell dinner. The FBI observed the meeting, and [[Sam Papich]], the FBI liaison with the CIA, told Harvey that Hoover would be informed. Harvey told Helms of the incident, and Helms agreed that McCone need not be briefed unless a call from Hoover was expected.[^31]
+In June 1963, before Harvey went on another assignment, he and Roselli had a farewell dinner. The FBI observed the meeting, and [[Sam Papich]], the FBI liaison with the CIA, told Harvey that Hoover would be informed. Harvey told Helms of the incident, and Helms agreed that McCone need not be briefed unless a call from Hoover was expected.[^33]
 
-The [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]], which described Harvey in June 1963 as "chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force," found it "unable to accept" the conclusion that the CIA-Mafia plots were irrelevant because they ended in February 1963, and reported that CIA files show Roselli continued to maintain direct contact with Harvey at least until 1967.[^32]
+The [[House Select Committee on Assassinations]], which described Harvey in June 1963 as "chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force," found it "unable to accept" the conclusion that the CIA-Mafia plots were irrelevant because they ended in February 1963, and reported that CIA files show Roselli continued to maintain direct contact with Harvey at least until 1967.[^34]
 
-In 1967 Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling at the [[Friars Club]] in [[Beverly Hills, California|Beverly Hills]]. He asked Harvey, who had left the agency, to represent him. Harvey contacted the agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution, according to a December 11, 1967 memorandum by [[Howard Osborn]].[^33]
+In 1967 Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling at the [[Friars Club]] in [[Beverly Hills, California|Beverly Hills]]. He asked Harvey, who had left the agency, to represent him. Harvey contacted the agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution, according to a December 11, 1967 memorandum by [[Howard Osborn]].[^35]
 
 ### The Clash with Robert Kennedy and the Missile Crisis
 
-Harvey and [[Robert Kennedy]] were openly at odds over Mongoose. Thomas wrote that Harvey regarded Kennedy's micromanagement of the operations as incompetent and dangerous, and that Kennedy regarded Harvey as insubordinate and unreliable.[^1] Harvey testified that during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] he gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. He said that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^34] Walter Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, described the episode as Harvey having "earned another black mark as not being fully under control," and said that Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the crisis.[^34]
+Harvey and [[Robert Kennedy]] were openly at odds over Mongoose. Thomas wrote that Harvey regarded Kennedy's micromanagement of the operations as incompetent and dangerous, and that Kennedy regarded Harvey as insubordinate and unreliable.[^1] Harvey testified that during the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] he gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. He said that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^36] Walter Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, described the episode as Harvey having "earned another black mark as not being fully under control," and said that Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the crisis.[^36]
 
 Martin wrote that Kennedy tied off a series of questions to Harvey with "and I've got 10 minutes to hear the answer," and that when Harvey exceeded his time limit Kennedy walked out and Harvey kept talking.[^5] Martin quoted McCone: "When you take a plant supervisor and make him president of the company, it doesn't always work out," and wrote that Dulles is said to have remarked, "That fellow Harvey is a conspiratorial cop."[^5] Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy demanded Harvey's removal.[^1]
 
 ### Rome and the End of Task Force W
 
-[[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced Harvey as chief of Task Force W in January 1963.[^35] It is unclear whether Harvey or FitzGerald conceived the plan to present Fidel Castro with a contaminated diving suit.[^35]
+[[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced Harvey as chief of Task Force W in January 1963.[^37] It is unclear whether Harvey or FitzGerald conceived the plan to present Fidel Castro with a contaminated diving suit.[^37]
 
-Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963, to replace [[Francis I. G. Coleman]], who was scheduled to attend the [[National War College]].[^36] He took up the Rome post before the November 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy. Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^1] Martin wrote in The Washington Post that some attributed the appointment to a wish to keep Harvey out of the country and others to the Rome station's need of a shakeup, that Harvey was hospitalized, that Desmond FitzGerald cabled a report to Helms, that Helms ordered Harvey relieved, that an aide sent to carry out the order sat seven hours across from Harvey, who held a loaded revolver in his lap, and that Harvey was then placed in a unit studying countermeasures against electronic surveillance.[^5]
+Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome, effective on or about June 30, 1963, to replace [[Francis I. G. Coleman]], who was scheduled to attend the [[National War College]].[^38] He took up the Rome post before the November 1963 assassination of John F. Kennedy. Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy had exiled Harvey to Rome.[^1] Martin wrote in The Washington Post that some attributed the appointment to a wish to keep Harvey out of the country and others to the Rome station's need of a shakeup, that Harvey was hospitalized, that Desmond FitzGerald cabled a report to Helms, that Helms ordered Harvey relieved, that an aide sent to carry out the order sat seven hours across from Harvey, who held a loaded revolver in his lap, and that Harvey was then placed in a unit studying countermeasures against electronic surveillance.[^5]
 
 ### Testimony Before the Senate
 
-Harvey testified before the Church Committee in executive session on June 25, 1975 and again on July 11, 1975. He signed an affidavit dated September 14, 1975.[^28] He told the committee that he had acted on explicit orders from Helms, and that he believed the 1962 assassination activity carried over from the period when Allen Dulles was Director, a belief he based on what Bissell had told him.[^18]
+Harvey testified before the Church Committee in executive session on June 25, 1975 and again on July 11, 1975. He signed an affidavit dated September 14, 1975.[^30] He told the committee that he had acted on explicit orders from Helms, and that he believed the 1962 assassination activity carried over from the period when Allen Dulles was Director, a belief he based on what Bissell had told him.[^18]
 
 Harvey said he had not informed the Special Group, or anyone outside the agency, that he had given the poison pills to Roselli. He said he did not brief McCone on the pills because he did not believe it was necessary.[^18]
 
 ### Retirement, Death and Aftermath
 
-In April 1967 Harvey was to be transferred from the [[European Division]] to the Office of Personnel, where he would be carried in casual status until his final retirement, and his sick leave required a physician's monthly certification.[^37] By October 30, 1967 he had not yet set a retirement date, and retirement was expected on November 30.[^38] He retired from the agency in 1967.[^29]
+In April 1967 Harvey was to be transferred from the [[European Division]] to the Office of Personnel, where he would be carried in casual status until his final retirement, and his sick leave required a physician's monthly certification.[^39] By October 30, 1967 he had not yet set a retirement date, and retirement was expected on November 30.[^40] He retired from the agency in 1967.[^31]
 
-In November 1967, while leaving the agency to practice law, Harvey asked Sam Papich for reputable private investigators. Papich suggested [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] Company, as Howard Osborn recorded in a memorandum of November 8, 1967.[^39]
+In November 1967, while leaving the agency to practice law, Harvey asked Sam Papich for reputable private investigators. Papich suggested [[Wackenhut Corporation]] or the [[Fidelifax]] Company, as Howard Osborn recorded in a memorandum of November 8, 1967.[^41]
 
-Roselli died in August 1976. On August 11, 1976 [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]], then Director of Central Intelligence, wrote that calls to Senators had suggested that the CIA was involved in the murder, and that he had asked [[Edward Levi]] to bring the FBI into the case.[^40]
+Roselli died in August 1976. On August 11, 1976 [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]], then Director of Central Intelligence, wrote that calls to Senators had suggested that the CIA was involved in the murder, and that he had asked [[Edward Levi]] to bring the FBI into the case.[^42]
 
 According to the 1976 obituary, Harvey moved to [[Indianapolis, Indiana|Indianapolis]] in 1969 after leaving the agency, and was law editor for [[Bobbs-Merrill]] at the time of his death.[^3]
 
-Harvey died of a heart attack at an Indianapolis hospital on June 9, 1976, at the age of 60. He was buried at South Cemetery in Danville, Indiana, and was survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter and a son.[^3] A CIA memorandum of August 9, 1976 gives the same date, "9 June 1976."[^29] Martin wrote that surgeons had worked four hours to implant an artificial valve and that Harvey died, holding his wife's hand, at ten minutes past two in the afternoon of June 9.[^2] A June 1976 press report named Harvey among ten agents whose identities the Senate committee had disclosed, and said that [[William Colby]] had argued that disclosure endangered agents.[^3] A CIA routing memorandum of June 16, 1976 records that the agency's information on his death came from the press reports.[^41] Martin wrote that Harvey's wife told him reporters were trying to link his death to Roselli's murder, that there had been two attempted break-ins, and that people were "after his papers," to which she said she had "burned everything."[^5]
+Harvey died of a heart attack at an Indianapolis hospital on June 9, 1976, at the age of 60. He was buried at South Cemetery in Danville, Indiana, and was survived by his wife, Clara Grace, a daughter and a son.[^3] A CIA memorandum of August 9, 1976 gives the same date, "9 June 1976."[^31] Martin wrote that surgeons had worked four hours to implant an artificial valve and that Harvey died, holding his wife's hand, at ten minutes past two in the afternoon of June 9.[^2] A June 1976 press report named Harvey among ten agents whose identities the Senate committee had disclosed, and said that [[William Colby]] had argued that disclosure endangered agents.[^3] A CIA routing memorandum of June 16, 1976 records that the agency's information on his death came from the press reports.[^43] Martin wrote that Harvey's wife told him reporters were trying to link his death to Roselli's murder, that there had been two attempted break-ins, and that people were "after his papers," to which she said she had "burned everything."[^5]
 
-In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agency employee for cooperation with a book about Harvey. The employee was irritated and believed that a retired CIA officer had given Martin his name.[^42]
+In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agency employee for cooperation with a book about Harvey. The employee was irritated and believed that a retired CIA officer had given Martin his name.[^44]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
@@ -221,18 +223,20 @@ In June 1977 Martin, an [[Associated Press]] correspondent, asked a retired agen
 [^25]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 164, and Additional Views of Senator Howard H. Baker Jr., p. 321, quoting Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 29-30 and 86. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/94465.pdf
 [^26]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 371, Editorial Note on the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), quoting Harvey's memorandum of August 14, 1962 and McCone's memorandum of April 14, 1967. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d371
 [^27]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 107 (Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, on telling Helms of McCone's opposition after the August 10 meeting). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^28]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 83-85 (the 1961 assignment and the November 16, 1961 notes; the April 1962 reactivation and "explicit orders"; the poison pills of April 18 and 21, 1962; the $5,000 equipment and the rented truck; the September 1962 meetings; the $2,700 payment; the second team; the February 1963 termination), citing Harvey testimony of June 25 and July 11, 1975, and the affidavit of September 14, 1975. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^28]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 366, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey), Washington, August 6, 1962, subject "CIA Draft Operational Plan B+." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d366
-[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Johnny Roselli," August 9, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811 (Harvey's operations from early 1962 to February 1963; Harvey as case officer from May 1962; Harvey and O'Connell in contact from 1964 to about 1970; Harvey retired in 1967).
+[^29]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 377, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Central Intelligence Agency Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey), Washington, August 16, 1962, subject "Actions by Cuban Refugees." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d377
-[^30]: Church Committee, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Final Report Book V, S. Rept. 94-755, April 23, 1976, pp. 69, 72. https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
+[^30]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 83-85 (the 1961 assignment and the November 16, 1961 notes; the April 1962 reactivation and "explicit orders"; the poison pills of April 18 and 21, 1962; the $5,000 equipment and the rented truck; the September 1962 meetings; the $2,700 payment; the second team; the February 1963 termination), citing Harvey testimony of June 25 and July 11, 1975, and the affidavit of September 14, 1975. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^31]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 105, citing Inspector General's report p. 54 (the June 1963 farewell dinner; FBI observation; Papich's notice to Harvey; Harvey's report to Helms). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^31]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Johnny Roselli," August 9, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811 (Harvey's operations from early 1962 to February 1963; Harvey as case officer from May 1962; Harvey and O'Connell in contact from 1964 to about 1970; Harvey retired in 1967).
-[^32]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, H. Rept. 95-1828, 1979, p. 117 (the committee's finding that the plots were not shown to be irrelevant; CIA files on contact with Harvey until 1967). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
+[^32]: Church Committee, *The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies*, Final Report Book V, S. Rept. 94-755, April 23, 1976, pp. 69, 72. https://archive.org/details/ChurchCommittee
-[^33]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (Osborn memorandum for the record, December 11, 1967). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^33]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 105, citing Inspector General's report p. 54 (the June 1963 farewell dinner; FBI observation; Papich's notice to Harvey; Harvey's report to Helms). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^34]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 149 n. 1, citing Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, and Walter Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34-35. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^34]: House Select Committee on Assassinations, *Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations*, H. Rept. 95-1828, 1979, p. 117 (the committee's finding that the plots were not shown to be irrelevant; CIA files on contact with Harvey until 1967). https://archive.org/details/reportofselectco1979unit
-[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (FitzGerald replacing Harvey in January 1963; the diving-suit plan), citing Inspector General's report p. 75. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^35]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (Osborn memorandum for the record, December 11, 1967). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^36]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
+[^36]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, p. 149 n. 1, citing Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81, and Walter Elder testimony of August 13, 1975, pp. 34-35. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^37]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," April 5, 1967. Reading room document 0001228917, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228917
+[^37]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots*, S. Rept. 94-465, pp. 86-87 (FitzGerald replacing Harvey in January 1963; the diving-suit plan), citing Inspector General's report p. 75. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," October 30, 1967. Reading room document 0001228965, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228965
+[^38]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
-[^39]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.
+[^39]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," April 5, 1967. Reading room document 0001228917, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228917
-[^40]: Bush, George, memorandum "The Death of Roselli," August 11, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811
+[^40]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record "William K. Harvey," October 30, 1967. Reading room document 0001228965, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001228965
-[^41]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record memorandum, June 16, 1976, filed with the reading room copy of the June 1976 press report, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-00498a000600020001-2
+[^41]: Osborn, Howard J. Memorandum for the record, November 8, 1967, JFK record 104-10133-10076. National Archives, JFK Assassination Records Collection.
-[^42]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record sheet, "Mr. David Martin, Associated Press Correspondent's Interest in Writing a Book About Mr. William King Harvey," June 27, 1977. Reading room document 0001229025, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001229025
+[^42]: Bush, George, memorandum "The Death of Roselli," August 11, 1976. Reading room document 00508811, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-00508811
+[^43]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record memorandum, June 16, 1976, filed with the reading room copy of the June 1976 press report, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp79-00498a000600020001-2
+[^44]: Central Intelligence Agency, routing and record sheet, "Mr. David Martin, Associated Press Correspondent's Interest in Writing a Book About Mr. William King Harvey," June 27, 1977. Reading room document 0001229025, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-0001229025

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Amiram Nir.md

@@ -11,21 +11,31 @@ born: 1950-12-08
 died: 1988-11-30
 location: "Israel"
 ---
-[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major [[Israel|Israeli]] newspaper chain.[^1]
+[[Amiram Nir]] was a former [[Israel|Israeli]] TV newsman and a counterterrorism adviser to [[Shimon Peres]]. He was originally a military officer in the tank corps and lost an eye in a training accident. He married [[Judy Moses]], the daughter of the owner of [[Yediot Ahronot]], a major Israeli newspaper chain.[^1]
 
-Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] during the 1981 elections. After [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
+Nir resigned from his TV job to work as a public relations adviser for Peres during the 1981 elections. After Peres became prime minister in 1984, he appointed Nir as his counterterrorism adviser. Nir found documents related to [[Rafael Eitan|Eitan's]] [[United States|U.S.]] spy network and the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
 
-[[Shimon Peres|Peres]] and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. [[Shimon Peres|Peres]] decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable [[Iran]] arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
+A note of January 4, 1986 by [[Charles Hill]], a [[George P. Shultz|Shultz]] aide, records [[John Poindexter]] saying that Nir had come to see him to revive the hostage idea.[^2] The 1987 congressional report describes Nir as Peres's adviser on counterterrorism and lists, among the occasions on which Israel acted to keep the Iran initiative moving, "Nir's January 1986 proposal to keep the initiative moving forward at a time when U.S. interest appeared to be flagging."[^3]
 
-Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]] connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and [[John Poindexter]] of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, [[Oliver North|North]], and [[John Poindexter|Poindexter]] gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
+Peres and Nir faced challenges from the [[Likud Party]]-controlled intelligence community and the lack of financial power within the [[Labor Party]]. Peres decided to open a competing arms channel, run by Nir, to gain control over the profitable Iran arms sales and to undermine the existing intelligence-community channel. Nir, despite his lack of experience in intelligence or business, sought support from individuals like [[Al Schwimmer]] and [[Yaacov Nimrodi]].[^1]
 
-Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, [[Oliver North|North]] initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|original channel]] and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the [[Likud Party]]'s credibility.[^1]
+Nir met with [[Robert McFarlane]] in [[Washington, D.C.]] and threatened him with exposure if he did not cooperate with the new channel. This led to McFarlane connecting Nir with [[Oliver North]] and John Poindexter of the [[National Security Council]]. Nir, North, and Poindexter gained the support of [[William J. Casey]], then head of the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]], and [[George H.W. Bush]] tacitly ignored the operation.[^1]
 
-In May 1986, [[Oliver North|North]], [[Robert McFarlane|McFarlane]], and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts. They were detained, and the military equipment was confiscated. This incident, along with the delivery of outdated [[Hawk missile]]s with [[Israel|Israeli]] markings, effectively killed off the [[Iran]] end of the second channel.[^1]
+Nir's operation, however, struggled to make significant inroads into the arms trade. In April 1986, North initiated a sting operation, the [[Hashemi sting]], to discredit the original channel and its members. Nir was also involved in the leaking of the [[Jonathan Pollard]] story to the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] to further undermine the Likud Party's credibility.[^1]
 
-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. A mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to [[Oliver North|North's]] group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee]], further exposing the second channel.[^1]
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in May 1986 North, McFarlane, and Nir traveled to [[Tehran]] disguised as Irish technicians, carrying [[TOW missile]]s and [[Hawk missile]] spare parts, were detained, and had the military equipment confiscated. He wrote that this incident, along with the delivery of outdated Hawk missiles with Israeli markings, effectively killed off the Iran end of the second channel.[^1]
 
-[[Amiram Nir|Nir]] was due to be a major witness in [[Oliver North|North's]] trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence believed was a [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing [[Shimon Peres|Peres]], [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or [[George H.W. Bush|Bush]].[^1]
+The independent counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that by May 1986 Nir had replaced [[David Kimche]] as the Israeli official in the arms dealings. When the McFarlane party left Washington on May 23, 1986, by way of Frankfurt and Israel, [[Richard Secord]] and Nir joined the group in Israel, and only a portion of the HAWK spare parts the Iranians expected was loaded onto the aircraft that took the party to Tehran. The party arrived in Tehran on May 25, 1986; according to North's notes of a secure message, "We have been treated politely, though heavily escorted by Rev[olutionary] Guard types who are also physically and technically surveilling our rooms." On the evening of May 26, North, [[Howard Teicher]], [[George Cave]] and Nir met without McFarlane with an Iranian foreign affairs adviser to the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, a meeting Teicher described as "our most serious meeting." On the evening of May 27 the Americans discovered that all day the plane "was not refueled," and the party left Tehran at about 9 a.m. on May 28, while the plane carrying the remainder of the HAWK parts turned back in mid-flight.[^4]
+
+According to Ben-Menashe, Nir also faced problems with his plans for supplying the [[Contras]], as [[Yitzhak Rabin]] refused to cooperate. The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that in September 1986 he and North discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, which Poindexter sanctioned as "a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless."[^5] On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin said that he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^6] According to Ben-Menashe, a mysterious $10 million contribution from the [[Sultan of Brunei]] to North's group, wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]], was leaked by the Joint Committee, further exposing the second channel.[^1]
+
+Nir was due to be a major witness in North's trial and knew a great deal about [[Ihsan Barbouti|Barbouti's]] chemical operation in [[Miami]]. He was killed in a plane crash in [[Mexico]] in November 1988, an event that Israeli intelligence believed was a CIA operation to prevent his testimony from embarrassing Peres, [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]], or Bush.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^2]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I, ch. 24 ("The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt"), n. 206 (Hill Note, January 4, 1986, ANS 0001255-56). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm
+[^3]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), pp. 526-27, "The Israeli Connection." https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^4]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1 ("United States v. Robert C. McFarlane"), on the May 23 to 28, 1986 trip (North Note, May 25, 1986, AMX 001128; Teicher Note, May 26, 1986, AKW 005421; Teicher Note, May 27, 1986, AKW 005452; Teicher Note, May 28, 1986, AKW 005452-53). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^5]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^6]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Harry H. Schwartz.md

@@ -4,11 +4,22 @@ tags:
   - Person
   - Nuclear
   - Israel
-summary: "Aide to Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke who witnessed Warnke directly confronting Israeli Ambassador Rabin about Israel's nuclear weapons program."
+summary: "Deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of Paul Warnke, present at the November 1968 meetings with Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin on the F-4 sale and the draft memorandum of understanding on nuclear assurances."
+relations:
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Office of the Secretary of Defense]]"
+    role: "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)"
+    start: 1968
+    fn: 2
 ---
 
-Harry H. Schwartz was an aide to [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about [[Israel]]'s nuclear capabilities. Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in [[Israel]] behind our back."[^1]
+[[Harry H. Schwartz]] was a deputy assistant secretary of defense in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.[^1][^2] He attended the November 22, 1968 meeting at which [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding on Israeli nuclear assurances implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy," and Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it.[^1] In a conversation with Warnke on November 26, 1968, Rabin said that General [[Mordecai Hod]] had met Schwartz the day before and presented a list of the items desired so that a letter of offer could be prepared.[^3] On December 20, 1968, in Warnke's office, Rabin said that the negotiations with Schwartz were finished.[^2]
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Schwartz was present at a meeting where Warnke directly questioned Rabin about Israel's nuclear capabilities, and that Schwartz recalled Warnke stating, "Mr. Ambassador, we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in Israel behind our back."[^4]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.
+[^1]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
+[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 355, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 20, 1968 (lists "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NESA)"). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d355
+[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 332, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 26, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d332
+[^4]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/John Poindexter.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-13
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: John Poindexter
 aliases:
   - John Poindexter
@@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ relations:
     start: 2002-01
     end: 2003-08-29
     role: "director, Information Awareness Office"
-    fn: 3
+    fn: 4
   - type: participant_in
     with: "[[Policy Analysis Market]]"
     start: 2002
     end: 2003-08-29
     role: "director of the Information Awareness Office, under which FutureMAP sat; approved the program per Nextgov"
-    fn: 8
+    fn: 9
 ---
 
 John Marlan Poindexter was born August 12, 1936. He graduated first in his class from the [[U.S. Naval Academy]] in 1958 and earned a PhD in nuclear physics from the [[California Institute of Technology]] in 1964. He pursued a naval career that included service in the Pentagon's [[National Security Council]] staff, rising to military assistant to President Reagan's National Security Advisers before assuming the position himself.[^1]
@@ -42,33 +42,36 @@ Poindexter succeeded Robert McFarlane as National Security Adviser in December 1
 
 Poindexter resigned on November 25, 1986, the same day North was fired, after Attorney General Meese's announcement that the Iran arms sale profits had been diverted to the Contras. His resignation and North's termination were the first public accountability actions in the Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
 
+After the September 1986 discussion between Oliver North and Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] of an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras, Poindexter sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless." He later cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." When North's memorandum briefing the President for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank Peres for the Israeli bloc arms, Poindexter penciled next to the sentence: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^2]
+
 ### Congressional Testimony and Criminal Proceedings
 
 Poindexter testified before the joint congressional [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran-Contra]] committees under a grant of immunity in July 1987. He stated that he had authorized the diversion of funds and had not told [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] about it. He said he made the decision himself because he did not want to place the President in the position of having approved an operation that violated the [[Boland Amendment]]'s prohibition on Contra assistance. This testimony was the central account of executive branch knowledge and authorization in the entire Iran-Contra affair.[^1]
 
-Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^2]
+Independent Counsel [[Lawrence Walsh]] indicted Poindexter in March 1988 on charges of conspiracy, obstruction of Congress, making false statements, and destroying documents. The case was tried in 1990 after North's conviction. Poindexter was convicted on five counts in April 1990 and sentenced to six months in prison.[^3]
 
-The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^2]
+The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Poindexter's conviction in November 1991, on the same grounds that had reversed North's: that witnesses against him had been exposed to his immunized congressional testimony, potentially tainting their accounts in ways the government could not demonstrate had not occurred. Walsh declined to retry the case.[^3]
 
 ### Total Information Awareness
 
-[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^3] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
+[[DARPA]] created the [[Information Awareness Office]] in mid-January 2002, under the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration, and Poindexter directed it.[^4] The office, a research program focused on mining large-scale databases for intelligence indicators, developed the Total Information Awareness (TIA) system, which proposed aggregating commercial, government, and intelligence databases to identify patterns predictive of terrorist activity.
 
-When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^3] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^4]
+When TIA became publicly known in late 2002, it generated intense opposition from civil liberties organizations and members of Congress, who argued that the system constituted a mass domestic surveillance infrastructure. Poindexter's own Iran-Contra history (including his conviction and its reversal) was cited repeatedly in the congressional debate over TIA. On August 12, 2003 Poindexter submitted a five-page letter of resignation to DARPA director [[Anthony Tether]], effective August 29.[^4] The conference report on the fiscal 2004 defense appropriations act provided in Section 8131 that none of the funds may be obligated "for the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," excepting processing, analysis and collaboration tools for counterterrorism foreign intelligence funded in the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and its joint explanatory statement states that the conferees "direct that the Office be terminated immediately."[^5]
 
-The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^4]
+The joint explanatory statement lists four projects previously under the office that may continue under DARPA: Bio-Event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology, Rapid Analytic Wargaming, Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment, and Automated Speech and Text Exploitation in Multiple Languages, including Babylon and Symphony.[^5]
 
-DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^5] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^6][^7] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^8][^9] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^7][^10]
+DARPA's May 20, 2003 report to Congress on Terrorism Information Awareness lists FutureMAP, the Information Awareness Office's prediction-market program, among TIA's decision-support projects.[^6] On July 28, 2003 Senator [[Ron Wyden]] told reporters that the program's [[Policy Analysis Market]] was under Poindexter's supervision, and Senator [[John Warner]] said the next day that Poindexter and DARPA director Anthony Tether had personally reviewed it.[^7][^8] Nextgov reported that Poindexter approved FutureMAP and that he was not leading the office when the original solicitation was answered; [[Robin Hanson]], who designed the market, wrote that he had never met him.[^9][^10] The Pentagon abandoned the market on July 29, 2003, and Poindexter's resignation letter to Tether is dated August 12, 2003.[^8][^11]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Tower Commission Report (President's Special Review Board). *The Tower Commission Report*. Bantam Books/Times Books, 1987. U.S. Congress, Joint Committees on Iran-Contra. *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*. 100th Congress, 1st Session, 1987.
-[^2]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
+[^2]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
-[^3]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
+[^3]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up*. W.W. Norton, 1997. Walsh, Lawrence E. *Iran-Contra: The Final Report*. Random House, 1994.
-[^4]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
+[^4]: Dan Caterinicchia, "Poindexter leaving DARPA," *Nextgov/FCW*, August 13, 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/poindexter-leaving-darpa/201670/
-[^5]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
+[^5]: Congressional Record, House, September 24, 2003, Conference Report on H.R. 2658, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004 (House Report 108-283), Sec. 8131 and Joint Explanatory Statement. https://sgp.fas.org/congress/2003/tia.html
-[^6]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
+[^6]: DARPA, "Report to Congress regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program," May 20, 2003, Annex B. https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/TIA/TIA-report.html
-[^7]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
+[^7]: "Pentagon plan to bet on terrorism is blasted," Associated Press, as published by the Deseret News, July 29, 2003. https://www.deseret.com/2003/7/29/19738241/pentagon-plan-to-bet-on-terrorism-is-blasted/
-[^8]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
+[^8]: "Pentagon Abandons Terrorism Betting Plan," Associated Press, July 29, 2003, as published by KSL. https://www.ksl.com/article/103317
-[^9]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
+[^9]: "DOD's misguided bet on the future," Nextgov, August 2003. https://www.nextgov.com/people/2003/08/dods-misguided-bet-on-the-future/201748/
-[^10]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/
+[^10]: Robin Hanson, "The Policy Analysis Market (and FutureMAP) Archive," George Mason University. https://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/policyanalysismarket.html
+[^11]: Dawn S. Onley, "In his resignation, Poindexter defends projects," Government Computer News, August 13, 2003. https://www.route-fifty.com/digital-government/2003/08/in-his-resignation-poindexter-defends-projects/295109/

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Menachem Schneerson.md

@@ -5,17 +5,18 @@ tags:
   - IranContra
   - CIA
   - Israel
-summary: "Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
+summary: "According to Ari Ben-Menashe, large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to Drexel Burnham, a brokerage house where Michael Milken built his junk-bond fortune."
 born: 1902-04-18
 died: 1994-06-12
 location: "Nikolaev, Russian Empire (now Mykolaiv, Ukraine)"
 ---
 
-[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. His financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
+[[Menachem Schneerson]], also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe, was a prominent orthodox Jewish leader based in Brooklyn, [[New York City]]. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], his financial institutions were enlisted by the [[Likud Party]]-controlled [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] to funnel money for housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers, drawing from the slush fund generated by arms sales to [[Iran]].[^1]
 
-Large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune. Until 1987, some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
+Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money were funneled through his institutions to [[Drexel Burnham]], a brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune, and that until 1987 some of the profits from the slush fund were used to finance the Lubavitcher yeshivahs (colleges).[^1]
 
-In 1987, the committee and Schneerson parted ways. This was partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the [[Likud Party]] and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe. Funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs. The committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
+He wrote that in 1987 the committee and Schneerson parted ways, partly due to questions regarding his allegiance to the Likud Party and the emergence of the orthodox [[Shas Party]], which was at odds with the Rebbe; that funds previously directed to the Lubavitcher yeshivahs were redirected to the Shas yeshivahs; and that the committee also decided to withdraw funds from Drexel and from Schneerson's control due to concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, contributing to Drexel's eventual downfall.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.md

@@ -2,19 +2,181 @@
 category: "Political Figure"
 tags:
   - Person
-summary: "Under the Shah, Iran maintained good relations with 'moderate pro-American Arab countries' such as Egypt, Jordan, and the Emirates."
+  - Iran
+  - OperationAjax
+  - SAVAK
+  - KurdishOperation
+  - ArmsSales
+  - HostageCrisis
+  - SafariClub
+  - Trident
+  - ProjectFlower
+aliases:
+  - "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
+  - "Mohammad Reza Shah"
+  - "Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi"
+  - "Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi"
+  - "Shah of Iran"
+  - "the Shah"
+summary: "Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979, returned to power by the 1953 coup, partner of Nixon and Kissinger in the Kurdish program, and admitted to New York Hospital on October 22, 1979."
 born: 1919-10-26
 died: 1980-07-27
 location: "Tehran, Iran"
+created: 2025-08-05
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Operation AJAX]]"
+    start: 1953-08-13
+    role: "signed firmans dismissing Mohammed Mossadegh and naming Fazlollah Zahedi prime minister"
+    fn: 6
+  - type: appointed
+    with: "[[Fazlollah Zahedi]]"
+    start: 1953-08-13
+    role: "prime minister by royal firman"
+    fn: 6
+  - type: relative_of
+    with: "[[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]]"
+    role: "twin sister, who with Schwarzkopf pressed him to sign the 1953 firmans"
+    fn: 5
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Safari Club]]"
+    start: 1976
+    role: "Iran listed among the member states by Prince Turki al-Faisal"
+    fn: 32
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Project Flower]]"
+    start: 1977-04
+    role: "signed the Israeli-Iranian oil-for-arms contracts with Shimon Peres, including the missile project, per documents published by Iranian students"
+    fn: 31
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Pike Committee]]"
+    start: 1976-02-16
+    role: "the Kurdish covert aid program examined in the committee report"
+    fn: 23
 ---
 
-[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled for nearly 40 years. His departure from [[Iran]] on January 16, 1979, marked a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and led to a new threat to [[Israel|Israel's]] existence.[^1]
+[[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]], also known as the Shah of [[Iran]], ruled Iran for nearly 40 years, from his accession during the Second World War until his departure on January 16, 1979.[^1] His throne was restored in 1953 by a coup that removed [[Mohammed Mossadegh]], and his government relied on the [[SAVAK]] security service. By November 1979 he was in the [[United States]] for medical treatment, and the decision to admit him became a subject of dispute involving the [[Jimmy Carter|Carter]] administration, [[Henry A. Kissinger]] and [[David Rockefeller]].
 
-Under the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]], [[Iran]] maintained good relations with "moderate pro-[[United States|American]] Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]], and the [[Emirates]]. However, by 1978, his rule was threatened by widespread discontent due to extreme corruption, skyrocketing prices, and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production issues. The infrastructure of [[Tehran]] was also unable to handle the traffic, leading to public frustration.[^1]
+### Return to power, 1951 to 1953
 
-[[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence, particularly [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], warned of an impending revolution and the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah's]] imminent overthrow as early as 1978. These warnings were dismissed by [[United States|U.S.]] analysts, who misread the threat to his rule. In December 1978, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[SAVAK]] (Iranian secret police) enlisted [[Israel|Israeli]] aid in a plan to assassinate [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini]], but the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]] rejected it, fearing further bloodshed.[^1]
+By 1952 the American embassy in [[Tehran]] had concluded that a government to replace Mossadegh could be installed only by a military coup. On July 31, 1952, [[Loy Henderson]] reported that any alternative to Mossadegh could be brought to power "except perhaps by military coup," and that the officers best placed to lead one were [[Fazlollah Zahedi]] and General Hedjazi.[^2]
 
-After his departure, the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah]]'s Regency and Supreme Military Councils were unable to function, and [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], his last prime minister, proved helpless. [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] arrived in [[Iran]] on February 1, 1979, and declared [[Iran]] an Islamic republic on April 1. The [[Israel|Israeli]] Embassy in [[Tehran]] was subsequently handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^1]
+In March 1953 Henderson assessed the Shah's own part in such a move. He wrote that the Shah would "undoubtedly be frightened at thought of military coup being attempted in his name" and would probably try to discourage it, and that a failed attempt would be likely to complete the ruin of the Shah and the dynasty.[^3] On April 15, 1953, the embassy reported that the Shah had been postponing a meeting with Zahedi from day to day.[^4]
+
+The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s history of the operation, known as TPAJAX and later as [[Operation AJAX]], was written by [[Donald Wilber]] in March 1954 and released in 2000. The [[National Security Archive]] posted it as part of its Iran coup briefing book. Wilber describes a plan in four steps. [[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]], the Shah's twin sister, was to urge him to dismiss Mossadegh and to tell him she was in contact with American and British officials. General [[H. Norman Schwarzkopf]], formerly head of the American gendarmerie mission in Iran, was to bring the Shah two royal decrees (firmans), one dismissing Mossadegh and one appointing Zahedi, and to get the army's commitment to the crown. A British agent whose credentials the Shah accepted would reinforce the message. [[Kermit Roosevelt]], representing the President of the United States, would then urge the Shah to sign.[^5]
+
+Wilber records that the Shah refused at first. On August 10 he said that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers. After pressure from Princess Ashraf and General Schwarzkopf and several meetings with Roosevelt, the Wilber history records, the Shah signed the required firmans, and action was set for August 16.[^5] A security leak in the Iranian army then caused the chief of the Shah's bodyguard, who had been assigned to seize Mossadegh, to be overwhelmed by loyal units. Wilber describes the Shah's flight to [[Baghdad]] as "an act of prudence" that had been at least partly foreseen in the plan.[^5]
+
+A British memorandum in the Foreign Relations volume dates the firman dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi to August 13, 1953, and says it was conveyed secretly. The opposition press later published photographs of it. The same memorandum says the firman was carried from Ramsar to Tehran by Colonel Nasiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, who delivered a copy late on August 15 to the officer in charge of the troops at Mossadegh's house and was arrested as he left; it records the belief that junior Guards officers with Tudeh sympathies disrupted the plan.[^6] On August 18 Henderson reported that Mossadegh had asked him whether the Shah had issued a firman removing him as prime minister.[^7] The same day Under Secretary of State [[Walter Bedell Smith]] wrote to the President that "it was a counter-coup, as the Shah acted within his constitutional power in signing the firman replacing Mosadeq." He added that "the old boy wouldn't accept this and arrested the messenger and everybody else involved that he could get his hands on."[^8] The Shah arrived in [[Rome]] from Baghdad in the early afternoon of August 18.[^9] On August 20 the embassy in Rome reported that he was to leave Rome for Baghdad around midnight, arriving about noon on August 21.[^10] An airgram from the Tehran embassy in January 1973 described the episode as the time "when the Shah was forced to flee the country only to return two weeks later when Mossadeq was ousted."[^1]
+
+On October 9, 1953, Henderson reported that the Shah had expressed willingness to sign the necessary firmans if Zahedi requested them.[^11] The oil arrangements that followed were recorded in the State Department files of late October 1954, when the Shah signed the oil bill.[^12]
+
+### SAVAK
+
+SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar) served as the Shah's internal security and intelligence service. A February 1971 airgram from the Tehran embassy recorded that Iranian young people widely assumed the CIA had aided SAVAK when the Shah first organized it, and that the "invisible hand of the CIA still wields considerable influence on, if not outright control of, SAVAK." The airgram also reported that SAVAK "is feared by most Iranians."[^13] The November 23, 1979 summary of [[Special Coordination Committee]] (Intelligence) conclusions lists, among its points, publicizing links between some present Iranian leaders and SAVAK.[^14]
+
+### The Kurdish operation, 1972 to 1975
+
+On May 30, 1972, in Tehran, [[Richard Nixon]] and Kissinger met the Shah. The memorandum of conversation records the Shah saying he feared the Soviets would establish "a coalition of the Kurds, the Baathists, and the Communists." When Kissinger asked what could be done, the Shah replied: "Turkey needs strengthening. Iran can help with the Kurds."[^15] The aid went to the Kurdish insurgency of [[Mulla Mustafa Barzani]] in [[Iraq]].
+
+In June 1972 the NSC staff, the CIA and the State Department worked through the question. On June 7 [[Harold Saunders]] wrote to Kissinger that "the balance is fairly fine on the question of whether we should support the Kurds," and advised that Kissinger should not meet Barzani's representatives personally, since that "comes so close to involving the President at least by implication."[^16] A CIA memorandum of June 12 to [[Richard Helms]] said that the policy of non-interference had been confirmed "not only by the State Department but by Dr. Kissinger's office as well."[^17] On July 28 [[Alexander Haig]] forwarded to Kissinger Helms's proposal: about $3 million from the United States over one year and about $2 million in supplies, with Iran also contributing. Haig recommended informing only the 40 Committee principals and to "avoid any paper and tell them that the President wants this done."[^18]
+
+Kissinger later described the origin of the program in a memorandum to Nixon of September 6, 1973: "You will recall that you initiated financial and military support to the Kurds in August 1972 in response to an appeal from the Shah."[^19] His memorandum of April 11, 1974 said that since then the United States had provided, "through the Iranians," a monthly subsidy, and that "the underlying purpose was to keep the Iraqi Government tied down and to limit its capacity for adventures abroad."[^20] On June 24, 1974, the CIA proposed $8.06 million for fiscal 1975, and Kissinger recommended that Nixon approve it.[^21] On March 16, 1975, after the Iran-Iraq agreement, [[Brent Scowcroft]] sent Helms, then ambassador to Iran, a message instructing him to tell the Shah that the United States was prepared to provide the March subvention, and to answer Barzani's message with the words "our prayers are with them."[^22]
+
+The [[Pike Committee]], the House Select Committee on Intelligence under Representative [[Otis Pike]], examined the Kurdish operation as one of three covert cases. Its report, printed in [[The Village Voice]] on February 16, 1976, states that the program ultimately involved some $16 million and was apparently endorsed by the President after a private meeting with the Shah and Kissinger. [[John B. Connally]], then about to take a major role in the President's re-election campaign, personally advised the Shah that the United States would cooperate. The report states that there was no [[Forty Committee]] meeting at which a formal proposal could be discussed and voted on. It says Kissinger "personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on the one occasion when such an attack might have been successful." After the Iran-Iraq border agreement the United States dropped the Kurds. The report charges: "The President, Dr. Kissinger and the foreign head of state [the Shah] hoped our clients would not prevail," and concludes: "Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise." A high American official later explained to the committee staff that "covert action should not be confused with missionary work."[^23]
+
+### Arms purchases and aircraft
+
+In May 1972 the Tehran embassy recommended that the United States make available at least three squadrons of F-15s, with possibly two to four F-14s equipped with Phoenix missiles per squadron.[^24] A memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense [[Kenneth Rush]] to Kissinger of May 18, 1972 attached a talking paper noting that since 1969 the Shah had focused on follow-on aircraft to replace his American-supplied F-4s, and that "these aircraft are barely out of the research and development stage."[^25] On April 27, 1973, Deputy Secretary of State Rush reported from [[Geneva]] on a ninety-minute audience with the Shah, in which he outlined plans to go ahead on the Trident and B-1 weapons programs of the United States.[^26]
+
+On July 20, 1973, the [[Senior Review Group]] discussed the Shah's visit. [[William Clements]] of the Department of Defense said that the Shah wanted to ride in an F-14 while he was in the country, and that "he has indicated he wants to buy a squadron of F-14s and F-15s at some point."[^27] Four days later the memorandum of a conversation records the Shah's belief that he needed sufficient air power, including F-14s, F-15s and possibly A-10s, to deter his enemies.[^28]
+
+A briefing memorandum from [[Alfred L. Atherton Jr.]] to Kissinger of November 10, 1975 listed friction points with Iran. It described [[Project IBEX]] as "a large electronic system which will give the Iranians an ELINT capability." The Department of Defense had suggested that IBEX be placed under foreign military sales, because it was responsible for overseeing the integration of Iranian communications under the Seek Switch program. The memorandum records that the Iranians said how IBEX was managed was "our bureaucratic problem to resolve," and that they would not accept delays or added costs.[^29]
+
+### Israel and Iran, 1958 to 1979
+
+[[Reuven Shiloah]], the founder of the Israeli intelligence services, pursued a "peripheral" alliance policy from 1957. The Turkish scholar Yusuf Suha Sonucu wrote that in the autumn of 1957 the Iranian embassy in Paris sent the Israeli embassy a note asking for a secret meeting at deputy prime minister level, that in January 1958 Shiloah carried a letter from [[David Ben-Gurion]] to Tehran, and that in April 1958 an Iranian delegation headed by a deputy of Prime Minister [[Manouchehr Eghbal]] was received in Tel Aviv by Ben-Gurion and [[Golda Meir]]. Following a meeting of prime ministers in [[Ankara]] on August 29, 1958, the heads of the three intelligence services met in Ankara in late September or early October 1958, and the tripartite arrangement known as Trident was set up among [[Mossad]], Turkey's National Security Service (MAH, later the [[Turkish National Intelligence Organization|MIT]]) and SAVAK. Sonucu reports that the services divided tasks against [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] and Soviet influence, with Iran contributing on the Persian Gulf and Iraq and Turkey on Syria, and that the service chiefs met twice a year. He also reports that after Ben-Gurion's approach to Washington the Central Intelligence Agency financed a two-story building in Israel as the Trident center, with Iranian officers on the "blue" floor, Turkish officers on the "yellow" floor and Israelis on the ground floor.[^30]
+
+Sonucu cites Haggai Eshed's biography of Shiloah for a CIA report on Israel's security, found in the American embassy in Tehran and published by Iranian revolutionaries in March 1979, that described Trident as an arrangement among Mossad, the Turkish service and SAVAK whose ministers met twice a year. He writes that after the Iran-Iraq agreement of March 5, 1975, the Shah told the Egyptian journalist [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal]] that the Nasser threat had gone and that Iranian intelligence and the army had been in contact with Israel, and that in the first months of the new regime Mossad director [[Yitzhak Hofi]] said Israel had wanted to keep Iran in the arrangement and had offered it free tires for its F-4 Phantoms.[^30]
+
+According to documents published by the Iranian students who held the American embassy after November 1979, the Shah and [[Shimon Peres]], then Israel's defense minister, signed one of six oil-for-arms contracts in Tehran in April 1977. The contract code-named Flower covered a surface-to-surface missile project. The Israeli papers, in English, were published in paperback in Iran, and the volume on the missile project was supplied to The New York Times in 1986. The documents state that the aim was to extend the range of an Israeli missile developed in the early 1970s and to replace American-supplied parts so that Israel could export it without American approval. The missile carried a warhead of 750 kilograms and a range of up to 300 miles; shipments were to go through a Swiss company to central Iran, with an assembly plant near Sirjan and a test range near Rafsanjan. In the record of General [[Hassan Toufanian]]'s July 1977 visit to Israel, [[Ezer Weizman]] tells him that Iran must have a missile, and [[Moshe Dayan]] raises the sensitivity of the Americans to missiles of that kind, which with a 750-kilogram head could also be regarded as nuclear-capable. Toufanian, the Shah's arms procurer, told the Times that the Israelis never said explicitly that they had a nuclear capability but that it was implied, and that Iran made a down payment in oil in 1978. A July 1978 summary of a conversation between Admiral Kamal Habibollahi and the Israeli navy commander Michael Barkai mentions enhancing Flower so that the missiles could be launched from submarines.[^31]
+
+Toufanian and Habibollahi told the Times that the recorded conversations were genuine, and Weizman did not deny that the documents were authentic. The spokesman for Israel's Foreign Ministry called them falsified documents spread by the Tehran government. [[Gary Sick]] and Harold Saunders told the Times that they had not known of the project. Israel halted the cooperation when [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] came to power in February 1979.[^31]
+
+### The Safari Club
+
+[[Turki al-Faisal|Prince Turki al-Faisal]], the former head of Saudi intelligence, said in a speech at [[Georgetown University]] on February 3, 2002, that in 1976, after Watergate, the American intelligence community was "literally tied up by Congress," and that a group of countries got together and established what was called the Safari Club. He stated that the Safari Club included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, with the aim of sharing information and countering Soviet influence, especially in Africa.[^32] Heikal wrote in 1982 that the club was the idea of Count [[Alexandre de Marenches]], head of the French [[SDECE]], and that an agreement among the five governments was signed by Sheikh [[Kamal Adham]], director of intelligence, for Saudi Arabia, General [[Nematollah Nassiri]], head of [[SAVAK]], for Iran, the director of intelligence for Egypt, Ahmed Duleimi, director of intelligence, for Morocco, and de Marenches himself for France. He wrote that a copy of the agreement was found in SAVAK's archives after the revolution, and that the proposal to make Algeria a founding member came to him in an interview with President [[Houari Boumediene]].[^33]
+
+### The 1978 warnings and the revolution
+
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who worked for Israeli intelligence, wrote in his memoir that under the Shah Iran maintained good relations with "moderate pro-American Arab countries" such as [[Egypt]], [[Jordan]] and the [[Emirates]], and that by 1978 the Shah's rule was threatened by widespread discontent over corruption, rising prices and the failure of his White Revolution to address food production. He added that the infrastructure of Tehran could not handle its traffic.[^34]
+
+Ben-Menashe also wrote that Israeli intelligence warned of an impending revolution and the Shah's overthrow as early as 1978, that American analysts dismissed the warnings, and that in December 1978 the CIA and SAVAK enlisted Israeli aid in a plan to assassinate Khomeini, which the Shah rejected, fearing further bloodshed.[^34]
+
+The Shah left Iran on January 16, 1979, which Ben-Menashe describes as a tumultuous upheaval in the [[Middle East]] and a new threat to Israel's existence. He wrote that the regency and supreme military councils were unable to function and that [[Shahpour Bakhtiar]], the last prime minister, proved helpless; that Khomeini arrived in Iran on February 1, 1979, and declared an Islamic republic on April 1; and that the Israeli embassy in Tehran was then handed over to the [[Palestine Liberation Organization|PLO]].[^34]
+
+### Medical treatment and the admission to the United States, 1979
+
+The Shah entered the United States on October 22, 1979, for diagnosis and evaluation of his medical condition at the Cornell medical facility in New York; the statement read by White House press secretary [[Jody Powell]] on December 15, 1979, gives that date, adds that he entered Wilford Hall Air Force Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base on December 2, and announces his departure for residence in [[Panama]].[^35]
+
+The Special Coordination Committee recorded on November 5, 1979 that "the Rockefeller group, which is managing the Shah's affairs, has increased the security around the Shah." The [[New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center]] released a medical update on him the same day.[^36] A [[National Security Council]] meeting record of November 6 states that he "has a tube implanted in him and also has cancer of the neck and could not easily be moved."[^37] The editorial note in the Foreign Relations volume on Iranian withdrawals from [[Chase Manhattan Bank]] records that David Rockefeller, "a friend of the Shah, had lobbied for the Shah's acceptance into the United States for medical treatment."[^38]
+
+A memorandum from Ambassador [[Hermann Eilts]] to Carter of November 21 recorded questions about the Shah's health, including whether he had cancer and how serious it was.[^39] At a National Security Council meeting on November 23, the minutes record the question whether [[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] should talk to David Rockefeller.[^40] A November 24 memorandum from Under Secretary of State [[David D. Newsom]] to [[Cyrus Vance]] records that the Rockefeller organization would arrange transportation for the Shah's planned trips to [[Mexico]].[^41]
+
+On November 26 Vance sent Carter a memorandum noting that a television interview by [[George Ball]] "inspired a number of inquiries on Henry Kissinger's advice." Ball had said on NBC's Meet the Press on November 25 that the Shah might not have been admitted to the United States were it not for the "enormously obnoxious" pressure exerted by Kissinger. The [[Chicago Tribune]] reported the same day under the headline "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay." Carter wrote in the margin that the press reported he had met "to soothe an angry Kissinger."[^42] On December 1 Vance's memorandum recorded plans for moving the Shah to Wilford Hall Hospital at [[Lackland Air Force Base]] in [[San Antonio]].[^43] A January 15, 1980 memorandum from [[Steven Oxman]] recorded the prognosis that the Shah's cancer could metastasize at any time and lead quickly to death.[^44]
+
+An undated memorandum from [[Hamilton Jordan]] to Carter, Vance and Brzezinski, written in January 1980, summarized the account given by Panamanian emissaries of their meetings with Iranian Foreign Minister [[Sadegh Ghotbzadeh]] on January 7 about the Shah's presence in Panama. According to that summary, Ghotbzadeh described the seizure of the American embassy as an "American conspiracy" involving "Rockefeller, Kissinger and others," who intended to create a crisis for Carter that would lead to the election of a Republican "controlled by Kissinger and Rockefeller."[^45]
+
+On March 30, 1980, a message from the Swiss ambassador to Iran reported that the Shah had been transferred to [[Cairo]], and that, according to the ambassador's information, Kissinger had organized the move.[^46] On April 1, 1980, the record of an Oval Office meeting noted that [[Abolhassan Bani-Sadr]] had said in a March 31 speech that Kissinger was responsible for the Shah's move to Egypt.[^47] The Shah died in Cairo on July 27, 1980.[^48]
 
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+
+[^1]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, Iran; Iraq, 1973-1976, document 1, Airgram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, January 9, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d1.
+[^2]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, document 192, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, July 31, 1952. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d192.
+[^3]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 313, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 6, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d313.
+[^4]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 324, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, April 15, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d324.
+[^5]: [[Donald Wilber]], *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953*, written March 1954, released by the CIA in 2000. Posted by the [[National Security Archive]] as Iran Coup Briefing Book 28 (November 29, 2000), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/; text copy at https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953. First disclosed by James Risen in *The New York Times* on April 16 and June 18, 2000. The CIA's mid-1970s internal history *The Battle for Iran*, released in 1981 with references to TPAJAX blacked out, was posted by the National Security Archive with those references restored on August 19, 2013 (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/).
+[^6]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 362, British Memorandum (undated), recording that the firman dismissing Mosadeq and appointing Zahedi was issued on August 13, 1953, and that the opposition press published photographs of the royal firman. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d362.
+[^7]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 347, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d347.
+[^8]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 346, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Smith) to the President, Washington, August 18, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d346.
+[^9]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 348, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 20, 1953, reporting telegram 571 from Rome of August 18. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d348.
+[^10]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 350, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, August 21, 1953, editorial note citing telegram 613 from Rome, August 20. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d350.
+[^11]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 374, Telegram From the Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State, Tehran, October 9, 1953. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d374.
+[^12]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 502, Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran, Washington, October 28, 1954, reporting that the Shah signed the oil bill on the day the Tehran embassy informed the Department. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d502.
+[^13]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969-1972, document 116, Airgram A-56 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, February 22, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d116.
+[^14]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979-September 1980, document 54, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee (Intelligence) Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d54.
+[^15]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 200, Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 30, 1972, 5:35 to 6:35 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d200.
+[^16]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 313, Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to Kissinger, Washington, June 7, 1972, "Message from Shah on Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d313.
+[^17]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 315, Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, CIA (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d315.
+[^18]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 321, Memorandum From Haig to Kissinger, Washington, July 28, 1972, "Kurdish Problem," attaching Helms's memorandum of July 18, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d321.
+[^19]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 233, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1973, "Increased Assistance to the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d233.
+[^20]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 246, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, April 11, 1974, "Further Support for the Kurds in Iraq." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d246.
+[^21]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 254, Memorandum From Kissinger to Nixon, Washington, June 24, 1974, "Fiscal Year 1975 Support for the Kurds." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d254.
+[^22]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 281, Backchannel Message From Scowcroft to the Ambassador to Iran (Helms), Washington, March 16, 1975, with the oral message to Barzani. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d281.
+[^23]: Pike Committee, *Report on the Central Intelligence Agency*, as printed in "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, Case 2 (Arms Support). Released through the CIA CREST database as document CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5; text at https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP89B00552R000800090008-5. The Kissinger restraint passage, the Iran-Iraq border passage and the "missionary work" remark appear in the printed introduction by Aaron Latham, which quotes the report.
+[^24]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 187, Telegram 2642 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, May 6, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d187.
+[^25]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume E-4, document 195, Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to Kissinger, Washington, May 18, 1972, with attached talking paper "Sale of F-15/F-14 Aircraft." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d195.
+[^26]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 14, Telegram From the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush) to the Department of State, Geneva, April 27, 1973, "Conversation with Shah." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d14.
+[^27]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 23, Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, July 20, 1973 (participants include William Clements for the Department of Defense). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d23.
+[^28]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 26, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 24, 1973. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d26.
+[^29]: *FRUS 1969-1976*, Volume XXVII, document 147, Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Atherton) to Kissinger, Washington, November 10, 1975, "Issues Between the U.S. Government and Iran." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v27/d147.
+[^30]: Yusuf Suha Sonucu, "Periferi Doktrini Bağlamında Türkiye-İsrail İstihbarat İşbirliği," *İsrailiyat: İsrail ve Yahudi Çalışmaları Dergisi*, no. 3 (Winter 2018), pp. 12-60, citing Haggai Eshed, *Reuven Shiloah: The Man Behind the Mossad* (Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 308-310; Yossi Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), pp. 11-15; Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion* (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp. 1322-1333; and Ofra Bengio, *The Turkish-Israeli Relationship* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 44-46. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/672649.
+[^31]: Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal With the Shah," *The New York Times*, April 1, 1986, as reprinted in the CIA reading room, CIA-RDP90-00965R000705970013-3. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp90-00965r000705970013-3.
+[^32]: Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, special address, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, February 3, 2002 (transcription by Paul Dyer). https://web.archive.org/web/20030402032839/http://www.ccasonline.org/publicaffairs/turki_02032002.html.
+[^33]: Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 113 and author's note. https://archive.org/details/iranuntoldstoryi00hayk
+[^34]: [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*, Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^35]: Jimmy Carter, "Shah of Iran: Statement by the White House Press Secretary on the Shah's Departure From the United States," December 15, 1979. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/248279.
+[^36]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 2, Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting, Washington, November 5, 1979, including the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center update of November 5. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d2.
+[^37]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 8, Record of a National Security Council Meeting, November 6, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d8.
+[^38]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 30, Editorial Note (Bani-Sadr announcement of November 14, 1979; John Kifner, "Iran Defends Move To Withdraw Funds," *New York Times*, November 15, 1979). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d30.
+[^39]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 43, Memorandum From Ambassador Eilts to President Carter, Washington, November 21, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d43.
+[^40]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 51, Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, November 23, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d51.
+[^41]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 57, Memorandum From Under Secretary of State Newsom to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, November 24, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d57.
+[^42]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 60, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, November 26, 1979, citing "Report Kissinger Tells Shah to Stay," *Chicago Tribune*, November 26, 1979, p. 2, and Robert G. Kaiser, "Vance Briefing Aimed at Soothing Angry Kissinger," *Washington Post*, November 27, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d60.
+[^43]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 76, Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, Washington, December 1, 1979. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d76.
+[^44]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 149, Memorandum by the Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State (Oxman), January 15, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d149.
+[^45]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 144, Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter, Secretary of State Vance, and Brzezinski, undated, with Jordan's summary of notes. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d144.
+[^46]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 228, Message From the Swiss Ambassador to Iran (Lang) to the Department of State, Tehran, March 30, 1980. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d228.
+[^47]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 233, Record of an Oval Office Meeting, April 1, 1980, recording Bani-Sadr's March 31 speech. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d233.
+[^48]: *FRUS 1977-1980*, Volume XI, Part 1, document 326, Editorial Note: "On July 27, 1980, the former Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, died in Cairo." https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v11p1/d326.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Oliver North.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - Oliver L. North
   - Lt. Col. Oliver North
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-08
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - KeyFigure
@@ -89,31 +89,33 @@ The writer [[Cheri Seymour]] wrote that North received drug profits from Al-Kass
 
 The Enterprise's air operation used the [[Ilopango Airbase|Ilopango]] base in [[El Salvador]]. North wrote to [[Felix Rodriguez]] in September 1985 asking him to use his influence with Salvadoran Air Force commander [[Juan Rafael Bustillo]] to secure hangar space; the CIA's records, as the writer [[Gary Webb]] reported, show Hangar No. 4 at Ilopango was used by the CIA for covert Contra operations until it was turned over to the NSC and North's Enterprise in 1985, while the adjoining Hangar No. 5 remained CIA-run.[^12] Walsh's Enterprise chapter records that the Salvadoran chief at Ilopango, General Bustillo, ordered the operation's warehouse of parts and supplies there, and that the downing of [[Eugene Hasenfus]] on October 5, 1986 "settled irrevocably the question of CIA assumption" of the Enterprise's operation.[^3]
 
+The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in May 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." On September 15, 1986, North told John Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]] recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^13]
+
 ### Panama and Noriega
 
-According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^13]
+According to testimony before the [[Kerry Committee]] by the Panamanian official José Blandón, [[Manuel Noriega]] met North in June 1985 on a boat anchored off Panama City to discuss Panamanian cooperation in the war against Nicaragua while the Boland Amendment barred direct or indirect CIA support. Blandón testified that this meeting produced Noriega's agreement to help train Contra troops and to let Contra leaders enter and leave Panama freely, and that at a second meeting Noriega suggested Panamanian units could be used in operations on Nicaraguan territory; Blandón had no information that Noriega acted on North's request. Noriega met Casey in November 1985; a memorandum Casey wrote suggested Noriega left "reassured" and the narcotics issue was not mentioned, and other U.S. officials concluded that Casey had "let Noriega off the hook."[^14]
 
-The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^14] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^15]
+The Independent Counsel's summary of North's "Quid Pro Quo" admission describes discussions with Noriega about acts of sabotage against the Sandinista government in exchange for U.S. help in rehabilitating Noriega's public image.[^15] Webb wrote, citing government documents filed in North's trial, that Noriega also offered to have the entire Sandinista leadership assassinated in exchange for a promise to "clean up Noriega's image"; that North raised the proposal at a top-level meeting but was told to say the administration was not keen on murdering Nicaraguan officials though Panamanian help with sabotage would be acceptable; that North returned to Panama a month after the torture-murder of [[Hugo Spadafora]] to assure Noriega of increased U.S. aid; and that within a year $200 million in additional U.S. funds and bank loans went to Noriega.[^16]
 
 ### NHAO and the contractors
 
-North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^16] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^16]
+North used the State Department's [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] to move Contra supplies. The Kerry Committee report found that the State Department selected four companies owned or operated by narcotics traffickers to supply humanitarian assistance to the Contras: SETCO Air, established by the Honduran trafficker [[Juan Matta Ballesteros]]; DIACSA, a Miami air company that served as headquarters of a trafficking enterprise run by the convicted traffickers Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero; Frigorificos de Puntarenas, owned and operated by Cuban-American traffickers; and Vortex, partly owned by the admitted trafficker [[Michael Palmer]]. The State Department paid the four a total of $806,401.20 between January and August 1986, and the report states that in each case federal law enforcement had received information about the individuals controlling the company before the contracts were signed.[^17] One of the pilots who flew Contra missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, who had been under investigation as an alleged trafficker since 1979 by ten different law enforcement agencies, without indictment.[^17]
 
-Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^15]
+Webb wrote that North installed his courier [[Robert Owen]] as a $50,000 "facilitator" at NHAO, that North instructed NHAO director Robert Duemling not to "dislodge or replace their existing arrangements," and that Fiers said: "I believe we guided them toward the carriers they ultimately used." Webb also wrote that Frigorificos was created by the [[Medellin Cartel]].[^16]
 
 ### Barry Seal and Federico Vaughn
 
-The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^13] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^13]
+The Kerry Committee report states that the DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] photographed a man identified as Federico Vaughn, a Nicaraguan government official, and [[Pablo Escobar]] loading Seal's plane with drugs; that the Seal operation "was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked to the press evidence supposedly collected" in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid; and that "one individual in the U.S. government, Lt. Col. Oliver North, decided to play politics with the issue."[^14] The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the phone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal was controlled by the U.S. Embassy; the State Department later reported no evidence of Nicaraguan use for drug shipments to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984 in connection with the Seal case."[^14]
 
-Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^15] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^17]
+Webb wrote that congressional records show North was regularly briefed by the CIA on the Seal sting and supplied with evidence; that North said his only involvement was as an observer; that North's diary contained a July 6, 1984 entry, "Freddy coming in late July," and an October 15, 1986 entry, "46 boxes of transcripts of SF Frogman case. Justice never provided"; that four DEA officials testified they were pressed by North and the CIA to leak Vaughn's involvement; and that after Seal was murdered North told the FBI of an "active measures program" by the Sandinistas against him and said he might be targeted by organized crime.[^12][^16] Seal was shot on February 19, 1986, as he parked at the Salvation Army Community Treatment Center in Baton Rouge, and three men were convicted of first-degree murder in 1987.[^18]
 
 ### Drug-related contacts
 
-Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^13]
+Webb wrote that North's courier Robert Owen reported to North in 1985 that a DC-6 owned by Mario Calero, brother of Adolfo Calero, "which is being used for runs out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs into U.S."; that Owen's phone number was found aboard a DC-4 seized by the DEA in March 1987 off Florida; and that a CIA cable said Frank Moss's notes aboard that plane contained "the names of two CIA officers and their telephone numbers."[^12] The Kerry report separately states that Honduran General José Bueso-Rosa, convicted in 1985 of conspiring to assassinate President Suazo Córdova in a plot to be financed by the sale of $40 million of cocaine, received a sentence cut to five years through intervention by senior U.S. officials, and that according to the United States's admissions in the North trial North suggested efforts be made concerning Bueso-Rosa to keep him from disclosing details.[^14]
 
-Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^18] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^19]
+Webb wrote that at a 1984 meeting with DEA officials North suggested that $1.5 million in cocaine cash the DEA planned to seize from the Medellín cartel be turned over to the Contras, which the DEA declined; that a White House leak then blew the DEA operation; and that North wrote that Casey did not want the Contras' "unofficial funds" entering U.S. banks for fear Treasury agents would grow suspicious.[^19] Webb also wrote that North relied on fraudulent end-user certificates from Guatemala and Honduras after Boland, quoting Fiers: "an arms broker will get an intermediary country to issue false end-user certificates."[^20]
 
-Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^20] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
+Webb further wrote that Dagoberto Núñez, a Costa Rican trafficker working for North and the CIA, signed a contract with the Sandinista agency Heroes and Martyrs Trading Corporation, and quoted a 1986 Owen memo to North: "He believes this will provide an opportunity to use his boats for cover operations, or to implicate the Ortegas and Borge in taking money on the side." In Webb's account, in November 1986 the FBI's "Operation Front Door" interviewed the realtor of [[Ronald Lister]], who said Lister claimed to run a "CIA-approved" security business and had told a neighbor he worked for North and Secord and had sent arms shipments to the Contras; the lead was not pursued.[^12][^21] The former Air Force intelligence officer [[Terry Reed]] claimed North was his CIA contact for a pilot-training program and a machine-tool front in [[Arkansas]], and described an Arkansas State Police "shredding party" to purge the state's [[Mena, Arkansas]] files of nearly a thousand documents including those naming North and Reed; North has denied knowing anything about Reed or Mena.[^12]
 
 Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads in El Salvador, "under the guise of anti-Communism," terrorized the entire country and murdered nuns, teachers, labor organizers, political opponents and thousands of other civilians, and that most of the activity was the responsibility of the ARENA party and its leader [[Roberto D'Aubuisson]].[^12]
 
@@ -121,7 +123,7 @@ Webb quoted North's 1991 memoir, *Under Fire*, as saying that the death squads i
 
 When the Iran arms sales and the Contra supply operation became public in October and November 1986, North told investigators little; the Independent Counsel wrote that his "wide destruction of records" eliminated possible documentary proof, and that he called the diversion the "secret within the secret."[^2] At the Select Committees' hearing on July 7, 1987, North testified under a grant of immunity that he believed the President had authorized the diversion.[^2] On November 25, 1986, Reagan telephoned North at a Sheraton hotel in Tysons Corner for two minutes; Reagan's sworn interrogatory answer says he told North he had no personal animus and "may have referred to LtCol North as a national hero."[^2]
 
-North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^21]
+North was indicted in March 1988 on 16 counts with Poindexter, Secord and Hakim. After the conspiracy count was dropped because of classified-information problems he stood trial before Judge Gerhard Gesell on 12 counts and on May 4, 1989 was found guilty on three: aiding and abetting the obstruction of Congress, shredding and altering official documents, and accepting an illegal gratuity from Secord in the form of a home-security system. The Court of Appeals vacated the convictions on July 20, 1990 because trial witnesses might have been affected by his immunized congressional testimony; the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 28, 1991; and on remand, after Robert McFarlane testified that his trial testimony had been "colored" by North's immunized testimony, the Independent Counsel consented to dismissal of the remaining counts with prejudice on September 16, 1991.[^1] President [[George H.W. Bush]] did not pardon North. On December 24, 1992 Bush pardoned [[Caspar Weinberger]], McFarlane, [[Elliott Abrams]], [[Duane Clarridge]], Clair George and Fiers.[^22]
 
 Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[Nita Scoggan]], wife of a [[Full Gospel Business Men's Fellowship International]] member, was invited to form by a Reagan aide who later worked for [[Pat Robertson]]'s presidential campaign.[^11]
 
@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ Seymour wrote that North reportedly attended a White House prayer group that [[N
 [^10]: Graham Exhibit 1, Deposition of Daniel O. Graham, Appendix B, vol. 12 (Internet Archive item micro_IA41152840_0234).
 [^11]: Seymour, Cheri. *The Last Circle: Danny Casolaro's Investigation into the Octopus and the PROMIS Software Scandal.* TrineDay, 2010.
 [^12]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998, chapters 6, 13 and 20.
-[^13]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^13]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
-[^14]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
+[^14]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, December 1988 (Panama chapter; "Barry Seal and the Cartel"; "Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"; Nicaragua chapter). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
-[^15]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
+[^15]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 2, section on the "Quid Pro Quo" admission and the "Heads of State" documents.
-[^16]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
+[^16]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapters 11 and 12.
-[^17]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
+[^17]: Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, section "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections."
-[^18]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
+[^18]: Lau, Maya, and Amy Wold. "Man who gunned down drug informant Barry Seal in Baton Rouge street dies at Angola." *The Advocate* (Baton Rouge), September 2, 2015, citing court documents. https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_f09fb38d-4bb9-59ea-bda3-557497d84561.html
-[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
+[^19]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 11.
-[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
+[^20]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 10.
-[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
+[^21]: Webb, *Dark Alliance*, chapter 20.
+[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Executive Summary and ch. 27, notes on pardons of December 24, 1992. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Richard Secord.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ aliases:
   - Dick Secord
   - General Secord
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Military"
 tags:
   - Person
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ relations:
     with: "[[Oliver North]]"
     role: "paid for a home security system for North and set up a 200,000 dollar Swiss account for North's family; both were charged as illegal gratuities"
     start: 1986
-    fn: 53
+    fn: 54
   - type: investigated
     with: "[[Department of Justice]]"
     reverse: true
@@ -178,50 +178,54 @@ The resupply operation that flew arms to the contras from [[Ilopango Airbase]] i
 
 On October 5, 1986, a resupply aircraft was shot down over [[Nicaragua]] and [[Eugene Hasenfus]] was captured. Walsh wrote that the Enterprise had effectively ceased its Central American activities after the shootdown.[^4] Before it, Secord and Hakim at North's request had three checks issued to pay outstanding contra grocery bills. Afterward Secord told Quintero to set aside a second check for 75,000 dollars and a third for 50,000 dollars to establish a defense fund for Hasenfus.[^31]
 
+In September 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] discussed with North an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras and suggested that North's ship, the Erria, dock at [[Haifa]] to be filled from a recently seized PLO shipment. [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer: "It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless.... Keep the pressure on Bill [Casey] to make things right for Secord."[^34]
+
 ### The Enterprise: The HAWK Shipment of November 1985
 
-A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^34] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^35][^36] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^37] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^38] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^39] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
+A letter dated November 19, 1985, which North signed with his own name for the national security adviser [[Robert McFarlane]], asked Secord, described as a retired U.S. Air Force general officer, to proceed to a third-country transit point and arrange the transfer of "sensitive materiel" being shipped from Israel.[^35] The Tower Commission recorded that [[Dewey Clarridge|Duane Clarridge]] of the CIA told the U.S. official trying to obtain flight clearance to be in touch with a man named "Copp," whom Clarridge was told was an alias for Secord, and that a CIA field officer attributed the failure of the arrangements to the amateurish way in which Secord and his associates approached officials in the government from which landing clearance was needed.[^36][^37] The Israelis transferred 1 million dollars on November 20, 1985 to the Enterprise's Lake Resources account to pay for airlifting the missiles; after 18 HAWKs were delivered and the Iranians rejected them, about 870,000 dollars remained in Lake Resources, commingled with other funds and used for the contras and other purposes.[^38] Clines accompanied Secord to Europe in late November 1985 to facilitate the shipment.[^39] Secord testified that the Israelis did not ask for the money back, and that North told him "we could use it for whatever purpose we wanted. We actually expended it on the Contra project."[^40] Secord quickly chartered a jet to fly the 18 HAWKs to Iran under cover of a humanitarian mission, according to the Los Angeles Times.[^1]
 
 ### The Enterprise: Iran Arms Sales and Swiss Accounts
 
 More than 47.6 million dollars from the Iran and contra operations flowed into the Enterprise's Swiss accounts. The largest share went to Lake Resources Inc. (31.5 million), with Energy Resources International (11.3 million) and Hyde Park Square Corporation (4.8 million) receiving the rest.[^29] Lake Resources was controlled by Hakim and later pleaded guilty to the corporate felony of theft of government property for diverting the proceeds of the arms sales.[^30] The Enterprise transferred 12.2 million dollars to a CIA Swiss account for weapons sold to Iran.[^29]
 
-[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^40] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^40] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^40] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^41] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^40] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^42] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^40]
+[[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], an Iranian exile and former CIA informant whom the agency had discredited as a fabricator, was a driving force behind the proposals to sell arms to Iran.[^41] On January 17, 1986, President Reagan signed a covert-action Finding that authorized direct U.S. sales to Iran, with Secord acting as an agent of the CIA. Under the Finding, Secord was to collect payment in advance and deposit the Defense Department's cost in a CIA account.[^41] In January 1986 North and Secord negotiated on behalf of the United States the sale of 4,000 TOW missiles to Iran, at 10,000 dollars per missile for an initial 1,000. In February 1986 [[Adnan Khashoggi]] deposited 10 million dollars into Lake Resources to finance the first sale; on February 10 and 11, 3.7 million dollars went from Lake to a CIA account, and the surplus on the sale was 5.6 million dollars.[^41] In February 1986 Secord, using the alias Major General Adams, requested alias documentation from North, and on February 20 he met Ghorbanifar in [[Frankfurt]] with North, [[Amiram Nir]] and a CIA officer.[^42] In May 1986 about 16.7 million dollars in Iranian and Israeli payments for HAWK parts and TOW replenishment went into Lake Resources, leaving a surplus of 9.2 million dollars.[^41] When Robert McFarlane flew to Tehran on May 25, 1986, Secord and one communicator remained in [[Tel Aviv]].[^43] A further 500 TOW missiles were sold in October 1986, and the Enterprise cleared 1.463 million dollars on that sale.[^41]
 
-Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^43] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^44]
+Walsh's trial-proof estimate of the diversion of arms-sale proceeds to the contras was 3.6 million dollars, and he judged the figure to be at least 1.1 million dollars low. Walsh wrote that North pressed Secord to send money from the Iran operation to the contra operation, and that Secord "claimed he did not view this as a diversion."[^44] In July 1986 the Enterprise paid Defex Portugal 2.6 million dollars and paid the Syrian arms dealer [[Monzer Al-Kassar]] 500,000 dollars for contra weapons; Walsh left the Al-Kassar payment out of his diversion estimate because Al-Kassar "was not available to testify."[^45]
 
 ### Secord's Personal Receipts
 
-Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^45]
+Walsh found that Secord personally received 1.037 million dollars in cash from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986, of which about 34,000 dollars was accounted for as legitimate expenses or withdrawals from his profits. Three payments totaling 796,000 dollars were unaccounted for. Secord said he gave two cash payments, of 225,000 and 260,000 dollars received on May 15 and 21, 1986, to the Israeli official Amiram Nir, and a further 311,000 dollars in July 1986 to the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar. He produced no documentation for any of them, and Ghorbanifar denied receiving the 311,000 dollars. The Independent Counsel stated that Nir had died and that the Israelis denied their government ever received the funds.[^46]
 
-Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^46] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^47]
+Walsh found that in July 1985 Secord had CSF delete his name from the Enterprise profit accounts, and that his profit distributions, totaling 1,457,568 dollars, were credited to a shell company, Korel Assets, whose documents he signed on September 20, 1985. Withdrawals from the Korel account paid for a small private airplane, a Porsche and a stay at a German weight-reduction spa. Walsh concluded that Secord personally received at least 2 million dollars from the Enterprise in 1985 and 1986. His 1985 return reported adjusted gross income of 147,000 dollars and answered "no" when asked about foreign financial accounts, and Walsh did not charge him with a tax offense because the Swiss records could not be used in a tax case.[^47] Hakim received 2.06 million dollars from the Enterprise in the same years.[^48]
 
 ### Congressional Testimony, May 1987
 
-In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^48] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^48] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^48]
+In December 1986 Secord was subpoenaed by the intelligence committees and refused to testify, invoking the Fifth Amendment. In February 1987 he refused to testify before the grand jury, and in March 1987 he appeared before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr. in response to a corporate subpoena and denied having custody of Enterprise records. In late April 1987 he agreed to testify voluntarily.[^49] He was the first witness before the joint House and Senate committees, testifying from May 5 to May 8, 1987, without immunity. He was recalled and deposed in June 1987.[^2][^49] Newsweek wrote on May 5, 1987 that committee chairman Senator [[Daniel Inouye]] said Secord "feels sincerely that he has nothing to hide."[^6] Walsh's assessment was that Secord "provided an enormous amount of largely truthful information regarding the Enterprise's operational workings," but that his "responses to questions about its financial activities were much less candid."[^49]
 
-On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^49] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^50] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and [[John Poindexter]], some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^50] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^51]
+On the first day Secord testified, according to the New York Times, that about 3.5 million dollars of 12 million dollars in profits from the sale of arms to Iran was spent on behalf of the contras, that more than half of the money was kept by his partner Hakim, and that part of the rest was used for a secret project unrelated to Iran or Nicaragua that he did not identify; he said: "We believed our conduct was in the furtherance of the President's policies," and "I also understood that this Administration knew of my conduct and approved it."[^50] In his testimony Secord said that North told him several times that he had mentioned to President Reagan that it was "very ironic" that "some of the ayatollah's money was being used to support the contras"; Secord said, "Whether he actually said this to the president, or whether he was joking with me, I'm not sure," and that it was "not said to me in a way that I took it as a joke."[^51] He said he had no direct knowledge of what the president knew, and that he had spoken to officials including Casey, McFarlane and John Poindexter, some of whom told him the president was aware of what he was doing with the contras. He said that a White House aide told him on November 25, 1986 that "they'd already built a wall around the president," and that [[Edwin Meese]]'s remarks that day "betrayed all of us, and it's unforgivable."[^51] On the third day he acknowledged that the Enterprise had amassed 12 million dollars in cash and assets in about two years, said the money was intended for future operations, and agreed that it had been set up at the request of Poindexter and North.[^52]
 
-Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^48]
+Walsh listed the statements on which the 1989 charges were based. Secord testified that he had waived all interest in Enterprise profits after July 1985, that Korel was not his company, that he had received no money from the Iran sales beyond his salary, that Defex was set up to hide the source of Enterprise funds from arms dealers, and that he held no beneficial interest in foreign accounts other than a British checking account. Walsh found each of these statements false. Walsh also found that the 500,000 dollars STTGI received from CSF was not a loan, as Secord had testified, and that STTGI in fact received at least 700,000 dollars. Walsh described Hakim, who had received limited use immunity from Congress, as the committees' chief source for Enterprise financial information.[^49]
 
 ### Indictment, Plea and Sentence
 
-The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^48]
+The Independent Counsel indicted Secord on March 16, 1988, together with Poindexter, North and Hakim, in a 23-count indictment whose first count charged conspiracy to defraud the United States; Secord was named in six felony counts that included conspiracy and theft and three counts of illegal gratuities paid to North.[^5][^30] The conspiracy and theft charges were dismissed because of problems with classified information, and the trials of the four defendants were severed. On May 11, 1989 a second indictment charged Secord with nine counts of obstruction, perjury and false statements.[^5][^49]
 
-On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^48] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^52] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^48]
+On November 8, 1989, five days before he was to stand trial on twelve felony charges, Secord pleaded guilty to one felony count of making false statements to Congress, admitting that he lied when he denied that North had received personal benefits from the Enterprise.[^49] The Deseret News reported that the plea was taken before Chief U.S. District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson Jr.; that Secord told the judge he had answered "no" "in a misguided effort to prevent further criticism" of North and himself; that the offense carried up to five years in prison; and that Walsh's chief prosecutor in the Secord case, [[Reid Weingarten]] told the judge the government was prepared to prove that Secord provided North with a home security system costing almost 14,000 dollars and a Swiss bank account containing 200,000 dollars funded by arms profits.[^53] Under the plea Secord agreed to cooperate in the pending trials and the Independent Counsel's investigation.[^49]
 
-The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^53] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^53]
+The gratuities concerned a 16,000 dollar security system installed at North's home in Great Falls, Virginia, after Secord introduced North to Glenn A. Robinette in the spring of 1986, and a 200,000 dollar Swiss account, the "B. Button" account, set up in 1986 to help educate North's children; Walsh wrote that the Independent Counsel could not prove that North accepted or received any of the money in that account.[^54] A 1989 conviction of North on the gratuity charge was later overturned on appeal.[^54]
 
 Robinson sentenced Secord on January 24, 1990, to two years' probation.[^5]
 
-Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^38][^46]
+Thomas Clines was indicted in February 1990 following the cooperation of Secord and Hakim, and was convicted in September 1990 of four tax felonies after a two-week jury trial in U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Secord, compelled to testify under a cooperation agreement, was a central prosecution witness; he admitted there that the Korel account was his own investment account, a fact he had denied before his plea.[^39][^47]
 
 ### Later Activity and the Memoir
 
-Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^54] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
+Secord published the memoir *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos*, written with [[Jay Wurts]] and published by John Wiley & Sons in 1992.[^55] The Washington Post obituary says that in the memoir he maintained he joined the operation out of what he saw as patriotic duty, and that later disclosures suggested financial motives "played no small role."[^2] In a 1987 interview with [[Playboy]] he said: "I feel I was betrayed."[^2]
 
 After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal Imaging, a computer imaging firm, and was president of the Air Commando Association.[^2] He and his wife had formed Secord Associates in 1983 and bought three houses near their McLean, Virginia, home.[^1]
 
+### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Los Angeles Times, March 29, 1987, "Secord: A Specialist in Covert Deals" ("Skilled Secret Soldier"), CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000201700001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000201700001-4.
 [^2]: Bill Hewitt, "Richard V. Secord, general embroiled in Iran-contra affair, dies at 92," *Washington Post*, Oct. 16, 2024, text reprinted by the National Security Archive, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/media/32473/ocr.
 [^3]: Testimony of Richard V. Secord, *Iran-Contra Investigation: Joint Hearings*, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1987 (Hearings 100-1), p. 46, https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152829_0342.
@@ -255,24 +259,25 @@ After leaving the Air Force, Secord was a top executive at Computerized Thermal
 [^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Southern Air Transport, Jetstar and Hasenfus defense-fund passages).
 [^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Dutton outline of the resupply operation, dated July 21, 1986).
 [^33]: H. Rept. 100-433, ch. 3, pp. 66-67.
-[^34]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
+[^34]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
-[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
+[^35]: *The Tower Commission Report* (Bantam/Times Books, 1987), p. 32, https://archive.org/details/towercommission00unit.
-[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
+[^36]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 162.
-[^37]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
+[^37]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 73.
-[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
+[^38]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Phase IV and November 1985 HAWK shipment), citing the Israeli Financial Chronology, Apr. 26, 1987.
-[^39]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
+[^39]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 11, "United States v. Thomas G. Clines," pp. 181-184, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_11.htm.
-[^40]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
+[^40]: Secord testimony, Hearings 100-1, p. 95; cited in Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, n. 32.
-[^41]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
+[^41]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (Direct U.S. Arms Sales to Iran; February 1986, May-August 1986 and October-November 1986 sections).
-[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
+[^42]: *The Tower Commission Report*, pp. 248-249.
-[^43]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
+[^43]: *The Tower Commission Report*, p. 296.
-[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
+[^44]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172 (The Iran/Contra Diversion), citing Secord, FBI 302, Mar. 12, 1988, p. 4.
-[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
+[^45]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 8, pp. 159-172, and n. 51.
-[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
+[^46]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances), citing Secord, OIC Interview, Mar. 9, 1988, pp. 106-07, Secord, Grand Jury, Jan. 22, 1988, pp. 150-51, and Ghorbanifar, OIC Deposition, Dec. 10, 1987, p. 94.
-[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
+[^47]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Finances; Korel perjury charge; Secord, Clines Trial Testimony, Sept. 5, 1990, p. 193).
-[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
+[^48]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, pt. V, ch. 10, "United States v. Albert Hakim," pp. 179-180, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_10.htm.
-[^49]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
+[^49]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Secord's Testimony to Congress and Independent Counsel; Secord Indicted; Obstruction, Perjury and False Statements).
-[^50]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
+[^50]: David E. Rosenbaum, "Secord Says High Officials Helped Him Supply Contras Despite Ban on U.S. Arms Aid," *New York Times*, dateline May 5, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000605580005-6, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000605580005-6.
-[^51]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
+[^51]: "North Said He Mentioned Diversion to Reagan, Secord Says," *Washington Post*, May 7, 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550012-3, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550012-3.
-[^52]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
+[^52]: Dan Morgan and Walter Pincus, "Secord Testifies Unspent Money Was for Future Operations, Not His Use," *Washington Post*, May 1987, CIA Reading Room CIA-RDP90-00965R000504550011-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000504550011-4.
-[^53]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
+[^53]: "Secord guilty of lying to Congress," *Deseret News*, Nov. 8, 1989, https://www.deseret.com/1989/11/8/18831419/secord-guilty-of-lying-to-congress/.
-[^54]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.
+[^54]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 9, pp. 173-178 (Gratuities to North: The Basis for the Guilty Plea; The North Security Fence; The "B. Button" Account; n. 13).
+[^55]: Richard V. Secord, with Jay Wurts, *Honored and Betrayed: Irangate, Covert Affairs, and the Secret War in Laos* (John Wiley & Sons, 1992), ISBN 0471573280, https://archive.org/details/honoredbetrayedi0000seco.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Uri Simchoni.md

@@ -5,12 +5,13 @@ tags:
   - IranContra
   - Israel
   - Military
-summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
+summary: "Brigadier General Uri Simchoni was, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee."
 ---
 
-Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
+Brigadier General [[Uri Simchoni]] was, according to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]. He served at various times as assistant deputy chief of staff for operations for the [[Israel]] and as a military attaché in [[Washington, D.C.]]. He had also been the chief of the elite [[Golani infantry brigade|Golani infantry brigade]].[^1]
 
-[[Uri Simchoni|Simchoni]] was part of the [[Israel|Israeli]] delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
+Simchoni was part of the Israeli delegation at the October 1980 [[Paris Summit Meeting]], which included [[George H.W. Bush]], [[William J. Casey]], and [[Mehdi Karrubi]].[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Walt Rostow.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ tags: [OSS, EnemyObjectivesUnit, AirTargeting, MITCenterForInternationalStudies,
 aliases: [Walt Rostow, Walt Whitman Rostow, Walter W. Rostow, W. W. Rostow, W.W. Rostow, Walter Rostow]
 summary: "American economist who served in the OSS Enemy Objectives Unit in London, chaired the State Department Policy Planning Council from 1961 to 1966, and was Johnson's national security adviser from 1966 to 1969."
 created: 2026-10-09
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 relations:
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Massachusetts Institute of Technology]]"
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ relations:
     role: "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs"
     start: "1966"
     end: "1969"
-    fn: 29
+    fn: 30
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[University of Texas at Austin]]"
     role: "professor of economics"
@@ -123,43 +123,45 @@ The State Department record lists Rostow as chairman of the Policy Planning Coun
 
 On February 15, 1965, Rostow sent Assistant Secretary [[William Bundy]] three points on a possible negotiation. He thought [[Hanoi]] might be driving for a settlement, that a "land grab" was likely, perhaps in the [[Laos]] corridor, and that the United States should consider a preemptive ground force move in that area and inside [[South Vietnam]], because air and naval power would be hard to use during a negotiation.[^27] Eight days earlier McGeorge Bundy's memorandum from Saigon had set out a "policy of sustained reprisal", described in Annex A as "graduated and continuing reprisal" against [[North Vietnam]].[^28]
 
+In August 1965 Rostow attended a Washington meeting on the mission to Vietnam of Edward Lansdale. Attendees included officials from State, the White House, AID, USIA and the CIA, among them [[William Colby]]. Lansdale described his aim as finding out what the Vietnamese thought, what they wanted and what they would do. Rostow suggested that Lansdale have a liaison officer who would keep other agencies and Washington advised of his efforts and thinking.[^29]
+
 ### National Security Adviser, 1966 to 1969
 
-By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^29]
+By April 1966 Rostow was the President's special assistant, as the headings of his memoranda show.[^30]
 
 #### POL strikes, June 1966
 
-On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^30] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^31] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^32] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^32][^33]
+On June 14, 1966, Johnson wrote [[Harold Wilson]] that Rusk had discussed "the problem of POL in Haiphong and Hanoi" with him. POL is the standard abbreviation for petroleum, oil and lubricants.[^31] At the National Security Council meeting of June 17, Rostow argued: "Striking the POL targets is an extension of our bombing program, not a change in our policy." He added that "our bombing program is forcing the North Vietnamese to divert laborers to the repair of roads and bridges." [[Arthur Goldberg]] argued that the risk of widening the bombing to POL targets was too great. Rostow's memorandum to Johnson of the previous day said he had "marched carefully through all the considerations" with Goldberg.[^32] On June 28 [[Robert McNamara]] telephoned Johnson and asked for authority to strike the two major POL storage installations in the Hanoi-Haiphong area that evening.[^33] On July 5 a telegram from the acting secretary of state reported that "Bob McNamara and Walt Rostow are going to the Ranch tomorrow." On July 7 Rostow wrote Johnson that the speech at Omaha on June 30 had been "a personal breakthrough, against the background of your decision to go for POL."[^33][^34]
 
 #### The Rostow thesis
 
-In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^34]
+In a memorandum of September 15, 1966, Rostow set out the case that bombing imposed a cumulative burden on Hanoi, and that without it Hanoi had no incentive to stop. He wrote that bombing "has imposed a severe but not decisive general burden on the North Vietnamese." He listed its effects: it engaged a large amount of civilian manpower for repair and air defense, caused economic stagnation or decline, imposed "a political and psychological burden and morale problems which have, on firm evidence, increased with the passage of time," limited shipping, and left most foreign aid shoring up the North rather than the South. "Put another way," he wrote, "without the bombing, Hanoi could keep the war going without any significant incentive to knock it off." He cited a 1962 interview with Hanoi leaders published in the [[Saturday Evening Post]], whose "punch line" was: "Americans do not like long, inconclusive wars, and this is going to be a long, inconclusive war. Thus we are sure to win."[^35]
 
 #### Tet, 1968
 
-On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^35] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^36] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^36]
+On January 31, 1968, Rostow sent Rusk an outline of headings for a presidential speech on Asia. A marginal note in an unknown hand reads "This is WWR not LBJ."[^36] On February 5 he gave Johnson a written account of the fighting, which he said was in answer to a question from [[Elspeth Davies Rostow]], his wife. He described the attacks on the cities and at [[Khe Sanh]] as the enemy committing a large part of its "capital," its pools of military forces and firepower, on the believed vulnerability of the South Vietnamese government and of American public opinion.[^37] On February 6 he reported the findings from captured prisoners and documents. One prisoner captured on January 31 said that the attack "was to create conditions which would bring the U.S. Government to negotiate in order to proceed with peace."[^37]
 
 #### Israel, 1967
 
-On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^37] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^38] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^39]
+On May 25, 1967, Rostow sent Johnson an Israeli intelligence estimate with a CIA appraisal attached. The appraisal, he noted, "throws a great deal of cold water on the Israeli estimate."[^38] On June 5 Rostow telephoned Johnson to read him a draft statement on the outbreak of fighting.[^39] His covering memorandum on a meeting among [[Meir Amit]], [[Walworth Barbour]] and [[Harry C. McPherson Jr.]] said that Amit's account was consistent with [[Levi Eshkol]]'s, and added: "At least that's his story."[^40]
 
 ### Security clearance
 
 A CIA Office of Security memorandum to the Director of Central Intelligence dated April 11, 1958, furnished in case Mr. Dillon should seek the agency's opinion of "Rostow's record and security standing," states that Rostow "has twice been denied clearance for OCB employment by the NSC Security Office," that he "was also disapproved for employment by Under Secretary of State, Herbert Hoover," and that he "has been denied a security clearance by the Office of the Secretary of Defense." The memorandum adds that in 1953 a CIA employee, since resigned, had threatened to take Rostow's case to the McCarran Committee.[^7]
 
-In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^40] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^41]
+In October 1967 Senator [[Strom Thurmond]] reported in his column in *The Clinton Chronicle* on a brief filed for [[Otto Otepka]], a State Department security officer, before a departmental hearing officer. The column stated that under the Eisenhower administration Rostow had twice been denied a State Department clearance "to handle" sensitive data, that Otepka had expressed reservations in 1960 about a proposed clearance for Rostow and had indicated to Dean Rusk and Attorney General-designate [[Robert F. Kennedy]] that he would probably still evaluate the file in the same manner, and that Rostow was then given immediate clearance as a White House aide.[^41] *Human Events* of October 23, 1967 reported the brief's account that the Air Force "had previously made a security finding adverse to Mr. Rostow" and that Under Secretary of State [[Herbert Hoover Jr.]], as chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, decided that Rostow would not be used as an employee or consultant by the State Department in connection with a psychological warfare project.[^42]
 
-The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^42]
+The Associated Press reported that Rostow denied the account. "From 1951 onward," he told a reporter, "I had continuous security clearance from various agencies of the federal government." The Associated Press noted that he did not say what assignment in 1951 had required clearance, and that his Who's Who entry listed him as a staff member of the Center for International Studies from 1951 to 1960.[^43]
 
-On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^43]
+On December 19, 1967 the CIA Director of Security, replying to an inquiry of December 15, wrote that Rostow "was granted a Special Intelligence Clearance by this Agency on 3 February 1961 based on a favorable investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1960."[^44]
 
 ### Later career and death
 
-Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^30][^36] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
+Rostow taught economics at the [[University of Texas at Austin]] from 1969 until his death in Austin on February 13, 2003.[^1] His official files are in the National Security File, "Memos to the President," at the [[Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library]], which the Foreign Relations volumes cite as "Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow."[^31][^37] Drafts and correspondence by and about Rostow, including drafts of his historical manuscripts, are in the Bissell papers at the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library]].[^6]
 
 ### Family
 
-His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^44] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^45] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
+His brother Eugene V. Rostow (1913-2002) became Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A 1967 letter from the Under Secretary to the Israeli ambassador was drafted by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow.[^45] In January 1983, as director of the [[Arms Control and Disarmament Agency]], Eugene was told by [[George Shultz]] that the President wanted his resignation. Spokesmen for the State Department and the White House, as reported by Joseph C. Harsch in the *Christian Science Monitor*, said that he "had not been a team player."[^46] Another brother, [[Ralph Waldo Emerson Rostow]] (1920-2006), is listed in the same family memorial record.[^1]
 
 His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same memorial record.[^1]
 
@@ -193,20 +195,21 @@ His wife, Elspeth Davies Rostow (1917-2007), is listed as his spouse in the same
 [^26]: *FRUS 1961-1963*, Volume I, document 335 ("Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," December 22, 1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d335 ; Volume II, document 140 ("Director of the Policy Planning Staff," April 3, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d140, and document 275 ("Counselor of the Department of State," September 5, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d275; Volume III, document 206 ("Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council," July 4, 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v03/d206
 [^27]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January-June 1965*, document 121, memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, February 15, 1965, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d121
 [^28]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume II*, document 84, memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, "The Situation in Vietnam," February 7, 1965, with Annex A, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v02/d84
-[^29]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
+[^29]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum for the record, "Lansdale Mission to Vietnam," August 1965. CIA reading room document CIA-RDP80R01580R001603420030-5. https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp80r01580r001603420030-5
-[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
+[^30]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV, Vietnam, 1966*, document 115, memorandum from the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to Johnson, April 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d115
-[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
+[^31]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 156, message from Johnson to Wilson, June 14, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d156 (source line: "Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President-Walt W. Rostow").
-[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
+[^32]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 159, summary notes of the 559th National Security Council meeting, June 17, 1966, with footnote on Rostow's memorandum of June 16, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d159
-[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
+[^33]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 164, editorial note on McNamara's telephone call to Johnson, June 28, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d164 ; document 173, telegram from the Department of State to Rusk, July 5, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d173
-[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
+[^34]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 176, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, "Reflections on Omaha and Los Angeles," July 7, 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d176
-[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
+[^35]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume IV*, document 232, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, September 15, 1966, "A reflection on bombing the North," quoting Bernard B. Fall, "Master of the Red Jab," *Saturday Evening Post* 235 (November 24, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v04/d232
-[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
+[^36]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968*, document 42, memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, January 31, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d42
-[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
+[^37]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume VI*, document 55, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 5, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d55 ; document 57, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, February 6, 1968, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d57
-[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
+[^38]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, document 61, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, May 25, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d61
-[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
+[^39]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, editorial note on Rostow's telephone call to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d152
-[^40]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
+[^40]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 158, telegram from the Embassy in Israel, with Rostow's covering memorandum to Johnson, June 5, 1967, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d158
-[^41]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
+[^41]: Senator Strom Thurmond, column in *The Clinton Chronicle*, October 19, 1967, p. 19, "Otepka and Rostow," https://historicnewspapers.sc.edu/lccn/sn86063780/1967-10-19/ed-1/seq-19/ (the column reports the brief's claims, and describes Rostow as "Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs").
-[^42]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
+[^42]: "The Rostow Story," *Human Events*, October 23, 1967, CIA reading room document CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040001-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000600040001-4
-[^43]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
+[^43]: Associated Press, "Rostow Denies Report on Security Clearance," as printed in newspaper clippings of October 1967, CIA reading room documents CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080008-2 and CIA-RDP75-00149R000700080006-4, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp75-00149r000700080008-2
-[^44]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
+[^44]: Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security, CIA, letter of December 19, 1967 replying to an inquiry of December 15, 1967, regarding "Mr. Walter Whitman Rostow," CIA reading room document 0001475810, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/0001475810
-[^45]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").
+[^45]: *FRUS 1964-1968, Volume XIX*, document 36, letter from the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eugene Rostow) to the Israeli ambassador (Harman), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d36 (drafted by Eugene Rostow, Meeker and Robert T. Grey; cleared by Rusk, Walt Rostow and others).
+[^46]: Joseph C. Harsch, "The Rostow affair," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 20, 1983, https://www.csmonitor.com/1983/0120/012025.html (Eugene Rostow summoned to the office of Secretary of State Shultz and told the President wanted his resignation; "had not been a team player").

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/William French Smith.md

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ---
 category: "Law Enforcement & Legal"
 created: 2024-04-25
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 tags:
   - Person
   - DoJ
@@ -19,9 +19,16 @@ William French Smith was the U.S. Attorney General under [[Ronald Reagan]] who s
 
 In early 1982, Smith and Casey signed a formal Memorandum of Understanding under which narcotics violations by non-employees were not on the list of crimes the CIA was required to report to the Justice Department.[^2] Crimes committed by people "acting for" an intelligence agency no longer needed to be reported either. Gary Webb, after quoting Inspector General [[Fred Hitz]]'s March 1998 testimony that the arrangement had been "hammered out" in 1982, wrote that for thirteen years "the CIA and Justice had a gentleman's agreement to look the other way."[^3] In an interview for the PBS series Frontline, Hitz said: "We didn't find any evidence of an understanding that official Washington was going to look the other way with respect to allegations of drug trafficking."[^4] The agreement was signed just as the CIA was launching both the [[Contras|Contra]] project and operations in Afghanistan, timing that [[Robert Parry]] argued proved premeditation: "That could only have been done for one purpose. They were anticipating what eventually happened. They knew drugs were going to be sold." Civil rights lawyers later filed suit charging the agreement was illegal and led to policies protecting rather than stopping drug trafficking.[^3]
 
+### Third-Country Funding for the Contras, June 1984
+
+The day after the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, Casey and CIA General Counsel [[Stanley Sporkin]] met Attorney General Smith. [[Lawrence Walsh]] wrote that Smith determined that third-country funding of the Contras was legally permissible as long as no U.S. funds were used for the purpose and the third country did not expect the United States to repay the aid.[^5] The Iran-Contra committees wrote that Smith orally expressed his opinion to Casey that solicitation was lawful as long as there was no quid pro quo.[^6] At the NSPG meeting [[George P. Shultz]] had said: "I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources."[^7]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
 [^2]: CIA Office of Inspector General, *Report of Investigation: Allegations of Connections Between CIA and the Contras in Cocaine Trafficking to the United States* (96-0143-IG), Vol. II, *The Contra Story.* https://archive.org/details/nps56-111612-04
 [^3]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Epilogue.
 [^4]: PBS Frontline, *Drug Wars,* interview with Frederick P. Hitz, CIA Inspector General 1990 to 1998. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/special/hitz.html
+[^5]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 1, n. 14 (Sporkin Memorandum for the Record, June 26, 1984, ALV 035917) and ch. 15. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^6]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 403.
+[^7]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), p. 9. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yehoshua Sagi.md

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ tags:
   - Israel
   - Aman
   - MilitaryIntelligence
-summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also rendered Saguy) served as director of Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman) from 1979 to 1983 and was found by the Kahan Commission to bear personal responsibility for indifference regarding the Sabra and Shatila massacres."
+summary: "Yehoshua Sagi (also Saguy) directed Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate from 1979 to 1983 and was faulted by the Kahan Commission over Sabra and Shatila."
 created: 2026-05-14
-updated: 2026-05-14
+updated: 2026-10-14
 born: 1933
 location: "Jerusalem, Mandatory Palestine"
 ---
@@ -25,7 +25,14 @@ Following the September 1982 [[Sabra and Shatila massacres|massacres at the Sabr
 
 Sagi subsequently entered electoral politics, serving as a member of the Knesset on the [[Likud Party|Likud]] list from 1988 to 1992. He then served as mayor of Bat Yam.
 
+### Ben-Menashe's Claims
+
+[[Ari Ben-Menashe]] wrote that, on [[Menachem Begin]]'s order in the fall of 1980, Sagi and [[Nachum Admoni]] were to appoint the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], a joint group of military intelligence and [[Mossad]] officers supplying arms to [[Iran]].[^3] The October Surprise Task Force reported that Saguy, in whose presence Ben-Menashe says [[Rafael Eitan]] confirmed reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between [[William J. Casey]] and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe and that he had no knowledge of such meetings.[^4] In the task force's account, Israeli authorities interviewed Saguy together with [[David Kimche]], Eitan and others, and each said he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until Ben-Menashe began making allegations in the American media in 1991.[^5]
+
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Rodger W. Claire, *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign That Denied Saddam the Bomb* (Broadway Books, 2004).
 [^2]: Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Final Report, February 8, 1983, section on "The Director of Military Intelligence, Major General Yehoshua Saguy," in Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Foreign Relations: Selected Documents*, vol. 8, 1982-1984, doc. 104. https://syriaaccountability.org/content/images/wordpress/ISRAELMFA_Commission-Inquiry-Beirut_1983_EN.pdf
+[^3]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015), p. 78. https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
+[^4]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97. https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^5]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98.

10 - PEOPLE/(N-S)/Yitzhak Rabin.md

@@ -4,20 +4,201 @@ tags:
   - Person
   - Nuclear
   - Israel
-summary: "As army chief of operations, Yitzhak Rabin was among the old-fashioned military men, including Yigal Allon and Ariel Sharon, who believed that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel."
+  - IranContra
+  - PollardAffair
+  - Oslo
+  - Assassination
+summary: "Yitzhak Rabin was Israel's chief of staff, ambassador in Washington, defense minister during the Iran-Contra shipments and Prime Minister when Oslo was signed, before Yigal Amir shot him in 1995."
+aliases:
+  - Yitzhak Rabin
+  - Rabin
 born: 1922-03-01
 died: 1995-11-04
 location: "Jerusalem"
+created: 2025-08-05
+updated: 2026-10-14
+relations:
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Palmach]]"
+    role: "Operations officer; commander of the Harel Brigade"
+    start: 1948
+    fn: 2
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel Defense Forces]]"
+    role: "Chief of Staff"
+    start: 1964
+    end: 1968
+    fn: 6
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Ambassador to the United States"
+    start: 1968
+    end: 1973
+    fn: 8
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Prime Minister"
+    start: 1974
+    end: 1977
+    fn: 19
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Minister of Defense"
+    start: 1984
+    end: 1990
+    fn: 24
+  - type: head_of
+    with: "[[Israel]]"
+    role: "Prime Minister"
+    start: 1992
+    end: 1995
+    fn: 40
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Labor Party]]"
+    fn: 40
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
+    role: "Defense minister whose ministry handled Israeli HAWK and TOW missile shipments to Iran and who offered Soviet-bloc arms to Oliver North"
+    start: 1985
+    end: 1986
+    fn: 29
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Jonathan Pollard]]"
+    role: "Defense minister during the Pollard operation"
+    start: 1985
+    end: 1986
+    fn: 39
+  - type: subject_of
+    with: "[[Shamgar Commission]]"
+    role: "Inquiry into the assassination of Rabin"
+    start: 1995
+    end: 1996
+    fn: 44
 ---
 
-[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] politician and military leader who served as Prime Minister of [[Israel]] and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1]
+[[Yitzhak Rabin]] was an [[Israel|Israeli]] soldier and politician who served as chief of staff of the [[Israel Defense Forces]], ambassador to the United States, Prime Minister twice, and Defense Minister. He was a rival of [[Shimon Peres]] within the [[Labor Party]].[^1] He was shot at a peace rally in [[Tel Aviv]] on November 4, 1995, and died of his wounds.
 
-As army chief of operations, [[Yitzhak Rabin]] was among the old-fashioned military men, including [[Yigal Allon]] and [[Ariel Sharon]], who believed that [[Israel]]'s essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. To these men, nuclear weapons were nothing more than a great equalizer, and they argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to [[Israel]] than an [[Egypt]] limited to conventional arms.[^2]
+### Palmach and the 1948 war
 
-As Defense Minister, [[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] did not try to impede the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee|Joint Committee's]] arms operations, as he had no interest in helping [[Shimon Peres|Peres]]. However, he unceremoniously and disrespectfully threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting [[Oliver North|North's]] attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
+Rabin served in the [[Palmach]], the strike force of the [[Haganah]]. In the early months of the 1948 war he was the Palmach's operations officer and liaison to the general staff, in April 1948 he took command of the Harel Brigade, and in July he served as operations officer and deputy to [[Yigal Allon]] in Operation Danny, the offensive that captured [[Lydda]] and [[Ramle]].[^2]
 
-[[Yitzhak Rabin|Rabin]] replaced [[Shimon Peres]] as leader of the [[Labor Party]] and became Prime Minister of [[Israel]] in 1992 after the national elections, replacing [[Yitzhak Shamir]].[^1]
+[[David K. Shipler]] wrote in 2015 that in 1979 an Israeli censorship committee chaired by the justice minister deleted five paragraphs from Rabin's memoir, his first-person account of the expulsion of Arab residents from Lydda and Ramle. Shipler quoted the suppressed section: "Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action," Rabin wrote. "There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth movement groups, and explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action." Shipler added that when he learned of the deletion at the time, Rabin told him that he had intentionally given the censors something else to do by writing about Israel's nuclear weapons.[^3] [[Alix Wall]] wrote in 2001 that the memoir's translator, [[Peretz Kidron]], gave the excised passage to the [[New York Times]].[^4]
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Rabin, Allon and [[Ariel Sharon]] were among the old-fashioned military men who held, as Rabin did as army chief of operations, that Israel's essential advantage over the Arabs was the quality and training of its military personnel. Hersh wrote that these men regarded nuclear weapons as nothing more than a great equalizer, and argued that an [[Egypt]] equipped with the bomb would be far more dangerous to Israel than an Egypt limited to conventional arms.[^5]
+
+### Chief of staff and the 1967 war
+
+Rabin was chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces from 1964. At the end of a three-year term in late 1966 the Prime Minister extended his tenure by a year, and he left the army at the beginning of 1968 after 27 years of service.[^6] A telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House dated June 18, 1967 records that on the evening of June 17 Lieutenant Colonel Efrat, "Aide to General Rabin, IDF COS," told the naval attaché: "Gen Rabin extends his personal regrets to the CNO USN for the sad mistake of the [[USS Liberty Incident|USS Liberty]] incident." The telegram records that Rabin had decided to provide a synopsis of the findings of the IDF court of inquiry into the attack, although the findings had not yet received final review.[^7]
+
+### Washington, 1968 to 1973
+
+Rabin became Israel's ambassador to the United States at the beginning of 1968 and held the post until March 1973.[^8] At the fifth session of the F-4 negotiations, on November 22, 1968, held in the office of [[Paul C. Warnke]], the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding, allowing the United States to recover aircraft if Israel acted contrary to its undertakings, looked "quite awkward," had no precedent, and implied that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke answered that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it. Rabin said that Israel had agreed only to reaffirm its earlier understandings, that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons or carry them on United States aircraft. Warnke asked: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?" The embassy's minister, [[Shlomo Argov]], said: "We feel we are on parole." Warnke's deputy [[Harry H. Schwartz]], the NESA deputy director [[Robert J. Murray]], and the Israeli air force commander [[Mordecai Hod]] attended.[^9]
+
+On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft. The letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons" and its agreement not to use the aircraft as a nuclear weapons carrier, and stated the United States position that "the physical possession and control of nuclear arms by a Middle Eastern power would be deemed to constitute the introduction of nuclear weapons." A note to the letter records that Rabin objected by telephone that the proposed last paragraph implied Israeli agreement with that interpretation, and that Warnke substituted a bland concluding paragraph.[^10]
+
+On June 20, 1969, Rabin spoke with [[Harold H. Saunders]] of the [[National Security Council]] staff. Saunders recorded that Rabin had labeled the conversation strictly personal, and that because of the "extremely personal nature of Rabin's talk" the memorandum would not be distributed through the system.[^11]
+
+On July 29, 1969, Rabin met the acting secretary of state, [[Elliot L. Richardson]], and the deputy secretary of defense, [[David Packard]], on Israel's nuclear weapon and missile policy. Rabin cited the exchange of letters with Warnke the previous November and observed that there were two problems, nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]]. He asked which of the two was the subject of the talk.[^12]
+
+The record of a September 25, 1969 meeting in Washington between [[William P. Rogers]], [[Henry Kissinger]], and the Israeli party, with Rabin present, describes the channel the two governments had agreed on with [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Golda Meir]]. Rabin's memoir, as quoted in that record, says that Kissinger would reach Rabin and Rabin would transmit the messages directly to [[Simcha Dinitz]] in Jerusalem.[^13]
+
+On March 12, 1970, Kissinger showed Rabin the points he had covered with [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] about a Soviet message on the Middle East, and let Rabin read the portion of the message Dobrynin had read to him.[^14] On August 17, 1970, Nixon met Rabin in the Map Room with General [[Alexander Haig]] present. Rabin later described the meeting in his memoir.[^15] On September 21, 1970, during the crisis over Syrian intervention in [[Jordan]], Assistant Secretary of State [[Joseph Sisco]] met Rabin and read him the King's answer to Allon.[^16]
+
+On December 29, 1971, Sisco met Rabin at the ambassador's residence. Sisco said that Nixon had directed that discussions begin with Rabin as a follow-up to the December 2 conversation between Nixon and Meir, with the aim of working out an agreement.[^17] In a November 14, 1972 meeting held during the visit of the defense minister, [[Moshe Dayan]], Rabin said of [[King Hussein]] that he was "moderate to the Western world, but this was not necessarily the case in his relations with Israel."[^18]
+
+### First premiership, 1974 to 1977
+
+Rabin took office as Prime Minister on June 3, 1974, and negotiated the interim agreement with Egypt through Kissinger, signed on September 1, 1975.[^19] On February 11, 1975, Kissinger's report on his talks in Jerusalem, relayed to [[Gerald Ford]] by [[Brent Scowcroft]], said that he had met Rabin alone at breakfast and then with the Prime Minister and his negotiating team, which included Allon and Peres.[^20] On March 22, 1975, Kissinger met Rabin and Israeli ministers in Jerusalem, where the discussion focused on the suspension of the negotiations with Egypt.[^21]
+
+In the 1976 hijacking of an airliner to [[Entebbe Airport]], the cabinet protocols released by the [[Israel State Archives]] record Rabin telling ministers that the Israeli intention was to hold the French government responsible for the fate of the passengers, and telling the cabinet on the fourth day: "We have no way of acting without the agreement of the countries concerned. What are we supposed to do, attack Uganda?" At a Saturday cabinet meeting, after the chief of staff, [[Mordechai Gur]], presented the plan, Rabin said: "Additional time, intelligence and study make a military option possible." The ministers unanimously approved the operation, and Rabin told them that if journalists called, "you deny it. In a case like this, it is justified not to tell the truth."[^22]
+
+In March 1977 [[Dan Margalit]] of [[Haaretz]] reported that [[Leah Rabin]] held a dollar account at a bank in Washington. [[Maariv]] reported that the account had been opened while Rabin was ambassador and should have been closed when the family left Washington in March 1973, and that at one point the balance was $20,000. Foreign currency accounts of that kind were illegal under Israeli law. On April 8, 1977, a Finance Ministry administrative penalty committee fined Rabin and his wife IL150,000. In a radio announcement Rabin said he accepted full responsibility for the joint offense. The [[Jewish Telegraphic Agency]] reported that the step meant he would not lead the party in the next elections, and that Defense Minister Peres was expected to take the party's reins.[^23]
+
+### Defense minister, 1984 to 1990
+
+Rabin was defense minister from the 1984 national unity government until the Labor Party left the government in 1990.[^24] [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], who says he sat on the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], wrote that Rabin did not try to impede the committee's arms operations, as he had no interest in helping Peres, and that Rabin threw [[Oliver North]] out of his office when the [[Contras]] were mentioned, thwarting North's attempts to set up his second channel.[^1]
+
+The congressional Iran-Contra report records that in the summer of 1985 Rabin would not proceed with the TOW sale to Iran unless he received assurances that the Secretary of State knew of the plan and that the President unequivocally approved it, and that Peres and Rabin approved the second shipment, of 400 TOW missiles, on September 9, 1985.[^25] [[Michael Ledeen]] told North and [[Robert McFarlane]] that Rabin was "complaining about" the failure of the United States to replace the TOWs sent to Iran.[^26] The report of the Independent Counsel, [[Lawrence Walsh]], records that on November 14, 1985, McFarlane told [[William Casey]] and the deputy director of central intelligence that Israel planned to ship weapons to Iranian military elements. The following day Rabin had breakfast with Casey and then met McFarlane at the [[White House]]. Rabin asked whether the United States still approved of Israeli arms sales to Iran. McFarlane replied that [[Ronald Reagan]] continued to approve. McFarlane later said that the purpose of Rabin's visit "was simply to reconfirm that the President's authority for the original concept was still valid."[^27][^28] The congressional report adds that Rabin also sought reassurance that the matter was a joint project of the two governments, and raised the unresolved replacement of 504 TOW missiles.[^29]
+
+Rabin called McFarlane in Geneva to report a problem with an arms shipment through a European country, and McFarlane directed North to help the Israelis with flight clearances.[^30] On November 17, 1985, Rabin telephoned North to say that Israel was ready to ship 80 HAWK missiles once replenishment problems were resolved, and North flew to New York to meet him.[^29][^31] The Walsh report states that 18 HAWK missiles were delivered from Israeli stocks on November 24, 1985, while Casey was on a trip to Asia.[^28] Walsh also records that North told Attorney General [[Edwin Meese]] in an interview that Rabin had described the November shipment as containing "oil related equipment," and that North later learned from [[Richard V. Secord]] that it contained HAWK missiles. This is North's account, recorded in the report as his own statement.[^32]
+
+The congressional report records that in May 1986 Rabin offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Contras' southern front, and that North and Rabin met again in September 1986 and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. The report quotes North's notes that Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North answered that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." [[John Poindexter]] sanctioned the offer ("It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless") and cautioned that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15, 1986, North told Poindexter that orders had been passed to the ship to proceed to Haifa, where loading would be accomplished by Israeli military personnel. North's later briefing memorandum for a visit by Peres recommended that the President thank him for the Israeli bloc arms "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance," and Poindexter penciled beside it: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^33]
+
+On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin called the report of the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]] on the Iran arms sales "highly inaccurate" and said that it "reached the wrong conclusions regarding Israel's role." He said he had personally categorically rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^34]
+
+### The first intifada and the "break their bones" charge
+
+In a February 1988 interview with the [[Christian Science Monitor]], Rabin insisted that "there is no policy of beatings" by the government. He said beatings were permissible for soldiers during demonstrations or in "hot pursuit" of demonstrators, and acknowledged "exceptions" in reports of Palestinians beaten in their homes. Two weeks earlier, he had advocated replacing "live ammunition" with "punches and blows," and had labeled the policy "might, power, and beatings." He said of the change in policy: "I brought about a change in policy to use force on a large scale, including hitting to replace the use of firearms. I'm not denying this is what I've said. But to call it a policy of beating is not a correct statement."[^35]
+
+The "break their bones" charge came from the case of [[Yehuda Meir]], an Israel Defense Forces colonel who was a lieutenant colonel at the time of the events. A Jewish Telegraphic Agency report of November 7, 1989 says that the state prosecutor charged that Meir ordered soldiers to break the arms and legs of 20 residents of Beita and Huwara.[^36] A report of March 30, 1990 says that the charge sheet alleged that in Huwara Meir ordered a platoon to arrest 12 Palestinians and break their bones, that they were bound, blindfolded and beaten with clubs although they had not resisted, and that Meir said he acted on orders from his superiors in "the military and political echelon."[^37] In July 1990 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported that Rabin, by then out of office, told the Foreign Press Association that he had not given orders to break bones and that there was no evidence to back such charges before a court or commission of inquiry. It reported that several senior officers facing disciplinary action contended they had acted on explicit instructions from Defense Minister Rabin, and that Rabin said troops were ordered to storm rioters "beating them with fists and batons, not to punish them but to hurt them and force them to cease their assault," and also to handcuff and detain them.[^38]
+
+### Jonathan Pollard
+
+The [[Knesset]] intelligence subcommittee chaired by [[Abba Eban]] reported on May 26, 1987 on the [[Jonathan Pollard]] affair. It faulted Rabin for failing "to follow up or increase supervision as he should have done" during the period of the operation, when he was defense minister.[^39] A cabinet panel chaired by [[Yehoshua Rotenstreich]] held that Peres, [[Yitzhak Shamir]] and Rabin did not follow up after Pollard's arrest to ensure full Israeli cooperation with the United States. On the promotions of [[Aviem Sella]] and [[Rafael Eitan]] the panel wrote: "All three of them share responsibility for these decisions." Rabin and Peres both attacked the Eban panel as politically tainted.[^39]
+
+### Second premiership and Oslo, 1992 to 1995
+
+Rabin defeated Peres in the Labor Party primaries, replacing him as leader of the Labor Party, and became prime minister in 1992 after the national elections, replacing Shamir. He presented his new government to the Knesset on July 13, 1992.[^40] According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center, he approved the continuation of the secret negotiations in [[Oslo]] between Israeli and [[Palestine Liberation Organization|Palestinian]] representatives, and approved the PLO as a party to the agreement after a letter from [[Yasser Arafat]] affirming PLO recognition of Israel. The Declaration of Principles was signed on the lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, with President [[Bill Clinton]] present.[^40][^41]
+
+The [[Nobel Committee]] awarded the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize jointly to Arafat, Peres and Rabin "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East."[^42]
+
+### Assassination, November 4, 1995
+
+On the evening of November 4, 1995, Rabin addressed a rally under the slogan "Yes to Peace, No to Violence" in the square in Tel Aviv, and was shot on his way to his car. According to the Yitzhak Rabin Center he died at Ichilov Hospital at 11:14 p.m.[^43] A summary of the [[Shamgar Commission]] report of March 28, 1996 states that [[Yigal Amir]] came to the event by bus from his home in [[Herzliya]] and situated himself in the parking area where Rabin's car was parked. At 9:45 p.m., as Rabin walked to the car with five bodyguards, Amir fired three shots. Rabin reached the hospital with no pulse and no blood pressure and died of his wounds.[^44]
+
+The summary states that the commission concluded that the murder was made possible by a lack of cooperation between the security agencies responsible for protection at the event. It criticized the head of the [[Shin Bet]], [[Carmi Gillon]], who resigned before the commission completed its work, and the head of the agency's VIP protection division, who had failed to assess the intelligence data and the threat from a Jewish assailant. It recommended that the procedures for cooperation between the police and the General Security Service be reevaluated and that the VIP protection unit double its personnel. The summary lists among the commission's conclusions: "There was no basis for the conspiracy arguments that were raised regarding the event."[^44]
+
+Amir was sentenced to life imprisonment plus six years for wounding Rabin's bodyguard. In a second trial he received eight more years, together with his brother [[Haguay Amir]], who received 12 years for conspiracy to murder the prime minister and weapons possession, and his friend [[Dror Adani]], who received seven years.[^45]
+
+[[Avishai Raviv]], identified as an agent of the General Security Service, was tried for not preventing the crime, on the basis that he knew Amir's intentions and did not report them to the service. He was found not guilty.[^45] In November 2022 the [[Times of Israel]] reported that recordings of Amir's interrogation and testimony to the Shamgar Commission, aired by Channel 12, had Amir saying that the Shin Bet "didn't know anything" about his plans, and giving as his motives the election results and the 1994 massacre in [[Hebron]] by Baruch Goldstein. In the same recordings Amir said he knew Raviv, that Raviv had discussed killing Rabin, and that Raviv was not trusted in [[Kiryat Arba]], where after Goldstein's massacre people told Amir that Raviv worked for the Shin Bet. Raviv has said that he heard Amir make the din rodef vow declaring Rabin worthy of killing but did not believe Amir was serious. A confidential section of the 1996 Shamgar report dealt with the Shin Bet and Raviv.[^46]
+
+The Times of Israel reported that [[Bezalel Smotrich]] told the Knesset on November 6, 2022 that the security services had used "irresponsible manipulations, which haven't been fully exposed to this day, to encourage the murderer to carry out his plan." Raviv's lawyer, [[Eitan Peleg]], called the allegations libel against his client and the state. The journalist Amichai Ataeli, who interviewed Amir in prison over several years, said that Amir and those around him suspected Raviv was being operated by the Shin Bet and that he did not see Raviv as having caused Amir to act. The former Shin Bet agent [[Lior Akerman]], who first interviewed Amir after the assassination, acknowledged intelligence failures and rejected the claim of Shin Bet encouragement as false.[^46]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
-[^2]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
+[^2]: "1948 - A Commander during the War of Independence," Yitzhak Rabin Center, Tel Aviv. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1948/
+[^3]: Shipler, David K., review of S. Yizhar, *Khirbet Khizeh*, *Moment* magazine, May 5, 2015 (May-June 2015 issue). https://momentmag.com/book-review-khirbet-khizeh/
+[^4]: Wall, Alix, article on Rabin's memoir and the excised passage, *J. The Jewish News of Northern California*, January 26, 2001. https://jweekly.com/?p=27908
+[^5]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 9.
+[^6]: "1964 - Chief of Staff" and "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1964/ and https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
+[^7]: Telegram from the Defense Attaché Office in Israel to the White House, "Israeli Court of Inquiry in USS Liberty incident," June 18, 1967, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XIX, *Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967*, Document 307. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d307
+[^8]: "1968 - Ambassador of Israel to the United States," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1968/
+[^9]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968*, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968, 5:40-6:15 p.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
+[^10]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968, and editorial note. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333
+[^11]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969-1972*, Document 36, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 20, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d36
+[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 41, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 29, 1969. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d41
+[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 52, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 25, 1969, quoting Yitzhak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Little, Brown, 1979), p. 154. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d52
+[^14]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 99, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 12, 1970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d99
+[^15]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 151, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 17, 1970, citing Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs*, pp. 184-185. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d151
+[^16]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIV, *Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970*, Document 306, Telegram, Washington, September 22, 1970 (Sisco's meeting with Rabin on September 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v24/d306
+[^17]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 271, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, December 29, 1971. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d271
+[^18]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXIII, Document 319, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 14, 1972. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v23/d319
+[^19]: "1974 - Prime Minister of Israel, first term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1974/
+[^20]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1976*, Document 131, Memorandum from Scowcroft to President Ford reporting Kissinger's initial discussions, February 11, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d131
+[^21]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, vol. XXVI, Document 158, Memorandum of Conversation, Jerusalem, March 22, 1975. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v26/d158
+[^22]: Crissy, Ron, "'No concessions': Entebbe files reveal drama behind one of Israel's most daring rescue operations," *Ynetnews*, 2026, on the Israel State Archives release of the Cabinet, Security Cabinet and special ministerial team protocols. https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/sjzfgnszme
+[^23]: "Rabin Resigns Following Probe into Illegal Bank Accounts Held by Him and His Wife in Washington," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, April 8, 1977. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-resigns-following-probe-into-illegal-bank-accounts-held-by-him-and-his-wife-in-washington
+[^24]: "1984 - Minister of Defense," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1984/
+[^25]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. No. 100-216, H. Rept. No. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 9, pp. 167 and 169, on Rabin's conditions for the 1985 TOW sale and the September 9, 1985 approval of the second shipment.
+[^26]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, p. 174, on Ledeen's account of Rabin's complaint about replacement of the TOW missiles.
+[^27]: Walsh, Lawrence E. *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. 1, *Investigations and Prosecutions* (1993), p. 110 and n. 110, on the November 15, 1985 meeting of McFarlane and Rabin. https://archive.org/details/WalshReport
+[^28]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 15, on the Casey breakfast with Rabin, McFarlane's assurance of continuing approval, and the November 24, 1985 delivery of 18 HAWK missiles.
+[^29]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 10, pp. 176-177, on the McFarlane-Rabin meeting of November 15, 1985 and Rabin's call to North on November 17.
+[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 4, on Rabin's call to McFarlane in Geneva about the shipment through a European country and McFarlane's direction to North. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_04.htm
+[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 18, on Rabin's request for help with flight clearances and the planned shipment of 80 HAWK missiles. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_18.htm
+[^32]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. 1, ch. 31 and n. 163, on North's account of the November shipment in his interview with Attorney General Edwin Meese. https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_31.htm
+[^33]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 3, pp. 75-76, "North Expands His Special Operations," citing North's notes and Poindexter's messages of September 1986.
+[^34]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report
+[^35]: Moffett, George D., III, "Israeli foresees more unrest," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 9, 1988, interview with Defense Minister Rabin. https://www.csmonitor.com/1988/0209/orab.html
+[^36]: "IDF Furloughs Officer for Beatings," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, November 7, 1989. https://jta.org/archive/idf-furloughs-officer-for-beatings
+[^37]: "Israeli Colonel Pleads Not Guilty to Brutality Toward Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, March 30, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/idf-colonel-pleads-not-guilty-to-brutality-toward-palestinians
+[^38]: "Rabin Denies Giving Orders to Break Bones of Palestinians," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, July 6, 1990. https://jta.org/archive/rabin-denies-giving-orders-to-break-bones-of-palestinians
+[^39]: Frankel, Glenn, "Israeli Spy Probes Fault Leadership," *Washington Post*, May 27, 1987 (Jerusalem dateline May 26). CIA CREST copy: https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-cia-rdp90-00965r000302080002-0
+[^40]: "Israel's Rabin Leaves Door Ajar For Ultra-Orthodox in Cabinet," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1992. https://www.csmonitor.com/1992/0714/14013.html
+[^41]: "1992 - Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, Second Term," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1992/
+[^42]: The Nobel Prize, "The Nobel Peace Prize 1994," Nobel Foundation. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1994/summary/
+[^43]: "1995 - Assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin," Yitzhak Rabin Center. https://www.rabincenter.org.il/en/years/1995/
+[^44]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), English summary of the Shamgar Commission, *Report on the Assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin*, March 28, 1996. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
+[^45]: Israel Electronic Library (CIE 2014), afterword to the summary of the Shamgar Commission report, on the sentences and on the trial of Avishai Raviv. https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1996-3-28-Shamgar-Commission-Report-on-the-Assassination-of-Prime-Minister-Yitzhak-Rabin.pdf
+[^46]: "Rabin's killer said Shin Bet 'didn't know anything' about plot, refuting Smotrich," *Times of Israel*, November 8, 2022. https://www.timesofisrael.com/rabins-killer-said-shin-bet-didnt-know-anything-about-plot-refuting-smotrich/

10 - PEOPLE/(T-Z)/Paul C. Warnke.md

@@ -10,8 +10,14 @@ died: 2001-10-31
 location: "Webster, Massachusetts"
 ---
 
-Paul C. Warnke served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was involved in intense pressure on [[Israel]] to sign the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|NPT]] in exchange for F-4 fighter jets. Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then [[Israel]]'s ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about [[Israel]]'s nuclear capabilities, stating, "we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in [[Israel]] behind our back."[^1]
+Paul C. Warnke served as the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. He was involved in intense pressure on [[Israel]] to sign the [[Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty|NPT]] in exchange for F-4 fighter jets. [[Seymour Hersh]] wrote that Warnke directly questioned [[Yitzhak Rabin]], then Israel's ambassador to [[Washington, D.C.]], about Israel's nuclear capabilities, stating, "we are shocked at the manner in which you are dealing with us.… You, our close ally, are building nuclear bombs in Israel behind our back."[^1]
+
+### Israeli F-4 negotiations, 1968
+
+In the fall of 1968, Warnke conducted the negotiations with Rabin over the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft. On November 22, 1968, in Warnke's office, Rabin said that a paragraph of the draft memorandum of understanding made it appear that the United States considered Israel "the bad guy." Warnke took issue with the reading and said that he had discussed the paragraph with [[Clark Clifford]] and Clifford with [[Dean Rusk]], and that the government did not put that construction on it. Warnke asked Rabin: "Suppose you deliver nuclear weapons in these aircraft in ten years time?"[^2] On November 27, 1968, Warnke wrote to Rabin that the United States agreed to sell Israel fifty F-4 Phantom aircraft, and the letter recorded the Israeli government's reaffirmation of its policy "that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons."[^3]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991. Chapter 14.
+[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, *Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967-1968*, Document 330, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 22, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d330
+[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968*, vol. XX, Document 333, Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke to Ambassador Rabin, Washington, November 27, 1968. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v20/d333

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Australian Security Intelligence Organization.md

@@ -5,11 +5,16 @@ tags:
   - Australia
   - Intelligence
 category: "Foreign Government"
-summary: "The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is Australia's domestic intelligence service that, after The Sydney Morning Herald alerted it to Oscar Guerrero's attempt to sell Mordecai Vanunu's Dimona photographs, passed the information through ASIS to Israel."
+summary: "The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is Australia's domestic intelligence service, which passed word of the Vanunu Dimona photographs to Israel through ASIS."
 start: 1949
 location: "Canberra, Australia"
 ---
-The [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization]] (ASIO) is [[Australia|Australia's]] internal intelligence service. It was informed by *The [[Sydney Morning Herald]]* about [[Oscar Guerrero|Oscar Guerrero's]] attempt to sell photographs of [[Israel|Israel's]] nuclear facility, provided by [[Mordecai Vanunu]]. [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization|ASIO]] then passed this information to the [[Australian Security Intelligence Service|Australian Security Intelligence Service]] (ASIS), who informed [[Israel]].[^1]
+The [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization]] (ASIO) is [[Australia|Australia's]] internal intelligence service. It was informed by *The [[Sydney Morning Herald]]* about [[Oscar Guerrero|Oscar Guerrero's]] attempt to sell photographs of [[Israel|Israel's]] nuclear facility, provided by [[Mordecai Vanunu]]. ASIO then passed this information to the [[Australian Security Intelligence Service|Australian Security Intelligence Service]] (ASIS), who informed Israel.[^1]
+
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], aircraft loaded with arms landed in Western Australia, en route to [[Tehran]], with the permission of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, as part of a smokescreen operation by the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^2] He also wrote that C-130 aircraft flew from Vietnam to Western Australia from early 1986.[^3]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+[^2]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 112.
+[^3]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 120.

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Australian Security Intelligence Service.md

@@ -9,9 +9,8 @@ summary: "The Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS) is Australia's ext
 start: 1952
 location: "Canberra, Australia"
 ---
-The [[Australian Security Intelligence Service]] (ASIS) is [[Australia|Australia's]] external intelligence service. It was informed by the [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization|Australian Security Intelligence Organization]] (ASIO) about [[Oscar Guerrero|Oscar Guerrero's]] attempt to sell photographs of [[Israel|Israel's]] nuclear facility, provided by [[Mordecai Vanunu]]. [[Australian Security Intelligence Service|ASIS]] then informed [[Israel]].[^1]
+The [[Australian Security Intelligence Service]] (ASIS) is [[Australia|Australia's]] external intelligence service. It was informed by the [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization|Australian Security Intelligence Organization]] (ASIO) about [[Oscar Guerrero|Oscar Guerrero's]] attempt to sell photographs of [[Israel|Israel's]] nuclear facility, provided by [[Mordecai Vanunu]]. ASIS then informed Israel.[^1]
-
-[[Australian Security Intelligence Service|ASIS]] was aware of and gave permission for aircraft loaded with arms to land in Western [[Australia]], en route to [[Tehran]], as part of a smokescreen operation by the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]].[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Iran-Israel Joint Committee.md

@@ -4,30 +4,202 @@ tags:
   - Government
   - Israel
   - Iran
+  - IranContra
+  - ArmsDealing
+  - OctoberSurprise
+  - AriBenMenashe
 category: "Foreign Government"
-summary: "The Iran-Israel Joint Committee was established in the fall of 1980 by Menachem Begin 1, who ordered Yehoshua Sagi and Nachum Admoni to appoint it."
+aliases:
+  - Iran-Israel Joint Committee
+  - Israeli Joint Committee
+  - Joint Committee
+summary: "A body that Ari Ben-Menashe says ran Israeli arms sales to Iran from 1980, set beside the Israeli proposals and shipments recorded in U.S. cables, the Iran-Contra reports and the October Surprise Task Force."
 start: 1980
 end: 1987
 location: "Tel Aviv, Israel"
+relations:
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980-11-28
+    role: "claimed youngest member, per his 1992 account"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[David Kimche]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed initial member, per Ben-Menashe; told Israeli authorities he never met Ben-Menashe"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Rafael Eitan]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed initial member, per Ben-Menashe; told the Government of Israel he never met Ben-Menashe"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Moshe Hebroni]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed initial member, per Ben-Menashe"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Uri Simchoni]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed initial member, per Ben-Menashe"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Shmuel Morieh]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed initial member, per Ben-Menashe"
+    fn: 1
+  - type: founded
+    with: "[[Menachem Begin]]"
+    reverse: true
+    start: 1980
+    role: "claimed by Ben-Menashe to have ordered its creation in the fall of 1980"
+    fn: 1
+created: 2025-08-05
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
-The [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] was established in the fall of 1980 by [[Menachem Begin|Prime Minister Begin]], who ordered [[Yehoshua Sagi|Director of Israel Defense Forces/Military Intelligence Yehoshua Sagi]] and [[Nachum Admoni|acting Director of Mossad Nachum Admoni]] to appoint it. This committee coordinated the efforts of both [[Israel|Israeli]] intelligence services and was assigned the task of supplying [[Iran]] with arms in its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]].[^1]
 
-The rationale for helping the [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] government was that if the Iranians fought the Iraqis, their soldiers would be killed instead of Israeli soldiers. Additionally, the war diverted [[Arab]] attention away from Israel and drained [[Arab countries]] of money. From the [[Likud Party|Likud's]] perspective, the rise of Khomeini was beneficial as he was radical, anti-[[United States|American]], and anti-Arab, aligning with Israel's national security interest to support him.[^1]
+The Iran-Israel Joint Committee is the name [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] gives, in his 1992 book [[Profits of War]], to a joint group of [[Israel|Israeli]] military intelligence and [[Mossad]] officers that he says supplied arms to [[Iran]] during its war with [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam Hussein's]] [[Iraq]] from 1980 to 1987.[^1] Israeli proposals to sell arms to Iran are recorded from April 1980, Israeli shipments to Iran from October 1980, and Israeli transfers of American-made missiles in 1985 and 1986.
 
-The initial members of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee included [[David Kimche]], [[Shmuel Morieh]], [[Uri Simchoni]], [[Moshe Hebroni]], and [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi]]. [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] was appointed to the committee on November 28, 1980, as the youngest member, responsible for carrying out the committee's initiatives due to his fluency in Farsi and personal contacts in Iran.[^1]
+### Founding and membership
 
-By March 1981, the Iran-Israel Joint Committee had established mechanisms for handling secret arms sales to Iran, as promised in the October [[Paris Summit Meeting]]. Israel operated under a general agreement of cooperation secretly reached in principle between Prime Minister Begin and [[William J. Casey]] in August 1980. David Kimche dealt directly with [[Robert Gates]] on the implementation of these sales. In early 1981, Gates approved the sale of unsophisticated weapons to Iran.[^1]
+In Ben-Menashe's account, [[Menachem Begin]] ordered in the fall of 1980 that [[Yehoshua Sagi]] (also spelled Saguy), director of the [[Military Intelligence Directorate]], and [[Nachum Admoni]], whom Ben-Menashe calls acting director of Mossad, appoint the committee, and that it coordinated the efforts of both services.[^2] He writes that [[William J. Casey|Casey]] telephoned Begin, Sagi and Admoni before the committee was formed, and that a meeting in Amsterdam in September 1980 was attended by [[David Kimche]], [[Uri Simchoni]] and [[Shmuel Morieh]].[^3][^4] He names Kimche, Morieh, Simchoni, [[Moshe Hebroni]] and [[Rafael Eitan|Rafi Eitan]] as its first members.[^1] He writes that he was appointed on November 28, 1980, as the youngest member, responsible for carrying out its initiatives because of his fluency in Farsi and his contacts in Iran.[^5] He writes that [[Yitzhak Shamir]], prime minister from 1983, let the group expand its operations,[^6] and that after Shamir became prime minister, members including Kimche were forced out and Eitan ran the committee.[^1]
 
-The Iran-Israel Joint Committee became self-sufficient, with its operating budget derived from the profits of arms sales, overseen by the [[Mossad]] comptroller. Profits rapidly grew into a huge extra-budgetary slush fund. Disbursements were requested from the Mossad comptroller through either the heads of the intelligence community or directly from the [[Prime Minister's Office]].[^1]
+The [[House October Surprise Task Force]] recorded that Eitan, whom Ben-Menashe says confirmed to him reports of 1980 meetings in Spain between William J. Casey and [[Mehdi Karrubi]], told the Government of Israel that he did not know Ben-Menashe and had never met him, and that Saguy, in whose presence Eitan allegedly confirmed the reports, told the Government of Israel that he had never met Ben-Menashe and had no knowledge of such meetings.[^7] According to the same report, Israeli authorities interviewed Kimche, Saguy, Eitan, a Samuel Moriah, Meir Meir and General [[Yitzhak Segev]] (chief Israeli military attache in Iran until 1980), and each said that he had never met, known or heard of Ben-Menashe until Ben-Menashe began making allegations in the American media in 1991. [[Yitzhak Hofi]], whom the report identifies as head of Mossad during 1980 to 1982, told Israeli authorities that he did not know Ben-Menashe, had never met him, and that Ben-Menashe was never assigned to any mission by Mossad.[^8]
 
-The committee used various trading companies and a flagship holding company called [[Ora Group|Ora]] to manage the slush fund. It also employed smokescreen operations involving private arms brokers like [[John Hortrich]] (alias [[John de Laroque]]) and [[Nicholas Davies]] to obscure its activities. The committee's operations included the sale of [[TOW missile]]s, [[T-80 tank]]s, and other military equipment to Iran.[^1]
+### Ben-Menashe's account of the arms sales
 
-From March 1981 to the end of 1987, Iran spent over $82 billion on equipment from the United States, Israel, [[Europe]], [[South America]], and [[South Africa]], with the Iran-Israel Joint Committee making substantial profits. These profits were used to finance activities of [[Yitzhak Shamir|Yitzhak Shamir's]] faction of the Likud Party, fund "black" operations (including those involving [[Mohammed Radi Abdullah]] and the [[Achille Lauro]] attack), and finance housing projects in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]] for Jewish settlers.[^1]
+Ben-Menashe writes that Begin secretly reached an agreement of cooperation in principle with Casey in August 1980.[^9] He writes that by March 1981 the committee had set up procedures for secret sales to Iran, as promised at the October [[Paris Summit Meeting]], and that [[Robert Gates]], dealing directly with Kimche, approved the sale of unsophisticated weapons to Iran in early 1981.[^1] He writes that the case for helping the [[Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini|Khomeini]] government was that if the Iranians fought the Iraqis, their soldiers would be killed instead of Israeli soldiers,[^2] that the war diverted [[Arab]] attention from Israel and drained [[Arab countries]] of money, and that from the perspective of the [[Likud Party]], Khomeini, as a radical, anti-American and anti-Arab leader, served Israel's national security interest.[^1] In his account, Hebroni expedited the export license for tires sold to Iran in April 1980.[^1] He writes that the sale was of 300 tires at $900 each, under a SIBAT export license.[^10]
-The government of [[Sweden]] under Prime Minister [[Olof Palme]] sold military equipment to Iran through Israel until Palme refused to continue the sales.[^1]
 
-In 1984, political chaos in Israel led to a coalition government between the [[Labor Party]] and Likud. [[Shimon Peres]], as prime minister, attempted to open a competing arms channel to Iran through [[Amiram Nir]], which led to the [[Iran-Contra Affair]] scandal. The Iran-Israel Joint Committee actively worked to thwart this second channel, including leaking information about [[Jonathan Pollard]] and the [[Oliver North|North]]-Nir operation.[^1]
+The 1992 report of the special counsel to the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee|Senate Committee on Foreign Relations]] summarized his claim that in the early 1980s he helped organize an international network of private arms dealers on behalf of the Israeli government in order to supply several billion dollars in American-made arms to Iran.[^11] He writes that between March 1981 and the end of 1987 Iran spent over $82 billion on equipment from the United States, Israel, [[Europe]], [[South America]] and [[South Africa]], and that the government of [[Sweden]] under [[Olof Palme]] sold military equipment to Iran through Israel until Palme refused to continue the sales.[^1]
 
-In September 1987, Ari Ben-Menashe and three other members of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee were dismissed due to pressure on Yitzhak Shamir following the leaking of the Iran-Contra Affair story. Prior to this, some funds were set aside for their futures, and the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] money controlled by Israel was transferred to the [[East Bloc]].[^1]
+### Israeli proposals and shipments, 1980 to 1982
+
+The Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force states that during a visit to Washington on April 13, 1980, a high level Israeli official told President [[Jimmy Carter]] that Israel had contacts in Iran that could be useful in the hostage negotiations and could be developed further if Israel were permitted to sell the Iranians certain military equipment. Carter rejected the offer and asked for assurance that Israel would observe the arms embargo, and Israel agreed.[^12] On September 28, 1980, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister [[Mordechai Zipori]] said in an interview that Israel was "in a position to supply Iran with artillery shells, sea-to-sea missiles and other arms."[^12]
+
+On October 22, 1980, Israeli officials told the American embassy that Israel had established contact with Iranians interested in buying arms and that a deal for F-4 Phantom aircraft tires had been negotiated. The Government of Israel's report to the task force states that, with the encouragement of the Israeli government, an Israeli businessman who had lived in Iran for many years renewed relations with Iranian military officials and negotiated with an Iranian procurement representative in Europe.[^13] On October 27, 1980, [[Samuel W. Lewis|Ambassador Lewis]] cabled that Israeli officials said the Iranians wanted artillery pieces and ammunition, "and we [Israel] have exactly what they want."[^13] The Government of Israel's report states that the overall scope of the proposed deals was approximately $200 million, that Begin raised the subject with Carter and Secretary of State [[Edmund Muskie]] in November 1980, and that on November 21, 1980 Begin ordered that arms and equipment not be supplied directly or indirectly to Iran until the hostages were released.[^14] On December 12, 1980, Lewis was told that Israel was receiving a "steadily mounting pile" of requests for sales of ammunition and spare parts to Iran.[^14]
+
+After the hostages were released, Secretary of State [[Alexander M. Haig, Jr.|Alexander Haig]] cabled on February 4, 1981 that the United States did not support arms sales to Iran. The Israeli government's account of Begin's meeting with Lewis that day says that Begin replied that future arms deliveries to Iran would not include American arms or arms with American components, and that only Israeli equipment would be supplied.[^15] Lewis cabled that Israel "had been aware as early as last autumn that weapons were reaching Iran from both French and British sources via various arms dealers."[^15] When Shamir, then foreign minister, met Haig in Washington later that month, Haig said, according to his own account, that the United States could not prohibit Israeli sales to Iran of items without American components but opposed any arms deals with Iran and prohibited sales of American-origin arms. Shamir reported to Begin that the United States objected to the sale of American-origin equipment but did not object to Israel shipping its own parts.[^16]
+
+The Government of Israel's report states that on March 20, 1981 a shipment of 60 106 mm recoilless rifles was sent by aircraft from Israel to Portugal and then to Iran, with Ahmed Heidari among the mediators, and that another delivery followed on April 13, 1981. Zipori had told a United States embassy official on February 25, 1981 that the sale of 106 mm recoilless rifles and Israeli-manufactured shells was about to be concluded.[^16] During Haig's April visit to Israel, Minister of Agriculture [[Ariel Sharon]] raised the subject of selling arms to Iran at a meeting at the King David Hotel.[^16]
+
+A State Department memorandum of November 21, 1986, quoted in the 1987 congressional report, records that in 1981 and 1982 the Government of Israel asked the United States to approve shipments of items under U.S. control to Iran, and that no such shipment was approved. The same report states that in May 1982 Israeli officials acknowledged publicly that Israel had sold substantial quantities of American-origin military supplies to Iran.[^17]
+
+On July 18, 1981, a Canadair CL-44 cargo aircraft of the Argentine company [[Transporte Aereo Rioplatense]] crashed about 50 kilometers from Yerevan in the Soviet Union after colliding with a Soviet Su-15 fighter sent to intercept it. The aircraft had flown two round trips from Tel Aviv to Tehran by way of Larnaca and was returning from delivering a third load; the three crew and one passenger died. The Soviet pilot said that the collision was a deliberate attempt to bring the aircraft down; Western aviation experts who examined his account believed that he misjudged a turn.[^18] The [[Christian Science Monitor]], citing the [[Sunday Times]] of London, reported on July 27, 1981 that the aircraft was returning from the third of twelve scheduled trips to Iran in a $15 million arms deal under which Israel was to supply Iran with 360 tons of American-made tank parts and ammunition, and that the Miami-based Scot hired to arrange the deal, who had chartered the aircraft, was killed in the crash, according to his Swiss partner.[^19]
+
+### The 1985 and 1986 transfers
+
+The documented Israeli role in the [[Iran-Contra Affair|Iran arms initiative]] of 1985 and 1986 begins in July 1985, when David Kimche, director general of the [[Israel Foreign Ministry|Israeli Foreign Ministry]], met [[Robert McFarlane]] at the White House on July 3. On August 2 Kimche asked whether it would make a difference if Israel delivered TOW missiles itself rather than the United States.[^20] The independent counsel reports that, according to [[Michael Ledeen]], [[Shimon Peres]] expressed displeasure with Israel's intelligence on Iran during Ledeen's May 1985 visit to Israel.[^21]
+
+On August 20, 1985, Israel, working through [[Yaacov Nimrodi]], [[Al Schwimmer|Adolph Schwimmer]] and [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], transferred 96 American-made TOW missiles to Iran by chartered aircraft.[^22] A second shipment of 408 TOWs reached Iran on September 14, and the release of Reverend [[Benjamin Weir]] followed it.[^23] A note of September 4, 1985 by [[Nicholas Platt]] records that [[Oliver North]], Ledeen and McFarlane were involved in obtaining the release of hostages, with Israel providing "equipment" to Iran.[^24] The Iran-Contra report quotes [[George P. Shultz|Shultz]]'s cable that "Israel's interests and ours are not necessarily the same," and a briefing paper Shultz brought to a private meeting with the President in November 1986 stating that Israel "obviously sees it in its national interest to cultivate ties with Iran, including arms shipments."[^25]
+
+A shipment of HAWK missiles from Israel reached Iran on November 24, 1985. The missiles were rejected as the wrong type, and one planeload of 18 HAWKs was delivered without any hostage release.[^26] The independent counsel wrote that the failed HAWK shipment resulted in the illegal involvement of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]].[^27]
+
+The congressional committees concluded that the arms transfers before January 17, 1986, the August, September and November 1985 shipments, were made from Israel's own stocks, and that "Israel was promised and later was given substantially identical replacements." In a December 17, 1986 memorandum, Assistant Attorney General [[Charles J. Cooper|Cooper]] wrote that "the real nature of the 1985 transactions was a bilateral sale by the United States to Iran, with Israel serving solely as a conduit or facilitator in the execution of that sale."[^28] The report describes Schwimmer as an adviser to Prime Minister Peres from September 1984, [[Amiram Nir]] as Peres's adviser on counterterrorism, and Nimrodi as an Israeli defense attache and then a consultant in Tehran for a total of 24 years.[^29]
+
+A note of January 4, 1986 by [[Charles Hill]], a Shultz aide, records [[John Poindexter]] saying that Nir had come to see him to revive the hostage idea, and states that [[Newsweek]] had the McFarlane-Kimche meetings but did not run them, and that "Kimche seems to have leaked it deliberately."[^30] By May 1986 Nir had replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the arms dealings. When McFarlane, North and others flew toward Tehran on May 23, 1986, by way of Frankfurt and Israel, [[Richard Secord]] and Nir joined the party in Israel.[^31]
+
+Ben-Menashe writes that political chaos in Israel in 1984 led to a coalition government of the [[Labor Party]] and Likud, and that Peres, as prime minister, opened a competing arms channel to Iran through Nir. He writes that the committee worked against that channel, including by leaking information about [[Jonathan Pollard]] and the North-Nir operation, and that North's April 1986 sting operation, the Hashemi sting, was aimed at discrediting the committee's channel and its members.[^1] He writes that the sting was planned from the World Trade Center in New York.[^32] He writes that the committee leaked the $10 million contribution from the Sultan of Brunei wired through [[Bruce Rappaport]] to North's group,[^33] and that Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] did not try to impede the committee's operations.[^1] He also says that he was the first person to leak the Iran-contra scandal to the press.[^11]
+
+### Money and smokescreens, as Ben-Menashe described them
+
+Ben-Menashe writes that the committee became self-sufficient, with an operating budget drawn from the profits of arms sales and overseen by the Mossad comptroller, and that the profits grew into a slush fund outside the Mossad budget. He writes that disbursements were requested from the comptroller through the heads of the intelligence community or directly from the [[Prime Minister's Office]], that the committee used trading companies and a flagship holding company, [[Ora Group|Ora]], to manage the fund.[^1] He names the holding company as Ora Group.[^34] He writes that it used the private arms broker [[John Hortrich]], also known as [[John de Laroque]], as a smokescreen,[^35] and [[Nicholas Davies]], whom he identifies as the foreign editor of the London [[Daily Mirror]].[^36] Its sales, in his account, included [[TOW missile]]s, [[T-80 tank]]s and other equipment.[^1][^37]
+
+He writes that the committee's profits financed the faction of Shamir within the Likud, "black" operations including those involving [[Mohammed Radi Abdullah]] and the [[Achille Lauro]] attack, and housing projects for Jewish settlers in the [[West Bank]] and [[Gaza Strip]].[^1][^38][^39] He writes that in 1987 the committee withdrew its funds from [[Drexel Burnham]] and from the control of [[Menachem Schneerson]], whose institutions had been used to route funds for settlement housing, and redirected them to the yeshivahs of the [[Shas Party]].[^1][^40] He describes aircraft loaded with arms landing in Western [[Australia]], en route to [[Tehran]], with the permission of the [[Australian Security Intelligence Organization]],[^41] and writes that C-130 aircraft flew from Vietnam to Western Australia from early 1986.[^42] He writes that [[Mohammed Jalali]] worked with the committee and, in July 1987, met Gates at the Americana Hotel in [[Kansas City]] to seek assurances that arms supplies to Iran would continue despite the Iran-Contra scandal.[^1][^43]
+
+### Ben-Menashe's service record and the Israeli government's position
+
+Ben-Menashe says that he joined the External Relations Department of Israeli military intelligence in 1977 as an Iran specialist and worked alongside Kimche and Eitan there. He has also said that he was an adviser to Shamir.[^11] His book reprints letters of reference dated September 1987 on External Relations Department letterhead, which he presents as evidence of his service.[^44]
+
+The special counsel to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, [[Reid H. Weingarten]], wrote in 1992 that Ben-Menashe "undoubtedly had real connections with Israeli intelligence and had access to some highly classified information," and that his insistence on placing himself in the middle of numerous scandals and his decision to pit himself against the sworn testimony of numerous credible witnesses and unimpeachable documents made him "a wholly unreliable witness."[^45]
+
+The October Surprise Task Force reported that the personnel file maintained by Israeli Military Intelligence, and interviews with his superiors, confirmed that he worked in the External Relations Department from 1977 to 1987, and stated that he worked the entire time as a translator of materials of relative insignificance and low levels of classification. Seven of his ten annual efficiency reports listed him as a translator. The other three listed him as a staff officer in an armaments unit, which the task force attributed to available slots and pay in an underfunded department.[^46] It also reported that he failed the preparatory training portion of the officer's course, a fact he omitted from his testimony to the task force, and that his job did not involve travel abroad or responsibility concerning Iran.[^46]
+
+[[Steven Emerson]] and Jesse Furman, writing in the *New Republic* in November 1991, reported that Ben-Menashe's military personnel records showed that he served as a low-level translator, and found that his allegations were fabricated, often drawing on things he read in the newspaper.[^47] At his 1990 trial, Assistant U.S. Attorney [[Baruch Weiss]] said that Ben-Menashe was merely a translator for Israeli military intelligence from 1977 to 1987.[^48]
+
+### Prosecution and acquittal, 1989 to 1990
+
+Federal prosecutors in New York accused Ben-Menashe, described in the press as a man who claims to be a former Israeli intelligence agent, and the businessman [[Richard St. Francis]] of arranging, in April 1989, a $36 million deal to sell three Israeli-owned C-130E transport planes to Iran. They were charged with planning to circumvent the State Department approval required for resale of American-made military goods, and the indictment said that the scheme was revealed by an undercover Customs Service agent posing as an Iranian buyer.[^49] The first count of the indictment charged conspiracy to sell American-made C-130 military cargo planes located in Israel to Iran, in violation of the [[Arms Export Control Act]].[^50] In an opinion of August 1, 1990, Judge [[Louis L. Stanton]] of the [[United States District Court for the Southern District of New York]] denied St. Francis's motion to dismiss on due process grounds. He granted motions to sever the second count, which concerned anti-aircraft missiles located in Israel, and to sever [[Joseph O'Toole]] from the first count. Ben-Menashe joined St. Francis's motions.[^50]
+
+On November 28, 1990, a federal jury in New York acquitted Ben-Menashe and St. Francis after a six-week trial before Stanton.[^51] At trial, Ben-Menashe's attorney, [[Thomas F.X. Dunn|Thomas Dunn]], contended that his client had been a former intelligence operative who represented Shamir in an attempted arms-for-hostages deal in 1988, which was to include the release of four U.S. hostages and fell through when Shamir insisted that three Israeli soldiers also be freed. After the verdict, Dunn said that his client claimed Israel had brokered arms deals with Iran between 1980 and 1988 that the U.S. government had covertly approved, among them the transaction that became the Iran-Contra scandal.[^51] The Senate special counsel's 1992 report states that "In 1990, Ben-Menashe was tried and acquitted in New York on federal charges of conspiring to sell U.S.-made arms to Iran."[^11]
+
+### The October Surprise Task Force
+
+The House October Surprise Task Force, chaired by [[Lee Hamilton]], issued its joint report on January 3, 1993. Its finding on Ben-Menashe's allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980 between Casey and Karrubi reads: "Credible testimonial and documentary evidence show Ben-Menashe to be totally lacking in credibility regarding his allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980 between William Casey and Mehdi Karrubi." The report adds: "Aside from early biographical details, virtually everything Ben-Menashe told the Task Force has been found to be false."[^52]
+
+On his account of a meeting at the L'Enfant Plaza hotel in Washington, the task force found: "Ben-Menashe's account is demonstrably false from beginning to end."[^53] On his account of the October 1980 meetings in Paris, which he places at a meeting attended by [[George H.W. Bush]], the task force stated that the personnel records the Government of Israel supplied, with Ben-Menashe's contemporaneous handwritten answers to the questions he was required to answer for the External Relations Department when traveling abroad, showed that he did not travel outside Israel in October 1980, and that exit stamps on his civilian passport indicated the same. It wrote that his account of the October meetings, "like his other October Surprise allegations, is a total fabrication."[^54]
+
+Ben-Menashe told the [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]], during the 1991 confirmation hearings for Gates as director of Central Intelligence, that Gates had conspired with the Reagan-Bush campaign to delay the release of the hostages and was present at meetings, including those in Paris. Gates, under oath, denied the allegations. The committee later reported that FBI and CIA inspector general investigations, including analyses of Gates's calendars and travel records, provided no credible evidence to confirm Ben-Menashe's allegations, and the task force stated that it was aware of no evidence to the contrary.[^55]
+
+### Hersh and The Samson Option
+
+[[Seymour Hersh]]'s 1991 book *[[The Samson Option]]* states that Ben-Menashe first contacted the author in mid-1990, that interviews began in early 1991, and that Ben-Menashe agreed "as no other Israeli would" to be directly quoted on nuclear issues. The author's note adds that Ben-Menashe left the United States for exile in Australia in June 1991, and that his allegations about Iran arms sales had been strongly denied in Washington and Jerusalem and were still under congressional review in the summer of 1991.[^56]
+
+### The 1987 dismissal
+
+Ben-Menashe writes that after the Iran-Contra story leaked, he and three other committee members were dismissed in September 1987 because of pressure on Shamir, and that before the dismissal some funds were set aside for their futures and CIA money controlled by Israel was transferred to the [[East Bloc]].[^1] The Israeli military file that the task force examined records a July 23, 1987 letter from [[Arieh Shur]], his superior, warning Ben-Menashe that he had taken too much personal leave; a letter of the same day in which Ben-Menashe wrote to his superiors that he wished to leave the Army and asked for help in finding new work; a September 9, 1987 complaint by him before the union of civilian employees of the Israel Defense Forces that he had served ten years as a translator without a significant promotion; and his resignation from the Israel Defense Forces on September 15, 1987.[^57]
 
 ### Footnotes
-[^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).
+
+[^1]: Ari Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network* (Sheridan Square Press, 1992; TrineDay reprint, 2015). https://archive.org/details/profitsofwarinsi0000benm
+[^2]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 78.
+[^3]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 70.
+[^4]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 71.
+[^5]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 79.
+[^6]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 143.
+[^7]: U.S. House of Representatives, *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97 (finding on Ben-Menashe; statements of Rafi Eitan and Yehoshua Saguy to the Government of Israel). https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^8]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98 (statements to Israeli authorities of Kimche, Saguy, Eitan, Moriah, Meir, Segev and Hofi).
+[^9]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 102.
+[^10]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 58.
+[^11]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *The October Surprise Allegations and the Circumstances Surrounding the Release of the American Hostages Held in Iran*, Report of the Special Counsel, S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, pp. 56-57. https://archive.org/details/ReportOfTheSpecialCounselOnTheOctoberSurpriseAllegationsAndTheCircumstancesSurrounding
+[^12]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 201-02 (April 1980 approach to President Carter; interview of Deputy Defense Minister Zipori, September 28, 1980).
+[^13]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 202-04 (Israeli approaches of October 22 and 27, 1980; the Government of Israel's report; cable of Ambassador Lewis).
+[^14]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 204-05 (the Government of Israel's report on the November 1980 Begin-Carter-Muskie discussions and Begin's order of November 21, 1980; Lewis cable of December 12, 1980).
+[^15]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 205-06 (Haig cable of February 4, 1981; Israeli government's account of Begin's meeting with Ambassador Lewis; Lewis cable).
+[^16]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 207-08 (Shamir's meeting with Haig in February 1981; the Government of Israel's report on the meeting of February 25, 1981 and the shipments of March 20 and April 13, 1981; Haig's April 1981 visit).
+[^17]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), p. 526, note (U.S. Department of State, Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Secretary of State Shultz, "U.S.-Israel Discussions on Arms Sales to Iran-1980-82," November 21, 1986, S3547). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^18]: Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives, "Crash of a Canadair CL-44D4-6 near Yerevan: 4 killed," July 18, 1981 (operator Transporte Aereo Rioplatense, registration LV-JTN). https://www.baaa-acro.com/crash/crash-canadair-cl-44d4-6-near-yerevan-4-killed
+[^19]: "Plane that fell in USSR reported on Iran arms run," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 27, 1981 (reporting the *Sunday Times* of London). https://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0727/072721.html
+[^20]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters*, vol. I, Part I (1993), on the July 3, 1985 meeting of David Kimche and Robert McFarlane, and vol. I, ch. 1 ("United States v. Robert C. McFarlane"), on the August 2, 1985 meeting. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm ; https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^21]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, Part I, on Michael Ledeen's May 1985 visit to Israel and his meeting with Shimon Peres. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
+[^22]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, on the August 20, 1985 transfer of 96 TOW missiles by Israel working through Nimrodi, Schwimmer and Ghorbanifar, citing the Israeli Historical Chronology. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^23]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, on the 408 TOW missiles shipped on September 14, 1985 and the release of Reverend Benjamin Weir. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^24]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 100 (Platt Note, September 4, 1985, ALW 0036259). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^25]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), pp. 527-28, "The Israeli Connection" (Shultz briefing paper of November 1986 and Shultz cable of July 1985). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^26]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, on the HAWK missiles shipped from Israel on November 24, 1985 and the delivery of 18 missiles of the wrong type. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^27]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 119 (on the failed HAWK shipment and CIA involvement). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^28]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), pp. 539-40, legal analysis of the 1985 Israeli transfers, including the December 17, 1986 memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Cooper. https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^29]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (1987), p. 526, "The Israeli Connection" (Schwimmer, Nir and Nimrodi). https://archive.org/details/Iran-ContraReport
+[^30]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 24 ("The Investigation of State Department Officials: Shultz, Hill and Platt"), n. 206 (Hill Note, January 4, 1986, ANS 0001255-56). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_24.htm
+[^31]: Walsh, *Final Report*, vol. I, ch. 1, on the party that left Washington on May 23, 1986 for Tehran by way of Frankfurt and Israel, where Secord and Amiram Nir, who had replaced Kimche as the Israeli official in the arms deals, joined it. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^32]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, pp. 178-179.
+[^33]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 182.
+[^34]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 190.
+[^35]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 108.
+[^36]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 113.
+[^37]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 119.
+[^38]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 123 (the Achille Lauro operation as an Israeli "black" propaganda operation).
+[^39]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 125 (the slush fund for West Bank and Gaza settler housing).
+[^40]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 126.
+[^41]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 112.
+[^42]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 120.
+[^43]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, p. 193.
+[^44]: Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War*, TrineDay reprint, 2015, appendix (letters of reference dated September 4, 6 and 14, 1987, on External Relations Department letterhead).
+[^45]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Report of the Special Counsel, S. Prt. 102-125, November 19, 1992, p. 114 (evaluation of the evidence offered by Ari Ben-Menashe). https://archive.org/details/ReportOfTheSpecialCounselOnTheOctoberSurpriseAllegationsAndTheCircumstancesSurrounding
+[^46]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, pp. 97-98 (Israeli Military Intelligence file and interviews with superiors on Ben-Menashe's service in the External Relations Department, 1977-1987).
+[^47]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 68 (summarizing Steven Emerson and Jesse Furman, "The Conspiracy That Wasn't," *The New Republic*, November 3, 1991, and their review of Ben-Menashe's military personnel records).
+[^48]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990 (dateline New York, November 28; statement of Assistant U.S. Attorney Baruch Weiss). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
+[^49]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990 (the charges: a $36 million deal for three Israeli-owned C-130E transport planes, April 1989; the January indictment; the undercover Customs Service agent). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
+[^50]: *United States v. Menashe*, 741 F. Supp. 1135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), No. 90 Cr. 010 (LLS), memorandum and order of Judge Louis L. Stanton, August 1, 1990. https://static.case.law/f-supp/741/cases/1135-01.json
+[^51]: "2 Acquitted of Trying to Sell Military Cargo Planes to Iran," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1990 (verdict, length of trial and presiding judge; statements of defense counsel Thomas Dunn at trial and after the verdict). https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1990/11/29/2-acquitted-of-trying-to-sell-military-cargo-planes-to-iran/2918bfd6-89a7-441a-a124-3b1916e90321/
+[^52]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 97 (finding on Ben-Menashe's allegations about meetings in Spain in 1980; passage beginning "Aside from early biographical details"). https://archive.org/details/JointReportOfTheOctoberSurpriseTaskForce
+[^53]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 110 (L'Enfant Plaza meeting account).
+[^54]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 148 (Ben-Menashe's account of the October 1980 meetings; personnel records and handwritten travel answers supplied by the Government of Israel; passport exit stamps).
+[^55]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 172 (Ben-Menashe's allegations about Robert Gates; Gates's sworn denial; the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report of 1991).
+[^56]: Hersh, Seymour M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*. Random House, 1991, Author's Note, pp. ix-x, and the note on Ben-Menashe at p. 260.
+[^57]: *Joint Report of the October Surprise Task Force*, January 3, 1993, p. 98 (Israeli military file: letter of Arieh Shur dated July 23, 1987; Ben-Menashe's letter of the same day; document of September 9, 1987; resignation of September 15, 1987).

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Safari Club.md

@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ tags:
   - 1970s
   - Church_Committee
   - Alexandre_de_Marenches
-summary: "The Safari Club was a 1976 informal intelligence alliance organized by SDECE director Alexandre de Marenches to conduct anti-Soviet operations in Africa and the Middle East when the CIA was constrained by Church Committee oversight, with France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, and Iran as core members."
+summary: "The Safari Club was a 1976 intelligence alliance of France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco and Iran, organized by SDECE director Alexandre de Marenches for anti-Soviet operations in Africa."
+updated: 2026-10-14
 start: 1976-01-01
 end: 1981-01-01
 location: "Paris, France / Riyadh, Saudi Arabia"
@@ -33,13 +34,17 @@ The core membership of the Safari Club was:
 
 Kamal Adham led the Saudi directorate until 1979, according to Gulf News, when King Khalid replaced him with Turki al-Faisal; Arab News and the Washington Institute give 1977 for Turki's accession.[^2][^3]
 
+[[Turki al-Faisal]], the former head of Saudi intelligence, said in a speech at Georgetown University on February 3, 2002, that in 1976, after Watergate, the American intelligence community was "literally tied up by Congress," that a group of countries got together and established what was called the Safari Club, and that it included France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Iran, with the aim of sharing information and countering Soviet influence, especially in Africa.[^4]
+
+The Egyptian journalist [[Mohamed Hassanein Heikal]] wrote in 1982 that the club, named after its inaugural meeting in Saudi Arabia, was the idea of Alexandre de Marenches of the SDECE. He wrote that an agreement among the five governments was signed by Sheikh Kamal Adham, director of intelligence, for Saudi Arabia, General [[Nematollah Nassiri]], head of SAVAK, for Iran, the director of intelligence for Egypt, Ahmed Duleimi, director of intelligence, for Morocco, and de Marenches himself for France, that its text opened with a reference to "recent events in Angola and other parts of Africa," and that a copy of the agreement was found in SAVAK's archives after the revolution.[^5]
+
 The CIA participated as a provider of intelligence products, targeting information, and logistics coordination, with Bush maintaining the relationship through DCI channels. The arrangement exploited the fact that congressional restrictions applied to CIA operations, not to those of allied foreign services.[^1]
 
 ### Operations
 
 The most extensively documented Safari Club operation was in Angola, where the Club supported Jonas Savimbi's [[UNITA]] movement against the Soviet- and Cuban-backed MPLA government. The Clark Amendment (1976) had prohibited the CIA from providing direct military assistance to factions in the Angolan civil war, but the Safari Club financed UNITA operations through Saudi channels. De Marenches described Angola as "a theater for revolutionary wars prompted and conducted by the Soviet Union." The Club provided an estimated $5 million in funding and logistical support to Savimbi's forces during this period.[^1]
 
-In the Horn of Africa, the Club supported Somalia against the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, channeling arms and funds to Somali President Siad Barre. Egypt supplied Soviet-compatible weapons that could be denied as American in origin. The operation collapsed when Cuba deployed approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia, reversing the Somali military advance.[^4]
+In the Horn of Africa, the Club supported Somalia against the Soviet-backed Ethiopian government during the 1977-1978 Ogaden War, channeling arms and funds to Somali President Siad Barre. Egypt supplied Soviet-compatible weapons that could be denied as American in origin. The operation collapsed when Cuba deployed approximately 15,000 troops to Ethiopia, reversing the Somali military advance.[^6]
 
 The Club also coordinated intelligence sharing and low-level operations in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Sudan, and other African theaters where Soviet and Cuban influence was considered a threat. Saudi funding provided the financial infrastructure for multiple simultaneous operations that would have required substantial CIA appropriations to sustain directly.[^1]
 
@@ -47,7 +52,7 @@ The Club also coordinated intelligence sharing and low-level operations in Rhode
 
 The Safari Club arrangement exploited a structural feature of American oversight: congressional restrictions applied to the CIA, but not to allied services receiving American intelligence support. Bush maintained the CIA's relationship with the consortium through intelligence-sharing channels, providing targeting data and strategic assessments that guided the allied operations. The operational work was then conducted by the allied services, keeping American fingerprints off the direct conduct of operations.[^1]
 
-The arrangement also had internal CIA consequences. CIA officers who had been forced out in the post-Watergate restructuring - including Ted Shackley, Tom Clines, and others associated with William Colby's predecessor Richard Helms - found employment and operational roles in the networks that supported Safari Club operations, operating through private channels with Saudi or other national funding. This created a persistent covert network operating outside CIA's formal chain of command.[^4]
+The arrangement also had internal CIA consequences. CIA officers who had been forced out in the post-Watergate restructuring - including Ted Shackley, Tom Clines, and others associated with William Colby's predecessor Richard Helms - found employment and operational roles in the networks that supported Safari Club operations, operating through private channels with Saudi or other national funding. This created a persistent covert network operating outside CIA's formal chain of command.[^6]
 
 ### Collapse
 
@@ -62,4 +67,6 @@ The Safari Club demonstrated that the constraints imposed on CIA by the Church C
 [^1]: Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network*. Carroll & Graf, 2005, pp. 52-108. De Marenches, Alexandre, and David Andelman. *The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism*. Random House, 1992.
 [^2]: Joseph A. Kechichian, "The man behind the scenes," Gulf News, February 12, 2010. https://gulfnews.com/uae/the-man-behind-the-scenes-1.581564
 [^3]: Simon Henderson, "The Saudis: Friend or Foe?", Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 22, 2001. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/saudis-friend-or-foe
-[^4]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 353-364. Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. W.W. Norton, 1978 (on Angola operations and CIA's role in the period).
+[^4]: Prince Turki al-Faisal bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, special address, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, February 3, 2002 (transcription by Paul Dyer). https://web.archive.org/web/20030402032839/http://www.ccasonline.org/publicaffairs/turki_02032002.html.
+[^5]: Mohamed Heikal, *Iran: The Untold Story* (New York: Pantheon, 1982), p. 113 and author's note. https://archive.org/details/iranuntoldstoryi00hayk
+[^6]: Weiner, Tim. *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*. Doubleday, 2007, pp. 353-364. Stockwell, John. *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story*. W.W. Norton, 1978 (on Angola operations and CIA's role in the period).

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL/Shas Party.md

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ location: "Jerusalem, Israel"
 ---
 The [[Shas Party]] is an orthodox political party in [[Israel]], which emerged as a significant force in Israeli politics. It was at odds with [[Menachem Schneerson]], the Lubavitcher Rebbe, and gained influence within the [[Likud Party]]-controlled Israeli government.
 
-In 1987, the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] redirected funds from the Lubavitcher yeshivahs to the Shas yeshivahs, as the committee and [[Menachem Schneerson|Schneerson]] parted ways. The [[Likud Party]] considered the support of [[Ovadia Yousef]], an Iraqi-Jewish rabbi who controlled Shas, essential due to his large following in [[Israel]]'s Middle Eastern Jewish communities.[^1]
+According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], in 1987 the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] redirected funds from the Lubavitcher yeshivahs to the Shas yeshivahs, as the committee and Schneerson parted ways, and the Likud Party considered the support of [[Ovadia Yousef]], an Iraqi-Jewish rabbi who controlled Shas, essential due to his large following in Israel's Middle Eastern Jewish communities.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/GOVERNMENT/USA/Kerry Committee.md

@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
 ---
 aliases:
+  - Kerry Committee
   - Kerry subcommittee
   - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
+  - Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications
   - Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations
+  - Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on terrorism, narcotics and international operations
+  - Kerry-Brown Senate investigation
 category: "Intelligence & Government"
 tags:
   - Organization
@@ -10,42 +14,317 @@ tags:
   - Congress
   - BCCI
   - Contras
-summary: "Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee under John Kerry that investigated drugs and foreign policy in 1987-88 and BCCI from 1988 to 1992, with a staff of two attorneys and no travel budget."
+  - DrugTrafficking
+  - Noriega
+  - KerryBrownReport
+summary: "Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee under John Kerry that investigated Contra-linked drug trafficking and Manuel Noriega from 1986 to 1988 and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International from 1988 to 1992."
 location: "Washington, D.C."
 relations:
   - type: head_of
     with: "[[John Kerry]]"
     reverse: true
     role: "chairman"
+    start: 1987-04
+    end: 1992-12
     fn: 1
   - type: employed_by
     with: "[[Jack Blum]]"
     reverse: true
-    role: "chief counsel"
+    role: "special counsel"
     end: 1989
+    fn: 4
+  - type: employed_by
+    with: "[[Jonathan Winer]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "staff, Kerry's personal staff"
+    start: 1986
+    fn: 4
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Hank Brown]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "ranking member for the BCCI inquiry"
+    start: 1991-05
+    end: 1992-12
+    fn: 67
+  - type: member_of
+    with: "[[Mitch McConnell]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "ranking member"
+    start: 1987-04
+    end: 1988-12
     fn: 1
-  - type: investigated
+  - type: reported_to
-    with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
+    with: "[[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]"
-    start: 1988
+    start: 1987-04
     end: 1992-12
     fn: 1
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Manuel Noriega]]"
+    start: 1986-04
+    end: 1988-12
+    fn: 55
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Contras]]"
+    start: 1986-04
+    end: 1988-12
+    fn: 12
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[John Hull]]"
+    start: 1987-10
+    end: 1988-12
+    fn: 31
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]]"
+    start: 1988-02
+    end: 1992-12
+    fn: 65
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Kissinger Associates]]"
+    start: 1991-07
+    end: 1992-12
+    fn: 73
 created: 2026-09-23
-updated: 2026-09-23
+updated: 2026-10-14
 ---
 
-The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], chaired by Senator [[John Kerry]] of [[Massachusetts]], conducted a two-year investigation of drugs, law enforcement and foreign policy in 1987 and 1988 and, from 1988 to 1992, the congressional investigation of the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI) that produced the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]] of December 1992. Its ranking member for the BCCI inquiry was Senator [[Hank Brown]] of [[Colorado]].[^1]
+The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations of the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]], chaired by Senator [[John Kerry]] of [[Massachusetts]], produced two reports: S. Prt. 100-165, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy* (December 1988), on narcotics trafficking, the [[Contras]] and [[Manuel Noriega]], and S. Prt. 102-140, *The BCCI Affair* (December 1992), on the [[Bank of Credit and Commerce International]] (BCCI), published as the [[BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report|Kerry-Brown Senate Report]]. The Foreign Relations Committee's drug inquiry began in April 1986; responsibility passed to the subcommittee in April 1987, with Senator [[Mitch McConnell]] of [[Kentucky]] as ranking member. Senator [[Hank Brown]] of [[Colorado]] was the ranking member for the BCCI investigation.[^1]
 
-### Origins
+### Origins of the drugs inquiry
 
-BCCI came to the subcommittee's attention in February 1988, during a hearing on the drug trafficking and money laundering of [[Manuel Noriega]]. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to those at the bank who handled Noriega's assets and the accounts of others in [[Panama]] and [[Colombia]]. Service was delayed at the request of the [[United States Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and the [[United States Customs Service|Customs Service]], which were concerned for the [[Operation C-Chase|C-Chase]] sting in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]]; by the time the subpoenas were served in late July 1988, the subcommittee's public hearings were over. BCCI officials then told its counsel, [[Jack Blum]], that the bank and its attorneys, among them [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]], were obstructing the inquiry. The subcommittee deposed [[Amjad Awan]] shortly before his arrest in the sting and a second former BCCI officer afterward.[^1]
+The report dates Kerry's own staff investigation to early 1986, when he began examining allegations that elements of the supply network for the Nicaraguan Contras were linked to drug traffickers. In April 1986 he took the information to the committee chairman, Senator [[Richard Lugar]], who agreed to a staff inquiry. Lugar scheduled a closed session of the committee for June 25, 1986. In February 1987 Chairman [[Claiborne Pell]] continued the inquiry and widened it to the effect of Caribbean, Central American and South American drug trafficking on foreign policy; in April 1987 it was assigned to the subcommittee.[^1]
 
-In the spring of 1989, as Blum left the subcommittee, Kerry authorized him to give his information to the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]]; when the department did not act on it, Blum took it to the New York District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]]. Kerry meanwhile continued the inquiry with two members of his personal staff. After failing to obtain authorization through the Banking Committee, he obtained it from the full Foreign Relations Committee, without dissent, on May 23, 1991, together with a new subpoena to BCCI; further subpoena authorizations followed on November 27, 1991, February 29, 1992, and June 4, 1992. The report recorded that the investigation's staff "remained limited, amounting to two attorneys, with no budget for travel," which particularly hampered its work outside the [[United States]].[^1]
+The report's chapter on the Contras opens: "The initial Committee investigation into the international drug trade, which began in April, 1986, focused on allegations that Senator John F. Kerry had received of illegal gun-running and narcotics trafficking associated with the Contra war against Nicaragua." It states that the subcommittee uncovered "considerable evidence relating to the Contra network which substantiated many of the initial allegations laid out before the Committee in the Spring of 1986," and that in each case one or another agency of the U.S. government had information about the involvement, either while it was occurring or immediately afterward.[^2]
 
-### Hearings and Report
+The subcommittee held fourteen days of open hearings and nine executive sessions and received testimony from 27 witnesses. Its staff deposed 20 more, and thirty subpoenas were issued.[^3] The transmittal letter names [[Jack Blum]], special counsel, with Kathleen Smith and Jonathan Litchman of the committee staff, and Richard McCall, [[Jonathan Winer]] and David McKean of Kerry's personal staff and Ron Rosenblith.[^4]
 
-The subcommittee held public hearings on BCCI on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991. It obtained documents from BCCI and its attorneys, former officials and creditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], Clifford and Altman, [[First American Bank]], the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]], the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]], the [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]], the [[Office of Thrift Supervision]], the [[Resolution Trust Corporation]], [[Abu Dhabi]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the Customs Service and the [[United States Department of State|State Department]].[^1] Its report, Senate Print 102-140, was issued in December 1992. The archivist [[Steven Aftergood]] of the [[Federation of American Scientists]], which published the committee's electronic text, noted that after its release "Sen. Hank Brown, reportedly acting at the behest of [[Henry A. Kissinger|Henry Kissinger]], pressed for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in Chapter 20 on 'BCCI and [[Kissinger Associates]],'" so that the version printed by the Government Printing Office "differs slightly from the Committee's softcopy version."[^2]
+### The executive branch response, 1986 to 1988
+
+After press accounts beginning in December 1985, the [[State Department]], with the [[Department of Justice]] and the intelligence agencies, reviewed the allegations in the spring of 1986. It told Congress in April 1986 that it had "evidence of a limited number of incidents in which known drug traffickers tried to establish connections with Nicaraguan resistance groups," and that these attempts took place mostly when the resistance was receiving no U.S. funding. In a second statement of July 24, 1986 it said that "the available evidence points to involvement with drug traffickers by a limited number of persons having various kinds of affiliations with, or political sympathies for, the resistance groups."[^5]
+
+In August 1987 the chief of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s Central American Task Force, [[Alan Fiers]], testified to the Iran-Contra committees that links between Contras on the Southern Front in [[Costa Rica]] and narcotics trafficking were far broader than the State Department had said in 1986. He testified that "it is not a couple of people. It is a lot of people," and that "We knew that everybody around [[Eden Pastora|Pastora]] was involved in cocaine."[^6]
+
+The subcommittee reported that in the spring of 1986 the Justice Department was adamantly denying that the narcotics allegations had substance, while the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation|FBI]] had significant information on narcotics traffickers in Contra operations and on Neutrality Act violations. On May 6, 1986 a bipartisan group of committee staff met representatives of Justice, the FBI, the [[DEA]], the CIA and the State Department. Justice Department officials there privately contradicted the department's public statements that the FBI had investigated the charges and found no substance, and confirmed that Neutrality Act investigations were under way. The CIA representatives categorically denied that the violations raised by the staff had taken place, citing classified documents; the report states that the FBI had by then assembled substantial information confirming them, including admissions by some of the persons involved.[^7]
+
+In August 1986 Senator Lugar and the ranking member, Senator Pell, wrote to the Justice Department asking for information on 27 individuals and organizations associated with the Contras. The department declined, on the grounds that the matters remained under active investigation and that the committee's "rambling through open investigations gravely risks compromising those efforts." The report records that less than three months earlier the department had told the press and the committee that the allegations had been thoroughly investigated and were without foundation, and that it did not disclose in reply that the FBI had developed extensive information from 1983 through 1986 suggesting many of the allegations were true.[^8]
+
+### Allegations of interference with the inquiry
+
+On October 5, 1988 the subcommittee received sworn testimony from [[Jeffery B. Feldman]], the [[Miami]] assistant U.S. attorney who handled the Neutrality Act and gun-running cases, that he had been told Justice Department officials had met in 1986 "to undermine" Kerry's attempts to hold hearings. Feldman testified that on November 17, 1987 [[Thomas E. Marum]] of the Internal Security Division told him that representatives of Justice, the DEA and the FBI had met in 1986 to discuss how Kerry's efforts to hold hearings could be undermined; that a memorandum he wrote in late May 1986 recommending a grand jury had been rewritten without his knowledge to call the case a "fishing expedition"; and that files given to him by U.S. Attorney [[Leon Kellner]] included a transcript of a Foreign Relations Committee executive session and memoranda between Deputy Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Bergquist and committee staff on coordinating efforts "to basically show that what you were saying wasn't necessarily correct."[^9]
+
+The Justice Department witnesses denied any agreement to obstruct the inquiry. Marum, in a deposition of October 25, 1988, denied telling Feldman that there had been an agreement to undermine the committee's investigation, and said it was true that the department and the other participants at the meeting opposed hearings. [[Mark M. Richard]], the Justice Department official, testified on November 7, 1988 that Feldman was wrong about any meeting he attended in which hearings were undermined; he recalled a meeting of October 15, 1986 attended by 20 to 25 people that went down the list of the committee's outstanding requests, and said the DEA did not want to provide the information requested. Kellner gave a deposition on November 8, 1988.[^10]
+
+### What the subcommittee found about Contra-linked traffickers
+
+The executive summary stated: "The Subcommittee did not find that the Contra leaders personally were involved in drug trafficking. There was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters throughout the region."[^11] The summary also stated that U.S. officials involved in Central America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war effort against Nicaragua, and that the war "contributed to weakening an already inadequate law enforcement capability in the region" that mercenaries, pilots and others involved in drug smuggling exploited.[^11]
+
+The concluding chapter restates the finding and adds that "the largest Contra organization, the FDN, did move Contra funds through a narcotics trafficking enterprise and money laundering operation." It records evidence that U.S. officials assisting the Contras knew that drug smugglers were exploiting the clandestine infrastructure established to support the war and that Contras were receiving assistance derived from drug trafficking, and states that "it appears that some officials may have turned a blind eye to these activities." On the question whether officials failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war, the subcommittee wrote that there were "serious questions" and urged the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Judiciary Committee to investigate.[^12]
+
+[[Paul Gorman]], a retired general and former commander of the U.S. Southern Command, testified on February 8, 1988 that the use of narcotics profits by armed resistance groups was commonplace and that "if you want to move arms or munitions in Latin America, the established networks are owned by the cartels." The DEA's assistant administrator, [[David Westrate]], testified on July 12, 1988: "It is true that people on both sides of the equation (in the Nicaraguan war) were drug traffickers, and a couple of them were pretty significant."[^13]
+
+### The Southern Front
+
+The subcommittee traced drug trafficking in the region to the late 1970s, when Costa Rican airstrips near the Nicaraguan border were used by Manuel Noriega and others to ship weapons to the [[Sandinistas]], and former Costa Rican law enforcement officials told it they were instructed to keep narcotics investigators away from the border during the revolution. After 1979, surplus weapons stored in Costa Rica were sold on the black market and some were shipped to Salvadoran rebels from the same airstrips by the same pilots.[^14]
+
+Werner Lotz, a Costa Rican pilot serving a sentence for drug smuggling, testified in closed session on April 8, 1988 that Contra operations on the Southern Front were in fact funded by drug operations: weapons came from [[Panama]] on small planes carrying mixed loads, and the pilots unloaded the weapons, refueled and flew north with drugs. He named the pilots as Americans, Panamanians and Colombians and occasionally uniformed members of the Panamanian Defense Forces. [[Karol Prado]], an officer of Eden Pastora's ARDE organization, testified that traffickers "approaches political groups like ARDE trying to make deals that would somehow camouflage or cover up their activities."[^15]
+
+The report states that DEA officials testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime in July 1988 that Lieutenant Colonel [[Oliver North]] suggested to the DEA in June 1985 that $1.5 million in drug money, carried aboard a plane piloted by DEA informant [[Barry Seal]] and generated in a sting of the [[Medellin Cartel]] and Sandinista officials, be provided to the Contras; the DEA rejected the suggestion.[^16] The former CIA station chief in Costa Rica, Thomas Castillo, testified to the Iran-Contra committees that during June, July and August 1986 U.S. Ambassador [[Lewis Tambs]] wanted to place guards on the secret Contra supply airstrip at Santa Elena to keep drug traffickers from using it.[^17]
+
+### The State Department contractors
+
+The State Department used the [[NHAO|Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Organization]] (NHAO) to channel humanitarian assistance to the Contras in 1985 and 1986. The subcommittee reported that the department selected four companies owned and operated by narcotics traffickers: [[SETCO]], [[DIACSA]], [[Frigorificos de Puntarenas]] and Vortex. In each case, before the department contracted with the company, federal law enforcement had received information that the individuals controlling it were involved in narcotics. NHAO officials told investigators of the General Accounting Office that all supply contractors were to have been screened by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and the GAO and NHAO were uncertain whether that had been done. The payments made to the four between January and August 1986 totaled $806,401.20 in the report's table, which lists $185,924.25 for SETCO, $41,120.90 for DIACSA, $261,932.00 for Frigorificos de Puntarenas and $317,425.17 for Vortex.[^18]
+
+The report posed the questions it had been unable to answer: who selected the firms and on what criteria, whether any official at the CIA, the National Security Council or the State Department knew of the narcotics allegations, and why the contractors were not checked against federal law enforcement records, which would have shown them to be under investigation or, in the case of DIACSA, under indictment. The NHAO director, Ambassador [[Robert Duemling]], could not recall how the companies were selected when Kerry questioned him in April 1988, and could not recall whether they had been checked. He had recalled before the Iran-Contra committees that Oliver North directed NHAO to continue "the existing arrangements of the resistance movement" in choosing contractors.[^19] The subcommittee concluded: "At best, these incidents represent negligence on the part of US government officials responsible for providing support to the Contras. At worst it was a matter of turning a blind eye to the activities of companies who use legitimate activities as a cover for their narcotics trafficking."[^20]
+
+SETCO had a long-standing relationship with the Honduras-based [[FDN]], and from 1984 was the principal company the Contras used in Honduras to transport supplies and personnel for it, carrying at least a million rounds of ammunition, food, uniforms and other military supplies from 1983 through 1985. The report cites U.S. law enforcement records stating that SETCO was established by the Honduran cocaine trafficker Ramon Matta Ballesteros, whose April 1988 extradition from Honduras caused riots outside the U.S. embassy in [[Tegucigalpa]], and quotes a 1983 Customs report: "SETCO aviation is a corporation formed by American businessmen who are dealing with Matta and are smuggling narcotics into the United States." One of the pilots who flew SETCO missions for the FDN was [[Frank Moss]], under investigation as an alleged drug trafficker since 1979 and investigated, though never indicted, by ten law enforcement agencies. In 1985 Moss formed his own company, Hondu Carib, which flew supplies to the Contras under a commercial agreement with the FDN's chief supply officer, [[Mario Calero]], who was to receive an ownership interest. One Moss DC-4 moved Contra goods from the United States to Honduras. A second DC-4 was chased off the west coast of Florida by [[U.S. Customs]] while, according to law enforcement personnel, it was dumping what appeared to be a load of drugs; when it landed at Port Charlotte no drugs were found, but an address book aboard contained the telephone numbers of some Contra officials and the Virginia number of [[Robert Owen]], North's courier. The DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987.[^21]
+
+Frigorificos de Puntarenas, a Costa Rican seafood company, was created as a cover for laundering drug money, according to grand jury testimony by one of its partners and testimony by [[Ramon Milian Rodriguez]], the convicted money launderer who established it. It was owned and operated by Luis Rodriguez of Miami, whom Massachusetts law enforcement officials said directed the largest marijuana smuggling ring in the state's history, and two convicted drug traffickers. Luis Rodriguez was indicted on drug trafficking charges on September 30, 1987. He controlled the bank account that received $261,937 in humanitarian assistance funds from the State Department in 1986, according to the narrative section of the report. In September 1984 Miami police told the FBI that Ocean Hunter, the American seafood company of which he was president and which bought from Frigorificos, was funding Contra activities through "narcotics transactions." Kerry told the Justice Department, the DEA, the State Department, NHAO and the CIA of the allegations in May 1986; in August 1986 the Foreign Relations Committee asked Justice whether they were true, and Justice declined to answer.[^22]
+
+DIACSA was an aircraft dealership and parts supply company partly owned by the Guerra family of Costa Rica. Its president, [[Alfredo Caballero]], was under DEA investigation for cocaine trafficking and money laundering when the State Department chose it, and was a business associate of [[Floyd Carlton]], the pilot who flew cocaine for Noriega. DEA Special Agent Daniel Moritz, in an affidavit filed in federal court in January 1985, described working undercover as a money launderer and said the traffickers used DIACSA's offices "as a location for planning smuggling ventures, for assembling and distributing large cash proceeds of narcotics transactions, and for placing telephone calls in furtherance of the smuggling ventures." The report states that from March 1985 until January 1986 Moritz received approximately $3.8 million from members of the organization, most of it delivered at DIACSA's offices, and that during 1984 and 1985 the FDN chose DIACSA for "intra-account transfers" that concealed funds for the Contras deposited at North's direction. Carlton, Caballero and five other defendants were indicted, and the State Department made payments to DIACSA on May 14 and September 3, 1986 totaling $41,120.90 despite the indictments. Court papers of July 1986 show that the U.S. embassies in Panama and Costa Rica were clients of DIACSA, and that embassy personnel were meeting one of the defendants about purchasing Cessna aircraft while plea negotiations were under way.[^23]
+
+Vortex was an air service and supply company partly owned by [[Michael Palmer]], whom the subcommittee described as an admitted drug trafficker. When the State Department signed its contract, Palmer, then the company's executive vice president, signed for Vortex while under active FBI investigation in three jurisdictions and facing a federal grand jury in Detroit. The contract required Vortex to receive, store, pack and inventory goods for the Contras; its principal assets were two airplanes Palmer had previously used for drug smuggling. The report states that Vortex was selected by NHAO assistant director Philip Buechler after calls among Buechler, Palmer and the president of Summit Aviation.[^24]
+
+### George Morales and the Pastora organization
+
+The subcommittee reported that [[George Morales]], a Colombian drug trafficker living in Miami and under indictment for narcotics trafficking, approached the organization of Eden Pastora in 1984, with discrepancies among the parties about when the first meeting took place. Pastora was wounded by a bomb at La Penca, Nicaragua on May 30, 1984; the ARDE officer Karol Prado said that U.S. aid to ARDE was cut off that day. According to a State Department report to Congress of July 26, 1986, a senior member of Pastora's Sandino Revolutionary Front agreed in late 1984 that FRS pilots would aid in transporting narcotics in exchange for financial assistance, and Morales reportedly provided the front with a C-47 aircraft, two crated helicopters and $100,000. The State Department said it knew of one incident from the arrangement, the January 1986 arrest in Costa Rica of the Contra pilot Gerardo Duran.[^25]
+
+Robert Owen, North's courier, testified to the Iran-Contra committees that he told North he thought Prado and Pastora's pilot [[Marcos Aguado]] were involved in trafficking drugs out of Panama; the subcommittee could not validate Owen's claims, and Prado denied them, saying he believed the allegations against Pastora were a CIA effort to discredit him.[^26] Morales testified that his involvement began in 1984 at the urging of the widow of one of his drug pilots, who introduced him to Pastora's second in command, Adolfo "Popo" [[Adolfo Chamorro|Chamorro]], Aguado and [[Octaviano Cesar]] at a meeting in Miami. He was under indictment for marijuana smuggling and thought assisting the Contras would end it. He wanted to make a deal, he said: he would help the Contras with their needs, and "they in exchange would help me with my objective, which was solving my indictment."[^27]
+
+The subcommittee videotaped depositions of Prado, Aguado and Cesar in San Jose, Costa Rica on October 31, 1987, and Chamorro testified in closed session in April 1988. Each said he had not known Morales was under indictment when they first met. All denied receiving more than $10,000 in cash from Morales; the subcommittee found that $10,000 went to Chamorro to cover the cost of flying a C-47 from Haiti to Ilopango, and that Customs records showed Morales entering the United States from the Bahamas on October 13, 1984 with Aguado, Cesar and Chamorro, carrying $400,000 in cash and checks that they said were returned to Morales after clearing Customs. Chamorro gave the subcommittee a notarized purchase order dated October 1, 1984 transferring a DC-3 (the civilian designation of a C-47) from Morales to Aguado for one dollar, and a list of 24 flights between October 1984 and February 1986 moving some 156,000 pounds of material from Ilopango to airfields in Costa Rica. The subcommittee stated that it substantiated key elements of Morales's account but did not find evidence that Cesar, Chamorro or Prado were personally involved in drug trafficking.[^28]
+
+Aguado told the subcommittee that the traffickers used "the same connections, the same air strips, the same people," and that "maybe they said that it was weapons for Eden Pastora, and it was actually drugs." Cesar testified that he told CIA personnel at the military attache's office at [[Ilopango Airbase]] about his dealings with Morales, and answered "Yes" when Kerry asked whether they had said it was all right as long as he did not deal in the powder.[^29]
+
+The report states that after the La Penca bombing the CIA cut off all assistance to ARDE, and that the United States said the cutoff related to the involvement of ARDE personnel in drug trafficking, while many of the same traffickers were assisting other Contra groups that continued to receive funding; Morales, for example, used the pilot Duran, who also worked for groups associated with Alfonso Robelo and Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro. Castillo testified that when the CIA learned of narcotics trafficking by Pastora's supporters and lieutenants it reported them to law enforcement. Morales continued to work with the Contras until January 1986, was indicted a second time in the Southern District of Florida for a January 1986 cocaine flight to the [[Bahamas]], and was arrested June 12, 1986. He testified that his offers to cooperate were refused by the U.S. attorney, Leon Kellner; Kellner and the head of the criminal division, Richard Gregorie, told committee staff in November 1986 that Morales's story was not credible and that he was using the "I was working for the CIA" defense, and discouraged staff from meeting him before his sentencing. After his testimony the DEA accepted his offer to cooperate, and in November 1988 it gave him a polygraph examination on his subcommittee testimony; the report states that he was considered truthful.[^30]
+
+### John Hull and the OPIC loan
+
+John Hull, an Indiana farmer living in northern Costa Rica, was in the report's account a central figure in Contra operations on the Southern Front when they were managed by Oliver North, from 1984 through late 1986. According to Castillo's public testimony he had earlier helped the CIA with military supply operations, and he received $10,000 a month from [[Adolfo Calero]] of the FDN at North's direction. His properties included at least six airstrips, known to pilots as John Hull's ranch. On March 23, 1984 seven men aboard a U.S. government owned DC-3 were killed when the plane crashed near the ranch.[^31]
+
+Five witnesses testified that Hull was involved in cocaine trafficking: Floyd Carlton, Werner Lotz, [[Jose Blandon]], Morales and [[Gary Betzner]]. Betzner was the only one who testified that he was present when cocaine was loaded onto planes in Hull's presence. Betzner, a pilot for Morales's network, testified that in July 1984 he flew weapons to Hull's ranch, was met by Hull, and flew 17 duffel bags and several boxes of cocaine to Lakeland, Florida, and that two weeks later he flew weapons to an airstrip about ten miles from Hull's properties and loaded approximately 500 kilos of cocaine. Lotz said drugs were flown into Hull's ranch but that he did not personally witness the flights, and that Hull was paid for the refueling stops.[^32]
+
+Feldman went to Costa Rica in late March 1985 with two FBI agents to investigate Neutrality Act violations. He testified that Ambassador Tambs and the CIA chief of station Castillo told him Hull had been working for U.S. interests before March 1984, that an embassy security officer told an agent the matter involved "agencies with other operational requirements and we shouldn't interfere with the work of these agencies," and that the embassy staff told Hull not to speak to him without an attorney. Feldman concluded that embassy officials were taking active measures to protect Hull, that the consul in San Jose was trying to get two jailed mercenaries to recant their statements about Hull's involvement with the CIA, and that because Hull was receiving protection from some U.S. officials he could not be interviewed. He took no further steps to do so.[^33]
+
+The report states that Hull then prepared falsified affidavits from jailed mercenaries in Costa Rica and sent them to Kellner; the mercenaries accused congressional staff of paying witnesses to invent stories about the Contra supply network. The Justice Department concluded the affidavits had been forged. Kellner testified that he "had concerns about them" and did not believe them, and the subcommittee recorded that the department had taken no action against Hull for filing false affidavits.[^34]
+
+On March 30, 1984 the [[Overseas Private Investment Corporation]] advanced $375,000 to a joint venture wood products factory for which Hull and two associates had applied in 1983; OPIC and the partners testified that no contributions were made to the venture. By the end of 1985 the loan was in default, OPIC found that the funds had been deposited in Hull's Indiana bank account and withdrawn in cash, and the report states that no equipment was purchased and no products shipped. In April 1987 the case was referred to the Justice Department for a criminal fraud investigation, and nothing had happened in almost two years. OPIC foreclosed and bought its own collateral at auction for $187,500. Hull was arrested by Costa Rican authorities in mid-January 1989 and charged with drug trafficking and violating Costa Rica's neutrality.[^35]
+
+### The Frogman case and the Cuban-American connection
+
+The San Francisco Frogman case, in which swimmers brought cocaine ashore from a Colombian vessel in 1982 and 1983, was in the State Department's words of July 26, 1986 one of the first in which allegations linked specific Contra organizations to drug smugglers. Two Nicaraguans convicted in it, including [[Carlos Cabezas]], claimed they had delivered large sums to resistance groups in Costa Rica; Cabezas said part of $1.5 million in proceeds went to help Pastora's and Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro's operations on the Southern Front in 1982 and 1983. After the trial the government returned $36,020 seized as drug money to one of the defendants after he submitted letters from Contra leaders saying the funds were theirs. The subcommittee found that the defendants' second source of supply was Nicaraguans in Costa Rica associated with the Contras, among them [[Horacio Pereira]], who was convicted in Costa Rica in 1985 and sentenced to twelve years.[^36]
+
+The report describes Miami-based Cuban Americans who supported the Southern Front while the [[Boland Amendment]] barred official assistance, with help funded in part with drug money. The State Department said in July 1986 there was no information to substantiate allegations that the group around [[Rene Corbo]] was a source of drug money. The subcommittee reported that in August 1986 it asked Justice for information on Corbo, [[Frank Castro]], Luis Rodriguez and others and was refused, that the CIA at the May 6, 1986 meeting categorically denied that weapons had been shipped to the Contras on flights involving Corbo and suggested the contrary allegations were disinformation, and that the FBI had learned from informants that Cuban American supporters had shipped weapons from south Florida to Ilopango and onward to John Hull's airstrips. Corbo told the FBI on June 4 and 16, 1986 that he had participated in shipping weapons to the Contras in violation of the Neutrality Act. He and Castro were indicted in a Neutrality Act case in August 1988, without narcotics allegations. Robert Owen warned North that the "Cubans (are) involved in drugs," and notes of Colonel Robert Earl record the CIA in August 1986 worrying about "disreputable characters in the Cuban-American community."[^37]
+
+In a closed session on June 25, 1987 Ramon Milian Rodriguez testified that in a meeting arranged by a Miami private detective he offered [[Felix Rodriguez]] drug money for the Contras, that Felix Rodriguez accepted, and that $10 million was subsequently provided through secret couriers; he said he also offered to help entrap the Sandinistas in a drug sting, in return for dropping the charges against him. Felix Rodriguez strenuously denied this version and said he reported the offer to U.S. government agencies including the FBI and CIA, which took no action. The detective declined to respond to a subpoena, and the subcommittee stated that it could not resolve the difference.[^38]
+
+### Cuba and Nicaragua
+
+The subcommittee's chapter on Cuba and Nicaragua rests on testimony. It reports testimony that Cuba was used throughout the 1980s as a transit point and haven for laundering money, that Cuban authorities provided smugglers with protection for their boats and aircraft, and that [[Fidel Castro]] mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Medellin cartel.[^39] George Morales testified that Cuban officials gave him overflight rights and sold him the radio frequencies of U.S. law enforcement agencies, and later offered him a house, a runway and banking facilities; he said he laundered over $500,000 through a bank at Cayo Largo.[^40]
+
+Jose Blandon testified that in the late 1970s Castro decided to use the power of drug traffickers to export revolution, and that he met Castro in Havana on June 21 or 22, 1984 at Noriega's request after Noriega raided a cartel laboratory in the Darien province, arrested 23 employees and seized equipment and drugs after accepting $5 million from the cartel. Castro, Blandon said, recommended returning the money and the laboratory; Noriega and Castro met directly a week later for five to six hours, and Cuba sent a 25-soldier unit to fly back with Noriega. Blandon produced photographs of himself with Castro, which were made part of the hearing record. A witness at the Miami conspiracy trial of the Cuban Ravelo-Renedo quoted high-ranking Cuban officials as saying "We'll drown them in drugs."[^41]
+
+Castro denounced Blandon's testimony as a fabrication in an NBC interview of February 25, 1988 and offered to prove Cuba was not involved in drug trafficking. Kerry told the Cuban Interest Section on March 14, 1988 that he would not visit unless his staff could advance the trip, Cuba agreed to discuss drug trafficking, and staff could interview [[Robert Vesco]]; the Cubans never replied and the trip did not take place.[^42]
+
+On Nicaragua, Floyd Carlton testified that [[Pablo Escobar]] sent him there twice in 1984, once to deliver money with a business partner of Noriega and once to locate airstrips for cocaine transshipment. Milian Rodriguez said Escobar asked him to explore drug operations in Nicaragua and document them in order to bargain with the United States for amnesty. A Miami attorney who passed a polygraph told the DEA in October and November 1986 that [[Jorge Ochoa]] told him the cartel "finances both Sandinista and anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua by setting up drug operations there," and that cartel principals wished to supply intelligence on guerrillas in return for amnesty; the DEA and FBI broke off contact. The principal evidence for Sandinista involvement came from Barry Seal's photographs of [[Federico Vaughn]], whom U.S. authorities identified as a Nicaraguan official, and Escobar loading Seal's plane; the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime found that the telephone number Vaughn used in calls from Seal had been controlled by the U.S. embassy since 1985. The State Department's narcotics report stated there was "no evidence" of Nicaragua being used to ship drugs to the United States "since the allegations made in 1984" in the Seal case.[^43]
+
+### Honduras and Bueso-Rosa
+
+The Honduras chapter covers the narcotics history of the country, the case of General [[Jose Bueso Rosa]] and Ramon Matta Ballesteros, and the policy issues those cases raised.[^44] On October 28, 1984 the FBI seized 345 kilos of cocaine valued at $40 million on a South Florida airstrip; the proceeds were to finance a plot to assassinate Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova. Bueso-Rosa, then military attache in Santiago, Chile, and two others were charged with conspiracy to commit murder. The Justice Department called the conspiracy the "most significant case of narco-terrorism yet discovered."[^45]
+
+The report states, citing the government's admissions in the trial of Oliver North, that in mid-September 1986 North advised Admiral [[John Poindexter]] that Ambassador John Negroponte, General Gorman, the senior CIA official [[Duane Clarridge]] and North had worked out arrangements for support of the resistance with Bueso-Rosa, who had recently been convicted, and that North suggested efforts be made on Bueso-Rosa's behalf to deter him from disclosing details of these covert activities. One co-defendant received 30 years; Bueso-Rosa received five years at Eglin Air Force Base after senior U.S. officials intervened with a federal judge.[^46] Mark Richard testified to the Iran-Contra committees that he was adamantly opposed to the interventions and that the Pentagon had taken the initiative; he recalled a meeting at which North, Gorman, [[Elliott Abrams]] and Clarridge "all agreed that Bueso-Rosa should be accommodated."[^47]
+
+### Law enforcement and national security
+
+The chapter on confused priorities listed the Barry Seal episode, the law enforcement investigations of the Contras on the Southern Front, a narcotics sting directed at a high Bahamian official, the Bueso-Rosa case and the handling of Noriega as instances in which foreign policy considerations took precedence over the war on drugs.[^48] Seal, a former smuggler, was used by the DEA in an operation against the Colombian cartels and officials of the Sandinista government. The report states that the operation was disclosed prematurely by an administration official who leaked evidence to the press in an effort to influence a pending congressional vote on Contra aid, and that one individual in the government, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, "decided to play politics with the issue." Associates of Seal who operated aircraft service businesses at the airport in [[Mena, Arkansas]] were targets of grand jury probes into narcotics trafficking; the report states that despite evidence sufficient for an indictment on money laundering charges and over the strong protests of state and federal law enforcement officials, the cases were dropped, and that the apparent reason was that prosecution might have revealed national security information.[^49]
+
+The subcommittee reported that it was unable to find a single case against a drug trafficker operating in the war zones of northern Costa Rica that was made on a tip or report from a U.S. intelligence official, and that traffickers' names in documents released in the Iran-Contra hearings were deleted in declassification although a memorandum on the trafficking written by Robert Owen to North had been widely circulated. Gregorie testified that the case against Noriega could be jeopardized if intelligence agencies did not share information, and that he was convinced the prosecutors had not seen "even a small percentage of what we should see." He resigned in January 1989.[^50]
+
+The chapter gives three case studies. Michael Palmer was an informant for the DEA and Customs while the State Department used Vortex's DC-6 for humanitarian cargoes. The Detroit indictment against him was dropped as "not being in the interest of the United States." Frank Camper, a Birmingham, Alabama informant for the FBI who ran a mercenary school, testified that he reported Panamanian Defense Forces dealings with the Medellin cartel to military intelligence, which did not follow up, that he trained members of the Civilian Military Assistance group who fought with the Contras and worked with Hull, and that the FBI advised him to continue training four Sikh nationalists; he said the Sikhs used plastic explosives obtained from his school in the June 1985 bombing of Air India Flight 182. Richard Brenneke testified in a deposition of April 23, 1988 that he had worked for the CIA and Israeli intelligence and arranged purchases of Eastern European weapons for the Contras, and that Israeli agents in the Central American weapons project were running drugs into the United States; the subcommittee reported that its review of thousands of documents found he was never officially connected to U.S. intelligence and that no evidence showed any of his arms deals came to fruition.[^51]
+
+### The Bahamas
+
+The subcommittee's Bahamas chapter begins with Robert Vesco, who fled the United States in 1972 accused by law enforcement authorities of looting $240 million from the Overseas Investors Services mutual fund. He established operations in the Bahamas and developed a relationship with Everett Bannister, a political fixer close to Prime Minister [[Lynden Pindling]]. Vesco gave Bannister "carte blanche" at the Bahamas Commonwealth Bank, and Bannister and Pindling in return gave Vesco protection from extradition. Vesco returned to the islands in 1978 after establishing a relationship with [[Carlos Lehder]], who bought most of Norman's Cay. Some forty Lehder employees drove other residents and visitors away from the island at gunpoint, and Lehder built a large hangar with cocaine storage facilities.[^52]
+
+Embassy cables led to a 1982 meeting between Vice President [[George H. W. Bush]], Admiral [[Daniel Murphy]] and Pindling, at which Pindling was shown a computer printout of surveillance of Norman's Cay and told that the island resembled O'Hare Airport. The report states there was no follow-up; with a new ambassador, [[Lev Dobriansky]], relations focused on base rights and the drug issue was relegated to a much lower priority. The State Department's 1988 narcotics report described "systematic corruption, which continues to make the Bahamas attractive to drug traffickers."[^53]
+
+### Colombia
+
+The Colombia chapter covers the origins of the cartels, their organization and wealth, and the cartels' war against the Colombian government. Its account of the origin of the cartels relies on the testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez on February 11, 1988 and of Leigh Ritch on February 8, 1988.[^54]
+
+### Panama and Manuel Noriega
+
+The Panama chapter describes the Noriega saga as "one of the most serious foreign policy failures for the United States." The executive summary held that each U.S. government agency with a relationship with Noriega "turned a blind eye to his corruption and drug dealing, even as he was emerging as a key player on behalf of the Medellin cartel."[^55]
+
+Witnesses testified that Noriega arranged for [[Hugo Spadafora]], a Panamanian opposition figure who had criticized him for working with Colombian traffickers, to be tortured and murdered by members of the [[Panama Defense Forces]] in September 1985; the report states the PDF's involvement was confirmed by several sources including Noriega's personal pilot, Floyd Carlton, and Jose Blandon. [[Francis J. McNeil]], a career State Department official and former ambassador to Costa Rica, referred to Noriega early on as "the rent-a-colonel," described the U.S. approach as a "see no evil approach," and called the failure a "true intelligence failure, the accountability for which rests with the intelligence folk who had become Noriega's clients." Noriega provided the Kalish drug smuggling organization with military protection and favorable treatment and, in return, Steven Kalish received three Panamanian passports, one of them diplomatic; Noriega worked with Kalish until his arrest in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]] on July 26, 1984.[^56]
+
+The subcommittee reported that it could not determine what U.S. agencies knew because the National Security Council had decided to prohibit General Accounting Office investigators from receiving information on U.S. policymaking on Noriega and narcotics. Gorman testified that after taking command in Panama in 1983 he tried to establish whether the rumors about Noriega were true and could not, having been assured by the U.S. embassy that Noriega was cooperating. [[Norman Bailey]], a senior NSC staff member from 1981 to 1983, testified to the House Select Committee on Narcotics that what was available to authorized officials was "not a 'smoking gun' but rather a twenty-one cannon barrage" of evidence, and that "clear and incontrovertible evidence was, at best, ignored, and at worst, hidden and denied by many different agencies." Noriega's name appeared in more than 80 DEA files between 1970 and 1987; the report states that DEA Administrator [[John Lawn]] told Admiral Murphy less than eight weeks before Noriega's indictment that no indictment would be issued, and that the Customs commissioner [[William von Raab]] testified that Customs had evidence linking Noriega to narcotics trafficking as early as 1983. Murphy, the former operations chief of the South Florida Drug Task Force, said information about Noriega was received by lower-level officials but not passed on to policy makers. Lawn had written to Noriega on May 8, 1986 to express the agency's "deep appreciation for the vigorous anti-drug trafficking policy that you have adopted."[^57]
+
+### Conclusions of the 1988 report
+
+The report's twelfth chapter lists conclusions on national security, federal priorities, covert activity, law enforcement, money laundering, personnel and the Neutrality Act. It states that international drug trafficking organizations are a threat to U.S. national security, that intelligence reporting on narcotics was "marginal and woefully inadequate," that law enforcement and national security agencies regarded each other with suspicion and should resolve the distrust, and that Customs preclearance be withheld from countries that do not cooperate. It recommends that the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence examine why the government failed to acknowledge the cartels' threat, and that the Select Committee review the handling of Frank Camper's testimony and whether military intelligence was involved in improper domestic operations.[^58] The chapter closes with the statement that "in the end the Contras themselves became victims of the very network created to support them," and that officials who "turned a blind eye to General Noriega, who intervened on behalf of General Bueso-Rosa, and who adamantly opposed the investigations of foreign narcotics figures by honest, hard-working law enforcement officials, must also bear the responsibility for what is happening in the streets of the United States today." It quotes Gregorie: "If it was the communists that were taking over South and Central America, we would have done something about it. But it's the drug dealers and therefore they (the government) don't see that as a significant priority."[^59]
+
+The money chapter records that a proposal by the subcommittee to have the Treasury negotiate agreements permitting foreign banks to cooperate with narcotics investigations, sponsored by Kerry and McConnell as an amendment, was included in the Omnibus Drug Bill passed at the close of the 100th Congress.[^60]
+
+### Hearings and witnesses
+
+The hearing record was published in four parts under S. Hrg. 100-773. Part 1 covers hearings of May 27, July 15 and October 30, 1987, held jointly with the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment.[^61] Part 2 is the Panama volume, February 8 through 11, 1988, with the testimony of Leigh Ritch, Jose Blandon, Floyd Carlton and Ramon Milian Rodriguez.[^62] Part 3, April 4 through 7, 1988, includes the testimony of Gary Betzner and George Morales and the prepared statement of Francis McNeil.[^63] Part 4, titled "The Cartel, Haiti and Central America," covers July 11, 12 and 14, 1988 and includes the testimony of David Westrate, Admiral Daniel Murphy and Frank Camper.[^64]
+
+### BCCI and the subcommittee's 1988 to 1992 investigation
+
+The BCCI report states that the subcommittee's investigation of the bank began in February 1988, early in the second year of what it calls a two-year investigation of drug trafficking and its relation to foreign policy and law enforcement. At a hearing on Noriega's drug trafficking and money laundering, BCCI was identified as facilitating his criminal activity. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to those at the bank who handled Noriega's assets and the accounts of others in Panama and Colombia. Service was delayed at the request of the Justice Department and the Customs Service, which were concerned for the [[Operation C-Chase|C-Chase]] sting in Tampa; by the time the subpoenas were served in late July 1988 the subcommittee's public hearings were over. BCCI officials then told subcommittee counsel Jack Blum that the bank and its attorneys, among them [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]], were obstructing the inquiry. The subcommittee deposed [[Amjad Awan]] shortly before his arrest in the sting and a second former BCCI officer afterward.[^65]
+
+In the spring of 1989, as Blum left the subcommittee, Kerry authorized him to give his information to the Justice Department. The report describes it as some 16 hours of interviews between Blum and two informants, taped by the Tampa prosecutors' office. When the department, in Blum's view, did not follow up, he took it to the New York District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]], who began his investigation based in substantial part on leads from Blum and the subcommittee. Kerry continued the investigation with two members of his personal staff through 1989 and 1990. In January 1990, when the Justice Department entered a plea agreement with BCCI, the subcommittee published a report on drug money laundering that raised further questions about BCCI and its alleged secret ownership of [[First American Bank]]; in July 1990 hearings were postponed after BCCI's attorneys and the Justice Department told staff that the requested witnesses, including Altman, would decline to testify.[^66]
+
+The Foreign Relations Committee authorized the investigation on May 23, 1991, without dissent, together with a subpoena to BCCI, and Brown and his staff then joined Kerry's. The printed report says that "staffing constraints in the offices of the Senators involved with the investigation hampered efforts to investigate matters pertaining to BCCI's activities outside the United States"; the committee's electronic text, which the Federation of American Scientists published, reads instead that staffing "remained limited, amounting to two attorneys, with no budget for travel," and adds that after efforts to obtain authorization through the Banking Committee failed Kerry decided in early 1991 to formalize the personal staff investigation. Subpoena and writ authorizations followed on November 27, 1991, February 29, 1992 and June 4, 1992.[^67]
+
+The subcommittee held thirteen days of public hearings, on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991, and staffed a Senate Banking subcommittee hearing on May 23, 1991. It obtained documents from BCCI and its attorneys, former officials and creditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], Clifford and Altman, First American, the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]], the [[Office of the Comptroller of the Currency]], the [[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation]], the [[Office of Thrift Supervision]], the [[Resolution Trust Corporation]], [[Abu Dhabi]], the CIA, the Customs Service, the State Department and the Department of Agriculture.[^68] The introduction states that BCCI "cannot be taken as an isolated example of a rogue bank, but a case study of the vulnerability of the world to international crime on a global scope that is beyond the current ability of governments to control." Brown's separate statement credits Kerry with spearheading an investigation that "no other committee in the United States Senate" conducted, and says that because many important members of Kerry's own party were involved it was a distasteful subject for other chairmen.[^69]
+
+The report's chapter on BCCI's relations with foreign governments records that BCCI obtained the account of Noriega while he ran Panamanian military intelligence, and that BCCI official [[Alauddin Shaikh]] flew to Panama two to three times a year until 1985 to meet him, according to the BCCI officer [[Nazir Chinoy]]. Noriega opened an account in the name of the Panamanian Defense Forces in early 1982; at its height it held about $25 million, mostly from cash deposits, and he used it for political payoffs, intelligence operations and later personal expenses. After his indictment in Miami in February 1988 he told BCCI to move the funds, and in July 1988, when BCCI learned the subcommittee had subpoenaed the records, about $23 million was moved through trading accounts of BCCI's commodities affiliate [[Capcom]].[^70]
+
+### BCCI and the CIA
+
+The chapter on the CIA states that the CIA's official record of its use of BCCI was "by and large, accurately represented" by Acting Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] in public testimony on October 25, 1991, supplemented by classified testimony on October 31, 1991. The report states that Kerr agreed to testify publicly after Kerry told the CIA that the nomination of [[Robert Gates]] as director would be delayed until the CIA provided such testimony.[^71] Kerr acknowledged what the subcommittee had learned the day before from the former First American president Altman, that the CIA had made extensive use of First American as a repository for "normal banking" and savings accounts, and that the CIA had also used BCCI for limited and routine intelligence-gathering. He testified that the CIA had not been involved with any BCCI "black network" of thugs and assassins, had no knowledge of any use of BCCI for arms sales to Iran or the diversion of funds for the Nicaraguan Contras, and had no relationship with BCCI's head, [[Agha Hasan Abedi]]. The report adds that the CIA's early 1985 report on BCCI was missing and had been reconstructed at the subcommittee's request, and that the record had substantial gaps on the activities of contacts including the BCCI customer and Iran-Contra arms merchant [[Adnan Khashoggi]].[^72]
+
+### Kissinger Associates and the two editions of the report
+
+The report's chapter 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," records BCCI contacts with the New York consulting firm [[Kissinger Associates]] from the fall of 1986 through early 1989. The firm's partners were [[Henry A. Kissinger]], [[Brent Scowcroft]], [[Lawrence Eagleburger]], Alan Stoga and T. Jefferson Cunningham III. Both editions state that discussions "ended in early 1989 at Henry Kissinger's personal insistence."[^73]
+
+In November 1991 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized a subpoena to Kissinger Associates for all documents on BCCI and its client lists. The firm promised to cooperate under an agreement that the subpoena not be served, provided documents, and declined to provide its client list. The printed report says the firm declined "contending the information was confidential"; the electronic text says the firm refused on the ground that the list was beyond the investigation and told the subcommittee it would litigate "through an extensive appellate process to the Supreme Court."[^74]
+
+The two texts of the chapter differ. The Federation of American Scientists' electronic text carries a note by [[Steven Aftergood]] describing it as the "penultimate draft" and stating that after the report's release Sen. Hank Brown, "reportedly acting at the behest of Henry Kissinger, pressed for the deletion of a few passages, particularly in Chapter 20 on 'BCCI and Kissinger Associates,'" so that the hardcopy printed by the Government Printing Office "differs slightly from the Committee's softcopy version." The electronic text names the firm's counsel, [[Lloyd Cutler]], as the source of the January 30, 1992 representations that the firm had "never represented or provided any services for BCCI, ICIC, or any BCCI shareholder" and that the only substantive contact was Abol Helmy's meetings with Stoga in late 1988 and early 1989, and adds the committee's comment that this account "is not untrue" but "does fail to characterize the full extent of the contacts." The printed chapter gives the same representations without naming Cutler, omits that comment, and says the contacts "extended over a period of 2 years." It adds a second paragraph stating that "while Henry Kissinger in December 1988, rejected the proposed relationship with BCCI," the record shows BCCI repeatedly reached out to the firm and to Kissinger as an individual and that "in each case reviewed by the Subcommittee, Kissinger declined the overtures."[^75]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Kerry, Senator John, and Senator Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* December 1992, ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
+[^1]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, S. Prt. 100-165, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (December 1988; Washington: GPO, 1989), Introduction, "Origins and Methodology," pp. 5-6, on the early 1986 staff investigation, the April 1986 approach to Chairman Lugar, the closed session of June 25, 1986, the direction of Chairman Pell in February 1987, and the assignment in April 1987 to the subcommittee chaired by Kerry with Senator McConnell as ranking member. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
-[^2]: Aftergood, Steven. Editorial note, "The BCCI Affair," Federation of American Scientists. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/
+[^2]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "Narcotics Traffickers and the Contras," Introduction, p. 36. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^3]: S. Prt. 100-165, "Origins and Methodology," pp. 5-6. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^4]: S. Prt. 100-165, Letter of Transmittal (dated Washington, D.C., April 13, 1989), staff acknowledgment: "Special Counsel Jack A. Blum." https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^5]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 37, quoting State Department document 3079e (April 16, 1986) and document 5136c (July 26, 1986). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^6]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 37-38, quoting the testimony of the CIA Central American Task Force chief before the Iran-Contra committees, August 5, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^7]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 38-39, citing the memoranda of conversation of the May 6, 1986 meeting held in the subcommittee files. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^8]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, and ch. 5, "The Cuban-American Connection," p. 60 (which cites a letter of John Bolton to Senators Lugar and Pell, August 11, 1986). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^9]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, and Appendix B, "Allegations of Interference with the Committee Investigation," pp. 147-148, citing the subcommittee testimony of Jeffery B. Feldman, October 5, 1988, pp. 24 and 29, and his Iran-Contra testimony. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^10]: S. Prt. 100-165, Appendix B, pp. 148-149, citing the deposition of Thomas E. Marum, October 25, 1988, p. 56, and the deposition of Mark Richard, November 7, 1988, pp. 37-40; p. 39 states that each Justice Department deponent denied participating in any agreement to obstruct a congressional investigation. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^11]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 1, "Executive Summary and Conclusions," "Past Failures," pp. 2-3. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^12]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 12, "Conclusions," items 5 and 6, "Covert Activity Issues," pp. 136-137. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^13]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 39, citing the testimony of Gen. Paul Gorman, Part 2, February 8, 1988, p. 44, and of David Westrate, Part 4, July 12, 1988, p. 144. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^14]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 39-40, citing Kerry's interviews with Costa Rican law enforcement officials, San Jose, October 31, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^15]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 40-41, citing the closed-session deposition of Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8, 1988, pp. 673-690, and the deposition of Karol Prado. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^16]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 41, citing DEA testimony before the House Subcommittee on Crime, July 28, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^17]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 42, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of "Thomas Castillo." https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^18]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "U.S. Government Funds and Companies with Drug Connections," pp. 42-43, with table and note 35 (GAO analysis of NHAO accounts; final figures provided by the State Department to the subcommittee, January 4, 1989). The table prints the four items and a total of $806,401.20. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^19]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 43-44, citing Duemling's statement to Kerry of April 6, 1988 and his Iran-Contra deposition, Appendix B, vol. 9, pp. 47-78. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^20]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 44. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^21]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "A. SETCO/Hondu Carib," pp. 44-45. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^22]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "B. Frigorificos de Puntarenas," pp. 45-47 (the $261,937 figure on p. 45; the table on p. 43 prints $261,932), citing the grand jury statements of Carlos Soto, the testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez, Part 2, February 11, 1988, pp. 260-261, and *U.S. v. Luis Rodriguez*, 88-0222 (S.D. Fla.). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^23]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "C. DIACSA," pp. 47-48, citing the affidavit of DEA Special Agent Daniel E. Moritz, *U.S. v. Carlton et al.*, S.D. Fla. 85-70. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^24]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "D. Vortex," pp. 48-49, citing the subcommittee testimony of Michael B. Palmer, April 6, 1988, and the Detroit indictment of 1986. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^25]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The Case of George Morales and FRS/ARDE," p. 49, quoting State Department document 5136c (July 26, 1986), p. 5. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^26]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 50, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of Robert Owen, Appendix B, vol. 20, pp. 849-850, and the deposition of Karol Prado, Part 3, p. 285. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^27]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 50, citing the testimony of George Morales, Part 3, April 7, 1988, pp. 297, 300. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^28]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 50-51, citing the video depositions of Aguado, Prado and Cesar, Part 3, pp. 277-286, and the closed-session testimony of Adolfo Chamorro, April 6, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^29]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 51-52, citing Part 3, pp. 282-286. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^30]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 52-53, citing the Iran-Contra executive session testimony of Thomas Castillo, May 29, 1987, pp. 83-85, the testimony of Morales, Part 1, July 16, 1987, p. 98. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^31]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "John Hull," pp. 53-54, citing North notebook entries, the Iran-Contra deposition of Robert Owen, and the Castillo executive session. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^32]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 54-55, citing the testimony of Gary Betzner, Part 3, April 7, 1988, pp. 253-267, and the deposition of Werner Lotz, Part 4, April 8, 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^33]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 55-56, citing the Iran-Contra deposition of Jeffrey Feldman, Appendix B, vol. 10, April 30, 1987, pp. 77-88. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^34]: S. Prt. 100-165, p. 56, citing the Iran-Contra testimony of Leon Kellner. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^35]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 56-58, citing the Part 1 testimony of October 30, 1987. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^36]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The San Francisco Frogman Case, UDN-FARN and PCNE," pp. 58-59, quoting State Department document 5136c. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^37]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "The Cuban-American Connection," pp. 59-61, including the account of the May 6, 1986 meeting on p. 60 and the Earl notes on p. 61 (Iran-Contra deposition of Robert L. Earl, Appendix B, vol. 9, p. 1109). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^38]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 5, "Ramon Milian Rodriguez and Felix Rodriguez," pp. 61-62. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^39]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Cuba and Nicaragua," Introduction, pp. 62-63. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^40]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, pp. 64-65, citing the testimony of George Morales, Part 3, pp. 294-296, and Part 1, pp. 48-66. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^41]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Ideological Use of Drugs" and "Cuba, Panama and the Cartel," pp. 65-66, citing the testimony of Jose Blandon, Part 2, February 9, 1988, pp. 101-108. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^42]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Castro Denies Involvement," pp. 66-67, citing NBC Nightly News, February 25, 1988, and a meeting of March 14, 1988 with the deputy chief of the Cuban Interest Section. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^43]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 6, "Allegations Concerning Nicaragua," pp. 67-69, citing the deposition of Floyd Carlton, December 4, 1987, the closed-session testimony of Ramon Milian Rodriguez, June 25, 1987, DEA debriefs of a Miami attorney (October 21 and November 13, 1986) and the testimony of Gen. Gorman, Part 2, pp. 104-107. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^44]: S. Prt. 100-165, Honduras chapter, pp. 73-79. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^45]: S. Prt. 100-165, Honduras chapter, p. 76. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^46]: S. Prt. 100-165, pp. 76-77, citing the agreed statements in *U.S. v. North*, 1988, para. 102, and p. 121 ("Bueso-Rosa and the Contras"), citing the testimony of Francis McNeil, Part 3, April 4, 1988, p. 52, and John C. Lawn, Part 4, July 12, 1988, pp. 134-135. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^47]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, p. 122, citing the Iran-Contra deposition of Mark M. Richard, Appendix B, vol. 23, August 19, 1987, pp. 122-128. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^48]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Law Enforcement vs. National Security: Confused Priorities," Introduction, p. 121. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^49]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Barry Seal and the Cartel," p. 121. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^50]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Intelligence vs. Law Enforcement" and "Misguided Priorities," pp. 122-123, citing the testimony of Richard Gregorie, July 12, 1988, and the April 1, 1985 Owen memorandum to North (Iran-Contra exhibit RWO 7). https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^51]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Case Studies," pp. 126-132, citing the testimony of Michael Palmer, Part 3, April 6, 1988, the testimony of Frank Camper, Part 4, and the deposition of Richard Brenneke, April 23, 1988. Camper's account of the Air India bombing is his testimony as summarized on p. 130. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^52]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 3, "The Bahamas," pp. 14-16. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^53]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 3, pp. 18-19, citing the State Department's 1988 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^54]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 4, "Colombia," pp. 25-35, "Origin of the Cartels," pp. 27-28. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^55]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 1, pp. 2-3, and ch. 9, "Panama," pp. 79-98. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^56]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 9, pp. 88-89, citing the testimony of Floyd Carlton, Part 2, February 10, 1988, p. 202, and the McNeil prepared statement, Part 3, p. 318. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^57]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 9, "U.S. Knowledge of Noriega's Activities," "Why Did the U.S. Fail To Respond to Noriega Allegations?" and "Mixed Messages," pp. 88-92, citing the testimony of Gorman, Part 2, pp. 38-39, of Admiral Murphy, Part 4, pp. 239-242, and of Norman Bailey before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, March 1988. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^58]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 12, "Conclusions," pp. 133-145, items 1 through 11. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^59]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 11, "Conclusion," pp. 132-133, quoting an NBC Nightly News interview with Richard Gregorie of February 22, 1989. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^60]: S. Prt. 100-165, ch. 10, "Money," "Summary and Conclusions," p. 120. https://archive.org/details/Kerry-Report-Drugs-Contras
+[^61]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy*, hearings before the Subcommittees on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications and International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans and Environment, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 1, 100th Cong., 1st sess., May 27, July 15 and October 30, 1987. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0003
+[^62]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement, and Foreign Policy: Panama*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 2, 100th Cong., 2d sess., February 8, 9, 10 and 11, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0004
+[^63]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: Hearings*, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 3, April 4, 5, 6 and 7, 1988. Betzner's testimony is cited in the 1988 report as Part 3, April 7, 1988, and Morales's as Part 3, April 7, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0005
+[^64]: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Drugs, Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy: The Cartel, Haiti and Central America*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, S. Hrg. 100-773, Part 4, July 11, 12 and 14, 1988. https://archive.org/details/micro_IA41152832_0009
+[^65]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown, *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*, S. Prt. 102-140, 102d Cong., 2d sess. (December 1992; Washington: GPO, 1993), ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation," p. 18. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 (GPO print); electronic text of the committee's version: https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
+[^66]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, pp. 18-19. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^67]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, p. 19 (printed text); electronic text of ch. 2, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm, for the "two attorneys, with no budget for travel" and Banking Committee sentences. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^68]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, pp. 19-20. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^69]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 2, p. 17 (introductory paragraph) and pp. 20-21 ("Senator Brown's View"). https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^70]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 5, "BCCI's Relationship with Foreign Governments, Central Banks, and International Organizations," pp. 108-109. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^71]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence," pp. 289 and 324. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^72]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, pp. 289, 292 (citing testimony of Kerr and of Altman, S. Hrg. 102-350, Pt. 3) and 293. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^73]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, "BCCI and Kissinger Associates," Introduction, p. 549. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ; electronic text: https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm
+[^74]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, p. 550, n. 507; electronic text, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^75]: *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 20, pp. 549-551 (printed text); electronic text of ch. 20 and note by Steven Aftergood, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/index.html and https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/20kiss.htm.

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PARAMILITARY/Golani infantry brigade.md

@@ -4,13 +4,14 @@ tags:
   - Military
   - Israel
 category: "Paramilitary"
-summary: "The Golani Brigade is an elite Israeli Army infantry unit whose former commander Uri Simchoni later served as a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee during the Iran-Contra arms transfers."
+summary: "The Golani Brigade is an elite Israeli Army infantry unit whose former commander Uri Simchoni later served, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, as a member of the Iran-Israel Joint Committee during the Iran-Contra arms transfers."
 start: 1948
 location: "Israel"
 ---
-The [[Golani infantry brigade]] is an elite infantry brigade of the [[Israel|Israeli Defense Forces]]. [[Uri Simchoni]], a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], was formerly the chief of this brigade.[^1]
+The [[Golani infantry brigade]] is an elite infantry brigade of the [[Israel|Israeli Defense Forces]]. [[Uri Simchoni]], whom [[Ari Ben-Menashe]] names as a member of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]], was formerly the chief of this brigade.[^1]
 
-[[Ari Ben-Menashe]]'s basic training in the military was in a special infantry unit known as Golani, where he undertook a special high-explosives sabotage course.[^1]
+Ben-Menashe's basic training in the military was in a special infantry unit known as Golani, where he undertook a special high-explosives sabotage course.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

20 - ORGANIZATIONS/PRIVATE/Drexel Burnham.md

@@ -5,16 +5,17 @@ tags:
   - Finance
   - USA
 category: "Private Organization"
-summary: "Drexel Burnham was the investment bank where Michael Milken built his junk-bond empire, and whose financial infrastructure was used by the Iran-Israel Joint Committee slush fund to finance covert activities."
+summary: "Drexel Burnham was the investment bank where Michael Milken built his junk-bond empire, and whose financial infrastructure, according to Ari Ben-Menashe, was used by the Iran-Israel Joint Committee slush fund to finance covert activities."
 start: 1935
 end: 1990
 location: "New York City"
 ---
-[[Drexel Burnham]] was a prominent brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune. It was involved in the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund, which was used to finance various covert activities and political initiatives.
+[[Drexel Burnham]] was a prominent brokerage house where [[Michael Milken]] built his junk-bond fortune. According to [[Ari Ben-Menashe]], it was involved in the financial operations of the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]]'s slush fund, which was used to finance various covert activities and political initiatives.
 
-Large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]], along with profits from earlier deals, were held at various interest rates by Drexel on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies after being funneled through [[United States|American]] banks. These large deposits contributed to Drexel's stature and helped underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds.[^1]
+Ben-Menashe wrote that large amounts of money from the arms sales to [[Iran]], along with profits from earlier deals, were held at various interest rates by Drexel on behalf of [[Israel|Israeli]] front companies after being funneled through [[United States|American]] banks. He wrote that these large deposits contributed to Drexel's stature and helped underwrite huge quantities of junk bonds.[^1]
 
-In 1987, the [[Iran-Israel Joint Committee]] decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel and from the control of [[Menachem Schneerson]] (Lubavitcher Rebbe). This decision was influenced by concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between [[Israel]] and the [[United States|U.S.]] deteriorated, and it contributed to [[Michael Milken|Milken's]] growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel.[^1]
+He wrote that in 1987 the Iran-Israel Joint Committee decided to withdraw its funds from Drexel and from the control of [[Menachem Schneerson]] (Lubavitcher Rebbe), and that this decision was influenced by concerns that the funds might be frozen if relations between Israel and the U.S. deteriorated, and contributed to Milken's growing troubles and ultimately to the fall of Drexel.[^1]
 
 ### Footnotes
+
 [^1]: Ben-Menashe, Ari. *Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network*. Sheridan Square Press, 1992 (TrineDay reprint, 2015).

30 - PROGRAMS & PROJECTS/INTELLIGENCE_OPERATIONS/Operation AJAX.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-05-15
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: Operation AJAX
 aliases:
   - Operation Ajax
@@ -15,12 +15,12 @@ tags:
   - ColdWar
   - 1950s
 category: "Intelligence Operation"
-summary: "Operation AJAX was the CIA's code name for the August 1953 covert operation that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, restoring the Shah to full power in collaboration with British MI6 (Operation Boot), and establishing the direct precedent for CIA-backed coups that shaped Cold War policy and Iran's trajectory toward the 1979 Islamic Revolution."
+summary: "Operation AJAX was the CIA code name for the August 1953 covert operation, run with British MI6 (Operation Boot), that overthrew Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and restored the Shah to power."
 start: 1953-08-19
 location: "Tehran, Iran"
 ---
 
-Operation AJAX was the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s operational code name for the August 1953 covert action that overthrew the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh|Mohammad Mosaddegh]] and restored [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] (the Shah) to full autocratic power. The British [[MI6]] designated the same operation Operation Boot. The coup took place on August 19, 1953, known in the Iranian calendar as 28 Mordad 1332. The CIA officially acknowledged its central role in the operation in August 2013 when it released a declassified internal history.[^1]
+Operation AJAX was the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s operational code name for the August 1953 covert action that overthrew the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh|Mohammad Mosaddegh]] and restored [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi]] (the Shah) to full autocratic power. The British [[MI6]] designated the same operation Operation Boot. The coup took place on August 19, 1953, known in the Iranian calendar as 28 Mordad 1332. The CIA's internal history of the operation, written in March 1954, became public in 2000. In August 2013 the [[National Security Archive]] posted a mid-1970s CIA history, *The Battle for Iran*, with its references to TPAJAX restored, and described it as believed to be the CIA's first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the coup.[^1][^2]
 
 ### Background: The Oil Nationalization Crisis
 
@@ -38,7 +38,9 @@ The operational plan involved multiple coordinated elements:
 - Hiring of provocateurs and street mobs to create chaos, including paying demonstrators to claim affiliation with the Tudeh Party while carrying out violent acts designed to discredit Mosaddegh
 - Coordination with Iranian military officers loyal to the Shah
 
-The first coup attempt on the night of August 15-16, 1953, failed when Mosaddegh was warned. The Shah fled to Rome. Roosevelt remained in Tehran and reorganized for a second attempt.[^1]
+Before the first attempt the Shah had signed the royal decrees (firmans) that the operation required. The CIA history records that on August 10 he said that while he approved of the plan for action he would sign no papers, and that after pressure from [[Princess Ashraf Pahlavi]] and [[H. Norman Schwarzkopf]] and several meetings with Kermit Roosevelt he signed the firmans dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing [[Fazlollah Zahedi]]. A British memorandum in the Foreign Relations volume dates the firman to August 13, 1953, says it was carried from Ramsar to Tehran by Colonel Nasiri, commander of the Imperial Guard, and says Nasiri was arrested after delivering a copy late on August 15 to the officer in charge of the troops at Mosaddegh's house.[^3][^4]
+
+The first coup attempt on the night of August 15-16, 1953, failed when Mosaddegh was warned. The Shah flew to Baghdad when the plan misfired and reached Rome from Baghdad on August 18. He left Rome for Baghdad around midnight on August 20 and returned to Tehran on August 22.[^1][^5] Roosevelt remained in Tehran and reorganized for a second attempt.[^1]
 
 ### The August 19 Coup
 
@@ -46,7 +48,7 @@ On August 19, 1953, coordinated operations produced the successful coup. CIA-org
 
 Mosaddegh was arrested, tried for treason by a military court, and sentenced to three years in prison. After his release he was confined to house arrest at his estate in Ahmad Abad, where he lived until his death in 1967. The Shah returned from exile and assumed direct control of the government.[^1]
 
-General Norman Schwarzkopf Sr. (father of the Gulf War commander) played a supporting role; he had trained the Iranian gendarmerie in the late 1940s and used his contacts with Iranian military officers in the coup preparations.[^2]
+General Norman Schwarzkopf Sr. (father of the Gulf War commander) played a supporting role; he had trained the Iranian gendarmerie in the late 1940s and used his contacts with Iranian military officers in the coup preparations.[^6]
 
 ### Consequences
 
@@ -60,11 +62,15 @@ The 1953 coup established Operation AJAX as the template for CIA-backed regime c
 
 ### CIA Acknowledgment
 
-The CIA maintained official silence about its role in Operation AJAX for sixty years. In August 2013, responding to Freedom of Information Act requests, the CIA released a partially declassified internal history of the 1953 coup written in 1954 by agency historian Donald Wilber, confirming CIA operational planning and execution. The State Department's official historical record, Foreign Relations of the United States, included Operation AJAX documentation in its 1989 volume on Iran 1951-1954.
+The CIA maintained official silence about its role in Operation AJAX for sixty years. The Wilber history of the 1953 coup, written in March 1954, was first disclosed by James Risen in The New York Times on April 16 and June 18, 2000, and posted by the National Security Archive on November 29, 2000. On August 19, 2013, the National Security Archive posted newly declassified CIA material, including the mid-1970s internal history *The Battle for Iran*, which the agency had released in 1981 with every reference to TPAJAX blacked out and which now showed those references, together with Kermit Roosevelt's working files; the Archive described it as believed to be the CIA's first formal acknowledgement that the agency helped to plan and execute the coup.[^2] The State Department's official historical record, Foreign Relations of the United States, included Operation AJAX documentation in its 1989 volume on Iran 1951-1954.
 
-Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] acknowledged in 2000 that the 1953 coup was a "setback for democratic governance" in Iran without explicitly admitting CIA direction. The 2013 declassification was the first official CIA acknowledgment of operational responsibility.[^1]
+Secretary of State [[Madeleine Albright]] acknowledged in 2000 that the 1953 coup was a "setback for democratic governance" in Iran without explicitly admitting CIA direction. 
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.* Wiley, 2003. CIA. "Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953." Originally classified document by Donald Wilber, March 1954; declassified 2013. Available at nsarchive.gwu.edu.
+[^1]: Kinzer, Stephen. *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror.* Wiley, 2003. CIA. "Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953." Written by Donald Wilber, March 1954; first disclosed by James Risen in The New York Times on April 16 and June 18, 2000, and posted by the National Security Archive as Iran Coup Briefing Book 28 on November 29, 2000, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/ ; text copy at https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953.
-[^2]: Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, eds. *Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran.* Syracuse University Press, 2004.
+[^2]: National Security Archive, "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup," Electronic Briefing Book 435, August 19, 2013. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/
+[^3]: Donald Wilber, *Clandestine Service History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952-August 1953*, written March 1954. Text copy: https://archive.org/details/CIA-Mossadeq-Iran-1953 ; National Security Archive, Iran Coup Briefing Book 28: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/
+[^4]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, Iran, 1951-1954, document 362, British Memorandum (undated), paragraphs 12-15. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d362
+[^5]: *FRUS 1952-1954*, Volume X, document 348, editorial note citing telegram 571 from Rome, August 18, 1953 (the Shah arrived in Rome from Baghdad in the early afternoon of August 18), and document 350, editorial note citing telegram 613 from Rome, August 20, and telegram 454, August 22 (the Shah to depart Rome for Baghdad around midnight, arriving about noon August 21; Henderson and other chiefs of mission met the Shah at the Tehran airport). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d348 ; https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v10/d350
+[^6]: Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, eds. *Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran.* Syracuse University Press, 2004.

30 - PROGRAMS & PROJECTS/INTELLIGENCE_OPERATIONS/Operation Mongoose.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: Operation Mongoose
 aliases:
   - Operation Mongoose
@@ -26,22 +26,22 @@ relations:
     role: "pretext list and JCS answer of April 10, 1962 that invasion was needed"
     start: 1962-03-05
     end: 1962-04-10
-    fn: 6
+    fn: 9
 ---
 
-Operation Mongoose was the Kennedy administration's covert action program targeting [[Fidel Castro]]'s Cuba, initiated in the aftermath of the failed [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion and operating from approximately November 1961 until the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 forced its suspension. It was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War, involving over 400 CIA officers, several thousand Cuban exile agents, and a budget approaching $50 million annually.[^1]
+Operation Mongoose was the Kennedy administration's covert action program targeting [[Fidel Castro]]'s Cuba, initiated in the aftermath of the failed [[Bay of Pigs]] invasion and operating from approximately November 1961 until the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 forced its suspension. It was the largest CIA covert action program since the Korean War, with Task Force W, the CIA component, employing approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and its Miami station,[^1] several thousand Cuban exile agents and a budget approaching $50 million annually.[^2]
 
 ### Origins
 
 The Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17-19, 1961 was a catastrophic failure: the CIA-trained Cuban exile brigade was captured within three days, the expected popular uprising against Castro did not materialize, and the operation had been run without adequate air support. President [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] publicly accepted responsibility but was furious at CIA misjudgments. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] became the primary administration driver for continuing pressure on Cuba.
 
-In November 1961, Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose as the successor to Bay of Pigs-era operations. The program was built around a different theory: rather than a direct invasion, Mongoose would use covert operations to create conditions for internal Cuban resistance that could eventually produce an uprising without requiring direct American military intervention.[^1]
+In November 1961, Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose as the successor to Bay of Pigs-era operations. The program was built around a different theory: rather than a direct invasion, Mongoose would use covert operations to create conditions for internal Cuban resistance that could eventually produce an uprising without requiring direct American military intervention.[^2]
 
 ### Command Structure
 
-The [[Special Group]] (Augmented) - chaired by Robert Kennedy and including [[McGeorge Bundy]] (National Security Adviser), CIA Director [[John McCone]], and senior State and Defense officials - provided policy oversight. General [[Edward Lansdale]], whose Philippines counterinsurgency success had made him the administration's preferred irregular warfare theorist, was appointed as operational director.
+The [[Special Group]] (Augmented), chaired by General [[Maxwell Taylor]] and including [[McGeorge Bundy]] (National Security Adviser), CIA Director [[John McCone]], and senior State and Defense officials, provided policy oversight.[^3] General [[Edward Lansdale]], whose Philippines counterinsurgency success had made him the administration's preferred irregular warfare theorist, was appointed as operational director. The March 2, 1962 program review dates the designation as chief of operations to the November 30, 1961 directive.[^4] Robert Kennedy played an active role in the program, a role unrelated to his position as attorney general.[^3]
 
-The CIA's operational implementation was headquartered at [[JM-WAVE|JM/WAVE]], a large covert station at the University of Miami's South Campus. [[William Harvey]], head of the CIA's [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] assassination planning program, was the CIA's project officer for Mongoose and chief of [[Task Force W]], the agency's component of the program.[^2][^3] The Senate interim report records that Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented the truck used to deliver the Roselli equipment.[^4] The station's cover included a legitimate South Florida business presence and several front companies.[^1]
+The CIA's operational implementation was headquartered at [[JM-WAVE|JM/WAVE]], a large covert station at the University of Miami's South Campus. [[William Harvey]], head of the CIA's [[ZR RIFLE|ZR/RIFLE]] assassination planning program, was the CIA's project officer for Mongoose and chief of [[Task Force W]], the agency's component of the program.[^5][^6] The Senate interim report records that Harvey and the chief of the JM/WAVE station rented the truck used to deliver the Roselli equipment.[^7] The station's cover included a legitimate South Florida business presence and several front companies.[^2]
 
 ### Operations
 
@@ -53,35 +53,53 @@ Resistance development: CIA officers and Cuban exile operatives attempted to rec
 
 Psychological operations: Radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, and propaganda campaigns targeted both the Cuban population and Castro's military and political leadership.
 
-Assassination tracks: Parallel to Mongoose's official programs, Harvey maintained ZR/RIFLE operations targeting Castro through the CIA-organized crime connection with [[Johnny Roselli]] and, through him, [[Sam Giancana]] and [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.|Santo Trafficante Jr.]] The assassination track was technically separate from but operationally intertwined with the broader Mongoose program.[^1]
+Assassination tracks: Parallel to Mongoose's official programs, Harvey maintained ZR/RIFLE operations targeting Castro through the CIA-organized crime connection with [[Johnny Roselli]] and, through him, [[Sam Giancana]] and [[Santos Trafficante, Jr.|Santo Trafficante Jr.]] The assassination track was technically separate from but operationally intertwined with the broader Mongoose program.[^2]
 
-The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] were drawn into Mongoose's planning in early 1962. On March 6, 1962, Edward Lansdale wrote to Goodwin that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^5] The Joint Chiefs' reply of March 13, 1962, signed by Chairman [[Lyman Lemnitzer]], assumed that "a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan" and recommended that "this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^6] The JCS history records that the list covered attacks and sabotage at Guantanamo, a blown-up unmanned ship, faked assassination attempts and bombings in Florida and Washington, a sinking of a boatload of Cuban refugees, a staged filibuster, the downing of a civilian airliner that was in fact a drone, and the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Air Force fighter.[^7]
+The [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] were drawn into Mongoose's planning in early 1962. On March 6, 1962, Edward Lansdale wrote to Goodwin that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^8] The Joint Chiefs' reply of March 13, 1962, signed by Chairman [[Lyman Lemnitzer]], assumed that "a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan" and recommended that "this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[^9] The JCS history records that the list covered attacks and sabotage at Guantanamo, a blown-up unmanned ship, faked assassination attempts and bombings in Florida and Washington, a sinking of a boatload of Cuban refugees, a staged filibuster, the downing of a civilian airliner that was in fact a drone, and the apparent shootdown of a U.S. Air Force fighter.[^10]
+
+Lansdale's review of the first phase, dated July 25, 1962, reported that recruitment of third-country nationals and the start of Cuban collection nets had made Mongoose "numerically the largest U.S. intelligence agent effort inside a Communist state."[^11] Taylor's memorandum to the president of August 17, 1962 described the program as generating the largest intelligence effort directed at any Soviet Bloc country.[^12] Harvey's memorandum of July 24, 1962 stated that as of July 23, 477 CIA staff personnel were devoting full time to the effort.[^13] The Church Committee put the total staff of Task Force W at approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and its Miami station.[^3]
+
+On January 19, 1962 Lansdale added Task 33, a plan to incapacitate Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by chemical means. Lansdale testified that the plan involved nonlethal chemicals meant to keep workers away from the fields for a 24 to 48 hour period. The task was initially approved for planning, with the notation that it would require a policy determination.[^14]
+
+In 1975 Parrott, an assistant to the president's military representative, testified about a plan that he attributed to Lansdale: spreading word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent, with an American submarine surfacing off Cuba to send up starshells as the sign. Parrott said that somebody dubbed the plan "Elimination by Illumination."[^15]
+
+On February 20, 1962 Lansdale detailed a six-phase schedule designed to culminate in October 1962 with "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." For its "Resistance" phase he listed "attacks on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders," noting that "Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police G-2 officials." Lansdale testified that the "actions" and "attack" meant killing.[^16] On January 30, 1962 Brig. Gen. William Craig forwarded to Lansdale a concept called Operation Bounty, a scale of rewards for killing or delivering alive known Communists, with 2 cents listed for Castro; Lansdale testified that he tabled it and never brought it before the Special Group (Augmented).[^17]
 
 ### The Missile Crisis and Suspension
 
-On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that the time had come to re-examine Mongoose's basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention." [[Maxwell Taylor]] put two questions to the Service Chiefs, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so. Five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both.[^7] Two days after that, on April 12, John McCone recorded that a JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions had been discussed at the April 11 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, and wrote that it was "a very thoughtful and useful document."[^8]
+On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that the time had come to re-examine Mongoose's basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention." Maxwell Taylor put two questions to the Service Chiefs, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so. Five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both.[^10] Two days after that, on April 12, John McCone recorded that a JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions had been discussed at the April 11 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, and wrote that it was "a very thoughtful and useful document."[^18]
 
 The October 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] fundamentally changed the operational environment. Kennedy's agreement with Soviet Premier [[Nikita Khrushchev|Khrushchev]] to resolve the crisis included a private U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba. This commitment effectively foreclosed the political precondition on which Mongoose was premised: that internal Cuban resistance could ultimately trigger an American-supported uprising.
 
-During the crisis, Harvey gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey testified that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^4] Evan Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy demanded Harvey's removal.[^1] Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^9]
+During the crisis, Harvey gave an order sending agent teams into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey testified that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to the order, and that McCone then ordered the agent operations stopped.[^7] Evan Thomas wrote that Robert Kennedy demanded Harvey's removal.[^2] Harvey was appointed chief of station at Rome effective on or about June 30, 1963.[^19]
 
 Mongoose was formally suspended in late 1962. Subsequent anti-Castro covert operations continued under different organizational structures and with reduced resources, but the large-scale coordinated program of 1961-1962 was not reconstituted.
 
 ### Significance
 
-Operation Mongoose occupied a significant place in Cold War history for several reasons. It demonstrated the Kennedy administration's willingness to pursue regime change through covert means on a large scale even after the Bay of Pigs disaster had publicly discredited the approach. It institutionalized the CIA-organized crime anti-Castro connection that became entangled with JFK assassination conspiracy theories. And its suspension terms - the no-invasion pledge - provided the diplomatic framework within which Cuba's revolutionary government survived for decades.[^10]
+Operation Mongoose occupied a significant place in Cold War history for several reasons. It demonstrated the Kennedy administration's willingness to pursue regime change through covert means on a large scale even after the Bay of Pigs disaster had publicly discredited the approach. It institutionalized the CIA-organized crime anti-Castro connection that became entangled with JFK assassination conspiracy theories. And its suspension terms - the no-invasion pledge - provided the diplomatic framework within which Cuba's revolutionary government survived for decades.[^20]
 
 The [[Church Committee]] investigations of 1975-1976 disclosed the assassination planning component of Mongoose, revealing that the CIA had maintained assassination plots against Castro through multiple administrations and had kept this information from the [[Warren Commission]] investigating the Kennedy assassination.
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
+[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 140. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^2]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 323, Memorandum From the Chief of Task Force W (Harvey) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone, April 10, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
+[^2]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.* Senate Report No. 94-465, 1975. Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
-[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10, Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), October 8, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10
+[^3]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 140. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^4]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 84-85 and p. 149 n. 1 (Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^4]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 309, Program Review, Washington, March 2, 1962, entry for November 30, 1961. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d309
-[^5]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
+[^5]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 323, Memorandum From the Chief of Task Force W (Harvey) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone, April 10, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
-[^6]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1969/321, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, paragraphs 2 and 3. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
+[^6]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10, Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), October 8, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10
-[^7]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
+[^7]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 84-85 and p. 149 n. 1 (Harvey testimony of July 11, 1975, pp. 80-81). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^8]: John A. McCone, memorandum on Operation Mongoose, April 12, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
+[^8]: Lansdale to Goodwin, March 6, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 310. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d310
-[^9]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
+[^9]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1969/321, memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)," March 13, 1962, paragraphs 2 and 3. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
-[^10]: Rasenberger, Jim. *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs.* Scribner, 2011. Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994.
+[^10]: Joint Chiefs of Staff, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1961-1964*, chapter 11, pp. 158-160. https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA551509
+[^11]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 360, Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale), to the Special Group (Augmented), July 25, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d360
+[^12]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 380, Memorandum From the President's Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, August 17, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d380
+[^13]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, doc. 359, Memorandum From the CIA Operations Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations (Lansdale), July 24, 1962. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d359
+[^14]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 143, including Lansdale's testimony of July 8, 1975, p. 29. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^15]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 142 n. 2, quoting the testimony of Parrott, July 10, 1975, pp. 49-50. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^16]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), pp. 143-144 (Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975, pp. 104-107). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^17]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 144 (Lansdale testimony of July 8, 1975, p. 26). https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^18]: John A. McCone, memorandum on Operation Mongoose, April 12, 1962, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. X, document 325. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d325
+[^19]: Central Intelligence Agency, memorandum "Appointment of Mr. William K. Harvey Chief of Station, Rome, Italy," June 12, 1963. Reading room document 01228805, https://archive.org/details/cia-readingroom-document-01228805
+[^20]: Rasenberger, Jim. *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs.* Scribner, 2011. Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994.

40 - EVENTS/CONTRA_WAR/Boland Amendment.md

@@ -3,8 +3,10 @@ title: Boland Amendment
 aliases:
   - Boland Amendment
   - Boland Amendments
+  - Boland amendments
+  - Boland
 created: 2026-05-17
-updated: 2026-05-17
+updated: 2026-10-14
 category: "Intelligence Scandal"
 tags:
   - Concept
@@ -12,28 +14,291 @@ tags:
   - ContraWar
   - 1980s
   - DarkAllianceInvestigation
-summary: "Series of congressional amendments prohibiting U.S. funding for Contra military operations, widely circumvented by the Reagan administration and the CIA."
+  - IranContraAffair
+  - CongressionalOversight
+  - NationalSecurityCouncil
+summary: "Series of congressional appropriations riders from 1982 to 1986 restricting U.S. military support for the Contras, whose coverage of the National Security Council staff split the Iran-Contra committees."
 start: 1982-12-21
-end: 1984-10-12
+end: 1986-10-18
 location: "United States"
+relations:
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Edward P. Boland]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "sponsor of the first substitute (December 1982) and of the October 1984 conference provision"
+    start: 1982-12-08
+    fn: 4
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Tom Harkin]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Representative who offered the amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill that Boland's substitute replaced"
+    start: 1982-12-08
+    fn: 4
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Ronald Reagan]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "President who signed P.L. 98-473 containing the October 1984 prohibition"
+    start: 1984-10-12
+    fn: 27
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[George P. Shultz]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Secretary of State who reported at the National Security Planning Group on June 25, 1984 that James Baker had called third-country solicitation an impeachable offense"
+    start: 1984-06-25
+    fn: 16
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[James A. Baker III]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "White House chief of staff whose view on third-country solicitation was reported to the National Security Planning Group"
+    start: 1984-06-25
+    fn: 16
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[William French Smith]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Attorney General who advised Casey on June 26, 1984 that third-country funding was permissible"
+    start: 1984-06-26
+    fn: 21
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Oliver North]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "NSC staff official who ran the resupply network during the cutoff"
+    start: 1984-10-12
+    end: 1986-10-18
+    fn: 55
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Robert McFarlane]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "National Security Adviser who wrote the 1985 letters to Barnes and Hamilton"
+    start: 1985-09
+    end: 1985-10
+    fn: 50
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[John Poindexter]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "National Security Adviser who testified that the NSC staff complied with Boland and withheld the Sciaroni opinion from Congress"
+    start: 1987-07-15
+    fn: 41
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Bretton G. Sciaroni]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Intelligence Oversight Board counsel who wrote the opinion that the NSC was not covered"
+    start: 1985-08
+    fn: 42
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[William J. Casey]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Director of Central Intelligence whose position on the Contras Walsh linked to the resupply network"
+    start: 1984-10-12
+    end: 1986-10-18
+    fn: 55
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Alan Fiers]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "CIA Central American Task Force chief whom Walsh said dovetailed CIA activities with North's network"
+    start: 1984-10-12
+    end: 1986-10-18
+    fn: 55
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Dewey Clarridge]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "CIA Latin American Division chief who in November 1984 told Fiers to cooperate with North, according to Fiers"
+    start: 1984-11
+    fn: 54
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[A. Langhorne Motley]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Assistant Secretary of State who told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March 1985 that the Boland prohibition barred third-country solicitation"
+    start: 1985-03
+    fn: 34
+  - type: participant_in
+    with: "[[Elliott Abrams]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Assistant Secretary of State who solicited $10 million from Brunei"
+    start: 1986-08
+    fn: 72
+  - type: investigated
+    with: "[[Lawrence Walsh]]"
+    reverse: true
+    role: "Independent Counsel whose final report concluded the conspirators violated the Boland Amendment"
+    start: 1986-12-19
+    fn: 47
 ---
-The Boland Amendments were a series of congressional provisions, named after Massachusetts Democrat [[Edward P. Boland]], that prohibited the use of taxpayer funds for overthrowing the government of [[Nicaragua]] or supporting the [[Contras]] in military operations.[^1] The amendments were largely circumvented by the [[Central Intelligence Agency]], the [[White House]], and [[Oliver North]]'s illegal resupply network.
+The Boland Amendments were a series of appropriations provisions, passed between December 1982 and October 1986, that restricted the use of U.S. funds for overthrowing the government of [[Nicaragua]] or for military support to the [[Contras]]. They were named after Massachusetts Democrat [[Edward P. Boland]], chairman of the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]].[^1] The first text applied only to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Department of Defense]].[^2] Later texts applied to "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities."[^3] The statutes did not name the [[National Security Council]], and the Iran-Contra committees divided over whether they reached its staff. [[Gary Webb]] wrote that the amendments were circumvented by the CIA, the [[White House]], and [[Oliver North]]'s illegal resupply network.[^1]
 
-### First Boland Amendment (1982)
+### Boland I, December 1982
 
-The first Boland Amendment was passed on Christmas Eve 1982 by a vote of 411–0, prohibiting the use of taxpayer funds "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras." It was triggered by a Newsweek cover story, "America's Secret War: Target Nicaragua," which exposed the [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] administration's covert war. Congressman Tom Harkin had proposed a complete funding cutoff, calling the Contras "vicious, cutthroat murderers" and urging Congress to "end our involvement with this group." Boland, who chaired the [[House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence|House Intelligence Committee]] and knew about the secret CIA project, persuaded Harkin to accept a weaker amendment.[^1]
+On December 8, 1982, Representative [[Tom Harkin]] offered an amendment to the fiscal 1983 defense appropriations bill. Boland offered a substitute that referred to overthrowing the government of Nicaragua. He said it was substantively identical to the restriction in the classified annex to the intelligence authorization bill effective September 27, 1982, and that the Administration had accepted it: "They do not like it," he said, "but it is agreeable to them." Harkin countered with a substitute that would have barred aid to any group "already known by that agency to have the intent of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or of provoking a military conflict between Nicaragua and Honduras." Harkin's substitute was defeated, and the Boland substitute prevailed 411 to 0.[^4] Webb quoted Harkin calling the Contras "vicious, cutthroat murderers" and urging Congress to "end our involvement with this group."[^1][^5] Webb wrote that Harkin had proposed a complete funding cutoff, and that the amendment followed a [[Newsweek]] cover story, "America's Secret War: Target Nicaragua."[^1] The Iran-Contra report cites Newsweek of November 8, 1982, pages 42 to 53, under the headline "A Secret War for Nicaragua."[^6]
 
-The amendment was largely a fraud. Internal government memos show the CIA, White House, Defense Department, and Contras' congressional supporters knew the Contras had no hope of defeating the [[Sandinistas]]. Since there was no way the Contras would overthrow the Nicaraguan government, supporters reasoned they could continue spending CIA funds despite the amendment. If the Contras received money for one purpose, arms interdiction, and used it for another, "that wasn't the CIA's fault."[^1]
+Webb wrote that Boland, who knew of the CIA's Nicaragua project, persuaded Harkin to accept a weaker amendment, and that the amendment was largely a fraud. In Webb's account, internal memoranda showed that the CIA, the White House, the Defense Department and the Contras' congressional supporters knew the Contras could not defeat the [[Sandinistas]]. Supporters reasoned that CIA funds could still be spent, and Webb quoted the phrase "that wasn't the CIA's fault" for the position that if Contra money went to a different purpose, the agency was not at fault.[^1]
 
-### Escalating Congressional Opposition
+The enacted text read, in part: "None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and [[Honduras]]."[^2] The provision took effect on December 21, 1982. The Senate had tabled a proposal by [[Christopher Dodd]] 58 to 38 on December 18. The provision remained law at least until October 1, 1983.[^4][^7]
 
-In May 1983, the House Intelligence Committee issued a special report suggesting the Contra operation was illegal. On July 28, 1983, the House passed a resolution 228–195 to stop all aid to the Contras. By 1984, Congress had cut off CIA funding entirely, leading Oliver North to establish illegal private funding networks - the enterprise at the center of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
+The Administration and Congress disagreed over whether the prohibition turned on the intent of the Contras or the purpose of the agency. Boland and others in Congress contended that the intent of the recipients governed, so that no group intending to overthrow the Nicaraguan government could receive U.S. assistance. The Administration took the position that if the United States itself was not seeking the overthrow, the Contras' objectives were irrelevant, and it pointed to the defeat of the second Harkin amendment. The report cites an [[Intelligence Oversight Board]] opinion of April 6, 1983 for the position that the agency's purpose, not the Contras' purpose, was controlling.[^8] Webb wrote that in May 1983 the House Intelligence Committee issued a special report suggesting the Contra operation was illegal.[^1] On May 13, 1983 the House Intelligence Committee reported H.R. 2760, a bill to amend the fiscal 1983 Intelligence Authorization Act, which would have barred funds "for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua"; the Senate never voted on it.[^4] The committee also reported the Boland-Zablocki bill, which provided $80 million in assistance to Central American governments to stop arms flows and no funds for "support of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua." The House passed the Boland-Zablocki bill on July 28, 1983, by 228 to 195. The Senate never considered it, and it did not become law.[^9] Webb described the House vote of July 28, 1983, 228 to 195, as a resolution to stop all aid to the Contras.[^1]
 
-### The October 1984 Boland Amendment
+### Fiscal 1984 cap
 
-The hardest blow came in October 1984, when the Democrat-controlled Congress passed yet another Boland Amendment - this one with teeth. Unlike the earlier versions, it prohibited the CIA, the Defense Department, or any other agency of the U.S. government from giving any money or aid to anyone for the support of the Contras. The money spigot had been officially turned off; the loopholes were sewn shut. The CIA and Defense Department began withdrawing their trainers, advisers, administrators, tacticians, and logisticians from Central America, and by the end of the year the Contras were alone and in disarray. Thousands of rebel fighters retreated from Nicaragua for the safety of Honduras.[^2]
+The House voted 243 to 171 to cut off covert aid in H.R. 2968, and on November 3, 1983 the Senate approved an intelligence authorization bill that did not restrict assistance. In December 1983 the conference capped covert funding.[^4] Section 775 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1984 (P.L. 98-212) set a limit for fiscal 1984.[^10] Section 108 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 1984 (P.L. 98-215), headed "Limitation on covert assistance for military operations in Nicaragua," provided that "not more than $24,000,000" of funds available to the CIA, the Defense Department, or "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" could be obligated or expended for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.[^3] Boland described the compromise as "a $24 million cap on funding from whatever source." The cap counted funds from October 1, 1983, and the conference language took effect on December 8 and 9, 1983.[^11]
+
+On June 11, 1984, a memorandum by CIA counsel [[Stanley Sporkin]] advised [[William J. Casey]] that the fiscal 1984 appropriation for CIA assistance to the Contras had virtually run out, and that under the Anti-Deficiency Act sanctions could be imposed directly on CIA officers if spending went beyond the $24 million cap.[^12] Webb wrote that by 1984 Congress had cut off CIA funding for the Contras entirely, and that this led North to build private funding networks, the enterprise at the center of the [[Iran-Contra Affair]].[^1]
+
+### Third-country funding, June 1984
+
+On June 25, 1984, the [[National Security Planning Group]] met on Central America. The participants listed in the minutes included the President, the Vice President, [[George P. Shultz]], [[Caspar Weinberger]], [[Edwin Meese]], [[Robert McFarlane]], [[John Poindexter]], Casey and CIA officer [[Dewey Clarridge]]. The White House chief of staff, [[James A. Baker III]], was not present.[^13][^14] Casey told the group: "The legal position is that CIA is authorized to cooperate and seek support from third countries. In fact, the finding encourages third country participation and support in this entire effort," and said that if the CIA notified the oversight committees, "we can provide direct assistance to help the FDN get the money they need from third countries," that the [[FDN]], Misura and ARDE were acting on their own to obtain financial support from third-party sources, and: "We need a decision to authorize our permitting the FDN to obtain third country support."[^15]
+
+Shultz listed several points, the third of which read: "I would like to get money for the Contras also, but another lawyer, Jim Baker, said that if we go out and try to get money from third countries, it is an impeachable offense." Casey answered: "I am entitled to complete the record. Jim Baker said that if we tried to get money from third countries without notifying the oversight committees, it could be a problem and he was informed that the finding does provide for the participation and cooperation of third countries. Once he learned that the funding does encourage cooperation from third countries, Jim Baker immediately dropped his view that this could be an 'impeachable offense', and you heard him say that, George." Shultz replied: "Jim Baker's argument is that the US Government may raise and spend funds only through an appropriation of the Congress." Weinberger said: "I am another lawyer who isn't practicing law, but Jim Baker should realize that the United States would not be spending the money for the anti-Sandinista program; it is merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources." Shultz then said: "I think we need to get an opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from third sources. It would be the prudent thing to do."[^16]
+
+Later in the meeting Casey said: "We need the legal opinion which makes clear that the US has the authority to facilitate third country funding for the anti-Sandinistas."[^17] Vice President [[George H.W. Bush]] asked: "How can anyone object to the US encouraging third parties to provide help to the anti-Sandinistas under the finding? The only problem that might come up is if the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return so that some people could interpret this as some kind of an exchange." Casey said: "Jim Baker changed his mind as soon as he saw the finding and saw the language." McFarlane proposed: "that there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need, and I certainly hope none of this discussion will be made public in any way." President Reagan said: "If such a story gets out, we'll all be hanging by our thumbs in front of the White House until we find out who did it."[^18] The Iran-Contra committees wrote that Shultz conveyed Baker's concern that solicitation and control of third-country funding was an "impeachable offense," and that others at the meeting asserted that third-country solicitation was permissible if the United States did not serve as a conduit.[^14]
+
+McFarlane testified to the committees that it was "likely" he told Baker in the spring of 1984 of the contribution from the country the report calls Country 2, and "possible" that he told Meese. Baker denied in his deposition of June 22, 1987 any knowledge of the contribution, and said of the June 25 remark that he did not recall "using that language or having a specific opinion such as that, although I do, as I have stated, recall feeling that we should take a very close look at the question of legality and feeling that we could not do indirectly what we couldn't do directly." Shultz testified that he was told of the contribution for the first time in June 1986, and Weinberger had no recollection of being told.[^19]
+
+McFarlane testified at North's trial that he told the President of the first Saudi contribution in June 1984 by putting the information on a card in the President's daily briefing book, saying either in writing or orally that "no one else knows about this," and that the President responded "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^20]
+
+On June 26, 1984, Casey and Sporkin met with Attorney General [[William French Smith]], who expressed the opinion that third-country funding was permissible if no U.S. funds were used and the donor did not expect repayment.[^21] [[Saudi Arabia]] donated $32 million between July 1984 and March 1985, and [[Taiwan]] contributed $2 million in September 1985 and February 1986.[^22] The majority wrote that between June 1984 and the beginning of 1986 the President, his National Security Adviser and the NSC staff secretly raised $34 million for the Contras from other countries.[^23]
+
+### Boland II, October 1984
+
+The majority identified the revelation of the CIA's role in mining Nicaraguan harbors as a major factor in the formulation of Boland II. [[The Wall Street Journal]] reported the involvement on April 6, 1984; Senator [[Barry Goldwater]], chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, protested to Casey; Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]] resigned as vice chairman and was persuaded to stay; and both houses voted to condemn the CIA's involvement.[^24] The majority also wrote that the CIA had allegedly exceeded the $24 million limit in the mining operation, and that according to reports it had attempted to obscure the overrun by charging the $1.2 million cost of a vessel to its overall operating budget.[^25]
+
+The House passed a fiscal 1985 prohibition on August 2, 1984, by 294 to 118. The Senate rejected a parallel provision on October 3, 1984, by 42 to 57.[^26] The conferees adopted the House prohibition and coupled it with a promise to revisit the issue in four months.[^26] Section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985, enacted October 12, 1984 as section 101 of P.L. 98-473, provided in subsection (a): "During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual." Subsection (b) allowed the prohibition to cease after February 28, 1985, if the President reported to Congress and a joint resolution was enacted. Subsection (d) specified $14,000,000.[^27] The 98th Congress had a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives (269 to 166) and a Republican majority in the Senate (55 to 45).[^28] Webb wrote that the Democrat-controlled Congress passed the October 1984 amendment.[^29]
+
+Boland told the House that the provision "clearly ends United States support for the war in Nicaragua," and that "there are no exceptions to the prohibition."[^30] [[Lawrence Walsh|Walsh]] quoted him describing the amendment as clearly prohibiting "any expenditure, including those from accounts for salaries and all support costs."[^31] North did not count fixed operating costs, such as his appropriated salary, as covered by Boland II; asked whether he was aware that salaries were included in the Boland Amendment, he answered "No" and, as to his own salary, "not mine."[^25] Senator [[Ted Stevens]] said the compromise did not cut the Contras' lifeline, but rather "[put] off the decision until next year," and that "The Contras [already] are supporting themselves with assistance they are getting from elsewhere in the world. Having that assistance out there to be made available on March 31 will encourage that assistance from other sources to the Contras during this period."[^32]
+
+Webb described the October 1984 amendment as one with teeth. In his account it closed the loopholes that the earlier versions had left open. The CIA and Defense Department withdrew their trainers, advisers, administrators, tacticians and logisticians from [[Central America]], and by the end of 1984 the Contras were alone and in disarray, with thousands of rebel fighters retreating from Nicaragua to Honduras.[^29]
+
+President [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] made the certification in April 1985. The Senate approved the joint resolution on April 23, 1985, by 53 to 46, and the House rejected it 180 to 248. The majority found that no funds were available for the Contras from the exhaustion of the $24 million in about June 1984 until the humanitarian legislation took effect on August 8, 1985.[^33]
+
+In March 1985 A. Langhorne Motley, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, told the [[Senate Foreign Relations Committee]]: "even if today we wanted to go to third countries to encourage or solicit, we could not because there is a prohibition." Asked by Dodd for an assurance that there would be no indirect efforts to finance the Contras through third-party nations, he said: "I think that was one thing that was loud and clear with us when I started. I told you that we understood what it means, direct and indirect, including third party." The committees wrote that the contributions were concealed from him.[^34] The majority wrote that the CIA also took the position that Boland II prohibited it from third-country solicitation, and that McFarlane told Congress that the NSC staff was not soliciting funds. North denied receiving any such instruction from McFarlane, but prefaced every meeting with potential contributors with a disclaimer that he was not soliciting.[^34] The majority described a memorandum from North to McFarlane that noted Boland II was silent on third-country funding but that Congress would regard it as an evasion, and concluded that solicitation could be safely undertaken only upon consultation with Congress and with the risk that Congress might refuse. The majority wrote that when North wrote it he was secretly involved in trying to raise money from Far Eastern countries, and that a Middle Eastern country had already contributed $32 million.[^35]
+
+### The NSC staff and the Intelligence Oversight Board
+
+Boland II applied to "any other agency or entity . . . involved in intelligence activities." The majority wrote that the assertion that the statute did not reach the NSC staff "never was made publicly prior to this investigation," and that "post hoc arguments are not persuasive." It concluded that Boland II "did not put just the CIA out of the Contra support business; it prevented other government agencies from covertly taking the CIA's place."[^36] It wrote that North and Poindexter both testified that there was discussion among the NSC staff after Boland II was adopted that it did not apply to the staff, and that "No documentary evidence exists, however, to suggest that this interpretation was ever put forward before August 1985." The majority wrote that the [[Department of Justice]], the Counsel to the President and the Attorney General were never asked for legal opinions on whether Boland II applied to the NSC staff. North testified that Professor [[John Norton Moore]] of the [[University of Virginia]] gave him an opinion that Boland II did not apply to the NSC; the majority recorded that Moore denied having been asked for or having given one.[^36]
+
+Robert McFarlane said that he interpreted the amendment "that the NSC was not to itself get involved in military or paramilitary activities or replicating the CIA function in those domains."[^37] At the public hearings he said: "If we felt that we were not covered, what was I doing?"[^38] An undated memorandum by the [[Congressional Research Service]], prepared in response to an inquiry dated August 13, 1985, found "strong, if not conclusive evidence that the [language] was intended to apply to the National Security Council." A staff memorandum prepared for Representative [[Henry J. Hyde]], which the FBI later found in North's files, stated that the "NSC is clearly a U.S. entity involved in intelligence activities, subject to the Section 8066(a) prohibition."[^37]
+
+[[Bretton G. Sciaroni]], counsel to the Intelligence Oversight Board, wrote an opinion that the NSC was not covered. Sciaroni wrote that "on the face of it the NSC would appear to be an agency or entity of the United States covered by the amendment," and reasoned from the premise that "it is a coordinating body with no operational role."[^39] The majority wrote that he had never practiced law before becoming Board counsel, that the opinion was his first on legislation, and that he "based his opinion on certain key factual premises that turned out to be incorrect." Asked at the hearings whether the incorrect facts were part of the basis for his opinion, he answered: "That is absolutely correct."[^39] The minority views defended the opinion, stating that Sciaroni testified that the additional facts then before the committees would not have changed his key legal conclusions, and that the opinion was approved and issued after review by a Board that included [[Charles Meyers]], former dean of the [[Stanford Law School]].[^40] The majority wrote that the opinion was not unveiled until long after North's activities began to unravel, and recorded John Poindexter's reason for keeping its conclusion under wraps as fear that if Congress learned the NSC staff considered itself exempt from Boland II, "Congress would act to eliminate any such misconception."[^41] The majority also wrote that Sciaroni noted in the opinion that if North's salary was borne by the Defense Department, an entity named in Boland II, North could be subject to its restrictions, and that this was the case.[^39]
+
+In late August 1985 the Board inquired into the activities of the NSC staff. It concluded that North "had not provided military or fundraising assistance to the Nicaraguan Resistance." The committees found that [[Paul Thompson]] had withheld six "troubling" memorandums from Sciaroni, and that North gave Sciaroni a "blanket denial" of involvement.[^42] McFarlane told the House Intelligence Committee on December 10, 1986, in response to questions from Representative [[Dick Cheney]], that in the summer of 1985 he "went to considerable length to determine whether" North had violated the Boland Amendment.[^43]
+
+The minority wrote that Congress chose language borrowed from the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, that "In the course of settling on that language in 1980, Congress deliberately decided to exclude the National Security Council (NSC) from its coverage," and that an appropriations rider "is nothing more than a limitation on the way Federal funds may be used."[^44] The minority wrote: "We have seen that the NSC was not covered by the law's language."[^45] It also quoted Thompson's recollection of telling Sciaroni that "McFarlane had already made the determination that we had not violated the Boland Amendment."[^46] Walsh wrote that the NSC fell within the statute as an "entity involved in intelligence activities," under the [[National Security Act of 1947|National Security Act]] and [[Executive Order 12333]], and that North was covered because his salary was paid by the Department of Defense.[^47] Attorney General Edwin Meese testified that "certainly the NSC is not an intelligence agency."[^48]
+
+In August 1985 McFarlane replied to congressional inquiries that the NSC was complying with "the letter and spirit of the law."[^49] On September 5, 1985 McFarlane wrote [[Lee Hamilton]], chairman of the House Intelligence Committee; on September 12 he wrote Representative [[Michael D. Barnes]], chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs; and on October 7 he answered questions forwarded by Hamilton. Walsh wrote that McFarlane "decided to lie about North's activities in a series of letters to Barnes and Hamilton in September-October 1985."[^50] McFarlane later pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor charges that he unlawfully withheld information from Congress.[^51] Poindexter testified: "I felt that the Boland Amendment did not apply to the NSC staff and I felt that indeed we were complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. Now, it doesn't say that we are not helping the Contras. We were."[^52]
+
+### The CIA and the NSC staff, September 1984 to 1985
+
+McFarlane testified that after Boland II was signed he believed the NSC staff's actions were restricted by it, and that he instructed his staff not to raise money for the Contras. On September 2, 1984 he had written on a North memorandum seeking to approach a private donor for a helicopter: "I don't think this is legal." McFarlane testified that Casey later expressed concern that North was conveying intelligence information to Contra leaders, and North replied with a memorandum of November 7, 1984, "Clarifying Who Said What to Whom." McFarlane found Casey's inquiry into North's activities "very odd at the time" because "Bill Casey knew what Ollie was doing."[^53]
+
+Walsh wrote that Casey appointed Alan Fiers chief of the CIA's Central American Task Force in late August 1984, about a month before the Boland cutoff took effect, and that Fiers became chief on October 9, 1984. Fiers pleaded guilty on July 7, 1991 to two charges of withholding information from Congress and testified at the 1992 trial of [[Clair E. George]], the CIA's deputy director for operations. He testified that in mid-September 1984 Dewey Clarridge introduced him to North, saying that North was "someone you need to get to know" and "He's got responsibilities at the NSC for Central America and you'll be working with him," and that in early November 1984 Clarridge told him to cooperate with North. Fiers testified that at a later meeting Casey asked North whether he was operating in Central America, said "Now Ollie, I don't want you operating in Central America. You understand that?" and that North answered "Yes, sir. I understand it." According to Fiers, George told him afterward: "What we saw was for our consumption. Sometime in the dark of night Bill Casey has told the President: I'll take care of Central America, Mr. President; don't worry about it." Fiers said he replied: "Wow, if that's true and if it blows it will be worse than Watergate." Both Fiers and George were pardoned by President Bush on December 24, 1992.[^54] Walsh wrote that Casey "was instrumental in pairing North with Secord as a contra-support team when the Boland Amendment in October 1984 forced the CIA to refrain from direct or indirect aid," and that Casey's position on the Contras prompted Fiers to "dovetail" CIA activities with those of North's resupply network, "in violation of Boland restrictions."[^55]
+
+The majority wrote that after Boland II forced the CIA to withdraw, North, "with the express approval of Poindexter and at least the acquiescence of McFarlane, took over where the CIA left off." It quoted Poindexter: North "was the switching point that made the whole system work."[^56]
+
+### Humanitarian aid, 1985
+
+The day after the House rejected the joint resolution in April 1985, it voted 213 to 215 against an amendment that would have released the $14 million as humanitarian assistance.[^57] On June 6 the Senate passed its version, 52 to 42. It unfenced the $14 million, authorized an additional $24 million, and provided that the full $38 million would be spent on humanitarian aid.[^57] On June 12 the House voted 248 to 184 to include $27 million in humanitarian aid in a supplemental appropriations bill. Opponents suggested that humanitarian aid to a fighting force was a "Trojan horse" concealing military assistance.[^57]
+
+Section 722(g) of P.L. 99-83, enacted August 8, 1985, provided that "there are authorized to be appropriated $27,000,000 for humanitarian assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^58] The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985 (P.L. 99-88, August 15, 1985) appropriated $27,000,000 for the program, available until March 31, 1986. Section 102(a) of that act applied the prohibition of section 8066(a) of P.L. 98-473, and section 801 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal 1985 (P.L. 98-618), to those funds "without limitation as to fiscal year." Section 102(b) provided that nothing in the act or in those Boland prohibitions barred the government from exchanging information with the resistance, and that the funds could be obligated only for the purposes for which they were expressly made available.[^59] The conference report stated that "none of the prohibitions on the provision of military or paramilitary assistance to the democratic resistance prohibits the sharing of intelligence information with the democratic resistance."[^60] Representative Hyde suggested the exception could let the Contras "defend themselves against the helicopter gunships."[^60] Related provisions of the same legislation included the Pell Amendment, which barred the United States from "enter[ing] into any arrangement conditioning, expressly or implicitly" assistance or arms sales on a recipient's assistance to the Contras, and the Kerry Amendment, which barred funds for activities against the government of Nicaragua not authorized by or pursuant to law and which would place the United States in violation of international law.[^57]
+
+Walsh wrote that Congress "modified the Boland Amendment by appropriating $27 million for humanitarian assistance to the contras," and that President Reagan created the [[Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office]] on August 29, 1985 to administer the money. The conferees did not give the National Security Council a role in the program, and the office was placed in the [[State Department]].[^61] The aircraft used for the humanitarian deliveries also flew lethal resupply missions.[^62]
+
+### Boland III, December 1985 to October 1986
+
+Section 105 of P.L. 99-169, enacted December 4, 1985, provided that funds available to the CIA, the Defense Department and other covered entities could be used during fiscal 1986 to support military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua "only as authorized in section 101," the classified schedule of authorizations, section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947, or section 106 of P.L. 99-88. Paragraph (b)(2) of the same section provided that "nothing in this section precludes . . . activities of the Department of State to solicit . . . humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."[^63] Section 8050 of the defense appropriations for fiscal 1986 (P.L. 99-190, December 19, 1985) provided that no funds could go to the resistance "unless in accordance with the terms and conditions specified by section 105" of P.L. 99-169.[^64]
+
+The majority wrote that Boland III permitted covered agencies to support the Contras "specifically by the provision of communications equipment, related training, and intelligence 'information and advice.'" The House conferees specified that Boland III prohibited any solicitation that the section did not authorize explicitly.[^65] The majority wrote that Boland II barred any significant transfer of intelligence information or resources to the Contras. The CIA proposed guidelines for "defensive" intelligence, meaning intelligence that could prevent needless loss of life, and those guidelines met resistance.[^66] Senator [[David Durenberger]] described advice on the "effective delivery and distribution of materiel" in a 1985 floor statement.[^67]
+
+### Renewed aid and the Brunei solicitation, 1986
+
+On March 20, 1986, the House rejected the administration's request for $100 million for the Contras.[^68] On June 25, 1986, the House approved an amendment offered by Representative [[Don Edwards]] by 221 to 209. The Senate adopted the House position on August 13, 1986. Congress ultimately provided $100 million for the opposition, of which $70 million could be used for non-humanitarian purposes.[^69] Section 206 of P.L. 99-500, enacted October 18, 1986, transferred $100,000,000 of unobligated fiscal 1986 defense funds and stated: "The Congress hereby approves the provision of assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in accordance with the provisions of this title."[^70] Section 106 of P.L. 99-569, enacted October 27, 1986, restricted support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua during fiscal 1987 to authorized channels.[^71]
+
+In the summer of 1986, Shultz and [[Elliott Abrams]] decided to solicit $10 million from the sultan of [[Brunei]]. Shultz had been expected to make the approach and did not, so Abrams made it to a Bruneian official in [[London]]. The committees dated the meeting August 8, 1986, and Walsh dated it August 9, 1986. Walsh wrote that Abrams used the name "Kenilworth" in arranging the meeting with the Bruneian defense minister, General Ibnu.[^72][^73] The committees wrote that Abrams traveled under an alias, requested $10 million in "bridge financing," and, asked what Brunei would receive, told the official: "Well, ... the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." Asked "What concrete do we get out of this?" he answered: "You don't get anything concrete out of it."[^72] North told Abrams that the account was controlled by the Contras, according to the committees; Walsh wrote that North told Abrams that the account North provided would permit more control by the U.S. Government.[^72][^73] When Brunei agreed to transfer the money, North gave Abrams the account number of [[Lake Resources]]. The number North provided was 368.430.22.1; the Lake Resources account was 386.430.22.1. North testified that he had intended to give Abrams the Lake Resources number and that the digits were transposed by him or by his secretary.[^72][^74] Walsh wrote that the deposit passed through accounts controlled by or on behalf of [[Bruce Rappaport]], a Swiss businessman; Swiss authorities declined to identify the recipient and reported that the money was returned to Brunei.[^74] The majority described the arrangement as "a deliberate effort to divert funds solicited for humanitarian purposes to lethal ends, and was foiled only because of an error in the account number."[^75]
+
+### The Iran-Contra committees and Walsh
+
+The majority concluded: "Once the NSC staff became involved in intelligence operations and continuing covert, albeit quasi-private, assistance to the Contras, both the letter and spirit of Boland II were violated."[^56] On the diversion, it wrote: "Because Boland II and III both prohibited direct or indirect use of the United States funds, the diversion was a flagrant violation of those proscriptions."[^75] It wrote that Congress and the American people were routinely assured that the statutes were being observed "in letter and in spirit," and quoted President Reagan at a press conference on April 14, 1983: "But what I might wish or our government might wish still would not justify us violating the law of the land."[^76]
+
+The minority concluded: "In short, the appropriations limitation purposes of the Boland Amendment in fact were met."[^45] It wrote that "To whatever extent the Boland Amendments tried to prohibit such activity, they were clearly unconstitutional," referring to efforts to persuade other countries to contribute their own funds, and that Congress could, by an appropriations rider, prohibit the entire U.S. Government from spending money to support the Contras, as the Clark Amendment had done for Angola in 1976, but that the specific language of the Boland Amendment was considerably more restricted.[^44]
+
+The majority found that the amendment was violated "in letter and spirit," and the minority found that it was not violated.[^47] Walsh wrote that the conspirators were not charged with conspiring to violate the Boland Amendment, and concluded: "Nonetheless, it is clear that the conspirators did violate that statute."[^47] Walsh, appointed Independent Counsel on December 19, 1986, listed among his findings that "the provision and coordination of support to the contras violated the Boland Amendment ban on aid to military activities in Nicaragua." He wrote that President Reagan "set the stage for the illegal activities of others by encouraging and, in general terms, ordering support of the contras during the October 1984 to October 1986 period when funds for the contras were cut off by the Boland Amendment," and that the directive to McFarlane to keep the Contras alive "body and soul" during the cutoff "was viewed by North, who was charged by McFarlane to carry out the directive, as an invitation to break the law." Walsh's account of [[The Enterprise (Iran-Contra)]] covers the same period.[^55][^77]
+
+Walsh wrote that "the Boland Amendment itself carried no criminal sanctions."[^78] He also wrote that the amendments were "always provisions in appropriation acts" and "did not provide for criminal sanctions."[^79]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 9: "He would have had me by the tail"
+[^1]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), ch. 9 ("He would have had me by the tail").
-[^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Chapter 10: "Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it"
+[^2]: Public Law 97-377, sec. 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (Dec. 21, 1982). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE-96-Pg1830.pdf
+[^3]: Public Law 98-215, sec. 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (Dec. 9, 1983). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-97/pdf/STATUTE-97-Pg1473.pdf
+[^4]: Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), majority views, ch. 26, pp. 395-396 (Harkin and Boland substitutes of Dec. 8, 1982; Boland I prevailed 411 to 0; effective Dec. 21, 1982). https://archive.org/download/Iran-ContraReport/Report%20of%20the%20Congressional%20Committees%20Investigating%20the%20Iran-Contra%20Affair.pdf
+[^5]: 128 Cong. Rec. H9148-49 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1982) (Rep. Harkin), as cited in Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, n. 14.
+[^6]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, n. 6 ("A Secret War for Nicaragua," Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1982, at 42-53).
+[^7]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 396 and n. 11 (Dodd proposal tabled 58 to 38 on Dec. 18, 1982; Boland I the law at least until Oct. 1, 1983, n. 13).
+[^8]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 396 and nn. 14-15; ch. 2, n. 20 (Intelligence Oversight Board opinion of Apr. 6, 1983).
+[^9]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, p. 34 and nn. 34-36 (H.R. 2760 reported May 13, 1983; Boland-Zablocki bill passed July 28, 1983, 228 to 195); ch. 26, p. 396.
+[^10]: Public Law 98-212, sec. 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (Dec. 8, 1983). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-97/pdf/STATUTE-97-Pg1421.pdf
+[^11]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 397 (Boland's statement on the compromise; funds counted from October 1, 1983; effective December 8 and 9, 1983).
+[^12]: Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 15, n. 6 (memorandum from Sporkin to Casey, June 11, 1984, ER 46099). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm
+[^13]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, "Central America," National Security Archive, The Iran-Contra Affair 20 Years On, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), p. 1 (participants listed). https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf
+[^14]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 403-404 ("The Permissibility of Solicitation").
+[^15]: Same minutes, p. 5 (Casey).
+[^16]: Same minutes, p. 9 (Shultz, Casey, Shultz, Weinberger, Shultz).
+[^17]: Same minutes, p. 12 (Casey).
+[^18]: Same minutes, p. 14 (Bush, Casey, McFarlane, Reagan).
+[^19]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 2, pp. 38-39 and nn. 145-151 (McFarlane Test., Hearings, 100-2, May 11, 1987, at 18, 53; Baker Dep., June 22, 1987, at 8-9, 12; Shultz Test., Hearings, 100-9, July 23, 1987, at 4; Weinberger Dep., June 17, 1987, at 74).
+[^20]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 10 (McFarlane, North Trial Testimony, Mar. 13, 1989, pp. 4203-04). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^21]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 14 (Sporkin memorandum for the record, June 26, 1984, ALV 035917) and ch. 15 (meeting of Casey and Sporkin with Attorney General Smith). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^22]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 14 (Saudi Arabia and Taiwan contributions). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
+[^23]: Iran-Contra report, Executive Summary, p. 3 ($34 million from other countries, June 1984 to early 1986).
+[^24]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 397 and nn. 29-33.
+[^25]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 400-401 and nn. 73-75 (North's testimony on salaries; the CIA's mining overrun and the $1.2 million vessel).
+[^26]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 398 (House vote of August 2, 1984; Senate vote of October 3, 1984; conferees' four-month promise).
+[^27]: Public Law 98-473, sec. 101 (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985, sec. 8066(a)-(d)), 98 Stat. 1837, 1935-36 (Oct. 12, 1984). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg1837.pdf
+[^28]: Senate Historical Office, Party Division, 98th Congress, 1983-1985 (Republicans 55, Democrats 45). https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm U.S. House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives, Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 98th Congress (Democrats 269, Republicans 166). https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/
+[^29]: Gary Webb, *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion* (Seven Stories Press, 1998), ch. 10 ("Teach a man a craft and he's liable to practice it").
+[^30]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 398 (Boland statements, citing 130 Cong. Rec. H11974 and H11980, daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984).
+[^31]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, n. 47 (quoting 130 Cong. Rec. H11980). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
+[^32]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 398-399 (Senator Stevens).
+[^33]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 399 (certification; Senate and House votes on the joint resolution; humanitarian effective date).
+[^34]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 403 (Motley testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 1985; CIA and NSC positions on solicitation) and Executive Summary, p. 3 (contributions concealed from Motley).
+[^35]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 404 and n. 103.
+[^36]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 399 and nn. 44-47.
+[^37]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 399-400 and nn. 48-53 (McFarlane; Congressional Research Service memorandum; staff memorandum for Representative Hyde).
+[^38]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 66 (McFarlane public testimony).
+[^39]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and nn. 54-60 (Sciaroni opinion, Ex. BGS-9; Sciaroni testimony, June 8, 1987, pp. 20, 33, 46).
+[^40]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 491, n.* (Sciaroni Test., Hearings, 100-5, June 8, 1987, at 12).
+[^41]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 61 (Poindexter Test., Hearings, 100-8, July 15, 1987, at 84-85).
+[^42]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 6, p. 132 (Intelligence Oversight Board inquiry, late August 1985; Thompson and the six memorandums; North's denial to Sciaroni).
+[^43]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 6, p. 132 and n. 194 (McFarlane before the House Intelligence Committee, Dec. 10, 1986).
+[^44]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 1, p. 451; ch. 6, p. 492.
+[^45]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 497.
+[^46]: Iran-Contra report, minority views, ch. 6, p. 503 and n. 23 (Thompson).
+[^47]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, "The Boland Amendment was Violated," and nn. 43, 47-52 (majority views, pp. 395-410, "in letter and spirit"; minority views, pp. 489-500). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
+[^48]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 27, n. 61 (quoting Meese deposition, July 8, 1987, p. 33). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_27.htm
+[^49]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 400 and n. 62.
+[^50]: Walsh, vol. I, part I, nn. 17-18 (letters to Barnes and Hamilton; Barnes letter of Aug. 16, 1985); ch. 1, nn. 60-62 (letters of Sept. 5, Sept. 12 and Oct. 7, 1985, AKW 001528-29, AKW 001512-14, AKW 001540-48); ch. 4, nn. 57-58. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_i.htm
+[^51]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1 (McFarlane's guilty pleas of March 11, 1988). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^52]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 7, p. 141 and n. 42 (Poindexter testimony).
+[^53]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1 and nn. 20-25 (McFarlane, North Trial Testimony, Mar. 10, 1989, pp. 3975-77; Mar. 15, 1989, p. 4645; North memorandum of Nov. 7, 1984, AKW 000329-30; McFarlane note of Sept. 2, 1984, ALW 019179). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_01.htm
+[^54]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 15, nn. 21-26 (Fiers, George Trial Testimony, Oct. 28, 1992, pp. 1254-64) ch. 1, n. 24; ch. 19 (Fiers became chief of the Central American Task Force on October 9, 1984). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_15.htm
+[^55]: Walsh, vol. I, executive summary (Casey, North and Secord, Fiers; the President; the Boland cutoff period). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/execsum.htm
+[^56]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 401 and 405 (Poindexter on North as "switching point").
+[^57]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 401-402 and nn. 76-86 (House votes of April and June 1985; Senate version of June 6, 1985; Pell and Kerry Amendments; opposition described as a "Trojan horse").
+[^58]: Public Law 99-83, sec. 722(g), 99 Stat. 190, 254 (Aug. 8, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg190.pdf
+[^59]: Public Law 99-88, sec. 102(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 293, 325; humanitarian appropriation of $27,000,000, 99 Stat. 325 (Aug. 15, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg293.pdf
+[^60]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 402-403 and nn. 87-94 (conference report on the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1985; Representative Hyde).
+[^61]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 402 and nn. 83-84 (conferees; NHAO in the State Department). Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25 (NHAO created August 29, 1985). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^62]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25 (use of the same aircraft for humanitarian and lethal flights). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^63]: Public Law 99-169, sec. 105(a)-(b), 99 Stat. 1002, 1003 (Dec. 4, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg1002.pdf
+[^64]: Public Law 99-190, sec. 8050, 99 Stat. 1185, 1211 (Dec. 19, 1985). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-99/pdf/STATUTE-99-Pg1185.pdf
+[^65]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 404 (Boland III; House conferees on solicitation).
+[^66]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 402 and n. 89 (H.R. 2760 history; CIA guidelines for "defensive" intelligence).
+[^67]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, n. 32 (quoting Sen. Durenberger, 131 Cong. Rec. S16074 (1985)). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm
+[^68]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 19 (House vote of March 20, 1986). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_19.htm
+[^69]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 405 (Edwards amendment, 221 to 209; Senate action of August 13, 1986; $70 million for non-humanitarian purposes).
+[^70]: Public Law 99-500, title II, sec. 206(a)(1)-(2), 100 Stat. 1783-300 (Oct. 18, 1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg1783.pdf
+[^71]: Public Law 99-569, sec. 106, 100 Stat. 3190, 3191 (Oct. 27, 1986). https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-100/pdf/STATUTE-100-Pg3190.pdf
+[^72]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 3, p. 71 and nn. 134-142 (Abrams's meeting in London, August 8, 1986; "bridge financing"; North's account card).
+[^73]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 25, "The Brunei Solicitation" and nn. 99-100 (London meeting of August 9, 1986; the name "Kenilworth"; General Ibnu). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_25.htm
+[^74]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 14, nn. 37-42 (Shultz and Abrams decision; account numbers 386.430.22.1 and 368.430.22.1; Rappaport; money returned to Brunei). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
+[^75]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, pp. 405-406 (Lake Resources account number; "flagrant violation").
+[^76]: Iran-Contra report, ch. 26, p. 406 and n. 116 (President Reagan, press conference, April 14, 1983).
+[^77]: Walsh, vol. I, Chronology of Key Public Events (Dec. 19, 1986: Walsh appointed Independent Counsel). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chron.htm
+[^78]: Walsh, vol. I, part II (the Boland Amendment "itself carried no criminal sanctions"). https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_ii.htm
+[^79]: Walsh, vol. I, part III, text on the Boland versions as appropriation provisions. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/part_iii.htm

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-09-23
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: BCCI Kerry-Brown Senate Report
 aliases:
   - Kerry-Brown Report
@@ -46,59 +46,68 @@ relations:
 
 The subcommittee's inquiry began in February 1988, during a hearing on the drug trafficking and money laundering of General [[Manuel Noriega]], at which BCCI was identified as facilitating his crimes. In March 1988 the Foreign Relations Committee authorized subpoenas to BCCI and to the bank officers who handled Noriega's assets, but their service was delayed at the request of the [[Department of Justice|Justice Department]] and the [[U.S. Customs|Customs Service]] so as not to interfere with [[Operation C-Chase]], the undercover sting in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]]. The subcommittee deposed [[Amjad Awan]], BCCI's manager for [[Latin America]] and Noriega's banker, shortly before his arrest in the sting in October 1988, and a second former BCCI officer afterward.[^2]
 
-In the spring of 1989 Kerry authorized the subcommittee's departing counsel, [[Jack Blum]], to give what he had developed to the Justice Department; when, in Blum's view, the department failed to follow up, he took it to the Manhattan District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]], whose investigation was "based in substantial part on the leads provided him by Blum and the Subcommittee." Kerry's personal staff continued the inquiry through 1989 and 1990. In January 1990 Kerry criticized the Tampa plea agreement and its 14 million dollar forfeiture as insufficient, and the subcommittee published a report on drug money laundering that raised BCCI's alleged secret ownership of [[First American Bank|First American]]. After the [[Bank of England]] closed BCCI on July 5, 1991, the investigation resumed with Brown as ranking member; its staff, the report recorded, amounted to "two attorneys, with no budget for travel."[^2]
+In the spring of 1989 Kerry authorized the subcommittee's departing counsel, [[Jack Blum]], to give what he had developed to the Justice Department; when, in Blum's view, the department failed to follow up, he took it to the Manhattan District Attorney, [[Robert Morgenthau]], whose investigation was "based in substantial part on the leads provided him by Blum and the Subcommittee." Kerry's personal staff continued the inquiry through 1989 and 1990. In January 1990 Kerry criticized the Tampa plea agreement and its 14 million dollar forfeiture as insufficient, and the subcommittee published a report on drug money laundering that raised BCCI's alleged secret ownership of [[First American Bank|First American]]. After the [[Bank of England]] closed BCCI on July 5, 1991, the investigation resumed with Brown as ranking member; its staff, the report recorded, amounted, in the committee's electronic text, to "two attorneys, with no budget for travel"; the Government Printing Office edition instead says that staffing constraints in the offices of the senators involved hampered the investigation of BCCI's activities outside the [[United States]].[^2][^3]
+
+The printed chapter 2 adds that the Foreign Relations Committee authorized the investigation on May 23, 1991 without dissent, that Brown and his staff then joined Kerry's, and that the Justice Department's information from Blum in the spring of 1989 consisted of some 16 hours of interviews with two informants taped by the Tampa prosecutors' office. In July 1990 hearings were postponed after BCCI's attorneys and the Justice Department told staff that the witnesses requested, including [[Robert Altman]], would decline to testify. The subcommittee held public hearings on August 1, 2 and 8, October 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and November 21, 1991, and on February 19, March 18, May 14 and July 30, 1992, with a closed hearing on October 31, 1991. In Brown's separate statement (pp. 20-21) he credits Kerry with an investigation that no other committee of the Senate conducted.[^3]
 
 ### Structure
 
-The report was published in chapters: an executive summary; an introduction; "The Origin and Early Years of BCCI"; "BCCI's Criminality"; "BCCI's Relationship with Foreign Governments, Central Banks, and International Organizations"; two chapters on BCCI in the [[United States]], covering the takeovers of [[Financial General Bankshares]] and the [[National Bank of Georgia]] and their consolidation; two on law enforcement, "The Justice Department and the US Customs Service" and "District Attorney of New York"; "BCCI and Its Accountants"; "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence"; "The Regulators"; "Clark Clifford and Robert Altman"; "Abu Dhabi: BCCI's Founding and Majority Stockholders"; "[[Mohammed Hammoud]]: BCCI's Flexible Frontman"; "BCCI And Georgia Politicians"; "BCCI's Lawyers and Lobbyists"; "Hill and Knowlton and BCCI's PR Campaign"; "[[Ed Rogers]] and Kamal Adham"; "BCCI and [[Kissinger Associates]]"; "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering"; "Legislative and Policy Recommendations"; and an appendix of matters for further investigation.[^3]
+The report was published in chapters: an executive summary; an introduction; "The Origin and Early Years of BCCI"; "BCCI's Criminality"; "BCCI's Relationship with Foreign Governments, Central Banks, and International Organizations"; two chapters on BCCI in the United States, covering the takeovers of [[Financial General Bankshares]] and the [[National Bank of Georgia]] and their consolidation; two on law enforcement, "The Justice Department and the US Customs Service" and "District Attorney of New York"; "BCCI and Its Accountants"; "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence"; "The Regulators"; "Clark Clifford and Robert Altman"; "Abu Dhabi: BCCI's Founding and Majority Stockholders"; "[[Mohammed Hammoud]]: BCCI's Flexible Frontman"; "BCCI And Georgia Politicians"; "BCCI's Lawyers and Lobbyists"; "Hill and Knowlton and BCCI's PR Campaign"; "[[Ed Rogers]] and Kamal Adham"; "BCCI and [[Kissinger Associates]]"; "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering"; "Legislative and Policy Recommendations"; and an appendix of matters for further investigation.[^4]
 
 ### Principal Findings
 
 The executive summary set out sixteen findings. It concluded that BCCI "constituted international financial crime on a massive and global scale," its "unique criminal structure," which it called "an elaborate corporate spider-web" with [[Agha Hasan Abedi]] and [[Swaleh Naqvi]] "in the middle," having been conceived "for the specific purpose of evading regulation or control by governments." It listed BCCI's crimes as including fraud involving billions of dollars, money laundering in Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas, bribery, "support of terrorism, arms trafficking, and the sale of nuclear technologies," management of prostitution, tax evasion, smuggling, illegal immigration, and "illicit purchases of banks and real estate." It found that BCCI "systematically bribed world leaders and political figures" in most of the 73 countries in which it operated, and named more than thirty countries where its relationships ranged "from the questionable, to the improper, to the fully corrupt."[^1]
 
-Money laundering: BCCI provided specialized services for laundering drug proceeds, including those of [[Medellín Cartel|Medellín]] traffickers in [[Colombia]], using shell corporations, secrecy havens, front men and nominees, and back-to-back documentation among its own entities.[^1][^4] Its former American regional manager, [[Abdur Sakhia]], testified that when BCCI bought a bank in Colombia in 1983, "we knew that all the dollar deposits we would be getting would be drug money."[^5]
+Money laundering: BCCI provided specialized services for laundering drug proceeds, including those of [[Medellín Cartel|Medellín]] traffickers in [[Colombia]], using shell corporations, secrecy havens, front men and nominees, and back-to-back documentation among its own entities.[^1][^5] Its former American regional manager, [[Abdur Sakhia]], testified that when BCCI bought a bank in Colombia in 1983, "we knew that all the dollar deposits we would be getting would be drug money."[^6]
 
-Arms dealing and terrorist financing: BCCI provided financial services to arms dealers and to the [[Abu Nidal]] organization, whose accounts at its Sloane Street branch in London were reported to British and American intelligence by the branch manager, [[Ghassan Qassem]].[^5]
+Arms dealing and terrorist financing: BCCI provided financial services to arms dealers and to the [[Abu Nidal]] organization, whose accounts at its Sloane Street branch in London were reported to British and American intelligence by the branch manager, [[Ghassan Qassem]].[^6]
 
-Noriega accounts: BCCI managed some 23 million dollars of Noriega's money from its London branches and helped him move it out of reach after his indictments, laundering part of it through its commodities affiliate [[Capcom]].[^5][^6]
+Noriega accounts: BCCI managed some 23 million dollars of Noriega's money from its London branches and helped him move it out of reach after his indictments, laundering part of it through its commodities affiliate [[Capcom]].[^6][^7]
 
-First American: BCCI secretly acquired First American, the Washington bank holding company, through nominee shareholders led by [[Kamal Adham]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and [[Robert Altman]] as its chairman and president and as BCCI's lawyers. The report found that Clifford and Altman "participated in improprieties with BCCI in the United States."[^1][^7]
+First American: BCCI secretly acquired First American, the Washington bank holding company, through nominee shareholders led by [[Kamal Adham]], with [[Clark Clifford]] and Robert Altman as its chairman and president and as BCCI's lawyers. The report found that Clifford and Altman "participated in improprieties with BCCI in the United States."[^1][^8]
 
-Iraq: the report's appendix recorded that BCCI "also made loans to Iraq, although of a substantially smaller nature" than those of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]], and listed the relationship among matters whose further investigation "could produce further understanding of [[Saddam Hussein]]'s international network for acquiring weapons."[^8]
+Iraq: the report's appendix recorded that BCCI "also made loans to Iraq, although of a substantially smaller nature" than those of the [[Banca Nazionale del Lavoro]], and listed the relationship among matters whose further investigation "could produce further understanding of [[Saddam Hussein]]'s international network for acquiring weapons."[^9]
 
 ### DOJ Obstruction Finding
 
-The report found that "the Justice Department mishandled its investigation and prosecution of BCCI." Customs officials had told Commissioner [[William von Raab]] by March 1988 that several BCCI officers were indictable under the racketeering statute, and Tampa prosecutors planned in April and May 1988 to indict BCCI as an institution, but in the fall of 1988 the department did not approve a RICO prosecution, "for reasons that were never explained to the Customs agents." The report found that after a recorded conversation in which Awan described BCCI's secret ownership of First American, prosecutors made "no effort to broaden the case against BCCI," with no attempt to interview Clifford or Altman. The January 1990 plea agreement, negotiated with BCCI's lawyers, the former federal prosecutors [[Lawrence Wechsler]] and [[E. Lawrence Barcella Jr.]], was decided by the United States Attorney in Tampa, [[Robert Genzman]]; the report found that it "kept BCCI alive," discouraged BCCI's officers from telling what they knew, and was followed by the department's ceasing to investigate BCCI entirely.[^1][^4]
+The report found that "the Justice Department mishandled its investigation and prosecution of BCCI." Customs officials had told Commissioner [[William von Raab]] by March 1988 that several BCCI officers were indictable under the racketeering statute, and Tampa prosecutors planned in April and May 1988 to indict BCCI as an institution, but in the fall of 1988 the department did not approve a RICO prosecution, "for reasons that were never explained to the Customs agents." The report found that after a recorded conversation in which Awan described BCCI's secret ownership of First American, prosecutors made "no effort to broaden the case against BCCI," with no attempt to interview Clifford or Altman. The January 1990 plea agreement, negotiated with BCCI's lawyers, the former federal prosecutors [[Lawrence Wechsler]] and [[E. Lawrence Barcella Jr.]], was decided by the United States Attorney in Tampa, [[Robert Genzman]]; the report found that it "kept BCCI alive," discouraged BCCI's officers from telling what they knew, and was followed by the department's ceasing to investigate BCCI entirely.[^1][^5]
 
-The report contrasted the department with Morgenthau's office, which obtained the Price Waterhouse audits despite resistance from BCCI's lawyers and accountants, the Bank of England, the British [[Serious Fraud Office]] and the Justice Department. It stated that the Justice Department's prosecutors "regarded Blum as a 'wacko'" while "the New York District Attorney's office took it seriously, investigated it, and proved it out," and concluded that Morgenthau "not only broke the case on BCCI, but indirectly brought about BCCI's global closure": "the pressure from a single, local prosecutor's office that would not relent when it found evidence of global criminality, proved sufficient to shut down a $23 billion criminal bank operating in some 73 countries."[^1][^9]
+The report contrasted the department with Morgenthau's office, which obtained the Price Waterhouse audits despite resistance from BCCI's lawyers and accountants, the Bank of England, the British [[Serious Fraud Office]] and the Justice Department. It stated that the Justice Department's prosecutors "regarded Blum as a 'wacko'" while "the New York District Attorney's office took it seriously, investigated it, and proved it out," and concluded that Morgenthau "not only broke the case on BCCI, but indirectly brought about BCCI's global closure": "the pressure from a single, local prosecutor's office that would not relent when it found evidence of global criminality, proved sufficient to shut down a $23 billion criminal bank operating in some 73 countries."[^1][^10]
 
 ### CIA Connections
 
-The report's chapter on intelligence recorded that the CIA first developed information on BCCI in 1979, learned in the early 1980s that it was involved in money laundering, targeted it for intelligence collection from the mid-1980s, and ran "a larger and more comprehensive operation as of 1986, which continued through 1990," producing several hundred reports on the bank. Acting Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] testified on October 25, 1991, that the CIA had also used BCCI for intelligence-gathering, which he "characterized... as limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI"; a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit, the subcommittee was told, confirmed that testimony, though the CIA did not allow the subcommittee to read it. Kerr acknowledged that the CIA "had made extensive use of First American for a variety of purposes." He testified that the agency had not been involved with any BCCI "black network," had no knowledge of any use of BCCI for arms sales to Iran or the diversion of funds to the [[Contras]], had no relationship with Agha Hasan Abedi, and had never placed Abedi on a watch list.[^10]
+The report's chapter on intelligence recorded that the CIA first developed information on BCCI in 1979, learned in the early 1980s that it was involved in money laundering, targeted it for intelligence collection from the mid-1980s, and ran "a larger and more comprehensive operation as of 1986, which continued through 1990," producing several hundred reports on the bank. Acting Director [[Richard J. Kerr]] testified on October 25, 1991, that the CIA had also used BCCI for intelligence-gathering, which he "characterized... as limited and routine, and undertaken without the knowledge of any person at BCCI"; a [[Senate Select Committee on Intelligence|Senate Intelligence Committee]] audit, the subcommittee was told, confirmed that testimony, though the CIA did not allow the subcommittee to read it. Kerr acknowledged that the CIA "had made extensive use of First American for a variety of purposes"; the report adds that First American served as a repository for "normal banking" and savings accounts, a fact the subcommittee had learned the day before from Altman, and that the CIA's early 1985 report on BCCI was missing and was reconstructed.[^11] He testified that the agency had not been involved with any BCCI "black network," had no knowledge of any use of BCCI for arms sales to Iran or the diversion of funds to the [[Contras]], had no relationship with Agha Hasan Abedi, and had never placed Abedi on a watch list.[^12]
 
-The report identified two CIA mistakes on the agency's own account: it "failed to provide the critical information it had gathered to the correct users of the information," the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department, and it used both BCCI and First American for its operations "even when the CIA knew that BCCI was as an institution a fundamentally corrupt criminal enterprise." Kerr said he was "not sure it was a bad decision," and Brown replied: "My training was that somebody's supposed to take responsibility... I have a different view of it."[^10]
+The report identified two CIA mistakes on the agency's own account: it "failed to provide the critical information it had gathered to the correct users of the information," the Federal Reserve and the Justice Department, and it used both BCCI and First American for its operations "even when the CIA knew that BCCI was as an institution a fundamentally corrupt criminal enterprise." Kerr said he was "not sure it was a bad decision," and Brown replied: "My training was that somebody's supposed to take responsibility... I have a different view of it."[^12]
 
-The report recorded without adopting them two further claims. On February 23, 1992, NBC News broadcast an allegation that the former [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[William J. Casey]], had met Abedi secretly every few months for three years at the Madison Hotel in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] to discuss arms deals with Iran and the arming of the Afghan rebels; the CIA told NBC that a search of its files had found no such evidence. On Afghanistan, the report stated only that BCCI "may have been moving money through the National Bank of Oman to fund the war in Afghanistan," quoting unnamed British journalists who cited a member of the cabinet of General [[Zia ul-Haq]], reported in *[[The Wall Street Journal]]* of October 23, 1991, as saying "It was Arab money that was pouring through BCCI"; BCCI owned 29 percent of the National Bank of Oman. The report found that BCCI was "incontestably used by key Iran/Contra figures to finance arms," including [[Adnan Khashoggi]] and [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], regardless of whether Casey and Abedi concluded any "off-the-books" operation.[^10] It concluded that "key questions about the relationship between U.S. intelligence and BCCI cannot be answered at this time, and may never be answered," because [[Abu Dhabi]] held BCCI's records and witnesses, a British judge had barred the subcommittee from documents without the permission of depositors such as Abu Nidal, and other documents had been "segregated and sealed by British intelligence (MI-5)."[^10]
+The report recorded without adopting them two further claims. On February 23, 1992, NBC News broadcast an allegation that the former [[Director of Central Intelligence]], [[William J. Casey]], had met Abedi secretly every few months for three years at the Madison Hotel in [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] to discuss arms deals with Iran and the arming of the Afghan rebels; the CIA told NBC that a search of its files had found no such evidence. On Afghanistan, the report stated only that BCCI "may have been moving money through the National Bank of Oman to fund the war in Afghanistan," quoting unnamed British journalists who cited a member of the cabinet of General [[Zia ul-Haq]], reported in *[[The Wall Street Journal]]* of October 23, 1991, as saying "It was Arab money that was pouring through BCCI"; BCCI owned 29 percent of the National Bank of Oman. The report found that BCCI was "incontestably used by key Iran/Contra figures to finance arms," including [[Adnan Khashoggi]] and [[Manucher Ghorbanifar]], regardless of whether Casey and Abedi concluded any "off-the-books" operation.[^12] It concluded that "key questions about the relationship between U.S. intelligence and BCCI cannot be answered at this time, and may never be answered," because [[Abu Dhabi]] held BCCI's records and witnesses, a British judge had barred the subcommittee from documents without the permission of depositors such as Abu Nidal, and other documents had been "segregated and sealed by British intelligence (MI-5)."[^12]
 
 ### Regulators and Accountants
 
-The report found that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] would not have approved the 1981 takeover of Financial General Bankshares "but for the false statements made to it," and that the Bank of England's regulation of BCCI "was wholly inadequate" and that it withheld information about BCCI's frauds "for fifteen months" before the closure; it called the Bank's tentative agreement to restructure BCCI as three banks "extraordinarily poor judgment" and its decision to let BCCI move its records to Abu Dhabi "a costly, and likely irretrievable, error."[^1][^11] It found that BCCI's auditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], "failed to protect BCCI's innocent depositors and creditors from the consequences of poor practices at the bank of which the auditors were aware for years," and recorded that the Bank of England allowed the Federal Reserve to give Congress Price Waterhouse's final report, the [[Sandstorm Report]], only in censored form.[^1][^5]
+The report found that the [[Federal Reserve Board|Federal Reserve]] would not have approved the 1981 takeover of Financial General Bankshares "but for the false statements made to it," and that the Bank of England's regulation of BCCI "was wholly inadequate" and that it withheld information about BCCI's frauds "for fifteen months" before the closure; it called the Bank's tentative agreement to restructure BCCI as three banks "extraordinarily poor judgment" and its decision to let BCCI move its records to Abu Dhabi "a costly, and likely irretrievable, error."[^1][^13] It found that BCCI's auditors, [[Price Waterhouse]], "failed to protect BCCI's innocent depositors and creditors from the consequences of poor practices at the bank of which the auditors were aware for years," and recorded that the Bank of England allowed the Federal Reserve to give Congress Price Waterhouse's final report, the [[Sandstorm Report]], only in censored form.[^1][^6]
+
+### Noriega's accounts
+
+Chapter 5 states that Noriega opened an account in the name of the Panamanian Defense Forces in early 1982, that it held about $25 million at its height, and that [[Alauddin Shaikh]] flew to Panama two to three times a year until 1985, according to [[Nazir Chinoy]]. After the February 1988 indictment Noriega told BCCI to move the funds; in July 1988, when BCCI learned of the subcommittee's subpoena, about $23 million moved through the trading accounts of Capcom.[^14]
 
 ### Reception
 
-Presenting the British inquiry into the Bank of England's supervision of BCCI, the [[Bingham Report]], to the House of Commons on October 22, 1992, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, [[Norman Lamont]], said: "I do not accept the findings of Senator Kerry's report. He did not have access to the documents to which Lord Justice Bingham had access and he did not take evidence from the Bank of England. I believe that some wild and incorrect allegations were made in that report."[^12]
+Presenting the British inquiry into the Bank of England's supervision of BCCI, the [[Bingham Report]], to the House of Commons on October 22, 1992, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, [[Norman Lamont]], said: "I do not accept the findings of Senator Kerry's report. He did not have access to the documents to which Lord Justice Bingham had access and he did not take evidence from the Bank of England. I believe that some wild and incorrect allegations were made in that report."[^15]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Kerry, John, and Hank Brown. *The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* Senate Print 102-140. 102nd Congress, 2nd Session. December 1992, ch. 1, "Executive Summary." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/01exec.htm
 [^2]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 2, "Introduction and Summary of Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
-[^3]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* chapter index. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/
+[^3]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140 (GPO print), ch. 2, pp. 17-21. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003 ; electronic text of ch. 2, https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/02intro.htm
-[^4]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the US Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
+[^4]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* chapter index. https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/
-[^5]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm
+[^5]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 8, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: The Justice Department and the US Customs Service." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/08just.htm
-[^6]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 21, "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/21capcom.htm
+[^6]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 4, "BCCI's Criminality." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/04crime.htm
-[^7]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 13, "Clark Clifford and Robert Altman." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/13clifford.htm
+[^7]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 21, "Capcom: A Case Study of Money Laundering." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/21capcom.htm
-[^8]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 24, "Appendix: Matters for Further Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/24appendic.htm
+[^8]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 13, "Clark Clifford and Robert Altman." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/13clifford.htm
-[^9]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 9, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: District Attorney of New York." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/09ny.htm
+[^9]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 24, "Appendix: Matters for Further Investigation." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/24appendic.htm
-[^10]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 11, "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
+[^10]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 9, "BCCI and Law Enforcement: District Attorney of New York." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/09ny.htm
-[^11]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
+[^11]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 11, pp. 292-293 and 324. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
-[^12]: House of Commons, "BCCI (Bingham Report)," *Hansard,* October 22, 1992. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/oct/22/bcci-bingham-report
+[^12]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 11, "BCCI, The CIA and Foreign Intelligence." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/11intel.htm
+[^13]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair,* ch. 12, "The Regulators." https://irp.fas.org/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/12reg.htm
+[^14]: Kerry and Brown, *The BCCI Affair*, S. Prt. 102-140, ch. 5, pp. 108-109. https://archive.org/details/thebcciaffair_202003
+[^15]: House of Commons, "BCCI (Bingham Report)," *Hansard,* October 22, 1992. https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1992/oct/22/bcci-bingham-report

40 - EVENTS/INTELLIGENCE_SCANDALS/Operation NORTHWOODS.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-10-12
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: Operation NORTHWOODS
 aliases:
   - Northwoods
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Killing of Americans: The document explicitly contemplated staging incidents in
 
 ### Rejection
 
-On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention."[^6]On March 5, 1962 the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, wrote to General Craig with the request, under the subject "Operation MONGOOSE." The Joint Chiefs' memorandum takes "cognizance of a suggested course of action proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area," citing a March 8, 1962 memorandum from the chief of naval operations to the Joint Chiefs titled "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)."[^7] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^8]
+On March 6, 1962 Edward Lansdale, chief of operations of Operation Mongoose, wrote to [[Richard Goodwin]], deputy assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, that Secretary of State [[Dean Rusk]] had spoken at the March 5 meeting of "other tracks" which might be opened for the United States to achieve its objective, and that he was asking the Defense representative, General Craig, "to give me a brief but precise description of pretexts which the JCS believes desirable if a decision is ultimately made to use direct military intervention." He asked State for a companion statement of the pretexts State believed desirable. According to the letter, Rusk's remarks at the meeting included a joking reference to a "Bay of Pigs" in, perhaps, Guatemala, as a notional clandestine action for which "they" could be blamed, and General Taylor had asked Lansdale to report on the alternate "tracks," among other things, to the Special Group Taylor chaired; Lansdale wrote that he intended to complete the report on Friday, March 9, and that he was acting "in response to direction."[^6] On March 5, 1962 the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, wrote to General Craig with the request, under the subject "Operation MONGOOSE." The Joint Chiefs' memorandum takes "cognizance of a suggested course of action proposed by the US Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area," citing a March 8, 1962 memorandum from the chief of naval operations to the Joint Chiefs titled "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)."[^7] The Joint Chiefs' memorandum of March 13 recommended that the paper be forwarded "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes." The paper (JCS 1969/321) rested on the premise that intervention "will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances," and a draft memorandum appended to it stated that a plan built from the suggestions "would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale."[^8]
 
 On March 16, 1962 President Kennedy met with [[John A. McCone]], General [[Maxwell Taylor]], [[Roswell Gilpatric]], Attorney General [[Robert F. Kennedy]], [[McGeorge Bundy]] and Lemnitzer to discuss the Mongoose guidelines. [[U. Alexis Johnson]]'s handwritten note records that "The President also expressed skepticism that in so far as can now be foreseen circumstances will arise that would justify and make desirable the use of American forces for overt military action," and that "no decision was expressed or implied approving the use of such forces although contingency planning would proceed."[^9] On April 5, 1962 the Special Group concluded that Mongoose should re-examine its basic philosophy "with particular reference to the possibility of finding a pretext for early... intervention," and five days later (April 10) the Joint Chiefs answered yes to both questions put by General Maxwell Taylor, whether the United States should invade Cuba and whether it had the capacity to do so.[^10] At the April 11, 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), according to McCone's notes, the "JCS paper on pretext or provocative actions was discussed," and McCone wrote that "We should have and review this paper as it is considered to be a very thoughtful and useful document."[^11]
 

60 - PLACES/COUNTRIES/Saudi Arabia.md

@@ -12,36 +12,41 @@ Saudi Arabia was a source of funding for the [[Contras|Contra]] war that supplem
 
 The Saudi contributions to the Contra war were part of Oliver North's network of third-party funding sources that included private donors, foreign governments, and drug trafficking proceeds. When Congress passed the [[Boland Amendment]] cutting off military aid to the Contras, the administration turned to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and other sources to keep the war funded. The combination of Saudi money, Iranian arms sales proceeds, and cocaine trafficking revenue created a multi-source funding pipeline that operated outside congressional oversight.[^2]
 
+Walsh recorded that Saudi Arabia donated $32 million between July 1984 and March 1985, and that [[Taiwan]] contributed $2 million in September 1985 and February 1986.[^3] The congressional committees wrote that a Middle Eastern country had contributed $32 million before North's memorandum to McFarlane on third-country funding, and referred to the donor as "Country 2." McFarlane testified that he told President Ronald Reagan of the first contribution in June 1984 by a note in the President's briefing book, and that Reagan answered "Good, let's just make sure it stays that way."[^4] At the [[National Security Planning Group]] meeting of June 25, 1984, [[William J. Casey]] told the group that the CIA could "provide direct assistance to help the FDN get the money they need from third countries," and [[Robert McFarlane]] proposed that "there be no authority for anyone to seek third party support for the anti-Sandinistas until we have the information we need."[^5]
+
 ### Saudi Nationals in American AI Companies
 
-On October 13, 2026 the Justice Department identified [[Abdulrahman Alfozan]], 35, as a Saudi national and an engineer at [[OpenAI]] who was charged with installing a recording device in an executive conference room in San Francisco.[^3] A post on X by the [[Smashi Business]] account on September 12, 2026 described him as "currently the only Saudi employee at OpenAI."[^4] On October 13, 2026 [[Scott Stedman]] wrote on X that Alfozan is a venture partner at [[RAED Ventures]], "which has received funding from Saudi government-backed entities," and that the firm also has a Saudi royal family member, [[Khalid bin Bader Al Saud]], as a venture partner.[^5]
+On October 13, 2026 the Justice Department identified [[Abdulrahman Alfozan]], 35, as a Saudi national and an engineer at [[OpenAI]] who was charged with installing a recording device in an executive conference room in San Francisco.[^6] A post on X by the [[Smashi Business]] account on September 12, 2026 described him as "currently the only Saudi employee at OpenAI."[^7] On October 13, 2026 [[Scott Stedman]] wrote on X that Alfozan is a venture partner at [[RAED Ventures]], "which has received funding from Saudi government-backed entities," and that the firm also has a Saudi royal family member, [[Khalid bin Bader Al Saud]], as a venture partner.[^8]
 
 ### Technology Competitions and Youth Programs
 
-In 2017 a national institution called the Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming and Drones (SAFCSP) was established. Its 2018 homepage places it "under the umbrella of the Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee."[^6] The federation ran the Hajj Hackathon, which Arab News reported in August 2018 as "the largest Hajj Hackathon for cyber security, programming and drones," an entry in the Guinness Book of Records.[^7] In 2020 it ran the Homathon, an online hackathon held April 19 to 25, with a total prize pool of $85,000.[^8] Abdulrahman Alfozan's LinkedIn profile lists first place in the Homathon.[^9] In October 2022 it co-organized the Tuwaiq Drone Challenge with the German Dronemasters Academy.[^10] Tuwaiq Academy, launched in August 2019 as an alliance between the federation and Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, runs its bootcamps.[^11]
+In 2017 a national institution called the Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming and Drones (SAFCSP) was established. Its 2018 homepage places it "under the umbrella of the Saudi Arabian Olympic Committee."[^9] The federation ran the Hajj Hackathon, which Arab News reported in August 2018 as "the largest Hajj Hackathon for cyber security, programming and drones," an entry in the Guinness Book of Records.[^10] In 2020 it ran the Homathon, an online hackathon held April 19 to 25, with a total prize pool of $85,000.[^11] Abdulrahman Alfozan's LinkedIn profile lists first place in the Homathon.[^12] In October 2022 it co-organized the Tuwaiq Drone Challenge with the German Dronemasters Academy.[^13] Tuwaiq Academy, launched in August 2019 as an alliance between the federation and Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, runs its bootcamps.[^14]
 
-The federation's chairman in April 2018 was [[Saud al-Qahtani]], identified as "Adviser at the Royal Court."[^7] Qahtani was fired as royal court adviser on October 20, 2018, in a royal order reported by Saudi state media, and the United States Treasury designated him on November 15, 2018 over the killing of [[Jamal Khashoggi]].[^12][^13]
+The federation's chairman in April 2018 was [[Saud al-Qahtani]], identified as "Adviser at the Royal Court."[^10] Qahtani was fired as royal court adviser on October 20, 2018, in a royal order reported by Saudi state media, and the United States Treasury designated him on November 15, 2018 over the killing of [[Jamal Khashoggi]].[^15][^16]
 
 ### Twitter Espionage Prosecution
 
-In November 2019 the United States charged two former Twitter employees, [[Ahmad Abouammo]] and [[Ali Alzabarah]], and a Saudi intermediary, [[Ahmed Almutairi]], with acting as agents of the kingdom without notice to the Attorney General, in the [[Twitter Saudi espionage case]]. The complaint alleges that Abouammo and Alzabarah obtained nonpublic account data on Twitter users critical of the Saudi government for officials of the kingdom, including an official whom the Ninth Circuit identifies as Bader Binasaker, a close associate of [[Mohammed bin Salman]] ([[Bader al-Asaker]]).[^14] Abouammo was convicted in August 2022 and sentenced to 42 months in prison; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions on December 4, 2024 and vacated the sentence, and on June 26, 2025 he was resentenced to time served.[^15][^16] On June 11, 2026 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment on the venue of the falsification count, holding that the trial for that count belonged in Seattle, and remanded the case.[^17]
+In November 2019 the United States charged two former Twitter employees, [[Ahmad Abouammo]] and [[Ali Alzabarah]], and a Saudi intermediary, [[Ahmed Almutairi]], with acting as agents of the kingdom without notice to the Attorney General, in the [[Twitter Saudi espionage case]]. The complaint alleges that Abouammo and Alzabarah obtained nonpublic account data on Twitter users critical of the Saudi government for officials of the kingdom, including an official whom the Ninth Circuit identifies as Bader Binasaker, a close associate of [[Mohammed bin Salman]] ([[Bader al-Asaker]]).[^17] Abouammo was convicted in August 2022 and sentenced to 42 months in prison; the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions on December 4, 2024 and vacated the sentence, and on June 26, 2025 he was resentenced to time served.[^18][^19] On June 11, 2026 the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the judgment on the venue of the falsification count, holding that the trial for that count belonged in Seattle, and remanded the case.[^20]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
 [^1]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
 [^2]: Webb, Gary. *Dark Alliance: The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion.* Seven Stories Press, 1998. Ch. 16.
-[^3]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Saudi National Arrested for Installing Surreptitious Audio Recording Device at OpenAI," October 13, 2026, press release 26-1173. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/saudi-national-arrested-installing-surreptitious-audio-recording-device-openai
+[^3]: Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (1993), vol. I, ch. 14. https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/walsh/chap_14.htm
-[^4]: Smashi Business, post on X, September 12, 2026. https://x.com/smashibusiness/status/2098758379091153118
+[^4]: Walsh, vol. I, ch. 1, n. 10; Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, H. Rept. 100-433 and S. Rept. 100-216 (1987), majority views, ch. 26, p. 404.
-[^5]: Scott Stedman, post on X, October 13, 2026. https://x.com/scottstedman/status/2110102749526573398
+[^5]: National Security Planning Group minutes, June 25, 1984, National Security Archive, EBB 210, document 2 (IC 00463), pp. 5 and 14. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/2-NSPG%20minutes%206-25-84%20(IC%2000463).pdf
-[^6]: Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming and Drones, English homepage, captured July 11, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180711041742/https://safcsp.org.sa/en
+[^6]: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, "Saudi National Arrested for Installing Surreptitious Audio Recording Device at OpenAI," October 13, 2026, press release 26-1173. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/saudi-national-arrested-installing-surreptitious-audio-recording-device-openai
-[^7]: Arab News, "Saudi-based Hajj Hackathon makes it to the Guinness Book of Records," August 2, 2018. https://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/saudi-based-hajj-hackathon-makes-it-to-the-guinness-book-of-records-1350066
+[^7]: Smashi Business, post on X, September 12, 2026. https://x.com/smashibusiness/status/2098758379091153118
-[^8]: Ajel (English), "SAFCSP launches Homathon Challenge Contest," undated, covering the launch in mid-April 2020. https://english.ajel.sa/news/safcsp-launches-homathon-challenge-contest
+[^8]: Scott Stedman, post on X, October 13, 2026. https://x.com/scottstedman/status/2110102749526573398
-[^9]: Abdulrahman Alfozan, LinkedIn profile, viewed October 13, 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/in/alfozan
+[^9]: Saudi Federation for Cybersecurity, Programming and Drones, English homepage, captured July 11, 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180711041742/https://safcsp.org.sa/en
-[^10]: Arab News, "Tuwaiq Drone Challenge hosts battle for innovative solutions," October 2022. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2177326
+[^10]: Arab News, "Saudi-based Hajj Hackathon makes it to the Guinness Book of Records," August 2, 2018. https://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/saudi-based-hajj-hackathon-makes-it-to-the-guinness-book-of-records-1350066
-[^11]: Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Endowments Company, "Tuwaiq Academy," English page, retrieved October 13, 2026. https://pnu.edu.sa/en/Departments/Endowments/Pages/TuwaiqAcademy.aspx
+[^11]: Ajel (English), "SAFCSP launches Homathon Challenge Contest," undated, covering the launch in mid-April 2020. https://english.ajel.sa/news/safcsp-launches-homathon-challenge-contest
-[^12]: Al Jazeera, "Who is Saud al-Qahtani, the fired Saudi royal court adviser?," October 20, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/saud-al-qahtani-fired-saudi-royal-court-adviser-181020125449478.html
+[^12]: Abdulrahman Alfozan, LinkedIn profile, viewed October 13, 2026. https://www.linkedin.com/in/alfozan
-[^13]: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release sm547, November 15, 2018. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm547
+[^13]: Arab News, "Tuwaiq Drone Challenge hosts battle for innovative solutions," October 2022. https://www.arabnews.com/node/2177326
-[^14]: Criminal complaint and affidavit of FBI Special Agent Letitia Wu, United States v. Abouammo, No. 3:19-mj-71824-MAG (N.D. Cal., filed November 5, 2019). https://justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1215836/download
+[^14]: Princess Nourah bint Abdulrahman University, Endowments Company, "Tuwaiq Academy," English page, retrieved October 13, 2026. https://pnu.edu.sa/en/Departments/Endowments/Pages/TuwaiqAcademy.aspx
-[^15]: United States v. Abouammo, 122 F.4th 1072, No. 22-10348 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024). https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/04/22-10348.pdf
+[^15]: Al Jazeera, "Who is Saud al-Qahtani, the fired Saudi royal court adviser?," October 20, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/saud-al-qahtani-fired-saudi-royal-court-adviser-181020125449478.html
-[^16]: Minute entry for resentencing (Dkt. 484, June 26, 2025), United States v. Abouammo, No. 3:19-cr-00621-EMC (N.D. Cal.). https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.351689/gov.uscourts.cand.351689.484.0.pdf
+[^16]: U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release sm547, November 15, 2018. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm547
-[^17]: Abouammo v. United States, 608 U.S. 597, No. 25-5146 (U.S. June 11, 2026). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/608us2r46_2c8f.pdf
+[^17]: Criminal complaint and affidavit of FBI Special Agent Letitia Wu, United States v. Abouammo, No. 3:19-mj-71824-MAG (N.D. Cal., filed November 5, 2019). https://justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1215836/download
+[^18]: United States v. Abouammo, 122 F.4th 1072, No. 22-10348 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024). https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/12/04/22-10348.pdf
+[^19]: Minute entry for resentencing (Dkt. 484, June 26, 2025), United States v. Abouammo, No. 3:19-cr-00621-EMC (N.D. Cal.). https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.351689/gov.uscourts.cand.351689.484.0.pdf
+[^20]: Abouammo v. United States, 608 U.S. 597, No. 25-5146 (U.S. June 11, 2026). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/608us2r46_2c8f.pdf

60 - PLACES/MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS/JM-WAVE.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 created: 2026-05-15
-updated: 2026-10-09
+updated: 2026-10-14
 title: JM/WAVE
 aliases:
   - JM WAVE
@@ -15,25 +15,25 @@ tags:
   - ColdWar
   - 1960s
 category: "Military Installation"
-summary: "CIA's Miami station from 1961 under the cover of Zenith Technical Enterprises at the University of Miami's South Campus, which employed over 400 CIA officers at its Mongoose peak."
+summary: "CIA's Miami station from 1961 under the cover of Zenith Technical Enterprises at the University of Miami's South Campus, which with Task Force W employed approximately 400 people at its Mongoose peak."
 start: 1961
 end: 1968
 location: "University of Miami South Campus, Coral Gables, Florida"
 ---
 
-JM/WAVE was the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s clandestine station in Miami, Florida, established in 1961 in the aftermath of the [[Bay of Pigs|Bay of Pigs invasion]] to serve as the operational headquarters for anti-[[Fidel Castro|Castro]] covert actions. At its peak during [[Operation Mongoose]] in 1962, the station employed over 400 CIA officers and had several thousand [[Cuba|Cuban]] exile agents on its payroll, making it temporarily the second-largest CIA station worldwide after headquarters in Langley, Virginia.[^1]
+JM/WAVE was the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s clandestine station in Miami, Florida, established in 1961 in the aftermath of the [[Bay of Pigs|Bay of Pigs invasion]] to serve as the operational headquarters for anti-[[Fidel Castro|Castro]] covert actions. At its peak during [[Operation Mongoose]] in 1962, Task Force W employed approximately 400 people at CIA headquarters and the Miami station,[^1] and the station had several thousand [[Cuba|Cuban]] exile agents on its payroll, making it temporarily the second-largest CIA station worldwide after headquarters in Langley, Virginia.[^2]
 
 ### Establishment and Cover
 
 JM/WAVE was physically located at the University of Miami's South Campus in Coral Gables, occupying a cluster of buildings under the commercial cover of "Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc." The cover company appeared in the Miami business directory and conducted enough legitimate business activity to support the fiction. The station also maintained a network of front companies that operated boats, aircraft, and commercial vehicles used in operational support.
 
-The station was one component of a broader Miami-area anti-Castro infrastructure that included multiple Cuban exile organizations, paramilitary training facilities throughout South Florida and elsewhere, and maritime and air assets for clandestine operations against Cuba.[^1]
+The station was one component of a broader Miami-area anti-Castro infrastructure that included multiple Cuban exile organizations, paramilitary training facilities throughout South Florida and elsewhere, and maritime and air assets for clandestine operations against Cuba.[^2]
 
 ### The Shackley Era
 
-[[Ted Shackley]], who later became one of the CIA's most consequential officers in Southeast Asia and [[Latin America]], served as JM/WAVE chief from approximately 1962 to 1965. Shackley had previously worked under [[William Harvey]] in [[Berlin]] and was assigned to Miami when Harvey was chief of [[Task Force W]], the CIA component of Mongoose.[^2] Harvey was appointed to Task Force W in early 1962; the Mongoose titles are the CIA project officer role and the Task Force W command.[^3] When Harvey was removed from operational control of Cuba operations in January 1963, when [[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced him as chief of Task Force W,[^2] Shackley continued as station chief through the period of Mongoose's wind-down and the subsequent reduced covert operations period.
+[[Ted Shackley]], who later became one of the CIA's most consequential officers in Southeast Asia and [[Latin America]], served as JM/WAVE chief from approximately 1962 to 1965. Shackley had previously worked under [[William Harvey]] in [[Berlin]] and was assigned to Miami when Harvey was chief of [[Task Force W]], the CIA component of Mongoose.[^3] Harvey was appointed to Task Force W in early 1962; the Mongoose titles are the CIA project officer role and the Task Force W command.[^4] When Harvey was removed from operational control of Cuba operations in January 1963, when [[Desmond FitzGerald]] replaced him as chief of Task Force W,[^3] Shackley continued as station chief through the period of Mongoose's wind-down and the subsequent reduced covert operations period.
 
-Under Shackley, JM/WAVE operated extensive maritime raiding teams (the "cowboys," as station personnel called them) that conducted boat raids against Cuban coastal targets, intelligence collection missions along the Cuban coast, and infiltration/exfiltration operations for agents inside Cuba. The station also coordinated with the large and fractious Cuban exile community in Miami, attempting to channel exile groups' energy into CIA-directed operations while managing the political conflicts among exile factions.[^1]
+Under Shackley, JM/WAVE operated extensive maritime raiding teams (the "cowboys," as station personnel called them) that conducted boat raids against Cuban coastal targets, intelligence collection missions along the Cuban coast, and infiltration/exfiltration operations for agents inside Cuba. The station also coordinated with the large and fractious Cuban exile community in Miami, attempting to channel exile groups' energy into CIA-directed operations while managing the political conflicts among exile factions.[^2]
 
 ### Operations
 
@@ -45,17 +45,18 @@ Intelligence collection: Cuban refugees arriving in Miami were systematically de
 
 Exile organizational management: The station provided funding and direction to multiple Cuban exile groups including the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FRD) and its successor the [[Cuban Revolutionary Council]], [[Brigade 2506]]'s survivors, and various smaller organizations. Managing competing exile factions and their political agendas within CIA operational requirements was a persistent challenge.
 
-Assassination planning: The CIA-organized crime assassination plots against Castro, run through [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]] by Harvey, were coordinated at least in part through JM/WAVE's Miami presence.[^1]
+Assassination planning: The CIA-organized crime assassination plots against Castro, run through [[Johnny Roselli]] and [[Sam Giancana]] by Harvey, were coordinated at least in part through JM/WAVE's Miami presence.[^2]
 
 ### Wind-Down
 
 Following the [[Cuban Missile Crisis|October 1962 Missile Crisis]], Operation Mongoose was suspended and the no-invasion pledge reduced the strategic rationale for large-scale covert operations against Cuba. JM/WAVE continued in a reduced capacity through the mid-1960s. Shackley left in 1965 for [[Laos]], where he commanded the CIA's covert war against the [[Pathet Lao]] and [[North Vietnam|North Vietnamese]]. The station was formally closed in 1968 as the Cuba threat receded from the top of U.S. intelligence priorities.
 
-Many of the Cuban exile personnel trained and organized through JM/WAVE remained in the CIA network for years afterward. Some appeared in later operations, including the [[Watergate]] burglary (the "plumbers" included several veterans of the anti-Castro operations) and, according to various accounts, in aspects of Central American operations in the 1970s and 1980s.[^4]
+Many of the Cuban exile personnel trained and organized through JM/WAVE remained in the CIA network for years afterward. Some appeared in later operations, including the [[Watergate]] burglary (the "plumbers" included several veterans of the anti-Castro operations) and, according to various accounts, in aspects of Central American operations in the 1970s and 1980s.[^5]
 
 ### Footnotes
 
-[^1]: Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994. Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
+[^1]: Church Committee (U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities), *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, S. Rept. 94-465 (1975), p. 140. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^2]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 86-87 and pp. 153-155. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
+[^2]: Corn, David. *Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades.* Simon & Schuster, 1994. Thomas, Evan. *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA.* Simon & Schuster, 1995.
-[^3]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10 (October 8, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10, and vol. X, doc. 323 (April 10, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
+[^3]: Church Committee, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders: An Interim Report*, S. Rept. 94-465, November 20, 1975, pp. 86-87 and pp. 153-155. https://archive.org/details/allegedassassina00unit
-[^4]: Shackley, Theodore, and Richard A. Finney. *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA.* Potomac Books, 2005. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network.* Carroll & Graf, 2005.
+[^4]: *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XI, doc. 10 (October 8, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d10, and vol. X, doc. 323 (April 10, 1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v10/d323
+[^5]: Shackley, Theodore, and Richard A. Finney. *Spymaster: My Life in the CIA.* Potomac Books, 2005. Trento, Joseph. *Prelude to Terror: The Rogue CIA and the Legacy of America's Private Intelligence Network.* Carroll & Graf, 2005.

70 - DISPATCHES/2026-10-14 Very Tightly Held.md

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+---
+title: "Very Tightly Held"
+date: 2026-10-14
+status: published
+summary: "In September 1986 Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin offered Oliver North Soviet-bloc arms and a seized PLO shipment for the Contras; Poindexter called it a private deal 'that we bless.'"
+entities:
+  - "[[Yitzhak Rabin]]"
+  - "[[Oliver North]]"
+  - "[[John Poindexter]]"
+  - "[[Richard Secord]]"
+  - "[[Shimon Peres]]"
+  - "[[Contras]]"
+  - "[[Iran-Contra Affair]]"
+tags:
+  - IranContra
+  - Israel
+  - Contras
+  - ArmsTrafficking
+---
+# Very Tightly Held
+
+In May 1986 Israeli Defense Minister [[Yitzhak Rabin]] offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the [[Contras]]' southern front. In September he and [[Oliver North]] met again. According to North's notes, Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for Sov Bloc weaps and ammo he could make avail," and asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. North said it was in Lisbon. Rabin suggested that it dock at [[Haifa]] and "have it filled w/ whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea."[^1]
+
+[[John Poindexter]] answered: "I think you should go ahead and make it happen. It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless." He later wrote that "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15 North told Poindexter that "orders were passed to the ship this morning to proceed to Haifa to pick up the arms. Loading will be accomplished by Israeli military personnel."[^1]
+
+Briefing President [[Ronald Reagan]] for a visit by Prime Minister [[Shimon Peres]], North wrote that Peres might raise the transfer of Soviet-bloc arms by the Israelis "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance," and recommended: "If Peres raises this issue, it would be helpful if the President thanked him since the Israelis hold considerable stores of bloc ordinance compatible with what the Nicaraguan resistance now uses." Next to that sentence Poindexter penciled: "Rabin. Very tightly held."[^2]
+
+On the night of February 4, 1987, Rabin called the Senate intelligence committee's report on the Iran arms sales "highly inaccurate," said it "reached the wrong conclusions regarding Israel's role," and said he had personally rejected an appeal by a ranking White House aide for Israel to become involved with the Contras in any way.[^3]
+
+[^1]: U.S. Congress, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, S. Rept. 100-216 / H. Rept. 100-433 (November 1987), ch. 3, p. 75.
+[^2]: *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair*, ch. 3, pp. 75-76.
+[^3]: "Rabin Rejects Senate Report," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, February 6, 1987. https://www.jta.org/archive/rabin-rejects-senate-report